An "empire of necessity" : capital accumulation on West Indian plantations and the problem of artisan manufacturing, 162...


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An "empire of necessity" : capital accumulation on West Indian plantations and the problem of artisan manufacturing, 1620-1880
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x, 310 leaves : map.
Waters, Donald Joseph
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Subjects / Keywords:
Agriculture Economic aspects Caribbean Area.
Agriculture Economic aspects Guyana.
Caribbean Area Economic conditions.
Economic conditions.
Industrial arts Caribbean Area History.
Industrial arts Guyana
theses   ( marcgt )


This dissertation comprises the first of a projected series of studies based on twenty-seven months of research, including fifteen months of ethnographic and historical research in Guyana, South America. It argues that various features of early colonial plantation organization led to the suppression of local manufacturing activity. Chapter One describes the unusual development of artisanry in one region of Guyana's plantation economy, and outlines the theoretical and historical dimensions of the relations between artisan manufacturing and plantation agriculture. Chapter Two reviews the essential characteristics of plantation agriculture and identifies the formal conditions for the original accumulation of capital on New World plantations. Chapter Three demonstrates that coercive labor practices, the structure of product markets, and other features of capital accumulation effectively suppressed artisan trades in Barbados, Jamaica, and the erstwhile British Guiana. Chapter Four notes that slave-based plantation economies still had to incorporate some kinds of manufacturing activities, though they did so in different ways, and it shows how slave emancipation had varying implications for artisan activities in West Indian plantation economies. Finally, the findings here are placed in a wider comparative perspective with evidence ,that the accumulation of capital in other forms of colonial agriculture - on New England farms and Mexican haciendas - did not always stifle local artisanry, although on plantations in other areas, such as Virginia, it did. Overall, with its focus on the much-neglected topic of artisan manufacture, this dissertation helps improve anthropological understanding of the ways in which agriculture and manufacturing are related. Within a comparative and historical framework, it indicates how early New World planters enfeebled local manufacturing, and it provides some of the necessary theoretical and historical background for further detailed ethnographic and historical studies in the Caribbean, of the organization and development of particular artisan trades.
General Note:
capital accumulation on West Indian plantations and the problem of artisan manufacturing, 1620-1880. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 273-310).
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1982.
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Photocopy. Ann Arbor, MI : University Microfilms International, 1984. 21 cm.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'. lI I I I I I ;. t i i I I I .. r '. AN "EMPIRE OF NECESSITY": CAPITAL ACCUMULATION ON WEST INDIAN PLANTATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ARTISAN MANUFACTURING, 1620-1880 A Dissertation Presented to. the Faculty of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of .... -",' Doctor of Philosophy by Donald Joseph Waters May 1982


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.,1'. '. CS> by Donald Joseph 1982 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ... ---.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.-. ." :f: ABSTRACT AN IIEHPIRE OF NECESSITY": CAPITAL ACCUMULATION ON WEST INDIAN PLANTATIONS THE PROBLEM OF ARTISAN HANUFACTURING,1620-1880 Donald joseph Waters Yale University 1982 This dissertation comprises the first of a projected series,of studies ,based on twenty-seven months of research, including fifteen months of ethnographic and historical research in Guyana, South'America. It 'argues that various features of early colonial plantation organization led to the suppression of local manufacturing actiyity.ChapterOne describes the unusual development of artisanry in one region of Guyana's plantation economy, 'and outlines the theoretical and historical of the relations bet\o1een artisan manufacturing and plantation agriculture. Chapter Two reviews the essential characteristics of plantation agriculture and identifies the formal conditions for the original accumulation of capital on New World plantations. Chapter Three demonstrates that coercive labor practices, the structure of product markets, and other features of capital accumulation effectively suppressed artisan trades in Barbados, Jamaica, and the erst\o1hile British Guiana. Chapter Four notes that slave-based plantation economies still had to.incorpQrate some kinds of manufacturing activities, though they did so in different ways, and it shows how slave emancipation had implications for artisan activities in West .-... -'


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'J" .. "' r I i Indian plantation economies. Finally, the findings here placed in a wider comparative perspective with evidence ,that the accumulation of capital in other forms of colonial agriculture--on England fams and Mexican haciendas--did not always stifle local artisanry, although on plantations in other areas, such as Virginia, it did., Overall, 'with its focus on the much-neglected topic q,f artisan manufacture, this dissertation helps improve understanding of the ways in which agriculture and manufacturing are related. Within a comparative and historical framework, it indicates how early New World planters enfeebled local manufacturing, and it provides some of the necessary theoretical and historical background for further detailed ethnographic and historical studies in the Caribbean, of the organization and development of particular ar.tisan trades. \ .-.. -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.PREFACE image of the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick-maker--a I conception of independent artisans producing and exchanging their. wares--has for long captivated social philosophers and social scientists concerned with economic activity. Early theorists, from Plato and Aristotle to the physiocrats, relied on features of artisan production to iliustrate aspects of the state1s political and ethical constitution. Later, when the economy itself became the subject of systematic investigations, Adam Smith, the classical political economists, and many subsequent scholars attributed to the artisan crucial; transitional roles in the expansion' of wealth. Butchers, bakers, and other artisans may be defined as persons who possess special skills, and who arrange to combine their skills with small investments in tools and equipment for the production of manufactured, rather than agricultural goods. In general, artisans contribute to the wealth of nations craft items of distinctive depending on their skills, and of restricted quantity, depending on the technical means they have available. Of course, wi thin limits, th.e investments made in skills relative to the technical means required for artisan production vary and change. Under certain conditions" investment in technical means may increase, as it did most notably during the so-called Industrial Revolutions of both England and the United states, to the point. where output advances quantitatively, and -iii -.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.production based in 'artisan skill to a qualitatively' different 'basis in factory wage-labor. For a particular branch of artisan manufacture eventually'to give way to the leavening action of factory production, however, many ,ingredients have to combine favorably. Industrialization is thus never a certain outcome. Indeed, most people of the world. labor in economies that are, or have been until relatively recently, deeplxbiased against the development of local manufacturing activities, and slanted steeply in favor of agriculture. The region of the \Olorld with which I am most familiar, the Caribbean, is no exception to this rule. The growth of manufacturing depends, at least in part, on the relations of interdependence artisans and producers in other branches and sectors of the economy. These relations' create potentially expanding markets for artisan products and help determine the ability of artisans to expand their production. Study of Caribbean political I economy is especially instructive with regard to the role of artisans in a wider institutional setting, because in that region the historical development of a single agricultural institution, the plantation, largely accounts for the general impoverishment of local I This dissertation reports some of the results of more than "twenty-seven months of research on the relations between plantation agriculture and artisan manufacture in Guyana and other parts of the English-speaking Caribbean. It is intended as a'contribution both to the anthropology of artisan production in general, and to the comparative historical and ethnographic study of Caribbean artisanry' in particular. For the flaws and shortcomings of the argument in the \ -iv -. __ ... -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.present volume, I am alone responsible. But for whatever merits this study may have, I am pleased to acknowledge the generous assistance that I have received from a variety of sources. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I began my research on this project as a graduate fellow of the ,National Science ,Foundation. Historical and ethnographic research in Guyana was made possible by a further award from the National Science Foundation (BNS77-25180), and by grants-in-aid from Sigma XI and the Yale University concilium on International and Area Studies. A Yale University Fellowship supported an additional year of library research in New Haven, and I produced this document using the splendid facilities and services of the Yale Computer Center. The results of my work in Guyana are only briefly reported in the first chapter of this volume. So full acknowledgment of the help I received 'in that country must await a subsequent publication. But here I do want to express my sincere appreciation for numerous courtesies extended to me and my wife by the Guyana government especially through the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Ministry of Education, the Regional I I Minister 'for Courantyne and New Amsterdam, and the Mayor, Town Council and staff of Rose Hall Town. Harold Davis, chairman of the Guyana Sugar Corporation, showed a profound interest In my work andused'his good offices to make an extraordinary amount of information available to me concerning sugar production throughout the country, and especially on the Courantyne Coast., Professor Leslie Cummings of the University of Guyana kindly served as my local academic advisor. Professor Lesley -v -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. ..... i I i I Potter, a geographer' in the University of Guyana, offered'anumber'of timely suggestions and assisted me in a numbe.r of ways that gr.eatly improved the course of my work. Michael Parris, a sociologist also at the University of Guyana, and Percy Hintzen, now at the University of (Berkeley), both exerted uncommon amounts of effort to introduce me and my wife to Guyana life. And during our stay, we were succored by the legendary hospitality of the Guyanese, a?d particularly by the fast friendship of Mrs. Vera Hintzen, .Mr. Emmanuel Chase, Hr. and Mrs. Suresh Ragnandan, Mr. and Mrs. Chandridat M. Persaud, Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Chinapin, and all their families. t-lhile drafting the chapters that comprise the present volume, I have benefited enormously from the'help and encouragement of numerous other friends and associates, but I have been especially fortunate to receive the assistance and support of three gifted teachers. Harold Scheffler has graciously acted as my principal advisor throughout my graduate career, and he has been an unfailing source of insight, good sense, and friendship. His acute ear for sound argument, and his willingness to share his wide learning have made him my best critic.' Keith Hart helped introduce me to the field of economic I i and is perhaps most responsible for my decision in this volume to try to set the relations between West Indian plantation agriculture and artisan manufacture in a Droad historical perspective. And Sidney Mintz has followed this project attentively and sympathetically since its inception. He has patiently ans\o1ered many queries about matters Caribbean, he has thoughtfully responded to various portions of the present argument, and he has kindly let me see related portions of his own work in progress. -vi -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. ....... __ .. _-_." --. -' In addition to professors Scheffler, Hart and Hintz, I should like also to thank John Blassingame, David Levine, Harold Conklin," John Cole, Susan Bean, Harvey Blustain, and Hichael Raber for readin;1 and commenting on earlier versions of parts of this dissertation. Doss ,Mabe, Susan Matchett, and William Cahoy also made useful suggestions at various stages. M. G. Smith offered valuable criticisms of several chapters and, during the late stages of composition, Kelly and Timothy Weiskel both made several insightful suggestions that greatly improved the overall organization of the text. Finally, I acknowledge my deepest debts of all: to my parents and parents-in-law for their patience, understanding and unswerving confidence; and, most of all, to my wife, tolho supported me at every stage of study, research and composition in a long-term project for which"this volume is but the first fruit. \ -vii -. ...... -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.... ----... -............... --..... ---.......... --.---------.......... -..,-.-------.. ..,---, ... --.. --.-seeking to conquer a larger liberty, man but Extends the empire of necessity Herman Melville, liThe Bell-Tower" -....... \, -viii -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., CONTENTS ,PREFACE iii Acknowledgments . .'. v Chapter I. INTRODUCTION: ARTISANRY IN A PLANTATION ECONOMY' 1 Artisan Manufacturing in Rose Hall, Guyana The Wider Dimensions of Rose Hall Artisanry Guyana's Plantation Economy A Comparative and Historical Perspective Plan of Work 5 13 17 20 24 -. II'. PLANTATIONS AND CAPITAL ACCUHULATION IN NEW WORLD COLONIES 29 The Essential Features of Plantation Agriculture 31 The Plantation as a Mechanism for Capital Accumulation 37 The Conditions of Original Accumulation on Plantations in New World Colonies 41 Types of Colonial Investment '.' 46 Investment in'Direct Production: Colonial Farms Plantations 51 The Politics of Land and Labor in the Development of Colonial Plantations 63 III. EARLY PLANTATIONS IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES AND THE IV. LIMITATIONS OF CRAFTS AND TRADE,S Barbados: The Reduction of Diversified Agriculture Jamaica: Planter opposition to Provision Agriculture Urban Economy .. The Guiana Colonies: Planter Rejection of Possible Alternative Crafts and Trades and THE CHANGING BASIS OF PLANTATION AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST INDIES 79 84 102 120 AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTISANRY '. 139 From Slavery to Emancipation: The Market for Manufactured Goods ........'....... 142 Planter Self-Sufficiency and Liberalization of the Slave Regime ...... '. .' 147 The Expansion of Local Needs at Emancipation '. .' 1.60 Planter Responses to the Labor Problems Emancipation 164 Labor Control in Barbados and Jamaica. .'. 167 -ix -"


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.V. British Guiana: The Beginnings of Capital Concentration: 175 AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURING ELSEWHERE IN' ,THE, NEW WORLD' COLONIES .' 189 The Spaniards in Mexico: Conquistadors, Production and, the Rise of Haciendas '. 193 Eastern North America: Indians and European Trade '. 206 F'rom Trading Posts to Farm Colonies in New England 210 The English in Virginia: The Development ofa Plantation Colony .. .0 221 VI. CONCLUSION: TOWARD FURTHER STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLANTATION 'AGRICULTURE AND ARTISAN MANUFACTURE 244 The Possible Effects of Artisanry on West Indian Political Economy During the Period of Capital Accumulation 247 The Role of Artisan Manufacturing in West Indian Political Economy During the Period of Capital Concentration: A Brief Overview .' 258 REFERENCES 272 \ -x -'0 f ._---.....


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission......... Chapter I INTRODUCTION: ARTISANRY IN A PLANTATION ECONOMY Handicraft stands on golden ground --A German proverb Guyana is the westernmost of the three Guiana countries that perch on the northeast shoulder of South America, north of Brazil and east of Venezuela. Early Dutch traders, the first Europeans to establish enduring settlements in the Guianas during the early seventeenth century, referred to the low-lying shore of this region as the Wild Coast of the entire continent. The shoreline is almost indistinct but for the growth of mangrove trees and courida bush. Indeed, at high tide, much of the land lies below sea level. The sea itself churns with silt swept northwestward by Atlantic currents from the mouth of the Amazon. And, because of the lay of the land and the sediments in the water. one encounters "a shallow sea, turbid and dirty" (Davy 1854: 338), as from the north one approaches this, the reputed home of the i; legendary gilded man, EI Dorado. One of thesupposed roots of the word "Guiana" is an Indian term meaning "land of many waters." Of the numerous rivers that course through the Guianas, those that empty north into the dreary seas of the Atlantic include the Essequibo, the Demerara, the Berbice, and the Courantyne Rivers. On the Essequibo and Berbice Rivers, the Dutch first began colonizing the Guianas; a settlement on the Demerara followed in \, -1 -. .. -... -" '.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.2 the eighteenth century as an offshoCct of the older colony on the Essequibo. From their inception, these three 'small river settlements maintained close social and economic ties with some of the West Indian colonies, such as Barbados, in the Caribbean Then, in 1803,Great Britain actually acquired by conquest the Dutch colonies on the Essequibo, Demerara, and the Berbice Rivers. Thereafter, despite the geographical and ecological differences that separated the mainland from the island territories, these settlements became incorporated politically, economically, and in many other respects as part of the' British West Indies. In 1831, Britain united the three river colonies 'to single entity named British Guiana (as distinct from Dutch and French Guiana to the east) and, in 1966, the colony gained its political ihdependence and became the sovereign nation of Guyana 1 .The Courantyne River marks the boundary between Guyana and Suriname, the erstwhile Dutch Guiana. The fertile, coastal region that stretches some 60 kilometers west into Guyana, from the Courantyne to the Berbice RivC!r, comprises what Guyanese regard conventionally as the Courantyne Coast and, somewhat more formaily, as East Berbice (see Figure 1). Between 1960 and 1970, the population of this region I I \ increased at an average rate of 3.5 percent per annum, a significantly higher rate than the 2.5 percent per year growth registered for the country as a whole over the same period. Assuming the same rates of increase during the next decade, there were, by 1977, approximately 150,000 people residing on the Courantyne Coast, and this figure 1 On the need, for various reasons, to count Guyana among the West Indies, see, for example, M. G. Smith (1955: 21), Lewis (1968: 15, 257-259),' Parry and Sherlock (1971: v), Hintz (1974b: 46), and Cross (1979: 1-3.). For the meaning of "Guiana," see Smith \(1962: 4).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. __ .-----_ .. _---.... _._n--__ ... _.-. ,', ..-..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.represented about 18-percent of Guyana's total population-.2 The extraordinary rate of population growth on Guyana's Courantyne Coast between 1960 and 1970 resulted largely froin -I agricultural exPansion in the region following, the opening, during the 4 1960s, of a new land settlement 'scheme, called Black Polder But local urbanization and the corresponding development of employment i opportunities in the manufacturing crafts also part, for the high rate of population increase on the Courantyne. In all of Guyana, there are only five towns. Two of them lie on the Demerara River, which drains into the Atlantic 90 kilometers farther west of the ,Berbice River: Georgetown, at the mouth of the Demerara, on the river's eastern bank, is the capital and principal port of the country; Linden, a is located 100 kilometers upstream. The other three urban areas in Guyana, however, all stand on the Courantyne Coast. Each of the three Courantyne towns caters, in part,to the population of a major sugar plantation. Corriverton, serving Skeldon Estate workers on the Courantyne River, and New Amsterdam, on the Berbice River supplying laborers of nearby Rose Hall Estate, are also minor ports. But Rose Hall TO\01D, YThich is neither historically nor I geographically related to the plantation of the same.namei,is not riverbound. Situated 18 kilometers east of New Amsterdam on the 2 There were 560,330 people living in British Guiana in 1960;'by 1970, 699,848 people lived in the newly independent country. Given the same -rate of annual growth--2.S percent per year--the population in Guyana at the end of 1977 exceeeded 822,000 people. Between 1960 and i970, in the five census districts that comprise the Courantyne Coast, the population had increased from a total of 89,371 to 120,367 people. See and Tobago, Central Statistical Office (1964': Table 1) and University of the West Indies, Census Research Pro.gramme (1973: Table 3). .... ... -... -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. .. \'-, ....... -._--_._-.. ---I I i i 5 i frontlands of Albion/Port Mourant Estate, the. largest sugar plantation in the Rose Hall is Guyana's smallest town. And in 1977-78, as part of a broadly-conceived investigation the role of artisans in plantation economies of the Caribbean area, I conducted fifteen months ,of ethnographic and historical research in Rose Hall Town and its immediate environs. 1.1 ARTISAN HANUFACTURING IN ROSE HALL, GUYANA Rose Hall Town rests in the midst of a densely populated area, known as the Lower Courantyne, which straddles the pUblic road and extends from to Johns (see Figure 1). Between 1960 and 1970, the population of this portion of the increased at an annual rate 0' 2.8 percent, a rate only slightly higher than that for the entire by 1977, given the same growth rate per annum, there were about 42,000 souls living in the area. By contrast, from 1960 to 1970, Rose Hall grew at a rate of 3.8 percent per year, which was much higher than the annual rate for the immediately surrounding area, 'and higher even than the rate for the Courantyne Coast as a whol.e. The town continued to grow in s.ucceeding years, but even assuming. the same annual .' I I rate of increase, Rose Hall contained only about 6400 residents by the end of 1977.3 3 There were 27,481 people in the Gibraltar-Johns district during the census of i960, and 35,080 during the census of 1970. Based on the number of registered births and deaths, the management of the local .sugar estate calculated the popUlation each year from 1970 to 1975 for this entire district, except Rose Hall Town, Gibraltar and its neighboring village, Fyrish. The figures suggest a slightly lower rate of increase--2.7 percent per annum--than the one I projected from the census returns (Guyana Sugar Corporation, Albion/Port Mourant Estate 1970-75). But growth in the popUlation of Hall Town undoubtedly accounts for the difference in rates. In'1960, there were


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission..... ............... .... .... ._ ... --_ ... -------f f i 6 Formally incorporated as a town in 1970, Rose.Hall still retains. many features of rural life. Indeed, of the 800 acres enclosed within its boundaries, fully 519 acres, 'or 65 percent of the total, comprise farm land. For more than two decades, however, most of the farms have been poorly cultivated in either rice or sugar cane, or they have lain completely idle. During that time, Rose Hall grew rapidly in population, and achieved its urban status largely because of the bustling growth of its commerce, and as a result of the expansion of related manufacturing activity. The Lower Courantyne area, which surrounds Rose Hall, provides a large.core of consumers who stimulate and sustain the business of the town merchants. In one important respect, hO\Olever, the Rose Hall I marketplace is not limited to local shoppers. The town has become a major center for Guyanals trade in cloth and clothing, and the wide selection of these items attracts customers from allover the country. They come to this small, but appealing, little town for cloth and then shop the stores of the other merchants for additional goods. Rose Hailis commercial district includes over forty various-sized shops. Of these, eight of the largest sell cloth for garments almost I I exclusively, and. some retail well in excess of one million Guyana dollars worth of goods each year.4 Two of the other stores, doing somewhat less business, sell only ready-made clothing. Still another is a large tailoring establishment. 3627 people living in Rose Hall; in 1970, the population numbered S018. See Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office {1964: Table 5), and University of the t-lest Indies, Census Research Programme' (1973: Table 3). 4 In 1977-7,8, G$l.OO equalled approximately US$0.40 ............ -i .. I I I .:1 ., ;,


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.This kind of concentrated commerce in cloth and clothing, with over one in four stores devoted to the trade, is duplicated nowhere. in the country, not even in Georgetown. Rose Hall is thus properly renowned its highly visible and prosperous cloth merchants, and it is worth noting that of the major shirt factories in the country, the first was established in Georgetown by one of these local Courantyne businessmen. But with so much cloth locally for sale,itshould not be surprising that the Rose Hall area itself also boasts a significant. proportion of manufacturers who fashion the available material into clothing. In the early years after World War II, according to the 1946 census returns, Georgetown the largest proportion of working people employed in manufacturing in what then British Guiana. By 1960, however, all the major subdivisions of the country, except the westernmost and sparsely settled county of Essequibo, had nearly equal proportions of workers in this type of employment. In Demerara and in Berbice, the proportion had increased, while in the other major divisions of the country, it had declined. Moreover, in 1960, on the portion of the Courantyne Coast that includes the so-called Lower I Courantyne, in the area surrounding Rose Hall, the ratio of people working in manufacturing had actually advanced to exceed the ratio of people so employed in Georgetown (see Table 1). Based on my research, I have concluded that garment-making undoubtedly formed the cornerstone for the growth of the Lower Courantyne area as a manufacturing center in the wider Guyanese economy. The master tailor and his five journeymen assistants, who keep shop in


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.TABLE 1 ". Persons Employed in Manufacturing as a Percentage of the Total Working Population(a), British Guiana (1946-1960) Region 1946 1960 Georgetown 25.6 19.6 New Amsterdam 23.1 16.7 Demera ra (b) 12.9 16.6 Berbice(c) 12.2 16.1 Courantyne Coast(d), 13.4 17.4 East Coast and Lower Courat;ltyne Coast 15.1 21.3 Essequibo 9.7 8.1 British Guiana 15.9 16.3 SOURCES: Jamaica, Central Bureau of Statistics (1950: Tables 41 and 42), Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office (1964: Table 16). NOTES: (a) He re, the ca tego ry I a be I led "Wo rk i n9 'popul at i on is he re assumed to be equiva lent to the categorr, labelled in 1946 as "Gainfully-Occupied population.' (b) Does not include Georgetown. (c) Does not inc.lllde New Amsterdam. (d) As specified here, the COllrantyne Coast is a category derived from the aggregation of several cen'sus subdivisions in Berbice County. for 1946, the category consists of (1) the East Coast (of the Berbice River) and the Lower Courantyne Coast, I ,which roughly corresponds to the 1960 subdivisions of Borlam-Vried en Vriendschap and Gibraltar-Johns; (2) Central Courantyne Coast, which is nearly equivalent to the '" Bloomfield-No. 51 subdivision' in 1960; and (3) Upper Courantyne Coast, which approximates the area covered by the 1960 No. 52-Crabwood Creek. \ -., .-!;. :: .... 8'" ,.----


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.the heart of Rose Hall1s shopping district, are easily the most visible garment-makers in the region. .But the total number of active seamstresses and tailors in and around Rose Hall.constitute fully 5 percent of the Lower Courantyne1s working population. Although this number may seem small in absolute terms, it represents at least 9 one-fifth of all the people locally occupied in manufacture, and this is by far the largest proportion of people employed in any single craft.s .. These garment workers are highly productive and the clothes that they manufacture are, as one might expect, widely varied. There are. those, for example, who produce ready-made wear for children, others. who tailor pants, shirts, dresses, blouses, and skirts to fit, still others who manufacture fine and fancy wear and, of course, those \-Tho can work upa number, if not all, of these different kinds of-garments. Whatever bits of clothing they produce, however, the garment-makers in the Rose Hall area do qualify, in. all the essential features of their productive organization, as artisans. 5 Hy estimate of the ratio of garment-makers to members of the korking population is based, in part, on my calculation that the percentage of people employed locaily in manufacture has increased since 1960 at a slightly faster rate than it did between 1946 and 1960 (see.Table 1). l-1y estimate is also based, in part, on a fuller analysis of the 1946 and 1960 census returns. In 1946, 4.9 percent of the workers in the Lower Courantyne reportedly \-Tere occupied in IITextiles and Apparel;1I in 1960, 3.1 percent of the workers in this area were counted as being occupied in IITextiles and Leatherll [see Jamaica, Central Bureau Statistics (1950: Table Trinidad and Tobago, Central Statistical Office (1964: Table 15)]. I believe that the more recent category--Textiles and Leather--although similar to the earlier one, did not fully cover the in this region. Moreover, even if it did, the figures 4.9 percent and 3.1 percent for the Lower as a whole both understated the higher conceritrations of garment-workers in the more narrowly defined region "that; surrounds Rose Hall. '-. .. __ ... -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.oIl 10' In general, artisans may be distinguished from other kinds. of producers insofar as they make relatively small investments in manufacturing tools and equipment, insofar as they depend on accumulated skills, and insofar as they actually participate in the. labor process ,. instead of merely directing others to work for them. On the Lower Courantyne Coast of Guyana, garment-makers first of all employ only limited amounts .of technical equipment. Some garment-:makers their own cloth and accessories, but they are few in number; most require no more than a sewing machine and ask their clients to provide thread and other materials. Although those with access to electricity may purchase sophisticated Touch-and-Sew machines costing several thousand Guyana dollars, pedal-driven models are far more common, and used ones can be had sometimes for less than G$100.6 Given such limited technical investments, all Rose Hall area tailors and seamstresses are, second, dependent largely on their accumulated skills. There is considerable variation here too, however. Some can do no more than stitch pieces "put out II to them by a skilled cutter. But at the other extreme, there are craftsmen known widely for their skill and flair, and they are ,sought I after not only their .work, but also for their ability properly to train apprentices. 7 6 For these garment-makers, as for craftsmen in general, "not only are the tools simple but the capital outlay is low" (Lloyd 1953: 32). See also, for example, Unwin {1904: 2), Kahn (1975: 141), and Long and .Richardson (1978: 179). For some of the general variatiqn in what constitutes a "low capital outlayll in artisan materials and tools, see, for example, Rabinowitch (1928: 834-835), Nadel (1942: 289-290), Staley and Morse (1965: 47), and Lebrun and Gerry 22). 7 Among the distinctive characteristics of Rabinowitch counted the artisan I s display of "manual'skill" and


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. '11 Finally, the third feature of organization that garment-makers as'artisans is that all of them actually labor on the cloth itself, either cutting or sewing, :in the production of garments. There is much variation in the organization of groups in'which tasks are ,divided and specializations carefully developed. ,Some work alone, some ., set up small shops with family members or journeymen and .apprentices, and others organize elaborate putting-out arrangements. But it is no one's function in any of these cases simply to boss or supervise those who work on the cloth.8 As producers who skillfully apply their own labor, and'perhaps that of a few assistants, to a minimal amount of equipment, the tailors and seamstresses in and around Rose Hall require only small investments of capital in labor and technology, and so they engage in a relatively simple form of manufacturing. But although their investments may be "creative work" (1928: 819-820). Indeed, as Marx pointed out, an artisan may use his skills lias a virtuoso" and create veritable works of art (1967, 1: 761). On the artistic dimension of artisan proCuction, see, for example, Johnson (1937: 259-277), Laloire (1961: 250), Shetty (1963: 5, 52-53), Staley and Morse (1965: 66-69), and a number of more recent works: Cooper (1980: 34-52), Silver (1980), and Eshelman (1981). Hhether or not artisan products have artistic merit, however, they are invested with individual skill. The objects of' handicraft thus "are produced for the most part one at a time with individual variation, II and this method of production distinguishes .' artisan from factory products (Staley and Morse 1965: 6, 47),. See also Lenin (1908:335-336) and especially Bucher {1901: 170}: IIAll the important characteristics of handicraft may be summed up in the single expression custom production" {italics in original}. Peil (1970), Verdon {1979}, Cooper (1980: 23-33), and $ilver {1981} have focused specifically on the transmission of skill from artisans to --apprentices. Unwin (1904: 2-3), Dobb {+947: 71-72, 84-85}, Orlove .(1974: 198), Kahn (1975: 142), Lebrun and Gerry (1975: 25), and (1975: 7-8) all have treated various aspects of the distinctions among master craftsmen, journeymen and apprentices. 8 An overview of the distinctions between.workshop, putting-out, and other forms of artisan organization is contained in Staley and Morse (1965: 58). See aiso Bucher (1901: 154-173), Herman "{1956}, the


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. small, Rose Hall garment-makers nevertheless contribute various needed commodities to the local economy. Moreover, the vigorous rise of. artisan manufacturing in one region of this generally poor country has surely iocal population growth, in part at least, because 12 such activity is a hopeful sign of advancing wealth Like other countries in the Caribbean area, Guyana is industrially impoverished and, during 1977, the Gross Domestic Product per capita in the country totalled only G$1367 (US$536) In other places, hQwever, especially in parts of Europe and in the united States, the historical development of artisanry.has facilitated the growth of forms of manufacturing that are more sophisticated both technologically and in their divisions of labor, and it has thereby contributed significantly to an expansion of capital capable of supporting a growing comment by Spengler (1957) and Herman's reply (1957), Long and Richardson (1978: 188-200), and Novelo (1981: 201-206). For further discussion of the relation between putting-out industry and mercantile activity, see, for example, Shallcross (1939: 1-20), Bythell (1968: 12-19) and Halowist (1981: 667-669). See Harglin (1974), who argues that the function of lib os sing II is a characteristic feature of the political economy of factory manufacture as opposed to artisanry. According to Rabinowitch, lithe function of the handicraftsman" is' to take "an active part in the execution of the work itselfll (1928: 820). If an artisan is thus a producer who labors himself, it is sometimes correct to assert that he is, in the words of the old Harxist dictum, a laborer who owns the means of production. Indeed, scholars often cite this dictum as definitive of artisan production. See, for example, Arnould (1981: 62), Cook (197Gb: 398, 400), Dobb (1947: 71,85), .Ennew, et al.(1977: 309), Lenin (1908: 41), Handel (19G8, 1:' 66), Mann arid Dickenson (1978: 467-468), Kahn (1978: 113-11-9:) and,. of. course, (1967, I: 761). -' Labor and the various materials and tools that enter into the production oia craft good all qualify as means of production. But the rights of an artisan to these means may vary widely without "affecting his identity as such. Although a craftsman .may legally own all the means, there are many artisans who are enslayed, enserfed, and in other forms of -dependence, and \o;ho thus produce goods without


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission."e'; population.'3 The ecot:lomic developments in Rose Hall thus merit careful study, and they deserve attention not only in respec'tof ,the intrinsic, or essential, features of artisan organization outiined above, but also in respect of the relations of artisanry .other elements in the' local political economy, and in respect of the history ,J of those .relations. 1.2 THE WIDER DIMENSIONS OF ROSE HALL ARTISANRY Like other social actors, artisans are not entirely self-determining. Indeed, aconsiderable portion of the existing literature on artisanry is devoted to a defense of the proposition. that the intrinsic feClltures of artisan organization are themselves partly dependent on the structure, and history of the wider political economy in which craft producers participate. Thus, in his recent book, Joel Kahn asserted that artisans fully lIot-mingll the rights in their own persons much less in a set of materials and tools. Equally, there are artisans who produce craft goods while legally owning some of the means of production, but who have only rights of usage in the other means, such as the cloth that a client may consign to a tailor for manufacture. All these variations are covered in the general notion that an artisan is a producer who takes lIan active part in the execution of the work itself,1I al?-d not simply function as a boss. To define an artisan as a lab6rer'who owns' the means of production is to take one of the variations and to raise it, quite arbitrarily and misleadingly it seems to" me, to the level of a general distingUishing trait. '3 I computed Guyana's per capita Gross Domestic Product for 1977 using data recently published by the World Bank (1980: 94-95). Sivard (1980: 24) put Guyana's per capita income in terms of the Gross National Product, for 1977 at US$51S and, with respect to this figure, ranked Guyana 87th in a t9tal of 140 countries. For the transformation of artisanry into so-called industrial forms of manufacturing, see, for example, the studies of Europe by Unwin (1904), Mantoux (1928), Dobb (1947: 123-319), Ashton (1948.), and Kellenbenz (1976), and the recent studies of the united States by Thomson (1976), Walla,ce (1978: 4-239), Hirsch Montgomery (1979: 9-31), and Mulligan (1981).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., ... +_., .. _-----:-----.,--14 take on "specific social forms" in produc.tion because they "stand in a particular social relation to other classes in the social formation" (1981: 102).10 But Adam Smith, too, defended a similar, though somewhat narrower, version of this argument as early as 1776. He referred to the organization of production among carpenters, blacksmiths and others, and asserted that their "division of labor must always be limited by the extent of the market" (1937: 17). As producers, artisans are immediately' locked into a wider economy by their need for some form of mercantile relation: must sell or exchange their own products for goods that they need but do not themselves .produce. Providing artisan wares to a consumer is, of course, the role of a merchant, and artisans may themselves undertake this role or they may largely consign it to someone e.lse. But in either case,. artisan manufacturing depends on the ability of merchant activity to locate and secure a regular body of customers for craft products.11 10 Kahn1s argument here is phrased in terms derived from the influential work of Althusser and Balibar (1970). The' key phrase is "social formation," and it is conceptually linked to a number of other terms, including "mode of production," "forces and relations of production," and the "articulation" of modes of production. Analysis of the possible significance and presumed 'interrelation of the designated by these terms has provoked considerable discussion and disagreement among so-called Harxist anthropologists.' But however inconclusive these debates have been, they have at least made other anthropologists more aware of the need to analyze carefully the effects of wider economic, political and social relations on particular forms of productive organization, such as artisanry. For arguments in the Althusserian tradition on this general point, see, for example, Terray (1972: 95-186; 1979)., Rey (1973; 1979), 0 1 Laughlin (1975: 346-348, 354-364), Hindess and Hirst (1975: 1;;.78; 1977: 1-6, 46-72), and Foster-Carter (1978)', 11 For some of the general 'effects of the development of product markets on artisan manufacturing, see Rao (1965: 29), Shetty (1963: 52) and -Staley and Horse (1965: 22), Chuta and Liedholm (1979: 22-30) distingilish between foreign and local demand, and note that local markets comprise _both consumer and producer demand.'. Anderson and


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.... 15 In several ways, the Rose Hall case nicely illustrates how the role of, merchants affects artisan organization. Until the end of World War II, the market for clothing in the. Rose Hall vicinity was .small and fragmented. tailors and .seamstresses sewed for themselves, their families and perhaps for a few neighbors, and they rarely had enough business to. keep them occupied for more than part of a week After the war, however, large quantities of cheap, synthetic fabrics became available on the world market to the major cloth in Rose Hall. Seizing the opportunity, these merchants assembled a small army of peddlers to hawk the material throughout the region, and thereby to make the cheap fabric readily available to the poorest consumer. As ... sales of the cloth expanded, so top did the need for artisans to fashion the material into garments, and both the peddlers and the larger merchants vigorously competed to train and to organize local tailors and seamstresses to manufacture clothing as efficiently as possible. Some individuals contined to work for themselves. But numerous artisan shops arose at this time, with tasks divided sometimes among fa.mily members, Lieserson (1980: 236-237) invoke similar distinctions. Bucher argued that artisans generally produce for a market comprising lIa locally limited circle of customers" (1901: 151). Herman (1956: 367) and Laloire (1961:250) have taken similar positions. In such the ._.-' artisan typically makes his product to the special order of each .. individual customer, and thus acts as his own merchant. See BUcher (1901: 170), Unwin (1904: 2), Lenin (1908:335-336), Lloyd (1953: 32), Laloire (1961: 248), and Lebrun and Gerry (1975: 21-22). As Cook (1970, 1976a,b, 1981) and Kahn (1975, 1980: 86-92) have recently made clear, however, artisans may also depend for the sale of tneir products in local markets on rather intricate relationswith local merchants. Similarly", Cooper (1979, 1980) and Littlefield (1976, 1978,1979) have each provided detailed studies of artisans \olho deal with merchants in an export trade. These various mercantile relations give rise to complex and varied organizationsof production, sometimes under a single roof in a workshop, and .. \.. .. arrangements.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ": \ '16 ", and sometimes among a master and his or her trained assistants and apprentices. In addition, some tailors and seamstresses began to Uput out" cut material to other garment-maker,s and thus to fashion large quantities of apparel. The activity of merchants who eagerly sought to expand the local sales of cloth and clothing during. the post-war era thus accounted directly for many of the forms of productive organization, which in 1977-78 characterized the Rose Hall ganment industry. But if the intrinsic features of artisanry in Rose Hall at least in part, on the role of merchants in the local economy and, indeed, on the integration of those merchants within the world trade in synthetic fabrics, then any local changes that served to promote mercantile activity and to protect the relative positions of artisans and merchants in the wider economy also local artisan organization in important ways. Additionally, the characteristics of such organization hinged on the ability of local consumers consistently to afford new items of clothing. This ability, in turn, depended not only on the availability of cheap fabric, but also on the earnings of consumers from employment in other sectors of the local economy, particularly in agriculture. In England" the locus classicus of the so-called Industrial Revolution, the development of manufacturing from an artisan base depended heavily on the growth of income in agriculture. Increased agricultural earnings apparently heightened various sorts of local demand for manufactured goods, including the demand for cloth and clothing. Under the stimulation of an expanding home market rooted in .-_ .. -....


