The economics and institutional economics of wildlife on private land in Africa

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The economics and institutional economics of wildlife on private land in Africa
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Child, Brian A.
Musengezi, Jessica
Parent, Gregory D.
Child, Graham F. T.
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In southern Africa, there are now 10,000 to 14,000 private ranchers that promote wildlife enterprises alone or in some in combination with domestic livestock. An important conservation success, this new bio-experience economy also creates social well-being through economic growth and job creation. It is an economic sector that needs to be taken seriously, not least because it pioneers policies that inform the valorization and sustainable management of ecosystem services. The article describes the historical emergence of a sustainable use approach to wildlife conservation since the Arusha Conference in 1963. It suggests that indigenous multi-species systems may have ecological advantages over modern livestock production systems, but these are difficult to quantify in complex dryland ecosystems and are trumped by economics and political processes. However, wildlife provides the foundation for a bio-experience economy that has a decided comparative economic advantage over agro-extractive commodity production (like beef) in drylands. We describe how new policy approaches, especially the valorization of wildlife and the devolution of proprietorship to landholders and communities, have allowed wildlife's economic advantages to be reflected in land use decisions through both ‘game ranching’ and ‘community-based natural resource management’. Institutional changes have modified the economics of wildlife in drylands, promoting both conservation and development by allocating environmental raw materials to higher-order goods and services. A further goal of the paper is to describe practical economic methods for assessing and explaining the wildlife sector to policy makers in terms of its profitability, both to individual landholders and to society through jobs and economic growth. The paper covers a 50-year period between the PhD studies of the four authors and takes a trans disciplinary approach which values the knowledge of practitioners as much as the academic literature. Keywords: Wildlife economics, Wildlife conservation, Game ranching, Sustainable use, Southern Africa
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doi:10.1186/2041-7136-2-18 Cite this article as: Child et al.: The economics and institutional economics of wildlife on private land in Africa. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012 2:18. Pgs.1-32
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Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18
http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18


0 Pastoralism
a SpringerOpen Journal


The economics and institutional economics

of wildlife on private land in Africa

Brian A Child", Jessica Musengezil, Gregory D Parent' and Graham F T Child1'2


Correspondence bchild@ufl edu Abstract
Stellenbosch Institute for
Advanced Studies (5T AS)
Waenberd iearcs (Cetre at In southern Africa, there are now 10,000 to 14,000 private ranchers that promote
Stellenbosch University, Marais wildlife enterprises alone or in some in combination with domestic livestock. An
Street, Stellenbosch 7600, South important conservation success, this new bio-experience economy also creates social
A t of r author information i well-being through economic growth and job creation. It is an economic sector that
available at the end of the article needs to be taken seriously, not least because it pioneers policies that inform the
valorization and sustainable management of ecosystem services. The article describes
the historical emergence of a sustainable use approach to wildlife conservation since
the Arusha Conference in 1963. It suggests that indigenous multi-species systems
may have ecological advantages over modern livestock production systems, but
these are difficult to quantify in complex dryland ecosystems and are trumped by
economics and political processes. However, wildlife provides the foundation for a
bio-experience economy that has a decided comparative economic advantage over
agro-extractive commodity production (like beef) in drylands. We describe how new
policy approaches, especially the valorization of wildlife and the devolution of
proprietorship to landholders and communities, have allowed wildlife's economic
advantages to be reflected in land use decisions through both 'game ranching' and
community-based natural resource management'. Institutional changes have
modified the economics of wildlife in drylands, promoting both conservation and
development by allocating environmental raw materials to higher-order goods and
services. A further goal of the paper is to describe practical economic methods for
assessing and explaining the wildlife sector to policy makers in terms of its
profitability, both to individual landholders and to society through jobs and
economic growth. The paper covers a 50-year period between the PhD studies of
the four authors and takes a trans disciplinary approach which values the knowledge
of practitioners as much as the academic literature.
Keywords: Wildlife economics, Wildlife conservation, Game ranching, Sustainable
use, Southern Africa


IL Springer


Review
Background
This provides a review of the economic evolution of the private wildlife sector in
southern Africa since the 1960s. It is intended to be accessible to a wide readership
(not just economists or wildlife managers). It draws on the academic literature but also
on considerable practitioner knowledge networks including gray and oral literature. It
describes the history of the wildlife sector from the perspective of the economic princi-
ples and lessons that are emerging from this policy experiment. Our purpose is to
2012 Child et al., licenee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.






Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 2 of 32
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describe the evolution of a sustainable use (or neo-liberal) approach to wildlife manage-
ment (SASUSG 1996; Martin 2009), which is underrepresented in the literature relative
to alternative paradigms of conservation and development.
We evaluate the economics of .' ,I.i.,. using the private sector experience for meth-
odological reasons, although this economy is smaller than the wildlife economy based
on Africa's protected areas, less scalable to Africa's extensive drylands than
community-based wildlife management, and under political scrutiny because of its ra-
cial history. However, stronger property rights and a gradual shift from administrative
to free-market competitive pricing mean that pricing is less distorted and economic
evaluation is more reliable on private land. Evaluating the economics of drylands is dif-
ficult at the best of times because internalizing the full costs and benefits of resources
like water, grazing, and %.' i.ii. is complicated because they are fugitive in space and
time, while ecological processes such as carbon and water cycles and soil processes are
complex and nonlinear, making the attribution of costs and benefits difficult.
The political economy of natural resources further muddies the economic waters.
-th i ... 11 i:.)i!. has been monopolized (e.g., protected areas) and heavily regulated
by the state, and market signals violate many of the assumptions needed for a sound
economic analysis given the recent and partial shift from centralized planning to
market-based approaches. "' ,:1,. also coexists with pastoralists and subsistence farm-
ers who are i."'I'" .*; *, ._". ,ii .i. with limited and contradictory rights (e.g., of ex-
clusion and use) to natural resources. Thus, economic signals are distorted by a
combination of state monopolies, regulation, administrative pricing, weak institutions
and/or predatory governance, and confused or open-access property regimes, making
economic analysis near impossible. 'Market failure, an economic term that refers to the
gap between the actual price of a good and its real value, is pervasive.
On private land in southern Africa and, indeed, where private land exists elsewhere
in Africa's drylands, the shift from livestock to -.I. i1.i. is widely acknowledged but not
reliably quantified. There are reported to be some 9,000 'game ranches' in South Africa
alone plus over 15,000 which combine '.i:. i:,. with livestock (Cousins et al. 2008). The
rapid expansion of the wildlife sector mirrors the growth in the regional and global
bio-tourism industry and is reflective of 1,;Qt;L global terms of trade. The South
African game ranching sector has expanded at between 5% and 20% annually in the last
decade, whereas real farm incomes have declined by 5.3% (Dry 2010a, b; Jenkins 2011).
Game ranching is a diverse sector that combines ecotourism, the sale of live animals,
several forms of hunting, and as a by-product, meat production. Prime ,. il:.l1, areas
generate large amounts of income and employment from tourism, while trophy hunting
is .... i il more extensive and a reliable form of income where ... 1II.i. popula-
tions are recovering or in areas of limited tourism potential. Hunting is critical in the
transition from cattle ranching back to multi-species production systems, except where
large amounts of capital are available for restocking, because it utilizes only 2% to 3%
of wildlife populations that can i.!,i--,. :i.!! expand at 10% to 30%. The markets for
hunting also appear to be larger and more robust than is often assumed, and both the
supply and price of trophy animals has been rising steadily in southern Africa since the
mid-1970s (Booth 2002, 2009; Lindsey et al. in press). For example, elephants sold for
US dollars $250 in the late 1970s and are now worth $12,000 to $20,000 in trophy fees
and up to $65,000 when we include outfitter fees. This suggests that upscaling of






Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 3 of 32
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trophy hunting and ecotourism is possible without tumbling prices. The southern
African ...., i.il:,. sector is a tiny share of the global tourism and hunting market, and
tourism is a cluster industry that benefits from economies of scale and from trends in
global terms of trade. By contrast, beef commodity prices have been I r_- li;i.__ globally
for nearly four decades (albeit with a .-ii.1!. .!! upturn in the last two years). Beef pro-
duction has also shifted steadily away from the drylands since the 1960s following
technological 'advances' like grain feeding, nitrogen supplementation, and feedlots,
while Africa's drylands are unlikely to be competitive with large-scale meat production
in Argentina, Brazil, or the USA.
Land use trends on private land, together with the data summarized in this paper,
confirm that the bio-experience economy based on the multiple uses of I i:.,i:!. is an
increasingly serious industry. It is beginning to be included in national agricultural sta-
tistics, .I.. i ill; in South Africa, though it is not yet well quantified because of its di-
versity compared to ....-,,,..:ir. markets. As an example of the magnitude of this
sector, private land hunting alone is worth over US $one billion in South Africa. Even
the casual observer can see that Africa's famous protected areas have .'iim:.. !..t
impacts on the growth of nearby urban centers like Arusha (Tanzania), Kasane, Maun
(Botswana) as well as national capitals.
The purpose of this paper is to present the case for -. kI.l:;. as a profitable form of
land use in semiarid savannas, creating more jobs and economic growth than meat
commodity production. For ecological and economic reasons, the bio-experience econ-
omy is a legitimate development option. With a more favorable policy environment, it
could be applied on a much broader scale than is currently the case, especially if it can
be adapted to Africa's communal area circumstances through approaches like
community-based natural resource management. Furthermore, these economic advan-
tages are increasing. Global terms of trade are moving in favour of the bio-experience
economy; the wildlife sector is a new industry with considerable potential for adding
value through product diversification and development, and it is synergistic with eco-
system services like water and carbon that are as undervalued as .1.11.. was several
decades ago.
In focusing this paper on presenting the economic case for .. .I l.'. we are not taking
an 'either-or approach' to economic alternatives. Our aim is to maximize the .'. II I. ,mi,.
of people living in marginal areas in -..o -..-.....,i,.!! sustainable ways, with -. !l!r.
conservation contributing to this in areas where it has a comparative advantage. None-
theless, we cannot avoid the implications that meat commodity production through
livestock or wildlife is economically and environmentally questionable in drylands.
White minority regimes supported cattle ranchers with ..,, ....1 subsidies for several
decades, but when these were removed in the transition to black majority rule, the beef
economy in drylands was shown to be financially marginal and 1..-; :11. hazardous,
and many of these I nm.1llI.I. i only survived by adding or switching to .. 1.ll11. opera-
tions (Child 1988; Grossman and Gandar 1989).
Unlike beef commodity production, i. .Ii'., i livestock systems have multiple values
(e.g., milk, meat, cash, and store of value). This may give them financial and ecological
advantages, but in the absence of recent or detailed long-term studies of these systems
that include the costs of labour and environmental capital, we are safer to assume that
they are unlikely to outperform commercial systems by a factor of two. In other words,






Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 4 of 32
i .-- I i .. I- ......i -- I I~/2/1 /18



their viability is still questionable, and we are irresponsible if we do not question the as-
sumption that dryland animal production can I'. ......i ',i address poverty. While we
claim no expertise in pastoral economics, our Il. i,;.... I surveys (unpublished data)
from Shorobe and Sankuyu communities in northern Botswana --. i that household
poverty is higher, and income distribution far more skewed, in communities that de-
pend on livestock (Shorobe) than those with !.il:.:!r._. ....' i:l.:liri.-i:.i data from
communal lands in South Africa (see below) suggest that the economic output commu-
nal land is low. While beyond the scope of this paper, rural people in the drylands of
southern Africa are vulnerable to extreme poverty and appear to be surviving more on
wages, remittances, and government transfer payments than on local production. Gen-
erally speaking, livestock are kept primarily for cultural reasons and as a mechanism of
savings and coping with risk. It is also significant that they are an asset that can be pri-
vately owned and used to harvest natural resources in situations where people generally
have limited rights to valorize, manage, or exclude others from 'their' natural resources.
This paper is about the wildlife economy and its potential to drive development.
The challenge of .. imi-. up this economic model and adjusting it to the ... il ......l.
of the rural poor in Africa's communal drylands moves beyond the economic model it-
self to the challenges of transferring it in ,ill,, '.,~ political, institutional capacity and
demographic circumstances. This policy response in southern Africa has been labeled
community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). Since the mid-1980s,
CBNRM has attempted to .. i.. ii.- the economic success of wildlife on private land in
the complex institutional circumstances of Africa's communal areas (Martin 1986;
Metcalfe 1993; Jones and Murphree 2004; Child and Barnes 2010) by attempting de-
volving full rights to use, manage, and benefit from .. .1.1 1i to communities as had been
done for private game ranchers (Murphree 1994), albeit falling short of this intention
(Martin 2009). On the one hand, it is naive to -' '- that ...I. '1.l.i, can resolve poverty
for millions of people in drylands, but on the other, CBNRM has clearly .. ... :-... i both
people and *. .:i!!.-. where it has been implemented with some level of competence
(Child et al. 2003; NACSO 2006). However, in several countries where superior '.,i. 1:,.
resources could clearly benefit people, this has not occurred (Nelson and Blomley 2009;
Nelson 2010). We fall on the side of the debate that the problem lies more with imple-
mentation than with the model itself (Hulme and Murphree 2001), which often falls far
short of best practice because communities are not really empowered to use, manage,
and benefit from wildlife (or for most natural resources that matter) (Martin 2009;
Ribot et al. 2010).
Although strongly associated with wildlife, CBNRM in southern Africa can be inter-
preted as a new institutional model that links payments for ecological services to pov-
erty reduction (Child 2004a, Frost and Bond 2008), which is applicable to many
ecosystem services, but just happens to take advantage of the value of wildlife and op-
portunities that arose because -....i :. provided an institutional greenfield. We certainly
need such models. Ecosystem services have been valued at several times global gross
domestic product (GDP) (Costanza et al. 1997), but we seldom take this into account
in land use decisions. Indeed, the i. l. li!. of our generation may well be to internalize
the costs and benefits of ecosystem services in the livelihoods and land use decisions of
the rural people who coexist with biodiversity in the manner that has been attempted
for -.. II;i. For example, the models of micro-governance and household cash payment






Child et al Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 5 of 32
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systems developed in some community '. .:!.-i. programs (Child 2004a, b, 2006) are
currently being i. i1i;. I, .1 with REDD payments in Tanzania I. 1... "' Brown, personal
communication). In other words, '. ,il'.:i- provides both a valuable resource for many
drylands and also a new model with economic, institutional, and L-.. ',, compo-
nents that may be transferable to other natural resources and ecosystem services. This
paper addresses only the economic component of this approach.
New approaches to wildlife conservation
F .;..i;... in the 1950s, conservationists in southern and East Africa began to develop
a new paradigm for conservation based on sustainable use of natural resources
(SASUSG 1996). 1, .1i;... this policy experimentation was private game ranching, espe-
cially in southern Africa. Although this has been a highly successful conservation and
economic initiative, relatively little is published about it or about the economic re-
search, methods, and principles behind this growth. Private wildlife conservation or
'game ranching' strongly influenced the new vision of conservation and development
that arose to prominence during the 1980s and 1990s (Martin 2009). The basic message
of the sustainable use approach is that wild resources and ecosystem services are enor-
mously valuable. If we change the ways that we govern them and if we can place land-
holders and rural communities at the junction of benefit and management, 'i..i
resources can pay for themselves and simultaneously address rural poverty and envir-
onmental injustice. At the time these ideas were introduced, they were radical, encom-
passing three major conceptual strands (Hulme and Murphree 2001):


that the state should devolve proprietorship, including the responsibility for and
benefits from managing wild resources, to the landholders and the communities that
live with them;
that natural resources should be exploited sustainably and as profitably as possible
to achieve both conservation and development goals; and
that the neo-liberal concepts of markets, property, and exchange should play a
greater role in shaping incentives for conservation and allocating resources to their
highest valued uses.


Game ranching provides an example of how practitioners .I!!,.i...i a plethora of
principles into one overarching ...;:1;-.. statement: 'to maximize the benefits from
:!..iii, to the people on whose land it lives' (Child 1995). It is also an example of the
centrality of institutions or the formal rules or informal norms that frame human
conduct (North 1990) to the relationships between people, economy and nature, and
the process of modifying these institutions in ways that were .. :. ,lifri1. carefully
crafted (Borgerhoff Mulder and Coppolillo 2005), and changed the outlook for i.I:i.
in Africa.


Brief history of wildlife use
We can view the :".1 ih economy in four phases (Table 1). In the pre-modern econ-
omy, -.. :i.il.i.- was plentiful, and the primary constraint to use was the technology and
costs of harvesting it. This was followed by a 'frontier economy' associated with the In-
dustrial Revolution and the exploration and settlement of Africa by Europeans. New
technology and markets, including guns, wagons, and even railways,. *.i'..il, altered







Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 6 of 32
" I is ... !I ...... i -- ... I I~ !-' 2/1 / 18




the economy of !i1.:i,. and enabled hunters to harvest vast numbers of -.. !.:i!r.- at a
low cost to sell in new urban and global markets. In the absence of institutions for con-
f.,.l'I, offtake, ..i .:.:,. including North America's vast herds of bison, was decimated
in a classic case of market failure whereby individuals internalize benefits but
externalize costs to society.
In response to this, wildlife was nationalized. In 1900 and 1933, the European powers
met in London to respond to the perceived extirpation of wildlife in their African col-
onies, making three policy decisions with 1., i. ..i: ., implications i(H. m.!. I:....
1997). First, they encouraged the formation of state protected areas, which led to the
formation of Africa's spectacular national parks and now "i'i ., -i vibrant economies
when managed effectively. Second, they greatly restricted the commercial use of wild-
life, rendering i=,:. valueless except for low-value subsistence uses. Third, they cen-
tralized ownership of .. I l.li in the state, disenfranchising landholders and taking upon
themselves the burden of protecting .:li.. from people (anti-:-." .-'',-'. and pro-
tecting people from ..ili:I. (problem animal control). In some countries, local com-
munities were severely disenfranchised, especially where traditional methods of hunting
were made illegal and ownership of firearms was restricted (Carruthers 1989;
Brockington and Igoe 2006). But in others, like Zambia and Botswana, local people
were given considerable freedom to hunt under permit systems that often became diffi-
cult to administer (Astle 1999).
The policy response embedded in the 'London Convention' became widely accepted,
sometimes :.l, -it;:.b : as the way conservation should be done: a combination of 'pris-
tine' parks and non-utilization of wildlife on land outside them, with '. :Illii, as a priceless
but (... !!. 1. 'ii) valueless asset, funded by the state and managed on its behalf by a small
band of dedicated game rangers. However, by the late 1950s, population growth and the
rapid .. I 1 of -.- -. liu... and livestock were causing an inexorable decline of Africa's
unique and spectacular l. I. At the i'. i:i, i of colonial Africa, many leading conserva-
tionists met at the Arusha Conference on the 'Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources in Modern African States; emphasizing that a radical new approach was needed
to conserve wildlife (IUCN 1963). This, the delegates said, needed to be led by Africans, and
i.i=.. needed to become an economic asset according to the emerging 'use it or lose it'
philosophy. Thus, the opening comments of the conference proceedings emphasize:


Only by the planned .,I,: ... of.. as a renewable natural resources, either
for protein or as a recreational attraction, can its conservation and development be

Table 1 Phases in the political economy of wildlife
Phase Features
1. Pre-modern economy Use is limited by ability/costs of harvesting
2. Frontier economy Costs of harvesting greatly reduced by technology.
Profits increased by markets.
But few rules or norms to control use
3. Wildlife is nationalized Control of wildlife centralized in the state
SCommercial use greatly restricted
4. Sustainable use approach Use of wildlife devolved to landholders (and later, to communities)
SCommercial uses encouraged






Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 7 of 32
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economically ..' -'". ,. in competition with agriculture, stock ranching and other forms
of land use (p19, IUCN 1963).



The emergence of wildlife utilization
Conservationists began to argue that -. lI:l r.1 was better suited to using Africa's harsh envir-
onments than the domestic monocultures imported from Europe because, to quote again
from the Arusha Conference, the variety of. .:'. .. fauna, their .-.. :-:.. high standing bio-
mass, and greater nutritional .., .-.... is seen to give them advantages over domestic live-
stock that concentrate their attention on a single constituent of the plant standing-crop
biomass the graminacious carpet (p19, IUCN 1963). Nonetheless, by 1980 fully, some 95%
of the large herbivore biomass in southern Africa was livestock (Cumming and Bond 1991).
The 1950s and 1960s saw unprecedented research into the ecology of .. il.l:i,. its
meat production potential, and even domestication (Talbot et al. 1961; Talbot et al.
1965; Mossman 1975). Cropping schemes were initiated, mostly in East Africa, and
well-known conservationists like George Adamson and others (in Kenya), and Norman
Carr (Zambia) proposed schemes whereby local people would benefit from -,!.:l!t.
(IUCN 1963; Parker 2004). The United Nation's African Special Project was developed
to assess and invest in the potential for -. i.i,:.. as an economic tool in Africa (Riney
and Hill 1967), including the establishment of national parks and game reserves (e.g.,
Botswana) and cropping schemes (e.g., Luangwa Valley, Zambia). However, with the
transition from colonial to African rule in East Africa, the control of :. -!.t. was in-
creasingly centralized (Kabiri 2010), and policy momentum shifted to southern Africa
where there was considerable discussion about the potential value of :I. ill.. (Riney
1960; Dasmann 1964), and experimental game cropping was initiated (Dasmann and
Mossman 1961). By the late 1960s, the heads of '.1. .Il' agencies in southern Africa
began meeting annually through the :. .... in.. Committee for Nature Conservation and
the Management and Use of '. -i.'l..' of the 'Southern African F. L-;.. :1 Commission
for the Conservation and .ih i..! of the Soil'. Soon thereafter, we see legislation
emerging in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa's provinces
i:,,.... L I:',, 11,.i. to use their .i': i:,- commercially and with far fewer state-
imposed restrictions (Child 1971; Suich and Child 2009). When it became apparent
that permits and surveys were impractical and that landholders husbanded valuable
:. ih.:, just as they husbanded their domestic stock, regulatory requirements were
reduced. In Zimbabwe, they were virtually removed by the bold Parks and Wild Life
Act of 1975.
Ecology and commodity (meat) production
Early research and discussions focused on .i:ll:..'s ecological adaptations to Africa's
climate and diseases (Mossman 1975) and the ability of -i.1 I:. to produce more meat,
or better p1,: i :; meat, than livestock (Talbot et al. 1965). It suggested that wildlife pro-
duced high-quality meat but that the logistical .. I 'i:. !-[._ ,., of cropping free-ranging wild
animals reduced potential profits. Research then turned to the relative suitability of di-
verse i.lt; .-..;. production systems compared to livestock monocultures. In elegant
studies, ecologists noted how the diversity of -.. !. r.:ir- was matched to the diversity of
vegetation and threats from predators (Jarman 1973), and that semiarid savannas in
particular evolved under indigenous multi-species systems : ... .II1 carrying 15 to 25






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I is .. I ...... --' ... .I -I' /2/1 /18



ungulate species compared to a maximum of five domestic species (Cumming 1982;
Cumming 1995). Scientists were surprised at how much overlap there was in the diet-
ary preferences of wild herbivores, but it was also argued that diet separation and the
fact that gregarious .' .I.lI.. was invariably mobile helped to maintain ecological bal-
ance, ...... i i: between the woody and grass components of savannas (Taylor and
Walker 1978; Child 1995). Ecologists noted that production in many African range-
lands was water limited (Coe et al. 1976; Bell 1982) and emphasized the importance of
the grass layer in absorbing. ..'ilI and making it available to plants 11 II) and '.' 11. .
1976). 'Degradation' was thought to be synonymous with the loss of perennial grasses,
which maintained the structure of the soil surface and absorbed water (Riney 1963;
Walker 1987). Overgrazing or frequent incorrect burning of the grass layer could tip
the crucial balance between grass and trees Ia' ...; 1963; Mahesh Sankaran et al. 2005)
into a new (and less productive) stable state from which recovery was difficult
(Campbell and Child 1971; Walker et al. "'- ii
Important and interesting as this research was, researchers were marching down a
blind alley in comparing the relative ability of .I.il:i. and livestock to produce meat.
The meat productive potential of semiarid rangelands was ecologically limited, regard-
less of species. Increasing animal production reduced the health of the grass layer (and
water infiltration where water was the limiting factor), thus undermining itself. In other
words, meat production was ..i',i IIl limited, and attempts to move beyond these
limits ultimately I i.i..i as we see later with private beef ranching in Zimbabwe. Ultim-
ately, the solution lay not in choosing between -. !.-:i:._ and livestock for meat produc-
tion but in adding value in ways that was not directly linked to extraction from the
environment, such as experiences or luxury goods like trophy animals. Seen retrospect-
ively, wildlife scientists mistakenly thought in terms of commodity production (like the
agricultural agencies of the time) rather than improving the economic allocation of
resources to add value. In the end, institutional adaptation and the development of new
markets by farmers, not production technology, provided commercial solutions for ran-
chers through a shift from agro-extractive beef commodity production to a bio-
experience economy.
Dysfunctional legal systems and human-wildlife relationships
In the twentieth century, white settlers acquired land in southern and East Africa, and
African agriculture and populations grew -:,p'-.: Prior to World War II (WWII), the
new conservation laws were directed mainly at white commercial hunters, and local
hunting for the pot was ..'.. i2 overlooked (Parker 2004). But as rural i.. !i....
grew, local hunting began to threaten '..:' :!._. was increasingly treated as poaching,
and prosecuted by the state. C ;;'-. .11 ... a traditional i., i,"... i. i like hunting
created a powerful sense of injustice, < .., il; when enacted by colonial governments
that lacked ,i,1;'; :1 1 .;'..:' 'Poachers' became Robin Hoods and were protected by
their communities, so '..ili. laws were difficult to implement. This also created a
negative relationship between local people, -. !.:lI: and the state.
Setting the state up against the people was never likely to result in sustainable solu-
tions for .' .I.111. In pre-independence Zimbabwe, for instance, protectionist conserva-
tion alienated white farmers from wildlife and became an important political tool in the
hands of black nationalists by highlighting the injustice of white minority rule. Even
today, some national ,. iI:.! agencies expropriate the benefits of-' I. Il.i. for themselves






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i .-- -i ....'I......-- I I~/2/1 /18



and their cronies and treat local 'poachers' brutally, so pastoral people who are natural
allies of ..'.ih:l, are planting fields in important ..il:i. areas, mostly to protect their
land rights (Nelson 2010).
One outcome of these dysfunctional policies is the false impression that local people
hate wildlife. Our surveys of local people across southern Africa show that people are
often extremely concerned about the impact of wildlife on their crops and livestock
(and the ineffective management of this problem), yet over 90% of people claim to like
..ih,: (or to like it a lot) for both aesthetic and material reasons. What they do not
like, however, is the inequity of wildlife laws and the high-handed manners of officials
who implement them; they like '.'. i .l.b, and even protected areas, but not the I.lii,
officials or laws. This situation is beginning to improve with the advent of CBNRM in
countries like Namibia and Botswana.
Protectionist, centralized '.!ii.1.1. legislation, from urbanized and wealthy industrial
nations, was pf.!,'...:, ; unjust and .......-,|..:,!!) flawed, causing enormous losses of
:. i.ii in developing, rural societies after WWVII as agriculture expanded. The 1940s to
the 1970s were the heyday of agriculture. Cattle ranchers complained that 'you cannot
farm in a zoo' and -. i:l!r.. was steadily exterminated (Taylor 2002). Newspaper clip-
pings in Zimbabwe dramatize cases where cattle ranchers shot large numbers of wilde-
beest and zebra and (having no legal commercial use) left them to 'rot in the veld'.
However, the bigger threat was more subtle: the fencing of water points and livestock
overgrazing i n .I..1 .1 IIl.11, for lack of food and water.
The perspectives and contributions of private landholders
We use a series of case studies to describe the shift back to :i.i.., which began slowly
led by a few maverick cattle ranches and then accelerated into a landscape-wide phe-
nomena. In the Lowveld of Zimbabwe, for example, the late George Style of Buffalo
Range Ranch 'II 'Ii ha) had a penchant for .i.il:! From the mid-1950s, he devel-
oped a successful cattle business, fencing paddocks and providing artificial water. The
eastern section of his ranch was bounded by the Chiredzi River, which for decades pro-
vided -'.i:. i. and livestock with permanent water in the dry season (Figure 1). Conse-
quently, this part of the ranch (some 9,000 ha) was degraded, and George Style
experimented with -. .: -.i as much as a hobby as for commercial reasons. Browsers
like eland, kudu, and impala thrived, and the sensitive grazing species like sable, roan,
and Lichtenstein's hartebeest displaced by cattle began to recover. Style ..... ..:I impala
to be sold through his butcheries and soon (early 1970s) initiated 'mini-safaris' with for-
eign hunting clients in a -... i appointed hunting camp.
George and his son, Clive, encouraged the use of their ranch for comparative re-
search. Detailed vegetation transects showed that cattle grazing damaged perennial
grasses and the soil surface, largely because of the continuously high stocking necessary
to keep a beef enterprise viable, whereas the range was slowly recovering under .: lI,.-
(Taylor and Walker 1978; Child 1988) (Figure 2). Overstocking appeared to directly
damage range productivity, with the pattern of cumulative overstocking (i.e., stocking
rate in each year less predicted carrying capacity calculated from rainfall using the for-
mula from Coe et al. 1976) matching a rapid decline in cattle calving rates (Child 1988)
(Figure 3) and ultimately destroying the profitability of the livestock enterprise on
Buffalo Range. This experience was shared by many cattle ranchers in the Lowveld
(PriceWaterhouse 1994; Taylor 2002), who began to switch to '. illlh. enterprises, some







Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18
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Figure 1 Map of Buffalo Range Cattle and Game Ranch.


partially, some completely, and some as groups of landholders over large blocks of land,
especially after losing livestock in the severe droughts of 1984 and 1992 (Taylor 2002;
Lindsay et al. 2009).
The beginnings of safari hunting on private land
On most properties, the switch to wildlife was gradual. Many cattle ranchers survived
financially by using remnant populations of wildlife for safari hunting. With good rev-
enues and few overhead costs, wildlife initially supplemented cattle ranching, but later,
some ranchers switched over entirely. Hunting guests from North America or Europe
stayed with the rancher for seven to ten days, initially in a spare bedroom and later in
specially built accommodation. Each day, they would go out early in the morning or in
the late afternoon, shooting roughly one animal a day. These were called 'plains-game


Figure 2 Changes in grass cover and grazing intensity on Buffalo Range ranch between 1973 and
1986.