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. agriculture,ferms of manufacture thus advanced, and did so the early stages of the Industrial Revolution in a pattern that closely resembles the advance of. the garment industry on the Lower Courantyne I Coast of But what makes the. Rose Hall case 50 unusual and so ,deserving of close examination is that the local artisans have developed and prospered in a local economy'grounded largely in plantation agriculture, a form of cultivation that is supposed, by its. very nature and since its inception in the New Ylorld, to have stifled the development of manufactures, even in their most simple forms. 1.2.1 Guyana's Plantation Economy The Courantyne Coast of Guyana maybe noted for its "lively commerce" and for the thriving development of certain forms of artisanry (Jayawardena 1963: 8). But the region is only the easternmost portion of Guyana's entire coastal area, which reaches no more than 20 miles inland, and on which 90 percent of the country's population lives and works. Overall, the coast is laced 'Ilith thousands of miles of man-made canals and earthen dikes that serve to reclaim this low-lying, but richly fertile, soil from the continuous encroachment of the And I in Guyana's coastal economy, especially in that branch on the Courantyne Coast, the primary source of economic wealth is agriculture. -... 12 The literature is huge on the development of agriculture and of the home market for industry in See, for example, E. L. Jones (1965, 1967, 1968) and Eversley (1967}.For the place of these advances .. in the development of the \orider European economy, see, for example, the recent series of articles in Past and P,resent that featured discussions of Brenner {1976}. ------_ .. -.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.t For more than' two centuries, the principle engine of agricultural production in Guyana has been the piantation, an institution designed to cultivate staple crops for large, centralized foreign markets. Provisioning consumers in Britain, plantations in the erstwhile colony of British Guiana have produced mainly sugar. Indeed, over time, the sweetener has steadfastly comprised Guyana's leading export. By 1886-1890, sugar and its by-products (rum and molasses) accounted, on average, for over 93 percent of the total value of the country's outgoing goods. Since that time, Guyana's exports have' diversified somewhat to include primary products other than sugar. For example, mining in the sparsely settled, interior regions of the country has earned a growing proportion of foreign exchange: around the turn of the century and again during the 1920s, the production of gold was important; after the 1930s, and especially during the 1960s and 197,Os, bauxite grew to become the most valuable mineral export of interior Guyana. Moreover, on the coast, where agriculture the number of peasant farmers has grown sharply since the 1880s, and of these producers cultivate rice not only for their own consumption and for the local market, but also for consumers abroad. By 19.71-1975, rice I comprised, on average, fully 9.0 percent of the value of Guyana's annual exports. the same five-year period, however, sugar still provided the backbone of Guyana's foreign trade. Earning extraordinarily high prices in 1974 and 1975, this plantation commodity (and its by-products) constituted 45.5 percent of the total value of the country's exports.13 13 For the relative values of sugar, gold, bauxite, an,d rice in Guyana's exports from 1880 to 1975, see Great Britain (1897 B: 160; ----


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission." '19..\ Sugar and the two other major prongs of outgoing foreign trade--bauxite and rice--accounted for 40.3 percent of Guyana's gross domestic product from 1971 to 1975; during that time, sugar alone accounted for 22.5 percent .of the GOP. Guyana thus depends heavily for its wealth on exports, particularly on a single plantation commodity, t and it does so even more than other former British colonies in the region, such as Jamaica. 14 As a result,. according to Gordon Lewis, the distinguished Caribbean historian, Guyana retains the region's "colonial export economy par excellence" (1968: 262). In the agricultural sector of that economy, Guyana's Courantyne Coast has contributed substantially to the total'production of .both rice and sugar. Between 1971 and 1975, for example, Courantyne farmers harvested exactly one-third of all the padi reaped in,the country. But in this area \.,here garment-making has also expanded and flourished, nothing represents the predominance of agriculture more than the sugar plantation. Estates in Berbice, of which the Courantyne forms the major 1930, Part 4, Appendix 2: Table and Diagram for British Guiana, facing p. 82), Nath (1970: Table 16), and Bank of Guyana (1979: 110). For more detail on the structure of Guyana's economy since 1945, see also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development' {1i953:; 113-159,351-3SS}, O'Loughlin (1959: 25-46) and David (1969: 84-231). 14 See Jainarain (1976: 86-88, 172-174), who compiled the data to show the percentage contribution of exports to the National Income of both Guyana and Jamaica as follows: Guyana Jamaica 1952 1956 1960. 1964 1968 1971 58.2 30.6 52.1 38.7 63.0 48.1 75.1 48.7 76.4 50.7 77 .8 48.9 Jainarain also provides similar data for Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados (ibid.: 131-133, 205-207). '. !' 'or, ........ -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.-.T portion, produced nearly half (49.3%) of the country I s total sugar output.1S And Rose Hall Town, the center of local artisan activity, is. and has long been dwarfed by what lies behind it: Plantation Albion/Port Mourant, "a sugarcane estate of flat, hideous.vastness, miles long and miles deep" (Naipaul 1962: 133). 1.2.2 Comparative and Historical Perspective Plantation agriculture displays an imposing economic presence not only in Guyana and on the Courantyne Coast, but also in many other economies of the Caribbean area. It has done so for years, with the result, according to some scholars, that these economies are almost uniformly "lacking an industrial base" in (Cross 1979: 28). As early as 1873, one witness noted that sugar generally seemed to discourage alternative activities: liThe shadow of the sugar cane,n wrote Richard Whitfield, "kills all other vegetations and chills all other industries" (quoted in Potter 1977: 2). Even earlier __ two thoughtful observers of conditions in British Guiana and the British West Indies had already concluded that, amidst the plantations, investments in artisanry and in other more advanced forms of I manufacturing had little hope of growing to provide a diverse and prosperous economic environment. 15 Again, this figure covers the period 1971-1975. It is derived from data kindly supplied to me by the Guyana Sugar Corporation. I. calculated the portion of total padi that was the Courantyne Coast from the final detailed Spring and Autumn estimates of the Guyana Board for the years 1971-1975. \ "',


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.210\ 1n, Robert Schomburgk, an explorer in British Guiana and, later, an historian of Barbados, bluntly argued that iltheBritish possessions in the Western hemisphere are agricultural. countries, in which manufactures do not thrivell (1840: 120). By 1854, John Davy, a doctor and the younger brother of famed chemist, Sir Humphrey Dayy, had .: completed a three-year period of ,residence and travel in the West Indies and British Guiana. He analyzed many of the local societies in fine detail, and he briskly amplified Schomburgk1s earlier assertion about the sad state of manufacturing in the so-called plantation economies of the region: IIHere we do not see, as even in the wildest parts of Asia, any traces of tr'ades, of crafts, that have come down from remote ages, descending from father to son,any specimens of delicate handiwork or even of coarse, peculiar to the peoplell (Davy 1854: Insofar as he overlooked, for example, the subtle heritage of African crafts in the traditions of ex-slaves in the Americas, Davy undoubtedly carried his OvID rhetoric too far. 6 But his argument, like that of Schomburgk and of Hhitfield, was penetrating enough that his insight about the deep agricultural bias of West Indian economies still applied more than a century later. For the most part, I 1 plantation economies today depend on lmported manufactured goods in some cases, they may even attract foreign-based firms to open a local branch factory. But indigenously-organized manufacturing has rarely 16 Melville Herskovits (1941) was one of the first scholars to try systematically to refute the argument that slaves retained little of -----, .. their African heritage in the New World. Among more recent scholars, Richard.and Sally Price have investigated with much care and imagination, the subtleways in which various African traditions, particularly in the arts and crafts, became incorporated in and transmitted through New World cultures. See, for example, Price (1966), Mintz and (1974), and Price and Price


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.succeeded and, according to Malcolm Cross, the persistent failures of such activity merely have demonstrated lithe inflexibility and intractabilityll of rural economies that .are so thoroughly dominated by plantations (1979: 39). George Beckford, a Jamaican econom,ist, has been even more emphatic on the subject, insisting that plantation agriculture, by its very nature" inhibits the rise not only of peasant agriculture, but of artisan manufacturing as liThe existence of open unemployment and underdevelopment as revealed in pe'asant production and the petty trades in all plantation economies is a reflection of a structura:J. condition that inheres in the systemll (1972: 179}.17 If, as Whitfield, Schomburgk, Davy, Cross, and Beckford have all asserted, plantation agriculture has persistently enfeebled manufacturing in the caribbean area, then the rich elaboration of artisan organization among Rose Hall garment-makers is truly an 17 See also Beckford (1979: 48), and compare the assertion that a group, known as New Associates, made with specific reference to Guyana: liThe Sugar Industry has traditionally been, and remains today, the main prop of the colonial economy. The character and structure of the economy and society have been molded to suit its needs The structure of production (ie., the limited importance of production for domestic consumption) and the structure of demand (ie., the overwhelming importance of demand for. imports) can.all,be explained .in terms of the history of the sugar industry" World Associates 19.63: 244).' The recent arguments by Cross ,.Beckford, the Hew World Associates and others, that Caribbean economies need to be analyzed in terms of the alleged dominance ofa form of agriculture that is dependent on foreign demand, is closely related to arguments about the dependence of Third World economies in general on more advanced, industrialized economies. For some useful reviews of the generalized literature on dependency, see., for example, Chilcote (1974), O'Brien (1975), (1977), Palma (1978), and Henfrey (1981).' For reviews and criticisms of the dependency argUments made with respect to Caribbean plantation economies, see Girvan (1973), Benn (1974), Bernstein and Pitt (1974) ,Brown' and (1974)., Cumper (1974), Oxaal (1975: 37-48), and 110rissey (1981). The dependence in the Caribbean for manufactured goods that are imported or the product of local, but foreign-based, branch ..... ----


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.23" extraordinary phenomenon that cries out for. explanation at several different levels of generalization. One must of course account for the icteraction of local manufacturing and agriculture in terms of the particularities of local social and economic history, and varying trends of demographic growth and of urban development, for example, can help indicate the nature of local economic change. But in a wider sense, one must also understand how, and with what specific variations, Caribbean plantations in general originally achieved their ascendant position over artisans and over the commercial and political activities that might have led to the unimpeded development of artisan manufacturing. Indeed, only with such a general, comparative understanding can one begin to isolate more precisely which factors within local patterns of change and variation contributed to the rise of a case that is exceptional, not only within the Guyanese economy, but also within a broader .pattern of interaction bet\'leen plantation agriculture and artisan manufacturing. Thus, in this dissertation, the firs.t of a projected series of studies on the role of artisan manufacturing in Caribbean plantation economies, I examine how the features of early plantation organization led variously to the active suppression of local manufacturing activity. factories has been widely noted in the post-\Olar era. See, for example, Lewis (1950), Voelker (1961: 2.,.4), Demas (1965: 90-91, 103-105, 115-118), Brewster and Thomas (1967: 58-96), Jefferson (1972: 125-:147), Girvan (1973: 2-9, 15-24; 1979), van Houton (1973), Levitt and Best (1975: 43, 52-55), Girling (1976), Jainarain (1976: 296-306), OdIe {1979}, Ayub (1981), and Garrity (19S1).' ". -... ...


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission." '24" : Central to Caribbean economies since the sixteenth and seventeenth, centuries, when the region first became a major theater of European colonization, plantation agriculture has not only differed from place to place; it has also changed considerably over time. T,o help provide an adequate framework for conceptualizing the change and variation, Eric Wolf has broadly distinguished between "old-style" and "new-style" plantation,s (1959b: 138-146). According to Wolf, new-style plantations typically depend on the employment of free' wage-laborers. By contrast, the so-called old-style institutions exploited coerced laborers, such as peons, indentured servants and 'slaves. For decades in many parts of the Caribbean slavery constituted the most form of coercion that owners and managers applied on old-style plantations. Certainly, it was the cruellest and most extreme form and, in ,some respects, it may even be appropriate to .compare slave plantations to "total institutions" (R. T. Smith 1967: 228-233). Because slave plantations controlled the local laboring popUlation so rigidly at both the societal and personal levels, they could easily subordinate any incipient activities,includidg the growth of artisan manufacturing, to the primary, agricultural goal of the institution, that is, to the large-scale production of a stapie crop for export. As a result, in the view of Raymond Smith, the heritage of slavery on plantations in the Caribbean goes a long way toward explaining lithe peculiar impoverishment of local culture with its dmost complete absence of arts [and] crafts II (ibid.: 231). -----..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.25" Unfortunately, beyond the general assertion that the politics of slavery on plantations choked the growth of alternative economic. activities, there are no detailed studies that show some of the specific ways in which the owners and managers of slave plantations worked to block opportunities for the advance of Some studies of the role of manufacturing in early plantation economies do exist for other areas, however, particularly for the American South and Brazil. IS These studies largely confirm that the politics of plantation slavery prevented any significant diversification in local plantation economies. But they emphasize also that an account of plantation labor organization does not exhaust the sources of the problem. As economic institutions, plantations also depend for their structure on the level of technical investment, 'and on the facilities available to' plantation products and, evidently, consideration for each of these factors also weighed heavily in the decisions of plantation ovmers and managers to oppose the growth of manufacturing and of other economic activities. If studies elsev,here thus are any indication, subtle changes and variations with respect to labor organization, and also with respect to technical investment and to the structure of the markets for staple products all helped give rise at the very earliest stages of Cai:-ibbean economic development to a varied array of plantations. Undoubtedly, the ovmers and managers of these institutions had correspondingly varied 18 See, for example, Bateman and Heiss (1981) and Graham (1981: 621 n.S, 630-655). Handler's brilliant and suggestive essay (1963a) on the development of pottery-making in Barbados still stands as the most striking exception to the rule that historians have neglected to focus on the role of artisan manufacturing in early Caribbean plantation economies. See also Handler's note (1964) concerning the possible. African origins of the pottery techniques practiced on early plantations in the caribbean island of Antigua \ .. : .. '-'---


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.26'\ abilities and incentives to control independent artisanry and other forms of manufacturing. So, in'order to examine the early arid various effects of plantation agriculture on the development of manufacturing in the Caribbean area, and to do so in the broadest theoretical and historical terms, it is concentrate on than relatively nature of coercive labor controls within the old-style plantations. Instead, for the purposes of this discussion,' I try to build on the work of Raymond Smith, Eric Wolf and by incorporating the distinction between old and new kind of plantations into a distinction between at least two periods of economic change: During the first period, plantations made their initial accumulation of 'capital and made it in forms of political economy \olhere they could balance specific kinds of investments in technology in coercive labor organization against the sale of their products in specific kinds of markets; during the second period, plantations endeavored, politically and econ?mically, to consolidate their capital.1! In Guyana, the period of accumulation on plantations extended roughly from the middle of the seventeenth century to the 1880s. In this dissertation, I seek to assemble some of the available evidence I concerning the suppression of local manufacturing activity in Guyana during this period, and to view the evidence within the comparative framework of West Indian colonial history and, even more generally, within the framework of early New colonial history. I begin in the next chapter by reviewing the essential characteristics of plantation agriculture and by the formal conditions for the 19 See Levine (1975: 51-67) for a discussion of the general features of periods of capital accumulation and. concentration. \. .-.. -.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. original accumulation of capital on New t-lorld plantations." Chapter Three consists of my demonstration that coercive labor practices, the structure of product markets, and other fea.tures of capital accumulation on colonial plantations in Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados had the effect of suppressing artisan trades. In Chapter Four, I note that slave-based plantation economies in these places. still had to incorporate some kinds of manufacturing activities, though they did so in different ways, and I examine how slave emancipation had varying implications ,for artisan activities in Caribbean plantation economies. Finally, before concluding, I place my findings for the Caribbean in a wider comparative .perspective by showing that the accumulation of .capital in other forms of colonial agriculture--on l1exican haciendas and Net" England farms--did not always stifle local artisanry, although on plantations in other areas it did. Given the absence of detailed studies on the relation between artisan manufacturing and capital accumulation in Caribbean.plantation agriculture, the present work obviously stands as a preliminary investigation. Much more work is required to confirm, extend, modify, and correct the generalizations advanced here. In myview, as an anthropologist of the Caribbean, such work will broaden and 'the essential theoretical and historical background needed for-detailed ethnographic and historical research in the region on the organization and development of particular artisan trades during the later periqds of plantation change, including particularly the periOd of capital consolidation. Indeed, given an understanding of the various ways that capital accumulation originally stifled artisanry in the British West .. ..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ '28 ., Indies, I have already begun work on a sequel to the.present.volulile, which will focus specifically on changes in the plantation economy Qf Guyana since the 1880s. It will show how the concentration. of sugar production in certain areas of the country combined with the related .. expansion of rice farming in the Rose Hall area to broaden the market for such consumers' goods as clothing, and it will examine how local merchants and artisans rapidly exploited that market through the sale of cloth and the production of garments. But, in addition to laying the foundation for further study of later periods of change, this dissertation, and the work to which it makes a preliminary contribution, also bears an intrinsic value of its own. To the extent that it improves our knowledge of the ways that early plantations restricted the scope of manufacturing in the Caribbean colonies, it adds an important dimension to our understanding of what Herman Melville aptly called the lIempire of necessity," which arose in parts of the New World when Europeans first came "seeking to. conquer a larger liberty" for themselves. ._ .. -....


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. Chapter II PLANTATIONS' AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN NEW COLONIES, Had I plantation of this isle, my lord--, nature should bring forth, Of it own kind, all foison, all abundance, To feed my innocent people. --Shakespeare, The Tempest: II,i ('136, 156-158) For broad purposes, scholars have frequently linked the ", islands in the Caribbean Sea, and the closely related mainland countries of Belize, French Guiana, Suriname, and Guyana, to an area of much wider scope. The wider region, including the Caribbean and extending from Brazil to the southern United States, has provided the setting for some very general historical processes. According to M. G. Smith, these processes "consist in the expansion of Europe to the New World, the common historical patterns of conquest, colonization, peonage or slavery, and the development of multiracial and multicultural societies throughout the areall (1955: 19). Also citing the feature of European competition for overseas; empire, Philip Curtin has argued that Caribbean societies ,have long 'rested at the heart of a so-called South Atlantic System, lIa compiex organism centered on the 'production in the Americas of staples for consumption'in Europe, and grown by the'labor of Africansll (1969: 3).1 Because the plantation was the principal means for organizing -: 1 See Curtin (1955: 4-5) for his introduction of the concept of IISouth Atlantic System. II .. -29 ------


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.30"': enslaved African laborers to supply. Europe with tropical staples, the development of this institution is one of the criteria for identifying. the Caribbean (including the Guianas) as part of the South Atlantic System. Indeed, so common and was the plantation from Brazil to the southern United States that one scholar has referred to I this area as "Plantation America" (Wagley 1957: 5-6). Of course, the plantation and the features associated with it do not fully define any New World society. With respect to the Caribbean proper, Sidney Hintz has noted that such features "only partially describe the island societies correctly" (1966: 913n). Still, the plantation is a crucial element in any definition of the caribbean as a socio-cultural area, and any of political economy within Caribbean societies, including the Guianas, must account for the influence of this institution.2 In the Caribbean, plantation agriculture generally appears to have had a deleterious influence on the development of artisan manufacturing. To plantations originally hampered the development of artisanry in the British West Indies, I turn first to the general defining features of the plantation. Then, I identify those I specific characteristics that distinguished the institution during the period of early European efforts to colonize the New World, when the plantation served as one of the primary means for the accumulation of capital. 2 See, for example, Mintz {1966; 915, 919-925; 1968: 306, 310-313} and Cross (1979: 1-8) \ .-.. -.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.2.1 THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF PLANTATION AGRICULTURE' According to, Sidney Mintz, lithe plantation is, a distinctive form of agricultural organization and may, accordingly, exhibit distinctive 31,"', social characteristics" (1953b: 139). Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that lithe formal structure of the plantation is not the same as the social and cultural behavior of its population"{Mintz 1959: 48).3 An adequate conception of the plantation thus must distinguish primary, or distinctive, features of plantation organization from the secondary features that may include the social and political mechanisms through \olhich the owners and managers of plantations act to contt:ol local economic forces, such as artisan manufacturing. Moreover, it 'is important to realize that the features of the plantation are themselves subject to considerable variation. The formal structure, the set of primary features, of the plantation comprises the attriputes of its economic organization,. Lewis Gray, writing of the plantations in the antebellum American South, 3. See also Rubin (1959: 1), Greaves {1959: 14}, and 11cBride {1937: 152}. Mintz has generalized his argument in a \Olay that he has tried cautiously to develop elsewhere: "11any of the features of life generally associated with 'urban,' 'Western,' or 'modern' such as a wage-labor pattern, ,standarized \Olage rates, and industrialir,ation, are introduced through plantation cirganization and seem to produce particular sociocultural effects" {1953b: 138}. For an elaboration, see, for example, Mintz (1974b: 42-52). Compare the cautious approach of Mintz, however, with the bold assertions of George Beckford, who has argued that "in societies which consist largely of plantation communities, we should expect to find the same characteristics of political organization on the individual plantation reflected in the larger society. The thesis which this -study advances in this connnection is that all plantation societies have in common the following features: concentration of power among a small planter class and highly centralized administrative structures (government)" (1972: 74). For telling criticisms of;Beckford's work on this point, see, for example, Lipton (1973), Hagelberg (1974: 2-3), and Benn (1974: \


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'. .. ::: .... :, ..... ','-,' ..... '32'" defined these characteristics as follows: liThe plantation was a capitalistic type of agricultural organization in which a considerable number of unfree laborers were employed under unified and control in the production of a staple crop" (Gray 1933, 1: 302).4 This definition is a useful preliminary characterization, but its stress on coerced labor is somewhat misleading. As an economic organization, the plantation has a dynamic nature in all its features. It takes different forms under different conditions and coercion is, only one aspect of labor employment,' which in turn is only one of the formal attributes subject to variation. As a capitalistic enterprise, the plantation "was sparked into life by the market relationship itselfll (Thompson 1975: 20-21). Settlers in the New World first established the with the aim of responding profitably to a large-scale. demand for certain staple crops. Characteristically, planters found the large productrnarket overseas in Europe, 'but the extent of the foreign demand differed. depending on the crop and it fluctuated over time in size and intensity for each kind of crop. To meet the large agricultural demand, planters engrossed land rights and formed large landed estates. Furthermore, i they participated in external capital markets to secure financing, technology labor, although the degree of participation frequently waxed and waned. Finally, the planters were concerned mainly with the 4 For works that focus on economic attributes as the primary features of plantation organization, see Courtenay (1965: 52}, Greaves (1935: 67), Gregor (1965: 228-235), W. o. Jones (1968: 154), McBride (1937: 148), and Wolf and Mintz (1957: See also Mintz (1953a: 224-225; 1959: 43-44), who has made some useful comments on Gray's definition. For broader definitions of the plantation, see Bacon (1625), Scisco (1903) and Thompson (1975: 31-40). .----.. '.:\'1 ,:!


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. of crops for export, although they did not preclude the possibility of producing an assortment of 'other crops in addition. 5. In relation to these features, the organization of. plantations varied widely. As competitive conditions changed in the external markets, plantation organizations altered achieve economies, and the I most important of these shifts focused on investments in the employment of labor and on investments in technology.6 Economies in the employment of labor varied from 'the II old-style II use of coerced labor to the "new-style" of using free labor (Wolf 1959b: 137). In the shift from one style of employment to the other, however, the separation between management and laborers remained sharp. The plantation "did not lose its feature of unified supervision over the choice of crop, the .method of cultivation and the marketing of the yield" (l'IcBride 1937: 149). Under such supervision, the new-style plantations have frequently kept large numbers of unskilled laborers who, because of their lack of skill and organization, afford a cheap labor supply. So cheap, in fact, that "\olhen it is desirable to introduce a new technology requiring a radical change in cultural practices, the plantation substitutes supervision-.-supervisory and administrative--for skilled, adaptive labor,.combining the supervision with labor whose principal skill is to follow orders" (W. o 5 For enumeration of these general features, I have drawn primarily from following sources: Courtenay (1965: 7, 51), Greaves (1959: 14-15), Gregor (1965), l'IcBride (1937: 148), MandIe (1972: 57), Mintz (1953a: '225), Thompson (1939: 89; 1940: 216-217; 1957: 30; 1975: 20-22,31, 34), Waibel (1941: 157), Wickizer (1958: 73), and Wolf and Itintz (1957: 396-407). 6 See, for example, Courtenay (1965; 52), Greaves (1935: 170), MandIe' (1972: 57), and Mintz (1953b: 139; 1959: 44) .. _--


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'. Jones 1968: 156). The scope of management's depend op cheap .but closely supervised laborers, hotolever, .has been limited, and in some. cases curtailed, by laborers who have themselves and successfully bargained for higher wages. Growing labor costs, in turn, have 'stimulated plantations to rely on techt:lological countermeasures that require fewer but more highly skilled and socially mobile laborers. Thus, plantation investments in laboring skills and wages have differed, and, similarly, plantations have varied in organization from those with small investments in stagnant technology to those highly capitalized structures identified t>1ith scientific cultivation, mechanical progress and operational efficiency.7 Whether old-style or new-style, labor intensive or heavily capitalized, plantation organizations have also depenqed on various other economies to take. advantage of changing conditions of profit-taking. Characteristically, plantations have been organized to achieve economies of both specialization and scale. The demand for certain has given planters special opportunities to' concentrate on the production of a single crop, and to do so on a large-scale. Indeed, the tendencies to monocrop production and large I scale have frequently appeared as distinctive features in definitions of the plantation. But like other efficiency measures, economies of specialization are not irreversible. Given certain such as depression in the product market or favorable government incentives, 7'For specific discussions of the distinctions in labor and technology that various authors posit to be relevant for an adequate conception of the plantation, see Greaves {1959: 16}, Gregor (1965: 227. 236-237), W. o. Jones (1968: 154-155), 11cBride {1937:. 148:-157}, Mintz {1953a: 225; 1953b: 139; 1959: 44}, Waibel (1941: 156-157), Wolf (1959b: 138) ,and Wolf and Mintz {1957: 399-407}.' .---_ ....


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.35" plantation managements may diversify rather than specialize their production. Economies of scale, of course,sometimes limit the capacity of the plantation,management to shift production from one crop to several. Large investments in capital stock,for example, may make such shifts The organization of the plantation based on considerations of scale do vary, however, because size is a relative feature. For certain crops in particular markets, the plantation may ,be large and economical compared to other forms of agricultural organizati()n. Yet compared to other plantations in light of such criteria as the size of the labor force"the size of the capital stock, and the relative portion of the ma,rket held, a 'particular plantation may be'relatively small and its production relatively unprofitable.8 Given a basic definition of the plantation, then, one can plot changes along several significant dimensions. An agricultural creature of foreign markets for certain crops, the plantation varies with changing competitive conditions, shifting relationships labor and technology, and differing economies of specialization and scale. Varieties of plantation organization, of course, need not each be distinguished by significant variation in all dimensions of change at one time. Nor are the changes of any particular dimension unidirectional and irreversible in relation to the other dimensions. But technical investments, labor organization, the ,structure of product a'Greaves (1935: 181-184; 1959: 14), Gregor (1965: 227), Mintz (1953a: 225), Thompson (1957: 30; 1975: 22, 31, 34), Waibel (1941: 156-157), and Wolf and l-lintz (1957: 398) all discuss economies of specialization. For work that focuses in part on economies of scaie, see Greaves (1959: 14), Gregor (1965: 237), W. o. (1968: 157-158), Waibel {1941: 157), and Wolf and Mintz (1957 :396-397). ,f.,


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'. :.:" ..... : '36." markets, and the other primary features of plantations all are interrelated, and many changes in these dimensions occur systematically in an historically ordered, step-by-step fashion. Thus, for certain analytical purposes, types of plantation organization maybe identified by reference to certain stages, or periods, in the development of plantation agriculture.9 Assertions about developmental stages, or periods, posit the "lawful conditions" of plantation organization (Mintz 1959: 46) To move from such assertions and to investigate, for example, the development of artisanry in p.1antation economies is to begin to examine the secondary features of plantations, that is, the possible effects plantation institutions. But plantation organization varies widely enough in its general defining features that about the. possible secondary characteristics demand immediate qualification: the effects of which plantations, where, and in what stage of development? Proper understanding of the role of artisanry in the early plantation colonies of the British West Indies, thus depends, at least in part, on the conclusions of a careful and rigorous typoloW of.. various kinds of plantations, a typology that facilitates comparisons of the social and political structures of the.wider societies in which the are For purposes of this discussion, I distinguish types of plantations engaged in. the initial accumulation of capital in the New World from those that subsequently acted to consolidate their capital, and I focus specifically on the features of plantation organization 9 See Gregor (1965: 236) and Mintz (1974a: 55). 10 Gregor (1965: 222), Mintz (1953b: 139; 1959: 48), and Wolf and Mintz (1957: 380-386, 4Q8-411). :. i, I" ,. '-:-1-


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'37'" during the long and difficult period of capital accumulation. 2.2 THE PLANTATION AS l-lECHANISl-l FOR CAPITAL ACCUI1ULATION with the expansion of European interests to the Americas, ,to Africa, and to the Far East beginning in earnest during the fifteenth century, the plantation quickly emerged as a distinctive organization that facilitated the colonization of the New t-lorld. ,l-toreover, as Sidney Mintz has observed, IIfrom the perspective of post-Roman European history, the plantation was an absolutely unprecedented social, economic, and political institution" (1964b: xiv). Generally, one can distinguish the plantation as a large-scale agricultural organization designed to produce staple crops for large, foreign markets. But to the extent that the institution was historically and contributed to a and major colonization effort, one must further distinguish early plantations in the, New World by the common foundation on which they all had to build: the need to establish new, original, or IIprimitivell accumulations of capital. The period of accumulation for New World plantations varied in length from institution to institution, from colony to colony, and from i region to region. Plantations have entered production at different times, with different levels of investment and metropolitan sl'pport, and under differing competitive pressures.11 On sugar plantations, 'for example, in the British West Indies, including the British Guiana, the period of accumulation lasted for more than two centuries, 11 For some of the problems in conceptualizing these diferences in terms of general periods of change, see Mintz (1977: 260-261, 1978: 85-90, and 1979a: 21S-2!6, 220-221, especially n.12). \


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.... 38 from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the' nineteenth century. When increasing supplies of beet sugar drastically altered in the world sugar market during the 18805, the owners and managers of estates in the region then began to consolidate and concentrate their capital in earnest. In particular, they tried to enhance their competitive edge by relying on growing investments in sophisticated technical changes and on the employment of wage-laborers. During periods of capital accumulation, however, "produc'ers lack sufficient capital to invest either in expensive and dynamic technology, or in the employment of wage-labor. Instead, such producers depend for their gains on relatively meager and stagnant quantities of materials and tools,. and on a variety of alternative devices for organizing and controlling the application of to their technical stock. Artisans and peasant farmers--small-scale producers respectively of manufactured' and agricultural goods--are typically constrained by the need to accumulate capital. To control labor, they resort to self-discipline: they themselves participate actively in the labor process. They may also, for example, to the privileges of kinship and thereby secure help from close relatives at relatively little expense. By contrast, in the newly established European colonies, particularly those in the Americas, large-.scale producers, such as those who or managed plantations, resorted to various forms of physical coercion both to obtain cheap labor, and'to apply it to available technical stocks. During the early phases of development, owners and managers of plantations often found it necessary and convenient to enslave potential laborers, and thereby to apply the .. ---....


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.", 39 harshest possible form of coercion. 12 Slavery, by definition, is distinct from indenture by the length of an individual's term of bondage, and is different from serfdom and peonage in the extent to which a master may freely dispose of the bondsman's person and abilities. t-lithin the scope of New World plantation development, 'slavery was directed specifically to'the control of labor-power and thus it served as one of the distinguishing features of the period of accumulation. But, of course,slavery in general cannot be viewed solely in these terms. Across the broad canvas of time and place, slaves have been confined only occasionally to agriculture, and even more rarely to plantation agriculture. In some c'ases, they have served quite different economic functions. Slaves have, for example, mined-gold, ferreted diamonds and smelted iron. In still other cases, they have bolstered armies, entertained royalty, cared for children, and thus met needs that do not directly pertain to the production and circulation of \o7ealth, and thus are not even economic in nature. Yet despite all these other, possible slave functions, most New World slaves still were removed from Africa largely for economic purposes, to labor for life under pain,of I coercion on plantations. That is, New World slavery matured in conjunction with the needs of capital accumulation on New World plantations, and so its growth must be vie\o7ed primarily as a particular phenomenon, in terms of plantation development, which, in 'turn, began as 12 With respect to the Caribbean area, Sidney Mintz has especially emphasized the that slavery was only one of a variety of coercive devices applied to potential plantation laborers. See Mintz (1977: 260-263, 1978: 85-90, 1979a: 222-225, 561-566)., Also see Bolland (1981: 592-593, 614-618). ..... ..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.40"' but one aspect of a wider process of European .colonization.13 As one of the forms of coercion pressed into the service o.f capital accumulation, New 1'10rld slavery rested on the force that masters .' .' needed to the work routines of people within their piantation domains. At the very least, owners and managers of plantations. thus exercised the control needed to determine the course of produ'ctive activity, including participation in artisan trades, on their individual estates But in many places, early New World planters also sought to' extend their control beyond the boundaries of their own plantations. To preserve the economy of having their products processed cheaply in the overseas market, and to eliminate any attractive economic opportunities that might have induced their slaves to escape or revolt, plantation '. owners and managers particularly endeavored tonarrow .. theemployment options of in the local societies. 1'1here planters obtained control over the external economy, the impoverishment of local arts and crafts tended to be deep lasting. How the owners and managers of plantationscame by such power is by no means obvious, because ail the oppressive measures that benefited these early colonists appeared under varying circumstances in different i places. But it is clear that an analysis of the links between the processes of coercive labor control and of artisan impoverishment hinges theoretically on a preliminary analysis of the conditions of capital 13 See Patterson (1979: 37; 47-67) on the importance of distinguishing the economic from the non-economic functions of slaves. For a general review of the comparative literature on slavery, see Patterson (1977a). Also compare Kopytoff and Miers (1977) and Watson. (1980) And see, for example, Padgug (1976: 15-22) and Mintz (1977) on the need to emphasize the relation between New W.orld slavery and plantations, and the role of both in the development of the so-called European world -_ .. -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.: : 41 accumulation on plantations in the colonial New World. The most salient of these conditions include the broad types of investments that Europeans mobilized to. accumulate colonial riches, the elementary economic relations of investment in production, specifically the relations that minimally s.erved to distinguish farms from plantations in periods of primitive accumulation and, finally ,aspects of the wider colonial political economy that bore on the problems of controlling labor during these periods. 2.3 THE CONDITIONS OF ORIGINAL ACCUl-IULATION ON PLANTATIONS IN NEW WORLD COLONIES --Andre Gunder Frank has written pungently of the "predatory needs" of the Europeans who began expanding to the Americas in the late fifteenth century (1972: 23). But each European ... ,ho preyed on the New did so no doubt for intensely personal motives. One of the characters who swaggered onto the caribbean stage, Sir Henry Colt, intended to prove himself a proper man: "Forrest we will nott untell we have doone some thinges worthy of ourselves, or dye in the attempt" (quoted in Dunn 1972: 9). Other, less grand reasons also moved Europeans to venture from home. liMen wished, perhaps, to strike the infidel a bloW,: to i strengthen their native state, to ascertain the shape and-nature of the earth, to gain great wealth, or to escape from a humdrum existence--or perhaps a mixture of these things" (Rich 1967: 302). But if colonists '" were not moved simply by greed to acquire new riches, they surely sought wealth in support of the New World ventures that they conceived to satisfy various other motivations. Thus, as Rich went on to note, "seldom was the hope of access to the trade goods, the spices and the ., ..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ .. ,." ',:' silks and cottons of the sophisticated East far from their minds" (ibid.). their other interests, then, Europeans in the New '42 World, from the initial moment of contact, could scarcely their pressing demand for ,wealth. Perhaps no myth better' captures the spirit: .of this demand than the legend of Ei Dorado, the, man 'reputedly gilded ingold. Few Europeans of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could '. have found a greater happiness if, by their adventures in the New World, they discovered wealth so plentiful that they, like El Dorado, could cover themselves with turpentine, roll in gold dust, and then afford to wash off the mineral by plunging exuberantly into a nearby lake. Thus, according to C. L. R. James, IIChristopher columbus landed first in the New World at the island of San Salvador, and after praising God enquired urgently for goldll (1963: 3). And when Hernan Cortes addressed the first r1exica noble he met, he affected a tone of cynicism, but effectively made the point: liThe Spainards are troubled with a disease of the heart for which gold is the specific remedy" (quoted in l-101 1959a: 161). Despite all' the particular, personal motives prompting I to adventure in the New World--and their particular interests often bitterly and violently divided them--a common' mission thus them, .-_'or at least many of them"a mission to accumulate material wealth. Settlers eventually did accumulate much wealth in the colonies by supplying various special commodities to Europe. The colonial branches of production included, in the early period, production of precious metals in Spanish America. Later, they included production of furs, \


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., ... '43. fish, and tobacco in North America, and the production of sugar, in the Caribbean and Brazil. But, of course, such specialized productions did not arise imme"diately, nor could their effects on European economy be felt all at The various settlers in the New World first had to create their colonies and then, within them, the.had to struggle to mount for new and original accumulations of capital. The notion of colonizing the Americas developed in the Old World as the new one became, kno\07n, and as this knowledge stimu"lated interest in investment. Europeans had begun exploring the Americas more or less haphazardly as part of the search for ways to enter the East Indies spice trade. "Of course, once settlements colonists required more systematic exploration so they could assess both their defensive \ needs and the possibilities of expanding their settlements. As exploration proceeded, knowledge of the New World gradually advanced. Politicians in Europe became more and more aware of the World as a source of substantial financial support, \Olhile merchants sa\Ol" potential for considerable profit in trade. In the interaction of Crown and mercantile interests, funds became available for colonization. Given financial investments, however, the colonists had at least to strive to I pay back the "ventured stock and, if possible, to make a" positive return on it. Europeans coionial interests certainly would not send good ----money after bad and, if interest from the metropolis dissipated, the colonists would ,be left alone to brave the New World. In view of this stark alternative, the colonial search for wealth, predatory from the 14 Indeed, the effects of colonial production and trade on European economic developments still have not been wholly and are subjects of important ongoing research. For a helpful overview of the salient quest;.ions in such research, see Minchin'ton'(1977).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.__ ---.-----.. '., ,', 44 start, became even more intensely pressing. To hold metropolitan interest and to provide creditors with a return on their investments, the colonists in the New World had to a ste.ady, if not steadily fund of capital. The colonists were limited, however, in their todo this. As E. G. has argued, colonization was above all a process by which territory was "peopled and settled" (1849: 16). Whether or not a territory was already occupied, it became a colony' when it was made subject both to the immigration of new people and to the' institution of government. IS The limitations on generating a capital return, although specific to each colony, thus derived, in general, from the dual processes of "peopling and each colony. 15 I have here identified the process of settlement as the institution of government. In so doing, I have departed slightly from Iiakefield I s original conception. He wrote that "unquestionably, the process of colonization comprises governmentll (1849: 16). In a later passage, however, he explicitly argued that colonial "settlement" had to be distinguished from colonial IIgovernment.1I He asserted that government is a political matter, while immigration and settlement depend on economic considerations: liThe politics of a coloriy--that is, all things relating to colonial government as there is government in the old country--are totally distinct from the economy of a colony--that is, all things relating only to immigration and the' .... -.-disposal and settlement of \olaste land .." (ibid.: 62).' For Wakefield, the concept of settlement presumably denoted only the process of setting up economic institutions But institutions arise in a world of other institutions, and one generally refers to the world of institutional interaction as a political world,the regulation of \Olhich is the field of government The institution of government, therefore, covers the process of institutionalization in general, and includes economic institutions in particular. I identify settlement \orith government, '1 widen Wakefield's sense of the process of settlement to include this general' process of ins ti tutionaliza tion. And with. this broadened sense of the term in mind, I reject Wakefield's argument that the' '.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 45"" The process of IIpeoplingll the New Horldrequired that prospective colonists have the means to subsist in their new settlements. That i"s, they. had to have the means to meet the full range of their everyday needs. Becaus.e wealth, or capital, is of the elements with which needs are met, it follows that the colonists needed a preliminary investment of wealth .just to subsist.16 Perhaps once they were settled, they could produce valuable items and exchange some of them to. obtain needed qoods that they did not produce. But until then, any would-be colonial producer had to have a source of capital, in Adam Smith's words, "to maintain him and to supply him "lith the materials and tools of his tradell (1937: 259). The colonists in the New subsisted on condition of several kinds of investment. They subsisted by means of investments in investments in trade, investments in direct production, and by investments in various combinations of these means. The conditions of "settlement of waste land" be kept distinct from the institution of government. On the definitions of "colonization" and IIcolonies," see, besides Wakefield, smith (1937: 531-532), Heeren (1829, 1: 30-32), Lewis (1841: 170-176), l-Ierivale (1861: xii), Roscher and Jannasch (l88S: 2-32), Leroy-Beaulieu (1902, 2: 564-68), Morris (1904, 1: 6-7), and Keller (1908: 1-2). For more recent discussions in this tradition, see Best (1968: 283-287), Hicks (1969: 49-54), and Knight .. _-_.-. (1978: 23-66). For a somewhat different approach to the processes of colonization, by those who profess the theory of so-called IIcolonial modes of production, II see, for example, Banaji (1972) and Cardoso (1975). 16 Merivale (1861: 161-169) discussed the dependence of emigration on accumulated funds of lI1ealth. See also Leroy-Beaulieu (1902, 2: 569-573) and Morris (1904, 1: 17). Although each scholar referred to these funds of wealth as capital entering production, they did so in the sense of capital as a financial investment seeking a return, not in the sense of expanding technical means. Financial investments in colonial production were high, but investments in technical means were relatively small. I argue this point more fully below.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.46", '. such ventures set immediate limits on the abilities of the colonists to generate arid accumulate their own stock of wealth. Moreover, as people, actually began IIsettlingll in each particular colony, they 'interacted with all 'parties having substantial interests in the venture. Institutions formed as a result to govern and to regulatethe affairs of the colony, and these institutions also constrained the colonists in their attempts to create their own original accumulations of capital on, for example, a plantation. 2.3.1 Types of Colonial Investment With reference to instances when colonists subsisted by means of force, some scholars written of of conquest. II 17 'Such colonies, it is claimed, originated in the Net-i "'hen European states invested colonists "lith military force and the colonists subjected either Indians or other European colonists, and seized their territory. But having made their conquest; and barring other kinds of investment, .the colonists had only a limited potential for generating wealth steadily and in amounts sufficient both to subsist and to make an adequate on the investments of force made by the Crown. Of course, it is entirely possible that the conquest of a specific colony could be justified on strategic or military ,_--alone, without any regard for a possible economic return. The British seizure of Jamaica from the Spaniards in 1655 certainly was so .. justified. Indeed, the island was virtually unihabited and devoid of 17 See Roscher and Jannasch (1885: 3-9), Morris (1904, 1: 8-9), and Best (1968: 285). Keller maintained that conquest properly, establishes a colony only if it provides for the emigration of IInon-official members of state's population" (1908: 2). \