Page 10 of 32


Grass Cover 1973-1986
30

25

720

1 5 E 1973
E 1986
10

5

0
Cattle Wildlife


Grass utilization 1973-1986
60

450'

40

S30 1_ 1973
Cattl 1986
20

10

0
Cattle Wildlife































Cattle Productivity

(calving rates)


"i



1970


Page 11 of 32


1975 1980 1985


I I
Figure 3 The relationship between range condition and cattle productivity on Buffalo Range ranch
(1967-1986).


safaris' because they relied on species like kudu, zebra, wildebeest, impala, and warthog.
Ranchers then improved their hunting product by nurturing or reintroducing valuable
species like eland, sable, waterbuck, and even predators like leopard, and later by add-
ing big game like elephant and buffalo, usually as part of multi-property conservancies.
But to do this, they began to improve environmental management by reducing stocking
rates and habitat fragmentation by removing cattle fences and scaling up to multi-
property management units. Cattle ranchers like George Style spent many days in the
field hunting and developed considerable knowledge about the habits and needs of
wildlife, which spread through farmer field days. Under natural conditions, wildlife is
highly mobile to respond to highly variable savanna rainfall, and ranchers defragmented
their land with simple (and cost-saving) measure like removing one strand from con-
ventional four-strand cattle fences, allowing species like kudu and eland to jump over
them, and wildebeest and warthog to duck under them. Similarly, they stopped fencing
water points and modified conventional cattle water troughs to enable wildlife to drink.
They catered for the specific needs of valuable species like sable, which struggle to
compete with cattle, and managed diseases like 'snotsiekte' (malignant catarrh) by en-
suring that their cattle were separated from wildebeest at calving time, during which
transmission from wildebeest to cattle occurs.


Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18
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-- Range Condition






E ....
S1970 1975 1980 1985



1970 1975 1980 1985
Cumulative overstocking = stocking rate -carrying capacity (rainfall). Calculated using Coeet al (1976)






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Trophy hunting is sustainable; meat production very risky
Although it runs counter to the moral argument, hunting animals for meat should not be
encouraged whereas ,11h.: them for sport provides a powerful conservation tool. The re-
covery of .- 1.11, l. over much of southern Africa has gone hand-in-hand with trophy hunt-
ing, which is a robust, low-risk solution for two reasons: (1) the mathematics of
population biology and (2) the transparency of safari hunting markets. An offtake of 2% to
3% provides a steady supply of.p 1 ,iil trophy males compared to population growth rates
of 10% to 30%, so ranchers like George Style made good profits from safari hunting at the
same time when wildlife populations recovered rapidly. Trophy hunting (unlike meat pro-
duction) is profitable and .i -.. .. ill robust, even more so because trophy hunting mar-
kets are personalized and information-rich, so hunting clients quickly avoid outfitters who
over-hunt with below-average trophy (horn) size. Indeed, the ecological i II "-- on suc-
cessful game ranches like Buffalo Range is seldom too little ....I l.i. but too much. George
Style .....i..:l hundreds of impala to protect the environment and allow greater .: ..'. -i*; of
: e I:. even though game meat production seldom covered costs.
In contrast to safari hunting, which is ecologically robust and profitable, commercial
or subsistence -.. !.:i !!r. meat production is ecologically risky and economically question-
able. Meat is a ubiquitous low-value commodity without the market checks and bal-
ances associated with hunting trophies. We need to kill at least 20 times as many
animals to generate the same income from meat as from trophy hunting, and the costs
are much higher. On private land, bushmeat is seldom viable except as a by-product of
more lucrative hunting and tourism businesses, with the implication that bushmeat
poaching is viable only because the harvester externalizes many costs to society. The
safest conclusion is that meat production in drylands, either from livestock or- .i.il::
is seldom viable if the full financial and environmental costs and benefits are accounted
for. It has not succeeded on private land, and we extend economic models based on
bushmeat production to rural communities at our peril.



Developing an economic understanding of wildlife production
Trophy hunting is worth more than a billion i,: in South Africa alone (Flack, per-
sonal communication), yet data and publications on private -. I.i1.'., conservation in
southern Africa are sparse. The purposes of this section are to summarize, with in-
creasing sophistication, methods used to understand the economics of the private wild-
life sector, to influence 1. :i' making in the past 25 years, and to use case studies to
illustrate how the .I.:!:r.- sector has emerged.
Shortly after Zimbabwe's Independence in 1980, one of the authors (Brian Child) was
recruited by the -. i-li1t. department to conduct economic research and extension on
game ranching (1984 to 1989). By I ...1iL extensive time with game and cattle ranchers,
he gained their confidence, learned how much they knew about '., 11. i. and worked with
them to understand the economics of their -. d-lIlr._ and livestock enterprises. Data from
22 cattle ranchers at the wetter limits of rangelands in the Zimbabwean Midlands in 1984
(Vincent and Thomas 1961) showed that safari hunting was easily the primary -..!:. I:i: ac-
tivity, with income comprised as follows: guiding .-.'. _. trophy fees (i meat from tro-
phy animals (I ." and meat cropping (7%). All but one of these I .l.I .I.. was
primarily a cattle rancher.







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Gross income (turnover) and net margins (profits)
Livestock, which comprised 80% of herbivore biomass, generated most of the income
in the area (Table 2), but when variable costs were deducted, livestock profits were
(Zimbabwean I..= : ,, Z$4.52/ha compared to Z$2.93 from .- : I=,I. All values for Zim-
babwean research are stated in 1984/86 Z$ when US$1=Z$1.3 A new financial ratio (i.
e., .".'r' !.. livemass) that we invented to reflect the ecological reality that grass was
the limiting factor (see above) showed that, from 1 kg of livemass, *.. I. earned 17c
and cattle earned 7c, suggesting that, at the margin, it paid landholders to reallocate
grazing from livestock with I. !i.-. A similar survey of 15 properties and 446,818 ha
in the more arid Lowveld in 1986 ..... i.i" .. Buffalo Range Ranch) confirmed that it
was economically rational to switch land from livestock (earning 7. I livemass) to
-1. I1.l (26c) (Table 3).
Repeating a survey of rancher opinions (unpublished mimeo) about rancher opinions
about wildlife in the Zimbabwe Midlands ten years after the radical Parks and Wild Life
Act of 1975 (that devolved full authority to i ....i:,.ii. to use : .il,'. and only four
years after the civil war ended, showed --... .iI : changes. W.I. l: income had quad-
rupled, and neutral or negative attitudes towards wildlife decreased from 22% to 0%. In
line with the predictions of the sustainable use approach, the geographic range of valu-
able hunting species increased, as we also see in the data from South Africa (see below).
The number of properties utilizing reedbuck, bushbuck, .. 1.1 1.. ., zebra, waterbuck,
tsessebe, kudu, eland, and sable increased by 21%; the geographic range of these species
expanded by 22%, and that of the most valuable species (i.e., waterbuck, tsessebe, eland,
and sable), by 35%. In terms of biodiversity conservation, a single, sedentary, gregarious
I1..11 ...l I ... feeder (i.e., domestic cattle) was replaced by a spectrum of 15 or more
species of wild (and domestic) animals (Child 2009), and habitats noticeably improved
(personal observation, .'',.ii .. i,1,l ) on large unfenced ranches in Zimbabwe, .11,-'.I 1,
there were strong concerns about degradation on small fenced game farms in South
Africa.
By the late 1980s, most cattle ranchers in Zimbabwe began to promote and use wild-
life because of a decline in cattle prices and subsidies and increasing ecological pro-
blems 11-_i,;i-,i..] by the 1984 and 1992 drought. A significant number shifted
completely into ':I II.I., especially in southern Zimbabwe and near Hwange National
Park and Victoria Falls. An excellent documentary video about the formation of the
Save Valley Conservancy illustrates these broader trends (Taylor 2002). In the video,



Table 2 A financial comparison (in Zimbabwean $ dollars) of wildlife and livestock in the
Zimbabwean Midlands in 1984
Wildlife and livestock economics in the Zimbabwe Midlands
Units Cattle Wildlife
Comparison/unit area (wildlife = 20% of biomass)
Income Ha $13.57 $3.36
Profit (income variable costs) Ha $4.52 $2.93
Comparison/kg biomass
Gross income Kg 20c 20c
Profit Kq 7c 17c







Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 14 of 32
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Table 3 A financial comparison (in Z$ dollars) of wildlife and livestock in the Zimbabwe
Lowveld in 1986
Cattle and wildlife profitability in the Lowveld in 1986
Livemass (kg) Turnover (Z$) Profit (Z$) Profit/kg
Cattle 10.1 m $2.0 m $0.7 m 0.07
Wildlife 4.7 m $1.4 m $1.2 m 0.26
m = million.


one of the leading ranchers in the Lowveld (Clive Stockil) describes how cattle ranching
had been developed in the areas since the 1950s. Following the adage 'you can't farm in
a zoo; ...li:.. had been .r. .11; replaced, including through active elimination cam-
paigns (e.g., of buffalo) by the veterinary department. Footage shows the degradation of
the habitat (much as .1. i : for Buffalo Range) and the collapse of cattle enterprises.
Noting that ranching needed to be ... -i,. 1,i1 sustainable, economically viable, and
socio-politically acceptable, Stockil describes how 27 ranchers studied the situation.
They commissioned a report (PriceWaterhouse 1994) that concluded that .. hl:i.
would double their income and increase the return on capital from 1% to 3% (1:...." to
10% to 22% (.. ,ili,.1, Consequently, the 27 landholders in the Save Valley shifted from
livestock to .. il:. combining 344,200 ha of previously degraded cattle ranches into a
huge wildlife conservancy with no internal fencing and common management policies
(Lindsay et al. 2009). The Save Conservancy was systematically restocked with elephant,
buffalo, predators including lions and wild dogs, and many of the antelope species dis-
placed by livestock. Hunting and tourism lodges diversified the economy, generated
more profits, provided more jobs, and ...I .-.I the environment to recover. To all
intents and purposes, this resembled a private national park. At least seven other simi-
lar initiatives occurred in Zimbabwe at the time.
Kickback from single commodity Leviathans
By the late 1980s, the relative economics of '..::! .. and livestock had reversed, but
agricultural polices had not. Despite falling beef prices on the world market, govern-
ment veterinary and ,. i lilr' .1 agencies continued to support beef while imposing
considerable costs on the ,: 1=0..- sector to the detriment of private ranches and the
greater economy (Muir-Leresche and Nelson 2000) dil .. I! wildlife was enabling cat-
tle ranchers to stay on the land (a pattern also observed in Texas, personal observation)
and to recover its ecological function (Child 1988; Jansen et al. 1992; PriceWaterhouse
1994). But powerful government ,i,:. I.hl, I1 agencies continued to promote beef with-
out considering its impact on wildlife, :!I!. : :...- the dangers of single-sector decision-
making. Between 1919 and the 1980s, thousands of wild animals including rhinos were
shot in the name of tsetse fly control (Child and Riney 1987), hundreds of miles of
game fence were erected, habitats were grossly modified"' ,"i;'. the bulldozing of ri-
parian %. .....ll I .i and waterholes, and DDT and i. i. I i ... were applied on a broad scale.
In the 1980s, large areas of the country were further fenced to control foot-and-mouth
disease despite questions as to the technical and economic merits of a fencing solution
(Taylor and Martin 1987). Based on controversial evidence of ill l. t.. i:- .t.. i trans-
mission, all buffalo on private land were shot despite the veterinary department being
informed that buffalo could double the profitability of wildlife enterprises. To combat
this, the small '.il..1., department began to study the economics of the cattle sector







Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 15 of 32
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Table 4 Quick and dirty beef industry budget (Zimbabwean $ dollar 1986)
Costs
1. Government services 62
2. Cold Storage Commission subsidy 50
3. Farmer's variable costs 74
4. Farmer capital investment (land, cattle) ??
5. Farmer overhead costs (fixed costs) ??
6. Industry investment in European Union-standard abattoirs, buffalo fencing, etc. ??
7. Environmental costs (overgrazing) ??
Total Costs 185+
income
1. Actual 149
2. With European Economic Commission exports 191


and developed a quick and dirty 'budget' for the beef sector (Table 4). Financial data
compiled from government reports (Child 1988) showed that even preferential access
to the high-priced European Union market would not cover farmer and industry costs,
even before the fixed costs to farmers (e.g., capital value of livestock, land, and facil-
ities), the industry (e.g., costs of new EU compliant abattoirs), or the environment were
accounted for. Single-sector Leviathans emphasized commodity production (e.g., bags
of maize and kilograms of beef) with little appreciation of economic issues like com-
parative advantage or allocative efficiency, which may speak well to politicians but does
not maximize societal well-being.
A historical review of the government's own reports, including Parliamentary Com-
missions of Inquiry, showed that the beef sector had been heavily subsidized for several
decades through advantageous beef prices, wealth transfer from the peasant to


C.S.C. Beef Prices (1965 1982)
Crnt per kg on-the-bone equalent

150
140
13tO


110
C Price of beefon Zimbabwean
100 market(subsidized)

I 70 -





40

World Price of beef



0 Producer + WholikIale Export A Total
Figure 4 Comparing domestic and world prices to estimate if land use is taxed or subsidized.






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commercial herd, support to farm development through fencing and water provision,
subsidisation of single-channel marketing systems (the Cold Storage Commission), and
so on (Phimister 1978; Child 1988). Methodologically, developing these arguments is
time consuming and subject to different interpretations. Parity pricing provides a
quicker and more reliable method for assessing if beef producers are subsidized (or
taxed) by comparing the price farmers get for beef on the domestic market compared
to the world market. Using government statistics (Figure 4) reveals that, after the mid-
1970s, the domestic price of beef was on average 40% higher than the world price, con-
firming other research findings that producers were heavily subsidized through pricing
policies (Williams 1993).
Financial and economic analysis
The proponents of wildlife intuited as far back as the 1960s that wildlife was being dis-
placed by livestock despite being a better land use option. An economist would say that
wildlife had an inherent comparative advantage in drylands but was undervalued by
market failures so that scarce resources were being misallocated to the detriment of so-
ciety. In 1990, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Zimbabwe's wildlife agency
used detailed financial accounts and asset registers to assess the viability of some 150
cattle and wildlife enterprises (Jansen et al. 1992). Wildlife was more profitable than
livestock, with only 5% of livestock operations generating a return on capital in excess
of 10% when profits were calculated using market (financial) prices (Figure 5). Market
prices were then adjusted to remove pricing distortions caused by market failures. In
terms of societal outcomes, wildlife was even more profitable (Figure 6), providing jobs,
economic growth, and foreign currency (which was undervalued by government-
controlled exchange rates). The rapid transition towards wildlife in many areas, unfor-
tunately, was never accurately quantified, but judging from trophy sales, wildlife popu-
lations on private land quadrupled between 1984 and 1992 (Booth 2002).
South Africa and Namibia
The land invasions in Zimbabwe in 2000 undermined much, but not all, of this pro-
gress. However, similar trends on private land in Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana
confirmed the coming of age of the wildlife bio-experience sector. In Namibia, between
the early 1970s and 2001, livestock populations on private land halved from 1.8 million


Figure 5 Comparison of the financial profitability of cattle and wildlife in Zimbabwe in 1990.







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90%
80o%

70% o FMa l financial
60%
SEconomic
50%_
40% -
30% --
20% --
10% --


Profitable Marginal Loss
Figure 6 Comparison of the financial and economic profitability of wildlife in Zimbabwe in 1990.


to 0.91 million, whereas huntablee' wildlife populations doubled from 0.565 million to
1,161 million head for economic reasons (Barnes and Jones 2009). In South Africa, the
numbers of wild animals easily quadrupled between 1964 and 2005, with some sources
(Flack unpublished data; Carruthers 2008 suggesting as many as 18.6 million wild ani-
mals between 1964 and 2005, and there are now some 10,000 wildlife ranches and
some 4,000 mixed wildlife and livestock enterprises (Bothma et al. 2009). Private wild-
life areas expanded eightfold between 1979 and the mid-1990s (Chadwick 1996), pro-
tecting at least 16.8% of the total area of South Africa (Cousins et al. 2008) compared
to 6% as IUCN category I to IV protected areas. As with Zimbabwe, 'utilized' species
increased much more rapidly than those 'protected'. Rhino increased from 50 to
18,000, and black wildebeest from a few to 26,000, much faster than bontebok (few to
less than 5,000) and Cape Mountain Zebra (few to 1,200) for which hunting has only
been allowed within the past decade (Flack, personal communication).
Policy analysis matrix
Despite its size and economic importance, there is remarkably little research or political
economic understanding of the wildlife sector in South Africa and some risk that con-
servation, economic, and employment gains will be undone in the politically charged
debate over land restitution. We highlight key findings of an investigation of the eco-
nomics of game ranching near Kruger National Park (Musengezi 2010) and illustrate
the usefulness of the Policy Analysis Matrix or PAM methodology (Table 5).
The PAM is theoretically robust (Monke and Pearson 1989), relatively easy to apply,
and useful for influencing policy makers, especially in finance ministries because it is
easy to understand as it follows the basic calculation, profit = income from sales less



Table 5 Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM)
Revenues Costs Profits
Tradable inputs Domestic factors
Private prices A B C D
'Social' (or 'economic) prices' E F G H
Divergence I J K L
'The PAM can also account for environmental externalities and for ecological, regulating and social/cultural services by
building estimates of the cost of these into social prices, but we did not do this.






Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 18 of 32
-- I i ... I ..... -'... 'I I /2/1 /18



costs of production. Constructing a PAM requires social skills because it relies on land-
holders' ..... ili... their income and p'. .1;.... accounts. It also requires technical
skills to classify accounts into revenues, tradable and domestic factor costs, and to cal-
culate 'economic' prices. It can be extended to incorporate negative externalities on
ecosystems or social/equity systems and to guard against ignoring these in policy
recommendations. The PAM is particularly useful for assessing if a land use represents
a good choice for society and how much choices are being distorted by policy and mar-
ket failures.
In this paper, for example, we use PAM to assess if '. i.: !!.. is an optimal use of dry-
lands, that is, does %.. .I.II.,' have a comparative ..i C 'Comparative advantage' is
not the same as absolute advantage but explains why countries gain mutually from
trading in products for which they have relative efficiencies. Comparative advantage is
calculated by comparing value-added (i.e., revenues-tradable inputs) to the costs of
local land, labour, and capital (i.e., domestic factors), which is why the PAM split costs
into two columns: tradable inputs and domestic factors.
Second, we can calculate how much market and policy failures are distorting prices,
and therefore land use decisions, away from the real values that would guide private
actors to allocate resources efficiently for society. We quantify these price distortions
by comparing private prices (top row) to prices in perfect markets (social prices row),
correcting prices using various econometric techniques. The divergence between the
private and social prices is a measure of the magnitude of market failure. It is also a
critical economic concept with considerable implications for conservation policy. When
private prices diverge from their true values, private decision makers do not properly
internalize social benefits and costs of their actions. This causes under-provision or
over-utilization of natural resources and is the root of many natural resource problems
(Libecap 2009).
In 2010, Jessica Musengezi applied the PAM methodology to eight properties near
Kruger National Park in South Africa (Table 6). -'*' Il..jr.- enterprises were too diverse
(and innovative) to summarize using simple averages. Property (a), for example, sup-
ported high-end tourism charging over US$500 per night, while property (d) was pur-
chased for ecological reasons and profits were an '*, ;L:''*i :,,i objective. Only property
(g) still had i,. V .. I. but profitability was achieved from vertical integration n. ii. '
an abattoir and butcheries (providing profits far in excess of cattle ranching in the
area).
Simple gross income and net margin (i.e., gross income direct costs) data showed
that all .. !.:!!r.. properties (except (d)) are profitable (Table 6), exceed the returns from
extensive commercial beef production (according to models provided by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture), and provided .. :in. .mi numbers of jobs it .... .. 2010). In-
deed, .- Ili.i. enterprises create more jobs than the livestock enterprises they displaced
by a factor of two and as much as five, and these jobs are also more specialized, in-
creasing wage bills some 20- to 32-fold, (PriceWaterhouse 1994; Taylor 2002; Langholz
and Kerley 2006).
We illustrate how the PAM is used to assess the relative economics of ...I.-il:. pro-
duction using Farm (a). The capital letters in the formulas are defined in the PAM in
Table 5. At a basic level, Farm (a) generates (South African rand) R8,706 /ha and is
'profitable' after costs with a gross margin of R8,282 (US$1=R7). It also adds value to







Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18
a results fr eigt wildlife p ties in S h Arica in 2/2/1/18




Table 6 Summary of PAM results for eight wildlife properties in South Africa in 2010


All price in South Africa Rand
(US $1R7)
Property attributes
Farm size (ha)
Big five
Beds
Average price Randd)
Revenue sources(% of total revenue)
Tourism accommodation
Biltong hunting
Cattle
Game meat
Live game sales
Retail
Trophy hunting
Labour
Number of workers
Labour cost (rand/ha)
Labour cost (% of total expenditure)
Financial and economic results
Gross income (rand/ha)
Gross margin (rand/ha)
Private cost ratio
Domestic resource cost
Effective protection coefficient
Profitability coefficient
Net policy transfer (% tax on net prc
PAM, Policy Analysis Matrix; N/a.


Farm
a b c d e


g h


2,800 3,200 14,400 30,000
No No No Yes


2 79
0 0
0 0
0 0
92 2
0 3
6 16


194 84
2,788 600


8,706
8,282
0.38
0.2
0.94
0.73
its) 27


the South African economy from both a
prices that guide the farmer to make


4,936
2,886
044
0.22
0.88
0.64
36


12 12
285 350


95 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 100
2 0
0 0


19 9
471 238
63 51


105 1,643
4 1,434
-1.51 0.34
-1 0.26
0.94 0.96
1.18 0.86
-18 14


10
250


5 0 0
17 1 0
0 84 0
1 0 0
71 14 100
0 0 0
6 2 0


87 233


private and social perspective. In terms of the
land use decisions, the private value-added


exceeds costs of domestic factor inputs. Said technically, the private cost ratio shows
that, for each rand of net profit (A-B), 38cents goes to pay domestic factors (C). This
leaves a net profit of 62 cents which is substantial (i.e., PCO = C/(A-B) = 0.38). When
prices are adjusted to correct pricing distortions, wildlife generates one rand of profit
from 20 cents of domestic factors costs (i.e., Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRC) =
G/(E-F) = 0.196). Economically speaking, :. I:Ii. has a comparative advantage and is a
good use of drylands in South Africa.
We can now use the PAM to advise policy makers as to how market failures are ef-
fectively taxing or subsidising :. I: :. First, we assess the impacts of exchange rate and
trade policies using the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC). On Farm (a), the social
value-added (E-F) exceeds the private value-added (A-B) by only 6% (i.e., EPC = (A-B)/
(E-F) = 0.94), which confirms that product markets in South Africa are relatively free
and only slightly disadvantaging :-. .'i Second, we use the profitability coefficient to


Page 19 of 32






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measure the overall effect of all policy distortions on the enterprise. On Farm (a), this
is D/H = 0.73, so overall, Farm (a)'s private profit is 27% lower than it would be in the
absence of economic distortion. This suggests that, in South Africa, domestic factors
(i.e., immovable land, labour, and capital) are moderately distorted and that, if we cor-
rected these issues, wildlife would be 27% more profitable.
There is considerable variability amongst the eight properties, depending upon the
specific configuration of their enterprise and cost structures. Nonetheless, wildlife
clearly provides significant jobs from marginal land. It is an economically efficient use
of drylands in South Africa (DRC < 1). It is also profitable to farmers despite govern-
ment policies being disadvantageous to wildlife. However, Musengezi's research also
showed that game ranchers faced significantly more nonfinancial barriers compared to
conventional agricultural enterprises in the form of additional regulations and permis-
sions. Her analysis is a single snapshot in time and does not incorporate habitat recov-
ery or the considerable increases in land values associated with wildlife properties.
Conceptualizing wildlife as an economic option
We can use two conceptual diagrams to summarize the economics of wildlife. Figure 7
hypothesizes that wildlife outcompetes livestock agriculture in some drylands because it is
easily diversified through hunting and tourism. These advantages are magnified at the eco-
nomic or societal level because the wildlife sector is associated with vertical integration
(lodging, guiding, etc.) and tourism multipliers (e.g., backwards linkages to inputs like food,
wine, transport, etc.) that are far higher than for simple commodities (like meat).
This has important policy implications. In terms of development, wildlife utilization is a
sensible land use option judged purely in terms of jobs and economic growth in some dry-
lands (Figure 8). Therefore, policies that internalize both the costs and benefits of wildlife
are likely to result in positive conservation and development outcomes. Conservationists
also need to take this seriously, recognizing that national parks in many savannas can


Figure 7 Conceptualizing economic differences between the bio-experience and commodity
economy in drylands.







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achieve their conservation objectives while also functioning as engines for economic growth
and rural development, which is also an important social responsibility.
In higher-rainfall agricultural areas, the argument is reversed (Figure 8). If we want to
conserve representative samples of these environments, we will need to subsidize them
(e.g., protected areas) because wildlife is only economically competitive on patches of land
that are difficult to farm (e.g. wetlands and hills) or uniquely accessible to markets in cities.
Figure 8 also illustrates a critical difference between agriculture and natural resource-
based systems. In traditional agricultural zones, ecosystems are greatly simplified, and
environmental energy is channeled directly into one, or at most a few, products like
cotton or corn. Outside these zones, people tend to harvest plants indirectly using ani-
mals (e.g., drylands) or to harvest a much wider variety of plant and animal products
(e.g., tropical forests). In drylands, humans harvest the third trophic tier. There is a
quantum loss in productivity because energy is lost in transfers between trophic layers,
and commodity production is ecologically limited (illustrated in Figure 8). It is in these
three-tier environments that the bio-experience economy has a comparative economic
advantage over agro-extractive commodity production. However, historically, the wild-
life in these ecosystems was undervalued and replaced by livestock. Policy and market
failures, especially the nationalization of wildlife, restrictions to commercial use, and
subsidization of commodity sectors, sent out the wrong pricing signal to landholders.
This trend was only reversed when radical changes in wildlife policy began to address
market failures by (a) devolving use rights for wildlife to landholders and (b) encour-
aging commercial use. Where market failures remain pervasive, for example where
wildlife remains nationalized (e.g., Kenya), and in communal lands where access to
resources remains open, wildlife continues to be replaced (see below).


Figure 8 Conceptualizing production systems (bottom) and comparative advantage (top).


S +-600-
0 700mm
" Agriculture more
profitable a In areas of
S I high rainfall & soil fertility

lc Wilaide more profitable
Policy failures drive according to 'natural'
down price of wildlife prices






Subsidies inflate
I profit of livestock

Rainfall (land productivity) ,


Rangeland Production System



I -------- ------- % I "Bl
...... .*. .I.


Agricultural Production System



Pdi union"

-I _________________ :unll,1ul






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Institutions and value
Walker et al. (2004) use the example of private conservation in southern Africa to illus-
trate how complex systems flip from one zone of attraction to another. Under early co-
lonial policies, ranches in southern African was locked in a mutually reinforcing cycle
of environmental degradation and financial crisis associated with beef commodity pro-
duction, but when these policies were changed, landholders quickly adapted, giving rise
to a dynamic and 1 ...I i .i1i. -. .: :i'.::. sector. That the natural environment is the same but
that -. 1.i,. i change followed a change in the rules, alerts us to the importance of these
rules and introduces the field of institutional economics (North 1990). Institutions are the
rules and norms that guide human behaviour, including the allocation of resources. Insti-
tutions like property rights and markets allow wealth to be created through processes of
specialization, diversification, and exchange, so institutionally rich countries are usually
wealthier than institutionally poor ones (North 1995). We hypothesize that this same logic
applies to drylands: institutionally rich drylands produce much greater value than those
that are institutionally thin because richer institutions enable landholders to convert eco-
logical raw materials into higher-order goods and services without damaging the resource
base. Thus, new institutions like '. !!.:1 !r. property rights, tourism markets, banks, i.:1! 1.
auctions, etc. have added considerable value to .,I.il:i. through processes of
specialization, .*'. i Ir ...i, economies of scale, investment, and exchange. New -. il.\.
institutions add value, :1 ....i... land to generate upward from South African Rand
R1,000/ha, and some R 1i i, I, to R2,788/ha in wages alone (Table 6). Moreover, the devo-
lution of wildlife rights to 10,000 private landholders has fueled considerable innovation
in the development of '.. I,. products, which has driven up the value of ,iiI.- in ways
that have not happened when natural resources are i.. !!..pl I by the state. Thus,
southern Africa provides a multitude of hunting and tourism experiences from walking
with lions to having moonlit dinners in the bush, whereas in Kenya and Tanzania, most
tourists are restricted to closed vehicles in state-managed i. II:.- areas. We can use the
price of South Africa's relatively unspectacular ,l.jl r.- as a benchmark of its potential
value. This suggests that the value of wildlife is far lower than it should be in centralized
and institutionally thin wildlife sectors, including many communal lands.
Our discussion of the relationship between the institutional richness and economic
productivity of drylands reflects Douglass North's explanation for why some countries
are rich and others poor. North postulates that the most dramatic shift in human his-
tory has been from a personalized economy of big men and small-scale economic and
political activity to an impersonal economy that relies on rules that allow us to transact
reliably all over the world and with people we don't know, allowing humans to
specialize and diversify on much higher scales than ever before (North 2003).
In Zimbabwe, enriching -. li.lil-. institutions by devolving proprietorship to land-
holders, encouraging trade, and establishing institutions like producer associations and
auctions (Child 1995) created value by converting raw materials into higher-value
goods and services by replacing low-value meat production (i.e., beef or bushmeat) with
high-value ecotourism. However, these gains rely on institutions, and when the rule of
law breaks down (degrading institutions such as property .; li courts, arbitration,
and economic exchange), people can no longer rely on impersonal institutions (North
2003). Personalized Big-Man economies re-exert themselves (Beinhocker 2006), and in-
stitutional breakdown often benefit elites (Chabal and Daloz 1999). The renewable







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resource economy, especially sectors like ,!I.:!r.. that rely on economies of scale and
exchange, is quickly disrupted, and land use reverts to resources that people can own
and protect ..i,. ..i ,ili like livestock or crops.
Similarly, communal lands are institutionally thin, lacking title deeds and genuine
proprietary rights to I1. il.i. and other natural resources like carbon. This locks in a re-
liance on privately owned livestock and individual (but untitled) fields even when these
are low-value land use options. We can develop a rough estimate of the opportunity
costs of weak institutions by comparing the output of communal and private drylands
(400 to 600 mm annual rainfall) outside Kruger National Park, using data from Gregory
Parent and Jessica Musengezi. In 2010, Parent conducted comprehensive surveys of
production and consumption data from households in the Mutale area bordering
northern Kruger National Park, in a study looking at the impacts of market access on
household vulnerability and resource use decisions (unpublished data). His data show
that conventional livestock and farming adds little or no value in terms of cash income
or jobs (Table 7). The net output of South African Rand R232/ha from the local area is
less than half of the requirements needed to maintain household consumption at R532/
ha (Table 8). People are highly dependent on transfer payments from family members
with jobs in urban areas and mines, and from government grants. Nonetheless, crop-
ping, natural resource collection, and livestock are important risk mitigation and cop-
ing strategies, 'i' ; for poorer households. Households tend to view cattle more as
an insurance policy than as a production commodity because they have limited access
to formal insurance institutions.
The key point is that, in the same agro-economic region, there is a 10 to 40 times dif-
ference in economic output between institutionally rich private land and institutionally
thin communal land (noting also that communal lands suffer enormously from the leg-
acies of apartheid). Communal lands also suffer i1; i ..: i ''-' ;4 ..i. 1I from overgrazing in
a tragedy-of-the-commons-type situation where environmental costs are externalized
to society (Hardin 1971). Our suggestion is that the opportunity costs of weak institu-
tions are enormous, and the return on investment from developing new institutions
may be high.
Policy 'failure' in East Africa
The economic value of institutions is 14ii! 1Li ..1 by the case of'.1! in East Africa.
East Africa's -. !:i!tr. is inherently superior to southern Africa, and the hunting sector
only moved southwards when it was restricted in East Africa in the early 1970s. In con-
trast to southern Africa, postcolonial East Africa perpetuated colonial ..i. .. of state
nationalisation, monopolisation, and centralization of wildlife (Kabiri 2010). Several pri-
vate I ...!i.:., I such as David Hopcraft in Kenya have 1, !. .. to develop -.. ii.ilii as

Table 7 Annual output from land use activities in Benda Mutali communal area'
Activity Total output Output per hectare" Output per household
Crops 97,185 4.19 171
Livestock 1,737,474 74.89 3,048
Natural resources 2,537,184 109.36 4,451
Labor 1,017,279 43.85 1,785
Total 5,389,122 232.29 9,455
'All values in South African Rand (US dollar $1 =R7).
"Area based on mapping exercise with community to calculate spatial extent of production, estimated to be 23,200 ha.







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Table 8 Annual household consumption in Benda Mutali'
Activity Total household Consumption per hectare Consumption per
consumption household
Crops 97,185 4.19 171
Livestock 768,152 33.11 1,348
Natural resources 1,364,392 58.81 2,394
Food purchases 5,242,040 225.95 9,197
Non-food 4,207,784 181.37 7,382
purchases
Asset depreciation 718,040 30.95 1,260
Total 12,397,593 534.38 21,750
'All data in South African rand. (US dollar $1=R7).
Area based on mapping exercises with community to calculate spatial extent of production.


a land use option for many years but suffer from weak proprietary rights, bureaucratic
uncertainty, and restrictions on use. Thus, Hopcraft relies on tourism and the sale of
meat to Nairobi for his income rather than on the potentially more lucrative safari
hunting, which is banned in Kenya (personal communication). Some large landholders
manage -I.:Ih:.. for tourism, but it would be a more competitive land use option in, for
instance, the Laikipia district if hunting was legalized (Craig, personal communication).
In Tanzania, hunting is legal, but the proceeds from hunting are seldom returned to
landholder communities, while the state is also extracting most tourism revenues from
community areas (Nelson 2010).' '. ill:i.. in prime areas in Kenya (e.g., Mara) has
declined to a third or less of its former (1977) abundance (Ogutu et al. iI and there
may well be similar downward trends in Tanzania, but data is sparse and often
restricted.


Externalities, collective action, and scale
W\'I 1I.I. is a mobile resource that, like many natural resources, is associated with exter-
nalities, for example, where one iu.ll.l. i conserves a species only for his neighbour
to hunt them or where -. !.:i!i..- damages crops on a neighboring property. These ex-
ternalities are the reason why individual ownership of .. 1 I 1. is thought to be prob-
lematic and has been centralized in the state. However, externalities may be easier to
solve in practice than theoretical approaches might suggest. This requires cross-scale
institutions. ,I .iiJ ... .n the principle of subsidiarity, these need to be built up from the
bottom. The primary goal is to internalize the costs and benefits of :i.llh. manage-
ment at the level of landholders because they are deterministic of land use outcomes.
The first essential step is to devolve proprietorship to I .... Ini l. Second, mechanisms
are needed to manage externalities associated with the fugitive character of i:.: and
other natural resources.
South Africa and Namibia manage -. I.I.I. 's externalities with physical infrastructure.
The right to utilize -. ,!.:! r.- is linked to a 'certificate of adequate enclosure' and requires
that :. ii. properties are appropriately fenced. Game fencing solves problems asso-
ciated with I. i II.t. 's mobility but introduces new problems because game fences are
expensive and fragment landscapes. The sedentarisation of wildlife on small, fenced pri-
vate ranches negates many natural behavioral advantages, allows .. i-,l I ,. and
results in the negative impacts on environments associated with decreased mobility in






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ruminants. Mismanagement of any animals, domestic or wild, causes ecological pro-
blems, and fencing savannas is a form of mismanagement. In the early days of game
farming in South Africa, overstocking was a considerable concern, though the situation
is improving with management experience and mechanisms for scaling up, such as
conservancies.
The alternative to managing externalities with physical infrastructure is to manage
them with institutions, as was done in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's far-sighted Natural
Resources Act of 1941 enabled farmers to voluntarily establish themselves (usually 30
to 50 landholders in a catchment) as democratically-managed Intensive Conservation
Areas (ICA) with more power to regulate themselves than anything a centralized state
would dare to impose. ICAs had the power to require members to address soil erosion
at their own financial cost, reduce livestock where ... i- -1 ; 'L was degrading the grass
layer, desist from tree cutting, or set quotas and other restrictions on the use of '.'. li1i.
species. Communities designed locally appropriate rules, which were enforced through
peer pressure backed by the 1... :ii,; of legal action. In essence, the community be-
came the primary locus of regulation and enforcement. The state retained responsibility
for regularly inspecting land to ensure that ICAs were performing and could intervene
if this community-based system nli .1 but this was rarely required. The Act also estab-
lished a court to which .,1.li, .l.. I could appeal.
ICAs became the focal point for social learning, collective action, and peer control of
-..i.il:. management, as farmers met to regulate and learn from each other. Self-
regulation was parsimonious but effective. Landholders were financially and socially ac-
countable for regulations they custom designed for their particular circumstances. They
limited regulation to high-value species and circumstances with real i, :. I, from regu-
lation, and where regulations were socially acceptable and could be enforced. For ex-
ample, in the Munyati-Sebakwe ICA, farmers set quotas for high-value species like
sable and waterbuck that were still i.,.i.: ,,. up after the livestock era but did not waste
their time regulating ubiquitous or territorial animals like impala and kudu. In the se-
vere 1984 drought, the Chiredzi ICA acted collectively to save the few remaining sable
in the area by capturing and feeding them (sable having been severely threatened by
livestock ....-.'L, ;,, As the species recovered, they judiciously increased hunting
quotas, rewarding ranchers who successfully recovered their sable populations with
higher quotas. In another example, one landholder was luring wildlife onto his land
using fire and fodder to capture and sell them, but the ICA resolved this problem by
imposing quotas on him. These issues were usually solved informally through peer
pressure backed up by the ICA's power to impose collective solutions if they needed to.
The system was inexpensive and highly effective. Decisions and enforcement were in-
ternally legitimate, managed primarily through peer pressure, and tightly designed to
suit local circumstances.
The ICA system not only used social interaction to manage the externalities asso-
ciated with natural resources but also provided a grassroots democratic system by
which government officials were held accountable for natural resource policies. ICAs
had direct statutory access to key ministers, parliament, and even the prime minister,
and it is no coincidence that the movement was strongly supported by research, exten-
sion, and even environmental education both in schools and for adults (Child and
Child, in preparation). Theoretically speaking, Zimbabwe's natural resource legislation






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combined privatization of wildlife to internalize costs and benefits at the level of the in-
dividual property, with collective action to control the spatial and temporal externalities
associated with -. ii.li,. and natural resources.
Private conservancies
In the 1990s, many ranchers began to recognize ecologies and economies of scale. They
formed conservancies, whereby up to 30 ranchers agree, often contractually, to manage
their wildlife collectively. This allowed a second economic transition. Whereas individual
game ranchers could reintroduce rarer species like sable, hartebeest, and rhino, large -..:. 11t.
collectives could restock big game like elephant, buffalo, lions, and even wild dogs. For ex-
ample, the Save Conservancy in southeastern Zimbabwe captured over 600 elephants in the
drought-stricken Gona-re-zhou National Park and restocked lions, wild dogs, buffalos, and
plains game. In South Africa, landholder collectives removed the fence between themselves
and Kruger National Park and generate substantial revenues from hunting and tourism.
The economies of scale associated with tourism and wildlife :-.! .._: these huge private
reserves to share management costs and principles over a larger area and to generate more
money than ii:.: Il, i properties.
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)
From the early 1970s, conservation bureaucrats in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana (and
also Zambia) argued that it was unfair that only white farmers should benefit from -:. I:11
and that, if similar rights were devolved to communal areas, both rural people and ...: IhL:.
would benefit (Metcalfe 1993). This led to the emergence of community-based natural re-
source management (CBNRM) in southern Africa where, led by Zimbabwe's iconic CAMP-
FIRE programme (Child 1993; Murphree 2005; Frost and Bond 2008; Taylor 2009), hunting
and tourism revenues were returned to communities. From a conservation perspective, this
stabilised or even increased -.. -!1ltr. populations in Zimbabwe's crowded communal lands
(Child et al. ''', .. and the recovery of -.. ,11, ... 1..1i;, endangered rhinos and elephants,
was even stronger in i i, ,i... (NACSO 2008). Income from li.I11- ..,1 .i ...: to social
projects, provided cash to households in some projects (Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003;
Jones and Weaver 2009), and helped to empower local people (Jones and Murphree i
In some communities, employment and income from hunting and tourism contributed sig-
nificantly to 1,. il,, ....., i.... : 1; as much as three-quarters of on-farm .1.. ii, ...! i to the
Sankuyo community in Botswana ,**. 'l.ii' .1I .I data).
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is the subject of a consider-
able it, .... and we emphasize only key issues here. First, '.. I.lil. ii ..: CBNRM is
founded on the potential to use i :i.Ilt. as an economic engine in communal lands and, in
so doing, to incentivise conservation. Second, CBNRM mostly does not involve a trade-off
between conservation and development because it is an institutional approach that allocates
natural resources including ..1:;:.:- to higher valued uses, and in some cases, more equit-
ably. Ti i CBNRM can and should simultaneously contribute to both conservation and
development, as happened for private land. Third, CBNRM relies on two sets of institutions:
those that devolve rights (or not) from state and community and about which much is writ-
ten ,.i:.i..:. 2004; Nelson 2010), and those within a community that promote participa-
tion and equitable benefit sharing, which is an emerging i, ill i!!i. that has hardly been
studied.
As with private conservation, an essential ingredient of CBNRM is the devolution of the
rights and benefits for -.. I. 1:::. to communities. Where all (e.g., Botswana and Namibia) or






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I i .. I ......i -.... I~-''. /2/1 /18



most (e.g., Zimbabwe) income has been devolved to communities, CBNRM has encouraged
the recovery of .. i. and generated significant incomes (NACSO 2008; Taylor '11- I' but
has not .1,... 1' (and unrealistically) resolved poverty, because of the number of people
involved and because i.lii. i..:,!1 it;.. are still low and recovering in hot, dry, and re-
mote environments. CBNRM is also ih lT.. lil to implement when human densities are high,
.:i ,r. populations are depleted, and benefits are low. However, the *-.. :,i-.:i 'crisis' in
CBNRM reflects a failure of implementation and, .. .*. .i,.. a failure to devolve rights and
responsibilities to communities within a carefully designed institutional framework. Many, if
not most CBNRM programmes, do not represent a serious attempt to devolve revenues to
communities and therefore cannot be expected to work (Nelson 2010; Ribot 2003). These
are CBNRM programmes in name only, and.. I. i:: :. is neither i.. ,. :- ":. communities nor
recovering therefore.
The emerging i. il. .. i. for CBNRM, and about which little is written, is the Ii '. .o of
within-community governance. Commonly CBNRM programmes generate revenue and re-
cover wildlife populations, but like many decentralization projects, they are plagued by elite
capture, misuse of money, and low levels of participation. In our experience, this is because
they rely on representational forms of governance whereby leaders elected by a community
sit on committees that make many or most of the decisions on behalf of the community.
The assumption is flawed that bi- or tri-annual elections and annual general meetings will
achieve accountability, participation, transparency, and equitable benefit sharing (and guard
against financial misappropriation and elite capture).
(_ -,. "-.'. as it may seem, participatory democracy may be an essential starting point
and building-block for a successful CBNRM (and much easier to implement than first
assumed). Real participation requires that CBNRM communities are defined at a scale and
implement participatory processes that allow the majority of the people to (1) meet face-to-
face to share information and make decisions, (2) instruct the committee to implement
these decisions, and (3) review the quality of implementation (i.e., does '1. ii.;... reflect
the budget agreed upon by the community?) no less than quarterly.
Scaling up and scaling down at the same time
The experience of private game ranching demonstrates that-. .,!:ihr.. can greatly increase the
economic output from drylands. We can have confidence in .. Ii:. .. utilization as an eco-
nomic model. However, we need to develop new governance models to substantially in-
crease levels of participation and t:...-.r-t sharing, and that prevent money from being
diverted to administrative expenses and elite capture. We suggest that this requires CBNRM
programs to be scaled down to the level of *. i I. Il i, -- communities and processes of par-
ticipatory democracy be strictly followed. In other words, CBNRM requires carefully crafted
institutions to manage the I, i1. ... of scale. These institutions need to scale up for reasons
of ecological and economic scale, but also to simultaneously scale down to improve ac-
countability, participation, and equitable benefit sharing (Child, unpublished data).



Hunting
One of the more controversial and misunderstood aspects of .. li. utilization is hunt-
ing. Trophy hunting is an (,.l.j.I .. ':i robust and high-value use of '.,1.1i1.. It is true
that non-hunting tourism can outcompete hunting tourism economically but only in
prime areas with excellent .. .l.lII. Hunting remains the bread and butter of '.1. ll.







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" .(" I i. .. ....../--' ....I~- 2/1 /18



operations, especially in non-prime areas and in times of global or national crisis when
tourists stop traveling but hunters do not. Hunting provides a significant cash flow
from very few animals, facilitating the transition towards ...I11,; .. ..I land uses. In-
deed, it is difficult to make the transition from livestock to ..: .i=.I. in the absence of hunt-
ing, except for people with large amounts of money to invest. We see this even in the
development of Pilanesberg Game Reserve in South Africa (Johnson et al. 2009). The gov-
ernment purchased degraded livestock ranches to form a new park on the basis that this
was a better economic use of the land. The transition was partly financed by carefully con-
trolled trophy hunting of excess males. Hunting was carefully zoned in time and place to
avoid conflicts with the i i I' growing photo-safari business while careful hunting prac-
tices were used, so .I i Ili did not associate gunshots with vehicles or people.
Hunting is an essential component of the transition to d I. i=.:. -, I land uses. However,
as -.,I i:. populations and diversity recover, landholders are able to introduce photographic
tourism, building attractive lodges, and training significant numbers of local guides, cooks,
caterers, and managers. However, even in these circumstances, photo-tourism and hunting
are compatible. Conflicts are certainly common between tour operators and hunting outfit-
ters when they are competing for land and wildlife (e.g., around the Okavango Delta in
Botswana and the Luangwa Valley in Zambia), but such problems seldom arise when the
same manager is responsible for both operations, as in the 1'i,! ..i. ;i example.



Conclusions
It has taken 60 years for ...1 ii,- to emerge as an important and economically viable land
use option. It is now a proven economic model, and given the right ecological and institu-
tion circumstance, .. .il. .. can provide ...., ... more jobs and economic growth than
conventional uses of the same land. We still face the i .11 ,, .- of how to apply this model
more broadly in Africa's communal lands, a i : c ll i- that requires genuine devolution of
proprietorship from government to community and democratic and effective organizational
-,. *...=1 r-., -:'. i-r ,.i com m unities.
The -. i!.i. option has emerged through proactive policy making and private sector
entrepreneurship. Far-sighted conservation bureaucrats ( 1. ili. i.:. i the postcolonial sta-
tus quo and developed a new approach to '. d.:!,!1. conservation based on landholder
i., .., ; They sought to maximize the value from '... I:.. to people living with it by (1)
devolving full proprietorship to i,.:'., ..I.... (2) encouraging sustainable commercial
uses provided they were humane, and i reducing the regulatory burden on the sector.
This allowed thousands of wildlife owners to experiment with new products, r ..l.i
driving up the value of-. i !.:i!..-r in ways that we seldom see with other wild resources
like forests. Where institutions were changed in this way, mainly on private land but
also in some communal lands, :i.ili. and the habitats on which it depends have
recovered enormously. But where --:.: !I.. remained centralized and noncommercial,
... i, :, populations have declined.
Many drylands are locked in a reinforcing cycle of ecological over-utilization, but
economic under-utilization often linked to a reliance on .........i i .1 production
systems. Bold policy -., .i,- ,-..i a transformation to an economy based not on commod-
ities but on experiences the i.1 1I. and bio-experience sector. This generates more
economic activity yet extracts far less from the environment and, though it seems







Child et al. Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practice 2012, 2:18 Page 29 of 32
I i ... I ..... i .... I~-''. /2/1 /18




counterintuitive in a world afflicted with poverty, the terms of trade for tourism and
experiences are improving steadily whereas the price of agricultural commodities has
been stagnant or : ii,- for several decades.
In the past few years, recognition of the importance of ecosystem services has increased.
In the most thorough analysis to date, Robert Constanza and his ., .II. .. demonstrated
that the value of ecosystems exceeds global GDP by several factors (Costanza, d'Arge et al.
1997). But the problem is that these values are not reflected in the private prices that guide
the decision makers of : i... -l.i.I. i nor, therefore, in land use outcomes. In the 1960s, wild-
life faced these very same problems. They were addressed by adopting a new approach to
conservation based on well-crafted institutions at both the national and local level that
sought, first, to maximize the value of-. :. II.-. to the I o., II.: .. by internalizing (privatizing)
its benefits and costs at the level of the landholder, and to simultaneously establish demo-
cratic collective action to manage externalities and scale. Contrary to the predictions of con-
servationists, .... -!..--.. .:.h:..'.: -. Iihr. in this way has had positive conservation and
development outcomes. Positive outcomes hinge on the simultaneous application of two
factors: driving up the price of* il..I. (i.e., price) while ensuring that benefits and manage-
ment are controlled by landholders (i.e., proprietorship and subsidiarity). In the absence of
proprietorship, for example, the high price of ivory and rhino horn has been disastrous, but
taking away the value of -..1.ii::. is not a solution either because it is quickly replaced by al-
ternative land uses.
The development of the wildlife sector has been a policy experiment based on the hypoth-
esis that giving wildlife value to the people who live with it will result in positive develop-
ment and conservation outcomes, requiring considerable tenacity and adaptive learning in
navigating towards this objective in complex economic and political circumstances. The ap-
proach has succeeded where laws, regulations, and operational procedures have incorpo-
rated the principles of price, I" i. "', i':I subsidiarity, and adaptive management in a
theoretically sound and disciplined manner. Indeed, 1, I.:1.i. provides a pioneering example
of Payments for Ecosystem Services, which was relatively easy to implement because of the
high value of ,i.lli. and the relative simplicity of costs and benefits attribution (at least
compared to ecosystem processes). Ecosystem services are facing similar market failures of
.. ,I. 1: The i, II ... -" of our generation may well be to convert these values into incentives
for maintaining ecosystem services, perhaps by 1 11..;' some of the lessons from the wild-
life sector in southern Africa.

Competing interests
[te authors declare they have no competing interests

Authors' contributions
BC corceptua ized and compiled the paper jM provided data on game ranching and GP provided data on
community livelihoods in Soulh Africa GC stienrgthened the paper's historical and policy rperspechves Al authors
read and approved the final manusctrio

Author details
Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies (STIAS), Wallenberg Research Centre at Stellenbosch University, Marais
Street, Stellenbosch 7600, South Africa 2Department of Geography, Center for Africa Studies, University of Florida, 427
Grinter Hall, PO Box 115560, Florida, USA