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.desirable wealth. But assuming the existence of local wealth in a vanquished territory, Europeans could secure a capital .return by" plundering local riches. 'Or, they 'could claim ,proprietary rights over the wealth and then appropriate the gooc;1s they wanted as regular 18 Plunder, however, simply exhausted the and in no way provided for its replenishment. Once the colonists the spoils, they could generate more only with additional of force and the conquest of additional territory. Under such conditions, colonies of conquest in the words of Henry l-Iorris,"the least productive, the least happy, and the least enduring; they ar'e the most exposed to the risk of abandonment or of war"., (1904, 1: 11). By appropriating tribute, on the other hand, colonists, interacting with Crown forces, could institute an administrative structure to assure the flow of wealth on a steady and regular basis. For additional controls on the quality and quantity of wealth, they had only to extend their administrative institutions. with regulation of production, they could achieve direct control over the generation of wealth. They could also exert more indirect controls by I the facilities .of commercial exchange. In colonies created simply by investments in the of conquest, then, tribute and plunder were the principal options available for the generation of colonial wealth. In the absence of local or of an easily subjugated,population to provide it, other kinds of investment necessary to kee:p the possession economically solvent. 18 Force liinay be used for conquest, the economic objective of \-'hich is revenue or tribute--or just plunder" (Hicks 1969: 52).' .. -.. -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 0\ '48 Given the need, as well as the opportunity and wherewithal, European colonists in the New World thus often sought the rewards of tradeor of direct production. In addition to colonies of conquest, scholars have also distinguished 'II colonies of trade" and, in so doing, have drawn attention to instances when colonists met their subsistence needs through the exchange of commodities.19 I; people representing the interests of European states did not directly invest in attempts to p'eople the New they usually supported mercantile efforts to do so. In fact, merchants' played a primary role in the search for new trade routes, to the East, and they were quick to express an interest in the World as a potential source of great Indeed, in the view of some scholars, colonies of trade "1ere the first to have been established in the New World.2o Certainly, colonial traders were relatively free from the problems encountered by colonists who had to meet their needs either by force of conquest or by direct production. Because. investments in trade were not restricted to geographically limited markets, traders did not have to make forceful claims on territory as a necessary condition of I I theic existence. Nor were traders necessarily restricted to fixed lines of products and, in this respect, they escaped the dilemmas direct producers who struggled to keep. down costs of production while expanding ----.-... 19 Heeren (1829, 1: Roscher and Jannasch (1885: 10-18), Leroy-Beaulieu (1902, 2: 564-565), and Morris (1904, 1: 9). See also' Hicks (1969: 49-54). 20 Roscher and Jannasch (1885: 16). Of. colonization founded on trade, Leroy-Beaulieu wrote: "Rien n'est simple comme cette colonisation" (1902, 2: 565).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.49 their sales.21 still., however freely merchants could move from one territory to another or from one product to another, they .did have to deal in some specific products and in some specific territory. When European merchants set up trading posts in some part of the New World,. they began "peoplingll a colony there, subsisting in it, and, of course, they soon encountered particular' dilemmas of their "Bargain buysll and IIdear sales": these were the axioms of colonial merchants seeking a return on their investments in the New World. To achieve a favorable margin bet",een purchase and sale, merchants had to control prices. To achieve such control, they often established some form of monopoly to create commercially dependent trading partners. They tried to position themselves so they ",ere not competing against other purchasers for the goods they t-lanted to buy from Indians, or against other sellers for the goods they wanted to offer back home in Europe. respect to European. markets, merchants in each metropolis struggled to secure state against competition from merchants of other nations. They .,,'on this general struggle as mercantilism gradually became Crown policy in Europe. But then, within the framework of state of merchant interests, particular merchants had to wage much narrower struggles to curry favor and preference for their particular lines of merc.handise In the colonial markets, merchants could, perhaps, enlist Crown forces to if not eliminate, other contenders for such Indian wealth as peltry. But even if certain merchants controlled the Indian trade in a given area, they often had little recourse when native Americans 21 Levine (1975: 55) remarked these advantages as features of capital invested-in trade. ..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 011 '50 encountered the limitations of their own forms of production and could no longer meet the demand. Apart from abandoning thedr interests' in' the. colonies altogether, they could only attempt to intervene directly in' the production. of Indian wealth, or else they could support.and stimulate the production of wealth by other sources, specificallyby t other colonists.22 When Europeans at last began to "peopleand settle" the New World as direct producers, they shouldered what proved to be the really decisive and portentous struggles of the early colonial period.. The process of colonization tended to confine conquerors and traders to a specific territory. These colonists had to admi't, although for different reasons, that being so' confined limited their means of supplying sufficient wealth to meet their O\OTn needs and to make adequate returns to those who invested in their activities. To overcome the inherent limitations of colonies of conquest and trade, Europeans turned to the direct production of colonial wealth. Referring to instances when colonists did actually engage in production, scholars have mainly distinguished "farm" and "plantation" colonies. Some scholars have used other labels, and some have found it. necessary to distinguish still other types of colonies. But all concur that colonial production required land and was preeminently agricultural. And, although there is no consensus on all of the features necessary and sufficient to differentiate these two types, most. scholars agree that farm and plantation colonies provided settlers with two very different alternatives to the payment of high wages for labor 22 For a brief, but useful, discussion of the relationships among trade, military force, and production in colonies, see Hitks (1969:


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ '. during the period of accumulation: in the first, producers were farmers who labored IIwith their own two handsll; in the second, they were planters who forced others to work for them.23 2.3.2 Investment in Direct Production: Colonial Farms and Plantations European producers in the New World could gain a steady return on coloniai investment when the value returned for their output consistently exceeded the value they advanced. To assure a steady return of wealth, therefore, colonial producers strove to keep their costs of production to a minimum. Because, in all production processes labor has to combine with some technical means to create a specific object of value, a colonist could assume an identity as a producer .. ,hen he could afford the costs of joining at some specific place both labor and the technical means of labor. As an essential ingredient of production, labor has ,the unique feature that it may 'be applied to any kind of technical stock. By contrast, the technical means of production differ in composition for each kind of production process. Materials and tools serve to divide and particularize the general laboring activity, which thereby becomes a I specific process turning out specific goods' of value.24'The ability to 23 I have labelled the contrast set with the terms used by Keller (1908: 4). I do not thereby endorse his argument that climatic features. are essential to the distinction. Other labels have been used for various purposes by Heeren {1928, 1: 31}; Merivale (186l: 260-276), Roscher and Jannasch (1885: 18-28), Leroy-Beaulieu (1902, 2: 564-568), l-Iorris (1904,-1:9), Best (1968: 285-287), and Knight -(1978: 50-66). The principal alternative form of production besides agriculture, which requires technic'al investment in land, and which scholars have distinguished, is mining. See Heeren (1829, 1: 31) and Smith (1937: 529). 24 For an,elaboration of these points, see Levine (197,8:


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. employ labor thus helps to distinguish the role 'of. producer in general, from the role, say, of a landlord. But ,the ability to afford the, technical means of labor is especially important because possession of those means identify him as a producer of a particular kind. Tools of the trade help single out different kinds of artisan producers, for 'example. The emploYment of a hammer and lumber distinguishes carpenters, use of a loom and thread sets apart weavers, ,and possession of a forge and iron identifies blacksmiths. Different kinds of cultivators, too, are distinguished by the technical means they employ. In particular, different kinds of seed identify cultivators of different kinds of crops. Agricultural producers are also distinguished by their use of such implements as plows an? sickles. But, as a group, cultivators are especially identified by of such technical features of the land as its mineral and moisture characteristics. Regardless of the particular distinctions that separate them, and whether they are cultivators or not, all producers are, like still other kinds of individuals, attached to land in a general way. They need somewhere to live and to make a living, and so they have or must acquire a set of rights against others that gives them access to some delimited piece of These rights may, of course,' vary considerably, being encumbered with all sorts of differing obligations. Depending on the particular nature of the rights of access and of the corresponding duties, land thus surely affects a producer and his organization of production. But land as a general object of access must be distinguished from land as a technical factor of production. strictly


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.S3 speaking, technical'means are commodities that are renewable as products of a labor process. To the extent that it is an object of access, however, land is simply "not the commodity product of a particular firm and is equally not the product ofa labor process" (Levine 1977: 248). As an object of access, land thus doe's not affect production in any narrow economic way; rather, it is an object of a determined process in which constituents, including producers as well as other parties, all lay claim to property and try to secure it politically against rival claims.25 Of all .whonecessarily have a political interest in gaining access to land, agricultural producers are among those who also express a more narrow interest: they need land not only as a location for their activity but as a technical ingredient of .it. That is, they need. the arable qualities of a tract of soil, just as they need seed, plows, hoes, and other implements, as technical means of production. Because agricultural producers thus have both a general interest in the political security of their claim to a portion of territory and a narrow economic interest in its particular, renewable features, they have a special, binding attachment to land. And because such allegiance is ;. necessary if a territory is to be "peopled and settled" for any length of time, agricultural producers are often regarded as colonial producers par excellence.26 25 The distiction argued for here betweenland as a political object of access arid land as. an economic object of technical means is based on' Max Gluckman's important. but much overlooked distinction between "estates of administration" and "estatesof.production." See Gluckman (1965: 86-91). 26 See, for example, Horrist.,tho notes that the term "colony" itself "conveys the of a landed possession, wher-ein 'a,gdculture is the -..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. .. ; 54"'1 Unlike land in the sense that it is a political object of access, land'in the economic sense of being the technical of the ,soil is, in principle, renewable through the application of such labor processes as irrigation and fertilization. Land thus' has a value in respect of its technical features that varies with the costs required to' produce or improve them. Moreover, because these properties enter as technical means into the further production of crops, their value, in turn, has a significant effect in determining the value "of final agricultural products. In the European colonies of the New World, however, potential cultivators found that land \-las exce.edingly cheap. They considered colonial land as virgin territory and, in part, this meant that they took the technical features of the soil as given to them by-nature, and not as the product of any previous indigenous labor process. In other words, land technically had so little value for agricultural producers in the colonies that they practically it from their own costs of production. And in so doing, they often tended to use the land until they used it up, and then they moved on to some new frontier.27 chief occupation of the inhabitants; a colonist, in the' true meaning of the term, is essentially an agriculturist" (1904, 1: 6) 27 Besides being technically cheap, colonial land \-las also cheap in the, sense that colonists found the land to be easily accessible: native used systems of shifting cultivation and, against the onslaught of European immigrants, had difficulty defending the territory which they administered but did not physically occupy. Although Wakefield seems not to have distingui?hed the two ways in which land may be cheap, he nevertheless conveyed the value in,which the original colonists must have held New World land in his vivid descriptions of it as "waste land" (1849: passim)., See also Smith (1937: 531-533). For ways in which some colonists 'confronted the problem of soil exhaustion, see, for example, Craven (1926). : .... ..... ---...


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ '55 Leaving aside, for the moment, the expenses. that cultivators incurred t9 attract laborers, and the wider issue of how they politically secured their landed property so they could employ thetechnical. features of virgin colonial soil, there is also the question of investment in other technical means. Some colonists, like Mr. Peel, I whom Wakefield and Marx have made famous, invested quite heavily. Indeed, settlement planners often advised prospective colonists to venture sufficient technical means so they could employ specialists in tasks, or aspects of tasks, ranging from exploration and defense, to clearing and cultivation, to house construction and trade. Unfortunately for those who succumbed to such advice, the actual routine of settlement seldom gave technicaf specialists enough work to keep them busy in their particular occupations. Consequently, .the risks were great. of losing substantial investments in technical means and Mr. Peel, for \olant of laborers, lost his entire venture.28 Until they could achieve a regular return of wealth from their activity, colonial producers thus had few sound reasons to invest heavily in technical means, either as soil improvements or otherwise, and most producers, moving very cautiously, deliberately kept such investments to a minimum. This prudent opposition of colonists to the establishment. of capital in the form of technical means turned out to be, in Karl Marx' s .-.-lithe secretboth of the prosperity of the colonies and of their 28 On the plight of Mr. Peel at Swan River in Australia, see Wakefield (1834: 217-219) and (1967, 1: 766-768). Richard Pares (1960: 1, 6-11) has an excellent analysis and brief discussion of the variety of tasks required for colonization. Richard Hakluyt (1584: 165) was one of the first settlement planners to advise prospective colonists to take with them a large concentration of artisans. Morgan (1975: 85) discussed one colony in which artisans had little to keep them busy in their special occupations.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.inveterate vice" (1967, 1: 768). The colonies prospered as people settled to produce Colonists could freely enter most lines of production because they were not technologically barred from doing so. That is; they did not have to find expensive technical means. The easy access to production perhaps encouraged the somewhat grand dreams of colonists who hoped to share in a prosperity like that of EI Dorado. But easy access for one colonist implied easy access for many, eac;:h of \o/hom competed for 'his fair share. The vice of the colonies, therefore, follotoJed from their prosperity. Easy access to meant a prosperous colony, but also vicious competition among producers for markets and profits In the competitive struggles, individual dreams surely lost some of their grandeur, if they did not degenerate to nightmares. In any case, stiff competition made it extremely difficult for colonial producers to accumulate capital in sufficient amounts to improve the technical conditions of labor. When production as a whole became more concentrated and firmly established, some producers could perhaps afford rapid and continuous improvements in the technical means of labor. The value of investment in technical change relative to the value advanced in the employment of labor could then favorably affect the accumulation of wealth. But until then, the colonies prospered and suffered in the competition that took place among producers "outside the firm basis of capitalist production in the absence of technical change. II There \O/as, in other words, .' III.primitivel or 'priori a principal feature of which was '. '.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.small investments in relatively stagnant technology {Levine 1975: 52).29 Given that their expenses for technical means, such and tools, were already miniscule, individual producers. competed with one another to keep down their other costs of production. These other costs consisted mainly of the price needed to bring laborers to the production process. In any period of accumulation, the costs of labor limit the margin between costs and return on output. But in periods of primitive, or original, accumulation, labor costs are especially critical because producers cannot risk the great expense of technological improvements that are designed to reduce labor costs relative to output.30 Small investment in technical means thus confronts primitive producers \Olith a special problem. Referring to such producers in the colonies, t'lakefield identified their dilemma as the "separation and inconstancy" of laborers {1849: 179}. On the one side of this problem, laborers are "separated, II unable to afford producers'any economies of scale. Without a firm organization of technical means, producers can give laborers no opportunity to specialize and so to "combine their labor" in a single overall process. On the other side of the problem, laborers are lIinconstant" to 29 Keller held that the colonies \07ere "primitive' in a wider sense, because of the simplicity of their institutional structures in general: II [C]olonies are, at least in their beginnings, societies of relative simplicity, as yet unendowed with that accumulation of relationships, institutions, and so on, through which older human groups appear to have rendered themselves, to some -'--" extent, independent of natural conditions II (1908: 3). Leroy-Beaulieu went even further, referring to colonization as lIune transformation. d'un pays barbarell (1902, 2: 710). Periods of primitive accumUlation are sometimes identified with so-called IInatural economies,1I on which see, for example, Bradby {1975}. 30 See Levine (1975: 52).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission..L ____ __ I producers .. Because of the small cost of technical means required for entry into production, laborers do not have to .labor constantly for a living. On the contrary, they can easily afford to disappear from the labor market and become producers themselves. In the colonies, both sides of. this problem found particular expression in the chronic shortage of laborers. To attract free laborers to new settlemen.ts, producers had to pay high wages. As Adam smith observed, for example, colonial producerswere lIeager to collect laborers from all quarters and to re\Olard them with the most liberal wagesll (1937: 532). According to in the Art of Colonization, the high wages, IIwhich put the colonial laborer at his ease," existed because, II in colonies, laborers for hire are scarce. II As a matter of fact, "in every stage of his endeavors, II .the colonist met the "difficulty of inducing a number of people to combine their labor for any purpose. II So serious \Olas the problem that lithe scarcity of labor for hire" \Olas lithe universal complaint of colonies It (1849: 169-170). Colonial producers made the complaint with considerable force. The scarcity of laborers drove them, under pressure of severe i competition, to seek, ifnot.actually to adopt, measures for lowering their labor costs of production. In general, they had bl0 to the payment of high wages for scarce laborers, both of which were, as argued, "great and injurious" .(ibid.: 340) A producer could, as one option, IIdepend himself for the of .the labor which his own hands are capable of performing. II In this case I according to Wakefield, the producer submitted to "drudgery" and "degradation.1I .. -.. -...


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.'", 59 Otherwise, if a producer wanted to obtain laborers and to keep them cheaply, he had to use force to do so and thus he succumbed to a "great evil. II Having identified these tt-l0 options and the nature of the injuries they caused, Wakefield then correctly posed the crucial question: Under what circumstances were colonial producers driven to adopt the "drudgery" of laboring for themselves or the "evilll of forced labor as alternatives to the payment of high t-lages (ibid.: 174-180) .31 If producers control the prices they receive for 'their products, they may have no interest at all in possible alternatives to high wages. They may simply absorb excessive labor costs by raising the price they receive on output from merchants and direct consumers.. The price returned on output, hO\>lever, lay well beyond the control of colonial producers. In relation to merchants, for example, t-lho purchased products and then resold them in Europe, New producers held a decidedly poor bargaining position. It was a central tenet of the doctrines of mercantilism that national economic policies should aim to protect the market of favored .\,roducts and so aim to control and maintain the price of these goods foreign competition. Colonial merchant syndicates typically I .formed to cultivate these policies and the commodity price supports they implied.32 1-.nd, to a degree,. colonial producers also' depended for their .--.. 31 For a full and general understanding of the various forms of independent farming and of the different kinds of agriculture by force that arose in the American colonies, it is essential to keep in mind the broad context o'f labor scarcity in t-lhich both these types of, organization had their common origins. A number of scholars have recently reiterated this point. See Parker (1969), Curtin (1977), and Hirschman (1978: 94). 32 On "11ercantilism as a System of Protection," see Heckscher (1955, 2: 53-172). For fut:ther discussion, see, for example,'\Coleman (1969)


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.existence on nationalist efforts to control prices against foreign competition. But in the context of a protected national domain of colonies, producers seldom thrived under mercantile policies; inmost cases, those few.who prospered were also traders. Although merchants were protected, the small technical costs of most productive activities t in the colonies allowed new producers to enter the market freely and thereby to stiffen considerably the competition among producers as a whole. As additional production increased supply, stiff competition prompted a decline in the prices merchants paid to producers for their product, especially in many branches of agriculture. Tobacco planters in Barbados, for example, were completely eliminated from production competition from planters entering, the British market from Virginia. Similarly, Barbadian sugar planters later suffered in. the British Jamaican planters entered production. As they strove for a steady returnof wealth" colonial producers thus had little or no recourse to price control. Under this constraint, high wages became more than.a nuisance. The competitive !.nteraction of colonial producers in relation to merchants made ;:eduction in the costs of labor an absolute necessity. But I ;.'elat.ions with producers varied and, with that variation, the options (Jpen to producers for achieving profitable operations also Herman Me rivale one of I s early and distinguished students and critics, identified two ways in t>lhich merchants integrated colonial producers and their products into the world market. In some and Minchinton (1969). The Dutch East India Company is perhaps the best example of the trading companies that formed during this period. For an overview of the chartered trading companies in Europe, see Coornaert (1967};.. but see also Eeckscher (1955, 1: --_.-..


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission..J! settlements--the so-called farm could find "no peculiar advantages:for the production of articles ofvaluein the foreign market." It was not that farmers could find no marketfor their goods, but that. the market was small. In such narrow and competitive markets, producers could not expect a sufficient return to make it worthwhile to employ laborers. Iristead, their IIfirst impulsell was "generally to spread themselves over the country, each possession of whatever spot of fertile land he may secure, and each tilling his own. farm" {1861: 260-261}. In so-called plantation colonies, however, producers raised "staple articles .of produce for foreign markets. II And for planters, "it is obvious that the necessity for an ample supply of laborers is of a far more urgent character. II If a narrOH and competitive market for goods. impelled producers to drudgery, each tilling his own farm rather than paying high \o7ages, then a wide, expansive and no less competitive rilarket gave producers compelling reason to have IIwant of compulsory labor," to insure an ample and cheap supply of laborers by force (ibid.: 269) .33 Within the scopeof each of these general.alternatives to the payment of high wages, the value needed to employ labor in a production process was still subject to wide fluctuation. If a colonial settler produced all or part of the items required to satisfy his O\OTn needs, he would have little or no use for a fund of value to sustain his own 33 Large and small product markets were the general alternatives in which colonial production developed. But such markets could differ along dimensions other than size, with corresponding differences in production organization. Haciendas arose in Mexico, forexample, partly in response to highly irregular product markets. See .below. Chapter S. \ _._ .. -


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.62 capacity to labor. However, a producer would requlre increasingly greater funds of value to the degree that he had to purchase all or part of the goods he needed, to the degree that he had to provide directly for the needs ,of his laborers who were indentured, enslaved, or in some other way forced to work for him, or to the degree that he had to advance value to his laborers in the form of a wage. A lesser fund may have been required if a settler had his forced laborers produce all or part of the items they needed. Similarly, to the extent that wage laborers produced their own items of need, 'a producer might have some leverage to bargain down his wage fund. Finally, a settler who had to purchase necessary goods would require a lesser fund of value if the people producing those items, in turn, produced all or part of their own subsistence goods and could offer the items ata cheaper price. During a period of accumulation when capital had no firm basis, these and other fluctuations in the value needed to employ labor in a production process were "subject to historically specific factors" (Levine 1975: 56). Given assumptions about the low value that colonial producers invested in both tools and the technical features of the soil, and given assumptions about broad variations in the size of the market for crops, one can two broad classes of agricultural solution to the problem o-f acquiring cheap labor in, the, colonies'. These solutions were embodied in farms and plantations. \


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. .. ___________ .... 63 But what particular adjustments .did colonial producers in agriculture have to make to institute a version of one or the other solution? How, for example, did those who wished to farm with .theirown two hands to resist producers who tried to force them to do other work? In cases there was severe economic pressure to stop bidding up wages and to employ laborers under physical duress, how did producers successfully overcome resistence to their force?34, And further,' besides these questions concerning the various responses of producers to colonial labor shortages, there also remains the problem identified earlier but then momentarily set aside: how did colonial producers in general, and cultivators in particular, acquire and secure various kinds of access to land in the first place? From an economic point of view, the answers to a1l these questions "appear to be the9retically problematic" (Levine 1975: 56). The appropriate answers, and with them, a fuller understanding of the conditions of capital accumulation on New World plantations seems to require an appeal beyond strictly economic factors to the wider struggles for power in colonial politics. 2.3.3 The Politics of LaJ'ld and Labor in the Development of Colonial Plantations Producers and merchants, as well as Crown, military and other administrative bodies, all interacted to advance European colonial efforts in the Americas and elsewhere. The perspectives and motives of each of these various participants were not always identical and, as a 34 See Evans (1970: 862):' ,liThe essential element \olhich is required in order for a labor ,shortage to lead to the use of coerced labor is the failur'e of other ,sectors 'of the economy, those from whom the workers will be takenr'tc piotest."


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.64 result, conflicts often erupted in colonial political arenas. Religious bodies, like those in some of the Spanish colonies, for example, who were secure in their ministry to the spiritual needs of settlers, sometimes tried to extend their prerogatives and administer the 'wider concerns of the body politic.' In cases like'New England, where religious bodies already claimed wider rights of administration, they often had to struggle tenaciously against persistent assaults on their. pre-established jurisdiction. Other matters, too, were 'subjects of, considerable conflict in colonial politics, and the issues of land and labor surely ranked among the most important of these. Like all other settle,rs, producers in the European colonies had to gain access to some designated area of territory, and so they entered the political struggle to secure their individtialrights of access against the claims of other interested parties. Similarly, all colonial producers needed to obtain labor. They all needed also to obtain and secure the right to property in technical means. But because investments in technical means were relatively insignificant in value during the early periods of colonial accumulation, investments in labor carried the principal burden in the generation of profit and, given various market pressures, all colonial producers vigorously struggled in the political realm to secure the right to obtain labor-power, in the cheapest possible way, including, in many places, the right to use force on plantations. Because the two pOlitical struggles--the one for land, and the other for labor--so widely aroused the shared passions of colonial producers, the contests evidently were interrelated. Indeed, \.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.6S such well-known scholars of colonial political economy as Adam Smith and E. G. have argued for a direct causal relationship. In. their analyses of European colonization, Smith and among others, have made much of a presumed relation between the high wages that colonial producers offered to attract laborers and the availability of so-called IIcheapland" in the colonies. According to Smith, II those liberal wages, joined to the plenty and cheapness of land, soon make the laborers leave [their landlords], in order to become landlords themselves" (1937: 532). for his part, elaborated the same argument: these high wages, the laborers soon save the means of acquiring and cultivating land. In every colony, land is so cheap that emigrant laborers who save at all, are able to establish themselves as lando\omers, .working on their own account" (1849: 328). And if IIcheap land" in the colonies thus made laborers scarce, then it follows that the struggle for such land led directly to the struggle for labor in which, according to Wakefield, colonial producers tried to institute such evils as slavery, "that makeshift for hiring" (ibid.: 324).35 i 35 Those who have defended in some form the general proposition that cheap land gives rise to scarce laborers include, besides Smith and Wakefield, Herivale (1861: 260-276), Lor;i.a (1899: 2-3), (1900: 305-315, 348-350, 387-391), Leroy-Beaulieu (1902, 2: 376-380, 375-387), Thompson (1940: 219-223), Williams (1944: 4-5), Rloosterboer (1960: 1-2, 206-215), Domar (1970: 19-21), Engerman (1973: 56-65; 1977: and Mintz 1977:'257). More critical.stances have been adopted by, for example, Marx (1967, 1: 765-774), Macleod (1925: 380), Siegel (1945: Patterson' (1977b), Pryor (1977: 30-35), and Bolland (1981: 612-614). Bolland's argument is particularly noteworthy in this context, because it insists that the theoretical relationships which Smith and Wakefield originally posited to between colonial land and labor still inform.!IIany modern accounts of West Indian colonial development. Bolland's criticism of the posited relationship. but does. not refer specifically to Smith and \-lakefield, nor 'to the extensive


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.' .. ( 66 Wakefield, in particular, was so convinced of the direct causal relationship between the political conflicts between land and labor in the colonies that he proposed, in one fell swoop, to alleviate the colonial labor shortages and to eliminate the need for producers to find alternatives for the payment of high wages. Because "cheapness of land is the cause of scarcity of labor for hire,lI he reasoned that the converse was also true: "Of plentifulness of labor for hire,. the cause is dearness of land" (ibid.: 325). The colonial government, therefore, had only to "pass a law for making land dearer" {ibid.: 344). Wakefield felt sure that such a proposal would achieve an orderly, "systematic" process of colonization. Expensive land, he thought, would surely quell the turmoil brought about by excessive labor mobility. Given a high price for land, laborers would now have to work for a long time before they could earn enough to even think about buying land. By proposing to legislate an end to the colonial struggles forland, Wakefield thus attempted, as Karl Marx wryly put it, "the manufacture of wage-workers in the Colonies" (1967, 1: 766). But the plan to end thereby the colonial struggle for labor was as simplistic as imagined it would be effective.36 Wakefield's scheme was faulty in at least three ways: it was based on reasoning from an oversimplified. assumption about the identity of landholders in the colonies; it turned on an ambiguous idea of IIcheap land"; and it displayed a serious misapprehension of the nature of the theoretical literature they spawned,. in which the relationships are explicitly articulated and defended. 36 For a helpful analysis of Wakefield's theory of "systematic colonization" in the context of the theory of class,ical political economy, see Winch (1965: 73-16S). i


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.67 political struggle for access to colonial First, when he asserted, with Smith, that the cost of coloniallarid was so attractive that laborers quit the labor market to become IIlandowners,1I Wakefield clearly assumed that colonial landlords were also colonial cultivators. Thus, for example, he spoke of landlords as IIworking on their own accountl (1849:328). Undoubtedly, many colonists in the .New World did indeed leave the labor market to become at once landlord and producer. But in most social circumstances, the relationships among these kinds of roles are more complex, and the colonies proved no exception. To grasp that complexity and, with it, the nature of the connections between colonial struggles for land and labor, it is therefore essential to keep. distinct the roles of landlord, producer, and laborer. By definition, landlords control access .to land and their role is opposed to that of tenants. Producers, on the other hand, join labor to technical means, .and this function is distinct from the narrower role of laborer, who works the stock of technical means, but does not control that stock. In the colonies, although some producers were landlords, many did not control access to land and thus they had to become tenants Conversely, some landlords were not producers. They either let their I land to people who did produce, or they altogether prevented their land from being used for production by restricting it to residential or commercial purposes. In cases where a landlord was not also a producer, .he stood in no necessary relation to hired laborers, and may even have been one himself. As for the laborers, if access to land in the colonies was so cheap that it attracted their savings, they could hardly' have expected to turn around and, as landlords, suddenly find rents .'


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ .. 68 alone high enough to sustain them. And assuming that they continued to earn \-lages for a, living, then the attraction of cheap access to land did not automatically drain the labor market, and the proposition that cheap land is the cause of a scarcity of labor for hire is false. But if colonists found the wherewithal, not necessarily to become landlords, t but to become producers, then labor scarcity did follow. On the one hand, if colonists became producers and worked \-11th their own two hands, they themselves withdrew from the labor market 'and' thereby tightened the supply of laborers. On the other hand, if' they became producers and tried to hire laborers, 'they also squeezed the labor market by increasing the demand on it. Thus, it was the attraction of being a producer, not necessarily of being a landlord, that caused labor scarcity in the colonies. In because cheap technical means made entry into production relatively easy, it -. vias, strictly speaking, the expense of these means that drew laborers from the market and created the shortages in supply. Of course, technical investment in the soil was one aspect of all technical expenses; but it was not the only one. And, unless a producer cultivated the soil, it formed no expense at all. In other words, an i I expense for land was not the only cause, nor even necessarily the chief cause of labor scarcity in the colonies.37 37 Some defenders of the land/labor argument have been more sensitive to this point than others. Engerman, for example, cited the importance of considerations other than the availability of cheap land in the. decisions of colonial laborers to leav,e the labor market and to enter production: liThe basic issue is really' tha t of a potential surplus above subsistence The necessary condition would, in general,' be surplus with or without free landll (1973,: 58).,


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission..;,..----'-------_ .. -------By failing to distinguish landlords and producers, Wakefield failed to see clearly and in the most general terms, which features of which category lured laborers out of the c?lonial market. But even granting that most colonists became cultivators, and that land bulked large in their leave the labor market, Wakefield's argument on the relationship between colonial struggles for land and 69 labor contained a second, further weakness. Justifiably or not, he identified landlords and cultivators and, in so doing, he did not distinguish their different interests in land. Landlords are interested in access and, although cultivators share this interest to some extent, they are particularly interested in the technical features of the soil. Because he did not sharply distinguish these different interests, he did not separate the corresponding differences in land expense, and thus did : not specify the different ways that land may be cheap. In other words, he articulated an essentially ambiguous notion of "cheap land," and this ambiguity is the second fault in his argument. Land in the colonies was cheap in one sense because it required very little technical investment. As I indicated eatlier, colonial cultivators took the soil as virgin territory, as land in which the mineral and moisture charactedstics did not require the expenses 6f aconomic improvement, but were left to be renewed by nature. Joined with the small costs of investment in other means, the small expense required to use the technical features of the soil attracted producers \Olho then had to c;1epend almost entirely on investments in labor to make a profit in commodity markets over which they largely had no control. But technical requirements made it generally easy for


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.70 laborers and others to enter production, and as laborers thus disappeared, those who remained bid up the wage and drove producers to demand reliable alternatives for obtaining labor. Colonial producers who wanted the. right to use either self-discipline or force over others began withdrawing the offer of a wage. As a result, laborers lost their incentive to come to the colonies, and they became even more scarce and expensive. Clearly, land that was technically cheap to use was a cause of the the scarcity of labor for hire, and it had a direct bearing on the political struggles for labor. Moreover, if in such technical means as the mineral and moisture characteristics of the soil leads to a scarcity of labor, then a greater technical investment may lead to a more plentiful supply. More expensive capital requirements no doubt. make it technically more difficult for laborers and others to afford entry into production. Thus denied their.mobility, laborers less readily disappear. And as the number of laborers iricrease, wages presumably fall and producers may eventually find it more attractive to hire than to apply self-discipline or to exercise force over others. Increased technical investment and a grot-ling pool of potential laborers, however, still may not make realize the advantages of employing hired help. A purely quantitative rise in technical investment brought about, for example, by a legislated tax levy on the use of the technical features of the soil may prohibit laborers from trying to become cultivators, but it may also discourage cultivators themselves from trying to produce a crop and from employing labor in any form. Wage labor is available under contract for a limited period of


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.71 time at a specified price, and what makes the use of this form attractive is a te.chnical investment that not only grows quantitatively but that also qU,alititatively improves the production process by making a given amount,of labor more productive. To the' degree that investment, improves the technical qualities of production, to the extent, for I example, that investment in chemicals improves the fertility of the soil, producers can better afford to risk the payment of the wage; by changing the technical means, they can regulate the labor 'process so that laborers produce commodities worth more than the costs of production. Technical improvements of this kind, ho't-7ever, are primarily .improvements of economy and, although they may be encouraged by sophisticated and selective forms of political regulation, they derive primarily from the economic interaction of producers ,competing for cheap ,supplies, lucrative markets, and high profits. When Wakefield called for a "law to make land dearer," he did not speak narrowly of regulating technical investment in land; rather, he spoke of land in the second, broader sense, as an object of access, and he explicitly declared his \ofish to create, through taxation, a "hurtful impediment to the, acquisition of new land" (1849: 344; my emphasis). To be sure, the costs of access are determined politically in the bargains between, for example, tenants and landlords, and they are subject, to further political determination by the imposition of taxes and government regulation. But the costs of access to land, whether axcessively ,or, as Wakefield proposed, uniformly high, do ,not necessarily affect the scarcity or abundance of labor for hire. Assuming, for example, that laborers seek to use part of their wages to


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.,--, gain control over access to land and thus to become landlords, and assuming further that these laborers have freedom of movement, they 72 surely would have no reason to people and settle a colony where access is more expensive in relation to 'their wages than it is else\olhere. Indeed, as Marx pointed out, in specific cases where Englishmen had already made accesss to land'uniformly dear, tithe stream of emigration was only diverted from the English colonies to the United Statestl (1967, 1: 773).38 Therefore, in colonies with expensive and scarce access, just as in colonies with cheap and easy' access, producers found laborers disappearing and had reason to search politically for alternative means, of dealing with the expenses of attracting more. Because l-lakefield reasoned from an ambiguous notion of "cheap land, II he misjudged the complexity of the problem of labor in the colon,ies. As a solution to the problem, he sought politically to raise the cost of IIcheap landll and became trapped in logical dilemma,. On the one hand, he could easily increase the costs of access to territory because such expenses are directly susceptible to political determination; unfortunately for these expenses are, not, directly linked to the demand for labor. On the other hand, the amount of investment in the technical features of the soil is directly linked to the demand for labor, but it is not so easily subject to manipulation. of course, political regulation of the costs of access, to land may aid indirectly in both the growth and qualitative improvement 38 Subsequent scholars have taken Harxs point and, in studies of land and labor in particular countries and regions, now demand an analysis of the possibilities for external labor migration., Among the more recent that emphasize this point, see Domar, (1970: 18-19)" Engerman (1973: 57), and Mintz' (1977:


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.73 of technical investment in the soil. Indeed, under favorable economic circumstances, subtle regulations can certainly favor access to land by those producers most willing and best able technically to improve methods of cultivation. But to formulate such policy measures, it is necessary to realize, as Wakefield did not, that there is a fundamental t distinctionbet;"leen the expenses for gaining access to land and the expenses for technical investment in the soil, and that landlords and cultivators have different interests in land. In addition, it is necessary to distinguish the differences among cultivators who themselves participate in the regulation of access to land. Wakefield's failure to pursue fully this last distinction comprised a third defect .in his argument. Producers found access to land relatively cheap in the colonies because at least some of them organized to oppose those who wanted to Limit access, or those, like the who wanted to assess a greater tax on it. In all fairness to Wakefield, it is to his credit that he appreciated some aspects of producer organization in'respect of land. He referred, for example, to the "history of those colonies,1I as lithe history of many struggles between the dependencies and the imperial power" (1849: 260). In those struggles, he argued, lithe greediness of colonistsll for access to land was lIequal to the profusion of governments" in granting that access (ibid.: 333). He took this state of affairs as evidence for his assertions that colonial governments lIexer cised no control" and were IIcareless and corruptll (ibid.: 334; 1834: 285). But Wakefield then narrowed his focus by ignoring the ways that colonial producers' themselves interacted to constitut'e the colonial


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.r 74 governments, and he urged simplistically that those governments be stronger, shake off the presumed corrupting influences, and legislate a rise in the price of access to land.39 The greed of colonists, however, t-lhich vlakefield s strategy was meant to oppose, did not always manifest itself as an unqualified thirst for cheap access to land.4o Colonial producers, for example, had interests in the price of access that differed from place to place, and varied with their particular organizations of production. All of them no doubt entered production expecting a high return on their investments. The principal condition of their was that the application of labor could achieve a high output with little or no advance in technical means. Assuming. that producers expected a high output because of the natural fertility of the soil,-regardless of the labor investment and barring other considerations, they probably had an absolute interest in cheap access: a low price facilitated movement of producers to new, fertile soil as soon as they exhausted the old soil. And no doubt such producers worked hard politically to guarantee their mobility. But assuming that the output of agricultural production depended substantially on the application of labor and on the forms of cooperation among laborers, producers had relative interests in the price of land, and surely they struggled politically to t)leir various interests. 39 Leroy-Beaulieu (1902; 2: 380) sharply criticized the simplistic notion of colonial government underlying Wakefield's proposal. Also, see above, note 15. 40 On this point, see, for example, Herivale and Leroy-Beaulieu (1902,' 2: 376-380, 575-567).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. -, 7S Those producers who, perhaps, could not afford a large investment in labor may have been interested in maintaining access to fertile. land, and in keeping costs of such access to a minimum. But those producers who invested in intensified labor sought to protect their investments by making it relatively more difficult for potential competitors to obtain fertile land. Similarly, producers with large investments in labor found it economical to work larger plots of land and sought to establish a favorable price for large plots, as opposed to smaller ones, or they sought favorable terms for joining together smaller plots. A high cost for access to land in some places thus did not necessarily lead to the demise of "makeshifts for hiring"; instead, sometimes it actually served to protect the interests of producers who had invested in such alternative means of securing la,bor-power as the IlS'e of force. 41 In light of the foregoing analysis of Wakefield's familiar, important and often-invoked argument, it would certainly be \01rong to deny unequivocally that "cheap landll contributes to a scarcity of labor for hire; cheap investment in the technical features of the soil is surely a condition for such scarcity.42 But it can be ventured with some See, for example, Kloosterboer (1960: 214), who cites cases where expensive access to land, \07hich ,lIwas largely the result of' a deliberate land policy on the part of the governing group,1I still led to patterns of forced labor. 12 Recently, in independent studies, Orlando Patterson and Frederic Pryor both purported to demonstrate that, by itself, the relation between land and labor has little merit in explaining the development of slavery. Patterson promised to IIlay the ghost" of the supposed explanation and spoke conclusively of its' II spuriousness II (1977b: 13, 32); Pryor argued that he found "no validation whatever" for it (l977 :37). Each author argued their respective conclusions from similar statistical tests of selected .cross-cultural data, which they each coded \li th tionalized" definitions of ke-y terms. Butboth


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.76 confidence that policies concerning the ease of access to in general do not enter directly into the struggle for labor. Determined policies regarding the value of access to land do not necessarily determine the plentifulness or scarcity of labor. Nevertheless, policies established in struggles for access to land do have a bearing I on struggles for labor, if only to the extent that the of such policies helps form the social order in which producers must also seek support for various methods of acquiring and using labor pO\-ler, and of protecting their labor investments. In the colonies, therefore, various land policies figured crucially in the labor considerations of kinds of producers, but only because those policies built up a part of the ground on which producers moved to fashion a 3table and secure system of labor exaction. rn the early colonies of the New World, wealth accumulated primitively, and the characteristics of such accumulation included meager investments in technical means, a scarcity of labor for hire, and t"ough assessments of the size of the markets for produced goods. Each .'1i these economic factors were themselves determined, at least in part, by the European search for wealth in the fifteenth, sixteenth and : scholars clearly appreciated the problematic nature of defining complicated ideas for statistical study, and neither pretended to have exhausted all the relevent senses of such elemental, but richly ambiguous and polysemous notions as U land. II Careful and thorough as they tried to be, therefore, both Patterson and Pryor issued conclusions with a finaiity that was some\vhat at odds with the tentative, lIoperational" framework within \vhich they each worked. And, in a. rebuttal of Patterson's essay that might equally have applied to Pryor's article, Stanley Engerman justifiably.insisted that, quite apart from the resultsof statistical analysis, the land/labor relation posited by Hakefield and the study of slavery still cOlJldyield much "useful insightll (1977:66-67).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.77 seventeenth centuries, and by the interaction of various sources of colonial investment; in turn, these factors provided colonial producers the principal terms for deciding whether to work.for themselves or to force others to work for them. The demand for staple products led producers in the British West Indies and elsewhere to try to set up' plantations based on coerced labor. Of course, whether or not the owners and managers of these historically lIunprecedented" institutions could arouse common approval for, and, beyond that, a firm commitment to protect investments in a specific form of coercion depended on where they stood generally in relation to the wider social order, and particularly in relation to such colonial political'struggles as that for access to land. But given the social orders in which potential planters were politically articulated, it thus was the political support they mustered for their economic practices that finally determined the' of the coercive labor system they used--be it indenture, peonage, slavery, or some other form,,:,-and, ultimately, it determined the course !)f capital accumulation on their estates. Moreover, although the evidence at this stage is by no means exhaustive, my research suggests that in the British West Indies, as in the American South and Brazil, the. owners and managers of early plantations not only obtained sanctions for the various kinds,of force they needed to command bondsmen to labor within their individual' ,estates They also managed to secure a basis for executing even more extensive measures of control: during the early development of plantations and of slavery as a system of forced labor exaction, they helped shape specific policies for discouraging alternatives to \.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.-------------------_.------76 plantation production, including possible. alternatives in local arts and crafts.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.Chapter III EARLY IN THE BRITISH WEST INDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON CRAFTS AND TRADES Our chiefest sufficiency is, to apply ourselves to divers fashions. It is a being but not a life, to be tied and bound by necessity to one only course. --Montaigne, Essays, III, 3 in the earliest stages of colonization, European agricultural producers in the New World accumulated their wealth with only small. investments in largely stagnant technology. The ability of producers to generate a profit depended primarily on how effectively they could economize on the costs of labor. When the market for their products was small, they economized by laboring for themselves, and so became farmers. In other cases, when they aimed to produce staple crops for large, centralized, foreign markets, New World producers forced people to work for them, and so they became planters And provided that the owners and managers of colonial plantations had a supply of slaves and the sanctions to make such bondsmen obedient for life, they particularly applied the force of slavery to afford the labor they needed on demand. Slavery is an extreme form of political subordination based on the power of masters to compel the obedience of slaves in perpetuity. The wide establishment of coercive measures, such as slavery, for the purpose of meeting a scarcity of labor ina specific kind of agricultural precipitated deep and lasting changes in all \ 79


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.80 realms of social life in plantation colonies of the New World. Coercive labor practices especially setoff grave economic repercussions, not the least of which dramatically affected the development of local manufacturing, activity. Now, some observers of colonization have noted that, in eastern North America, the very development of regular, large, and concentrated markets for staple products tended to militate against the emergence of varied crafts and trades in plantation colonies. ,When farm products were shipped widely to small, diverse markets in Europe, the Caribbean and elsewhere, it made good economic sense not to scatter the trading, and all the allied processing and service industries in the receiving ports, but to center them in the shipping colonies and to take of, among other things, possible economies' of scale. Urban thus sprouted throughout places like New England. Trade was directed from those centers, and local manufactures thrived beside farm tultivation both to process the agriculturi:ll goods and to service the various entrepreneurs. But when large quantities of staple products began to be shipped to central destinations in Europe from plantation regions, like Virginia, it became accordingly more economical I the trade and its associated industries in the receiving ports abroad. Virginians and other southern colonists thus tended to be relatively deprived of the support of local,urban conveniences, particularly the 'development of industry in the artisan ,trades. 1 1 For detailed discussion of the general relationsbett.,.eencolonial product ,markets and urban development in eastern No'rth America, see Rothstein (1967), Price (1974), and Earle and Hoffman (1976). i 1


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. Ii I' '1 81 I: i! Plantation colonies in the British West Indies, the Guianas, and elsewhere suffered similar effects., which. can be attributed, at least in part, to the of the product markets. for plantation But the story of capital on New World plantations and of the effects of. such accumulation is, of course, much more complicated For example, the markets for agricultural products themselves were not immutable; they depended on the varied and constantly c.hanging interaction of Crown forces, merchants, various kinds of producers, other colonial settlers; and consumers both in the colonies and abroad, all of whom had differing interests and perspectives. Moreover, assuming that the processing of plantation products did tend, for good economic reasons, to gravitate abroad to the metropolitan centers of trade, and that plantation colonies thus tended to lack the. attraction of urban economic opportunities, then these colonies simply did not lure enough able-bodied settlers to form an adequate pool from \'lhich planters' could freely hire laborers to produce goods for a large lucrative export market. And joined to the general ease with which could, in any case, technically afford to enter production in the colonies on their own accounts and could thereby leave the colonial labor force, the particular unattractiveness of plantation colonies made it all the more necessary for planters to use force in their. enterprises. But, as is for example, in the cases of Virginia Barbados, the concentrated trade in staple products that almost by nature diminished employment opportunities in plantation colonies was not sufficient to lead planters directly to take most of their laborers as slaves r


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.82 Although slaves were recognized among the categories of bondsmen since the early days of colonization, the owners and managers of plantations in Virginia and Barbados initially acquired many of laborers for a fixed number of years under terms of indenture. Provided they lived long enough to take up their however, few servants desired to continue working on. the estates to which they had been bound. Those who could do so quickly struck out on their own and, if they had the means, they entered local trade as petty.merchants, or they obtained the necessary technical implements and worked hard on their own accounts as farmers producing food crops mainly for themselves, their families, and the local market, or as artisans producing locally needed craft goods. Some prospered in these ways, and even ventured to obtain servants of their own and to enter agricultural production as planters. Competing now against their former masters, they increased the supply of the staple crop and, other things being equal, drove down its price and their profits. As a result of these various developments, indenture did not l\lways prove to be a satisfactory for coercing people to labor on plantations. The owners and managers of these agricultural institutions had to replenish their labor supply when individual terms of indenture expired. Moreover, given the relative ease of entry into. plantation .produ.ction, planters faced increasingly stiff competitive pressures. Even the efforts of ex-servants and others to develop petty trade, farming, and craft lI.Ianufacturing outside plantation boundaries presented a crucial complicating factor. Such efforts helped diversify the local economy and so opened potentially attractive employment \


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.83 opportunities that could make bondsmen ,on plantations increasingly dissatisfied coerced state and more easily tempted to, seek removal of the chains that forcefully prevented them from pursuing a better life. To insure that their coerced laborers continued to work and did not flee or rebel,owners and managers of colonial plantations typically sought to institute measures that would enable them to tighten security on their estates, to stiffen punishments, to lengthen the terms of indenture and, when possible, to shift to the use of slaves, those servants for life. In addition the concern of planters to protect their estates drove them even further, to try to hinder the development of diverse activities in the wider economy outside the plantation. Colonial political realities did not ,always favor their efforts, but to the extent that they achieved any success in limiting local economic diversification, they made'life for their fellow settlers generally more and slavish in its commitment to the returns of various staple 1,;rops. In New World plantations, then, the conditioris of capital ;Jccumulation--the structure of product markets, the meager and stagnant investments in technology, the demand for coercive labor practices, and the struggles for political influence--all contributed to help limit the in the wider economy of petty trade, of small-scale agriculture, ,and of artisan manufacturing. But, just as the'nature of" the markets sought, the of crops produced, the forms of bondage' used, and the political battles joined, all differed from place to place, so too did the mechanisms by which planters restricted the wider


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.84 development of individual colonial economies. And it is to the variation in these restrictions, particularly in the British West ,Indies and in the Guianas, that I now wish to turn. In some, places, like the Dutch colonies of what now comprises the country of Guyana, the limitation was comprehensive and was achieved in response to a general propagation of diverse crafts and trades. In other places, the owners and managers of early plantations managed to exercise a more narrow restraint upon economic alternatives. In Jamaica, planters responded specifically to the lively urban economy fostered by the buccaneers, while in Barbados planters moved principally to check the rise of diversified agriculture and its associated trades ilnd crafts. 1 ,BARBADOS: THE REDUCTION OF DIVERSIFIED AGRICULTURE in 1627, two shiploads of English settlers waded ashore in l:j'arbados, an uninhabited island lying on the outer eastern perimeter of t.hl: Lesser Antilles in the Caribbean Sea. Under the employ of a, ",t?rchant syndicate that was related through one of its principals, courteen, to a large Anglo-Dutch trading house, the I to form a clearing in the Barbadian forest. Meanwhile, one of their ships proceeded to the Essequibo River on the Guiana CO!1st !Jf 5uuth America. There, from a colony that was also partly sponsored by mmilbers of the Courteen firm, the, ship1s captain, Henry Powell, obtained Q variety of seeds and a group of ArawakIndians. When Powell l"eturned to Barbados, the Indians helpfully instructed the newly-settled' Englishmen in the finer points of tropical agriculture, a service in


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.85 return for which they were. eventually reduced to slaves. 2 The Courteen firm sank about 10,000 pounds sterling into .its Barbadian venture. But before it could secure a rightful claim to the island from th.e English King, the Earl of Carlisle, a court favorite of Charles I, acted on behalf of a rival group of merchants, and acquired a proprietary patent in respect of Barbados and nearly every island in the Lesser Antilles, except Trinidad and Tobago. When Sir William Courteen protested, Charles promptly withdrew his grant from Carlisle, awarded the patent to Courteen, and even added Trinidad and Tobago to it. Then, in an act of sheer duplicity, the King again reversed himself and returned to his original grant. Carlisle accordingly appointed a Governor for his new colonies and he dispatched settlers to the islands. In Barbados, rival colonists squared off and soon raised arms against another. In London, however, Courteen and Carlisle lodged formal lippeals counter-appeals in efforts peacefully to decide the vexed question of jurisdiction. In 1629, an extra-judicial tribunal found in of Carlisle, left Courteen without redress, and so ratified a of intrigues against the first European settiers of Barbados that, in the hindsight of historian Vincent Harlow, amounted to ilbarefaced robbery" (1926: 10).3 Powell I s account of his yoyage to' the.' Essequibo is contained in Harlow (1925: 36-38). The motive for the voyage' is convincinglydeduced in. Edmundson (1901: For a sensitive analysis of the fragmentary evidence concerning the subsequent history of the Arawaks whom Powell brought to Barbados, see Handler (1969: 38-47) 3 For more details on the Carlisle-Courteen dispute and i,ts resolution, see Williamson (1926: 21-63) and Cambell (1977).


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.86 Beginning as early as 1628, Barbadian settlers sought and obtained grants of land under the Carlisle proprietorship. Apparently, a minimum of ten acres was awarded to each settler, with an additional' ten acres for each servant. Many received small awards of between thirty and fifty acres. Others, however, qualified for one hundred or more, indicating that they were sufficiently enterprising to maintain' numerous indentured servants. And in discharging a substantial debt to his merchant backers, Carlisle awarded them a free grant of 10,000 acres. By 1640, nearly all the arable land in Barbados had been distributed, and by that time also a pattern of marked inequality had at least with respect to land holdings.4 Barbadian settlers originally seized on tobacco as their principal crop. Virginia was their model, and they imagined that the colony would become, like its mainland counterpart, a plantation Golony in which planters would exploit the large tobacco market using 1:he forced labor of a body of indentured servants. Several powerful ;;gencies, however, induced the Barbadians quickly to forego complete on tobacco Under pressure, large landholders, uho had hoped to engross the trade, increasingly leased their lands to sllbtenants, many of them time-expired servants, who then produced varied crops for a wide range of markets. During the first decade of there thus emerged in Barbados a rather substantial body of farmers.' Much uncertainty about the population in Barbados at this time still exists, of course, and so one should neither exaggerate 1 On the early distribution of land, see Williamson (1926: 136), Innes (1970: 4-13), Dunn (1972: 51), Sheridan (1974: 83), and'Cambell (1977: 170-172). \. Ii n II Ii II I


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.67 the percentage of smallholdingcultivators, nor neglect the great number of bound servants in the colony. But enough is known to suggest that the opportunities for attaining agricultural prosperity were sufficiently varied and alluring that immigrants, free and bound, carne by the thousands. Although Carlisle did almost nothing to promote the. colony, Barbadian population appears to have increased roughly sevenfold in the short span of time. between 1635 and 1639.5 One of the leading pressures moving Barbadian settlers to cultivate crops other than tobacco came at the prompting of the King. Like his father, James I, Charles detested tobacco, and he abhorred. the leaf no less than any other. Charles agreed with his Privy Council that lithe great abuse of tobacco, to the great of tc)th body and courage" was "notoriousuand, throughout the thfrties, he pusistently tried to halt its production in Barbados, Virginia and '.'; lsewhere (quoted in Innes 1970: 15 ) Production continued to increase, J,;)1,Jever, and if he could not halt the spread of the weed, Charles was to make money from it. Tobacco duties filled the King's but, in respect of the taxes, Barbadian and Caribbean producers more than others, for Charles was persuaded to favor early I F()ducers in Virginia and Bermuda over latecomers elsewhere. Moreover, .i.n addition to being handicapped at customs, Barbadian planters endured. t.he reputation of producing tobacco of uniformly poor quality. In the "Iords of one colonist, local tobacco was"A Commodity of Noe Better 5 For the development of early tenant relationships in the island, see Innes (1970: 10-13). has reemphasized the significance of yeoman farmers in early Barbados (1979a: 228). See Sa He (1976) for a detailed. discussion of the general economicptomise the island from the initial attractiveness of tobacco production. And Dunn (1972: 54-55), for the early population figures. i. Ii Ii ,I Ii I: Ii Ii Ii Ii i: Ii .'-",

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., ..... : ... "' .. .. ... ;, 88 Estimation, not worth Anything, for it is wors tof all tobaccoes II (quoted in Benne t t 1965: 15 r The declining price of the leaf, which was brought about over the decade by the continually growing supply on the world market did little to sustain the confidence of Barbadian planters. After a particularly severe depression in the market during 1638, so many producers in Barbados were ready to leave the industry that the King was actually able to enforce a cessation of tobacco production in the island and in the other English Caribbees for two full years beginning in 1639.6 Although general royal opposition to the leaf, together with the .specific disabilities of Barbadian tobacco combined eventually to convince island cultivators that they should diversify production, (mother major influence that undoubtedly added to their conviction was arbitrary nature of the local proprietary government. Carlisle cared little for the welfare of his subjects except insofar as they to fill his purse. His agents dunned the colonists with great' !ligor and they often pursued their tasks with intentions of satisfying their own greed. The islanders thus came to scorn Carlisle's .rule for Us rapacity, and in Barbados, the levy of a poll tax was the most I llnportant and perhaps the IIbest hatedll of all the proprietary actions I,Harlow 1926: 16). Because it was exacted equally upon all in the colony, regardless of status, the masters had to pay the rate on their servants, and this kind of'regressive tax of course tended to discourage the use of forced laborers. It especially intimidated the 6 For further discussions of the quality of Barbadian tobacco, of its relative favor at English customs, and of the tobacco cessation, see,' Harlow 39), Williamson (1926: (1967: 360), Bridenbaugh and Bt:idenbaugh (1972: 53:-54)', and Batie'--(19'76:, 11).' 1\ d 'I I, I: I: I; I I' ,; i,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.89 poorer planters whose ability to accumulate depended most.on the economies afforded by such laborers. The colonists also had to contend with a host of other demands for fees, fines and oaths of loyalty that were .imposed without their consent and seemingly at the self-serving whimsy of the proprietor or his agents.7 In such unfavorable and uncertain political circumstances, most Barbadian cultivators dared not risk their entire investment in the use of forced laborers to plant tobacco. Some turned to different staple crops, while others sought safer, sometimes smaller and immediately less profitable outlets in which they had little or no use for forced laborers at all. For a time, the owners and managers of Barbadian plantations, who became disenchanted with tobacco production, and who turned to other large staple markets, found cotton production the most rewarding (")lternative. Like tobacco, cotton was neither complicated nor expensive \:D raise and, by 1634, lithe planters of Barbados had installed in their i whole and intact, the cotton culture as it was then known" Ulridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh 1972: 57). So many cultivators turned to ':'otton, however, that "in 1639 the extra supply forced the bottom out of t.he English market" (Batie 1976: 12). Some planters then began, raising i ginger, but the many proprietary pressures impinging on the plantations not thereby much relieved, and planters seemed destined to continue s,iitching from one staple to another. By 1640, one observer warned that "unless some New Inventions be founde oute to A Commodytie on the Inhabitants are noe wayes able to subsist" (quoted in Bennett 1965: 16-17). Even then, however, there were .budding candidates for such a 7 For more details, see Harlow (1926: 12-17, 97) and (1926: 83-95, 219). Compare Bennett (1965: 12).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.90 "New Invention, II and among the most promising were indigo and sugar Individual planters in Barbados had begun systematic production of these two crops during the mid-thirties. Both indigo and sugar, however, immediate processing at harvest to preserve their yield. Indigo leaves had to be steeped and the precipate oxidized, while cane had to be milled and the resulting juice boiled and refined to produce a crystalline substance. Because both crops thus required a substantially greater investment of technical equipment than did either tobacco, cotton or ginger. Few cultivators thus could easily afford to produce them on a commercial scale. Even with easy credit facilities, ?Dtential producers of these crops had to come to. the island already endowed with wealth. Otherwise, they had to accumulate sufficient '::ilpital during their stay in the island, for example, .. by successfully yroducing other crops that did not require such a large initial ii;:; it turned out, so many cultivators in the island shifted to indigo or ;,!Jgar after having first built a capital base in other lines of :'':Jricultural production that prospective sugar planters elsewhere were ,",tbsequently best advised to build their plantations according to this, ;'he "Barbados custom" (Bennett 1964: 59). The production of indigo in ; .; i:;:.1rbados became' especially lucrative between 1640 and 1642, when the i::dropean market suffered a severe shortage of the dye following the !:ollapse of the Spanish convoy system, which brought supplies from Guatemala. In the follo\oIing years, however, as. Barbadian planters acquired the needed skills for its production, sugar became increasingly more attractive: Spanish supplies of indigo resumed and bid down the price of the dye, while the Portuguese struggled to evict the Dutch from

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ Brazil, thereby disrupting European supplies of the sweetener and driving the Dutch to facilitate its production elsewhere, particularly in the island of Barbados. s Many cultivators thus reacted to royal pressure to diversify production 'by abandoning tobacco and moving to plant other staple products. In addition, by shifting, somewhat restlessly, from 91 one staple to another in a constant search for the highest profits, they aimed to meet and overcome the various fiscal demands of the proprietor, particularly the regressive tax policy, that tended to discourage the use of forced labor. Many other cultivators in the, however, succumbed both to royal and to proprietary measures. They abandoned tobacco production and began developing products for ftl;':rkets that were neither large nor concentrated enough to drive them to I,livest in forced labor. In particular, they began farming provision crops, including corn, cassava, plantains, and yams. After a brief of transition in 1630-1631, known as the IIstarving time ," hlrbadian farmel's began producing for the home market of the island, and by 1634, they had expanded their markets to such an extent that the i;;land was being called lIa granary of all the rest of the charybbies I isles" (quoted in Dunn 1972: 54).'3 Batie (1976) has provided the most thorough account of the market, conditions under which early Barbadian planters shifted from one. staple crop to another. But see also Innes (1970: 13-22)., See Edel (1969) for a complementary view of the forces that led Dutch merchants to promote sugar production in the West Indies. 'l See Sheridan (1974: 84). Also see Batie (1976: 8, n.25): IIFood shortages \.Jere common during the 1620s, but as tobacco prices fell settlers began raising their own eatables, and Barbados apparently' even started exporting foodstuffs to the other Caribbees." On the profusion of small peasant-like farmers during this period, see, for Ha1'1ol-1 (1-92&: ,md Sherid:m (19'74: 124).\

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 92 Had the sturdy class of yeoman farmers in Barbados develop, the island may have taken on many of the features of colonies such as those in New England. catering to a diverse supply of crops and seeking broad.outlets to dispose of them, local merchants may have grown in importance, found it necessary to establish their base of operations in the island, and mobilized the resources to promote needed manufacturing and service industries. A local shipping industry may have emerged, for example, as it did in New England, giving rise to various crafts and other attractive opportunities for budding entrepreneurs. Such developments surely would have lured workers from local plantations and made it even more difficult for planters to subsist in profitable circumstances, no matter how lucrative the staple markets may have become. Such a scenario was not to be, however, for the Earl of Carlisle died in 1636, and in the next decade the English Parliament revolted against the King. Support for a farm ll
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ proceeds to settle the Earl's many outstanding debts.. The proprietorship then was to devolve upon the Earl's son. In Barbados, the trustees seem to have continued Carlisle's pattern of rather 93 arbitrary and self-serving rule. The Barbadian Governor under Carlisle, Henry Hawley, continued his despotic administration, and the trustees appointed a Receiver General named Peter Hays who collected the poll tax and other funds due.the proprietor with such diligence that he "systematically alienated the rulers and the ruled in Barbados" (Bennett 1965: 18). Meanwhile, Carlisle'S son, the second Earl, grew quickly impatient of being excluded from the proprietorship that he considered his by right of birth. He appealed to the king to void the trusteeship h.i.s father had formed, and he took various other measures to frustrate the business of his rivals in the islands. 1 0 Unfortunately, his actions ,;,arved more to divide and weaken the proprietorship than to wrest ;:;olltrol of it for himself from the trustees. The rift within the Carlisle proprietorship was not lost on the m;merous parties interested in Barbados. The Earl of Warwick, for who ultimately wanted to settle Trinidad and Tobago, offered to p1lrchase the proprietary rights to Barbados. But before he even closed I'.he deal, he apparently went so far. as to enlist the aid of Hawley, .the B;lrbadian governor, to begin recruiting local settlers to leaye island and to open the new colonies. When the trustees discovered this intrigue, they refused the sale to warwick, and they promptly removed Hawley from office. 'Hawley thought more could be made of the divided. proprietorship, however, and in 1639, he misrepresented himself to the 10 Harlow (1926: 15-i7), Williamson (1926: 103-109) and Bennett (1965: 19-20).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ..... __ ._._--_.._------94 King and obtained a commission to supervise that year's cessation of ..... .. ,"" tobacco planting in the,islands. Bearing the King's seal, he returned to Barbados and reclaimed the office of Governor. To obtain the support of the local settlers, Hawley now played champion of democracy and summoned the colony's first elected assembly. This petty tyrant was finally removed from power in 1640, but the assembly, composed of the island's leading planters, refused to disband.11 The trustees'and the second Earl of Carlisle managed to fashion a temporary compromise in choosing Hawley's successor. The,trustees accepted Henry Hunks, Carlisle's nominee, as Governor, in return for the Earl's promise not to interrupt the trustees in the "quiet collecting and enj oying the said rents, etc., of the said island" (quoted in Bennett 1965:' 21). Carlisle, however, did not promise to leave tmtouched the basis on which the various taxes and fees were assessed, Zlnd so, through his man Hunks, he made a decisive play for the support i.1f the wealthiest inhabitants of the island, the plantation owners, 1i;{ainst the trustees. 12 In particular, he proposed a change in the principle of tax assessment, to which the planters were so opposed. hstead of a levy per poll, Hunks agreed with members of the I to resettle the proprietary tax on a per acre basis. f' !.antation owners thus managed to overturn the policy that had long
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.-----_ .............. .... ........... 9S confirm titles to their lands. Peter Hay, the Receiver General for the trustees, was quick to appreciate how severely this action challenged the authority of his employers. He tried to'pottiay the new policy as unpopular, indeed it was, but only with the large body of farmers who worked with their own two hands, without benefit of forced laborers, and in virtue of various kinds of informal tenant relationships. These farmers now had the security of their tenancies endangered, and some of them rose up and marched on the Governor, demanding that he IIchange.not o[u]r old tenure, by w[hi]ch we have paid o[u]r former Rent" (quoted in :iliid.: 27). But Hunks was willing to back up the new policy with force. He apprehended the rebels lIin a ryotous way, II and when the Receiver himself openly opposed the policy change, Hunks had him too .. up in close prisonll (quoted in ibid.: .). The forcefulness that Hunks displayed in Barbados, however, could r:ot ultimately prevent his recall to London. By 1641, the trustees had nc)t only replaced him with a new Governor, Philip Bell, they had also the tax reform that the Carlisle and Hunks had promoted in interest of the Barbadian planters. 13 Carlisle IS strategy of seeking t.lJe support of a disaffected class of island cultivators thus did not :l iford him full recognition as the proprietor i but it did provide clear of the continuing rupture between him and the truste!2s Anc:1 the direction of proprietary rule now seeming to vacillate without end, the plantation o\omners grew increasingly assured that such rule was f!O'
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. .. ----........... _-----..... ....... 96 representatives legitimately deployed in the colony's Assembly, the planters awaited only a suitable occasion for defiant action. As it turned out, an opportunity came quickly during the following year, and the planters did not hesitate to exploit it. In 1642, the Long Parliament convened in London, exercised its control of the royal purse and challenged the authority of the King. Civil War broke out and, as the King came under escalating military attack at home, his powers declined abroad. Not only was he unable, for example, to sanction the proprietary rule of Barbados, he also lost the capacity to enforce broad measures of colonial policy, including his e)'lcouragement of agricultural diversification. In Barbados, colonists thus began to take control into their own hands. With the outbreak of in England, Barbadians of a1l kinds began"refusing to pay j',mtsand taxes, and the Assembly of planters asserted that no fees c:'l,ld be imposed or' collected without its prior approval. In June of with Governor Bell's assent, the Assembly acted forma1ly to j.,. t all taxes, and then in September, again with the Governor's ;lrproval, enacted a new tax measure that placed assessments finally on il per acre basis and called for settlement of titles. 14 Having decisively overturned a policy that discouraged the use of f0tced labor and that encouraged the rise of diverse economic alternatives, and with royal calls for agricultural diversification effectively muted by civil war, the owners of Barbadian plantations favorable grounds on which.nowtoconcentrate the expansion of their estates. By 1643, they had begun such development in earnest and, 14 Bennett (1967: 368-369).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.97 with the technical assistance, cheap slaves, easy credit, and a ready market all supplied by Dutch merchants, they focused specifically on sugar.15 Competition to enter cane production was mediately brisk; and .prominent among the.contenders were the established planters of the island who had accumulated their capital from the successive CUltivation of various lesser staples. But there were also members of the English gentry, who carne to the island in flight "from the noise and oppressions of England" and now saw a lucrative opportunity for investing their wealth, and there were the numerous yeoman farmers of the island, who nov/ dreamed of participating in the rewards of plantation agriculture (Harlow 1926: 45, 29) .16 As sugar cane took root in Barbados, planters there in no way relaxed their determination to be free from the vexatious interference of the proprietor, the King, and even Parliament. By 1644, proprietary 'HIe continued to flounder. The trustees had resigned themselves to the fiscal policy that favored plantation growth and, in recognition of the dramatic changes in staple production, asked only that taxes now be Fdd in money rather than in tobacco or cotton. But Carlisle meanwhile c,:ntinued his dogged and unsuccessful search for full recognitic;m as the ., p-.)prietor. For a time. in 1645, he courted Parliament and, when that pr:wed unsuccessful in 1646, he promised personally to go to the island and assume his rightful position. For reasons that still are not fully 1!i Williamson suggested that Bell and his Council "made the advancement of prosperity their chief object," and that they identified prosperity "with the encouragement of the Dutch .traders" (1926: 159). 16 Pares (1960: 4, n. 15) emphasized that large planter's with much smaller.competitors in the .early days of sugar production. On the significance of exiled gentry among the larger planters, see Williamson (1926:-162-163), Dunn (1972: 78) and Batie (1'976:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., ---------------------,--_. 98 known, however, he never did go. In 1645, the King too tried to assert his control'over the Caribbeesand sent the Earl of Marlborough to represent him. But the Barbadian planters defied the royal authority and turned Marlborough away. And when Par.liament tried to establish its control by the Earl of Warwick as governor-in-chief and admiral of all coionies, the Barbadians were no less defiant. They insisted on a policy of neutrality and, in the words of Governor Bell, affirmed that lIif we should partake or declare ourselves on eyther side we wer undone: for against the kinge we are resolved never to be, and rtlithout the freindshipe of the perliament and free trade of London ships are not able to subsist" (quoted in Bennett 1967: 373}.17 By 1645, Barbados thus constituted virtually an independent Mtion, and sugar producers were so assured of their-position that they expanded production. One contemporary observer proclaimed of the process that lithe like Improvement was never made by any People under the Sunne" (quoted in Thornton 1956: 26). Such enthusiasm, however, did r:';t quite speak to the wrenching transformations that accompanied the f.::)rly crowning of sugar king in the island. Countless farmers and planters, for example, were "wormed out" of the colony, and, beginning I in 1546, successful planters began consolidating smaller agricultural enterprises to form larger and more efficient estates for the, production of sugar (Handler and Shelby 1976: 118, 120). Hany of the settlers lost out simply because their tenancies were temporary or yeomen farmers, however, first watched their fortunes decline as 17 For more details on the Barbadian policy of neutrality during this period, see Harlow (1926: 28-34), Williamson (1926,: 114-122, 159-"!61) and (1961: 369-377). -,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.99 'planters maneuvered, to changethe'policy of assessing rent. Then, the colony's provision trade was opened to the venturesome merchants of New England, and many of the Barbadian farmers succumbed before the low bulk prices that their competitors offered. other farmers joined small and middling planters and gambled their earnings in sugar and, when misfortune struck, they found either their neighbors eager to buy them out or their creditors all too willing to foreclose.18 The forced laborers on the plantations also suffered greatly during the ascendance of sugar in Barbados. Under Dutch influence, the and managers of local plantations had come to accept the advantages of cheap slaves over indentured laborers. Slaves were bound far life and they could be made to live more cheaply than people who their bondage only for a short period of time by the terms of an agreement. But then, in the aftermath of the English civil war, planters managed further to demean the status of laborers. Cromwell CCHlsigned thousands of convicts and prisoners of war to the island and, [0f planters to find it worthwhile to accept these new arrivals onto p1::1l1tations where laborers already worked slavishly, 'they made c::nditions even harsher. And they did so to such an extent that the threat of being "barbadosed" during that time carried the same menacing 13 Pares dates the aggregation of smaller properties into larger ones from 1646 (1960: 4, n.1S). For general discussions of the process, see Davis (1887: 80), Harlbw j06-307), Williamson (1926: 119), and Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh (1976: 21). ,On the ,insecurity ,of some tenant relations, see Innes 10) and 13-14). In Barbados, according to Sheridan, lias more and more land was planted in canes, the islanders became increasingly dependent upon outside sources, of foodstuffs, building materials 'and draft animals" (1974: 139). On the provision trade between'Barbados and New England, see-especially Harlow (1926:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission..... -._------------_._--------connotations as the promise of being "shanghied" did in a later age.19 Already by 1647, the o ... mers of plantations ,in Barbadoshad amassed truly formidable political and economic power. And' .through 'their agents in London, they now pressed Carlisle directly. to yield,the proprietorship. Carlisle made one last play for the support of the colonists. He offered grants of lands in his other Caribbean islands to the thousands of displaced settlers in Barbados. The gesture had little impact, however, for the exodus from Barbados to the other islands in the English Caribbees was already well underway. Although he apparently realized the futility of his continuing efforts, Carlisle still refused sacrifice his claims. But he did lease the proprietorship to Lord and thus left the struggle largely to another man. An ardent ftiYi.1list himself, Willoughby came to Barbados in 1650 and made some h;;:,:;dl-ray in securing the' rights of the proprietorship by appealing to the royalist sentiment in the island among the exiled gentry ar,J the captives of war. He declared Barbados for Charles II as the. its!:,'J of England. But this extreme maneuver hardly made inroads into the .. ':;;r of the Barbadian planters. When Parliament dispatched a fleet to bl:lckade the island and to reduce to obedience the colonies unde,r I H:i.lloughby' s rule, the planters acted as a moderating force and obtained 1 'IOn the dumping of convicts and prisoners in' Barbados,. see, for example, Harlow (1926: 294-299) and Sheppard (1977: 18-20).' For a more general treatment of the practice, see Smith (1947).' The peculiar relationship between penal labor and slave labor that emerged in Barbados at this. time surely helped to establish the long' tradition of harsh treatment for which planters in' the British West. Indies came to be so well kno\m. In a recent and suggestive review' article, Mintz (1979b) 'has compellingly argued for a closer. look at this relationship and its implications .. For in such a study, Beckles (1981: 8-11,14-15), who has tl:"ied to document the. joint actions of resistence taken in Barbados by Irish servants and African slaves.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.101 significant concessions from the admiral, Sir George Ayscue. In return for submitting to the authority of Parliament, the planters acquired, among other things, guarantees of continued self-government. And in the next decade, when they were dealing with the restored King, the planters were able to preserve these concessions and, in addition, to secure both a protected market in England for their sugar. and a favorable duty at customs.2D At the Restoration in 1660, the golden age of sugar in Barbados had largely passed. So, according to historian Richard Dunn, "having gained their wealth, [the planters] now set about trying to conserve itn (1972: 82). As they consolidated their power and came to rely almost ezclusively on black slaves from Africa, they appreciated the continuing dangers of labor uprising. By driving out the farmer,s they had prevented the development of alternative occupations and thus eliminated potentially attractive lure that may have spurred the slaves on to their freedom. Then, for further protection, they imported te tenants to serve in the local militia, and they took other nll:,\sures to favor the impoverished whites in the island as a buffer force against the black slaves. Still, the exodus of whites from the i!.',land continued. Those displaced farmers and failed planters who could do so looked for new opportunities. Even fabulously successful planters for additional outlets to invest their profits and to amass ,even greater wealth.21 20 For full accounts of these events, see Harlow (1926: 33-36, 44-131) and Williamson (1926: 120-134, 164-187, 198-214). Also see Dunn (1972: 79-81). 21 See, for' example, Harlow (1926: 117-118, 156-157) and Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh (1972_: 23-25). Beckles (1981: 17-19) discu'ssed the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ .. 102 After 1655, one of .the first places such migrants looked was to Jamaica, which in that year fell from Spanish control and. became the latest of England's New World colonies. But if restless settlers who cast off from Barbados had witnessed the emergence of plantation slavery on the island following the. planters' successful struggle to overturn a .policy that favored small-scale provision farming and that may eventually have given rise to more diverse crafts and trades, those who landed in Jamaica, and who there aspired to install plantations based on slave labor, had to contend with the buccaneers, whose activities not only stimulated provision farming but actually provoked the vigorous development of crafts and trades. 3.2 JAt1AICA: PLANTER OPPOSITION TO PROVISION AGRICULTURE AND URBAN ---ECONOMY England grabbed Jamaica in 1655 and held it initially as a colony of conquest. The victory enhanced no one's military reputation, however. In pursuit of Cromwell's grand "Western Design" for an American empire, AcilBlral Penn and General Venables had launched an offensive against Sp.mish-held Hispaniola. They were soundly rebuffed and, ree1irtg south.,:',. in defeat, poorly-led and ill-provisioned, the tattered remains of ,the stumbled ashore in Jamaica. Had the weary and broken soldiers been required to muster any substantial display of tactical skill, they surely would have suffered further humiliation. Instead, they met almost no resistence. Spain had regarded the island importation of military tenants and its effects, and Sheppard (1977: 27-65) analyzed some of the various'measures taken in Barbados to favor the poor whites over the slaves. Fot' a view of white privilege in Barbadian slave society from the perspective of\blatk freedmen, see Handler '(1974: 66-116).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.r' ,", 103 periphally, had settled it thinly, and had defended it lightly. The inhabitants, mostly cattle ranchers and cacao planters, and their, slaves, yielded easily before the astonished English' forces. Pushed to the mountainous interior, the Spaniards emerged periodically to conduct half-hearted guerrila actions before they were finally expelled five years later in 1660.22 The seizure, of Jamaica thus came an afterthought in a more ambitiously conceived plan of conquest. Although Cromwell chafed at riot having achieved a nobler prize, he appreciated the strategic location of ths island at the heart of the Caribbean, well within striking distance of the Spanish Main. Horeover, Jamaica was evidently as fertile as any of the plantation colonies in the Eastern Caribbean--and much larger. Cr"Illwell thus decided to make the best of his new colony, and he issued a proclamation to give lIencouragement to such as shall transport th"mselves to (quoted in Whitson 1929: 5). Because one of the fit"t steps in making the island attractive for settlement was to secure he commissioned one of General Venables I officers, Cdonel Edward D'Oyley to take command the occupied territory. Rtl j by martial law, D 'Oyley granted land to his troops and I tJi.,''.i"fI to raise much needed provisions. He judged merchant disputes, es Ulblished markets, licensed craftsmen and tradesmen, and in, ways ini.tiated regulatory measures to stabilize the new economy and to stimulate commerce. He organized a militia with his soldier-farmers at its core. 'And,' lacking naval protection from England,he enticed 22 On the conquest of Jamaica, see Taylor (1965); Also see, for example, Haring rl9io: 85-92), (1929: 1-5), 'Dunn 151-152), and Webb (1979: ,',., .' ... ,.'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.104 English buccaneers to transfer their headquarters from Tortuga to Port Royal. With D10yleyis sanction, these sea rovers continued their unrelenting attacks on the Spanish Main and, in so doing, they helped shield the fledgling colony from Spanish attempts to recover the. island. 23 By the time Charles II climbed the restored throne in England, D10yley had finally ejected the Spaniards from Jamaica, the buccaneers were firmly entrenched in Port Royal, and London-based merchants were now clamoring for decisive action to encourage the development of plantation agriculture. Charles agreed to retain control of the colony and he appointed Lord Windsor as its new governor. In addition, the King swayed to a vision in which the planting of staple .crops rested at the foundation of Jamaica I s economy and in which the duties on tlie commerce of such crops filled the royal purse. To attract planters to the new colony in the Caribbean, Charles thus generously conceeded to fott.:go taxes on grants of land in the island for a period of. seven 23 F(}f a detailed account of D10yleyis administration, see (1979: 172-210). Webb1s chronicle of early Jamaican polical history is thorough and well-researched, but it must be used Hith caution. It is part of a larger study in ... :hich the author seeks to that 'I from the beginning, English colonization "',as at least as much military as it \.Jas commercialll (ibid.: xvi). The Jamaican case is, of course \.:ell-suited to advance such a thesis for, as Hebb shows in great detail, local administrators devoted much attention, 'first, to securing the island militarily as a colony of conquest.and, later, to using it as a staging ground for raids on the Spanish l-lain. In respect both of its acquisition and of its subsequent use, however, Jamaica among the English colonies. Unfortunately Webb so far made little effoz:ot to'compare and contrast these distinctive features of Jamaica1s constitution with those in the other English colonies, particularly in the Caribbean. As a result, it is at'all established, at least in this, the first of a planned of volumes,that Jamaica did indeed fit a broader pattern in \vhich the Crown made systematic and caiculated use of military force" or the threat of such force, as. a matter of imperial policy to that colonists acquiesced to royal'prerogatives.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.years. In addition, by the terms of Windsor's commission, he made it plain that Jamaicans were to enjoy the same rights of legislative assembly that settlers exercised in other English colonies, such as Barbados and Virginia.24 By January i664, when the first Assembly convened in Jamaica, 105 plantation owners predominated among the elected representatives. They quickly asserted the power of the Assembly to enact all the laws binding on the colonists, and they brazenly challenged the King's authority even to grant tax concession, insisting instead that it was the sole right of the Assembly to levy taxes and to collect and disburse funds.25 As the planters thus mobiilzed to wriggle free of Crown control, they the action of the buccaneers and apparently agreed with the of Charles Littleton, the island's deputy. governor, who wrote lithe attempts upon the Spaniards and Privateering had let out tl\(, many ill and those that remained were in ways of thriviJ!g 11bd. by that made Peaceable and Industrious" (quoted in Webb 1979: 219). If the planters indeed shared such a complaisant attitude, however, they H(;fe not well-advised, because the buccaneers soon posed a more threat to their abilities to secure slave-based plantations th.m did the imperial asp ira tions of the King. Lord Windsor conducted a whirlwind tour as Governor Jamaica, only two months in the island before losing interest and returning home to England during 1662. Littleton acted in the office until June 1664, when Sir Thomas Modyford arrived as the new Governor. 24 Whitson (1929: 8-19), Bennett (1964: 54), Dunn (1972: 153-154), and Webb (1979: 214). 25 Whitson (1929: 23-29) and \olebb (1979: 221-223).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.106 At first, Jamaican planters must have regarded Hodyford as the ideal promote their agricultural interests. A resident an,d former governor of Barbados, he was an established planter himself and, when he came to assume his new post, he brought nearly a .thousand settlers with him. He also managed to lure planters from elsewhere, including four hundred refugees of the English colony in Suriname, which had recently fal1en to the Dutch. Uoreover, he encouraged the planters who were already in Jamaica to expand, assuring them that "planting is a happy and innocent way of thriving" (quoted in Bennett 1964: 59). Hodyford's own plantation in the island was huge, embracing nearly 10,000 acres and including four hundred slaves; altogether the Modyford family owned twenty-two tracts of land in eight parishes of the island. During his seven years in office, Modyford granted 300,000 acres of land, or triple the acreage of Barbados, and he watched the popUlation oS" the island by two hundred per cent.26 But if, in all this, Ur,;:lyford made himself the good friend of Jamaican planters, he proved by fm-ther action that he was a true al1y of the buccaneers--and his fd ;mds suffered the consequences. Modyford became notorious for his support of the buccaneers. S00n after he constructed his own superb plantation, he resolved to prl)mote privateering as Jamaica I s premier industry, and he w,,:s d"t:;rmined that no one would deter him Among his first steps, he eazily trampled the new found power of the island'sother plantation owners. He ousted them from appointed offices and instal1edmembers of 26 According to Nhitson, "was popular with the planters because. they felt he was one of themseh'es" (1929.: 36). also Dunn (1970: 58; 1972: 154-15.5)' and (1979: 227-228).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.107 his own family. Otherwise, he ruled by proclamation. He convened only one Assembly, briefly, at the end of 1664. In it, he made sure the buccaneers were well-represented. The Speaker of the Assemby was himself a buccaneering captain and, in the partisan words of a planter, a thoroughly "malicious, beggarly, debauched fellow" (quoted in Whitson 1929: 32). Whatever his true character, the Speaker directed the Assembly to revoke all previous legislation. Modyford's packed house then granted all levies raised in the colony to the King's government on the warrant of the Governor, after which it reenacted the remaining lWt.'s. Thus satisfied, Modyford disbanded the Assembly. When he left offil:e in 1671, he still had not convened another and professed that "tl,ere is no assembly in being--nor that I know urgent occasion for any" (q!.lt)ted in Webb 1979: 230)27 Having stifled the planters and secured for himself the disposal of the island I s revenue, Modyford favored the buccaneers, in part to s:;tisfy his own greed. No doubt he saw the privileges of his office--to if,:;IlE! licenses and to tax goods--as means to share in the fabulous loot tln 1: the buccaneers returned to the island from their raids. But was also genuinely concerned about the defense of Jamaica and ahG'.lt the imperial designs of his mother country. When England went to Will" in 1665 against the Dutch and the French, he commissioned, the sea rovers as privateers to patrol the island's coast, to collect military intelligence and to raid the commerce of the enemy. Moreover, by the buccaneers, .Hodyford endeavored to make Jamaica lithe SCt)l1rge of Spain II and the "center of English empire in. the Indies" {Webb 27 Whitson (1929: 32-36) and Webb (1979: 230-233).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.lOB 1979: 233). He sent Henry Morgan on a series of spectacular raids and, even as Spain and England concluded a treaty of peace, he countenanced the most sensational foray of all: the sacking of Panama at the heart of the spanish Main. Between 1664 and 1671, when Modyford was recalled to London, the buccaneers thus wildly enjoyed the heyday of their colonial influence.28 And those who prospered in their revelry were not Jamaica's planters, but its provision farmers, and the people occupied with a wide range of associated crafts and trades in the bustling new town of Port Royal. Despite the early assurances of Deputy Governor Littleton, the initial encouragement of Governor Modyford, and even a heady moment of legislative power, the Jamaican colonists who settled down to a life of staple crops for European markets with the help of forced laborers remained few in number. The shifting nature of the military th,'o:at to the island required Jamaica's leaders frequently and unpredictably to mobilize the local militia. Given their obligations to th:< defense of the island, most colonists had neither the time nor'the to supervise a labor force and to apply themselves regularly ttl the day-to-day details of operating a profitable plantation. Most th'lS were content to work on their own account. Many farmed provision crops and they depended closely on the fortunes of the who priillad the island's commerce with their stolen loot. The buccaneers traded captured prize for goods at easy rates and, among other things, demanded enormous quantities of food to stock the privateer. fleets 28 For a full description of Jamaican buccaneering under Hodyford; see Haring (1910: 120-199). Also see Whitson (1929: 30-31), Thornton (1956: 84-85, 92-95, 100-102, 108-123, 149), Bennett (1964: 58-59), Dunn (1970: 58;l972: 156), and Webb (1979: 238-249') ....