Received: 19 October 2011 Accepted: 5 March 2012
Published: 28 September 2012

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doi:10.1186/2041-7136-2-18
Cite this article as: Child et ao The economics and institutional economics of wildlife on private land in Africa.
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!DOCTYPE art SYSTEM 'http:www.biomedcentral.comxmlarticle.dtd'
ui 2041-7136-2-18ji 2041-7136fm dochead Reviewbibl title p The economics and institutional economics of wildlife on private land in Africaaug au id A1 ca yes snm Childmi Afnm Brianinsr iid I1 email bchild@ufl.eduA2 MusengeziJessicajmuzengesi@gmail.comA3 ParentDGregorygparent@ufl.eduA4 ChildT Graham F I2 gftchild@gmail.cominsg ins Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies (STIAS), Wallenberg Research Centre at Stellenbosch University, Marais Street, Stellenbosch, 7600, South AfricaDepartment of Geography, Center for Africa Studies, University of Florida, 427 Grinter Hall, P.O. Box 115560, Florida, USAsource Pastoralism: Research, Policy and Practiceissn 2041-7136pubdate 2012volume 2issue 1fpage 18url http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18xrefbib pubid idtype doi 10.1186/2041-7136-2-18history rec date day 19month 10year 2011acc 532012pub 2892012cpyrt 2012collab Child et al.; licensee Springer.note This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.kwdg kwd Wildlife economicsWildlife conservationGame ranchingSustainable useSouthern Africaabs sec st AbstractIn southern Africa, there are now 10,000 to 14,000 private ranchers that promote wildlife enterprises alone or in some in combination with domestic livestock. An important conservation success, this new bio-experience economy also creates social well-being through economic growth and job creation. It is an economic sector that needs to be taken seriously, not least because it pioneers policies that inform the valorization and sustainable management of ecosystem services. The article describes the historical emergence of a sustainable use approach to wildlife conservation since the Arusha Conference in 1963. It suggests that indigenous multi-species systems may have ecological advantages over modern livestock production systems, but these are difficult to quantify in complex dryland ecosystems and are trumped by economics and political processes. However, wildlife provides the foundation for a bio-experience economy that has a decided comparative economic advantage over agro-extractive commodity production (like beef) in drylands. We describe how new policy approaches, especially the valorization of wildlife and the devolution of proprietorship to landholders and communities, have allowed wildlife's economic advantages to be reflected in land use decisions through both ‘game ranching’ and ‘community-based natural resource management’. Institutional changes have modified the economics of wildlife in drylands, promoting both conservation and development by allocating environmental raw materials to higher-order goods and services. A further goal of the paper is to describe practical economic methods for assessing and explaining the wildlife sector to policy makers in terms of its profitability, both to individual landholders and to society through jobs and economic growth. The paper covers a 50-year period between the PhD studies of the four authors and takes a trans disciplinary approach which values the knowledge of practitioners as much as the academic literature.meta classifications classification WP subtype theme_series_title type BMC Wildlife and Pastoralismtheme_series_editor Maryam Niamir-Fullerbdy ReviewBackgroundThis provides a review of the economic evolution of the private wildlife sector in southern Africa since the 1960s. It is intended to be accessible to a wide readership (not just economists or wildlife managers). It draws on the academic literature but also on considerable practitioner knowledge networks including gray and oral literature. It describes the history of the wildlife sector from the perspective of the economic principles and lessons that are emerging from this policy experiment. Our purpose is to describe the evolution of a sustainable use (or neo-liberal) approach to wildlife management (abbr bid B82 SASUSG 1996; B57 Martin 2009), which is underrepresented in the literature relative to alternative paradigms of conservation and development.We evaluate the economics of wildlife using the private sector experience for methodological reasons, although this economy is smaller than the wildlife economy based on Africa's protected areas, less scalable to Africa's extensive drylands than community-based wildlife management, and under political scrutiny because of its racial history. However, stronger property rights and a gradual shift from administrative to free-market competitive pricing mean that pricing is less distorted and economic evaluation is more reliable on private land. Evaluating the economics of drylands is difficult at the best of times because internalizing the full costs and benefits of resources like water, grazing, and wildlife is complicated because they are fugitive in space and time, while ecological processes such as carbon and water cycles and soil processes are complex and nonlinear, making the attribution of costs and benefits difficult.The political economy of natural resources further muddies the economic waters. Historically, wildlife has been monopolized (e.g., protected areas) and heavily regulated by the state, and market signals violate many of the assumptions needed for a sound economic analysis given the recent and partial shift from centralized planning to market-based approaches. Wildlife also coexists with pastoralists and subsistence farmers who are politically marginalized, with limited and contradictory rights (e.g., of exclusion and use) to natural resources. Thus, economic signals are distorted by a combination of state monopolies, regulation, administrative pricing, weak institutions and/or predatory governance, and confused or open-access property regimes, making economic analysis near impossible. ‘Market failure’, an economic term that refers to the gap between the actual price of a good and its real value, is pervasive.On private land in southern Africa and, indeed, where private land exists elsewhere in Africa's drylands, the shift from livestock to wildlife is widely acknowledged but not reliably quantified. There are reported to be some 9,000 ‘game ranches’ in South Africa alone plus over 15,000 which combine wildlife with livestock (B28 Cousins et al. 2008). The rapid expansion of the wildlife sector mirrors the growth in the regional and global bio-tourism industry and is reflective of shifting global terms of trade. The South African game ranching sector has expanded at between 5% and 20% annually in the last decade, whereas real farm incomes have declined by 5.3% (B35 Dry 2010a,B36 b; B45 Jenkins 2011). Game ranching is a diverse sector that combines ecotourism, the sale of live animals, several forms of hunting, and as a by-product, meat production. Prime wildlife areas generate large amounts of income and employment from tourism, while trophy hunting is geographically more extensive and a reliable form of income where wildlife populations are recovering or in areas of limited tourism potential. Hunting is critical in the transition from cattle ranching back to multi-species production systems, except where large amounts of capital are available for restocking, because it utilizes only 2% to 3% of wildlife populations that can biologically expand at 10% to 30%. The markets for hunting also appear to be larger and more robust than is often assumed, and both the supply and price of trophy animals has been rising steadily in southern Africa since the mid-1970s (B5 Booth 2002,B6 2009; B54 Lindsey et al. in press). For example, elephants sold for US dollars $250 in the late 1970s and are now worth $12,000 to $20,000 in trophy fees and up to $65,000 when we include outfitter fees. This suggests that upscaling of trophy hunting and ecotourism is possible without tumbling prices. The southern African wildlife sector is a tiny share of the global tourism and hunting market, and tourism is a cluster industry that benefits from economies of scale and from trends in global terms of trade. By contrast, beef commodity prices have been stagnating globally for nearly four decades (albeit with a significant upturn in the last two years). Beef production has also shifted steadily away from the drylands since the 1960s following technological ‘advances’ like grain feeding, nitrogen supplementation, and feedlots, while Africa's drylands are unlikely to be competitive with large-scale meat production in Argentina, Brazil, or the USA.Land use trends on private land, together with the data summarized in this paper, confirm that the bio-experience economy based on the multiple uses of wildlife is an increasingly serious industry. It is beginning to be included in national agricultural statistics, especially in South Africa, though it is not yet well quantified because of its diversity compared to commodity markets. As an example of the magnitude of this sector, private land hunting alone is worth over US $one billion in South Africa. Even the casual observer can see that Africa's famous protected areas have significant impacts on the growth of nearby urban centers like Arusha (Tanzania), Kasane, Maun (Botswana) as well as national capitals.The purpose of this paper is to present the case for wildlife as a profitable form of land use in semiarid savannas, creating more jobs and economic growth than meat commodity production. For ecological and economic reasons, the bio-experience economy is a legitimate development option. With a more favorable policy environment, it could be applied on a much broader scale than is currently the case, especially if it can be adapted to Africa's communal area circumstances through approaches like community-based natural resource management. Furthermore, these economic advantages are increasing. Global terms of trade are moving in favour of the bio-experience economy; the wildlife sector is a new industry with considerable potential for adding value through product diversification and development, and it is synergistic with ecosystem services like water and carbon that are as undervalued as wildlife was several decades ago.In focusing this paper on presenting the economic case for wildlife, we are not taking an ‘either-or approach’ to economic alternatives. Our aim is to maximize the well-being of people living in marginal areas in environmentally sustainable ways, with wildlife conservation contributing to this in areas where it has a comparative advantage. Nonetheless, we cannot avoid the implications that meat commodity production through livestock or wildlife is economically and environmentally questionable in drylands. White minority regimes supported cattle ranchers with significant subsidies for several decades, but when these were removed in the transition to black majority rule, the beef economy in drylands was shown to be financially marginal and ecologically hazardous, and many of these landholders only survived by adding or switching to wildlife operations (B16 Child 1988; B38 Grossman and Gandar 1989).Unlike beef commodity production, traditional livestock systems have multiple values (e.g., milk, meat, cash, and store of value). This may give them financial and ecological advantages, but in the absence of recent or detailed long-term studies of these systems that include the costs of labour and environmental capital, we are safer to assume that they are unlikely to outperform commercial systems by a factor of two. In other words, their viability is still questionable, and we are irresponsible if we do not question the assumption that dryland animal production can meaningfully address poverty. While we claim no expertise in pastoral economics, our livelihood surveys (unpublished data) from Shorobe and Sankuyu communities in northern Botswana suggest that household poverty is higher, and income distribution far more skewed, in communities that depend on livestock (Shorobe) than those with wildlife (Sankuyo). Additional data from communal lands in South Africa (see below) suggest that the economic output communal land is low. While beyond the scope of this paper, rural people in the drylands of southern Africa are vulnerable to extreme poverty and appear to be surviving more on wages, remittances, and government transfer payments than on local production. Generally speaking, livestock are kept primarily for cultural reasons and as a mechanism of savings and coping with risk. It is also significant that they are an asset that can be privately owned and used to harvest natural resources in situations where people generally have limited rights to valorize, manage, or exclude others from ‘their’ natural resources. This paper is about the wildlife economy and its potential to drive development.The challenge of scaling up this economic model and adjusting it to the livelihoods of the rural poor in Africa's communal drylands moves beyond the economic model itself to the challenges of transferring it in difficult political, institutional capacity and demographic circumstances. This policy response in southern Africa has been labeled community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). Since the mid-1980s, CBNRM has attempted to replicate the economic success of wildlife on private land in the complex institutional circumstances of Africa's communal areas (B56 Martin 1986; B58 Metcalfe 1993; B47 Jones and Murphree 2004; B23 Child and Barnes 2010) by attempting devolving full rights to use, manage, and benefit from wildlife to communities as had been done for private game ranchers (B62 Murphree 1994), albeit falling short of this intention (Martin 2009). On the one hand, it is naïve to suggest that wildlife can resolve poverty for millions of people in drylands, but on the other, CBNRM has clearly benefited both people and wildlife where it has been implemented with some level of competence (B25 Child et al. 2003; B66 NACSO 2006). However, in several countries where superior wildlife resources could clearly benefit people, this has not occurred (B69 Nelson and Blomley 2009; B68 Nelson 2010). We fall on the side of the debate that the problem lies more with implementation than with the model itself (B41 Hulme and Murphree 2001), which often falls far short of best practice because communities are not really empowered to use, manage, and benefit from wildlife (or for most natural resources that matter) (Martin 2009; B78 Ribot et al. 2010).Although strongly associated with wildlife, CBNRM in southern Africa can be interpreted as a new institutional model that links payments for ecological services to poverty reduction (B19 Child 2004a,B20 B37 Frost and Bond 2008), which is applicable to many ecosystem services, but just happens to take advantage of the value of wildlife and opportunities that arose because wildlife provided an institutional greenfield. We certainly need such models. Ecosystem services have been valued at several times global gross domestic product (GDP) (B27 Costanza et al. 1997), but we seldom take this into account in land use decisions. Indeed, the challenge of our generation may well be to internalize the costs and benefits of ecosystem services in the livelihoods and land use decisions of the rural people who coexist with biodiversity in the manner that has been attempted for wildlife. For example, the models of micro-governance and household cash payment systems developed in some community wildlife programs (Child 2004a,b,B21 2006) are currently being replicated with REDD payments in Tanzania (Morgan Brown, personal communication). In other words, wildlife provides both a valuable resource for many drylands and also a new model with economic, institutional, and governance components that may be transferable to other natural resources and ecosystem services. This paper addresses only the economic component of this approach.New approaches to wildlife conservationBeginning in the 1950s, conservationists in southern and East Africa began to develop a new paradigm for conservation based on sustainable use of natural resources (SASUSG 1996). Leading this policy experimentation was private game ranching, especially in southern Africa. Although this has been a highly successful conservation and economic initiative, relatively little is published about it or about the economic research, methods, and principles behind this growth. Private wildlife conservation or ‘game ranching’ strongly influenced the new vision of conservation and development that arose to prominence during the 1980s and 1990s (Martin 2009). The basic message of the sustainable use approach is that wild resources and ecosystem services are enormously valuable. If we change the ways that we govern them and if we can place landholders and rural communities at the junction of benefit and management, wild resources can pay for themselves and simultaneously address rural poverty and environmental injustice. At the time these ideas were introduced, they were radical, encompassing three major conceptual strands (Hulme and Murphree 2001):indent 1 that the state should devolve proprietorship, including the responsibility for and benefits from managing wild resources, to the landholders and the communities that live with them;that natural resources should be exploited sustainably and as profitably as possible to achieve both conservation and development goals; andthat the neo-liberal concepts of markets, property, and exchange should play a greater role in shaping incentives for conservation and allocating resources to their highest valued uses.Game ranching provides an example of how practitioners simplified a plethora of principles into one overarching guiding statement: ‘to maximize the benefits from wildlife to the people on whose land it lives’ (B18 Child 1995). It is also an example of the centrality of institutions or the formal rules or informal norms that frame human conduct (B70 North 1990) to the relationships between people, economy and nature, and the process of modifying these institutions in ways that were insightful, carefully crafted (B7 Borgerhoff Mulder and Coppolillo 2005), and changed the outlook for wildlife in Africa.Brief history of wildlife useWe can view the wildlife economy in four phases (Table tblr tid T1 1). In the pre-modern economy, wildlife was plentiful, and the primary constraint to use was the technology and costs of harvesting it. This was followed by a ‘frontier economy’ associated with the Industrial Revolution and the exploration and settlement of Africa by Europeans. New technology and markets, including guns, wagons, and even railways, radically altered the economy of wildlife and enabled hunters to harvest vast numbers of wildlife at a low cost to sell in new urban and global markets. In the absence of institutions for controlling offtake, wildlife, including North America's vast herds of bison, was decimated in a classic case of market failure whereby individuals internalize benefits but externalize costs to society.In response to this, wildlife was nationalized. In 1900 and 1933, the European powers met in London to respond to the perceived extirpation of wildlife in their African colonies, making three policy decisions with long-lasting implications (B40 Heijnsbergen 1997). First, they encouraged the formation of state protected areas, which led to the formation of Africa's spectacular national parks and now support vibrant economies when managed effectively. Second, they greatly restricted the commercial use of wildlife, rendering wildlife valueless except for low-value subsistence uses. Third, they centralized ownership of wildlife in the state, disenfranchising landholders and taking upon themselves the burden of protecting wildlife from people (anti-poaching) and protecting people from wildlife (problem animal control). In some countries, local communities were severely disenfranchised, especially where traditional methods of hunting were made illegal and ownership of firearms was restricted (B11 Carruthers 1989; B9 Brockington and Igoe 2006). But in others, like Zambia and Botswana, local people were given considerable freedom to hunt under permit systems that often became difficult to administer (B1 Astle 1999).The policy response embedded in the ‘London Convention’ became widely accepted, sometimes dogmatically, as the way conservation should be done: a combination of ‘pristine’ parks and non-utilization of wildlife on land outside them, with wildlife as a priceless but commercially valueless asset, funded by the state and managed on its behalf by a small band of dedicated game rangers. However, by the late 1950s, population growth and the rapid spread of agriculture and livestock were causing an inexorable decline of Africa's unique and spectacular wildlife. At the twilight of colonial Africa, many leading conservationists met at the Arusha Conference on the ‘Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in Modern African States’, emphasizing that a radical new approach was needed to conserve wildlife (B42 IUCN 1963). This, the delegates said, needed to be led by Africans, and wildlife needed to become an economic asset according to the emerging ‘use it or lose it’ philosophy. Thus, the opening comments of the conference proceedings emphasize: it Only by the planned utilization of wildlife as a renewable natural resources, either for protein or as a recreational attraction, can its conservation and development be economically justified in competition with agriculture, stock ranching and other forms of land use (p19, IUCN 1963).table Table 1caption b Phases in the political economy of wildlifetgroup align left cols 2 colspec colname c1 colnum colwidth 1* c2 thead valign top row rowsep entry PhaseFeaturestbody 1. Pre-modern economy· Use is limited by ability/costs of harvestingmorerows 2. Frontier economy· Costs of harvesting greatly reduced by technology.· Profits increased by markets.· But few rules or norms to control use3. Wildlife is nationalized· Control of wildlife centralized in the state· Commercial use greatly restricted4. Sustainable use approach· Use of wildlife devolved to landholders (and later, to communities)· Commercial uses encouragedThe emergence of wildlife utilizationConservationists began to argue that wildlife was better suited to using Africa's harsh environments than the domestic monocultures imported from Europe because, to quote again from the Arusha Conference, the variety of ungulate fauna, their mobility, high standing biomass, and greater nutritional efficiency is seen to give them advantages over domestic livestock that concentrate their attention on a single constituent of the plant standing-crop biomass the graminacious carpet (p19, IUCN 1963). Nonetheless, by 1980 fully, some 95% of the large herbivore biomass in southern Africa was livestock (B31 Cumming and Bond 1991).The 1950s and 1960s saw unprecedented research into the ecology of wildlife, its meat production potential, and even domestication (B84 Talbot et al. 1961; B85 Talbot et al. 1965; B60 Mossman 1975). Cropping schemes were initiated, mostly in East Africa, and well-known conservationists like George Adamson and others (in Kenya), and Norman Carr (Zambia) proposed schemes whereby local people would benefit from wildlife (IUCN 1963; B74 Parker 2004). The United Nation's African Special Project was developed to assess and invest in the potential for wildlife as an economic tool in Africa (B81 Riney and Hill 1967), including the establishment of national parks and game reserves (e.g., Botswana) and cropping schemes (e.g., Luangwa Valley, Zambia). However, with the transition from colonial to African rule in East Africa, the control of wildlife was increasingly centralized (B49 Kabiri 2010), and policy momentum shifted to southern Africa where there was considerable discussion about the potential value of wildlife (B79 Riney 1960; B33 Dasmann 1964), and experimental game cropping was initiated (B34 Dasmann and Mossman 1961). By the late 1960s, the heads of wildlife agencies in southern Africa began meeting annually through the ‘Standing Committee for Nature Conservation and the Management and Use of Wildlife’ of the ‘Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and Utilization of the Soil’. Soon thereafter, we see legislation emerging in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, and South Africa's provinces allowing landholders to use their wildlife commercially and with far fewer state-imposed restrictions (B15 Child 1971; B83 Suich and Child 2009). When it became apparent that permits and surveys were impractical and that landholders husbanded valuable wildlife just as they husbanded their domestic stock, regulatory requirements were reduced. In Zimbabwe, they were virtually removed by the bold Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975.Ecology and commodity (meat) productionEarly research and discussions focused on wildlife's ecological adaptations to Africa's climate and diseases (Mossman 1975) and the ability of wildlife to produce more meat, or better quality meat, than livestock (Talbot et al. 1965). It suggested that wildlife produced high-quality meat but that the logistical challenges of cropping free-ranging wild animals reduced potential profits. Research then turned to the relative suitability of diverse multi-species production systems compared to livestock monocultures. In elegant studies, ecologists noted how the diversity of wildlife was matched to the diversity of vegetation and threats from predators (B44 Jarman 1973), and that semiarid savannas in particular evolved under indigenous multi-species systems typically carrying 15 to 25 ungulate species compared to a maximum of five domestic species (B29 Cumming 1982; B30 Cumming 1995). Scientists were surprised at how much overlap there was in the dietary preferences of wild herbivores, but it was also argued that diet separation and the fact that gregarious wildlife was invariably mobile helped to maintain ecological balance, especially between the woody and grass components of savannas (B89 Taylor and Walker 1978; Child 1995). Ecologists noted that production in many African rangelands was water limited (B26 Coe et al. 1976; B4 Bell 1982) and emphasized the importance of the grass layer in absorbing rainfall and making it available to plants (B50 Kelly and Walker 1976). ‘Degradation’ was thought to be synonymous with the loss of perennial grasses, which maintained the structure of the soil surface and absorbed water (B80 Riney 1963; B91 Walker 1987). Overgrazing or frequent incorrect burning of the grass layer could tip the crucial balance between grass and trees (Riney 1963; B55 Mahesh Sankaran et al. 2005) into a new (and less productive) stable state from which recovery was difficult (B10 Campbell and Child 1971; B92 Walker et al. 2004).Important and interesting as this research was, researchers were marching down a blind alley in comparing the relative ability of wildlife and livestock to produce meat. The meat productive potential of semiarid rangelands was ecologically limited, regardless of species. Increasing animal production reduced the health of the grass layer (and water infiltration where water was the limiting factor), thus undermining itself. In other words, meat production was ecologically limited, and attempts to move beyond these limits ultimately failed as we see later with private beef ranching in Zimbabwe. Ultimately, the solution lay not in choosing between wildlife and livestock for meat production but in adding value in ways that was not directly linked to extraction from the environment, such as experiences or luxury goods like trophy animals. Seen retrospectively, wildlife scientists mistakenly thought in terms of commodity production (like the agricultural agencies of the time) rather than improving the economic allocation of resources to add value. In the end, institutional adaptation and the development of new markets by farmers, not production technology, provided commercial solutions for ranchers through a shift from agro-extractive beef commodity production to a bio-experience economy.Dysfunctional legal systems and human-wildlife relationshipsIn the twentieth century, white settlers acquired land in southern and East Africa, and African agriculture and populations grew rapidly. Prior to World War II (WWII), the new conservation laws were directed mainly at white commercial hunters, and local hunting for the pot was usually overlooked (Parker 2004). But as rural populations grew, local hunting began to threaten wildlife, was increasingly treated as poaching, and prosecuted by the state. Criminalizing a traditional livelihood strategy like hunting created a powerful sense of injustice, especially when enacted by colonial governments that lacked political legitimacy. ‘Poachers’ became Robin Hoods and were protected by their communities, so wildlife laws were difficult to implement. This also created a negative relationship between local people, wildlife, and the state.Setting the state up against the people was never likely to result in sustainable solutions for wildlife. In pre-independence Zimbabwe, for instance, protectionist conservation alienated white farmers from wildlife and became an important political tool in the hands of black nationalists by highlighting the injustice of white minority rule. Even today, some national wildlife agencies expropriate the benefits of wildlife for themselves and their cronies and treat local ‘poachers’ brutally, so pastoral people who are natural allies of wildlife, are planting fields in important wildlife areas, mostly to protect their land rights (Nelson 2010).One outcome of these dysfunctional policies is the false impression that local people hate wildlife. Our surveys of local people across southern Africa show that people are often extremely concerned about the impact of wildlife on their crops and livestock (and the ineffective management of this problem), yet over 90% of people claim to like wildlife (or to like it a lot) for both aesthetic and material reasons. What they do not like, however, is the inequity of wildlife laws and the high-handed manners of officials who implement them; they like wildlife, and even protected areas, but not the wildlife officials or laws. This situation is beginning to improve with the advent of CBNRM in countries like Namibia and Botswana.Protectionist, centralized wildlife legislation, from urbanized and wealthy industrial nations, was politically unjust and economically flawed, causing enormous losses of wildlife in developing, rural societies after WWII as agriculture expanded. The 1940s to the 1970s were the heyday of agriculture. Cattle ranchers complained that ‘you cannot farm in a zoo’ and wildlife was steadily exterminated (B86 Taylor 2002). Newspaper clippings in Zimbabwe dramatize cases where cattle ranchers shot large numbers of wildebeest and zebra and (having no legal commercial use) left them to ‘rot in the veld’. However, the bigger threat was more subtle: the fencing of water points and livestock overgrazing eliminated wildlife for lack of food and water.The perspectives and contributions of private landholdersWe use a series of case studies to describe the shift back to wildlife, which began slowly led by a few maverick cattle ranches and then accelerated into a landscape-wide phenomena. In the Lowveld of Zimbabwe, for example, the late George Style of Buffalo Range Ranch (20,000 ha) had a penchant for wildlife. From the mid-1950s, he developed a successful cattle business, fencing paddocks and providing artificial water. The eastern section of his ranch was bounded by the Chiredzi River, which for decades provided wildlife and livestock with permanent water in the dry season (Figure figr fid F1 1). Consequently, this part of the ranch (some 9,000 ha) was degraded, and George Style experimented with wildlife as much as a hobby as for commercial reasons. Browsers like eland, kudu, and impala thrived, and the sensitive grazing species like sable, roan, and Lichtenstein's hartebeest displaced by cattle began to recover. Style culled impala to be sold through his butcheries and soon (early 1970s) initiated ‘mini-safaris’ with foreign hunting clients in a well-appointed hunting camp.fig Figure 1 Map of Buffalo Range Cattle and Game Ranchtext
Map of Buffalo Range Cattle and Game Ranch.
graphic file 2041-7136-2-18-1 George and his son, Clive, encouraged the use of their ranch for comparative research. Detailed vegetation transects showed that cattle grazing damaged perennial grasses and the soil surface, largely because of the continuously high stocking necessary to keep a beef enterprise viable, whereas the range was slowly recovering under wildlife (Taylor and Walker 1978; Child 1988) (Figure F2 2). Overstocking appeared to directly damage range productivity, with the pattern of cumulative overstocking (i.e., stocking rate in each year less predicted carrying capacity calculated from rainfall using the formula from Coe et al. 1976) matching a rapid decline in cattle calving rates (Child 1988) (Figure F3 3) and ultimately destroying the profitability of the livestock enterprise on Buffalo Range. This experience was shared by many cattle ranchers in the Lowveld (B76 PriceWaterhouse 1994; Taylor 2002), who began to switch to wildlife enterprises, some partially, some completely, and some as groups of landholders over large blocks of land, especially after losing livestock in the severe droughts of 1984 and 1992 (Taylor 2002; B53 Lindsay et al. 2009). Figure 2 Changes in grass cover and grazing intensity on Buffalo Range ranch between 1973 and 1986
Changes in grass cover and grazing intensity on Buffalo Range ranch between 1973 and 1986.
2041-7136-2-18-2 Figure 3 The relationship between range condition and cattle productivity on Buffalo Range ranch (1967–1986)
The relationship between range condition and cattle productivity on Buffalo Range ranch (1967–1986).
2041-7136-2-18-3 The beginnings of safari hunting on private landOn most properties, the switch to wildlife was gradual. Many cattle ranchers survived financially by using remnant populations of wildlife for safari hunting. With good revenues and few overhead costs, wildlife initially supplemented cattle ranching, but later, some ranchers switched over entirely. Hunting guests from North America or Europe stayed with the rancher for seven to ten days, initially in a spare bedroom and later in specially built accommodation. Each day, they would go out early in the morning or in the late afternoon, shooting roughly one animal a day. These were called ‘plains-game safaris’ because they relied on species like kudu, zebra, wildebeest, impala, and warthog. Ranchers then improved their hunting product by nurturing or reintroducing valuable species like eland, sable, waterbuck, and even predators like leopard, and later by adding big game like elephant and buffalo, usually as part of multi-property conservancies. But to do this, they began to improve environmental management by reducing stocking rates and habitat fragmentation by removing cattle fences and scaling up to multi-property management units. Cattle ranchers like George Style spent many days in the field hunting and developed considerable knowledge about the habits and needs of wildlife, which spread through farmer field days. Under natural conditions, wildlife is highly mobile to respond to highly variable savanna rainfall, and ranchers defragmented their land with simple (and cost-saving) measure like removing one strand from conventional four-strand cattle fences, allowing species like kudu and eland to jump over them, and wildebeest and warthog to duck under them. Similarly, they stopped fencing water points and modified conventional cattle water troughs to enable wildlife to drink. They catered for the specific needs of valuable species like sable, which struggle to compete with cattle, and managed diseases like ‘snotsiekte’ (malignant catarrh) by ensuring that their cattle were separated from wildebeest at calving time, during which transmission from wildebeest to cattle occurs.Trophy hunting is sustainable; meat production very riskyAlthough it runs counter to the moral argument, hunting animals for meat should not be encouraged whereas killing them for sport provides a powerful conservation tool. The recovery of wildlife over much of southern Africa has gone hand-in-hand with trophy hunting, which is a robust, low-risk solution for two reasons: (1) the mathematics of population biology and (2) the transparency of safari hunting markets. An offtake of 2% to 3% provides a steady supply of quality trophy males compared to population growth rates of 10% to 30%, so ranchers like George Style made good profits from safari hunting at the same time when wildlife populations recovered rapidly. Trophy hunting (unlike meat production) is profitable and ecologically robust, even more so because trophy hunting markets are personalized and information-rich, so hunting clients quickly avoid outfitters who over-hunt with below-average trophy (horn) size. Indeed, the ecological challenge on successful game ranches like Buffalo Range is seldom too little wildlife, but too much. George Style culled hundreds of impala to protect the environment and allow greater diversity of wildlife even though game meat production seldom covered costs.In contrast to safari hunting, which is ecologically robust and profitable, commercial or subsistence wildlife meat production is ecologically risky and economically questionable. Meat is a ubiquitous low-value commodity without the market checks and balances associated with hunting trophies. We need to kill at least 20 times as many animals to generate the same income from meat as from trophy hunting, and the costs are much higher. On private land, bushmeat is seldom viable except as a by-product of more lucrative hunting and tourism businesses, with the implication that bushmeat poaching is viable only because the harvester externalizes many costs to society. The safest conclusion is that meat production in drylands, either from livestock or wildlife, is seldom viable if the full financial and environmental costs and benefits are accounted for. It has not succeeded on private land, and we extend economic models based on bushmeat production to rural communities at our peril.Developing an economic understanding of wildlife productionTrophy hunting is worth more than a billion dollars in South Africa alone (Flack, personal communication), yet data and publications on private wildlife conservation in southern Africa are sparse. The purposes of this section are to summarize, with increasing sophistication, methods used to understand the economics of the private wildlife sector, to influence policy making in the past 25 years, and to use case studies to illustrate how the wildlife sector has emerged.Shortly after Zimbabwe's Independence in 1980, one of the authors (Brian Child) was recruited by the wildlife department to conduct economic research and extension on game ranching (1984 to 1989). By spending extensive time with game and cattle ranchers, he gained their confidence, learned how much they knew about wildlife, and worked with them to understand the economics of their wildlife and livestock enterprises. Data from 22 cattle ranchers at the wetter limits of rangelands in the Zimbabwean Midlands in 1984 (B90 Vincent and Thomas 1961) showed that safari hunting was easily the primary wildlife activity, with income comprised as follows: guiding (35%), trophy fees (46%), meat from trophy animals (13%), and meat cropping (7%). All but one of these landholders was primarily a cattle rancher.Gross income (turnover) and net margins (profits)Livestock, which comprised 80% of herbivore biomass, generated most of the income in the area (Table T2 2), but when variable costs were deducted, livestock profits were (Zimbabwean dollar) Z$4.52/ha compared to Z$2.93 from wildlife. All values for Zimbabwean research are stated in 1984/86 Z$ when US$1=Z$1.3 A new financial ratio (i.e., profit/kg livemass) that we invented to reflect the ecological reality that grass was the limiting factor (see above) showed that, from 1 kg of livemass, wildlife earned 17c and cattle earned 7c, suggesting that, at the margin, it paid landholders to reallocate grazing from livestock with wildlife. A similar survey of 15 properties and 446,818 ha in the more arid Lowveld in 1986 (including Buffalo Range Ranch) confirmed that it was economically rational to switch land from livestock (earning 7c/kg livemass) to wildlife (26c) (Table T3 3).Table 2A financial comparison (in Zimbabwean $ dollars) of wildlife and livestock in the Zimbabwean Midlands in 19844 center c3 3 c4 nameend namest Wildlife and livestock economics in the Zimbabwe MidlandsUnitsCattleWildlifeComparison/unit area (wildlife = 20% of biomass)IncomeHa$13.57$3.36Profit (income − variable costs)Ha$4.52$2.93Comparison/kg biomassGross incomeKg20c20cProfitKg7c17cTable 3A financial comparison (in Z$ dollars) of wildlife and livestock in the Zimbabwe Lowveld in 19865 c5 Cattle and wildlife profitability in the Lowveld in 1986Livemass (kg)Turnover (Z$)Profit (Z$)Profit/kgtfoot m = million.Cattlechar 10.1 m$2.0 m$0.7 m0.07Wildlife4.7 m$1.4 m$1.2 m0.26Repeating a survey of rancher opinions (unpublished mimeo) about rancher opinions about wildlife in the Zimbabwe Midlands ten years after the radical Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975 (that devolved full authority to landholders to use wildlife), and only four years after the civil war ended, showed significant changes. Wildlife income had quadrupled, and neutral or negative attitudes towards wildlife decreased from 22% to 0%. In line with the predictions of the sustainable use approach, the geographic range of valuable hunting species increased, as we also see in the data from South Africa (see below). The number of properties utilizing reedbuck, bushbuck, wildebeest, zebra, waterbuck, tsessebe, kudu, eland, and sable increased by 21%; the geographic range of these species expanded by 22%, and that of the most valuable species (i.e., waterbuck, tsessebe, eland, and sable), by 35%. In terms of biodiversity conservation, a single, sedentary, gregarious bulk-roughage feeder (i.e., domestic cattle) was replaced by a spectrum of 15 or more species of wild (and domestic) animals (B22 Child 2009), and habitats noticeably improved (personal observation, photographs) on large unfenced ranches in Zimbabwe, although there were strong concerns about degradation on small fenced game farms in South Africa.By the late 1980s, most cattle ranchers in Zimbabwe began to promote and use wildlife because of a decline in cattle prices and subsidies and increasing ecological problems highlighted by the 1984 and 1992 drought. A significant number shifted completely into wildlife, especially in southern Zimbabwe and near Hwange National Park and Victoria Falls. An excellent documentary video about the formation of the Save Valley Conservancy illustrates these broader trends (Taylor 2002). In the video, one of the leading ranchers in the Lowveld (Clive Stockil) describes how cattle ranching had been developed in the areas since the 1950s. Following the adage ‘you can't farm in a zoo’, wildlife had been steadily replaced, including through active elimination campaigns (e.g., of buffalo) by the veterinary department. Footage shows the degradation of the habitat (much as described for Buffalo Range) and the collapse of cattle enterprises. Noting that ranching needed to be ecologically sustainable, economically viable, and socio-politically acceptable, Stockil describes how 27 ranchers studied the situation. They commissioned a report (PriceWaterhouse 1994) that concluded that wildlife would double their income and increase the return on capital from 1% to 3% (beef) to 10% to 22% (wildlife). Consequently, the 27 landholders in the Save Valley shifted from livestock to wildlife, combining 344,200 ha of previously degraded cattle ranches into a huge wildlife conservancy with no internal fencing and common management policies (Lindsay et al. 2009). The Save Conservancy was systematically restocked with elephant, buffalo, predators including lions and wild dogs, and many of the antelope species displaced by livestock. Hunting and tourism lodges diversified the economy, generated more profits, provided more jobs, and allowed the environment to recover. To all intents and purposes, this resembled a private national park. At least seven other similar initiatives occurred in Zimbabwe at the time.Kickback from single commodity LeviathansBy the late 1980s, the relative economics of wildlife and livestock had reversed, but agricultural polices had not. Despite falling beef prices on the world market, government veterinary and agricultural agencies continued to support beef while imposing considerable costs on the wildlife sector to the detriment of private ranches and the greater economy (B61 Muir-Leresche and Nelson 2000) although wildlife was enabling cattle ranchers to stay on the land (a pattern also observed in Texas, personal observation) and to recover its ecological function (Child 1988; B43 Jansen et al. 1992; PriceWaterhouse 1994). But powerful government agricultural agencies continued to promote beef without considering its impact on wildlife, illustrating the dangers of single-sector decision-making. Between 1919 and the 1980s, thousands of wild animals including rhinos were shot in the name of tsetse fly control (B24 Child and Riney 1987), hundreds of miles of game fence were erected, habitats were grossly modified including the bulldozing of riparian woodlands and waterholes, and DDT and deildrin were applied on a broad scale. In the 1980s, large areas of the country were further fenced to control foot-and-mouth disease despite questions as to the technical and economic merits of a fencing solution (B88 Taylor and Martin 1987). Based on controversial evidence of buffalo-to-livestock transmission, all buffalo on private land were shot despite the veterinary department being informed that buffalo could double the profitability of wildlife enterprises. To combat this, the small wildlife department began to study the economics of the cattle sector and developed a quick and dirty ‘budget’ for the beef sector (Table T4 4). Financial data compiled from government reports (Child 1988) showed that even preferential access to the high-priced European Union market would not cover farmer and industry costs, even before the fixed costs to farmers (e.g., capital value of livestock, land, and facilities), the industry (e.g., costs of new EU compliant abattoirs), or the environment were accounted for. Single-sector Leviathans emphasized commodity production (e.g., bags of maize and kilograms of beef) with little appreciation of economic issues like comparative advantage or allocative efficiency, which may speak well to politicians but does not maximize societal well-being. Table 4Quick and dirty beef industry budget (Zimbabwean $ dollar 1986)Costs 1. Government services62 2. Cold Storage Commission subsidy50 3. Farmer's variable costs74 4. Farmer capital investment (land, cattle)?? 5. Farmer overhead costs (fixed costs)?? 6. Industry investment in European Union-standard abattoirs, buffalo fencing, etc.?? 7. Environmental costs (overgrazing)??Total Costs185+Income 1. Actual149 2. With European Economic Commission exports191A historical review of the government's own reports, including Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry, showed that the beef sector had been heavily subsidized for several decades through advantageous beef prices, wealth transfer from the peasant to commercial herd, support to farm development through fencing and water provision, subsidisation of single-channel marketing systems (the Cold Storage Commission), and so on (B75 Phimister 1978; Child 1988). Methodologically, developing these arguments is time consuming and subject to different interpretations. Parity pricing provides a quicker and more reliable method for assessing if beef producers are subsidised (or taxed) by comparing the price farmers get for beef on the domestic market compared to the world market. Using government statistics (Figure F4 4) reveals that, after the mid-1970s, the domestic price of beef was on average 40% higher than the world price, confirming other research findings that producers were heavily subsidised through pricing policies (B93 Williams 1993). Figure 4 Comparing domestic and world prices to estimate if land use is taxed or subsidized