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 109 Wonderful rates of return induced the hawk-eyed New England merchants to try to muscle in on the trade in Jamaica, as they had in Barbados. But local peasant farmers held their own and thrived by the sale of their.crops in the Port Royal markets.29 The buccaneers had various other. needs besides the desire for .. provisions, however, and, based in Port Royal, they stimulated a booming development of local trades and crafts to supply those needs. When they returned from their jaunts at sea, the sailors first had to dispose of their loot. As a result, those who flourished best in Port Royal happened to be the big merchants, those engaged in international trade, who alone could afford to advance the large sums needed quickly to fence stolen prize of the buccaneers. But also thriving mightily were the and the bartenders, who fed and watered the large numbers of while they remained in port. In many ways, the town was a I dive. Life was boisterous and rowdy. Liquor was in high demand, and the tavernkeepers did such a business that, to Modyford, visitors "wondered much at the sickness of our peepIe, until they knew the strength of their drinks, but then wondered mcrr-: that they all were not dead" (quoted in Webb 1979: 240). Still, everyone squandered their wealth in the simple pleasures. Prosperous residents demanded fine goods in splendid homes. The. cabi.netmakers, the pewterers and the glaziers of the town thus all did well, as did the craftsmen--the coopers and tanniers, for example--who 29 Whitson observed the effects of military maneuvers on the ability of colonists to establish plantations (1929: 31). According to.Dunn, IImost colonistsll in Jamaica at this time 1I\-1eresubsistence farmers" (1970:55). See also Bennett (1964: 55-56) and Webb (1979: 185). Thornton (1956: 98), Pawson and Buisseret (1975: 31) and (1979: 244) all noted the development of Ne\-1 England

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.110 supplied goods needed in bulk by the sailors and the townspeople.; Doing less well perhaps, but working in greater numbers were those engaged in the dozens of lesser crafts required to outfit a locally-based fleet. of ships and to service its supporting population: the blacksmiths, the sailmakers, the masons, the cordwainers, the carpenters, the shoemakers, and the tailors, to name just a few. As a business center with a wide range of crafts and trades, Port Royal emerged to resemble a New England coastal town and, indeed, of the English towns in America by 1680, only Boston ranked larger in population.3D As Port Royal boomed, the owners of Jamaican plantations were out of the island spotlight and they looked on from the gallery with increasing distaste. They rejected the supposed benefits to the is,!.imd of the rapid economic developments. They disagreed that support for provision farming would free planters to concentrate on sugar pr,t.Iuction, that petty merchants and craftsmen added valuable enL::apreneurial talent to the colony, and that privateering stimulated in".:."Lgration. Rather, they argued, if privateering continued as the let) ..1,Lng industry, then the colony was destined for certain The pl:i.1ters observed the aggressive recruiting tactics of the buccaneers, the easy entry of people into subsistence farming, .and the many opportunities to practice crafts in Port RoyaL ,with undisguised attention'to their own interests, they contended that all these factors lured overseers and indentured laborers away from the plar.ltations, and thus left a large body of slaves who lacked proper supervision and who had increasing evidence to suppose that the 3D Dunn and Pawson and Buisseret 175-185). See also (1929: 31) and Sennett (-1964: 54-55).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.111 prospect of freedom in the local economy might merit the risk of trying to shed the' oppressive fetters of bondage. More generally, the planters asserted that unrelenting plunder by the buccaneers hampered peaceful commerce with the only Engli'shmeri but also friendly merchants of other'nations feared i'ndiscriminate privateering attacks and were reluctant to pursue a course. of trade, or if they did dare to trade they charged prohibitively high freight rates.31 As early as 1663, the English Crown acted, at least in part, on the planters' complaint that privateering made their labor force unstable. The King explicitly sanctioned the employment of the buccaneers for the naval defense of Jamaica, but only on the condition' that the privateers not be permitted to recruit their crews from among inhabitants. But the King's proviso was unenforceable and almost tot;llly ineffectual because, as historian A. P. Thornton has since obsut'ved, "where His Majesty expected these ships to recruit themselves cal! only be surmised" (1956: 82). As long as the King agreed to depend on the privateers for Jamaica's security, the planters thus found little remdy for their labor problems. But then in 1670, with a treaty of already signed between England and Spain, Morgan's wild excursion I to Panama thoroughly embarassed the King. The treaty did not' establish f01.'mal trade relations between the .two European countries, it was supposed to bring peace "beyond the line" to the Caribbean, and so it impdled the King to recognize the more general obj ection of Jamaican 31 Hodyford provided the economic defense of buccaneering. For a discussion of his argument, (1979: 244-245). For the objections of the planters, see also Thornton (1956: 58, 79), Dunn (1970: 59, 61; 1972: 150), and Pawson and Buisseret (1975: 21-22, 32).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 112 planters concerning the buccaneers: that the sea rovers disrupted the peace that was essential for normal trade relations, of any kind to With the immediate recall of Modyford to London, Charles withdrew his official sanction of the privateers, and the, planters breathed a great sigh of relief.32 But'thefreebootingspirit in Jamaica did not thereby simply dissipate. It took the planters fully twenty more years of bitter factional strife before they quashed the buccaneers, undermined the local yeoman farmers and Port Royal tradesmen, and thus established the conditions for a more satisfactory solution to the labor problems. By the end of the century, they had their control. to the wider Jamaican economy and had thereby obtnined great leverage in their attempts to protect an ever-increasing in slavery against the attractions of loc,al freedom that ah'ays threatened to spark the slaves into flight or rebellion. To take command of Jamaica from Modyford, King Charles dispatched Sir Thomas Lynch. A loyal and competent military officer, and a former pn:,,;ident of Sir Charles Littleton I s governing council in Jamaica, Lynch pu:: down the buccaneers, and he looked favorably upon the owners of the cCllr:my' s plantations. He promised them, for example, that under his fU!':! "peace and an easy government will in a short time make it a most fLmrishing Country" (quoted in Webb 1979: 256). True to word, he caned an assembly of elected representatives who, for the most part, were planters, and he insisted only that. they authorize some kind of levy to finance the administration. The planters complied and taxed not 32 For full background to the 1670 treaty between Spain and England, see Thornton (1956: 67-123)., On some of the consequences of the treaty; see Dunn (1970: 59) and Webb (1979: 1S6).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 113 their'land, but 'merchants imports. Lynch then w'orked together to fashion a legal code, during which time the Assembly gained control over its own members, ordered its own business, and otherwise became independent of the Governor in the conduct of its own internal affairs. In addition to giving them a free reign in the colony's legislation, Lynch ,in other ways also tried to protect the planters' interests. He conducted careful land surveys, issued new rights of access only to and sav.ed tracts of soil in the colony for prospective planters, that is, for those aiming to produce staple products for large, centralized, foreign markets. these various assurances of their political standing under Lynch's rule, Jamaican planters had begun confidently to follow the, "Barbados cllstom." They started out cultivating minor staples and worked grudually up to sugar, for in the words of one plantation owner, it was "no new thing nor any adventure, but a known and expe'rienced truth II that investment in cane would "make a sweet business" (quoted in 1964: 67). With the buccaneers officially out, of commission as privateers for the colony, plantation owners and managers, chiefly those CUltivating sugar, stepped up the importation of slaves, and they did so I at such a rate that, by the early 1680s, about 1500 slaves entered the colony each year.33 Although Jamaican farmers and craftsmen'had lost their principal outlets when the buccaneers were outlawed in the island, these producers, who aimed at the small, local markets for products that they could produce with their own labor, did not readily abandon the. colony. 33 Whitson (1929: 39-54), Bennett (1964: 59-60), Dunn (1972: 156-157, 16b-170). and (1979: 252-258. 262-263).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission....... _--------_ ... _._--------------_._ ....... _._ ... 114 Indeed, they and the buccaneers still retained considerable strength and their power' extended even to the royal court in London. Thus, in 1674, they watched the leading buccaneer, Henry Morgan, knighted for his exploits and returned in triumph to Jamaica as lieutenant to the newly appointed governor', Lord Vaughan. The buccaneers, the yeoman farmers, and the craftsmen were back .in business. But if, through an alliance with Morgan and the threat of a resurgence in privateering and in the diversified home market for provisions and associated trades, Vaughan was meant to bully the aggressive and increasingly planters into submission, then he failed utterly. Vaughan intensely disliked Mor9an and refused to cooperate with him. As for the planters in the Assembly, they consolidated their control under Vaughan's equivocal and now claimed for themselves all the legislative and powers of the House of Commons in England. By 1677, the Governor ha.; isolated himself from both the planter and buccaneer factions of the isbnd and, during the following year, he left his office in total fmstration.34 Meanwhile, the King resolved to tolerate no longer the insolence of the Jamaican planters. If Jamaica was to be a proper colonr, "and I a Christian Algiers ," it would have to be properly subordinated to th,:. Crown (quoted in Dunn 1970: 60); and the King supposed that to him, not to the Jamaicans, belonged the prerogatives of colonial' legislation. He thus had royalauthori ties draft for Jamaica, as they had for Ireland, an entire body of. acts, including one .law .that the King .. a permanent revenue. In 1678, the King placed the acts in the hands of 34 Whitson (1929: 54-69), Dunn (1972: 157-158) and Webb (1979: 263-215). ii 11 r Ii ii Ii I' \ I

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.115 the new governor of Jamaica, the Earl of Carlisle, and demanded that the colonial Assembly ratify them at once. Of course, by placing the. island's monies under royal control and by enacting the royally approved laws, such action implied that a further assembly would no longer be necessary and that the troublesome representatives of the planters could at last be disbanded. Carlisle himself publicly expressed reservations about the King's new hard line policy, however, and so he was less than enthusiastic about his duties when he approached the Jamaican Assembly. Moreover, the Earl was greedy and he quickly compromised his position by succumbing to the charms of the buccaneers, who plied him with shares of the loot in return for his tacit approval of their continued operations of plunder. Aware that Carlisle thus took a relaxed and self-serving view of the Governor IS responsibilities, the of planters buffeted him with denunciations of the King I s imp':'dal policy, adamantly refused to accept the acts he proffered, and evccntually used his illicit association with the buccaneers to blackmail him into advising the home government that the King could never overcome the opposition in Jamaica, and that His Majesty would do better to the legislative privileges the Assembly had earlier assumed.3s Blocked in the attempt to emasculate the Jamaican Assembly by the dou.ble-dealing of its own agent, the Crown had to concede of legislation to the colonists, and aimed now to qbtain the more narrow goal of a permanent revenue. The experience with Carlisle, however, convinced the King that he needed a Governor whom he could trust, and who enjoyed the confidence of the planters in control of the Jamaican 35 I-Ihitson (1929: 70-109), Thornton (1956: 172-178, Dunn (1972: (1979: 276-312).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.116 Assembly. He thus turned once again to the able Sir Thomas Lynch Lynch immediately warmed to the difficult task ahead of him and decided to pursue the strategy that Lord Vaughan had been unable to follow a few years earlier.: he opted to playoff the opposing parties in Jamaica against one another to the King's advantage. As the planters and the buccaneers continued to struggle for supremacy, neither wanted the power of the Assembly curtailed. But the planters were currently in control, and Lynch judged correctly that they would rather yield some ground to the King than to be altogether replaced by supporters of the buccaneers. Lynch promised favorable action towards the planters, therefore, if their representatives would agree to reserve a guaranteed sum of money for the administration of the colony for the next twenty-one years. of the evident consequences for their own claims to power, the bu:;:,;aneers bitterly opposed this proposition. But the planters were now to put down their rivals once and for all, and the Assembly passed measure. Lynch then put Morgan and his supporters out of all cOil:ll1and and annIJunced that the II little drunken, silly party of Sir Hfirtry Horgan" was now rendered harmless (quoted in Cundall 1936: 53) .36 Unfortunately for the planters, Lynch died in 1684. He had fi(lally driven them to a rapprochement with the Crown. But with the of his inspired leadership, the planters over the next five years .. watched as the power and self-confidence that they had so painstakenly accumulated over the previous fifteen years rapidly eroded. Lynch's successor, Sir Hender Molesworth, was the colony's agent for the Royal African Company, which held a monopoly on the English slave trade. 36 Whitson (1929: 106-127), Cundall (1936: 6S-70),Thornton (1956: 196-203, 207-210), and DUnn (1970: 60-61; 1972: 159).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ \ 117 In that capacity, Molesworth had frequently run afoul of the owners and managers of 'local plantations, who a good supply of slaves. at cheap, not monopoly, rates. As Governor, he did his best to regulate closely the importation of slaves and to check the smuggling trade along the coast of the island. Then, to make matters worse, Parliament doubled the sugar duty during Molesworth term in office, and this IIdrastically cut the planters' profits" (Dunn 1972: 160). Finally, the King renewed the policy of confrontation with the planters by appointing the Duke of Albemarle. A dissolute fortune hunter, Albemarle opposed the planters in the island and sought out Mor.gan and his supporters. Using the force of his position, he turned the plantation owners out of pot-Jer and installed in office representatives of the buccaneers, the farmers, and the craftsmen of the island. Stunned and appalled, the planters protested vehemently to the King, charging that Albemarle upset th:: Jamaican social order with "needy and mechanick men such as tapsters, barbers and the like" (quoted in Dunn 1972: 162) .3'7 In 1689, it was now the planters, not the buccaneers, who had the proper cOimections at Court. In one of his last gestures as King, James II cancelled AlhHrnarle's proceedings and restored the planters to power in Jamaica. William III confirmed this action, and so the Glorious Revolution in England marked the final repudiation of the buccaneering-farming-artisan alliance in Jamaica. A year earlier,. in 1688, 'Sir Henry Morgan died and' the Duke of Albemarle followed him to the grave a few months laters. Leaderless and out of favor at court, and excluded from local power, the 37 Whitson (1929: 129-131), and Dunn (1970: 61-62, 65:;'.67).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. \ 118 buccaneers abandoned Jamaica and stationed themselves in St. Dominque and the Bahamas. White provision farmers on the island also left. or became purchasing slaves and converting to' the cultivation of staple And these farmers were 'not replaced as the number of indentured servants coming to Jamaica rapidly declined. Then in 1692, the ground shook violently in Jamaica and the better part of Port Royal, the erstwhile haven of the buccaneers and the burgeoning center of the island's artisans and tradesmen, slid off the face of the earth into the surrounding sea. With that act of God, no one could doubt that sugar was now king in the At the end of the seventeenth century, Jamaican planters entered their golden age. With victory in the long and bitter conflict against the interlocking pursuits of the buccaneers, yeoman farmers, and they finally gained political ascendance in the colony and ext.mded their control beyond the immediate boundaries of their own phntations and into the wider economy. Politically, they managed to himler employment in once flourishing branches of both agriculture and mal'.ufacturing and, by dampening these opportunities 'for free persons in tho; economy, they lessened the chance that the slaves on their estates wOld.d find local freedom attractive enough to attempt to escape, one way or another, from bondage. Jamaican planters thus grew more more confident that they had greatly enhanced the security of the plantation regime of slavery. Indeed, so confident did they become that when the market for slaves was free trade, they embarked on a huge buying spree and, by 1700, Jamaican planters were importing 4000 slaves 39 Whitson (1929: 1-31-132) and Dunn (1972: 162-164,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 119 a year, nearly triple the rate just two decades earlier. When Jamaican planters obtained undisputed control of the island's government, they also began to cultivate more cordial relations with the King in turn, provided ample military support for the colony, and who protected plantation products against foreign competition. Moreover, given the huge new influx of slaves, the incidence of slave runa\Olays climbed, the dangers of wholesale slave revolt became more pronounced, and planters had to retool thoroughly their earlier procedures for keeping the swelling body of forced lab.:)rers under control. Compared to Barbados, where the ratio of blacks to \yhites was only three-to-one, in Jamaica the ratio quickly reached a stajgering eight-to-one, and there the problems of social control were compounded by the increasing number of planters who left the island for England where they retired as absentee owners. Those who managed Jcmi;ican plantations thus had to take 'extraordinary security precautions ag:: tnst slave runaways and against the threat of wholesale slave rev;Jlts. Unable to rely on a buffer force of poor whites as fully as ph',liters did in Barbados, white Jamaicans instead made more active use of poor but free blacks. In particular, they tried to pacify the maroon colonies of ex-slaves in the Jamaican hills and to enlist their aid for int(!rnal security.39 39 Dunn (1970: 74; 1972: 162-165). On the enlistment of free blacks to the Jamaican security forces, see Sio (1976: ,90-91). Patterson (1970) and Kopytoff (1'976) discussed English efforts to pacify the Jamaican maroon colonies, and to turn them against rebellious slaves. The causes and consequences of absentee ownership by planters in the Caribbean still have not been wholly assessed. But for some helpful suggestions, see, for example, Pares (1960: 34-37, 42-44), and especially Hall -< 1964) \.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 120 All these various actions, of course, prove that political restrictions on local economic diversity were not the only measures that Jamaican planters adopted to protect their agricultural investments. But once allowance is made for the additional efforts, the evidence certainly seems to'confirm that in Jamaica, as in Barbados, the active limitiation of employment opportunities in the wider economy outside the plantation, including opportunities in the crafts, provided a central element in the early efforts of plantation owners and managers to secure a stable system of production based on forced labor. And, by the time English planters joined the Dutch along the Guiana'coastduring the middle of the next century, they had grasped the point of ,wider economic control so well that they were prepared to squelch even the vaguest that their colony would benefit by the promotion of crafts and trades outside the plantation boundaries. 3.3 THE GUIANA COAST: PLANTER REJECTION OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE CRAFTS AND TRADES AltkiUgh Spain and Portugal had divided South America between them, neHher country had settled the Guiana region of the continent, which str0tched from the Amazon to the Orinocco River. Known as the Wild, Coa.;;t, Guiana was, according to Sir Walter Ralegh in 1595, "a Country that. hath yet her never. sackt, turned nor wrought!' (1595: 73), And Ralegh confidently supposed such land to be well worth taking. Explorers had spent years searching feverishly for El Dorado. The lands to the west, however, had fail,ed to yield either the legendary king, his capital city of Manoa, or his "mighty., rich and beautiful Empire" (ibid.: 4). Ralegh deduced that the elusive country of fabulous wealth

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.121 'had to lie in the hitherto unexplored hinterland of the Wild Coast, and he argued that, when found, E1 Dorado would prove to. be the formidible ally needed to turn the tide decisively Spain, and to overturn her conquest of the New World. The English and the Dutch, Spain's greatest enemies, attended Ralegh's speculations with much interest, and their excitement grew when his lieutenant, Lawrence Keymis disclosed evidence that Manoa rested, in all liklihood, at the headwaters of the Ess!quibo river." 0 The Dutch subsequently established several colonies in the region, and then they even took control of the one settlement that the English, after many false starts had finally managed to form. By 1.740, further explorations had finally convinced most Europeans that E1 (lorado did not exist after all. But by that time, Guiana had become vahlab1e for quite a different reason. It was the of prospering pkr,tation colonies, and Englishmen had begun again to look for ways to influence in the area. Francis, Lord Willoughby, of Parham, settled the English colony of Suriname in 1650. Willoughby may have had designs on the reputed kir:::.1om of El Dorado, and he certainly professed his intention to est:\blish a base from which "a strEmgh may bee easily conveyed into the bo';,,)l1s of the Spaniard at Peru" (Harlow 1925: 182). But he formed the cor'; of his colony with hopeful planters from Barbados, and in thirteen yeurs four thousand people ,including slaves, had settled into the production of staple crops on some five hundred plantations. Under the teri!!S of the Treaty of Breda, which calmed has tili tie'S tha t had broken 40 For a detailed account of the search for E1 Dorado, see Harlow (1928). See Hakluyt (1600, 7: 358-400), for Keymis' account of his voyage to i i' r. Ii 11 t, I' ,.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. 122 out in 1665, Suriname passed into Dutch hands in 1668. Planters there then repaired the destruction incurred during the war, solidified,their position, and the colony resumed its flourishing state.41 But with all of its plantations, Suriname in 1668 stood in sharp contrast to the ii ii, I' older Guianese colonies ,of the Dutch, which were located to the west between the Corentyne and Orinocco rivers, in the land that was supposed Ii Despite repeated efforts at planting, these ',Ii" Colonies remained devoted largely to the Indian trade for more than a to be the gateway to Manoa. century following their original foundation. In 1616, the first permanent Dutch colony in Guiana took shape on the Essequibo River under the able leadership of Aert Adriaansz van Apparently Groenewegen had much previous experience in the Wei;t Indies. He labored in the employ of the Anglo-putch merchant house' of lhe Courteen family, which a decade later helped settle Barbados, and wh>;:h carried salt from the great deposits of Araya, near Cumana in Vei'.;:!zuela. Soon after, he served the Spanish in the Orinoco River, wh:,t0. he learned to trade with the local Indians. When he arrived on the' Essequibo River, he acted on behalf of a company of Zeeland rne?'.:;hants formed by his old employer, Peter Courteen, and an influential butlo master I Jan de Moor. At the confluence of the Essequibo, Cuyuni and Hazaruni rivers, he established a fortified trading post. There he European knives, hardware and cloth for Indian tobacco"annatto orellana) I cac'ao, and hammocks. And evidently he turned a profit 41 Hilliamson{1923: 153-184) gave an account of colonx, in Suriname. Harlow (1925: 132-222) reprinted several pertinent manuscript sources. A useful starting point, in English, for the subsequent history of Suriname under Dutch rule is Nassy, et al. (1788). I' i: I' !:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.123 for, when the Dutch West India Company formed in 1621, de Moor and courteen sought and obtained an exclusive concession to continue their private venture Indeed, the petition of de 'Moor and Courteen must have made the colonr look exceedingly attractive. In 1624, their fellow merchants in the zeeland Chamber of the wider Company decided to create an official trading settlement on the river to parallel, though not replace, the private one, and to emulate similar trading activity, undertaken by the rival Amsterdam Chamber on the banks of the Hudson River in North America. Horeover, in 1627, still another colony of a permanent character was begun in Guiana, but further to the east on the Berbice River, and under the proprietorship of a merchant named Abraham van Pere.42 Not much is known in detail about any of these, .early colonies. But t.Oe surviving evidence of those on the Essequibo suggests that the Lmd settlement languished while Groenewegen' s blossomed. In 1632, teturns of the official Essequibo outpost were so depressed that the Wesr India Company as a whole elected to ignore Guiana and to COl\f;;-;ntrate its efforts instead on the slave trade and on sugar pro,]uction in Brazil. Zeeland refused to abandon Essequibo entirely, I and for its loyalty to the region, the Chamber continually pressed the Company for recognition of its monopoly on local and navigation. The other Chambers never officially relinquished their 42 See Edmundson (1901: 655-675) for discussion of the evidence concerning both Groenewegen's background and, more generally, the establishment of the Dutch colonies on the Essequibo. On the, foundation of the Dutch Hest India Company, and on the. rivalry between the Zeeland and Amsterdam Chamber, see Bachman (1969: 25-55, 97-109). On the items exchanged in the Indian trade, see Rodway (1891, 1: 2-3), and for the chatoter of the Berbice colony, see Rodway and Watt (18S8: 95-99), but compare Goslinga(1971:\409;,413-41S}.'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.124 rights to enter the region, but for many years they .. virtually no competition in Guiana, and it was not until 1750 that they even seriously questioned Zeeland I s pretended monopoly. As for Groenewegen I S ,settlement on the Essequibo in the 1630s, the man proved gifted in his relations with the local Indians. He cemented some of his alliances by a marrying a woman from one of the local tribes, and he tapped deeply into the Indian trading networks. These networks were well-established and probably of considerable antiquity. Through them, Groenewegen received various dyes, oils, precious woods and other valuable native products, and he spread Dutch goods and influence far intn the continent. Indeed, while the West India Company withdrew its support from the region, Groenewegen's industrious activity "kept the Sp
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.,125 Nevertheless the declining position of the Dutch in Brazil afforded Zeeland its'first real chance to shift the focus of its Guiana colonies from trade to production. Under Portuguese pressure, a .number of Dutch and Jewish planters retired from Brazil in 1651 to forma settlement on the Pomeroon river'between the Essequibo and Orinoco. Unfortunately, the Anglo-Dutch war in the follo\o1ing year cut off overseas communications and the colony perished. But then in 1655, as they despaired of retaining control in Brazil, the Dutch threw all of Guiana open to settlement. Zeeland drew up a prospectus granting political liberties and special exemptions for settlers and, in 1657, ships again ard.?ed in the Pomeroon now bearing an even, larger number of refugee planters from Brazil. The new colonists praised the quality of the so:U" planted sugar, constructed mills and, although. they complained abo;,.\: the lack of slaves, they fashioned a colony that even the English g01J'.r.nor of Suriname acknowledged was the IIgreatest of alli, the Dutch settlements in Guiana (Harlow 1925: 199). This colony also succumbed to th(; ;'avages of war, however. When a new round of Anglo-Dutch broke out in 1665, the English captured the Pomeroon and its plantations.44 By the time peace returned to the Wild Coast with the signing of the treaty of Breda in 1668, the West India Company was Essequibo was in a shambles i and private planters, ruined and despondent, moved to nearby Suriname to make a new start in relative security. By 1674, after investors refinanced the West India Company, 14 See especially Oppenheim (1907, 1909) for discussions Of these plantation settlements. But see also Rod\olay and Watt (iS88: 133-137, 167, 187-190), Burr (1897: 191-197, 215-216), Edmundson (1901: G50-651), and Goslinga (1971: 420-425). \ i: I' Ii II II II Ii \1 I. I: I: I: r Ii Ii II

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.126 the Zeeland Chamber was prepared to inject renewed vigor into its settlement on the Essequibo. But it now adamantly refused,to provide more than token support for investments in production. Instead, it made the Indian trade, which Groenewegen had done so much to foster, lithe chief source of income and the object of its most jealous care" (Burr 1897: 203). The Chamber valued the letterwood, the carap-oil, the balsam copaiba, and especially the annatto, a food dye, that it gained through the Indian trade ,and it continued to collect these goods through employees called outrunners (uitlopers). These factors, like Groene\olegen, stirred the Indians to bring their wares to the Dutch fort, and sometimes they ventured on expeditions to raise trades by carrying samp.le European goods to barter in the bush. After 1675, however, donal agents were stationed throughout the countryside in permanent pos .!;, usually along principal transportation routes. Called outlyers these postholders served to keep open the channels of They prodded and coaxed the Indians to produce desired and, with their assistance, the Cumpany fort was transformed frer.: the endpoint of Dutch trade to a higher order center supported by a fan :Jf lesser points of collection and distribution. Many of the outlyers were ruthless and avaricious men, and they often provoked more tro",lble than trade. But when they did their jobs, they helped keel" tribal peace and peeled a watchful eye for the incursion of foreigners. They thus furthered Dutch interests not only in native gooc'b, but in the security .of the country itself. 4 5 45 ROdway{1891, 1: 10-13, 41), Burr (1897: 203-20S),and Goslinga (1971: '. ".

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.127 Given the paucity of evidence, it is difficult to say for sure, but during the first fifty years of its existence, it appears that the van Pere settlement on the Berbice River followed much the same lines of development as the Zeeland colony on the Essequibo. After a slow start, by 1675, the settlers had erected a fort on the Berbice River, stationed trading posts along the Canje River, a Berbice tributary, learned to manipulate the local Indians to their own advantage, and managed even to plant some sugar on a commercial scale for export. During the Anglo-Dutch war in the mid-60s, they fared slightly better than their Essequibo colleagues: they repulsed an English attack and they struck leading blows in the successful Dutch effort to dislodge the English. captors from the Pomeroon. Yet, in the last quarter of the seventeenth cent:lry, as the colony gradually expanded and as the number of plantations rose, inadequate defense proved to be its Achilles I Heel. Frepch privateers captured the settlement in 1689 and again in 1712, and bot1; times held it for ransom. The second time, van Pere I s company refi.r.;ed to pay, ceded the colony to the captors, who then sold it to ano::ller company of Zeeland merchants. The new company lacked the means to r::build the colony, however, and, in 1720, the Berbice Association, a joint-stock company, formed to raise the needed capital and to take coni:rol of the Guiana settlement. 46 In Essequibo, too, during the 1680s and 1690s, agriculture slowly ,expanded as the Indian trade grew., Although the Zeeland Chamber of the West India Company one but Zeelanders to the region, in 1686, a few planters broke ground in the Pomeroon for the third time. 46 Rodwayand Watt (lS88: 98-100, 185-186), Rodway : 6-7, 14-15, 18, 28-31, 45-46.., 54-62, 85:-92), Goslinga (1971: 4i3, 429-430).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 128 By the end of the' century, the Chamber itself had several plantations stocked with slaves to produce sugar, and these were important enough. to have separate managers who together formed a Council of Policy for governing the .day-to-day affairs of the Colony. But here, as in Berbice, the planters suffered the woes of inadequate defense. In 1689, French privateers destroyed the Pomeroonsettlement, and no planters dared venture in that coastal area again. Not even the riverain settlements near the Company fort were safe. In 1708, the French captured the entire colony until it was ransomed; then, in the following year, they returned at will to attack and plunder the estates' of the rem?.:i.ning colonists. 47 When peace broke out in 1713 at the end of the War of theSpanish the immediate threat to the security of the Berbice and colonies diminished. But the issue of defense continued to on the colonists. The Essequibo settlers, in particular, debated abo::t whether or not they should move their fort downstream to the mouth of the river, where they could better protect both the coastal and areas. They were unwilling to take such a drastic step, hOW'.:'ler in part because the land at the estuary was completely unck/eloped and rather far removed from the present locus of settlement. But :i.n 1721, the Commander of the colony acted decisively to ,remove this obstacle. He laid out a new Company plantation in the fertile lowland near the sea, and so initiated what was to become "a slow but almost general migration towards the .coast" (Rodway 1891, 1: 66). Indeed; as CUltivation of the newly opened land began to yield attractive returns, Redway (1891, 1: 35-36,45-53)' Burr (1897: and Goslinga (1971: 427).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.129 additional planters trickled into the colony. By the mid-1730s, the settlement had grown large enough for the owners of private plantations to form a local militia. Finally, in 1739, the Commander moved his offices to one of the islands in the mouth of the Essequibo and began erecting a new fort. The Directors of the colony thus demonstrated their commitment to protect the investments of Essequibo planters. But then they went even further. They gave private planters a voice in the administration of the colony by admitting one plantation owner to the Court of Justice; a body that had earlier been added to the Council of Policy, and which to settle the conflicts that increasingly arose between free planters and the Company1s Indian agents, and among the planters themselves. l-loreover, the Directors boldly opened the Essequibo River to of all nations and granted a ten year exemption from head for everyone who took up a new plantation. Given Zee!and1s former jealous refusal to admit anyone but Zeelanders to the colony, this IIwas so novel that it amounted almost to a revolutionll (RCld',:ay 1891, 1: 104). Indeed, this dramatic change of policy quickly!;,formed Essequibo from a colony of trade to a colony of production. I What may have induced Zeeland to chart this novel course for its colony after it had resisted the temptation for so is not altogether clear. There are reports that by 1737 the Indian trade, particularly in the most valued product, annatto, had fallen off sharply. Apparently, agents made .such lucrative offers for supplies of Indian slaves, and possibly fOr assistance against militant and runaway slaves, that local tribes became IIsluggish about dye

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. ...... _--_._ ..... ...... -----130 gathering" (Burr 1897: 232). Thus, it may be that the overwhelming ..:' :':: .' ..... competition from Suriname for Indian attention drove Zeeland 'to make the Essequibo a colony of production. But whatever caused the new policy, the Chamber pursued it with a vengeance and, in some respects, with a breathtaking lack of caution. The Directors, for example, hastily called for a "great reform" of the Company's own plantations (Gravesande 1911, 2: 410). Sugar was the obj ect and, in subsequent years, everyon,e was pressed to increase its production. Company artisans were dismissed or sent to the fields, though without care to distinguish those who the declining supply of Indian trade goods, from those who maintained the Company facilities. Sugar cane thrived, but skills were lost or forgotten and, by 1769, the commander, Laurens Sterr,: van 's Gravesande, had great cause for alarm at ,the rapid det::, doration of the Company I s buildings, especially the fort. 48 Meanwhile, as news spread that Essequibo was open for settlement, col :;:nists came from Suriname, Barbados, Antigua, and elsewhere, often wit), their own supply of slaves to set up plantations. The Company welcomed them with huge individual grants of land that sometimes amou:ited to awards of two thousand acres. In addition, the Directors impr:jved the settlers participation in colony affairs. The militia was bolstered, and plantation owners now could select a body of representatives who, in turn, would nominate a fellow planter to serve 4B On the decline of the Indian trade, see Rodway (1891, 1: 131-132, 145-146). Gravesande reported in 1763, a time of widespread slave revolts in the Guianas, that lithe Indians have neglected or cut down all their dye trees" (1911, 2: 412) For more details on the' Company's "great reform" and its consequences from'.the 'point of the governor, see (ibid., 1: 282, 328-329; 2: 412, 621-622). \,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.!. -----_._---------------------131 on the Colony's Court of Justice and would advise the Court in its decisions. By 1745, planters had grasped all the best locations in Essequibo, and Gravesande, who became Commander in 1743, applied for and received permission to open up the Demerara River, nearby to the east. There too, colonists rapidly seized the choice land and set up large plantations. In 1748, Gravesande noted lithe success, far beyond all expectations, of Demerara" (1911, 1: 237). In 1750, he was appointed Director-General of the two rivers, and he returned to the Netherlands personally to deliver a comprehensive report on the progress of his employer's fledgling plantation colony.49 In his report, Gravesande applauded the success of the Essequibo and Demerara planters in advancing the settlement. Interest, he said was keen, the population was growing at a great rate, and the crops of sugar were so plentiful that much of the cane rotted in the fields bec?use producers could not assemble mills fast enough to grind it all. Gravesande did not offer all glowing praise, however. He observed the desti.tute state of the colony's lesser planters and traders,' and he attn.outed their plight to regulations of the parent company, panlcularly with respect to shipping rates, that worked to the unfair advantage of the big sugar planters. He urged his superiors to redress this imbalance, but then went on in a far sighted set of recommendations to that the West India Company ultimately could not afford to favor the interests of a single group of planters. Noting that success often breeds complaisance, he suggested that "through rooted habit" the owners of local sugar plantations IIstrongly cling to their old waysll, and that 1'3 Rod'..:ay (lS91, 1: 105-134, 138-139) (1911,1: 204-205,' 211, 218). For full te:-tt of the report, see (ipid., 1: 252-276).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 132 really there were lIamong them no industrious and enterprising persons" (1911, 1: 262). He thus argued that. his superiors should support.the cultivation of other staple crops, as cotton, coffee, and tobacco. In addition, Gravesande strongly urged the Company to take advantage of the numerous other' resources of the country. He advised the Directors, for example, to encourage cattle-ranching, to promote the shipbuilding with Guiana hardwoods, and to stimulate the crafts needed to process local. drugs and wares. Gravesande's vision for the colony awakened the long dormant interest of many members of the parent company. The Amsterdam Chamber, which until now had found little use for the Wild Coast and had yielded control of it largely to the rival Zeeland Chamber, became particularly excited. Members of the Zeeland Chamber, however, naturally viewed this sUQd,m interest as an infringement on its prerogatives, and there erupted, within the Company as a whole, a bitter dispute over colonial judsdiction that lasted for nearly twenty years. During this time, of Gravesande I s recommendations escaped the withering effects of the and only a few were implemented. Meanwhile, the Comm::mder's report, supposedly submitted in confidence, found its way back to Essequibo and Demerara. The major sugar planters were annoyed wit.}, Gravesande I s support for manufacture and trade, and they, were particularly incensed at the implication that their own efforts in production were somehow not sufficiently industrious for the continued prosperity of the colony. In Gravesande's own words, these colonists ridiculed his report II in every possible' way in order to provoke general hatred towards me" (1911, 1: 283). Receiving from his \. 1 I .. ...

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.-_ .. _----. -----_ .. _-_._-._----133 superiors, who were themselves quarrelling and internally divided, and seeing that limy suggestions did not meet' with the same favor as before" in the colony, the Commander rapidly abandoned his position: "I preferred to give way and no longer interfere in those matters II (1911, 2: 429). Instead, while the West India Company tried to resolve its internecine struggle, Gravesande becames careless about shipping produce to Zeeland, he overlooked the illegal smuggling of slaves into the colony, and in other ways he lent the power of his office to protect ,the interests of the powerful sugar planters, of whom he now considered' himself one. 50 With equal vigor, the the owners and managers of plantations in Berbice also joined together to block even the merest hint of a rise in man)) facture and minor trades outside their domains. -In 1730, the, Berh;ke Association entered an agreement with the West India Company to keep the colony supplied with slaves. Plantations rapidly multiplied and, in 1738, the colony I s directors and planters entertained an from the Moravian Brethren to minister to the slaves. They admitted several missionaries, but soon discovered that, the Brethren received no salary and instead practiced handicrafts to earn r thei r living. Evidently, the missionaries did their best to teach the to lIobey their masters in all things II (Rodway 1891, 1: ,16'4) But they still earned the deep suspicion of the owners and managers of local plantations who feared that artisan activity might invest the slaves with undue confidence about, their ability to leave the estates and work independently. The planters thus adamantly refused frequent pleas 50 See Redway (1891, 1:'135-138,146,221-224,230-233) and Gravesande, (1911, 1: 299;2:561, 573, 582-533, 594,631,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.i from the missionaries for special privileges to enlarge their. work. Then, during the 1750s and 1760s, the colonists of Berbice received a number of requests from Jewish. merchants to inhabit the colony 50me obviously meant to set up plantations and they were welcomed. But 134 others, who were destitute and apparently desirous only of plying petty trades, were repeatedly and resolutely turned away.51 50 thoroughly did the planters of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo limit the development of alternatives which might have lured the slaves out of their control that, for over forty years, they refused, even for administrative purposes, to layout urban areas where artisan and trad,t!smen might possibly congregate. Thus in 1782, when plans for a capital in Demerara were finally announced, the proclamation noted that is perhaps the only instance of a European colony, among thousEmds thrr.:1.lghout the world, which has arrived at some magnificence without the est'ii;;lishment of either town or village" (Rodway 1891, 2: 7). And if the planters I fear of crafts and trades in the wider economy was enough to llinder urban development in Guiana, it could not help but also alter the Dutch relations with the local Indians. As planters accumulated wea.1th and their plantations became well-entrenched, the Indian trade upon which the Dutch had originally founded their settlements was not entirely curtailed. But slaves increasingly rebelled against.the.harsh 51 For an account of developments in Berbice, see Rodway (1891, 1: 91-99,153-170) According to Rod\olay, poor Jews were also denied in Demerara be.cause II they had no knowledge of planting and could only be traders, an.d very poor ones too, going about among the negroes and colored people, and inducing them to pilfer from the planters. II In short, II they \.:ere quite useless in an agricultural settlement" and "\"ould only become a burden to the colonyll (ibid.: 248) Fo.r. more background on the Horavian missions, 'and for a brief discussion of Hora\t:an activities in nearby SUrinaiTl.e, see Danker (1971: 13-75); see FurLey (1965; 1968) and (196Sa).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.., 135 conditions of intensified plantation production, and Company postholders in the bush'now were expected, in addition to their previous responsibili ties, to watch for slave deserters. and to enlist the aid of Indians in tracking them down. As early as 1743, Company agents officially rewarded local tribes for the capturing or killing runaway slaves. In Berbice, roving bands of Indians were instrumentalin suppressing the great slave rebellion of and, during 1767, Gravesande dispatched an eager squad of Caribs to attack and destroy a palisaded encampment of escaped slaves in Demerara. Given such action, the local tribes soon became less the trading partners of the Dutch and more the allies of the planters against deserted slaves, and a formal Systl:ffi of annual presents from the Guiana colonies to the local chiefs eventually came to sustain this alliance. 52 But even the assistance of neighboring Indian.s was not enough to SUPI;i-ess the plantation uprisings. Slaves in the three river colonies of G!;iana were among the most rebellious in the Americas--by one est.;,;;,.lte, slaves in these colonies averaged one major revolt every two yea) ;;-from 1731 to 1823. And surely not all of the factors that contributed to this restiveness were subject to Indian influence. what most emboldened the siaves in the three river colonies was undcqbtedly the deep national divisions among the European therl\5elves. When Zeeland opened the colonies, English planters flooded the (;ountry. By 1760, Gravesande reported that Englishmen constituted S2 Rodway (1891, 1: 159-160, 197-198, 207-208; 1896: 15-16) and Gravesande (1911, 1: 206-207, 287; 2: 424, 430, 438,.440n, 561-563, 573, 575-577). A detailed chronicle of events'during the Berbice Rebellion may be found in Hartsinck (1958-60) For the SUbsequent history of the system of Indian presents" se,eMenezes (1977: 44-72). '.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.136 the majority of settlers resident in Demerara; and by 1813, according to Rawle Farley, IIBritish capital and British subjects bore a proportion of nineteen in twenty to the Dutch" in all of the .three rivers (1955a: 56). Meanwhile, during the era of international wars that lasted from 1780 to 1815, the colonies swung back and ,forth between and English control and, as they did, the growing number of English planters increasingly chilled at the' thought that if they did not lose their investments to the Dutch, they would certainly lose them to the They thus mounted an intense campaign for a quick and favorable settlement of the question of national control. Finally, in 1814, Bri tain acquired the colonies, and so the land that originally exc'i ted the English imagination in the time of Ralegh, but that had since been held by the Dutch, passed into the firm clutches of the British empire. 53 In 1600, Guiana had offered perhaps the last best hope for the disc::I'lery of Hanoa, the imagined site of unparallelled riches, the city of rt Dorado. But, by the late eighteenth century, the land on the Berb Demerara and Essequibo rivers was instead contributing, mightily I to the spread of the plantation, that historically lIunprecedented" insti.tution for the production of New World agricultural commodities. As in Barbados, and Jamaica, planters on these rivers accumulated their wealth primitively. They started with the smallest possible investments in technical means and, a scarcity of labor for hire, and large 53 Genovese (1979: 33-35) counted the slave revolts. On the gro\dng English majority, se'e Rod\.Jay (1891, 1: 222, 230-231') and Gravesande (1911, 2: 379). Farley (1955a) recounted in detail, the, transfer of the three iivers-to British rule under planter :,'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.137 centralized, foreign product markets, they forced laborers to work for them. In particular, they purchased slaves and, used their'labor in the production of staple crops 'for export. On plantations in early stages of accumulation, planters did not always rely on slavery as the principal form of labor exaction. The economic conditions under which early colonial plantersexisted--the limited technical means, the labor scarcity, the large product markets--impelled them to seek laborers by force. But whether or not they could resort to slavery, to indenture, or to some other means of force ultimately depended on political considerations, on where planters stOCIU in relation to' other settlers and to the mother country, and on the kinds of political support they could expect to obtain for their coerr:ions in specific colonial settings. Slavery was undoubtedly the harshest form of coercion, and eve; this institution cast its dark shadow in the colonial world of Americas, slaves, by definition, had to obey their for lifo-'or else attempt somehow to escape or revolt. Assuming there was a ready supply of such bondsmen, the owners and managers of plantations who '.'!anted to put them to work thus needed, to begin, the 1 sanetions of force that would enable them, to make slaves do as they were told for as long as they lived. Even quite considerable inve,stments in fore" I however, were always ,at great risk as 10ne;1 as slaves found it at ,all to resist planter authority. So, in order'to make the peculiar institution more secure, more enduring and perhaps some\.;hat cheaper to maintain, planters also sought to parlay essential political support for th'e application of force into such a deep and loyal

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.138 political commitment to slavery that slaves would despair of ever giving the options 'offlight or rebellion much chance of success. And in Barbados, Jamaica, and the three river colonies of Guiana, pla?ters tried to implement this broader political strategy, at least partially, by extending their'control beyond the domain of their own plantations, and into the wider local economy, where they variously made the prospect of economic freedom for the slaves as dismal as possible. They discouraged peasant agriculture that might have fostered diverse crafts and trades, they fought those, like the buccaneers, who did spawn such occupations, and they squashed general proposals for the development of. alternative employment. In colonies where slaves found allies among the maroons, and whel,; planters had to contend with internal divisions among themselves by the passions of European rivalries, such actions could nevrr wholly suppress the will of slaves to resist planter oppression. And if, by obtaining a broad commitment to the peculiar institution fro.!: supporters in the wider society, planters did discourage slaves fleeing the plantation or from rising in rebellion, these parUcular actions did not quite address the possibility that S!laves I could also engage in subtler forms of resistence, including what one scholar has dubbed "subversive accomodation" (Hintz 1974b: 61.). Still, whatp.ver immediate effects planters thus may have had on the political will of their slaves, wherever they tried to enhance of plantation slavery and did.sospecifically by obtaining control over the wider local economy, one consequence has been almost certain: theycut a wide and lasting swath from the growth of local economic diversity.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.Chapter IV, THE BASIS OF AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST INDIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTISANRY Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute authority, and, on the other unlimited obedience. --Rousseau, The Social Contract, If Slavery. II Given what can only be called at this stage a preliminary survey of the available evidence, there is apparently good and ample reason to suppose that capital accumulation on plantations in the British West Indies, and in the Guianas, systematically diminished the extent of local economic diversity, and particularly enfeebled artisan manufacturing. The very structure of the product market for staple crops generally favored the devdopment of many processing trades and crafts, not on New World plantations, but in the central receiving ports of Europe. And when the arose for the growth of petty trade, of peasant farming I and of crafts in the colonies outside plantation boundaries, the owners and managers of individual estates typically joined their common and endeavored politically to drain the wider local economies of these and other diverse employment opportunities. In the absence of sufficient capital to invest in changing technology, plantation owners and managers in the Caribbean area I as depended heavily for their profits on coercive J.abor 'practices. Thus, they sought anxiously to suppress any developments, such as the growth of independent artisan trades, that might have 139 -. .. -" ;. '. :

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.140 emboldened their bondsmen to seek freedom either by flight or rebellion. Indeed, so intensely did planters in Barbados, Jamaica, and the Guiana colonies try to crush alternative branches of trade and industry during the earliest and most difficult stages of capital accumulation that it is no wonder that anthropologist Raymond Smith would have been moved to remark generally on the region's "peculiar impoverishment of local culture, with its almost complete absence of arts [and] crafts" (1967: 231), Such broad assertions, however, require careful qualification. all, one needs to observe the considerable variation both in the conditions under which planters in the Caribbean area acted to manj,:)ulate the wider local economies ,. and in. the corresponding effects of fll.ilnter responses to those conditions. Although plantation owners and ,:lanagers in Barbados, Jamaica, and the Guianas all acted to suppress alt()1. native activities, the efforts of those in Essequibo and Demerara, for ':;tample, were so effective that a town was not incorporated,even for ,idministratlve purposes, until more than thirty years after local platl\,ations began to expand in earnest By contrast, farming and crafts outs the plantation became firmly entrenched in Jamaica almost I after the colony became an English possession. As a result, Jam", i:an planters had a more difficult time altering the wider economy to s'"rit their needs and, by 1700, the control they had finally acquired still was far from secure. In addition to noting these crucial variations, on at least two other points, one must also qualify the general argument that capital accumulation on New World pla'ntations led to the ac'tive suppression of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.141 artisan manufacturing. First, the sweeping actions of plantation owners and managers to limit local economic. diversity did not totally eliminate the market for manufactured goods; their efforts only reduced product demands to the very limited needs that existed on their own plantations and thus were almost completely under their own control. However, the ways in which plantation owners in the British West Indies and British Guiana responded to these limited product demands sometimes produced quite unexpected consequences for the development of local forms of artisanry. Indeed, bondsmen and ex-bondsmen in some of these colonies faced the prospect of making an independent living in a potentially more diverse economic environment. Second, when planters lost support for coercive labor practices, such as slavery--and they did by different means in different places at diff:':rent times--they lost important measures of control both over their lab;::.;, force, and over the wider local economy. Rapid changes in the polLical climate of the British empire.and in the world sugar market bet'd'!l'!n 1830 and 1880, for example, prompted plantation owners and in Barbados, Jamaica, and. Bri tish Guiana to begin rec()[\Stituting their businesses on a slighly altered foundation.1 Many in these places did go out of production in the process but, whelV;'Jer possible, others began to concentrate their capital .by it in changing technology. The gradual shift in emphasis on West Indian plantations accumulation to concentration. continued to depress the local markets for manufactured goods, at least initially., 1 Else\,Ihere, of course, more radical changes occurred. Thus the republic.of Haiti appeared in 1803 after slaves violently overthrew the plantation regime. In that former French colony, white planters succumbed to the -successful revolution. and all but disappeared.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 142 but here again the effects varied widely. In this chapter, I expand each of these two points in turn. As I do, I continue to apply some of the more relevant. arguments that have p.merged in the highly developed debate concerning the effects of plantation agriculture on manufacturing in the antebellum American south. I want to reiterate, however, that our knowledge about similar effects in the British West Indies (including British Guiana) is still so limited that the assertions which follow must be regarded as tentative, not definitive. I invoke the regional comparison only to help generate plausible hypotheses and to help stimulate more thorough invftstigations about the lesser-known conditions in the British Caribbean. Any final statement on the subject, of course, will ult:l.mately have to account for the significant differences that separate South from the British plantation colonies in the West Inch And among these differences one will undoubtedly have to the much higher ratio of blacks to whites in the West Indian cohHies, the fewer number there of native-born slaves, and the much size of individual plantations. 4.1 FROH SLAVERY TO EHANCIPATION: THE MARKET FOR GOODS LimL ted needs for manufactured goods appeared from various sources within the domains of New World planters. For the most part,. the economy of shipping crops, such as tobacco, cotton and. sugar, to large centralized foreign markets for processing and resale severely curtailed the various processing trades and crafts. Still, the. estates needed routine maintenance, their cultivations required cheap implements, and

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.' 143 some of their crops had to receive at least some preliminary processing. So, simply to conduct 'the essentials of their businesses, planters regularly demanded the products of some assorted tradesmen, including carpenters, blacksmiths, sugar boilers, and so on. Moreover, planters and bondsmen all required consumer goods. As they profited from their estates, planters often desired conspicuous. luxury items. But the demand, say, for a richly custom-tailored suit, or for a finely crafted piece of furniture made to accompany a specific decor was highly individualized. In any case, it had a strictly limited effect in stimulating manufacturing because wealthy planters formed only a small proportion of the total population of any plantation' colony. As for the most populous segment of such colonies, the slaves, their demands too were limited in effect, though for .. a different reason. Because lithe employer of slaves has absolute power over his workmen, II planters controlled what was needed lito maintain the slaves in health and 5 trength" (Cairnes 1862: 38-39). Indeed, according to Edgar Thompson, IIplantation agriculture may be described as military agriculturell because lithe planter possesses power not only over the laborer's job, but also over his home, his recreation, and his daily relations with others" (1940: 217). By their power as masters, planters thus could forcibly keep their bondsmen lIat a lower level of existencell than other people (Parker 1969: 134). They could reject the demands of slaves for many manufactured goods and restrict their demands for other items to the cheapest kinds available.2 2 According to ,Genovese, IIplantation slavery. so limited the pur'chasing power of the Souththat it could not sustain much industryll.{1967:. 173}. He maintained that IIplanters rieeded .increased S.outhern manufacturing, but only for certain purposes" (ibid.'": 165), and he

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ .. 144 In plantation colonies that depended on a system of slavery, and particularly in places like Guiana where planters dampened opportunities for development in the wider economy, the demand for various kinds of manufactured goods thus was strictly limited, though not absent, and planters controlled such demand, though by different means, at each of its principal sources.3 To satisfy the operating requirements of their plantations, and to meet their own consumer needs and those of their slaves, planters could, of course, try to buy their tools, hire the assorted tradesmen, and purchase both the luxuries and the humbler of personal furnishings. But in addition to seeking supplies on the npen market, planters always retained still another option. As mast.ers, they could readily command some of their slaves to train in craft. skills and thereby to take over the business of supplying at least a of the various needs for manufactured goods that sprouted within the boundaries of the plantations. In other words, if concer%:!. for the security of the peculiar institution drove planters in some' to impair employment opportunities outside their domains, then conf. for the inherent powers of slavery everywhere afforded them the ability of retreating from the open market to a state of their particular needs for agricultural implements for lUKuries for themselves (170), and for cheap articles .for their slaves (1.ll5-166). See 'also Parker (1970: 117), who emphasized the control th:lt planters exerted under slavery over the disposition of total income; and see Bateman and \'leiss, who have suggested that such a peculiar structure of demand implied the existence not'of a single limited market, but of' "a series of smaller, localized markets" composed of the limited needs of individual planters (1981: 155). 3 Stanley Engerman has suggested that planters"used their leveragell to keep nonagricultul-al activities "restricted to\.:hat they could control" (1978: 157). Although made originally with reference to planters in the southern .United States, this assertion applies equally to the West Indian planters.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.145 relative self-sufficiency.4 And whether individual planters actually made such a' retreat or not, the potential, of doing. so inevitably placed a distinctive on the ways that free producers organized to supply needed goods in slave-based plantation colonies.s On one the open market for manufactured goods comprised the free artisans and businesses that supplied the New World planters and their estates; on the other side, the demand side, the market consisted of the multitude of plantations. Because the demand on each individual plantation was strictly limited, free producers of manufactured goods cou11 only expand by incorporating a number of plantations in the market they supplied, and the most enterprising producers, of course, tended to subSl1me the estates of an entire colony and, indeed, of several colonies, The well-known result logically followed that New World plantHs had to import a goodly number of their necessities from 6 In some cases, and for certain kinds of products, suppliers of manuf.actured goods did establish narrower markets and remain within the 4 Sen I for example, Hall (1962: 308): IICompared with the other li'-'I!stock, and even moreso with the tools and buildings and of the estate, slaves were useful in many ways and, consequentlyi, highly desirable.1I See ,also Pinchbeck (1926: 11-14, 26-27, 32-36, Hullin (1972: 10-12, 87), Genovese and Fox-Genovese (1979: 16, 20). 5 Set! I for example, the argument of Anderson and Gallman (1977: 45): "What differentiated the South from the other regions of the country. was not so much the structure of demand as the means by whichthe demand was supplied. Southern organizatio'n permitted, a much narrower scope to local and exchange, based on specialization at the level of the enterprise. II 6 Imports included not only luxury items for the, planters, but also the mass-produced articles for the slaves. See, for example; the comments of Genovese (1967: 24), Parker (1970: 117,.120), (1970: 129-130, Genovese'and Fox-Genovese (1979: 20),. and Bateman and Weiss (1981: 37-41, 49-69)', ..

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.146 realm of a particular colony. But these producers tended to monopolize the supply of their products. Potential competitors well-appreciated that the composition of a given' market could quickly shrink if any planters found it necessary or convenient to become self-sufficient, and so they hesitated to risk joining in the production. And without the stimulus of competition, existing producers tended to stagnate.' Thus, insofar as planters participated in the wider economy, their demands for manufactured goods either helped stimulate production abroad, or it provided narrow and parochial markets for local producers, who monopolized sales and who had little opportunity or incentive to 'expand and develop Neither the emergence of fragile monopolies within the plantation COlCHl tes, nor the development of production abroad conflicted with the aims of those planters in some places, who sought to secure the regime of slavery by restricting the growth of employment opportunities outside the of the plantation and its immediate requirements. Indeed, depel'J1ing at least in part on the power of planters to retreat to a position of relative self-sufficiency, these responses to the quite speci fie and limited needs. for various manufactured goods on colonial i estat:;s added little, if any, diversity to local economies. Comp:quently, they gave little cause for alarm that bondsmen might find local economic freedom attractive enough .to flee or revolt But the ability of planters to become more self-sufficient hinged on their decisions, as to compel their bondsmen not only to labor in the production of the staple crop,' but also to service' some of the .' I especially ,Bateman and Weiss (1981: 143-156).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.accumulated needs within the estates. And, ironically, to the extent that the'y exercised their very power as slaveholders in this way,' planters did not always preserve the security of their regime, but at times actually made ,it more vulnerable. 147 To practice some form of self-sufficiency, planters had to distribute various economic roles among their bondsmen. Given such a promotion of internal differentiation within the plantation, especially in parts of the British West Indies, slaves began to contribute not only to the demand of certain goods, but also to their supply. It became possible for them to provide for themselves and, if did not thus find the means-to secure their liberation, then at least they became better, conditioned to a key aspect of free social life, and better able to raise their demand for previously restricted mate,rial goods. Moreover, in the British West Indies, when the force of bonchge finally fell at Emancipation, the needs of the ex-slaves exp{ii)ded still further under pressure of the relatively high wages they now on the plantations, and the local market for manufactured goo(L; began to demonstrate its potential for internal growth and opmen t 4.1.1 Planter Self-Sufficiency and Liberalization of the Slave ,Regime In of their accumulated wealth, their political stances, their agricultural savvy, their lines of credit, and merchant conn<'!ctions, the owners and managers of West Indian plantations differed enough among themselves so that they all did not always, or equally, find it necessary to use their otom slaves to supply goods Ileeded

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ 1. 148 within the boundaries of the plantation. Some plantation owners, for example, were exceedingly wealthy, or drew on ample credit facilities, and could easily afford to depend 'almost wholly upon the open market. others found reasons for participating in the market whether it was advantageous for them to do so or not. Considerations of status often prompted plantation owners or managers to purchase prestigious goods, such as fine furniture, from the metropolis, regardless of the expense that they incurred, and despite the'ability of their own slaves to produce comparable items. Moreover, in places like Jamaica and Barbados, where economic polides had restricted opportunities for freemen, and where black greatly outnumbered free whites, colonial legislators went so far as t:l prohibit planters from employing their slaves in certain crafts on the l;lantation. By reserving these occupations legally for white arti.':;J.ns, they meant to encourage a greater settlement of whites in the colc,rty, and thus to halt the rapid and politically dangerous tilt of rad ::l.1 imbalanca. 8 Still, these and other various considerations to the contrary notwithstanding, most plantation owners and managers in the West Indies and Guiana did try, at some time and to some to become more self-sufficient, and those who did commonly responded to one or more of at least three powerful motives. After the flurry of intense activity that was required' initially to set up a new plantation, the process of cultivating a staple crop for export took on its own rhythms, just like any other form of agriculture. The use of force; particularly the force of slavery, 8 Dunn (1972: 242-243). ....

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.149 always assured planters an adequate number of laborers during the most difficult seasons, such as the harvest. Indeed, slaves were assumed by definition to b.e a kind of permanent fixture on plantations and, in this sense, they always represented a' ready economic asset. But what about the times of the. year when the cultivation was not so pressing, and the slaves' labor became agriculturally redundant? Busy in the production of staple crops or not, they still had to be maintained. And, from the planters' point of view, periods of easy idleness in the rhythms of staple crop production not only drained exper!sive resources for provisions and wasted potentially valuable labor, but also provided ample opportunity for slaves to share their disc{)!ltents, and to incubate and hatch plots of rebellion. It thus often made good political sense for plantation owner.s and managers to. keep their slaves as busy as possible throughout the year I and good ecor ... :mic sense to maximize the return of ready labor by keeping them in other forms of employment on the estate, especially in those jobr that could supply goods, which othenTise had to be purchased. '3 But, again, because of varying circumstances; not all planters who o;med slaves necessarily appreciated the economic and political r adva:!tages of "keeping all hands occupied at alltimes" (Genovese 1967:. 49). Nor, of course, did those who developed such an apprec;ation alway;; direct their slaves from the strictly agricultural tasks of staple crop production to activities that would make the plantation C) Mintz (1974a: 74) and.Craton (1974: 127). Also see, for example, Green {1973: 449} and Hard (1978: 201). Though made. with reference to the U.S. South,a. full and useful treatment of this aspect of plantation self-sufficiency is contained in Anderson and Gallman (1977};but compare Stavisky (1920: 196;: 185-.186) and jernegan (1920: 225-2.47,239). \.'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 150 economically more self-sufficient. For the owners and managers of plantations ,to focus specifically on the economies of subsistence production, many needed the added pressure of stiffened competition in the markets they sold their staple products, and one persistent and vexing source of competition regularly emerged on the colonial frontiers, including those within .already settled plantation colonies and at the foundations of new ones. Fledgling planters in frontier areas usually reaped the benefits of rich, virgin soil and offered plentiful supplies of staple crops on the market at less than customary prices. As a result, prices for plantation products tended to fall over the long term, and the owners and managers of older plantations had to struggle constantly to keep their estates in line with fresh competition. Sometimes, they adjusted merel.y by intensifying the output of labor 'drawn from their slaves. But incn:,:\sed competition for depressed product markets also frequently requ3,red attention to the various operating expenses of the estates .. "A share of the factors of production was thus diverted to maintain the !,J:lhabitants" on plantations in the older colonies of the West Indies such :\5 Barbados, while in new and rapidly expanding colonies I Brit:hih Guiana, a large part of the income from exports "was taken up for the purchase of imported plantation supplies" (Levy 1959:. 332,). 10 But if pressures from competitive producers still did not impel plantation owners and managers to fall back to a relative position of autat'ky in the midst of an. export economy, then perhaps only an 10 See also Hintz and Hall (1960: 12). Genovese hasadvanced'a.similar. argument c,oncerning regional differences in the U.S. South (1970: 146; 1974: 389-390); see also Genovese and Fox-Genovese (1979: 10, 17, 20).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.151 uncertain supply of manufactures and other needed goods on the open market could finally persuade them. War, and the threat of it, undoubtedly contributed most to the indeterminacy of supply markets in plantation colonies, and it especially ai'fected imported supplies. In a long period of rapid international expansion. to the New World that was marked by frequent hostility and conflict, the American Revolution, for example, severely disrupted the subsistence leg of .the so-called Triangular Trade to the West Indies. And later, when war between England and France continued to disorganize Atlantic shipping, legislators in plantation colonies, such as Jamaica, formally resolved to give every encouragement to the local production of food crops, and the and managers of individual plantations typically made wider use of their own slaves and became more self-sufficient in both agrkultural and manufactured provisions. 11 For one or more of several reasons, then, plantation owners and in the West Indies depended on their bondsmen to supply various goor)'; and services needed on their estates: planters acted to keep theJ,;-slaves busy, to cut costs in the face of stiff competition in the where they offered their own products for sale, and to, I with vagaries in the markets that provided the various supplies they them':;elves needed. But just as various considerations COUld. figure in thej.r motives, so too individual planters actually moved toward along routes that varied in coverage from time totime and place to place. In British West Indies alone, the variation was 11 Parry ,(1954: 33-34}. See also, for example, Davy'{1854: 127}, Mathieson (1926: ?O-?l), Bennett (1958: 93-94), Mintz and Hall {1960: 3}, and Hall (1962: 314).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 152 extensive and complex, and here I can' only outline the principal features of such variation before turning toa few of the more relevant implica tions. When the owners and managers of plantations in the British West, Indies tried approach a position of autarky on the estates,' they either made use of the skills that slaves already possessed, or they endeavored to train their slaves to produce some of the manufactured goods that were essential for the production of the staple crop. Slaves brought many skills with them from Africa, and there is some evidence that in Nevis, Antigua and Jamaica they practiced African pottery techniques to turn out the vesselS that planters needed to boil down cane juice to sugar; on the Codrington estates in Barbados, however, slav:::$ appearently learned and used European techniques of pottery-making. In addition, on other plantations like the Worthy Park in Jamaica, managers found that they could obtain considerable savings in time and money, if they had slave blacksmiths to fashion neeckd hinges and nails, ,special tools, replacement parts for machinery in U,e mills and boiling houses, and even the shackles needed to restj'ain or punish recalcitrant bondsmen. Well-managed and ecpnomical estates also saved much by acquiring skilled enough to make the needed ,to transport sugar to its foreign markets.12 As plantation owners and managers in newer 'colonies, such as in Guiana, quickly learned, the opportunities to enjoy a economy in the provision of needed crafts thus were 12 Bddenbaugh and Bridenbaugh (1972: 302), Handler (1963a: 130-139; 1964), (1972; 1973), Bennett (1958: and Craton (1978: 229, 232)-.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ \ 153 numerous, and West Indian planters on the expanding frontier of sugar production brought skilled slaves from' the older islands to train local bondsmen not only as potters, blacksmiths, and coopers, but also as carpenters, bricklayers, millrights, and so on. Moreover, whenever plantation managers imparted craft skills to their slaves, some of the trades proved especially adaptable and promised to fulfill needs beyond those directly connected to the prosecution of plantation business. Responsible for simple buildings to shelter machinery for the sugar mills, slave carpenters, for example, could also be directed to erect humble abodes for their fellow slaves ,and trained to fashion the luxurious mansions for their masters, complete with louvered windoiols, bannistered stairways and decorated porches. 13 In other words, owners and managers could also make their' estates autarkic in of their own consumer needs and those of their slaves. As a resu}!., the catalog of slave craftsmen on West Indian plantations often was ,:;{tensive, and could include, in addition to those already menli'med, bakers ,cobblers coppersmiths, millers, plasters, seam" ':resses, tailors, thatchers, and weavers, among still others. 14 But the c0mpulsion by which planters directed their slaves to supp+y some I need;:.:! consumer goods, including certain craft items and especially arti{:les of food, did not always consist of the straightforward application of force that one might expect in a system of bondage where 13 Bolingbroke (1807: 211), Brathwaite (1971: 235-236), and Craton (1978: 227-228). See Handler (1963a; 139-147), for another example of the transfer of skills from the prosecution of plantation businesi to the.production of consumer items. 14 See (1971: 154-155, 160-161), Goveia (1965:131-141), (1976: 37j,and Patterson (1967: 59).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 154 masters exacted unlimited obedience from their slaves. Some West Indian planters, it is true, integrated.the production of food, craft items, and other provisions directly into' the regular, supervised activity of the estate. Plantation managers in Barbados, for example, who assumed responsibility for food production, commonly reserved a portion of land and adapted the harsh discipline of the slave regime to supply provisions in common for 'a later distribution, which they strictly controlled. Slaves of such masters thus worked under the whip to produce goods that \Olere meant to enter their bellies and their homes, just as they labored to cultivate the staple crop that entered the \'iorld market. The resulting produce was rarely enough to maintain slaw:s in an adequate state of health, however, and plantation managers who i:ook such an exacting route toward self-sufficiency often permitted slav';", to raise fowl, to maintain a kitchen garden near their houses, to maml{,lcture minor items, and to do all these things on their own time. In t.;; i.s way, the slaves could supplement the consumer goods allocated to them from within the estate. In addition, plantation managers in these colo:iies also permitted their bondsmen to take whatever surplus they accumulate and trade it in the local market. Slaves took I advantage of such opportunities to act on their own, and they fueled local markets with locally-produced provisions, including the craft needed by their fellow bondsmen, and by planters and other freemen. Indeed, by '1806, one observer "in Barbados reported that lithe' markets of the island depend almost wholly on this mode of. supply" {Pinckard 1806, 1: 370).15 15 See also (ibid.: 287, 368), (1958: 22-24, 37-39,.93-94, 101), Handler (1971: and Levy (1980: 9-10).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.155 In colonies, however, where land was given over to the staple crop less entirely than it was in such islands as Barbados, owners and managers of West,Indian plantations went still further in making slaves: responsible for the supply of certain needed consumer goods. By refusing to buy food and manufactured provisions in bulk on the market, they too forced slaves to produce such items themselves. But rather than to supervise closely the main provisioning activities then to alloy! the slaves to supplement the products on their own, they found it useful and convenient--apparently from the earliest days of settlment--to induce their slaves to provide the bulk of their provisions on their own time. They allocated unused parcels of land, usually in the hilly or less fertile sections ,of the estates, and they set aside the evenings and part of the weekends to give bondsmen time to go tt: their fields. There, slaves produced food and craft materials for domestic use. But eventually, they also acquired the rights to m;!,rket their produce and to inherit both the use of the provision land and whatever proceeds may have accumulated therefrom. 16 It is well-documented that this approach to plantation self',mfficiency, based on the efforts of planters to induce their, slav% voluntarily to grow or manufacture most of the goods the bondsmen flourished well in Jamaica. Of course, if they had sufficient access to suitable land, the owners and managers of plantations elesewhere--some in Demerara, for example--adopteda similar strategy. See M'Donnell (1825: 149-150) and Rodt-lay (1891, 2: 42-43). 16 The classic here I of course, is Hall (1960). But also see, for-example, Mathieson (1926: 71-73), Par-ry (1955), Hall (1959: 19; 1962: 314)" Patterson (1967: 216-230), and Aufhauser-63).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.i --------------,---------------_. ------. elsewhere also adopted a similar strategy. And when they did,. their slaves invariably invested great energy in the production and sale .of provision goods and thus. demonstrated a great passion for 156 "money-making. U Indeed, in the colonies of Guiana, for example ,there is good evidence that slaves on at least some estates had lias much ground as they choose to till" and "often half a day and sometimes a day" for independent work (MIDonnell 1825: 159) ithat "seasoned negroes keep fowl, pigs, goats and grow garden stuff," while the tradesmen among them lIemploy their spare time in making those articles of their several trades which they can sell to advantage II (Bolingbroke 1807: 112) i that the '.ieekly markets were lIentirely supplied with ground provisions and feathered stock from the private allotments of the slaves" (Rodway 1891, 2: 100) i and that bondsmen acquired rights of inheritance whereby "one old ;,ioman is reported to have died with fifteen hundred dollars, which was distributed among her children II (ibid.). In general, then, whenever slaveholding planters tried to establish a more self-sufficient estate, they diverted some of their from toiling on the staple crop in the fields. Whether they moved the slaves into the production of goods needed for the further i prosecution of plantation business, or into the production ofconsurner items I it fo11o\>1s that the plantation owners and managers prom9teda wider division of roles among the bondsmen and made .the members of the plantation population functionally more interdependent. The.divisions of labor among field, artisan, and domestic slaves for purposes of running the master1s estate and producing the staple crop are well known and, no doubt, in many cases, slaves also became sufficiently differentiated.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.157 and mutually dependent enough in of their own needs, that they could well have existed freely outside the control of the But, it must be. remembered, the implication that the development of autarky meant a slave regime, if not liberated slaves, followed only from certain particular ways that plantation owners and managers channelled slave labor toward a goal of plantation setf-sufficiency. Thus, when a West Indian planter specifically required his slaves on their own time to supplement their allocations of food and provisions, or to provide a major portion of these consumer goods, he not only fostered a greater interdependence. From the standpoint of the such a planter actually eased the burden of slavery: he gave them the opportunity to afford a better diet, to acquire a small income, to a sense of proprietorship, and to accumulate a patrimony dese rving of heirs. Within a system of bondage, then, that was noted for harsh and debilitating, West Indian slaves derived; from at one pattern of plantation self-sufficiency some liberal incentives to Uve, to work, and even to reproduce. Yet to the plantation owner or any bondsmen who WOUld. labor industriously without expensive supervision on their own time to provide some or most of their needs I thoroughly to accept a stake in the peculiar institution: they freed the owner or manager to concentrate the force of his authority in areas of social life, and so they effectively contributed to their own continued bondage. Indeed, because bondsmen drew tangible benefits while apparently also yielding control, they seemed to ally with the planter in "a happy coalition of interests" to perpetuate the 17 See, for example, Brathwaite (1971: 152-159), Goveia (1965: 131-142), and Patterson 57-65).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.158 institution of slavery, albeit a somewhat liberalized one {Edwards 1793, 2: 131).18 The such.a coalition became especially significant for owners and managers of plantations in the British West Indies after 1807, when the slave trade ended. under mounting religious and humanitarian pressure against slavery, and without a cheap supply of slaves, planters could no longer work their bondsmen to death as they pleased, and then simply buy new ones. Instead, they had to demonstrate to their opponents that slavery could have its alleviations, that as masters they could encourage their slaves to work with vigor, while presetving their health and inducing in them the desire to reproduce. Many plantation owners and managers in the West Indies found that they tely served these purposes, and approached their primary goal of plantation self-sufficiency as well, by giving their slaves the opportunity to supply voluntarily at least part of their own needs. But for planters in these circumstances to reach what they regarded as the best f;ossible outcome--a genuine coalition with their slaves to preserve and fl'i:1intain a somewhat ameliorated institution of bondage.--they had to cemer,t a truly wide "breach" in the slave regime (Lepkowski 1968" 1: 59), nnd one that was caused by nothing less than the very efforts they made to make their estates more autarkic. As Sidney Mintz has perstlasively argued, when slaves produced food and craft items on their o'm time for themselves and others, they worked "without supervision," they organized in "groups of their own choosing, II .and they made 18 Pinckard (1806, 1: 368), Rod,."ay (1891, 2: 293), Mathieson (1926: 73-74), Farley (1954: 88-89i 1964: 54-55), Benneti t195a: 91, 95-96; 111, 136), Mint: ind Hall (1960: 11-12), and Hintz (1964a: 251-253).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.159 calculations--what to produce and how much--that "nourished their own sense of autonomy." All these actions Uran entirely counter to the whole conception of how the slave mode of production was supposed to operate," with .the result being that, acr'oss the gap between their ideal and the reality of' pla'ntation slavery that had emerged, the owners and managers of West Indian plantations truly confronted the worst possibility: that their slaves had been able "to transform what had begun as a coercive form into something else" (Mintz 1978: 93-94) .19 Plantation ot-mers and managers undoubtedly had great difficulty forming a genuine coalition with their slaves and, equally, by satisfying some of their own needs. on their own time, West Indian boncl;men may not have been able to liberate themselves fully from the comp;.Jlsions of slavery. But the contributions that slaves thus made to plard:ation self-sufficiency implied at least that they enjoyed the bend.its of a somewhat looser regime of bondage. More specifically, it meanl that they could gain valuable experience in farming, craft and marketing.2o Indeed, many slaves actually accumulated a 19 were, of course, other "breaches" in the ways that the system of plantation slavery vIas supposed to work. Some of these II have already mentioned. Despite their interest in stifling the growth of ill" tisan trades in the wider economies, for example, plariters sl'Illletimes encouraged the immigration of white artisans to help. control a racially imbalanced sqciety. Free! slaves and free coloreds in the West Indian plantation col6nies also put a dent in the planters' ideal of slavery by 'vigorously plying various trades and crafts, 'particularly in such urban areas as Bridgetown, Kingston, and Georgetown. (see Handler 1974, Hall 1972 and Farley 1955b). Although these developments are certainly germane, limitations of .... space prevent me from fully integrating them irito the present argument. for further discussion of the so:-called "peasant breach," compare Mintz (1977: 261 and n.36; 1979a: 226, 240-241)' and (1962: 314-315). 20 These activities were vital for the successful of bondsmen to free peasant Hie. But under a slave regime, subsistence