Comparing domestic and world prices to estimate if land use is taxed or subsidized.
2041-7136-2-18-4 Financial and economic analysisThe proponents of wildlife intuited as far back as the 1960s that wildlife was being displaced by livestock despite being a better land use option. An economist would say that wildlife had an inherent comparative advantage in drylands but was undervalued by market failures so that scarce resources were being misallocated to the detriment of society. In 1990, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Zimbabwe's wildlife agency used detailed financial accounts and asset registers to assess the viability of some 150 cattle and wildlife enterprises (Jansen et al. 1992). Wildlife was more profitable than livestock, with only 5% of livestock operations generating a return on capital in excess of 10% when profits were calculated using market (financial) prices (Figure F5 5). Market prices were then adjusted to remove pricing distortions caused by market failures. In terms of societal outcomes, wildlife was even more profitable (Figure F6 6), providing jobs, economic growth, and foreign currency (which was undervalued by government-controlled exchange rates). The rapid transition towards wildlife in many areas, unfortunately, was never accurately quantified, but judging from trophy sales, wildlife populations on private land quadrupled between 1984 and 1992 (Booth 2002). Figure 5 Comparison of the financial profitability of cattle and wildlife in Zimbabwe in 1990
Comparison of the financial profitability of cattle and wildlife in Zimbabwe in 1990.
2041-7136-2-18-5 Figure 6 Comparison of the financial and economic profitability of wildlife in Zimbabwe in 1990
Comparison of the financial and economic profitability of wildlife in Zimbabwe in 1990.
2041-7136-2-18-6 South Africa and NamibiaThe land invasions in Zimbabwe in 2000 undermined much, but not all, of this progress. However, similar trends on private land in Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana confirmed the coming of age of the wildlife bio-experience sector. In Namibia, between the early 1970s and 2001, livestock populations on private land halved from 1.8 million to 0.91 million, whereas ‘huntable’ wildlife populations doubled from 0.565 million to 1,161 million head for economic reasons (B2 Barnes and Jones 2009). In South Africa, the numbers of wild animals easily quadrupled between 1964 and 2005, with some sources (Flack unpublished data; B12 Carruthers 2008 suggesting as many as 18.6 million wild animals between 1964 and 2005, and there are now some 10,000 wildlife ranches and some 4,000 mixed wildlife and livestock enterprises (B8 Bothma et al. 2009). Private wildlife areas expanded eightfold between 1979 and the mid-1990s (B14 Chadwick 1996), protecting at least 16.8% of the total area of South Africa (Cousins et al. 2008) compared to 6% as IUCN category I to IV protected areas. As with Zimbabwe, ‘utilized’ species increased much more rapidly than those ‘protected’. Rhino increased from 50 to 18,000, and black wildebeest from a few to 26,000, much faster than bontebok (few to less than 5,000) and Cape Mountain Zebra (few to 1,200) for which hunting has only been allowed within the past decade (Flack, personal communication).Policy analysis matrixDespite its size and economic importance, there is remarkably little research or political economic understanding of the wildlife sector in South Africa and some risk that conservation, economic, and employment gains will be undone in the politically charged debate over land restitution. We highlight key findings of an investigation of the economics of game ranching near Kruger National Park (B65 Musengezi 2010) and illustrate the usefulness of the Policy Analysis Matrix or PAM methodology (Table T5 5). Table 5Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM)RevenuesCostsProfitsTradable inputsDomestic factorssup iThe PAM can also account for environmental externalities and for ecological, regulating and social/cultural services by building estimates of the cost of these into social prices, but we did not do this.Private pricesABCD‘Social’ (or ‘economic’) pricesiEFGHDivergenceIJKLThe PAM is theoretically robust (B59 Monke and Pearson 1989), relatively easy to apply, and useful for influencing policy makers, especially in finance ministries because it is easy to understand as it follows the basic calculation, profit = income from sales less costs of production. Constructing a PAM requires social skills because it relies on landholders’ providing their income and expenditure accounts. It also requires technical skills to classify accounts into revenues, tradable and domestic factor costs, and to calculate ‘economic’ prices. It can be extended to incorporate negative externalities on ecosystems or social/equity systems and to guard against ignoring these in policy recommendations. The PAM is particularly useful for assessing if a land use represents a good choice for society and how much choices are being distorted by policy and market failures.In this paper, for example, we use PAM to assess if wildlife is an optimal use of drylands, that is, does wildlife have a comparative advantage? ‘Comparative advantage’ is not the same as absolute advantage but explains why countries gain mutually from trading in products for which they have relative efficiencies. Comparative advantage is calculated by comparing value-added (i.e., revenues-tradable inputs) to the costs of local land, labour, and capital (i.e., domestic factors), which is why the PAM split costs into two columns: tradable inputs and domestic factors.Second, we can calculate how much market and policy failures are distorting prices, and therefore land use decisions, away from the real values that would guide private actors to allocate resources efficiently for society. We quantify these price distortions by comparing private prices (top row) to prices in perfect markets (social prices row), correcting prices using various econometric techniques. The divergence between the private and social prices is a measure of the magnitude of market failure. It is also a critical economic concept with considerable implications for conservation policy. When private prices diverge from their true values, private decision makers do not properly internalize social benefits and costs of their actions. This causes under-provision or over-utilization of natural resources and is the root of many natural resource problems (B52 Libecap 2009).In 2010, Jessica Musengezi applied the PAM methodology to eight properties near Kruger National Park in South Africa (Table T6 6). Wildlife enterprises were too diverse (and innovative) to summarize using simple averages. Property (a), for example, supported high-end tourism charging over US$500 per night, while property (d) was purchased for ecological reasons and profits were an insignificant objective. Only property (g) still had livestock, but profitability was achieved from vertical integration including an abattoir and butcheries (providing profits far in excess of cattle ranching in the area).Table 6Summary of PAM results for eight wildlife properties in South Africa in 20109 c6 6 c7 7 c8 8 c9 FarmAll price in South Africa Randabcdefgh(US $1=R7)PAM, Policy Analysis Matrix; N/a.Property attributes Farm size (ha)5,2071,7003,7002,0172,8003,20014,40030,000 Big fiveYesNoYesNoNoNoNoYes Beds684252121210-- Average price (rand)2,854350260285350250--Revenue sources(% of total revenue) Tourism accommodation95279950500 Biltong hunting000001710 Cattle000000840 Game meat00000100 Live game sales092201007114100 Retail60320000 Trophy hunting061600620Labour Number of workers1948420199107510 Labour cost (rand/ha)2,7886006644712388723314 Labour cost (% of total expenditure)7721436351181918Financial and economic results Gross income (rand/ha)8,7064,9362,2311051,6431,0992,906150 Gross margin (rand/ha)8,2822,88685641,4347681,94790 Private cost ratio0.380.440.13−1.510.340.690.160.16 Domestic resource cost0.20.220.59−10.260.430.110.08 Effective protection coefficient0.940.880.920.940.961.030.910.9 Profitability coefficient0.730.640.141.180.860.550.860.83 Net policy transfer (% tax on net profits)273686−1814451417Simple gross income and net margin (i.e., gross income − direct costs) data showed that all wildlife properties (except (d)) are profitable (Table 6), exceed the returns from extensive commercial beef production (according to models provided by the Department of Agriculture), and provided significant numbers of jobs (Musengezi 2010). Indeed, wildlife enterprises create more jobs than the livestock enterprises they displaced by a factor of two and as much as five, and these jobs are also more specialized, increasing wage bills some 20- to 32-fold, (PriceWaterhouse 1994; Taylor 2002; B51 Langholz and Kerley 2006).We illustrate how the PAM is used to assess the relative economics of wildlife production using Farm (a). The capital letters in the formulas are defined in the PAM in Table 5. At a basic level, Farm (a) generates (South African rand) R8,706 /ha and is ‘profitable’ after costs with a gross margin of R8,282 (US$1=R7). It also adds value to the South African economy from both a private and social perspective. In terms of the prices that guide the farmer to make land use decisions, the private value-added exceeds costs of domestic factor inputs. Said technically, the private cost ratio shows that, for each rand of net profit (A-B), 38cents goes to pay domestic factors (C). This leaves a net profit of 62 cents which is substantial (i.e., PCO = C/(A-B) = 0.38). When prices are adjusted to correct pricing distortions, wildlife generates one rand of profit from 20 cents of domestic factors costs (i.e., Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRC) = G/(E-F) = 0.196). Economically speaking, wildlife has a comparative advantage and is a good use of drylands in South Africa.We can now use the PAM to advise policy makers as to how market failures are effectively taxing or subsidising wildlife. First, we assess the impacts of exchange rate and trade policies using the Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC). On Farm (a), the social value-added (E-F) exceeds the private value-added (A-B) by only 6% (i.e., EPC = (A-B)/(E-F) = 0.94), which confirms that product markets in South Africa are relatively free and only slightly disadvantaging wildlife. Second, we use the profitability coefficient to measure the overall effect of all policy distortions on the enterprise. On Farm (a), this is D/H = 0.73, so overall, Farm (a)'s private profit is 27% lower than it would be in the absence of economic distortion. This suggests that, in South Africa, domestic factors (i.e., immovable land, labour, and capital) are moderately distorted and that, if we corrected these issues, wildlife would be 27% more profitable.There is considerable variability amongst the eight properties, depending upon the specific configuration of their enterprise and cost structures. Nonetheless, wildlife clearly provides significant jobs from marginal land. It is an economically efficient use of drylands in South Africa (DRC < 1). It is also profitable to farmers despite government policies being disadvantageous to wildlife. However, Musengezi's research also showed that game ranchers faced significantly more nonfinancial barriers compared to conventional agricultural enterprises in the form of additional regulations and permissions. Her analysis is a single snapshot in time and does not incorporate habitat recovery or the considerable increases in land values associated with wildlife properties.Conceptualizing wildlife as an economic optionWe can use two conceptual diagrams to summarize the economics of wildlife. Figure F7 7 hypothesizes that wildlife outcompetes livestock agriculture in some drylands because it is easily diversified through hunting and tourism. These advantages are magnified at the economic or societal level because the wildlife sector is associated with vertical integration (lodging, guiding, etc.) and tourism multipliers (e.g., backwards linkages to inputs like food, wine, transport, etc.) that are far higher than for simple commodities (like meat).Figure 7 Conceptualizing economic differences between the bio-experience and commodity economy in drylands
Conceptualizing economic differences between the bio-experience and commodity economy in drylands.
2041-7136-2-18-7 This has important policy implications. In terms of development, wildlife utilization is a sensible land use option judged purely in terms of jobs and economic growth in some drylands (Figure F8 8). Therefore, policies that internalize both the costs and benefits of wildlife are likely to result in positive conservation and development outcomes. Conservationists also need to take this seriously, recognizing that national parks in many savannas can achieve their conservation objectives while also functioning as engines for economic growth and rural development, which is also an important social responsibility.Figure 8 Conceptualizing production systems (bottom) and comparative advantage (top)
Conceptualizing production systems (bottom) and comparative advantage (top).
2041-7136-2-18-8 In higher-rainfall agricultural areas, the argument is reversed (Figure 8). If we want to conserve representative samples of these environments, we will need to subsidize them (e.g., protected areas) because wildlife is only economically competitive on patches of land that are difficult to farm (e.g. wetlands and hills) or uniquely accessible to markets in cities.Figure 8 also illustrates a critical difference between agriculture and natural resource-based systems. In traditional agricultural zones, ecosystems are greatly simplified, and environmental energy is channeled directly into one, or at most a few, products like cotton or corn. Outside these zones, people tend to harvest plants indirectly using animals (e.g., drylands) or to harvest a much wider variety of plant and animal products (e.g., tropical forests). In drylands, humans harvest the third trophic tier. There is a quantum loss in productivity because energy is lost in transfers between trophic layers, and commodity production is ecologically limited (illustrated in Figure 8). It is in these three-tier environments that the bio-experience economy has a comparative economic advantage over agro-extractive commodity production. However, historically, the wildlife in these ecosystems was undervalued and replaced by livestock. Policy and market failures, especially the nationalization of wildlife, restrictions to commercial use, and subsidization of commodity sectors, sent out the wrong pricing signal to landholders. This trend was only reversed when radical changes in wildlife policy began to address market failures by (a) devolving use rights for wildlife to landholders and (b) encouraging commercial use. Where market failures remain pervasive, for example where wildlife remains nationalized (e.g., Kenya), and in communal lands where access to resources remains open, wildlife continues to be replaced (see below).Institutions and valueWalker et al. (2004) use the example of private conservation in southern Africa to illustrate how complex systems flip from one zone of attraction to another. Under early colonial policies, ranches in southern African was locked in a mutually reinforcing cycle of environmental degradation and financial crisis associated with beef commodity production, but when these policies were changed, landholders quickly adapted, giving rise to a dynamic and profitable wildlife sector. That the natural environment is the same but that radical change followed a change in the rules, alerts us to the importance of these rules and introduces the field of institutional economics (North 1990). Institutions are the rules and norms that guide human behaviour, including the allocation of resources. Institutions like property rights and markets allow wealth to be created through processes of specialization, diversification, and exchange, so institutionally rich countries are usually wealthier than institutionally poor ones (B71 North 1995). We hypothesize that this same logic applies to drylands: institutionally rich drylands produce much greater value than those that are institutionally thin because richer institutions enable landholders to convert ecological raw materials into higher-order goods and services without damaging the resource base. Thus, new institutions like wildlife property rights, tourism markets, banks, wildlife auctions, etc. have added considerable value to wildlife through processes of specialization, diversification, economies of scale, investment, and exchange. New wildlife institutions add value, allowing land to generate upward from South African Rand R1,000/ha, and some R100/ha, to R2,788/ha in wages alone (Table 6). Moreover, the devolution of wildlife rights to 10,000 private landholders has fueled considerable innovation in the development of wildlife products, which has driven up the value of wildlife in ways that have not happened when natural resources are monopolized by the state. Thus, southern Africa provides a multitude of hunting and tourism experiences from walking with lions to having moonlit dinners in the bush, whereas in Kenya and Tanzania, most tourists are restricted to closed vehicles in state-managed wildlife areas. We can use the price of South Africa's relatively unspectacular wildlife as a benchmark of its potential value. This suggests that the value of wildlife is far lower than it should be in centralized and institutionally thin wildlife sectors, including many communal lands.Our discussion of the relationship between the institutional richness and economic productivity of drylands reflects Douglass North's explanation for why some countries are rich and others poor. North postulates that the most dramatic shift in human history has been from a personalized economy of big men and small-scale economic and political activity to an impersonal economy that relies on rules that allow us to transact reliably all over the world and with people we don't know, allowing humans to specialize and diversify on much higher scales than ever before (B72 North 2003).In Zimbabwe, enriching wildlife institutions by devolving proprietorship to landholders, encouraging trade, and establishing institutions like producer associations and auctions (Child 1995) created value by converting raw materials into higher-value goods and services by replacing low-value meat production (i.e., beef or bushmeat) with high-value ecotourism. However, these gains rely on institutions, and when the rule of law breaks down (degrading institutions such as property rights, courts, arbitration, and economic exchange), people can no longer rely on impersonal institutions (North 2003). Personalized Big-Man economies re-exert themselves (B3 Beinhocker 2006), and institutional breakdown often benefit elites (B13 Chabal and Daloz 1999). The renewable resource economy, especially sectors like wildlife that rely on economies of scale and exchange, is quickly disrupted, and land use reverts to resources that people can own and protect individually like livestock or crops.Similarly, communal lands are institutionally thin, lacking title deeds and genuine proprietary rights to wildlife and other natural resources like carbon. This locks in a reliance on privately owned livestock and individual (but untitled) fields even when these are low-value land use options. We can develop a rough estimate of the opportunity costs of weak institutions by comparing the output of communal and private drylands (400 to 600 mm annual rainfall) outside Kruger National Park, using data from Gregory Parent and Jessica Musengezi. In 2010, Parent conducted comprehensive surveys of production and consumption data from households in the Mutale area bordering northern Kruger National Park, in a study looking at the impacts of market access on household vulnerability and resource use decisions (unpublished data). His data show that conventional livestock and farming adds little or no value in terms of cash income or jobs (Table T7 7). The net output of South African Rand R232/ha from the local area is less than half of the requirements needed to maintain household consumption at R532/ha (Table T8 8). People are highly dependent on transfer payments from family members with jobs in urban areas and mines, and from government grants. Nonetheless, cropping, natural resource collection, and livestock are important risk mitigation and coping strategies, especially for poorer households. Households tend to view cattle more as an insurance policy than as a production commodity because they have limited access to formal insurance institutions.Table 7Annual output from land use activities in Benda Mutali communal areai         ActivityTotal outputOutput per hectareiiOutput per householdiAll values in South African Rand (US dollar $1 =R7).iiArea based on mapping exercise with community to calculate spatial extent of production, estimated to be 23,200 ha.Crops97,1854.19171Livestock1,737,47474.893,048Natural resources2,537,184109.364,451Labor1,017,27943.851,785Total5,389,122232.299,455Table 8Annual household consumption in Benda Mutalii         ActivityTotal household consumptionConsumption per hectareiiConsumption per householdi All data in South African rand. (US dollar $1=R7).ii Area based on mapping exercises with community to calculate spatial extent of production.Crops97,1854.19171Livestock768,15233.111,348Natural resources1,364,39258.812,394Food purchases5,242,040225.959,197Non-food purchases4,207,784181.377,382Asset depreciation718,04030.951,260Total12,397,593534.3821,750The key point is that, in the same agro-economic region, there is a 10 to 40 times difference in economic output between institutionally rich private land and institutionally thin communal land (noting also that communal lands suffer enormously from the legacies of apartheid). Communal lands also suffer disproportionately from overgrazing in a tragedy-of-the-commons-type situation where environmental costs are externalized to society (B39 Hardin 1971). Our suggestion is that the opportunity costs of weak institutions are enormous, and the return on investment from developing new institutions may be high.Policy ‘failure’ in East AfricaThe economic value of institutions is highlighted by the case of wildlife in East Africa. East Africa's wildlife is inherently superior to southern Africa, and the hunting sector only moved southwards when it was restricted in East Africa in the early 1970s. In contrast to southern Africa, postcolonial East Africa perpetuated colonial policies of state nationalisation, monopolisation, and centralization of wildlife (Kabiri 2010). Several private landholders such as David Hopcraft in Kenya have struggled to develop wildlife as a land use option for many years but suffer from weak proprietary rights, bureaucratic uncertainty, and restrictions on use. Thus, Hopcraft relies on tourism and the sale of meat to Nairobi for his income rather than on the potentially more lucrative safari hunting, which is banned in Kenya (personal communication). Some large landholders manage wildlife for tourism, but it would be a more competitive land use option in, for instance, the Laikipia district if hunting was legalized (Craig, personal communication). In Tanzania, hunting is legal, but the proceeds from hunting are seldom returned to landholder communities, while the state is also extracting most tourism revenues from community areas (Nelson 2010). Wildlife in prime areas in Kenya (e.g., Mara) has declined to a third or less of its former (1977) abundance (B73 Ogutu et al. 2011), and there may well be similar downward trends in Tanzania, but data is sparse and often restricted.Externalities, collective action, and scaleWildlife is a mobile resource that, like many natural resources, is associated with externalities, for example, where one landholder conserves a species only for his neighbour to hunt them or where wildlife damages crops on a neighbouring property. These externalities are the reason why individual ownership of wildlife is thought to be problematic and has been centralized in the state. However, externalities may be easier to solve in practice than theoretical approaches might suggest. This requires cross-scale institutions. Following the principle of subsidiarity, these need to be built up from the bottom. The primary goal is to internalize the costs and benefits of wildlife management at the level of landholders because they are deterministic of land use outcomes. The first essential step is to devolve proprietorship to landholders. Second, mechanisms are needed to manage externalities associated with the fugitive character of wildlife and other natural resources.South Africa and Namibia manage wildlife's externalities with physical infrastructure. The right to utilize wildlife is linked to a ‘certificate of adequate enclosure’ and requires that wildlife properties are appropriately fenced. Game fencing solves problems associated with wildlife's mobility but introduces new problems because game fences are expensive and fragment landscapes. The sedentarisation of wildlife on small, fenced private ranches negates many natural behavioural advantages, allows overstocking, and results in the negative impacts on environments associated with decreased mobility in ruminants. Mismanagement of any animals, domestic or wild, causes ecological problems, and fencing savannas is a form of mismanagement. In the early days of game farming in South Africa, overstocking was a considerable concern, though the situation is improving with management experience and mechanisms for scaling up, such as conservancies.The alternative to managing externalities with physical infrastructure is to manage them with institutions, as was done in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's far-sighted Natural Resources Act of 1941 enabled farmers to voluntarily establish themselves (usually 30 to 50 landholders in a catchment) as democratically-managed Intensive Conservation Areas (ICA) with more power to regulate themselves than anything a centralized state would dare to impose. ICAs had the power to require members to address soil erosion at their own financial cost, reduce livestock where overstocking was degrading the grass layer, desist from tree cutting, or set quotas and other restrictions on the use of wildlife species. Communities designed locally appropriate rules, which were enforced through peer pressure backed by the possibility of legal action. In essence, the community became the primary locus of regulation and enforcement. The state retained responsibility for regularly inspecting land to ensure that ICAs were performing and could intervene if this community-based system failed, but this was rarely required. The Act also established a court to which landholders could appeal.ICAs became the focal point for social learning, collective action, and peer control of wildlife management, as farmers met to regulate and learn from each other. Self-regulation was parsimonious but effective. Landholders were financially and socially accountable for regulations they custom designed for their particular circumstances. They limited regulation to high-value species and circumstances with real benefits from regulation, and where regulations were socially acceptable and could be enforced. For example, in the Munyati-Sebakwe ICA, farmers set quotas for high-value species like sable and waterbuck that were still building up after the livestock era but did not waste their time regulating ubiquitous or territorial animals like impala and kudu. In the severe 1984 drought, the Chiredzi ICA acted collectively to save the few remaining sable in the area by capturing and feeding them (sable having been severely threatened by livestock overgrazing). As the species recovered, they judiciously increased hunting quotas, rewarding ranchers who successfully recovered their sable populations with higher quotas. In another example, one landholder was luring wildlife onto his land using fire and fodder to capture and sell them, but the ICA resolved this problem by imposing quotas on him. These issues were usually solved informally through peer pressure backed up by the ICA's power to impose collective solutions if they needed to. The system was inexpensive and highly effective. Decisions and enforcement were internally legitimated, managed primarily through peer pressure, and tightly designed to suit local circumstances.The ICA system not only used social interaction to manage the externalities associated with natural resources but also provided a grassroots democratic system by which government officials were held accountable for natural resource policies. ICAs had direct statutory access to key ministers, parliament, and even the prime minister, and it is no coincidence that the movement was strongly supported by research, extension, and even environmental education both in schools and for adults (Child and Child, in preparation). Theoretically speaking, Zimbabwe's natural resource legislation combined privatization of wildlife to internalize costs and benefits at the level of the individual property, with collective action to control the spatial and temporal externalities associated with wildlife and natural resources.Private conservanciesIn the 1990s, many ranchers began to recognize ecologies and economies of scale. They formed conservancies, whereby up to 30 ranchers agree, often contractually, to manage their wildlife collectively. This allowed a second economic transition. Whereas individual game ranchers could reintroduce rarer species like sable, hartebeest, and rhino, large wildlife collectives could restock big game like elephant, buffalo, lions, and even wild dogs. For example, the Save Conservancy in southeastern Zimbabwe captured over 600 elephants in the drought-stricken Gona-re-zhou National Park and restocked lions, wild dogs, buffalos, and plains game. In South Africa, landholder collectives removed the fence between themselves and Kruger National Park and generate substantial revenues from hunting and tourism. The economies of scale associated with tourism and wildlife allowed these huge private reserves to share management costs and principles over a larger area and to generate more money than individual properties.Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)From the early 1970s, conservation bureaucrats in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana (and also Zambia) argued that it was unfair that only white farmers should benefit from wildlife and that, if similar rights were devolved to communal areas, both rural people and wildlife would benefit (Metcalfe 1993). This led to the emergence of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) in southern Africa where, led by Zimbabwe's iconic CAMPFIRE programme (B17 Child 1993; B64 Murphree 2005; Frost and Bond 2008; B87 Taylor 2009), hunting and tourism revenues were returned to communities. From a conservation perspective, this stabilised or even increased wildlife populations in Zimbabwe's crowded communal lands (Child et al. 2003), and the recovery of wildlife, including endangered rhinos and elephants, was even stronger in Namibia (B67 NACSO 2008). Income from wildlife contributed to social projects, provided cash to households in some projects (B32 Dalal-Clayton and Child 2003; B48 Jones and Weaver 2009), and helped to empower local people (Jones and Murphree 2004). In some communities, employment and income from hunting and tourism contributed significantly to livelihoods, providing as much as three-quarters of on-farm livelihoods to the Sankuyo community in Botswana (unpublished data).Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is the subject of a considerable literature, and we emphasize only key issues here. First, wildlife-based CBNRM is founded on the potential to use wildlife as an economic engine in communal lands and, in so doing, to incentivise conservation. Second, CBNRM mostly does not involve a trade-off between conservation and development because it is an institutional approach that allocates natural resources including wildlife to higher valued uses, and in some cases, more equitably. Thus, CBNRM can and should simultaneously contribute to both conservation and development, as happened for private land. Third, CBNRM relies on two sets of institutions: those that devolve rights (or not) from state and community and about which much is written (B63 Murphree 2004; Nelson 2010), and those within a community that promote participation and equitable benefit sharing, which is an emerging challenge that has hardly been studied.As with private conservation, an essential ingredient of CBNRM is the devolution of the rights and benefits for wildlife to communities. Where all (e.g., Botswana and Namibia) or most (e.g., Zimbabwe) income has been devolved to communities, CBNRM has encouraged the recovery of wildlife and generated significant incomes (NACSO 2008; Taylor 2009), but has not magically (and unrealistically) resolved poverty, because of the number of people involved and because wildlife populations are still low and recovering in hot, dry, and remote environments. CBNRM is also difficult to implement when human densities are high, wildlife populations are depleted, and benefits are low. However, the so-called ‘crisis’ in CBNRM reflects a failure of implementation and, specifically, a failure to devolve rights and responsibilities to communities within a carefully designed institutional framework. Many, if not most CBNRM programmes, do not represent a serious attempt to devolve revenues to communities and therefore cannot be expected to work (Nelson 2010; B77 Ribot 2003). These are CBNRM programmes in name only, and wildlife is neither benefiting communities nor recovering therefore.The emerging challenge for CBNRM, and about which little is written, is the challenge of within-community governance. Commonly CBNRM programmes generate revenue and recover wildlife populations, but like many decentralization projects, they are plagued by elite capture, misuse of money, and low levels of participation. In our experience, this is because they rely on representational forms of governance whereby leaders elected by a community sit on committees that make many or most of the decisions on behalf of the community. The assumption is flawed that bi- or tri-annual elections and annual general meetings will achieve accountability, participation, transparency, and equitable benefit sharing (and guard against financial misappropriation and elite capture).Challenging as it may seem, participatory democracy may be an essential starting point and building-block for a successful CBNRM (and much easier to implement than first assumed). Real participation requires that CBNRM communities are defined at a scale and implement participatory processes that allow the majority of the people to (1) meet face-to-face to share information and make decisions, (2) instruct the committee to implement these decisions, and (3) review the quality of implementation (i.e., does expenditure reflect the budget agreed upon by the community?) no less than quarterly.Scaling up and scaling down at the same timeThe experience of private game ranching demonstrates that wildlife can greatly increase the economic output from drylands. We can have confidence in wildlife utilization as an economic model. However, we need to develop new governance models to substantially increase levels of participation and benefit sharing, and that prevent money from being diverted to administrative expenses and elite capture. We suggest that this requires CBNRM programs to be scaled down to the level of single-village communities and processes of participatory democracy be strictly followed. In other words, CBNRM requires carefully crafted institutions to manage the challenge of scale. These institutions need to scale up for reasons of ecological and economic scale, but also to simultaneously scale down to improve accountability, participation, and equitable benefit sharing (Child, unpublished data).HuntingOne of the more controversial and misunderstood aspects of wildlife utilization is hunting. Trophy hunting is an ecologically robust and high-value use of wildlife. It is true that non-hunting tourism can outcompete hunting tourism economically but only in prime areas with excellent wildlife. Hunting remains the bread and butter of wildlife operations, especially in non-prime areas and in times of global or national crisis when tourists stop traveling but hunters do not. Hunting provides a significant cash flow from very few animals, facilitating the transition towards wildlife-based land uses. Indeed, it is difficult to make the transition from livestock to wildlife in the absence of hunting, except for people with large amounts of money to invest. We see this even in the development of Pilanesberg Game Reserve in South Africa (B46 Johnson et al. 2009). The government purchased degraded livestock ranches to form a new park on the basis that this was a better economic use of the land. The transition was partly financed by carefully controlled trophy hunting of excess males. Hunting was carefully zoned in time and place to avoid conflicts with the rapidly growing photo-safari business while careful hunting practices were used, so wildlife did not associate gunshots with vehicles or people.Hunting is an essential component of the transition to wildlife-based land uses. However, as wildlife populations and diversity recover, landholders are able to introduce photographic tourism, building attractive lodges, and training significant numbers of local guides, cooks, caterers, and managers. However, even in these circumstances, photo-tourism and hunting are compatible. Conflicts are certainly common between tour operators and hunting outfitters when they are competing for land and wildlife (e.g., around the Okavango Delta in Botswana and the Luangwa Valley in Zambia), but such problems seldom arise when the same manager is responsible for both operations, as in the Pilanesberg example.ConclusionsIt has taken 60 years for wildlife to emerge as an important and economically viable land use option. It is now a proven economic model, and given the right ecological and institution circumstance, wildlife can provide significantly more jobs and economic growth than conventional uses of the same land. We still face the challenge of how to apply this model more broadly in Africa's communal lands, a challenge that requires genuine devolution of proprietorship from government to community and democratic and effective organizational development within communities.The wildlife option has emerged through proactive policy making and private sector entrepreneurship. Far-sighted conservation bureaucrats challenged the postcolonial status quo and developed a new approach to wildlife conservation based on landholder benefit. They sought to maximize the value from wildlife to people living with it by (1) devolving full proprietorship to landholders, (2) encouraging sustainable commercial uses provided they were humane, and (3) reducing the regulatory burden on the sector. This allowed thousands of wildlife owners to experiment with new products, steadily driving up the value of wildlife in ways that we seldom see with other wild resources like forests. Where institutions were changed in this way, mainly on private land but also in some communal lands, wildlife and the habitats on which it depends have recovered enormously. But where wildlife remained centralized and noncommercial, wildlife populations have declined.Many drylands are locked in a reinforcing cycle of ecological over-utilization, but economic under-utilization often linked to a reliance on commodity-based production systems. Bold policy facilitated a transformation to an economy based not on commodities but on experiences the wildlife and bio-experience sector. This generates more economic activity yet extracts far less from the environment and, though it seems counterintuitive in a world afflicted with poverty, the terms of trade for tourism and experiences are improving steadily whereas the price of agricultural commodities has been stagnant or falling for several decades.In the past few years, recognition of the importance of ecosystem services has increased. In the most thorough analysis to date, Robert Constanza and his colleagues demonstrated that the value of ecosystems exceeds global GDP by several factors (Costanza, d'Arge et al. 1997). But the problem is that these values are not reflected in the private prices that guide the decision makers of landholders nor, therefore, in land use outcomes. In the 1960s, wildlife faced these very same problems. They were addressed by adopting a new approach to conservation based on well-crafted institutions at both the national and local level that sought, first, to maximize the value of wildlife to the landholder by internalizing (privatizing) its benefits and costs at the level of the landholder, and to simultaneously establish democratic collective action to manage externalities and scale. Contrary to the predictions of conservationists, commercializing wildlife in this way has had positive conservation and development outcomes. Positive outcomes hinge on the simultaneous application of two factors: driving up the price of wildlife (i.e., price) while ensuring that benefits and management are controlled by landholders (i.e., proprietorship and subsidiarity). In the absence of proprietorship, for example, the high price of ivory and rhino horn has been disastrous, but taking away the value of wildlife is not a solution either because it is quickly replaced by alternative land uses.The development of the wildlife sector has been a policy experiment based on the hypothesis that giving wildlife value to the people who live with it will result in positive development and conservation outcomes, requiring considerable tenacity and adaptive learning in navigating towards this objective in complex economic and political circumstances. The approach has succeeded where laws, regulations, and operational procedures have incorporated the principles of price, proprietorship, subsidiarity, and adaptive management in a theoretically sound and disciplined manner. Indeed, wildlife provides a pioneering example of Payments for Ecosystem Services, which was relatively easy to implement because of the high value of wildlife and the relative simplicity of costs and benefits attribution (at least compared to ecosystem processes). Ecosystem services are facing similar market failures of wildlife. The challenge of our generation may well be to convert these values into incentives for maintaining ecosystem services, perhaps by adapting some of the lessons from the wildlife sector in southern Africa.Competing interestsThe authors declare they have no competing interests.Authors’ contributionsBC conceptualized and compiled the paper. JM provided data on game ranching and GP provided data on community livelihoods in South Africa. GC strengthened the paper’s historical and policy perspectives. 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REVIEWOpenAccessTheeconomicsandinstitutionaleconomics ofwildlifeonprivatelandinAfricaBrianAChild1*,JessicaMusengezi1,GregoryDParent1andGrahamFTChild1,2*Correspondence: bchild@ufl.edu1StellenboschInstitutefor AdvancedStudies(STIAS), WallenbergResearchCentreat StellenboschUniversity,Marais Street,Stellenbosch7600,South Africa Fulllistofauthorinformationis availableattheendofthearticleAbstractInsouthernAfrica,therearenow10,000to14,000privateranchersthatpromote wildlifeenterprisesaloneorinsomeincombinationwithdomesticlivestock.An importantconservationsuccess,thisnewbio-experienceeconomyalsocreatessocial well-beingthrougheconomicgrowthandjobcreation.Itisaneconomicsectorthat needstobetakenseriously,notleastbecauseitpioneerspoliciesthatinformthe valorizationandsustainablemanagementofecosystemservices.Thearticledescribes thehistoricalemergenceofasustainableuseapproachtowildlifeconservationsince theArushaConferencein1963.Itsuggeststhatindigenousmulti-speciessystems mayhaveecologicaladvantagesovermodernlivestockproductionsystems,but thesearedifficulttoquantifyincomplexdrylandecosystemsandaretrumpedby economicsandpoliticalprocesses.However,wildlifeprovidesthefoundationfora bio-experienceeconomythathasadecidedcomparativeeconomicadvantageover agro-extractivecommodityproduction(likebeef)indrylands.Wedescribehownew policyapproaches,especiallythevalorizationofwildlifeandthedevolutionof proprietorshiptolandholdersandcommunities,haveallowedwildlife'seconomic advantagestobereflectedinlandusedecisionsthroughboth ‘ gameranching ’ and ‘ community-basednaturalresourcemanagement ’ .Institutionalchangeshave modifiedtheeconomicsofwildlifeindrylands,promotingbothconservationand developmentbyallocatingenvironmentalrawmaterialstohigher-ordergoodsand services.Afurthergoalofthepaperistodescribepracticaleconomicmethodsfor assessingandexplainingthewildlifesectortopolicymakersintermsofits profitability,bothtoindividuallandholdersandtosocietythroughjobsand economicgrowth.Thepapercoversa50-yearperiodbetweenthePhDstudiesof thefourauthorsandtakesatransdisciplinaryapproachwhichvaluestheknowledge ofpractitionersasmuchastheacademicliterature. Keywords: Wildlifeeconomics,Wildlifeconservation,Gameranching,Sustainable use,SouthernAfricaReviewBackgroundThisprovidesareviewoftheeconomicevolutionoftheprivatewildlifesectorin southernAfricasincethe1960s.Itisintendedtobeaccessibletoawidereadership (notjusteconomistsorwildlifemanagers).Itdrawsontheacademicliteraturebutalso onconsiderablepractitionerknowledgenetworksincludinggrayandoralliterature.It describesthehistoryofthewildlifesectorfromtheperspectiveoftheeconomicprinciplesandlessonsthatareemergingfromthispolicyexperiment.Ourpurposeisto 2012Childetal.;licenseeSpringer.ThisisanOpenAccessarticledistributedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttribution License(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0),whichpermitsunrestricteduse,distribution,andreproductioninanymedium, providedtheoriginalworkisproperlycited.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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describetheevolutionofasustainableuse(orneo-liberal)approachtowildlifemanagement(SASUSG1996;Martin2009),whichisunderrepresentedintheliteraturerelative toalternativeparadigmsofconservationanddevelopment. Weevaluatetheeconomicsofwildlifeusingtheprivatesectorexperienceformethodologicalreasons,althoughthiseconomyissmallerthanthewildlifeeconomybased onAfrica'sprotectedareas,lessscalabletoAfrica'sextensivedrylandsthan community-basedwildlifemanagement,andunderpoliticalscrutinybecauseofitsracialhistory.However,strongerpropertyrightsandagradualshiftfromadministrative tofree-marketcompetitivepricingmeanthatpricingislessdistortedandeconomic evaluationismorereliableonprivateland.Evaluatingtheeconomicsofdrylandsisdifficultatthebestoftimesbecauseinternalizingthefullcostsandbenefitsofresources likewater,grazing,andwildlifeiscomplicatedbecausetheyarefugitiveinspaceand time,whileecologicalprocessessuchascarbonandwatercyclesandsoilprocessesare complexandnonlinear,makingtheattributionofcostsandbenefitsdifficult. Thepoliticaleconomyofnaturalresourcesfurthermuddiestheeconomicwaters. Historically,wildlifehasbeenmonopolized(e.g.,protectedareas)andheavilyregulated bythestate,andmarketsignalsviolatemanyoftheassumptionsneededforasound economicanalysisgiventherecentandpartialshiftfromcentralizedplanningto market-basedapproaches.Wildlifealsocoexistswithpastoralistsandsubsistencefarmerswhoarepoliticallymarginalized,withlimitedandcontradictoryrights(e.g.,ofexclusionanduse)tonaturalresources.Thus,economicsignalsaredistortedbya combinationofstatemonopolies,regulation,administrativepricing,weakinstitutions and/orpredatorygovernance,andconfusedoropen-accesspropertyregimes,making economicanalysisnearimpossible. ‘ Marketfailure ’ ,aneconomictermthatreferstothe gapbetweentheactualpriceofagoodanditsrealvalue,ispervasive. OnprivatelandinsouthernAfricaand,indeed,whereprivatelandexistselsewhere inAfrica'sdrylands,theshiftfromlivestocktowildlifeiswidelyacknowledgedbutnot reliablyquantified.Therearereportedtobesome9,000 ‘ gameranches ’ inSouthAfrica aloneplusover15,000whichcombinewildlifewithlivestock(Cousinsetal.2008).The rapidexpansionofthewildlifesectormirrorsthegrowthintheregionalandglobal bio-tourismindustryandisreflectiveofshiftingglobaltermsoftrade.TheSouth Africangameranchingsectorhasexpandedatbetween5%and20%annuallyinthelast decade,whereasrealfarmincomeshavedeclinedby5.3%(Dry2010a,b;Jenkins2011). Gameranchingisadiversesectorthatcombinesecotourism,thesaleofliveanimals, severalformsofhunting,andasaby-product,meatproduction.Primewildlifeareas generatelargeamountsofincomeandemploymentfromtourism,whiletrophyhunting isgeographicallymoreextensiveandareliableformofincomewherewildlifepopulationsarerecoveringorinareasoflimitedtourismpotential.Huntingiscriticalinthe transitionfromcattleranchingbacktomulti-speciesproductionsystems,exceptwhere largeamountsofcapitalareavailableforrestocking,becauseitutilizesonly2%to3% ofwildlifepopulationsthatcanbiologicallyexpandat10%to30%.Themarketsfor huntingalsoappeartobelargerandmorerobustthanisoftenassumed,andboththe supplyandpriceoftrophyanimalshasbeenrisingsteadilyinsouthernAfricasincethe mid-1970s(Booth2002,2009;Lindseyetal.inpress).Forexample,elephantssoldfor USdollars$250inthelate1970sandarenowworth$12,000to$20,000introphyfees andupto$65,000whenweincludeoutfitterfees.ThissuggeststhatupscalingofChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page2of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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trophyhuntingandecotourismispossiblewithouttumblingprices.Thesouthern Africanwildlifesectorisatinyshareoftheglobaltourismandhuntingmarket,and tourismisaclusterindustrythatbenefitsfromeconomiesofscaleandfromtrendsin globaltermsoftrade.Bycontrast,beefcommoditypriceshavebeenstagnatingglobally fornearlyfourdecades(albeitwithasignificantupturninthelasttwoyears).Beefproductionhasalsoshiftedsteadilyawayfromthedrylandssincethe1960sfollowing technological ‘ advances ’ likegrainfeeding,nitrogensupplementation,andfeedlots, whileAfrica'sdrylandsareunlikelytobecompetitivewithlarge-scalemeatproduction inArgentina,Brazil,ortheUSA. Landusetrendsonprivateland,togetherwiththedatasummarizedinthispaper, confirmthatthebio-experienceeconomybasedonthemultipleusesofwildlifeisan increasinglyseriousindustry.Itisbeginningtobeincludedinnationalagriculturalstatistics,especiallyinSouthAfrica,thoughitisnotyetwellquantifiedbecauseofitsdiversitycomparedtocommoditymarkets.Asanexampleofthemagnitudeofthis sector,privatelandhuntingaloneisworthoverUS$onebillioninSouthAfrica.Even thecasualobservercanseethatAfrica'sfamousprotectedareashavesignificant impactsonthegrowthofnearbyurbancenterslikeArusha(Tanzania),Kasane,Maun (Botswana)aswellasnationalcapitals. Thepurposeofthispaperistopresentthecaseforwildlifeasaprofitableformof landuseinsemiaridsavannas,creatingmorejobsandeconomicgrowththanmeat commodityproduction.Forecologicalandeconomicreasons,thebio-experienceeconomyisalegitimatedevelopmentoption.Withamorefavorablepolicyenvironment,it couldbeappliedonamuchbroaderscalethaniscurrentlythecase,especiallyifitcan beadaptedtoAfrica'scommunalareacircumstancesthroughapproacheslike community-basednaturalresourcemanagement.Furthermore,theseeconomicadvantagesareincreasing.Globaltermsoftradearemovinginfavourofthebio-experience economy;thewildlifesectorisanewindustrywithconsiderablepotentialforadding valuethroughproductdiversificationanddevelopment,anditissynergisticwithecosystemserviceslikewaterandcarbonthatareasundervaluedaswildlifewasseveral decadesago. Infocusingthispaperonpresentingtheeconomiccaseforwildlife,wearenottaking an ‘ either-orapproach ’ toeconomicalternatives.Ouraimistomaximizethewell-being ofpeoplelivinginmarginalareasinenvironmentallysustainableways,withwildlife conservationcontributingtothisinareaswhereithasacomparativeadvantage.Nonetheless,wecannotavoidtheimplicationsthatmeatcommodityproductionthrough livestockorwildlifeiseconomicallyandenvironmentallyquestionableindrylands. Whiteminorityregimessupportedcattlerancherswithsignificantsubsidiesforseveral decades,butwhenthesewereremovedinthetransitiontoblackmajorityrule,thebeef economyindrylandswasshowntobefinanciallymarginalandecologicallyhazardous, andmanyoftheselandholdersonlysurvivedbyaddingorswitchingtowildlifeoperations(Child1988;GrossmanandGandar1989). Unlikebeefcommodityproduction,traditionallivestocksystemshavemultiplevalues (e.g.,milk,meat,cash,andstoreofvalue).Thismaygivethemfinancialandecological advantages,butintheabsenceofrecentordetailedlong-termstudiesofthesesystems thatincludethecostsoflabourandenvironmentalcapital,wearesafertoassumethat theyareunlikelytooutperformcommercialsystemsbyafactoroftwo.Inotherwords,Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page3of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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theirviabilityisstillquestionable,andweareirresponsibleifwedonotquestiontheassumptionthatdrylandanimalproductioncanmeaningfullyaddresspoverty.Whilewe claimnoexpertiseinpastoraleconomics,ourlivelihoodsurveys(unpublisheddata) fromShorobeandSankuyucommunitiesinnorthernBotswanasuggestthathousehold povertyishigher,andincomedistributionfarmoreskewed,incommunitiesthatdependonlivestock(Shorobe)thanthosewithwildlife(Sankuyo).Additionaldatafrom communallandsinSouthAfrica(seebelow)suggestthattheeconomicoutputcommunallandislow.Whilebeyondthescopeofthispaper,ruralpeopleinthedrylandsof southernAfricaarevulnerabletoextremepovertyandappeartobesurvivingmoreon wages,remittances,andgovernmenttransferpaymentsthanonlocalproduction.Generallyspeaking,livestockarekeptprimarilyforculturalreasonsandasamechanismof savingsandcopingwithrisk.Itisalsosignificantthattheyareanassetthatcanbeprivatelyownedandusedtoharvestnaturalresourcesinsituationswherepeoplegenerally havelimitedrightstovalorize,manage,orexcludeothersfrom ‘ their ’ naturalresources. Thispaperisaboutthewildlifeeconomyanditspotentialtodrivedevelopment. Thechallengeofscalingupthiseconomicmodelandadjustingittothelivelihoods oftheruralpoorinAfrica'scommunaldrylandsmovesbeyondtheeconomicmodelitselftothechallengesoftransferringitindifficultpolitical,institutionalcapacityand demographiccircumstances.ThispolicyresponseinsouthernAfricahasbeenlabeled community-basednaturalresourcemanagement(CBNRM).Sincethemid-1980s, CBNRMhasattemptedtoreplicatetheeconomicsuccessofwildlifeonprivatelandin thecomplexinstitutionalcircumstancesofAfrica'scommunalareas(Martin1986; Metcalfe1993;JonesandMurphree2004;ChildandBarnes2010)byattemptingdevolvingfullrightstouse,manage,andbenefitfromwildlifetocommunitiesashadbeen doneforprivategameranchers(Murphree1994),albeitfallingshortofthisintention (Martin2009).Ontheonehand,itisnavetosuggestthatwildlifecanresolvepoverty formillionsofpeopleindrylands,butontheother,CBNRMhasclearlybenefitedboth peopleandwildlifewhereithasbeenimplementedwithsomelevelofcompetence (Childetal.2003;NACSO2006).However,inseveralcountrieswheresuperiorwildlife resourcescouldclearlybenefitpeople,thishasnotoccurred(NelsonandBlomley2009; Nelson2010).Wefallonthesideofthedebatethattheproblemliesmorewithimplementationthanwiththemodelitself(HulmeandMurphree2001),whichoftenfallsfar shortofbestpracticebecausecommunitiesarenotreallyempoweredtouse,manage, andbenefitfromwildlife(orformostnaturalresourcesthatmatter)(Martin2009; Ribotetal.2010). Althoughstronglyassociatedwithwildlife,CBNRMinsouthernAfricacanbeinterpretedasanewinstitutionalmodelthatlinkspaymentsforecologicalservicestopovertyreduction(Child2004a,FrostandBond2008),whichisapplicabletomany ecosystemservices,butjusthappenstotakeadvantageofthevalueofwildlifeandopportunitiesthatarosebecausewildlifeprovidedaninstitutionalgreenfield.Wecertainly needsuchmodels.Ecosystemserviceshavebeenvaluedatseveraltimesglobalgross domesticproduct(GDP)(Costanzaetal.1997),butweseldomtakethisintoaccount inlandusedecisions.Indeed,thechallengeofourgenerationmaywellbetointernalize thecostsandbenefitsofecosystemservicesinthelivelihoodsandlandusedecisionsof theruralpeoplewhocoexistwithbiodiversityinthemannerthathasbeenattempted forwildlife.Forexample,themodelsofmicro-governanceandhouseholdcashpaymentChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page4of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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systemsdevelopedinsomecommunitywildlifeprograms(Child2004a,b,2006)are currentlybeingreplicatedwithREDDpaymentsinTanzania(MorganBrown,personal communication).Inotherwords,wildlifeprovidesbothavaluableresourceformany drylandsandalsoanewmodelwitheconomic,institutional,andgovernancecomponentsthatmaybetransferabletoothernaturalresourcesandecosystemservices.This paperaddressesonlytheeconomiccomponentofthisapproach.NewapproachestowildlifeconservationBeginninginthe1950s,conservationistsinsouthernandEastAfricabegantodevelop anewparadigmforconservationbasedonsustainableuseofnaturalresources (SASUSG1996).Leadingthispolicyexperimentationwasprivategameranching,especiallyinsouthernAfrica.Althoughthishasbeenahighlysuccessfulconservationand economicinitiative,relativelylittleispublishedaboutitorabouttheeconomicresearch,methods,andprinciplesbehindthisgrowth.Privatewildlifeconservationor ‘ gameranching ’ stronglyinfluencedthenewvisionofconservationanddevelopment thatarosetoprominenceduringthe1980sand1990s(Martin2009).Thebasicmessage ofthesustainableuseapproachisthatwildresourcesandecosystemservicesareenormouslyvaluable.Ifwechangethewaysthatwegovernthemandifwecanplacelandholdersandruralcommunitiesatthejunctionofbenefitandmanagement,wild resourcescanpayforthemselvesandsimultaneouslyaddressruralpovertyandenvironmentalinjustice.Atthetimetheseideaswereintroduced,theywereradical,encompassingthreemajorconceptualstrands(HulmeandMurphree2001):thatthestateshoulddevolveproprietorship,includingtheresponsibilityforand benefitsfrommanagingwildresources,tothelandholdersandthecommunitiesthat livewiththem;thatnaturalresourcesshouldbeexploitedsustainablyandasprofitablyaspossible toachievebothconservationanddevelopmentgoals;andthattheneo-liberalconceptsofmarkets,property,andexchangeshouldplaya greaterroleinshapingincentivesforconservationandallocatingresourcestotheir highestvalueduses. Gameranchingprovidesanexampleofhowpractitionerssimplifiedaplethoraof principlesintooneoverarchingguidingstatement: ‘ tomaximizethebenefitsfrom wildlifetothepeopleonwhoselanditlives ’ (Child1995).Itisalsoanexampleofthe centralityofinstitutionsortheformalrulesorinformalnormsthatframehuman conduct(North1990)totherelationshipsbetweenpeople,economyandnature,and theprocessofmodifyingtheseinstitutionsinwaysthatwereinsightful,carefully crafted(BorgerhoffMulderandCoppolillo2005),andchangedtheoutlookforwildlife inAfrica.BriefhistoryofwildlifeuseWecanviewthewildlifeeconomyinfourphases(Table1).Inthepre-moderneconomy,wildlifewasplentiful,andtheprimaryconstrainttousewasthetechnologyand costsofharvestingit.Thiswasfollowedbya ‘ frontiereconomy ’ associatedwiththeIndustrialRevolutionandtheexplorationandsettlementofAfricabyEuropeans.New technologyandmarkets,includingguns,wagons,andevenrailways,radicallyalteredChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page5of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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theeconomyofwildlifeandenabledhunterstoharvestvastnumbersofwildlifeata lowcosttosellinnewurbanandglobalmarkets.Intheabsenceofinstitutionsforcontrollingofftake,wildlife,includingNorthAmerica'svastherdsofbison,wasdecimated inaclassiccaseofmarketfailurewherebyindividualsinternalizebenefitsbut externalizecoststosociety. Inresponsetothis,wildlifewasnationalized.In1900and1933,theEuropeanpowers metinLondontorespondtotheperceivedextirpationofwildlifeintheirAfricancolonies,makingthreepolicydecisionswithlong-lastingimplications(Heijnsbergen 1997).First,theyencouragedtheformationofstateprotectedareas,whichledtothe formationofAfrica'sspectacularnationalparksandnowsupportvibranteconomies whenmanagedeffectively.Second,theygreatlyrestrictedthecommercialuseofwildlife,renderingwildlifevaluelessexceptforlow-valuesubsistenceuses.Third,theycentralizedownershipofwildlifeinthestate,disenfranchisinglandholdersandtakingupon themselvestheburdenofprotectingwildlifefrompeople(anti-poaching)andprotectingpeoplefromwildlife(problemanimalcontrol).Insomecountries,localcommunitieswereseverelydisenfranchised,especiallywheretraditionalmethodsofhunting weremadeillegalandownershipoffirearmswasrestricted(Carruthers1989; BrockingtonandIgoe2006).Butinothers,likeZambiaandBotswana,localpeople weregivenconsiderablefreedomtohuntunderpermitsystemsthatoftenbecamedifficulttoadminister(Astle1999). Thepolicyresponseembeddedinthe ‘ LondonConvention ’ becamewidelyaccepted, sometimesdogmatically,asthewayconservationshouldbedone:acombinationof ‘ pristine ’ parksandnon-utilizationofwildlifeonlandoutsidethem,withwildlifeasapriceless butcommerciallyvaluelessasset,fundedby thestateandmanagedonitsbehalfbyasmall bandofdedicatedgamerangers.However,bythelate1950s,populationgrowthandthe rapidspreadofagricultureandlivestockwe recausinganinexorabledeclineofAfrica's uniqueandspectacularwildlife.Atthetwilig htofcolonialAfrica,manyleadingconservationistsmetattheArushaConferenceonthe ‘ ConservationofNatureandNatural ResourcesinModernAfricanStates ’ ,emphasizingthataradicalnewapproachwasneeded toconservewildlife(IUCN1963).This,thedel egatessaid,neededtobeledbyAfricans,and wildlifeneededtobecomeaneconomicassetaccordingtotheemerging ‘ useitorloseit ’ philosophy.Thus,theopeningcommentso ftheconferenceproceedingsemphasize: Onlybytheplannedutilizationofwildlifeasarenewablenaturalresources,either forproteinorasarecreationalattraction,canitsconservationanddevelopmentbe Table1PhasesinthepoliticaleconomyofwildlifePhaseFeatures 1.Pre-moderneconomyUseislimitedbyability/costsofharvesting 2.FrontiereconomyCostsofharvestinggreatlyreducedbytechnology.Profitsincreasedbymarkets.Butfewrulesornormstocontroluse 3.WildlifeisnationalizedControlofwildlifecentralizedinthestateCommercialusegreatlyrestricted 4.SustainableuseapproachUseofwildlifedevolvedtolandholders(andlater,tocommunities)Commercialusesencouraged Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page6of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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economicallyjustifiedincompetitionwithagriculture,stockranchingandotherforms oflanduse (p19,IUCN1963).TheemergenceofwildlifeutilizationConservationistsbegantoarguethatwildlifewasbettersuitedtousingAfrica'sharshenvironmentsthanthedomesticmonoculturesim portedfromEuropebecause,toquoteagain fromtheArushaConference, thevarietyofungulatefauna,theirmobility,highstandingbiomass,andgreaternutritionalefficiencyisseentogivethemadvantagesoverdomesticlivestockthatconcentratetheirattentiononasin gleconstituentoftheplantstanding-crop biomass-thegraminaciouscarpet (p19,IUCN1963).Nonetheless,by1980fully,some95% ofthelargeherbivorebiomassinsouthernAfricawaslivestock(CummingandBond1991). The1950sand1960ssawunprecedentedresearchintotheecologyofwildlife,its meatproductionpotential,andevendomestication(Talbotetal.1961;Talbotetal. 1965;Mossman1975).Croppingschemeswereinitiated,mostlyinEastAfrica,and well-knownconservationistslikeGeorgeAdamsonandothers(inKenya),andNorman Carr(Zambia)proposedschemeswherebylocalpeoplewouldbenefitfromwildlife (IUCN1963;Parker2004).TheUnitedNation'sAfricanSpecialProjectwasdeveloped toassessandinvestinthepotentialforwildlifeasaneconomictoolinAfrica(Riney andHill1967),includingtheestablishmentofnationalparksandgamereserves(e.g., Botswana)andcroppingschemes(e.g.,LuangwaValley,Zambia).However,withthe transitionfromcolonialtoAfricanruleinEastAfrica,thecontrolofwildlifewasincreasinglycentralized(Kabiri2010),andpolicymomentumshiftedtosouthernAfrica wheretherewasconsiderablediscussionaboutthepotentialvalueofwildlife(Riney 1960;Dasmann1964),andexperimentalgamecroppingwasinitiated(Dasmannand Mossman1961).Bythelate1960s,theheadsofwildlifeagenciesinsouthernAfrica beganmeetingannuallythroughthe ‘ StandingCommitteeforNatureConservationand theManagementandUseofWildlife ’ ofthe ‘ SouthernAfricanRegionalCommission fortheConservationandUtilizationoftheSoil ’ .Soonthereafter,weseelegislation emerginginNamibia,Zimbabwe,Mozambique,Botswana,andSouthAfrica'sprovinces allowinglandholderstousetheirwildlifecommerciallyandwithfarfewerstateimposedrestrictions(Child1971;SuichandChild2009).Whenitbecameapparent thatpermitsandsurveyswereimpracticalandthatlandholdershusbandedvaluable wildlifejustastheyhusbandedtheirdomesticstock,regulatoryrequirementswere reduced.InZimbabwe,theywerevirtuallyremovedbytheboldParksandWildLife Actof1975.Ecologyandcommodity(meat)productionEarlyresearchanddiscussionsfocusedonwildlife'secologicaladaptationstoAfrica's climateanddiseases(Mossman1975)andtheabilityofwildlifetoproducemoremeat, orbetterqualitymeat,thanlivestock(Talbotetal.1965).Itsuggestedthatwildlifeproducedhigh-qualitymeatbutthatthelogisticalchallengesofcroppingfree-rangingwild animalsreducedpotentialprofits.Researchthenturnedtotherelativesuitabilityofdiversemulti-speciesproductionsystemscomparedtolivestockmonocultures.Inelegant studies,ecologistsnotedhowthediversityofwildlifewasmatchedtothediversityof vegetationandthreatsfrompredators(Jarman1973),andthatsemiaridsavannasin particularevolvedunderindigenousmulti-speciessystemstypicallycarrying15to25Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page7of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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ungulatespeciescomparedtoamaximumoffivedomesticspecies(Cumming1982; Cumming1995).Scientistsweresurprisedathowmuchoverlaptherewasinthedietarypreferencesofwildherbivores,butitwasalsoarguedthatdietseparationandthe factthatgregariouswildlifewasinvariablymobilehelpedtomaintainecologicalbalance,especiallybetweenthewoodyandgrasscomponentsofsavannas(Taylorand Walker1978;Child1995).EcologistsnotedthatproductioninmanyAfricanrangelandswaswaterlimited(Coeetal.1976;Bell1982)andemphasizedtheimportanceof thegrasslayerinabsorbingrainfallandmakingitavailabletoplants(KellyandWalker 1976). ‘ Degradation ’ wasthoughttobesynonymouswiththelossofperennialgrasses, whichmaintainedthestructureofthesoilsurfaceandabsorbedwater(Riney1963; Walker1987).Overgrazingorfrequentincorrectburningofthegrasslayercouldtip thecrucialbalancebetweengrassandtrees(Riney1963;MaheshSankaranetal.2005) intoanew(andlessproductive)stablestatefromwhichrecoverywasdifficult (CampbellandChild1971;Walkeretal.2004). Importantandinterestingasthisresearchwas,researchersweremarchingdowna blindalleyincomparingtherelativeabilityofwildlifeandlivestocktoproducemeat. Themeatproductivepotentialofsemiaridrangelandswasecologicallylimited,regardlessofspecies.Increasinganimalproductionreducedthehealthofthegrasslayer(and waterinfiltrationwherewaterwasthelimitingfactor),thusunderminingitself.Inother words,meatproductionwasecologicallylimited,andattemptstomovebeyondthese limitsultimatelyfailedasweseelaterwithprivatebeefranchinginZimbabwe.Ultimately,thesolutionlaynotinchoosingbetweenwildlifeandlivestockformeatproductionbutinaddingvalueinwaysthatwasnotdirectlylinkedtoextractionfromthe environment,suchasexperiencesorluxurygoodsliketrophyanimals.Seenretrospectively,wildlifescientistsmistakenlythoughtintermsofcommodityproduction(likethe agriculturalagenciesofthetime)ratherthanimprovingtheeconomicallocationof resourcestoaddvalue.Intheend,institutionaladaptationandthedevelopmentofnew marketsbyfarmers,notproductiontechnology,providedcommercialsolutionsforranchersthroughashiftfromagro-extractivebeefcommodityproductiontoabioexperienceeconomy.Dysfunctionallegalsystemsandhuman-wildliferelationshipsInthetwentiethcentury,whitesettlersacquiredlandinsouthernandEastAfrica,and Africanagricultureandpopulationsgrewrapidly.PriortoWorldWarII(WWII),the newconservationlawsweredirectedmainlyatwhitecommercialhunters,andlocal huntingforthepotwasusuallyoverlooked(Parker2004).Butasruralpopulations grew,localhuntingbegantothreatenwildlife,wasincreasinglytreatedaspoaching, andprosecutedbythestate.Criminalizingatraditionallivelihoodstrategylikehunting createdapowerfulsenseofinjustice,especiallywhenenactedbycolonialgovernments thatlackedpoliticallegitimacy. ‘ Poachers ’ becameRobinHoodsandwereprotectedby theircommunities,sowildlifelawsweredifficulttoimplement.Thisalsocreateda negativerelationshipbetweenlocalpeople,wildlife,andthestate. Settingthestateupagainstthepeoplewasneverlikelytoresultinsustainablesolutionsforwildlife.Inpre-independenceZimbabwe,forinstance,protectionistconservationalienatedwhitefarmersfromwildlifeandbecameanimportantpoliticaltoolinthe handsofblacknationalistsbyhighlightingtheinjusticeofwhiteminorityrule.Even today,somenationalwildlifeagenciesexpropriatethebenefitsofwildlifeforthemselvesChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page8of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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andtheircroniesandtreatlocal ‘ poachers ’ brutally,sopastoralpeoplewhoarenatural alliesofwildlife,areplantingfieldsinimportantwildlifeareas,mostlytoprotecttheir landrights(Nelson2010). Oneoutcomeofthesedysfunctionalpoliciesisthefalseimpressionthatlocalpeople hatewildlife.OursurveysoflocalpeopleacrosssouthernAfricashowthatpeopleare oftenextremelyconcernedabouttheimpactofwildlifeontheircropsandlivestock (andtheineffectivemanagementofthisproblem),yetover90%ofpeopleclaimtolike wildlife(ortolikeitalot)forbothaestheticandmaterialreasons.Whattheydonot like,however,istheinequityofwildlifelawsandthehigh-handedmannersofofficials whoimplementthem;theylikewildlife,andevenprotectedareas,butnotthewildlife officialsorlaws.ThissituationisbeginningtoimprovewiththeadventofCBNRMin countrieslikeNamibiaandBotswana. Protectionist,centralizedwildlifelegislation,fromurbanizedandwealthyindustrial nations,waspoliticallyunjustandeconomicallyflawed,causingenormouslossesof wildlifeindeveloping,ruralsocietiesafterWWIIasagricultureexpanded.The1940sto the1970sweretheheydayofagriculture.Cattlerancherscomplainedthat ‘ youcannot farminazoo ’ andwildlifewassteadilyexterminated(Taylor2002).NewspaperclippingsinZimbabwedramatizecaseswherecattleranchersshotlargenumbersofwildebeestandzebraand(havingnolegalcommercialuse)leftthemto ‘ rotintheveld ’ However,thebiggerthreatwasmoresubtle:thefencingofwaterpointsandlivestock overgrazingeliminatedwildlifeforlackoffoodandwater.TheperspectivesandcontributionsofprivatelandholdersWeuseaseriesofcasestudiestodescribetheshiftbacktowildlife,whichbeganslowly ledbyafewmaverickcattleranchesandthenacceleratedintoalandscape-widephenomena.IntheLowveldofZimbabwe,forexample,thelateGeorgeStyleofBuffalo RangeRanch(20,000ha)hadapenchantforwildlife.Fromthemid-1950s,hedevelopedasuccessfulcattlebusiness,fencingpaddocksandprovidingartificialwater.The easternsectionofhisranchwasboundedbytheChiredziRiver,whichfordecadesprovidedwildlifeandlivestockwithpermanentwaterinthedryseason(Figure1).Consequently,thispartoftheranch(some9,000ha)wasdegraded,andGeorgeStyle experimentedwithwildlifeasmuchasahobbyasforcommercialreasons.Browsers likeeland,kudu,andimpalathrived,andthesensitivegrazingspecieslikesable,roan, andLichtenstein'shartebeestdisplacedbycattlebegantorecover.Styleculledimpala tobesoldthroughhisbutcheriesandsoon(early1970s)initiated ‘ mini-safaris ’ withforeignhuntingclientsinawell-appointedhuntingcamp. Georgeandhisson,Clive,encouragedtheuseoftheirranchforcomparativeresearch.Detailedvegetationtransectsshowedthatcattlegrazingdamagedperennial grassesandthesoilsurface,largelybecauseofthecontinuouslyhighstockingnecessary tokeepabeefenterpriseviable,whereastherangewasslowlyrecoveringunderwildlife (TaylorandWalker1978;Child1988)(Figure2).Overstockingappearedtodirectly damagerangeproductivity,withthepatternofcumulativeoverstocking(i.e.,stocking rateineachyearlesspredictedcarryingcapacitycalculatedfromrainfallusingtheformulafromCoeetal.1976)matchingarapiddeclineincattlecalvingrates(Child1988) (Figure3)andultimatelydestroyingtheprofitabilityofthelivestockenterpriseon BuffaloRange.ThisexperiencewassharedbymanycattleranchersintheLowveld (PriceWaterhouse1994;Taylor2002),whobega ntoswitchtowildlifeenterprises,someChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page9of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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partially,somecompletely,andsomeasgroupsoflandholdersoverlargeblocksofland, especiallyafterlosinglivestockinthes everedroughtsof1984and1992(Taylor2002; Lindsayetal.2009).ThebeginningsofsafarihuntingonprivatelandOnmostproperties,theswitchtowildlifewasgradual.Manycattlerancherssurvived financiallybyusingremnantpopulationsofwildlifeforsafarihunting.Withgoodrevenuesandfewoverheadcosts,wildlifeinitiallysupplementedcattleranching,butlater, someranchersswitchedoverentirely.HuntingguestsfromNorthAmericaorEurope stayedwiththerancherforseventotendays,initiallyinasparebedroomandlaterin speciallybuiltaccommodation.Eachday,theywouldgooutearlyinthemorningorin thelateafternoon,shootingroughlyoneanimaladay.Thesewerecalled ‘ plains-game Figure2 ChangesingrasscoverandgrazingintensityonBuffaloRangeranchbetween1973and 1986. Buffalo Range Ranch Figure1 MapofBuffaloRangeCattleandGameRanch. Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page10of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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safaris ’ becausetheyreliedonspecieslikekudu,zebra,wildebeest,impala,andwarthog. Ranchersthenimprovedtheirhuntingproductbynurturingorreintroducingvaluable specieslikeeland,sable,waterbuck,andevenpredatorslikeleopard,andlaterbyaddingbiggamelikeelephantandbuffalo,usuallyaspartofmulti-propertyconservancies. Buttodothis,theybegantoimproveenvironmentalmanagementbyreducingstocking ratesandhabitatfragmentationbyremovingcattlefencesandscalinguptomultipropertymanagementunits.CattlerancherslikeGeorgeStylespentmanydaysinthe fieldhuntinganddevelopedconsiderableknowledgeaboutthehabitsandneedsof wildlife,whichspreadthroughfarmerfielddays.Undernaturalconditions,wildlifeis highlymobiletorespondtohighlyvariablesavannarainfall,andranchersdefragmented theirlandwithsimple(andcost-saving)measurelikeremovingonestrandfromconventionalfour-strandcattlefences,allowingspecieslikekuduandelandtojumpover them,andwildebeestandwarthogtoduckunderthem.Similarly,theystoppedfencing waterpointsandmodifiedconventionalcattlewatertroughstoenablewildlifetodrink. Theycateredforthespecificneedsofvaluablespecieslikesable,whichstruggleto competewithcattle,andmanageddiseaseslike ‘ snotsiekte ’ (malignantcatarrh)byensuringthattheircattlewereseparatedfromwildebeestatcalvingtime,duringwhich transmissionfromwildebeesttocattleoccurs. RangeCondition CattleProductivity (calvingrates) Cumulativeoverstocking Calvingrates(%) 1970197519801985 1970197519801985 Cumulativeoverstocking = stockingrate–carryingcapacity(rainfall).CalculatedusingCoeetal(1976) Figure3 TherelationshipbetweenrangeconditionandcattleproductivityonBuffaloRangeranch ( 1967 – 1986). Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page11of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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Trophyhuntingissustainable;meatproductionveryriskyAlthoughitrunscountertothemoralargument,huntinganimalsformeatshouldnotbe encouragedwhereaskillingthemforsportprovidesapowerfulconservationtool.TherecoveryofwildlifeovermuchofsouthernAfricahasgonehand-in-handwithtrophyhunting,whichisarobust,low-risksolutionfortworeasons:(1)themathematicsof populationbiologyand(2)thetransparencyofsafarihuntingmarkets.Anofftakeof2%to 3%providesasteadysupplyofqualitytrophymalescomparedtopopulationgrowthrates of10%to30%,sorancherslikeGeorgeStylemadegoodprofitsfromsafarihuntingatthe sametimewhenwildlifepopulationsrecoveredrapidly.Trophyhunting(unlikemeatproduction)isprofitableandecologicallyrobust,evenmoresobecausetrophyhuntingmarketsarepersonalizedandinformation-rich,sohuntingclientsquicklyavoidoutfitterswho over-huntwithbelow-averagetrophy(horn)size.Indeed,theecologicalchallengeonsuccessfulgamerancheslikeBuffaloRangeisseldomtoolittlewildlife,buttoomuch.George Styleculledhundredsofimpalatoprotecttheenvironmentandallowgreaterdiversityof wildlifeeventhoughgamemeatproductionseldomcoveredcosts. Incontrasttosafarihunting,whichisecologicallyrobustandprofitable,commercial orsubsistencewildlifemeatproductionisecologicallyriskyandeconomicallyquestionable.Meatisaubiquitouslow-valuecommoditywithoutthemarketchecksandbalancesassociatedwithhuntingtrophies.Weneedtokillatleast20timesasmany animalstogeneratethesameincomefrommeatasfromtrophyhunting,andthecosts aremuchhigher.Onprivateland,bushmeatisseldomviableexceptasaby-productof morelucrativehuntingandtourismbusinesses,withtheimplicationthatbushmeat poachingisviableonlybecausetheharvesterexternalizesmanycoststosociety.The safestconclusionisthatmeatproductionindrylands,eitherfromlivestockorwildlife, isseldomviableifthefullfinancialandenvironmentalcostsandbenefitsareaccounted for.Ithasnotsucceededonprivateland,andweextendeconomicmodelsbasedon bushmeatproductiontoruralcommunitiesatourperil.DevelopinganeconomicunderstandingofwildlifeproductionTrophyhuntingisworthmorethanabilliondollarsinSouthAfricaalone(Flack,personalcommunication),yetdataandpublicationsonprivatewildlifeconservationin southernAfricaaresparse.Thepurposesofthissectionaretosummarize,withincreasingsophistication,methodsusedtounderstandtheeconomicsoftheprivatewildlifesector,toinfluencepolicymakinginthepast25years,andtousecasestudiesto illustratehowthewildlifesectorhasemerged. ShortlyafterZimbabwe'sIndependencein1980,oneoftheauthors(BrianChild)was recruitedbythewildlifedepartmenttoconducteconomicresearchandextensionon gameranching(1984to1989).Byspendingextensivetimewithgameandcattleranchers, hegainedtheirconfidence,learnedhowmuchtheyknewaboutwildlife,andworkedwith themtounderstandtheeconomicsoftheirwildlifeandlivestockenterprises.Datafrom 22cattleranchersatthewetterlimitsofrangelandsintheZimbabweanMidlandsin1984 (VincentandThomas1961)showedthatsafarihuntingwaseasilytheprimarywildlifeactivity,withincomecomprisedasfollows:guiding(35%),trophyfees(46%),meatfromtrophyanimals(13%),andmeatcropping(7%).Allbutoneoftheselandholderswas primarilyacattlerancher.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page12of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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Grossincome(turnover)andnetmargins(profits)Livestock,whichcomprised80%ofherbivorebiomass,generatedmostoftheincome inthearea(Table2),butwhenvariablecostswerededucted,livestockprofitswere (Zimbabweandollar)Z$4.52/hacomparedtoZ$2.93fromwildlife.AllvaluesforZimbabweanresearcharestatedin1984/86Z$whenUS$1=Z$1.3Anewfinancialratio(i. e.,profit/kglivemass)thatweinventedtoreflecttheecologicalrealitythatgrasswas thelimitingfactor(seeabove)showedthat,from1kgoflivemass,wildlifeearned17c andcattleearned7c,suggestingthat,atthemargin,itpaidlandholderstoreallocate grazingfromlivestockwithwildlife.Asimilarsurveyof15propertiesand446,818ha inthemorearidLowveldin1986(includingBuffaloRangeRanch)confirmedthatit waseconomicallyrationaltoswitchlandfromlivestock(earning7c/kglivemass)to wildlife(26c)(Table3). Repeatingasurveyofrancheropinions(unpublishedmimeo)aboutrancheropinions aboutwildlifeintheZimbabweMidlandstenyearsaftertheradicalParksandWildLife Actof1975(thatdevolvedfullauthoritytolandholderstousewildlife),andonlyfour yearsafterthecivilwarended,showedsignificantchanges.Wildlifeincomehadquadrupled,andneutralornegativeattitudestowardswildlifedecreasedfrom22%to0%.In linewiththepredictionsofthesustainableuseapproach,thegeographicrangeofvaluablehuntingspeciesincreased,aswealsoseeinthedatafromSouthAfrica(seebelow). Thenumberofpropertiesutilizingreedbuck,bushbuck,wildebeest,zebra,waterbuck, tsessebe,kudu,eland,andsableincreasedby21%;thegeographicrangeofthesespecies expandedby22%,andthatofthemostvaluablespecies(i.e.,waterbuck,tsessebe,eland, andsable),by35%.Intermsofbiodiversityconservation,asingle,sedentary,gregarious bulk-roughagefeeder(i.e.,domesticcattle)wasreplacedbyaspectrumof15ormore speciesofwild(anddomestic)animals(Child2009),andhabitatsnoticeablyimproved (personalobservation,photographs)onlargeunfencedranchesinZimbabwe,although therewerestrongconcernsaboutdegradationonsmallfencedgamefarmsinSouth Africa. Bythelate1980s,mostcattleranchersinZimbabwebegantopromoteandusewildlifebecauseofadeclineincattlepricesandsubsidiesandincreasingecologicalproblemshighlightedbythe1984and1992drought.Asignificantnumbershifted completelyintowildlife,especiallyinsouthernZimbabweandnearHwangeNational ParkandVictoriaFalls.Anexcellentdocumentaryvideoabouttheformationofthe SaveValleyConservancyillustratesthesebroadertrends(Taylor2002).Inthevideo, Table2Afinancialcomparison(inZimbabwean$dollars)ofwildlifeandlivestockinthe ZimbabweanMidlandsin1984WildlifeandlivestockeconomicsintheZimbabweMidlands UnitsCattleWildlife Comparison/unitarea(wildlife=20%ofbiomass) IncomeHa$13.57$3.36 Profit(income variablecosts)Ha$4.52$2.93 Comparison/kgbiomass GrossincomeKg20c20c ProfitKg7c17c Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page13of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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oneoftheleadingranchersintheLowveld(CliveStockil)describeshowcattleranching hadbeendevelopedintheareassincethe1950s.Followingtheadage ‘ youcan'tfarmin azoo ’ ,wildlifehadbeensteadilyreplaced,includingthroughactiveeliminationcampaigns(e.g.,ofbuffalo)bytheveterinarydepartment.Footageshowsthedegradationof thehabitat(muchasdescribedforBuffaloRange)andthecollapseofcattleenterprises. Notingthatranchingneededtobeecologicallysustainable,economicallyviable,and socio-politicallyacceptable,Stockildescribeshow27ranchersstudiedthesituation. Theycommissionedareport(PriceWaterhouse1994)thatconcludedthatwildlife woulddoubletheirincomeandincreasethereturnoncapitalfrom1%to3%(beef)to 10%to22%(wildlife).Consequently,the27landholdersintheSaveValleyshiftedfrom livestocktowildlife,combining344,200haofpreviouslydegradedcattleranchesintoa hugewildlifeconservancywithnointernalfencingandcommonmanagementpolicies (Lindsayetal.2009).TheSaveConservancywassystematicallyrestockedwithelephant, buffalo,predatorsincludinglionsandwilddogs,andmanyoftheantelopespeciesdisplacedbylivestock.Huntingandtourismlodgesdiversifiedtheeconomy,generated moreprofits,providedmorejobs,andallowedtheenvironmenttorecover.Toall intentsandpurposes,thisresembledaprivatenationalpark.AtleastsevenothersimilarinitiativesoccurredinZimbabweatthetime.KickbackfromsinglecommodityLeviathansBythelate1980s,therelativeeconomicsofwildlifeandlivestockhadreversed,but agriculturalpoliceshadnot.Despitefallingbeefpricesontheworldmarket,governmentveterinaryandagriculturalagenciescontinuedtosupportbeefwhileimposing considerablecostsonthewildlifesectortothedetrimentofprivateranchesandthe greatereconomy(Muir-LerescheandNelson2000)althoughwildlifewasenablingcattlerancherstostayontheland(apatternalsoobservedinTexas,personalobservation) andtorecoveritsecologicalfunction(Child1988;Jansenetal.1992;PriceWaterhouse 1994).Butpowerfulgovernmentagriculturalagenciescontinuedtopromotebeefwithoutconsideringitsimpactonwildlife,illustratingthedangersofsingle-sectordecisionmaking.Between1919andthe1980s,thousandsofwildanimalsincludingrhinoswere shotinthenameoftsetseflycontrol(ChildandRiney1987),hundredsofmilesof gamefencewereerected,habitatsweregrosslymodifiedincludingthebulldozingofriparianwoodlandsandwaterholes,andDDTanddeildrinwereappliedonabroadscale. Inthe1980s,largeareasofthecountrywerefurtherfencedtocontrolfoot-and-mouth diseasedespitequestionsastothetechnicalandeconomicmeritsofafencingsolution (TaylorandMartin1987).Basedoncontroversialevidenceofbuffalo-to-livestocktransmission,allbuffaloonprivatelandwereshotdespitetheveterinarydepartmentbeing informedthatbuffalocoulddoubletheprofitabilityofwildlifeenterprises.Tocombat this,thesmallwildlifedepartmentbegantostudytheeconomicsofthecattlesector Table3Afinancialcomparison(inZ$dollars)ofwildlifeandlivestockintheZimbabwe Lowveldin1986CattleandwildlifeprofitabilityintheLowveldin1986 Livemass ( kg ) Turnover ( Z$)Profit ( Z$)Profit / kg Cattle10.1m$2.0m$0.7m0.07 Wildlife4.7m$1.4m$1.2m0.26m=million.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page14of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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anddevelopedaquickanddirty ‘ budget ’ forthebeefsector(Table4).Financialdata compiledfromgovernmentreports(Child1988)showedthatevenpreferentialaccess tothehigh-pricedEuropeanUnionmarketwouldnotcoverfarmerandindustrycosts, evenbeforethefixedcoststofarmers(e.g.,capitalvalueoflivestock,land,andfacilities),theindustry(e.g.,costsofnewEUcompliantabattoirs),ortheenvironmentwere accountedfor.Single-sectorLeviathansemphasizedcommodityproduction(e.g.,bags ofmaizeandkilogramsofbeef)withlittleappreciationofeconomicissueslikecomparativeadvantageorallocativeefficiency,whichmayspeakwelltopoliticiansbutdoes notmaximizesocietalwell-being. Ahistoricalreviewofthegovernment'sownreports,includingParliamentaryCommissionsofInquiry,showedthatthebeefsectorhadbeenheavilysubsidizedforseveral decadesthroughadvantageousbeefprices,wealthtransferfromthepeasantto Table4Quickanddirtybeefindustrybudget(Zimbabwean$dollar1986)Costs 1.Governmentservices 62 2.ColdStorageCommissionsubsidy50 3.Farmer'svariablecosts 74 4.Farmercapitalinvestment(land,cattle)?? 5.Farmeroverheadcosts(fixedcosts)?? 6.IndustryinvestmentinEuropeanUnion-standardabattoirs,buffalofencing,etc.?? 7.Environmentalcosts(overgrazing)?? TotalCosts 185+ Income 1.Actual 149 2.WithEuropeanEconomicCommissionexports191 World Price of beef Price of beef on Zimbabwean market (subsidized) Figure4 Comparingdomesticandworldpricestoestimateiflanduseistaxedorsubsidized. Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page15of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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commercialherd,supporttofarmdevelopmentthroughfencingandwaterprovision, subsidisationofsingle-channelmarketingsystems(theColdStorageCommission),and soon(Phimister1978;Child1988).Methodologically,developingtheseargumentsis timeconsumingandsubjecttodifferentinterpretations.Paritypricingprovidesa quickerandmorereliablemethodforassessingifbeefproducersaresubsidised(or taxed)bycomparingthepricefarmersgetforbeefonthedomesticmarketcompared totheworldmarket.Usinggovernmentstatistics(Figure4)revealsthat,afterthemid1970s,thedomesticpriceofbeefwasonaverage40%higherthantheworldprice,confirmingotherresearchfindingsthatproducerswereheavilysubsidisedthroughpricing policies(Williams1993).FinancialandeconomicanalysisTheproponentsofwildlifeintuitedasfarbackasthe1960sthatwildlifewasbeingdisplacedbylivestockdespitebeingabetterlanduseoption.Aneconomistwouldsaythat wildlifehadaninherentcomparativeadvantageindrylandsbutwasundervaluedby marketfailuressothatscarceresourceswerebeingmisallocatedtothedetrimentofsociety.In1990,WorldWideFundforNature(WWF)andZimbabwe'swildlifeagency useddetailedfinancialaccountsandassetregisterstoassesstheviabilityofsome150 cattleandwildlifeenterprises(Jansenetal.1992).Wildlifewasmoreprofitablethan livestock,withonly5%oflivestockoperationsgeneratingareturnoncapitalinexcess of10%whenprofitswerecalculatedusingmarket(financial)prices(Figure5).Market priceswerethenadjustedtoremovepricingdistortionscausedbymarketfailures.In termsofsocietaloutcomes,wildlifewasevenmoreprofitable(Figure6),providingjobs, economicgrowth,andforeigncurrency(whichwasundervaluedbygovernmentcontrolledexchangerates).Therapidtransitiontowardswildlifeinmanyareas,unfortunately,wasneveraccuratelyquantified,butjudgingfromtrophysales,wildlifepopulationsonprivatelandquadrupledbetween1984and1992(Booth2002).SouthAfricaandNamibiaThelandinvasionsinZimbabwein2000underminedmuch,butnotall,ofthisprogress.However,similartrendsonprivatelandinNamibia,SouthAfrica,andBotswana confirmedthecomingofageofthewildlifebio-experiencesector.InNamibia,between theearly1970sand2001,livestockpopulationsonprivatelandhalvedfrom1.8million 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%ProfitableMarginalLoss Cattle Wildlife Figure5 ComparisonofthefinancialprofitabilityofcattleandwildlifeinZimbabwein1990. Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page16of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