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.160 monetary profit by their experience in producing certain items and in disposing freely of the produce on local markets. The process did not make them rich by any standard, but as their wealth grew under an autarkic slave regime moving toward Emancipation, so too did their demands, and reports are numerous in the literature that refer to the steady expansion of slaves I buying pO\07er. With their accumulated earnings, according to an observer in the Guiana colony of Demerara, they particularly developed a taste fo!, the "luxuries" and lIextravagancies" of life (1-11 Donnell 1825: 163). Of course, these labels applied only by comparison to the cheap and simple goods that were the slaves I usual fare. Nevertheless, they always covered manufactured. gooc1=:, and included, for example, what that same observer in Guiana described as "clothing of the best description" (ibid.: 165) .21 4.1. ";; The Expansion of Local Needs at Emancipation FOrIi"d in Guiana and elsewhere in the British West Indies under the strj i; t control of slaveholding planters, the market for manufactured thus first expanded under the influence of a particular approach to pLantation autarky. That pattern of self-sufficiency greatly I tempr:red some of the harsh realities of the slave regime and, by 1838, production and marketing, although unsupervised, still were ultimately subject to the command of the master, and so they qualified the slaves only as members of an emergent category, which rlintz has designated as the "proto-peasantry" (1961: 34; 1974a: 151-152). See also Parry (1954: 35), Farley (1954: 88-89; 1964: 54-55), Hintz (1958: 49), Mintz and Hall (1960: 9, 18, 23),' and Handler (1971: 84-86). 21 See also, for example, Bolingbroke (1807: 51, 113), Mathieson (1926: 73), Bennett (1958: 104-105), r'lintz and Hall (1960: 17), and Brathwaite (1971: 232-234).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.161 when slavery in the British colonies was finally abolished the ability of bondsmen to profit on their own time from the production and sale of food and handicraft items had already well elevated the level of local consumer demand. As the ex-slaves then took on the privileges and responsibilities of freedom .. and particularly as they consumed the wages that plantation owners and managers now had to pay for labor, their supply of goods and their corresponding demands did not alter much in character, but it received fresh impetus and continued to grow. According to Mintz and Hall, who referred specifically to circumstances in ,1amaica: !lAfter Emancipation, many new markets would appear and the scope of economic activity open to the freedmen would be much increased. But Emancipation, insofar as marketing and cultivation practices were widened opportunities and increased alternatives; apparently it eHd not change their nature substantially" (1960:). Freedom for West Indian slaves in 1838 of course meant that they no Ivnger had to submit before another class of men and women with unl:i :nited obedience. Instead, they could set about constructing their own communities. Some observers suggested that they did so If\<.'rely by mimicking the behavior of their former masters.. the I woro, of one planter in Demerara, lithe negroes at once assumed, as much as p:):3sible, the manners of the white man" (Landowner 1853: 14) But more subtle and less explicitly racist investigators revealed that ,whether or not the. freed men and women imitated whites, they now married, educated their children, prayed to their gods, organized for better working conditions I their own internal political affairs, participated in seasorialfetes, and the countless

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ \ 162 other tasks of community-building all with a mounting sense of public respectability, which often was viciously denied them during slavery. Thus an Anglican bishop remarked as early as 1839 that "I have b.een much struck, as I passed from parish to parish [in. British Guiana], with the appearance of the people, with the respectability of their dres's, and with the quietness and propriety of their demeanor II (quoted in Schomburgk 1840: 139). And as they lived up to the various aspects of their new life of freedom, the ex-slaves undoubtedly expanded their economic needs, not only for respectable attire, but also for foodstuffs, buildings, furnishings, and recreational materials.22 But just as freedom opened the bondsmen to the possibility of leadi,ng a respectable life, it also meant that the plantation owners and manently earned by the ex-slaves. And if, before Emancipation, without any I,:ages and solely on the basis of earnings from subsistence procb;tion and sales, slaves had managed to expand their demands for I vad:iUs goods, then this shift of income after freedom greatly enlarged the lJUying power of the ex-slave population as a whole,. and particularly of those who returned to work for wages on the plantation, while 22 See also the remarks ofa leading merchant, whom a colonial office quoted on the condition and prospects of British Guiana: IIFor some time after emancipation, up to,' I may say, 1845 laboring classes ... evinced an eagerness for articles of improved comfort, and a desire to appear respectable (Great Britain 1851: 14; emphisis in original). See also, for example, Marshall 254, 260), Dalton (1855, 1: 437), Farley (1964: 58), Green' (1969:'42), and Rodney (1979: 265-286)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 163 continuing to produce and sell provisions. Indeed, joined with the widened need for' goods to lead a fitting and respectable life, it was the relatively high level of wages on plantations that was largely responsible for the further expansion of local markets in the West Indies following 1838, and for the increase of local economic activity. 23 Ex-slaves, particularly in such West Indian colonies as Jamaica and E'ritish Guiana responded vigorously to the "rising taste and culture" of their fellows after Emancipation (Lewis 1936: 12). Widened expectations, fueled with money put in circulation by estate employment, numerous opportunities for local economic advancement With savir,gs accumulated from slave times ,for example, some. freed men and womer, tried to secure not just use rights, but ownership of land for farming, and they expanded their investments in the of food and other crops. Artisans, too, flourished as they manui.ilctured various goods to satisfy the wants of ex-slaves who, in the word." of Governor Metcalfe of Jamaica, were very "fond of Luxuries, and Smarl; Clothes, and good Furni ture" (quoted in Hall 1959: 159). In addh'Lon, a growing class of astute local merchants directed rapid I circljlation Qf agricultural and manufactured goods i and helped establish new marketplaces to service better the areas of free 23 Davy (1854: 101), Dalton (1855, 1: 438), Cropper (1912: 256), Hall (1959: 167-170), and Moohr (1972: 598). 24 Riviere (! 972: 2-4). For some-of these developments in British Guiana, see Dalton.(lS55, 1: 483), Rodway (1891, 3': 53), Cropper (1912: 257-258), Farley (1954: 91-102: 1964: 56-60): Moohr (1972: 597), Adamson (1972: 34-41) and Roberts and Johnson (1974: 69)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.( ",' 164 But all this prosperity had a dramatically short life in the post-Emancipation period of the, British, West Indies. The general' promise of continued economic advancement in diverse industries outside the plantation' pivoted all too sharply on the wages gained in estate employment. The owners and managers of plantations throughout the region were scarcely pleased when they lost control'of their source of labor at Emancipation and, during the next decade, they suffered from a severe crunch in world market competition. Under considerable economic pressure, they looked in earnest for ways to reduce the level of wages, retaining a reliable supply of laborers. Planters in different were various situated to take such action, their strategies diff'"red, and so the effects on the local economies were not at all unif;.'nn. But, allowing for the variation, planters almost everywhere in the PQst Indies upset the precarious balance of post-Emancipation growth in local economies and, for the newly freed participants in those eCOrH);'!lies, the results were largely depressing. 4.2 PLANTER RESPONSES TO THE LABOR PROBLEMS AFTER EHANCIPATION the peace of 1815, supplies of sugar rose on the London market i and t:he price of the commodity embarked on a steady decline. Within the Briti'.1h West Indies, increased supplies from newer colonies, such, as Guiana and Trinidad contributed to the lower prices and helped squeeze the profits of older producers in Barbados and Added to this level of competition, owners and managers of West Indian plantations also had to jockey for position in the wider British Empire, against their counterparts in Nauritius and the East and in the i' .I I: Ii Ii I: ,I

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.165 world market, against cane producers elsewhere in the N.ew World. planters in' Brazil and Cuba, for example, posed especially severe' threats because ,they continued to enjoy the economies of slave labor after British ,Emancipation. The West Ind'ians thus were stiffly arrayed j, Ii against competitors in more favorable circumstances and, by 1842, they II sorely felt the financial burdens of having to pay high wages to attract' II a steady source of free laborers. And the pain only increased in 1847, when Britain began to withdraw the imperial preference for West Indian sugar, thereby placing the commodity on a more equal footing at customs with sugar traded from elsewhere in the world market.2s As economic pressures rapidly mounted to crisis proportions, plantation owners in the British West Indies feared for their very surv:i val. Evel'Y"7here in the region, marginal plantations ceased production and others had their cane stands pulled back to the most prOC},ictive land. I1oreover, after more than a century and a half of almo"t no technical progress, and now beset by vicious competition, by on their primary source of labor, and by a growing profit sqUl:':;ze, owners of West Indian plantations at last began thinking about technical improvements. In order to offset rising costs with some who could afford it did introduce the plow, or the steam engine, or special fertilizers, such as guano. But even givt:n sufficient capital, few of the resident plantation owners in the West Indies were themselves competent enough in all the various facets of plantation administration to integrate technical innovations into the 2S Deerr (1949-50, 2: 362-378, 431-448), Sheridan (1961, 1976a), Lobdell (1972: 31-32, 39-41), Aufhauser (1974a: 46-48) and,Green (1976: 35-64, 229-244).-' II \i Ii II Ii i l' i' I: I: It

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.-------_. ---.... __ ...... .. agricultural routine and to insure that laborers .did not abuse them. Nor could many plantation owners, resident or absentee, boast of' 166 managers and overseers in their employ who were significantly adept in these administrative skills. Lacking either adequate finances or managerial competence, or both, the owners of West "Indian plantations generally resisted committing their estates to the costs. of technical change.26 Instead, most of them focused on ways of controlling their labor supply, and when their wage bill rose so enormously at freedom, they specifically concentrated on making their laborers more reliable and less expensive to employ. As it turned out, some plantation otomers and managers, like those in Earbados, manipulated the newly freed with relative ease and set uages virtually as they pleased. By contrast, jamaican planters struggled with considerable difficulty for a solution to their labor. problems. Similarly, plantation owners and mami)erS in British Guiana found it hard at first to obtain a steady and cher.'li supply of laborers. But although a corlservative labor policy in Barl.Hdos made technical reorganization largely unnecessary, at least for time, and although the prolonged uncertainty in Jamaica apout;the labt.!i' supply chased away potential funds for capital investment., planters in British Guiana managed both to articulate a crushing answer to the labor question and to establish a firm basis for a program of continued technical change. And if, in all these places, the development of the local market for various kinds of agricultural and Z6 For discussion of these barriers to technical change and of the early attempts to overcome them, see Landowner (1853: 35), Davy (1854: 13, 113-115), Hall (1964: 21-25), Barrett (1965), (1974b) and Green. (1926.: .. 51-64).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.167 manufactured goods was effectively tied to the actions of planters to depress wages, in Guiana, it was also linked specifically to.the pattern of technical change within the sugar industry. 4.2.1 post-Emancipation Labor Control in Barbados and Jamaica By Emancipation, Barbados had long weathered political and economic storms. The oldest sugar-producing colony in the British West Indies was, in the words of Daniel Defoe, the "Garden of the Caribbean" (quoted in Sheridan 1974: 121), and it had given rise to a firm, deeply-rooted, highly resistent breed of plantation owners.and managers. From the earEest stages of cane cultivation in the Caribbean in the seventeenth centtiry, Barbadian sugar producers had divided among themselves virt\:Jilly the entire settled expanse of this small, gently rolling isl1li1d and, in the years following Emancipation, they reportedly had t 100 in every 106 of the colony I s densely populated acres Under cultl::ation.27 In respect of the shocks that curled through the West Indbrl sugar industry in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Barb;,dian planters thus stood in an extraordinary position of strength. Indel':d, Emancipation itself appears to have concerned them slightly, if at all. Because there were few places for newly freed to take up residence outside the plantation domains, the majority of the ex-bondsmen remained on the estates and, to insure that they continued to work regularly in the cane fields and at a reasonable wage, the planters simply flexed-their collective muscle. In particular, they 27 Sewell (l861: 33-34). See also the general remarks of Lewis (1936: 4, 10-11), Harshall (1968: 254; 1970: 2; 1972: 32). and Marshall, et al. and Levy (1980: 72).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 168 instituted an especially severe system of tenancy for their former slaves. After Emancipation, the owners and managers of Barbadian plantations generally forbade ex-slaves to continue residing in houses and cUltivating gardens on estate property unless they also to labor in the production of the staple crop. To retain a roof over their heads, many ex-slaves thus had to work on the plantation and, at first, the plantation owners and managers fully exploited the predicament of the freedmen. They refused even to pay wages and, instead, accepted the labor service of their tenants in lieu of rent. The outcries from the laboring population and from British officials, all protesting that such a system merely resurrected slavery under a dif'ferent name, eventually persu-:ded some plantation owners and managers to relent--but not by much; The new practice that they adopted, which was in force as late as 1862, distinguished rent and wages, and it provided an estate laborer with::, house and an allotment of land for a stipulated rent; but, as a condiiion of renting, the tenant still had lito give to the estate a certai.n number of days I labor, II and to do so "at certain stipulated wages, varying from one sixth to one third less than the market; (Sewell 1861: 32).28 Only much later, apparently, did it become commonplace for Barb.adian planters to charge rent for a house 'and' garden and t;:: leave the tenant completely free to find employment where he or .' she pleased. ----,------------------28 See also Davy (1854: 148-149), Riviere (1972: 7), et al. (1975: 86-87), HaJl (1978: 21), and especially Levy'.(1980: 78-80,. 87-89,.99-100, 110-111, 129-130,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.As a group, the owners and managers of Barbadian sugar plantations were well-organized. They controlled the local assembly, and they spoke with a voice that was broken by discord only on relatively minor issues: they either gave little ground to the ex-slaves, or they gave some grudgingly and exacted a great price. 169 Distinguished for their meticulous, labor-int-.ensive cultivations before Emancipation, they kept laborers readily and cheaply ayailable aftenJards, and attained a level of solvency unparalled in the British West Indies. By 1869, none of the colony's 608 estates had been abanci(med, and Barbados was reputed to be' "pre-eminently the most prosperous of the sugar colonies" (Beachey 1957: 42). By dint of a tough and conservative labor policy after Emancipation, management practices in all realms of plantation administration 'changed little from in force during slave times, and Barbadian sugar estates continued specHically to avoid investments in changing capital stock, at least until. after the maj or depression of the 1880s. As for the laboring with only meager wages to its credit, it could scarcely prime the pump. of local demand. Consequently, the local production of agricllltural and manufactured goods developed at a snail's pace. I Indee.d, if the ability of peasant farmers to afford their own land is any indication, significant growth in the local market of the 'island did not until after the turn of the next century. 29 29 On the political organiza Hon of the Barbadian planters, see Davy (1854: 153), Hall (1959: 105-106), and Marshall, et al. (1975: 87-88). For the continuity and success of their economic practices, see Sewell (1861: 59-66), Beachey (1957: 93), Green (1973: 402: 1976: 201-202, 257-259), and Levy 93-96, 103-112, 136-137). And compare Riviere (1972: 16-17, 24, 28), al. (1975: 8S-l0l), Mintz (1979a:229-230},and Levy (1980: 78;,91',96-98,129) on the, development of local production and trade in Barbados.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.170 In contrast to Barbados, Jamaica did not blossom as a sugar-producing colony until. the early eighteenth century and, even by the nineteenth century, cane did not nearly cover the island. Early plantation owners settled primarily on the coast and in some of the more easily accessible intermontane regions of the island. At later stages in the early history of the colony new planters thus had plenty of room to enter production by moving into the other fertile valleys of the interior. As they did so, the older producers, in turn, fought to withstand the competition and, at Emancipation, the Jamaican sugar industry was still in a state of considerable flux and change. Being so developed, the industry simply could not boast that its produeers were, as a group, as well-establishe,d as those in the so-ciI.Ued "Garden of the Caribbean". Some planters operated at a loss, othel'::; barely broke even, and many were in debt on heavily mortgaged esta!:!:;s.:3 0 Nor, by comparison to Barbados, could Jamaica in 1838 accord its plant '.ltion owners and managers an unrivaled position in the local economy. As the ex-slaves themselves well-knew, there was consHerable profit to made from in the hills an9 on; marg1.nal es ta te lands, and from the sale of produce that did not always directly further the prosecution of plantation business. Mor'eover, a small, but steadily growing party of local merchants insinuated itself into the Jamaican assembly and promoted the various trades, which, if developed, could potentially occupy the freedmen independently of work 3D For some of this background, see the discussion in Sheridan {1965, 1968, 1976a} Thomas. (l968). See also Sewell (1861: 169-173, 230-242), Curtin (1955: 108-109) 'and Hall (1959: 81).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.171 in the cane fields and could thereby conflict with the immediate interests of the sugar At Emancipation, Jamaican planters thus were not only internally divided by differences in financial status; they also faced the emergence of sources of potentially serious political and economic opposition. Given these particular difficulties, they proved themselves a resourceful and imaginative lot. But they were somewhat less than successful when they attempted specifically to recruit a reliable body of laborers from the newly freed population, and tried to do so without paying ruinously high wages. At first, many owners and managers' of Jamaican plantations adopted tactics similar to those applied by their Barbadian count(!rparts. Some instituted rent-for-labor schemes. Others, who paid wages, lowered the rate and then tried to recover even those payments by exact:t,lg ridiculously high rents, which, at times they cha'rged not agair:,; t the property occupied, but against the number of in a partie',llar tenant I s family! Still other plantation owners and managers went .i:'llrther than the Barbadians and, acting on the belief that cheap labor 'Ilould be more readily available from a landless proletariat, they sirnplr ejected their laborers from residence on the estate and ,from rights to use their provision grounds.S2 The reactions of the Jamaican freed!ilen, however, clearly demonstrated that, to be manipulated as planta tion laborers, they merited more subtle approaches than these. 31 Hall (1959: 97-98) and Green (1976: 357-359). 3Z Paget (1945: 33-3.6), Curtin (1955: 128-129), Hall ('1959: 20-23), Riviere (1972: 5-8), and Knox (1977: 387-388).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.172 If the freedmen were not thrown off the estates, they soon began to leave in droves, rather than submit to the aggress.ive and vindictive conditions that the planters imposed for them to stay. They bought available land when they could and squatted when they could not. Many settled haphazardly, but others were attracted by the schemes of Baptist missionaries to settle freedmen in organized villages, particularly on ruined estates In all cases, by leaving the plantations, the ex-slaves burdened the sugar producers with a lack of "continuous laborll (quoted in Curtin 1955: 127) and, to provide any labor at all, they still could command a relatively high wage. The funds that ex-slaves received for laboring on plantations, moreover, continued to fuel the local market, and d:l.d so to such an extent that the relative share of independent produ:::tion in the island s total output increased sharply in the quarter centtiry after Emancipation. Unfortunately for everyone the gross prod\lt. t of the island declined, largely because of the persistent troubles in the sugar industry. 33 The hefty wage bill that sugar produce:rs paid to hire much needed after 1838 magnified the high costs of sugar production in Jamai:':a, and forced more and more plantation owners to abandon .their ., estates. Between 1836 and 1865, the number of .operating plantations in the island declined from 670 to 300, and this sharp contraction in the sugar industry could not help but to reduce the total wages put in circulation, and eventually to depress the locai consumers market. 33 On the independent settlements of the freedmen, see Paget (1945: 36-48), Curtin (195.5: 110-116, 12iL folintz (1958: 48-(5), Hall (1959: 17-16, 23-26; 1978: 14-17), and Rivier-e (1972: 9, 15) For the development of independent production in the, island after. Emancipation, see Knox (1977: 366-367), Riviere (1972: '.12, 21-24), Hall (1959: 119-120), and Beachey (1957: 43) c

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ .... Moreover, although some plantation owners could afford the economies of increased investments in capital, and although many sugar produce'rs certainly became more attuned to the benefits of scientific agriculture, the Jamaican sugar industry as a \o1hole had great difficulty attracting sources of investment for technical improvements. The nearby islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, which both still profited from slave labor, lured funds that might otherwise have gone to Jamaica. And not until 1861 did the Jamaican Assembly institute the Encumbered Estates Act, which made it much easier for heavily mortgaged esta:tes to pass unburdened into the hands of buyers with capital to advance in the production of Jamaican sugar, As a result, in the decades immediately following Emancipation, lithe technological backwardness of Jamaican planting was only slightly remeched" (Curtin 1955: 145), planters had to redoub-Ie their efforts to consl'rve the freed slaves as cheap plantation laborers and, to the exter!;: that they forced down wages, the local consumers market began notir;;:ably to falter. 34 From their early acts of ejectment and from their harsh tenancy requ.i.rements, the owners and managers of Jamaican plantations turned duril:;; the 1840s and 1850s to a variety of other tactics. Fori example, many planters obtained a core of relatively cheap and reliable laborers by bringing several thousand people under contracts from India, Africa, Madeira, and China. Such immigration was expensive, however, and the parties in the Jamaican Assembly who were not directly associated with sugat' property did not particularly support measures aimed at spreading the costs over the entire community. This solution to the labor.problem 34 Eeachey (1957: 6_-8, 43-44), Hall (1959: 32, 75-76,\116-119), Green (1976: 234-245, 250-251, 255-256), and Knoi (1977: 386-367).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 174 thus did not take the plantation owners and managers very far, and it meant that they still had to draw the bulk of their laborers from among the ex-slaves on the island. So the planters endeavored to make all the a'1ternatives to plantation labor as unattractive as possible for the freedmen. They moved the Assembly to make import and export duties, as well as the direct taxes on local property, bear more heavily on the independent producers in the free population on .",' .' .'.: .. '. ." .. ., .:'-=: '. '. .' ...: ,:' ::; :,1 ... ; (";.: ':' .... .. :' Then, to intensify the they c::hannelledthe toward .;; road construction and other projects that specifically favored, not the ex-slaves, but the sugar industry. In addition, they sponsored "vagrancy" acts to keep potential estate laborers in line, and they supported an education system designed to train the freedmen in obedL:mce, humility and other qualities suitable for work in a plan t:t tion regime. 3 5 Given these various measures persuading them to give up local proch::tion for a life of plantation labor, and competing in markets weakened by downward pressure on the wages that sugar proc;!;,r:ers were willing to put into circulation, freed artisans, cult.i.vators and merchants in Jamaica struggled to stay in business. '. j I Inde!';d, as Sidney Hintz has suggested, "the real wonder is the ability of Jamaican peasantry to have survived at all" {1979a: 232}.' But conditions for independent production in the island, ultimately were not as severe as those in Barbados. During the decades following Emancipation, the local consumers I market deteriorated in both colonies 35 Beachey (1957: 106-107), Hall (1959: 21, 85, 176-180, 202-206), Green (1976: 243-244, 248-249,346-348, '394-395)', Knox' (1977.: 393,.384, -3SS-392), and Hintz (1979a: 231-232) ..

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 175 after an initial burst of strength, though it did 'at a much faster rate in Barbados: in Jamaica, however, the sugar industry also changed considerably, particularly in the approach of plantation owners and managers to the labor problem. After 186'S, cane, production was confined more and more to the western portion of the island. Moreover, as financially troubled estates succumbed ,to ruinous competition, many fell into the hands of British merchant houses with funds to invest in labor-saving technical innovations. A new class of estate managers thus appeared in the colony, who were scientifically oriented and technologically progressive., And with this overall pattern of conCf!ntration and reorganization--a pattern that differed fundamentally from the course followed by Barbadian planters during the same period of potential for development in other sectors of the Jamaican econ(';l'Y correspondingly varied: the small-scale producers among the free(Jmen, supported by the local merchant party, began to refocus their attent.ion and to concentrate on the ,production and sale of goods--such as G'Jfiee and ginger--that were in demand beyond the confines of the loea} provision markets. 36 British Guiana: The Beginnings of capital concentration In the owners and managers of plantations in post-Emancipation British Guiana resembled those in jamaica by the. variety of devices they brandished to depress wages and to obtain a ready supply of laborers. They brought in contract laborers from overseas. In addition, they resorted to a variety of fiscal and legal measures to manipulate the 36 Beaehey (1957: 38, 43. 123-124), Hall (1959: 11S, Green' (1976: and Knox (1977: 383, 386).'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.;\ 176 ex-slave population. But in all this they performed with an effectiveness similar to that which the owners and managers of Barbadian plantations achieved in much more limited actions; by comparison with the Jamaicans ,for example, <:;uianese planters thoroughly saturated their colony with indentured immigrants. Yet the Guianese plantation owners: and managers may also be distinguished, in general, from those in both Jamaica and Barbados because their solutions to the labor problem were tied to a much higher level of technical innovation--of mechanization--in the production of sugar. And to the extent that planter efforts to obtain cheap labor after slavery in British Guiana affected the local markets for agricultural and manufactured goods, then these markets also depended directly on the continuing pace of capital conce;,trationin the sugar industry. In 1800, the three river colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbj.::e, which later joined together in 1831 to become British Guiana, comprised one of the frontier regions of sugar production for British plant'2rs. Compared to the long-established estates in Barbados, and to much ,;f the cultivated land in Jamaica, soil along the Guiana rivers and. coast offered settlers the superb fertility of freshly opened territory. I I Being new and holding land relatively unencumbered of debts, owners of Guianese plantations easily attracted credit on favorable terms, 'and they 'Jsed it to equip their young estates with the latest technology. They installed steam engines and large boiling houses to process the. cane, and they readily adopted various innovations, such as the plow, improved fertilizers, and better drainage techniques, all. to advance their field cultivation. By 1838, British Guiana British sugar \

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.177 colonies in ,the introduction of machinery, and its plantation owners and managers seemed perhaps "best fitted to, respond to the challenge II 'of labor scarcity at Emancipation, {Tinker 1974: 2S} .37 Largely established on the basis of early and rather considerable investments in capital stock, Guianese plantations were later able to avoid the long and painful effects of breaking away from more primitive habits of sugar production. But even given this advantage over plantations in other parts of the British West Indies', the owners of Guianese plantations suffered dearly when they freed their' slaves" With or without technical change and access to labor-saving innovations, they could not produce at all unless they had a guaranteed supply' of cheap laborers. Like plantation owners elsewhere, they thus had to deal immerJiately with the possibility that ex-slaves would find it more rewai':.ling to work in occupations outside the sugar industry. Although, ownen and managers of Guianese plantations were generally in a better posiHon than other West Indians to attract free labor by paying high wage6, they still moved desperately to cut their labor costs. Some tried to tie laborers cheaply to their estates by granting them tenancy on pJ.:mtation land in exchange for free labor, or labor at a reduced t rate. Others took the reverse course and tried to cut costs by lowering their wage offer and then by withdrawing various benefits, such as housing and access to provision land. In both cases, in as in .Jamaica, the freedmen vigorously protested the early and harsh response of the planters to Emancipation, and they'began to flee the plantations 37 Da\' (1854: 359-361), Dalton (1855, 1: 493,496-497, 500-501), Hall' (1959: 106), Marshall (1968: 254), Green (1969: 45; 1976: 193, 203-205, 210-214), Lobdell (1972: 34-35,38-39, 41.:.tl2)'" Mandle'(i973: 61-62), and Drescher (1977: 92-96).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.. .. 178 in great .numbers.3S Some ex-slaves in British Guiana moved upriver totally out of range of the plantations, purchased or squatted on Crown land, and lived what one partisan observer described as a "savage sort of life" (Dalton 1855, 1: 437). Many others, however, who left the sugar estates, stayed within striking' distance and participated in a "singular spectaCle to be witnessed in no other part of the world" (Landowner 1853: 63). They purchased, without assistance, vast amounts of land, some individually to form proprietary villages, others jointly to establish communal By the end of 1842, nearly 16,000 people, or 20 percent, of the population had settled in the new villages founded since Emancipation. By 1854, this number had nearly tripled, and still more left the estates to live in the towns of Georgetown and New Amsterdam. But therever they went, they took advantage of their freedom and pursued a vax j i!ty of occupations in which they fulfilled expanding local needs. They did domestic work, they farmed, they fished, they manufactured hanci.l!!rafts and they entered petty trade. Their activity on .the internal market replaced imported goods with. products and, hy 1842, imports of consumer items to British Guiana had fallen by : 40 percent, from '762,503 pounds sterling to 474,503 pounds.3'3 38 (1855, 1: 435-438), Beachey (1957: 38-39}, Roberts and Johnson (1974: 72), 8-9, 11-14, 16-18" 3'3 Dalton (1855,1: 483), RodMay (1891,3: 57-54, 84-85), Cruickshank (l921: 69-70), Le\.fis (1936: 7-8), Farley (1954: 93:-94, 96-102; 1964: 56-60};Adamson (1972: 35-38), Hoohr (1972: 595-598), Riviere (1972: IS, 17-24), Handle (1973: 22-23), and Roberts and Johnson (1974: 71-72). -'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.179 Against these various kinds of independent activity, the ex-slaves balanced the advantages of working for relatively high wages on the sugar Many continued to perform plantation work, and they fueled the expanding local consumers I market with purchasing power. But from the planters I point of view, such labor "was costly and inefficient because it was intermittent, unpredictable, arbitrarily' withdrawn II (Adamson 1972: 40.). Indeed so costly was it that the weaker planters could not survive: between 1838 and 1846, fifty-seven, or 18.S percent of Guiana IS 30.8 plantations abandoned cultivation. 4 0 As for the remaining plantations, their owners and managers intensified their efforts to control an adequate supply of labor, and peI:haps the most significant development after their early failures with the ex-slaves was the ultimate success they had in securing laborers by immigration. The owners and managers of Guianese plantations sought a body of immi9rants to provide the ex-slaves with potential competitors for jobs. Above all, the sugar producers hoped that job compf.;tition would drive down wages. In addition, they felt it would helpi:o discipline laborers to appear regularly for work and to perform their assigned tasks without quarrel, under pain of being replaced. and I of It'dng needed income. But because the ex-slaves could support them521ves with only occasional work on the estates, plantation and IHdnagers rightly expected that the immigrants would scarcely work with any more regularity unless they were somehow prompted to do so. The planters thus sought to bind the newcomers by legal contract to work for them at a fixed rate for a certain period of time. Obviously, the. 40 Hoohr. (1972: 598:'60.0.) and Riviere (1972: 11-12, 23-"24).'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 180 more immigrants they could obtain in this way, and the longer the period of indenture, the greater the pressure on other plantation laborers to become competitive and to work cheaply and under a stricter discipline. 41 Immediately after Emancipation, indentures that extended for any prolonged period smacked too much of slavery, and the British colonial office prohibited contracts that lasted for more than one year. But under pressure from the owners of West Indian plantations the metropolitan government soon began making exceptions. Plantation owners in Guiana were especially persistent. Unlike their Jamaican counterparts, who were in deeper financial straits and who encountered local political opposition, they eventually received long-term support for immigration, as well as sanctions for" rigid labor contracts that covered five-year terms. Between 1834 and 1890 I 228,805 people came to British Guiana as indentured laborers. Of these, nearly 90 percent came from just two places. The largest and, by far the most irnpo:"cant segment, comprising fully 74.1 percent of the total, came from Indb, But, in addition, 32,216 Portuguese came from the Maderia Islands, and they played an especially crucial, if some\Olhat indirect, I role in the struggles of British Guiana planters to resolve their post-Emancipation labor problems. 42 The Maderia Islands" were among the earliest sources of immigrant labor tapped by the owners and managers of plantations in British Guiana. The Portuguese were generally favored with short-term 11 Lawrence (1965a: 50), Adamson (1972": 46-49), Lobdell (1972: 41), and Moohr (1972; 602). See also Mintz (1979a: 234-235). i2 Lawre!'lce (l965bf and Roberts and Johnson (1974: 73r.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.181 contracts. But ,when their terms expired, very few of them stayed on the estates to endure the rigors of the plantation regime. They gravitat7d to the internal trade of the colony and, with their accumulated wages, they opened shops and bought stock to engage in peddling. As a group, they received preference 'over others, particularly the ex-slaves, in obtaining the licences required to conduct local merchant activity. In addition, large wholesalers in Georgetown made goods available to the Portuguese shopkeepers and peddlers on easy credit terms, while they afforded black ex-slaves either severe terms or no credit at all. As a result, lithe retail trade rapidly became a Portuguese stronghold, and by 1844 they were effectively driving the ere,ole [black freedmen] hucksters out of the marketll (Moore 1975: 9). By 1865, to take only one measure of commercial success, the Portuguese controlled 90 percent of the rumsbops in the entire colony. With 'their near monopoly in the retail tradf;\, the Portuguese cut into the profits of the ex-slaves acting as local producers and, through high markups, shifted the burden of their own Gists forward to the freedmen acting as local consumers.43 Thus, if plant did not bolster their labor force directly with Portuguese, immi9t'ants, then in a more roundabout way, they chipped away at the body I of who now had their employment options in commerce \ considerably reduced, who found themselves more impoverished:and in an increasingly desperate situation. 43 Landowner (1853: 59), Dalton (1855, 1: 454-466), Adamson (1972: 68-72), (1975), Wagner Bartels (1977: 400)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. 182 The saturation of British Guiana with East Indians, however, ultimately provided local plantation owners and managers the direct supply of cheap and reliable laborers they desired and, in addition, it firmly prepared the ground for further measures against the ex-slaves. Beginning as a trickle in 1838, coming in spurts during the 1840s and early 18505, and flowing regularly after 1855, the stream of East Indian immigrants originated from the ports of Calcutta and 11adras. In exchange not only for their transportation to British Guiana, but also for a suitable dwelling in the colony, for medical care, and for rations during their first three months of residence, the new arrivals were genenlly obliged to work on a specified plantation for six days a week at a fixed wage for five years. Plantation owners and managers often evaded their side of the bargain by taking advantage of the illiteracy of rnti:1Y immigrants and of the administrative confusion generated by the intrvilictionof people speaking a foreign language into an unfamiliar counUy. On the other side, however, the planters stringently enforced the Jibor obligations of the East Indians: they set work tasks on the planL.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.183 desires," now had to be "content to go about with the least amount of clothing consistent with decency and to be satisfied with the coarsest fare" (Davy 1855: 363). 4S Independent cultivators and manufacturers consequently began losing their markets and their incentives to expand' production. Residents of free villages also suffered serious f problems in the administration of their own internal political affairs. Keeping the villages drained of water, for example, proved especially vexing. In the proprietary villages, small, private holdings gave rise to an extreme individualism by which neighbors refused to join in the maintlmance of common drains; in the communal villages, members lacked the fIlilnagerial expertise to delegate and to supervise drainage work. 46 Softened thus both economically and politically, the ex-slaves became more and more vulnerable to the direct assaults of the prOdtli;:ers. Indeed, seizing the initiative, plantation owners and moved more effectively to halt the spread of the free villages. They sponsored legislation in 1852 that prohibited more than twenty perswiiS from buying land collectively. Ordinance Number 33 of 1856 then discouraged. the purchase of land by freedmen with the stipl!lation that acreage bought by more than ten people had to .be I parti tioned and each slave made subj ect to compulsory monthly rates. In 1S During 1951, a leading merchant in British Guiana reported that "in the last three or four years various circumstances have combined to reduce the demand and consumption of articles not of .luxury .only, but of ordinary comfort. The laborers now usually confine their pl!rchases to the very fe\.[ and indispensible articles .of clothing, and to articles of necessaryfooci. The other portion the community have also contracted their wants into a 'much narrower compass than in former years II (Great Britain 1851: 14). See also Hoohr (1972: '590, 603-604) 46 Cruickshank (1921: 70-71)i Adamson. (1972: 58-62, 87), Moohr(1972: 600-601), and Rodney (19S1: 332-333).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.i' 184 1861, legislation finally doubled the price of Crown lands and limited purchase to no less than one hundred acres. And if .these measures, which thoroughly restricted access to land, were not enough to them, then the freedmen became fmmobilized under the weight of a disproportionate share of the colony I s tax burden. The. planter-controlled government granted the plantations special exemptions on import and export duties, while it strictly enforced village rate collections, and then specified the headings under which the collected revenue would be spent. 47 By the 1860s, the promising offorts of the ex-slaves in British Guiana to achieve a richly independent life had all but failed. The freedmen I s villages did not disappear, but everywhere they "presented a picture of widespread desolation and sorry neglect" .(Farley 1954: 102). As for the sugar producers, though they accomplished in two decades a victory as complete as that which the Barbadians achieved in a few years, they did not emerge unscathed. The struggles of the postr.Emancipation years weakened them compared to the planters in Barbados, and many could only limp along in their production. But their very l"eakness, joined to the decisive resolution of the labor question, strongly attracted the interest of British merchant houses, who saw an opportunity to make significant inroads in the hotly world sugar market. These companies bought up faltering estates rejuvenated the local sugar industry with considerable savings by consolidating some estates and amalgamating others. Between 1853 and 1884, the number of plantations dropped from 173 to 105, while, at the 17 Adams6n (1972: 57-58, 75-76, 80-84, 88-89), Moohr l1972: 596, 604-605) and MandIe (1973: 28) ..