PAGE 17

to0.91million,whereas ‘ huntable ’ wildlifepopulationsdoubledfrom0.565millionto 1,161millionheadforeconomicreasons(BarnesandJones2009).InSouthAfrica,the numbersofwildanimalseasilyquadrupledbetween1964and2005,withsomesources (Flackunpublisheddata;Carruthers2008suggestingasmanyas18.6millionwildanimalsbetween1964and2005,andtherearenowsome10,000wildliferanchesand some4,000mixedwildlifeandlivestockenterprises(Bothmaetal.2009).Privatewildlifeareasexpandedeightfoldbetween1979andthemid-1990s(Chadwick1996),protectingatleast16.8%ofthetotalareaofSouthAfrica(Cousinsetal.2008)compared to6%asIUCNcategoryItoIVprotectedareas.AswithZimbabwe, ‘ utilized ’ species increasedmuchmorerapidlythanthose ‘ protected ’ .Rhinoincreasedfrom50to 18,000,andblackwildebeestfromafewto26,000,muchfasterthanbontebok(fewto lessthan5,000)andCapeMountainZebra(fewto1,200)forwhichhuntinghasonly beenallowedwithinthepastdecade(Flack,personalcommunication).PolicyanalysismatrixDespiteitssizeandeconomicimportance,thereisremarkablylittleresearchorpolitical economicunderstandingofthewildlifesectorinSouthAfricaandsomeriskthatconservation,economic,andemploymentgainswillbeundoneinthepoliticallycharged debateoverlandrestitution.WehighlightkeyfindingsofaninvestigationoftheeconomicsofgameranchingnearKrugerNationalPark(Musengezi2010)andillustrate theusefulnessofthePolicyAnalysisMatrixorPAMmethodology(Table5). ThePAMistheoreticallyrobust(MonkeandPearson1989),relativelyeasytoapply, andusefulforinfluencingpolicymakers,especiallyinfinanceministriesbecauseitis easytounderstandasitfollowsthebasiccalculation,profit=incomefromsalesless Table5PolicyAnalysisMatrix(PAM)RevenuesCostsProfits TradableinputsDomesticfactors PrivatepricesABCD ‘ Social ’ (or ‘ economic ’ )pricesiEFGH DivergenceIJKLiThePAMcanalsoaccountforenvironmentalexternalitiesandforecological,regulatingandsocial/culturalservicesby buildingestimatesofthecostoftheseintosocialprices,butwedidnotdothis. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%ProfitableMarginalLoss Financial Economic Figure6 ComparisonofthefinancialandeconomicprofitabilityofwildlifeinZimbabwein1990. Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page17of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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costsofproduction.ConstructingaPAMrequiressocialskillsbecauseitreliesonlandholders ’ providingtheirincomeandexpenditureaccounts.Italsorequirestechnical skillstoclassifyaccountsintorevenues,tradableanddomesticfactorcosts,andtocalculate ‘ economic ’ prices.Itcanbeextendedtoincorporatenegativeexternalitieson ecosystemsorsocial/equitysystemsandtoguardagainstignoringtheseinpolicy recommendations.ThePAMisparticularlyusefulforassessingifalanduserepresents agoodchoiceforsocietyandhowmuchchoicesarebeingdistortedbypolicyandmarketfailures. Inthispaper,forexample,weusePAMtoassessifwildlifeisanoptimaluseofdrylands,thatis,doeswildlifehaveacomparativeadvantage? ‘ Comparativeadvantage ’ is notthesameasabsoluteadvantagebutexplainswhycountriesgainmutuallyfrom tradinginproductsforwhichtheyhaverelativeefficiencies.Comparativeadvantageis calculatedbycomparingvalue-added(i.e.,revenues-tradableinputs)tothecostsof localland,labour,andcapital(i.e.,domesticfactors),whichiswhythePAMsplitcosts intotwocolumns:tradableinputsanddomesticfactors. Second,wecancalculatehowmuchmarketandpolicyfailuresaredistortingprices, andthereforelandusedecisions,awayfromtherealvaluesthatwouldguideprivate actorstoallocateresourcesefficientlyforsociety.Wequantifythesepricedistortions bycomparingprivateprices(toprow)topricesinperfectmarkets(socialpricesrow), correctingpricesusingvariouseconometrictechniques.Thedivergencebetweenthe privateandsocialpricesisameasureofthemagnitudeofmarketfailure.Itisalsoa criticaleconomicconceptwithconsiderableimplicationsforconservationpolicy.When privatepricesdivergefromtheirtruevalues,privatedecisionmakersdonotproperly internalizesocialbenefitsandcostsoftheiractions.Thiscausesunder-provisionor over-utilizationofnaturalresourcesandistherootofmanynaturalresourceproblems (Libecap2009). In2010,JessicaMusengeziappliedthePAMmethodologytoeightpropertiesnear KrugerNationalParkinSouthAfrica(Table6).Wildlifeenterprisesweretoodiverse (andinnovative)tosummarizeusingsimpleaverages.Property(a),forexample,supportedhigh-endtourismchargingoverUS$500pernight,whileproperty(d)waspurchasedforecologicalreasonsandprofitswereaninsignificantobjective.Onlyproperty (g)stillhadlivestock,butprofitabilitywasachievedfromverticalintegrationincluding anabattoirandbutcheries(providingprofitsfarinexcessofcattleranchinginthe area). Simplegrossincomeandnetmargin(i.e.,grossincome directcosts)datashowed thatallwildlifeproperties(except(d))areprofitable(Table6),exceedthereturnsfrom extensivecommercialbeefproduction(accordingtomodelsprovidedbytheDepartmentofAgriculture),andprovidedsignificantnumbersofjobs(Musengezi2010).Indeed,wildlifeenterprisescreatemorejobsthanthelivestockenterprisestheydisplaced byafactoroftwoandasmuchasfive,andthesejobsarealsomorespecialized,increasingwagebillssome20-to32-fold,(PriceWaterhouse1994;Taylor2002;Langholz andKerley2006). WeillustratehowthePAMisusedtoassesstherelativeeconomicsofwildlifeproductionusingFarm(a).ThecapitallettersintheformulasaredefinedinthePAMin Table5.Atabasiclevel,Farm(a)generates(SouthAfricanrand)R8,706/haandis ‘ profitable ’ aftercostswithagrossmarginofR8,282(US$1=R7).ItalsoaddsvaluetoChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page18of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

PAGE 19

theSouthAfricaneconomyfrombothaprivateandsocialperspective.Intermsofthe pricesthatguidethefarmertomakelandusedecisions,theprivatevalue-added exceedscostsofdomesticfactorinputs.Saidtechnically,theprivatecostratioshows that,foreachrandofnetprofit(A-B),38centsgoestopaydomesticfactors(C).This leavesanetprofitof62centswhichissubstantial(i.e.,PCO=C/(A-B)=0.38).When pricesareadjustedtocorrectpricingdistortions,wildlifegeneratesonerandofprofit from20centsofdomesticfactorscosts(i.e.,DomesticResourceCostRatio(DRC)= G/(E-F)=0.196).Economicallyspeaking,wildlifehasacomparativeadvantageandisa gooduseofdrylandsinSouthAfrica. WecannowusethePAMtoadvisepolicymakersastohowmarketfailuresareeffectivelytaxingorsubsidisingwildlife.First,weassesstheimpactsofexchangerateand tradepoliciesusingtheEffectiveProtectionCoefficient(EPC).OnFarm(a),thesocial value-added(E-F)exceedstheprivatevalue-added(A-B)byonly6%(i.e.,EPC=(A-B)/ (E-F)=0.94),whichconfirmsthatproductmarketsinSouthAfricaarerelativelyfree andonlyslightlydisadvantagingwildlife.Second,weusetheprofitabilitycoefficientto Table6SummaryofPAMresultsforeightwildlifepropertiesinSouthAfricain2010Farm AllpriceinSouthAfricaRandabcdefgh ( US $ 1 = R7 ) Propertyattributes Farmsize(ha)5,2071,7003,7002,0172,8003,20014,40030,000 BigfiveYesNoYesNoNoNoNoYes Beds684252121210-Averageprice(rand)2,854350260285350250-Revenuesources(%oftotalrevenue) Tourismaccommodation95279950500 Biltonghunting000001710 Cattle000000840 Gamemeat00000100 Livegamesales092201007114100 Retail60320000 Trophyhunting061600620 Labour Numberofworkers1948420199107510 Labourcost(rand/ha)2,7886006644712388723314 Labourcost(%oftotalexpenditure)7721436351181918 Financialandeconomicresults Grossincome(rand/ha)8,7064,9362,2311051,6431,0992,906150 Grossmargin(rand/ha)8,2822,88685641,4347681,94790 Privatecostratio0.380.440.13 1.510.340.690.160.16 Domesticresourcecost0.20.220.59 10.260.430.110.08 Effectiveprotectioncoefficient0.940.880.920.940.961.030.910.9 Profitabilitycoefficient0.730.640.141.180.860.550.860.83 Netpolicytransfer(%taxonnetprofits)273686 1814451417PAM,PolicyAnalysisMatrix;N/a.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page19of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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measuretheoveralleffectofallpolicydistortionsontheenterprise.OnFarm(a),this isD/H=0.73,sooverall,Farm(a)'sprivateprofitis27%lowerthanitwouldbeinthe absenceofeconomicdistortion.Thissuggeststhat,inSouthAfrica,domesticfactors (i.e.,immovableland,labour,andcapital)aremoderatelydistortedandthat,ifwecorrectedtheseissues,wildlifewouldbe27%moreprofitable. Thereisconsiderablevariabilityamongsttheeightproperties,dependinguponthe specificconfigurationoftheirenterpriseandcoststructures.Nonetheless,wildlife clearlyprovidessignificantjobsfrommarginalland.Itisaneconomicallyefficientuse ofdrylandsinSouthAfrica(DRC<1).Itisalsoprofitabletofarmersdespitegovernmentpoliciesbeingdisadvantageoustowildlife.However,Musengezi'sresearchalso showedthatgameranchersfacedsignificantlymorenonfinancialbarrierscomparedto conventionalagriculturalenterprisesintheformofadditionalregulationsandpermissions.Heranalysisisasinglesnapshotintimeanddoesnotincorporatehabitatrecoveryortheconsiderableincreasesinlandvaluesassociatedwithwildlifeproperties.ConceptualizingwildlifeasaneconomicoptionWecanusetwoconceptualdiagramstosumma rizetheeconomicsofwildlife.Figure7 hypothesizesthatwildlifeoutcompeteslives tockagricultureinsomedrylandsbecauseitis easilydiversifiedthroughhuntingandtouris m.Theseadvantagesaremagnifiedattheeconomicorsocietallevelbecausethewildlifese ctorisassociatedwithverticalintegration (lodging,guiding,etc.)andtourismmultipliers (e.g.,backwardslinkagestoinputslikefood, wine,transport,etc.)thatarefarhigher thanforsimplecommodities(likemeat). Thishasimportantpolicyimplications.Intermsofdevelopment,wildlifeutilizationisa sensiblelanduseoptionjudgedpurelyintermsofjobsandeconomicgrowthinsomedrylands(Figure8).Therefore,policiesthatint ernalizeboththecostsandbenefitsofwildlife arelikelytoresultinpositiveconservationa nddevelopmentoutcomes.Conservationists alsoneedtotakethisseriously,recognizingthatnationalparksinmanysavannascan For Landholder (Financial) For Society (Economic) Meat Meat Hunting Tourism Economic output Economic Multipliers Vertical Integration in Sector Profit to Land Economic Multipliers Vertical Integration in Sector Profit to Land Meat Viability Economic output Figure7 Conceptualizingeconomicdifferencesbetweenthebio experienceandcommodity economyindrylands. Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page20of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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achievetheirconservationobjectiveswhileal sofunctioningasenginesforeconomicgrowth andruraldevelopment,whichisalsoa nimportantsocialresponsibility. Inhigher-rainfallagriculturalareas,theargumentisreversed(Figure8).Ifwewantto conserverepresentativesamplesoftheseenvironments,wewillneedtosubsidizethem (e.g.,protectedareas)becausewildlifeisonl yeconomicallycompetitiveonpatchesofland thataredifficulttofarm(e.g.wetlandsandh ills)oruniquelyaccessibletomarketsincities. Figure8alsoillustratesacriticaldifferencebetweenagricultureandnaturalresourcebasedsystems.Intraditionalagriculturalzones,ecosystemsaregreatlysimplified,and environmentalenergyischanneleddirectlyintoone,oratmostafew,productslike cottonorcorn.Outsidethesezones,peopletendtoharvestplantsindirectlyusinganimals(e.g.,drylands)ortoharvestamuchwidervarietyofplantandanimalproducts (e.g.,tropicalforests).Indrylands,humansharvestthethirdtrophictier.Thereisa quantumlossinproductivitybecauseenergyislostintransfersbetweentrophiclayers, andcommodityproductionisecologicallylimited(illustratedinFigure8).Itisinthese three-tierenvironmentsthatthebio-experienceeconomyhasacomparativeeconomic advantageoveragro-extractivecommodityproduction.However,historically,thewildlifeintheseecosystemswasundervaluedandreplacedbylivestock.Policyandmarket failures,especiallythenationalizationofwildlife,restrictionstocommercialuse,and subsidizationofcommoditysectors,sentoutthewrongpricingsignaltolandholders. Thistrendwasonlyreversedwhenradicalchangesinwildlifepolicybegantoaddress marketfailuresby(a)devolvinguserightsforwildlifetolandholdersand(b)encouragingcommercialuse.Wheremarketfailuresremainpervasive,forexamplewhere wildliferemainsnationalized(e.g.,Kenya),andincommunallandswhereaccessto resourcesremainsopen,wildlifecontinuestobereplaced(seebelow). Figure8 Conceptualizingproductionsystems ( bottom ) andcomparativeadvantage(top). Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page21of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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InstitutionsandvalueWalkeretal.(2004)usetheexampleofprivateconservationinsouthernAfricatoillustratehowcomplexsystemsflipfromonezoneofattractiontoanother.Underearlycolonialpolicies,ranchesinsouthernAfricanwaslockedinamutuallyreinforcingcycle ofenvironmentaldegradationandfinancialcrisisassociatedwithbeefcommodityproduction,butwhenthesepolicieswerechanged,landholdersquicklyadapted,givingrise toadynamicandprofitablewildlifesector.Thatthenaturalenvironmentisthesamebut thatradicalchangefollowedachangeintherules,alertsustotheimportanceofthese rulesandintroducesthefieldofinstitutionaleconomics(North1990).Institutionsarethe rulesandnormsthatguidehumanbehaviour,includingtheallocationofresources.Institutionslikepropertyrightsandmarketsallowwealthtobecreatedthroughprocessesof specialization,diversification,andexchange,soinstitutionallyrichcountriesareusually wealthierthaninstitutionallypoorones(North1995).Wehypothesizethatthissamelogic appliestodrylands:institutionallyrichdrylandsproducemuchgreatervaluethanthose thatareinstitutionallythinbecausericherinstitutionsenablelandholderstoconvertecologicalrawmaterialsintohigher-ordergoodsandserviceswithoutdamagingtheresource base.Thus,newinstitutionslikewildlifepropertyrights,tourismmarkets,banks,wildlife auctions,etc.haveaddedconsiderablevaluetowildlifethroughprocessesof specialization,diversification,economiesofscale,investment,andexchange.Newwildlife institutionsaddvalue,allowinglandtogenerateupwardfromSouthAfricanRand R1,000/ha,andsomeR100/ha,toR2,788/hainwagesalone(Table6).Moreover,thedevolutionofwildliferightsto10,000privatelandholdershasfueledconsiderableinnovation inthedevelopmentofwildlifeproducts,whichhasdrivenupthevalueofwildlifeinways thathavenothappenedwhennaturalresourcesaremonopolizedbythestate.Thus, southernAfricaprovidesamultitudeofhuntingandtourismexperiencesfromwalking withlionstohavingmoonlitdinnersinthebush,whereasinKenyaandTanzania,most touristsarerestrictedtoclosedvehiclesinstate-managedwildlifeareas.Wecanusethe priceofSouthAfrica'srelativelyunspectacularwildlifeasabenchmarkofitspotential value.Thissuggeststhatthevalueofwildlifeisfarlowerthanitshouldbeincentralized andinstitutionallythinwildlifesectors,includingmanycommunallands. Ourdiscussionoftherelationshipbetweentheinstitutionalrichnessandeconomic productivityofdrylandsreflectsDouglassNorth'sexplanationforwhysomecountries arerichandotherspoor.Northpostulatesthatthemostdramaticshiftinhumanhistoryhasbeenfromapersonalizedeconomyofbigmenandsmall-scaleeconomicand politicalactivitytoanimpersonaleconomythatreliesonrulesthatallowustotransact reliablyallovertheworldandwithpeoplewedon'tknow,allowinghumansto specializeanddiversifyonmuchhigherscalesthaneverbefore(North2003). InZimbabwe,enrichingwildlifeinstitutionsbydevolvingproprietorshiptolandholders,encouragingtrade,andestablishinginstitutionslikeproducerassociationsand auctions(Child1995)createdvaluebyconvertingrawmaterialsintohigher-value goodsandservicesbyreplacinglow-valuemeatproduction(i.e.,beeforbushmeat)with high-valueecotourism.However,thesegainsrelyoninstitutions,andwhentheruleof lawbreaksdown(degradinginstitutionssuchaspropertyrights,courts,arbitration, andeconomicexchange),peoplecannolongerrelyonimpersonalinstitutions(North 2003).PersonalizedBig-Maneconomiesre-exertthemselves(Beinhocker2006),andinstitutionalbreakdownoftenbenefitelites(ChabalandDaloz1999).TherenewableChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page22of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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resourceeconomy,especiallysectorslikewildlifethatrelyoneconomiesofscaleand exchange,isquicklydisrupted,andlanduserevertstoresourcesthatpeoplecanown andprotectindividuallylikelivestockorcrops. Similarly,communallandsareinstitutionallythin,lackingtitledeedsandgenuine proprietaryrightstowildlifeandothernaturalresourceslikecarbon.Thislocksinarelianceonprivatelyownedlivestockandindividual(butuntitled)fieldsevenwhenthese arelow-valuelanduseoptions.Wecandeveloparoughestimateoftheopportunity costsofweakinstitutionsbycomparingtheoutputofcommunalandprivatedrylands (400to600mmannualrainfall)outsideKrugerNationalPark,usingdatafromGregory ParentandJessicaMusengezi.In2010,Parentconductedcomprehensivesurveysof productionandconsumptiondatafromhouseholdsintheMutaleareabordering northernKrugerNationalPark,inastudylookingattheimpactsofmarketaccesson householdvulnerabilityandresourceusedecisions(unpublisheddata).Hisdatashow thatconventionallivestockandfarmingaddslittleornovalueintermsofcashincome orjobs(Table7).ThenetoutputofSouthAfricanRandR232/hafromthelocalareais lessthanhalfoftherequirementsneededtomaintainhouseholdconsumptionatR532/ ha(Table8).Peoplearehighlydependentontransferpaymentsfromfamilymembers withjobsinurbanareasandmines,andfromgovernmentgrants.Nonetheless,cropping,naturalresourcecollection,andlivestockareimportantriskmitigationandcopingstrategies,especiallyforpoorerhouseholds.Householdstendtoviewcattlemoreas aninsurancepolicythanasaproductioncommoditybecausetheyhavelimitedaccess toformalinsuranceinstitutions. Thekeypointisthat,inthesameagro-economicregion,thereisa10to40timesdifferenceineconomicoutputbetweeninstitutionallyrichprivatelandandinstitutionally thincommunalland(notingalsothatcommunallandssufferenormouslyfromthelegaciesofapartheid).Communallandsalsosufferdisproportionatelyfromovergrazingin atragedy-of-the-commons-typesituationwhereenvironmentalcostsareexternalized tosociety(Hardin1971).Oursuggestionisthattheopportunitycostsofweakinstitutionsareenormous,andthereturnoninvestmentfromdevelopingnewinstitutions maybehigh.Policy ‘ failure ’ inEastAfricaTheeconomicvalueofinstitutionsishighlightedbythecaseofwildlifeinEastAfrica. EastAfrica'swildlifeisinherentlysuperiortosouthernAfrica,andthehuntingsector onlymovedsouthwardswhenitwasrestrictedinEastAfricaintheearly1970s.IncontrasttosouthernAfrica,postcolonialEastAfricaperpetuatedcolonialpoliciesofstate nationalisation,monopolisation,andcentralizationofwildlife(Kabiri2010).SeveralprivatelandholderssuchasDavidHopcraftinKenyahavestruggledtodevelopwildlifeas Table7AnnualoutputfromlanduseactivitiesinBendaMutalicommunalareaiActivityTotaloutputOutputperhectareiiOutputperhousehold Crops97,1854.19171 Livestock1,737,47474.893,048 Naturalresources2,537,184109.364,451 Labor1,017,27943.851,785 Total5,389,122232.299,455iAllvaluesinSouthAfricanRand(USdollar$1=R7).iiAreabasedonmappingexercisewithcommunitytocalculatespatialextentofproduction,estimatedtobe23,200ha.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page23of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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alanduseoptionformanyyearsbutsufferfromweakproprietaryrights,bureaucratic uncertainty,andrestrictionsonuse.Thus,Hopcraftreliesontourismandthesaleof meattoNairobiforhisincomeratherthanonthepotentiallymorelucrativesafari hunting,whichisbannedinKenya(personalcommunication).Somelargelandholders managewildlifefortourism,butitwouldbeamorecompetitivelanduseoptionin,for instance,theLaikipiadistrictifhuntingwaslegalized(Craig,personalcommunication). InTanzania,huntingislegal,buttheproceedsfromhuntingareseldomreturnedto landholdercommunities,whilethestateisalsoextractingmosttourismrevenuesfrom communityareas(Nelson2010).WildlifeinprimeareasinKenya(e.g.,Mara)has declinedtoathirdorlessofitsformer(1977)abundance(Ogutuetal.2011),andthere maywellbesimilardownwardtrendsinTanzania,butdataissparseandoften restricted.Externalities,collectiveaction,andscaleWildlifeisamobileresourcethat,likemanynaturalresources,isassociatedwithexternalities,forexample,whereonelandholderconservesaspeciesonlyforhisneighbour tohuntthemorwherewildlifedamagescropsonaneighbouringproperty.Theseexternalitiesarethereasonwhyindividualownershipofwildlifeisthoughttobeproblematicandhasbeencentralizedinthestate.However,externalitiesmaybeeasierto solveinpracticethantheoreticalapproachesmightsuggest.Thisrequirescross-scale institutions.Followingtheprincipleofsubsidiarity,theseneedtobebuiltupfromthe bottom.Theprimarygoalistointernalizethecostsandbenefitsofwildlifemanagementattheleveloflandholdersbecausetheyaredeterministicoflanduseoutcomes. Thefirstessentialstepistodevolveproprietorshiptolandholders.Second,mechanisms areneededtomanageexternalitiesassociatedwiththefugitivecharacterofwildlifeand othernaturalresources. SouthAfricaandNamibiamanagewildlife'sexternalitieswithphysicalinfrastructure. Therighttoutilizewildlifeislinkedtoa ‘ certificateofadequateenclosure ’ andrequires thatwildlifepropertiesareappropriatelyfenced.Gamefencingsolvesproblemsassociatedwithwildlife'smobilitybutintroducesnewproblemsbecausegamefencesare expensiveandfragmentlandscapes.Thesedentarisationofwildlifeonsmall,fencedprivateranchesnegatesmanynaturalbehaviouraladvantages,allowsoverstocking,and resultsinthenegativeimpactsonenvironmentsassociatedwithdecreasedmobilityin Table8AnnualhouseholdconsumptioninBendaMutaliiActivityTotalhousehold consumption ConsumptionperhectareiiConsumptionper household Crops97,1854.19171 Livestock768,15233.111,348 Naturalresources1,364,39258.812,394 Foodpurchases5,242,040225.959,197 Non-food purchases 4,207,784181.377,382 Assetdepreciation718,04030.951,260 Total12,397,593534.3821,750iAlldatainSouthAfricanrand.(USdollar$1=R7).iiAreabasedonmappingexerciseswithcommunitytocalculatespatialextentofproduction.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page24of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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ruminants.Mismanagementofanyanimals,domesticorwild,causesecologicalproblems,andfencingsavannasisaformofmismanagement.Intheearlydaysofgame farminginSouthAfrica,overstockingwasaconsiderableconcern,thoughthesituation isimprovingwithmanagementexperienceandmechanismsforscalingup,suchas conservancies. Thealternativetomanagingexternalitieswithphysicalinfrastructureistomanage themwithinstitutions,aswasdoneinZimbabwe.Zimbabwe'sfar-sightedNatural ResourcesActof1941enabledfarmerstovoluntarilyestablishthemselves(usually30 to50landholdersinacatchment)asdemocratically-managedIntensiveConservation Areas(ICA)withmorepowertoregulatethemselvesthananythingacentralizedstate woulddaretoimpose.ICAshadthepowertorequirememberstoaddresssoilerosion attheirownfinancialcost,reducelivestockwhereoverstockingwasdegradingthegrass layer,desistfromtreecutting,orsetquotasandotherrestrictionsontheuseofwildlife species.Communitiesdesignedlocallyappropriaterules,whichwereenforcedthrough peerpressurebackedbythepossibilityoflegalaction.Inessence,thecommunitybecametheprimarylocusofregulationandenforcement.Thestateretainedresponsibility forregularlyinspectinglandtoensurethatICAswereperformingandcouldintervene ifthiscommunity-basedsystemfailed,butthiswasrarelyrequired.TheActalsoestablishedacourttowhichlandholderscouldappeal. ICAsbecamethefocalpointforsociallearning,collectiveaction,andpeercontrolof wildlifemanagement,asfarmersmettoregulateandlearnfromeachother.Selfregulationwasparsimoniousbuteffective.Landholderswerefinanciallyandsociallyaccountableforregulationstheycustomdesignedfortheirparticularcircumstances.They limitedregulationtohigh-valuespeciesandcircumstanceswithrealbenefitsfromregulation,andwhereregulationsweresociallyacceptableandcouldbeenforced.Forexample,intheMunyati-SebakweICA,farmerssetquotasforhigh-valuespecieslike sableandwaterbuckthatwerestillbuildingupafterthelivestockerabutdidnotwaste theirtimeregulatingubiquitousorterritorialanimalslikeimpalaandkudu.Inthesevere1984drought,theChiredziICAactedcollectivelytosavethefewremainingsable intheareabycapturingandfeedingthem(sablehavingbeenseverelythreatenedby livestockovergrazing).Asthespeciesrecovered,theyjudiciouslyincreasedhunting quotas,rewardingrancherswhosuccessfullyrecoveredtheirsablepopulationswith higherquotas.Inanotherexample,onelandholderwasluringwildlifeontohisland usingfireandfoddertocaptureandsellthem,buttheICAresolvedthisproblemby imposingquotasonhim.Theseissueswereusuallysolvedinformallythroughpeer pressurebackedupbytheICA'spowertoimposecollectivesolutionsiftheyneededto. Thesystemwasinexpensiveandhighlyeffective.Decisionsandenforcementwereinternallylegitimated,managedprimarilythroughpeerpressure,andtightlydesignedto suitlocalcircumstances. TheICAsystemnotonlyusedsocialinteractiontomanagetheexternalitiesassociatedwithnaturalresourcesbutalsoprovidedagrassrootsdemocraticsystemby whichgovernmentofficialswereheldaccountablefornaturalresourcepolicies.ICAs haddirectstatutoryaccesstokeyministers,parliament,andeventheprimeminister, anditisnocoincidencethatthemovementwasstronglysupportedbyresearch,extension,andevenenvironmentaleducationbothinschoolsandforadults(Childand Child,inpreparation).Theoreticallyspeaking,Zimbabwe'snaturalresourcelegislationChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page25of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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combinedprivatizationofwildlifetointernalizecostsandbenefitsattheleveloftheindividualproperty,withcollectiveactiontocontrolthespatialandtemporalexternalities associatedwithwildlifeandnaturalresources.PrivateconservanciesInthe1990s,manyranchersbegantorecognizeecologiesandeconomiesofscale.They formedconservancies,wherebyupto30ranchersagree,oftencontractually,tomanage theirwildlifecollectively.Thisallowedasecondeconomictransition.Whereasindividual gamerancherscouldreintroducerarerspecieslik esable,hartebeest,andrhino,largewildlife collectivescouldrestockbiggamelikeelephan t,buffalo,lions,andevenwilddogs.Forexample,theSaveConservancyinsoutheasternZimbabwecapturedover600elephantsinthe drought-strickenGona-re-zhouNationalPark andrestockedlions,wilddogs,buffalos,and plainsgame.InSouthAfrica,landholdercolle ctivesremovedthefencebetweenthemselves andKrugerNationalParkandgeneratesubsta ntialrevenuesfromhuntingandtourism. Theeconomiesofscaleassociatedwithtou rismandwildlifeallowedthesehugeprivate reservestosharemanagementc ostsandprinciplesoveralargerareaandtogeneratemore moneythanindividualproperties.Community-basednaturalresourcemanagement(CBNRM)Fromtheearly1970s,conservationbureaucratsinZimbabwe,Namibia,andBotswana(and alsoZambia)arguedthatitwasunfairthatonlywhitefarmersshouldbenefitfromwildlife andthat,ifsimilarrightsweredevolvedtocommunalareas,bothruralpeopleandwildlife wouldbenefit(Metcalfe1993).Thisledtoth eemergenceofcommunity-basednaturalresourcemanagement(CBNRM)insouthernAfricawhere,ledbyZimbabwe'siconicCAMPFIREprogramme(Child1993;Murphree2005;FrostandBond2008;Taylor2009),hunting andtourismrevenueswerereturnedtocommuni ties.Fromaconservationperspective,this stabilisedorevenincreasedwildlifepopulationsinZimbabwe'scrowdedcommunallands (Childetal.2003),andtherecoveryofwildlife, includingendangeredrhinosandelephants, wasevenstrongerinNamibia(NACSO2008).Incomefromwildlifecontributedtosocial projects,providedcashtohouseholdsinso meprojects(Dalal-ClaytonandChild2003; JonesandWeaver2009),andhelpedtoempowerlocalpeople(JonesandMurphree2004). Insomecommunities,employmentandincomef romhuntingandtourismcontributedsignificantlytolivelihoods,providingasmuchas three-quartersofon-farmlivelihoodstothe SankuyocommunityinBotswana(unpublisheddata). Community-basednaturalresourcemanagem ent(CBNRM)isthesubjectofaconsiderableliterature,andweemphasizeonlykeyissueshere.First,wildlife-basedCBNRMis foundedonthepotentialtousewildlifeasa neconomicengineincommunallandsand,in sodoing,toincentiviseconservation.Seco nd,CBNRMmostlydoesnotinvolveatrade-off betweenconservationanddevelopmentbecause itisaninstitutionalapproachthatallocates naturalresourcesincludingwildlifetohighe rvalueduses,andinsomecases,moreequitably.Thus,CBNRMcanandshouldsimultaneouslycontributetobothconservationand development,ashappenedforprivateland.Thi rd,CBNRMreliesontwosetsofinstitutions: thosethatdevolverights(ornot)fromstateandcommunityandaboutwhichmuchiswritten(Murphree2004;Nelson2010),andthosewithinacommunitythatpromoteparticipationandequitablebenefitsharing,whichis anemergingchallengethathashardlybeen studied. Aswithprivateconservation,anessentiali ngredientofCBNRMisthedevolutionofthe rightsandbenefitsforwildlifetocommunities.Whereall(e.g.,BotswanaandNamibia)orChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page26of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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most(e.g.,Zimbabwe)incomehasbeendevolvedtocommunities,CBNRMhasencouraged therecoveryofwildlifeandgeneratedsignificantincomes(NACSO2008;Taylor2009),but hasnotmagically(andunrealistically)resolvedpoverty,becauseofthenumberofpeople involvedandbecausewildlifepopulationsarestilllowandrecoveringinhot,dry,andremoteenvironments.CBNRMisalsodifficultt oimplementwhenhumandensitiesarehigh, wildlifepopulationsaredepleted,andbenefitsarelow.However,theso-called ‘ crisis ’ in CBNRMreflectsafailureofimplementationand,specifically,afailuretodevolverightsand responsibilitiestocommunitieswithinacareful lydesignedinstitutionalframework.Many,if notmostCBNRMprogrammes,donotrepresentaseriousattempttodevolverevenuesto communitiesandthereforecannotbeexpectedtowork(Nelson2010;Ribot2003).These areCBNRMprogrammesinnameonly,andwildlifeisneitherbenefitingcommunitiesnor recoveringtherefore. TheemergingchallengeforCBNRM,andaboutw hichlittleiswritten,isthechallengeof within-communitygovernance.CommonlyC BNRMprogrammesgeneraterevenueandrecoverwildlifepopulations,butlikemanydecentr alizationprojects,theyareplaguedbyelite capture,misuseofmoney,andlowlevelsofparti cipation.Inourexperience,thisisbecause theyrelyonrepresentationalformsofgover nancewherebyleaderselectedbyacommunity sitoncommitteesthatmakemanyormostofthedecisionsonbehalfofthecommunity. Theassumptionisflawedthatbi-ortri-annu alelectionsandannualgeneralmeetingswill achieveaccountability,participat ion,transparency,andequitab lebenefitsharing(andguard againstfinancialmisappro priationandelitecapture). Challengingasitmayseem,participatoryde mocracymaybeanessentialstartingpoint andbuilding-blockforasuccessfulCBNRM(andmucheasiertoimplementthanfirst assumed).RealparticipationrequiresthatC BNRMcommunitiesaredefinedatascaleand implementparticipatoryprocessesthatallowt hemajorityofthepeopleto(1)meetface-tofacetoshareinformationandmakedecisions,(2)instructthecommitteetoimplement thesedecisions,and(3)reviewthequalityofimp lementation(i.e.,doesexpenditurereflect thebudgetagreeduponbythecommunity?)nolessthanquarterly.ScalingupandscalingdownatthesametimeTheexperienceofprivategameranchingdemons tratesthatwildlifecangreatlyincreasethe economicoutputfromdrylands.Wecanhaveco nfidenceinwildlifeutilizationasaneconomicmodel.However,weneedtodevelopnew governancemodelstosubstantiallyincreaselevelsofparticipationandbenefits haring,andthatpreventmoneyfrombeing divertedtoadministrativeexpensesandelite capture.WesuggestthatthisrequiresCBNRM programstobescaleddowntothelevelofsing le-villagecommunitiesandprocessesofparticipatorydemocracybestrictlyfollowed.In otherwords,CBNRMrequirescarefullycrafted institutionstomanagethechallengeofscale.T heseinstitutionsneedtoscaleupforreasons ofecologicalandeconomicscale,butalsotosimultaneouslyscaledowntoimproveaccountability,participation,andequitable benefitsharing(Child,unpublisheddata).HuntingOneofthemorecontroversialandmisunderstoodaspectsofwildlifeutilizationishunting.Trophyhuntingisanecologicallyrobustandhigh-valueuseofwildlife.Itistrue thatnon-huntingtourismcanoutcompetehuntingtourismeconomicallybutonlyin primeareaswithexcellentwildlife.HuntingremainsthebreadandbutterofwildlifeChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page27of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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operations,especiallyinnon-primeareasandintimesofglobalornationalcrisiswhen touristsstoptravelingbuthuntersdonot.Huntingprovidesasignificantcashflow fromveryfewanimals,facilitatingthetransitiontowardswildlife-basedlanduses.Indeed,itisdifficulttomakethetransitionfromlivestocktowildlifeintheabsenceofhunting,exceptforpeoplewithlargeamountsofmoneytoinvest.Weseethiseveninthe developmentofPilanesbergGameReserveinSouthAfrica(Johnsonetal.2009).Thegovernmentpurchaseddegradedlivestockranchestoformanewparkonthebasisthatthis wasabettereconomicuseoftheland.Thetransitionwaspartlyfinancedbycarefullycontrolledtrophyhuntingofexcessmales.Huntingwascarefullyzonedintimeandplaceto avoidconflictswiththerapidlygrowingphoto-safaribusinesswhilecarefulhuntingpracticeswereused,sowildlifedidnotassociategunshotswithvehiclesorpeople. Huntingisanessentialcomponentofthetransi tiontowildlife-basedlanduses.However, aswildlifepopulationsanddiversityrecover,landholdersareabletointroducephotographic tourism,buildingattractivelodges,andtrainingsignificantnumbersoflocalguides,cooks, caterers,andmanagers.However,eveninthes ecircumstances,photo-tourismandhunting arecompatible.Conflictsare certainlycommonbetweentourop eratorsandhuntingoutfitterswhentheyarecompetingforlandandwi ldlife(e.g.,aroundtheOkavangoDeltain BotswanaandtheLuangwaValleyinZambia),butsuchproblemsseldomarisewhenthe samemanagerisresponsibleforbothope rations,asinthePilanesbergexample.ConclusionsIthastaken60yearsforwildlifetoemergeasanimportantandeconomicallyviableland useoption.Itisnowaproveneconomicmodel,andgiventherightecologicalandinstitutioncircumstance,wildlifecanprovidesigni ficantlymorejobsandeconomicgrowththan conventionalusesofthesameland.Westillfacethechallengeofhowtoapplythismodel morebroadlyinAfrica'scommunallands,ach allengethatrequiresgenuinedevolutionof proprietorshipfromgovernmenttocommunityan ddemocraticandeffectiveorganizational developmentwithincommunities. Thewildlifeoptionhasemergedthroughproactivepolicymakingandprivatesector entrepreneurship.Far-sightedconservationbureaucratschallengedthepostcolonialstatusquoanddevelopedanewapproachtowildlifeconservationbasedonlandholder benefit.Theysoughttomaximizethevaluefromwildlifetopeoplelivingwithitby(1) devolvingfullproprietorshiptolandholders,(2)encouragingsustainablecommercial usesprovidedtheywerehumane,and(3)reducingtheregulatoryburdenonthesector. Thisallowedthousandsofwildlifeownerstoexperimentwithnewproducts,steadily drivingupthevalueofwildlifeinwaysthatweseldomseewithotherwildresources likeforests.Whereinstitutionswerechangedinthisway,mainlyonprivatelandbut alsoinsomecommunallands,wildlifeandthehabitatsonwhichitdependshave recoveredenormously.Butwherewildliferemainedcentralizedandnoncommercial, wildlifepopulationshavedeclined. Manydrylandsarelockedinareinforcingcycleofecologicalover-utilization,but economicunder-utilizationoftenlinkedtoarelianceoncommodity-basedproduction systems.Boldpolicyfacilitatedatransformationtoaneconomybasednotoncommoditiesbutonexperiences-thewildlifeandbio-experiencesector.Thisgeneratesmore economicactivityyetextractsfarlessfromtheenvironmentand,thoughitseemsChild etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page28of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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counterintuitiveinaworldafflictedwithpoverty,thetermsoftradefortourismand experiencesareimprovingsteadilywhereasthepriceofagriculturalcommoditieshas beenstagnantorfallingforseveraldecades. Inthepastfewyears,recognitionoftheimpo rtanceofecosystemserviceshasincreased. Inthemostthoroughanalysistodate,Robert Constanzaandhiscolleaguesdemonstrated thatthevalueofecosystemsexceedsglobalGDPbyseveralfactors(Costanza,d'Argeetal. 1997).Buttheproblemisthatthesevaluesareno treflectedintheprivatepricesthatguide thedecisionmakersoflandholdersnor,therefore,inlanduseoutcomes.Inthe1960s,wildlifefacedtheseverysameproblems.Theyw ereaddressedbyadoptinganewapproachto conservationbasedonwell-craftedinstituti onsatboththenationalandlocallevelthat sought,first,tomaximizethevalueofwildlifetothelandholderbyinternalizing(privatizing) itsbenefitsandcostsatthelevelofthelandholder,andtosimultaneouslyestablishdemocraticcollectiveactiontomanageexternalities andscale.Contrarytothepredictionsofconservationists,commercializingwildlifeint hiswayhashadpositiveconservationand developmentoutcomes.Positiveoutcomeshi ngeonthesimultaneousapplicationoftwo factors:drivingupthepriceofwildlife(i.e.,p rice)whileensuringth atbenefitsandmanagementarecontrolledbylandholders(i.e.,propri etorshipandsubsidiarity).Intheabsenceof proprietorship,forexample,thehighpriceofivoryandrhinohornhasbeendisastrous,but takingawaythevalueofwildlifeisnotasolutioneitherbecauseitisquicklyreplacedbyalternativelanduses. Thedevelopmentofthewildlifesectorhasbeenapolicyexperimentbasedonthehypothesisthatgivingwildlifevaluetothepeoplewholivewithitwillresultinpositivedevelopmentandconservationoutcomes,requiringcon siderabletenacityandadaptivelearningin navigatingtowardsthisobjectiveincomplexe conomicandpoliticalcircumstances.Theapproachhassucceededwherelaws,regulations ,andoperationalprocedureshaveincorporatedtheprinciplesofprice,proprietorship ,subsidiarity,andadaptivemanagementina theoreticallysoundanddisciplinedmanner.I ndeed,wildlifeprovidesapioneeringexample ofPaymentsforEcosystemServices,whichwasrelativelyeasytoimplementbecauseofthe highvalueofwildlifeandtherelativesimplicit yofcostsandbenefitsattribution(atleast comparedtoecosystemprocesses).Ecosystemse rvicesarefacingsimilarmarketfailuresof wildlife.Thechallengeofourgenerationmayw ellbetoconvertthesevaluesintoincentives formaintainingecosystemservices,perhapsbyadaptingsomeofthelessonsfromthewildlifesectorinsouthernAfrica.Competinginterests Theauthorsdeclaretheyhavenocompetinginterests. Authors ’ contributions BCconceptualizedandcompiledthepaper.JMprovideddataongameranchingandGPprovideddataon communitylivelihoodsinSouthAfrica.GCstrengthenedthepaper ’ shistoricalandpolicyperspectives.Allauthors readandapprovedthefinalmanuscript. Authordetails1StellenboschInstituteforAdvancedStudies(STIAS),WallenbergResearchCentreatStellenboschUniversity,Marais Street,Stellenbosch7600,SouthAfrica.2DepartmentofGeography,CenterforAfricaStudies,UniversityofFlorida,427 GrinterHall,P.O.Box115560,Florida,USA. Received:19October2011Accepted:5March2012 Published:28September2012 ReferencesAstle,WL.1999. AHistoryofwildlifeconservationandmanagementinthemid-LuangwaValley,Zambia .Bristol:British EmpireandCommonwealthMuseum.Child etal.Pastoralism:Research,PolicyandPractice 2012, 2 :18Page29of32 http://www.pastoralismjournal.com/content/2/1/18

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