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission." : same time, the average area on each estate actually increased sharply from 256 to 757 acres. -To manage these bigger estates, the metichant 185 companies replaced the old class of plantation managers with anew breed consisting of specialists in business who were "junior members of respectable families and young men of education and refined' habits" (Landowner 1853: 37). Under such management, and using 'the creditworthiness that their non-estate assets gave them, these companies then invested their plantations with the latest capital equipment.48 As the immigration of contract laborers and the institution of measures specifically designed to hamstring the ex-slaves all combined to ct"e,:lte a cheap and abundant source of wage labor in British Guiana, the colony's sugar industry clearly recovered its reputation in the West Indies for technological leadership. The long era of prim.i, accumulation in the local industry thus gradually came to a Two of the defining features of the period--stagnant technology and and expensive wage 1abor--both disappeared. Then, in the 1880r;. the world market for sugar, \olhich had long sustained' the aCC\li:lU.lation of capital on New Wor-ld plantations radically changed, and a new era of production began. I, During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, heavily subsi.dized beet sugar from Europe flooded the world sugar market,' and sharply under-cut the price of cane sugar, which originated largely on plantations. 'In British Guiana, in the West Indies, and elsewhere, sugar profits disappeared as sugar prices sank to record lows. 18 Beachey (1957: 41-42, 62-65, 68,.76-78, 118 .. 121) and Adamson (1972: 160-167, 199-213). See also Far-ley (1955: 132), Lobdell (1972: 41-45.), Handle (1973: 61), and Tinker(1974: 25).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186 Plantations .survived only by consolidating and amalgamating their capital invested in land and equipment with that of weaker competitors. Long accumulated capital thus became more and more concentrated in large firms, and the great expense now required to set up a competitive plantation effectively limited the appearance of new sugar producers. Indeed, at least within the sugar industry of British Guiana and the British West Indies, if not within the wider world market, competition among sugar producing plantations no longer hinged on the threat.of new producers starting cultivation, increasing the supply of sugar, and driving down the price of the commodity. Instead, competitive pressures gradually shifted to focus on the relative abilities of existing firms to costs both by incorporating weaker producers when possible and by instituting innovative technical changes. 49 Most of the technical innovations subsequently adopted in British Guiana contributed to the mechanization of the sugar industry. The were essentially labor-saving and decreased the overall demand for i:lbori according to Alan Adamson, they i1allowed the ratio of labor cosb to total income to be reduced from 53 percent in 1851 to somewhere betl'leen 35 and 45 percent in 1882-8411 (1972: 206). From the dire I strai.ts of labor scarcity immediately after Emancipation, the plantations thus moved to circumstances of labor surplus. The number of people employed as agricultural laborers steadily dropped in the colony after 1851. Even time-expired East Indian laborers began to have 19 For a theoretical treatment of periods of concentrationll in the growth.of capitalist see Levine (1975: 58-57). On the swift and r:adical changes'in the composition of the world sugar market during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, see, for example, Deerr (J.949-50, 2: 471-508) and Tache, 2: 3-60).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. .. 187 difficulty retaining employment on the sugar plantations. 5 a These conditions continued to depress the local consumers' market and to diminish the opportunities for local employment, expecially in the artisan trades. But the emergent processes of capital concentration on Guianese plantations also had other, somewhat contradictory, implications. Sugar producers no longer had difficulty finding laborers at all; now they confronted the problem of stabilizing a restless and overpopulated labor force, of encouraging laborers to reside peacefully near the plantation and of tying those laborers closely to the various capital components in the field and the factory. In short, sugar producers now had to carve out a select group of people, endow them with the skills needed to operate plantation machinery, and duly reward this body of workers. As they did so they established a geogrnphically concentrated and relatively well-paid segment of the popuL'ition that comprised a potentially lucrative market for the locd and sale of various agricultural and manufactured goods. The concentration of capital in the sugar industry of British Guia!D thus created, above all, sharp regional distinctions in ;the COlO!('ll S landscape. Where, during slavery, relatively small plantations appeoi'ed throughout the colony, by the end of' the nineteenth century, sugar production was increasingly confined to fewer, albeit'larger, areas, Correspondingly, the local markets for consumer, goods began' to differentiate into regions marked, at least in part, by the presence or absence of settlements of plantation laborers. Areas, like the \. 5Q Adamson (1972: 1, 146-149) and MandIe (1973: 30-33).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.188 courantyne Coast, whiC;h surrounded such settlements, experienced a gradual increase in the proportion of artisans in the local working population and, beginning in 1891, artisan employment actually began to rise in the colony as a "thole. The deve lopment of artisan production, and particularly of garment-making in areas like Rose Hall thus depended, at least in part, on the pattern of concentration in the sugar industry. In a subsequent volume, I will examine some of the complicated relationships between artisan manufacture and plantation agriculture during the period of capital concentration in the local sugar industry of British Guiana, and I will account, at least partially, for the growth of the garment-making industry in and around the town of Rose Hall c1n the Courantyne Coast. But before concluding'the present volume, I wal'it to advance one further argument in support of the thesis that Capi!>11 accumulation on West Indian plantations generally stifled the groioith of artisanry. In the next chapter, I widen the scope of the inquiry to demonstrate that capital accumulation in other forms of ionial agriculture, on the haciendas of' Mexico and the farms of New Engl
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. Chapter V AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURING IN NEW. WORLD COLONIES Hither also may be referr'd that Separation which is made, when People by one Consent go to form Colonies. For this is the Original of a New and Independent People. --Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, II, 9 As they set foot in the New World, most settlers preoccupied themselves with the eminently practical question of their survival. Given the vicissitudes and dangers of transatlantic travel, could the provisions they hrought sustain them until new supplies arrived from the mother .. country or until they developed alternative stores? Often, settlers quietly turned for help to the native populations, but invariably they cons:i.::lered producing needed goods on their own. Some entered subsi:itence production so they could diminish their overseas dependence and decrease the expense of purchasing supplies from abroad. Others produced items demanded at home in the mother country, and thereby generated enough currency to purchase the supplies they needed; in the colony. And still others produced both a regular and cheap source of subsistence goods and a stock exports in an effort to earri enough to generate a profit and eventually to improve theirsocial position. Whatever course they settled upon, most colonists did eventually .decide to enter production to accumulate needed wealth. Because their investments in technical were initially so small, howevei, their abilities to turn a profit depended in large measure on how. economically 189 -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.190' they organized their use of iabor. Did they hire or did. they force others to work for Or, did they work for themselves? Producers made their however, only in specific social settings; the kind of enterprise they established and the form of labor organization they created depended on a host of particular and highly variable social relationships. Producers, for example, had to contend with government .... officials who regulated the affairs of colonists and sought to command. the resources to do so by various peaceful devices and, when necessary, by fOfce of conquest. In addition, they had to deal with merchants who sold dear and bought cheap. They had to compete for markets, and technical means against other producers. And, for various kinds of access to land, they had to struggle with other inhaUtants of particular colonies, including the indigenous peoples. When ,'me begins to examine how colonial producers actually interacted in sett tngs of such political and economic complexity, it becomes evident that New. World conditions of capital accumulation were not always ripe for the development of plantations, nor, therefore, for the elaboration of c
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.191 of encomienda, to extract the wealth of native civilizations. Then, as the colonists themselves directly entered production, they accumulated capital by servicing markets that were often large, but proved more often to be highly irregular and unpredictable. In response to such trade, the colonists typically formed haciendas, not plantations. within these institutions, they often employed indebted wage laborers, or peons, not slaves. And though by various means, such as encomienda, they incorporated and reorganized native agriculture and crafts, they did not eliminate these activities. Elsewhere in the New World, European nations formed colonies under the influence of merchants who worked actively to open markets for and to keep trade flowing. In northeastern North America, Dutch. French, and English colonists vied for native furs and established colonies of trade to obtain a steady supply of the pelts from local Indians. New England settlers, however, soon displaced resilhnt tribes and began setting up farms to produce goods for quite diff"t'ent markets. They built towns that were particularly designed to resi:> t administrative intrusions, including those that might direct proc11i::tive efforts to large-scale and potentially coercive enterprises. I From these towns, New England merchants developed regular markets for farm products, but markets that were small and diverse, and that typil:;)l1y gave rise to a host of locally-based artisans who processed the (Joods and serviced the trade. Within the broader framework of capital accumulation in New World cololJies, then, settlements grew on the basis of conquest, trade and production, the markets for colonial products slowly and

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.192 irregularly in some places if they developed at all, and in other places regular markets emerged but were small and diverse. Only within such a wide framework did some colonists manage to find reliable markets that were large and concentrated, and in response to which-they could seek to establish plantations. Their efforts often met with difficulties, but settlers in Virginia, like those in the West Indies, thrived with a steadily growing demand for staple crops. In contrast to conditions of capital accumulation in the Spanish colonies and in the New England colonies, conditions in Virginia favored the spread of plantations and, as this colony received increasing supplies of slaves whom planters coer.;:,;:d to work for them for life, local political attempts to diversify-the e::onomy by creating other alternatives in agriculture, in the I and in the trades all persistently failed. In what follows, by compnrison to conditions in Mexico, New England, and Virginia, I move to establish that the conditions of primitive accumulation on plan! -:ltions in the t-lest Indies enfeebled local artisanry. I survey the opment of haciendas in Mexico and of farms in New England to show -that. although investments in technical means were generally small and stagpont throughout the colonial Hew World, product markets anp. I poE dcal circumstances differed widely and did not always favor the rise of plantations. In,the absence of plantation agriculture, indep.;ndent artisanry survived and, in places like New England, even flourished. In this chapter, I also review the Virginia case to confirm that in other areas, besides the British West Indies, where conditions spawned plantations, capital accumulation on these agricultural institutions generally had an 'adverse effect on the independent manufacturing activi ties.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.193 Although the scope of my analysis here does not permit me to do justice to all aspects of each. of these institutions in each of the colonial regions surveyed, I certainly do not mean to minimize the enormous social and cultural complexity of colonial development. For convenience of presentation, for example ,I do not fully consider the mixture all institutions of production in each area nor, at this level of analysis, do I discuss the wide variation in the organization of the institutions I do consider. But I am fully aware that, as historian William Taylor has observed, haciendas formed only a "narrow slice of the spectrum of colonial estates" in Mexico, and the features of such estates were often "much too varied to be subsumed under a single label" (1974: 392-393). I have already issued similar cautions about the analrsis of plantations in Chapter 'Two above and, for a detailed invc:.;tigation of agriculture in New England, much the same no doubt could be said of farms. 5.1 THE SPANIARDS IN I1EXICO: CONQUISTADORS, PRODUCTION AND THE RISE OF THE .! ----The Spanish CI"own, seeking new SOUI"ces of wealth, undeI"took the formdtion of its American colonies late in the fifteenth by the interest of its subjects in the possible rewards of conquest. Soldier-peasants in Spain, for example, wanted Unen(:umbered land while Spanish aristocrats, oriented to gaining riches by w'lrfare, wanted open range for sheep and cattle, or land for dependent cultivators. Pr,oddedby eager rulers, and united in the hope of achieving their individual goals, these and otheI" adventuI"eI"s came to the New WoI"ld. They found it populated with peopte who, though

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.194 speaking strange languages and behaving in peculiar manners, nevertheless lived by organized and settled routines.2 To satisfy:their own needs and the needs of the Crown, the settlers applied military and political pressures upon the Indians they conquered. They reorganized Indian routines to' transfer wealth to Spanish hands "in a procedure that was more orderly than the outright looting of spoils" (Gibson 1966: 67). By appropriating wealth from the Indians, the conquistadors bore virtually no costs of production and; assuming they could meet the administrative costs of collection and enforcement, they found themselves in the enviable position of having access to what must have seemed like unlimited amounts of wealth. The conquistadors first developed their methods of appropriation in Caribbean, and then they refined them in Mexico and in Central and S,1U th America. As rewards for their military successes the conqui.stadors came to expect, and the Crown came to authorize, awards of encorc i.enda. These awards entitled a conquistador to tribute and labor serv:h:s from a conquered Indian population that was defined by its in a specified area. In return, the encomendero had the obHt},1.tion to protect and Christianize the Indian population entrusted I I to hiia. Through the encomienda the settlers incorporated native communities under Spanish rule, and relegated the Indians to the status of part-time laborers. 3 2 On the motives of the Spaniards who came to the New World, see 1959a: 157-162} and Chevalier (1952: 23-35). On some of their perceptions of the Indians they met, see, for example, Zavala (1943: 33). Holf (1959a: 49-151) has also provided a lucid overview of the Indian cultures of Niddle America. 3 Discussion of the principal features of the may be found in Zavala .(1943: 69-7-5, 80-81, 84-85), Simpson (1950: 6-10), (1959a:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.195 Within his area of entitlement, an encomendero usually placed tribute and labor service obligations upon a native local community as a whole. He would use native officeholders to exact his' charges and, burdened with.a community obligation, the Indians, in turn, tended to respond corporately. Upon their local leaders, they conferred lithe right and duty to collect tribute, organize corvee labor, and to exercise formal and informal sanctions in the maintenance of peace and orderll (Wolf 1957: 10). Furthermore, cOmn\uni ty members often devised corporate procedures to insure that no individual would be so by encomienda obligations that he could not meet his subsistence needs. The Indians redistributed local wealth, particularly throu9h the religious system, and they maintained and distributed a body of rights granting minimum access to community possessions such as land. In and other ways, members of native corporate communities bore the 1.';lrdens of encomienda. They supported the bulk of Spanish sett:l r.:ment, they furnished the labor force required for Spanish enterprise and, above all, they provided the mineral wealth that served as tlw IIdriving forcell of Spanish colonization (Wolf 1955: 456).4 Unfortunately for the conquistadors, the devel0l'ment of,Spanish I rule ,In these terms encountered a number of obstacles. First, native Americans often resisted Spanish demands, or simply fled. In addition, 189), Gibson (1964: 58; 1966: 49-50), and Lockhart (1969: 414-416, 420). 4 For more details on the changing structure' of Indian communities after the Conquest, see Chevalier (1952: 186-206), Wolf (1959a: 213-226), Gibson (1964: 127-135, 211-222; 1966: 148-149), Taylor (1972: 35-56, 70-73; 1974:.405-407), and HacLeod(1973: 326-328)'. Some.Indians. considered the resulting community pressures toosevere and escaped them when they could. See Chevalier (1952: 198), Wolf 206), MacLeod (1973: 2%-297).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.196 Indian populations were fatally susceptible to the diseases that the Spaniards carried and many of their communities disintegrated with the. spread of virulent epidemics. Finally, the Spanish Crown.sought politically to counter the increasing pO\Oler of the conquistadors, and introduced some compelling obstacles of its own. In the Antilles, where the Spaniards first attempted settlement, some Indian groups had resisted the appropriation of tribute by refusing to produce anything at all, even for themselves. Others succumbeq to the new and unfamiliar diseases. By the time the colonists began turning to the mainland, the production of wealth in the islands had declined dramatically anc:! the Indian population had virtually disappeared. In Mexico and Peru, on the other hand, the conquistadors found advanced civilizations that were more tractable to the demands of trihLte and labor service. Indeed, the Aztec and Inca empires had such well developed systems of tribute that some of the more attentive conquistadors tried to approximate their own demands to those of the pre.oj.',;mquest political order. Still, the mainland Indians were no less to disease. Between 1519 and 1650, for example, six-':levenths of the. Indian population in Hesoamerica was wiped out 5 I Given the enormous loss of human life, the imposition of the encom.ienda burden upon communities, rather than upon individuals; became incrQasingly important to the Spaniards, and all the more traumatic to the Indians. Regardless of individual losses, encomenderos still 5 On the Spanish colonies in the Antilles, see, for example, Simpson (1950: 1-55). Zavala (1943: 88) and Gibson (1966: 57) discussed Spanish adaptation to native tribute systems; bht for some of ihe many the. Spanairds had, see Gibson (1964: 194-196). On the decimation of native popUlation, and for some of the causes, see the sl!mmaries in-\volf (1959a: 195-199) and Gibson 63-64)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. expected surviving members of native communities to meet obligations, and, this expectation drove the Indians to compensate 'for their losses in various ways. When it was possible to do so, for 197 example, some took up wage labor. But more characteristically, emphasized the production of goods ,in which their particular community as a whole exercised some comparative advantage over other communities. And undoubtedly, for Indian villages to profit from specialization in the regional economies during the colonial period, they depended to a large extent on the continued existence of specialized classes--the heriditary nobles, traders, mayaques, especially the artisans--the artists, builders, metal and stone workers, and weavers--all of whom had already emerged in the Pre-C:::nquest period. 6 As long as the conquistadors could thus manipulate the existing Indir,;\ political economy through the twin controls of the encomienda, trib'.:,::.e and labor service they held the possibility of steadily incn"':lsing their wealth at little or no cost, and this despite the decline in Indian population. The Spanish Crown, however, had r'::cognized almost immediately that the encomenderos posed a severe I thre;;>.t to its own control over the colonial wealth. Acting in their trusteeships without restraint, the encomenderos became not only wealthy but p;)werful, and they gained an independence of the Crown much as the feudatories in Europe had acquired. To curtail this growing power, the Crown appointed royal governors and gave them, instead of the conquest 6 Taylor (1974: 401), Wolf (1955: 460; 19S9a: 226-228) and Gibson (1964: 198). The Indians also displayed a special facility for learning and developing new crafts and trades in the Spanish towns." See, for el\ample, \':olf (l9-S9a: 185-136).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.198 leaders, the responsibil ty for assigning new encomiendas. In addition, themonarch'began sending his jurists and lawyers to replace the conquistadors in all other. important bureaucratic positions.7 Theil, in a series of actions culminating in the 1540's the Crown urged its representatives to' whittle down the .prerogatives of the encomenderos with the goal of finally restoring royal authority. Because, royal intervention initially met strong resistence in the colonies, the Crown moved quickly and deliberately to build its power base. To its goal of reinstating royal authority, it added the further intention of defending the Indians against the arbitrariness and harsh treatment of the encomenderos, and it thereby gained the alliance of those segments of the Catholic Church that had been lobbying for administrative reform. With Church backing, the Crown in 1542 prom:d.gated the famous New Laws. These regulations abolished Indian forbade the granting of new encomiendas, ordered ecclesiastics and royal officers to reliquish their holdings, and allowed others to keer; iJleir grants only on the condition that they did not bequeath them. The ,:olonists raised a general outcry against these radical measures, whiCh clearly were calculated to destroy the encomiendawithin. a gene! '.Ition. Open rebellion erupted in Peru and threatened elsewhere. In 1::)45, the Hapsburg Emperor himself recognized the unenforceability of manl' ilf the provisions and specifically repealed the prohibition on inheritance of the encomienda.8 The settlers. claimed victory in the 7 On the growing power of the encomenderos, see Simpson (1950: 73-83), Chevalier (1952: 33) and Wolf (1959a: .. For 'some of the early countermeasures: Simpson (1950: 84-122), Zavala (1943: 90-91), Chevalier (1952: 43), Wolf (1959a: 189-190), and Gibson (1966: 55-56). a (1950: 123-144), Zavala (1943: 75-77},Chevalier (1952:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ 199 dispute, but the Crown promptly responded by endeavoring, somewhat more realistically, to regulate existing encomiendas and to control the behavior of the encomenderos. First, ,from 1549 on, royal regulatlon managed to disrupt the connection between' labor service and tribute. Encomenderos were no longer entitled to labor service and could only assess ',", ';',' tribute. Only later did the Crown then refuse grants to extend into perpetuity. As individual encomiendas expired, the tribute taken was directed to the depleted royal treasury where it became an important part of the Crown I s income the end of the colonial era. In other words, against the aspirations of the encornenderos, Crown policy explicitly favored the native political econO;;lY, with its already highly developed specializ'ations in trade, agrit;:i.ilture, and the crafts. Indeed, the Spanish monarchy came to deper"l crucially on these forms of economy and, through the continued exactions of tribute, preserved them to suit its own needs. Meanwhile, withc"1t benefit of labor services to advance the production of goods, the l;i\comenderos found that the administrative costs of collecting trib'Jte and the expense of paying clerics increasingly squeezed their i. proLts. The encomienda had become lIa precarious source of wealthll (MacLeod 1973: 288).9 44-45), Gibson (1966: 58-59, 75-77), and HacLeod (1973: i07-119). 9 See also Simpson (1950: 145-158), Zavala (1943: 78-79, 85-86), Chevalier (1952: 44-45, 119), Holf (1959a: 190-191):, Gibson (1964: 80-81;,1966: 59-6'5,143).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.;' 200 Although depopulation and royal interference had combined to tame the encomienda, and then to .eliminate it as a perduring institution, settlers did not give up their attempts to gain wealth in the colonies; they simply sought other means. Even before the encomienda privileges expired, in order to escape the obstacles that seemed destined to deprive them of a relatively free and comfortable level of living, many settlers had taken up rural land for ranching and for. semi-subsistence farming. On the northern frontier, where vacant land was abundant, settlers purchased titles from the indigent Spanish Crown. Close to the. great silver mines of the area, they supplied resident workers with much needed food and hides. In central Mexico and in the highlands to the south, Spaniards also obtained access to land,. and they serviced nearby urbar! areas with grains that the declining Indian population found it difficult to provide. Despite the continuing drop in the r of Indians, however, these southern regions still were wel1'populated, and the colonists thus had to settle their land in coe>:Litence with local Indian communities, many of whose members had wise'I-.,! confirmed their rights of access to land in Spanish titles soon after the Conquest, and Hho now jealously defended, both at law arid by I fore.:' I their rights of access to land and their rights to continue practicing traditional forms of agriculture and crafts. 1 0 10 For the drive to take up land as the encomienda declined, see, in general, Borah (1951: 32-33) and Brading (1978: 7-8) Lockhart {l969: 41G-418} outlined some of the structural implications of the encomienda for the processes by which Spaniards later obtained land. For the processes in northern Uexico, see Chevalier (1952: 54-56, 165-169) Wolf (1959a: 191-192). For central and southern Me.ico, and for Central America, see Chevalier (1952: and MaCLeod (1973: 217-224). On the resistence displayed by Indians in the populous regions to the south, see, for example, Chevalier (1952: 196-19S), Gibson (1964: 271, 285-288) and Taylor 77-84; 1974:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.201 Unfortunately for the Spanish cultivators and ranchers in all these areas, the silver mines began to fail eady in the seventeenth century. Largely because the operators lacked sufficient supplies of mercury, an essential ingredient in the extraction process, many of the mines closed. Settlers in the north lost the prime market for their produce. Moreover, as silver exports dwindled, and as the Indians continued to die, the need for administrators in the towns and cities to the south lessened, and a growing number of Spaniards there sought rural land. Competition among Spanish producers thus stiffened, prices fell and profits began to vanish.11 North and south, Spanish farmers and ranchers had little recourse to markets. Overseas travel along the Spanish Main suffered persiGtent attacks by privateers of rival European nations. Transpl)rtation from the interior to the coast was difficult and costly .. And, Qgcept for service provided to cultivators in easily accessible along the coast, the merchants whom the Crown had authorized to the colonial trade refused to handle anything but mineral wealth. As a result; in northern I-Iexico during the seventeenth century, settLrs largely abandoned the land, although some remained to; IIvegetate in self-subsistence" (Brading 1971: 13). In central Mexico and in the :}!.1uthern highlands, the economy fragmented into small markets surrounding the local centers. Spanish producers in these areas, especially cultivators of wheat; did not do particularly well, for they 402-403, 408). 11 Borah (1951: 43-44) and Brading 9-12; 1978:.8-9) have outlined some of the main reasons for the failures of the Hexican si,lver mines. For some_ of the consequences, see Chevalie( (1952: 66, 17S-1S1)., H.acLeod 217-224, 232-302) and Brading (1978: 9).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.competed not only against other Spaniards, but also, in the grain market, against Indian maize cultivators. Indian production of corn 202 fluctuated widely from s'eason to season, however, and Spanish producers soon realized that they could profit greatly only if they could be prepared, when Indian production failed, to exploit the large, normally self-sufficient market of Indian communities. So they devised a productive institution, the hacienda, that was uniquely suited to markets that occasionally grew large, often were small and, during the times when the Indians did exceptionally well, all but disappeared. 12. spanish producers had little capital. So to generate wealth, they had to economize their labor costs. For the ability to expand periodically to meet large markets, they specifically had to have ready access to cheap labor-power other than their own and, simultaneously, so they could contract efficiently when markets shrunk, they had to have no 12 Chevalier (1952: 48-49) and l-lorner (1973: 204-205) reviewed some of problems with Spanish overseas trade from Hexico. Indigo was an i!(!portant export from Central America at the beginning of the sJ?;'fenteenth century, but it too decliz:led, in part, because of these trade problems. See HacLeod (1973: 176-203). On the fragmentation of the local internal markets, see Chevalier (1952: 291-292), MacLeod (1973: 291-292, 311) and Taylor (1974: 394, 397). Wolf. (l9S9a: 178-182) surveyed the variety of crops produced for'loch ccmsumption. For the competitive pressures, especially in the grain rn,1rket, see, for example, Chevalier (1952:'51-52,'59-65), Gibson (1964: 310-312, 322-334) and Brading (1978: 10-11). Taylor (1972: 140-142) discussed the economic instability among the Spanish producers in the Valley of Oaxaca at this time. For various definitions of the hacienda, and for discussions of the conditions from which they generally sprang, see Wolf and Hintz (1957: 380, 386-395), Taylor (1972: 121-123; 1974:'391-393) and MBrner (1973: 165-186, 188-192, 203-205). Also see HacLeod (1973: 227-228), who argued that Spaniards in the countryside of. Central America "had neither the resources, the manpower, nor the capital to mount large-scale agricultural enterprises. Abo, .. e all, there was a lack of internal markets.1I The disappearance of markets was only temporary, however, and haciendas arose as "asyiums to which the Spaniards had reluctantly retreated to d\.;ait better days." It thus seems that the irreglllarity of local markets, not necessarily their slliall size, was

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 203 lasting and costly commitments to their laborers. Although the benefits of labor service under the encomienda system could have met these 'requirements, any encomenderos who remained among the Spanish farmers and ranchers had long since lost ,the privileges of Indian labor. Under another system known as repartimiento, however, the Spanish Crown had reserved to itself the right to demand Indian labor service, and it conducted an official exchange to allocate the available workers. A fixed percentage of the able-bodied males of each community formed a pool of laborers who were liable to be drafted in rotation. By Crown authorization, many owners of landed estates were entitled to receive a nme. of Indian workers for a designated period, for particular tasks, and the only obligation being the payment of a minimal wage.1S Repartimiento labor helped the struggling Spanish hacendados to some But the ever-diminishing Indian popUlation and the CrownLs own on the drafted laborers for royal projects gradually made the private allocations irregular and unpredictable. In any case, the owners had no great desire to remain under the restrictive umbn:lla of the Spanish Crown, so they resorted to other means of recruiting laborers for the times when they needed them most Some I :, leasd portions of their land to Indians who could then double as estate when required. Others simply paid a daily wage to Indians from near-by villages and dismissed the laborers as, soon as markets turned one of the essential conditions underlying the development of the hacienda. 13 For discussion of repartimiento, see Zavala (1943: 94-97), Borah (1951: 35-36), Chevalier (1952: 191}, Gibson (1964: 224-236: 1966: 143':'145)" Taylor (1972:' 144,:-147), and HacLeod (1973: 208-209, -295-296).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 204 sour. But many others secured a ready and cheap body of workers by advancing Indians sums of money that the natives could never payback. Legally tied to estate by their ,debts, the Indians were in no position to pressure wages.' 110reover, in the event that the market contracted and the estate could no longer offer the hacendado could enjoy the privilege of watching his indebted laborers, or peons, fend locally for themselves in petty trade, subsistence agriculture, or native crafts, and yet still remain obligated to him whenever he needed them.14 With their various complements of cheap laborers, haciendas thus afforded their owners the unique ability lito retrench in times of adverse marketsll and lito increase production if demand rose II (Wolf 1959a: 210). Bearing only a small labor cost in a time of primitive accumulation; these institutions their owners, and became one of the characteristic features of colonial settlement in the region. Much as they envied the mineral wealth that Spain first extracted from jts colonies of conquest in the New World, none of. the other nations were, able to 'duplicate the Spanish achievement. But then i.either did other European colonists in the New World find. I compar:lble native civilizations whose great wealth, which was based in part Oil the practice of local crafts, they could readily' extract, and whose people they could readily exploit to. re.solve the persistent 14 For discussions of the various methods. of labor recruitment used by the colonial'haceridados, (1943: 98-99), Borah (1951: Chevalier. (1952: 69, 277-278), Gibson (19.64:' 246-256; 1966: 146-147),. Taylor (1972: 143-iS2}; MacLeod (1973: 224-226, and Brading (1978: 9-10). On status relations within the hacienda,' see, for example, Chevalier (1952: 29j-299), Wolf and Mintz (1957: 387), .and Wolf (I9::!9a: 207-210).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ .. 205 problem of colonial labor scarcity. Nor did settlers from other '" 'European nations suffer the irregularities and weaknesses of local markets. Elsewhere, Newl-lorld colonists depended on their own labor or on that of immigrants from abroad, and they did so in ,the context of colonial markets that generally were steady and regular, although some markets were rather narrow and small, while others proved. quite wide and large. The eventual development of production on haciendas in the New World thus remained, like the extraction of gold silver, largeiy a Spanish phenomenon. Stll, the differences of other European colonies in the New World from the colonies of spain did not simply begin with differing endowments of mineral wealth, nor end with market differences. .. Occasionally, other Europeans set out like Spain to create a colony by conquest. But when they did, their object was most often the land held by other Europeans. Given growing evidence that native states Simil?f to the Aztec and Inca, empires did not exist elsewhere in the' New World, European colonists accordingly modified their aims for estabHshing colonies in other areas, such as eastern North America, and they '1.:1ried their treatment of the native people. Thus, Englishmen I their colonial foothold in the northeast part of the continent not by conquest but by cultivating the Indian trade, and in Virginia they 'Jettled by forming as soon as possible a colony of production.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 206 5.2 EASTERN NORTH AND EUROPEAN TRADE While they were developing their settlements in the Caribbean, Mesoamerica, and South America, the Spanish did not totally ignore the eastern North American continent. Until 1561, they actively explored as far north as the Chesapeake Bay in efforts to gauge the wealth they might procure from the region. However, the potential of North America for development began to lose much of its attraction as French encroachments in the New World increasingly threatened the safety of the Spanish fleet that transported goods to and from already established colonies. Moreover, when John Hawkins appeared in the Caribbean in 1562, he marked the arrival of a new threat to Spanish America, the Engli::ih. From that point on, Spanish interest in eastern North America tended to focus on settlements established for 'defensive, not expan;,:, ionary, reasons. Spaniards sought to pacify the Indians in Floridii, primarily through missionary activity, and to control thereby the coast, from which they could then protect the passage, of the Spani";h fleet through the vital Bahama Channe1.15 French and British pirates persistently harassed the Spanish in the Caribbean during the latter half of the sixteenth,century I and, I,ll this, they were supported by Dutch and Portuguese interlopers. But Eut"opeanopposition to Spain was not confined to arenas in the New World, The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 off the coast of ,nglalld dealt Spain a particularly stunning blow. In 1609, Holland gained independence from Spain. A class of merchant businessmen subsequently rose to power in the new Dutch state .and, in 1621, 15 For details of the Spanish expansion along the North American coast, see, forexample;-Sturtevant (1962: 46-49, 54-64).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.i ... \ established the formidable Dutch West India Company. By the early seventeenth'century, Spain not only had its attention diverted from North American expansion, but the balance of European power had ,so 207 shifted that Spain could no longer resist' all the territorial claims of the French, British and Dutch, particularly all their claims in the West Indies. The Dutch West India Company, being the most forceful claimant during the early seventeenth century, cornered .the West routes, attacked the Portuguese colony in Brazil, opened the fringes of the Caribbean to settlement, and helped the English and French to establish thriving West Indian colonies. Meanwhile, the French, English and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch had also developed a lively interest in eastern North America and, after severil1 decades of activity, they had a vivid sense of its potential wealth, Before 1600, the French and English even had established seveLll short-lived settlements along the coast. When the English finally gained an adequate foothold in the early seventeenth century, they :ittempted to duplicate the Spanish production of mineral wealth; but t.hey failed miserably. Captain John Smith, for example, reported with dismay that Englishmen in early Virginia, for all the ent1'\usiasm i with '.?hich they searched for gold and silver, were rewarded only with shiplrJads of much gilded durt" (quoted in Nash 1974: 49)., If the promise of mineral wealth in North America ultimately was not flllfilled, the French, English and Dutch had become well aware that New Horld gold could take other forms. French fishermen who had been working the fertile waters off the coast of Newfoundland visited the Saint Lawrence River as early as 1535 and found Indians willing, to trade.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.208 the skins of fur-bearing animals f,or Stimulated by the prospect of 'enhancing their wealth in furs, Europeans anxiously explored the North Americ,an coast and learned much about the native inhabitants.16 In general, 'they found that lithe Indians lived according to a well-ordered and impressively complex system of government. They dwelled in secure villages, had substantial houses and extensive gardens, and had a notable assemblage of artifacts for utilitarian, religious and decorative purposesll (Lurie 1959: 44). But explorers and traders also noted how markedly different North American social organization was from that of the high civilizations of Mesoamerica and South America. Native North Americans ,had not drawn rigid class lines nor a:, subjects to government were they lIaccustomed to supporting the luxurr of a theocratic state apparatus" (Leacock 1971: 7). The scale of socir:l organization was much smaller, making for less dense settlements than those found in Spanish America and having the consequence that, as a whr.l.e, native North American were not so easily subjugated. There were, of course, pocke:ts of settlements with dense population under, power Eul, sometimes shifting political alliances. The interior, tribes I of th" eastern Great Lakes region, such as the Huron and the Iroquois, one locus of power at the time of European colonization, and another could be found in the Chesapeake region where Powhatan had warded off the inland tribes of the Piedmont and had consolidated his hold ':In a confederacy of coastal tribes. But by contrast, in what was to become New England, pressures from the Eastern Iroquois and internal 16 See, for example, Hunt (1940: 16-17), Brasser 66.,.68; 1978: 79-80) and Nash (1974: 34).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., i 209 rivalries sharply divided and systematically weakened the political organization of the local peoples. 17 It is doubtful whether any European nation, 'other than Spain" could have mustered either the manpower or the state financing for 'a major military effort of conquest in the New World during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But once traders and explorers bacame aware of the general characteristics of North American Indian societies and had satisfied themselves, and those in their mother countries, that native North Americans were not organized to yield the wealth either of the Aztecs or of the Incas, they adopted strategies more suited to the nature of local tribal circumstances and to the expected scale of return. At various junctures in the colonial period, settlers did use force, incorporate some tribes, and appropriate wealth as tribute. But, for th::: most part, especially in the northeast part of the continent, the Fr;;:nch, English and Dutch each tried to cultivate Indian interest in trade, And, up and down the coast, they all learned, though some of cours': better than others, to make use of Indian alliances and rivalries in orller to channel the trade to their own advantage or to obtain land for Similarly, many Indians learned the nature and, extent I of rivalries among Europeans and, by manipulating these relationships, they sought advantages over' other Indians in obtaining deslt-;:d trade goods ,and in diking the flood of European colonization.1B 17 HlIllt (1940: 32-33), Leach (1958: 23-24), Lurie (1959: 39-43), Washburn (1959: 23-24), Vaughan (1965: 27-63), Brasser (1971: 68-70, 73; 1978: Nash (1974: 15-25, 49, 76-78), Mbrgan (1975: 48-58), Sheehan (1980: 90-93, 155-157), and Wright (1981: 16, 60). 18 See, for example, (1971: 74-77;1978: 82-85) and Nash (1974: 49, 66-67), Sheehan (1950: 153-155), and Wright ,68-70, 94-96, 106-116, 135-144)-.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 210 Relations with native Americans thus counted among the prime factors in the early history of North American colonial politics and diplomacy i and c.onsiderations based on trade relations were particularly important. In the northeast, the French settled colonist,s at their Canadian outposts between 1598 and 1604, to solidify their claims on the Indian trade against the Dutch and the English. The Dutch, in turn, after opening the Hudson River to trade in 1610, planted settlers in New Amsterdam at the mouth of the river in 1624. It was the English, however, who made the most vigorous attempts at settlement in the northeast, in Hassachusetts, starting in 1620. 5.2.1 From Trading Posts to Farm Colonies in, New England In New England settlement followed the fur trade. As traders opened the river courses, the fringes of settlement spread. For a time, New England traders accepted the support of other kinds of colonists. But it became increasingly evident that encroachments by settlers endal'!',lered the habitat of the beaver and threatened to upset the precadous balance the traders had \olith local Indians. When. colord.sts began moving into the Connecticut River Valley during, the I ; 1630":. for example, the Pequot Indians attacked to defend their rights to th,! land. The settlers won, however, and, as they pressedtheir claim,', from the south and the easf, the New England fur traders and Indians were also being squeezed on the north and west by French and Dutch inroads. Not until 1664, when the English wrested control of New York from tl:le Dutch, did the fur traders finally discover a satisfactory out Ie t for their energies. Unfortunately, the New Indians

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 211 eventually found none. They mustered a major effort in a series of battles begun in 1675, known as King'Philip's War; but they were soundly and decisively crushed. The fur trade subsequently dissipated in New England and "those Indians t-lho survived the struggle of 1675-1676 were forced to recognize the stark fact of English supremacy"(Leach 1958: 245).1 '3 Although the use of military force thus occasionally became necessary, merchants not military men had originally sponsored New England settlement. English merchants sought the returns of the fur trade and aimed to lower costs and increase profits by encouraging self-subsistent residents'in the New World to process the goods on a large scale. In the first decade of however I the expected profits did not materialize. Early settlers often had to relocate their original settlements and seek the assistance of local Indians before they could set up agricultural production. Conflicts arose and, growing quickly impatient, the merchants withdrew their ,original support ,and "eitfv:;r ceased to concern themselves with the settlers or restricted theh interest in them to sending over English goods at exhorbitant priCC:i; ,II But the people at Plymouth eventually discovered the yalu,e of Wampi.lirl to the Haine Indians, and when they did, "their trade balances rose :;ignificantly. II By the end of the 1620s, colonial products included fish and timber, and the added value "offered English merchants 19 For the colonial expansion that closely followed the fur trade, and for some of the conflicts ,both internal and external, that it generated in the English settlements, see, for example, Buffinton (1916), Bailyn (1955: (1959: 53), and Craven' (1968: 115-116). For the story of the Pequot War, see Vaughan (1965: 122-154). Leach (1958) has provided a detailed King Philip.' s War. -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.212 new inducements to invest in voyages to New England" (Bailyn 1955: 11, 13, 15). The steady influx of new arrivals bearing ready cash and needing to purchase food, among other necessities', stimulated the production of m agricultural surplus in the 1630s, as well as a network of local artisans and merchants to process and to distribute the goods. By 1639, however, the rate of arrivals slowed and the market created by the newcomers consequently began to contract. Cultivators found it harder to dispose of their products, the prices for which fell, while the demand for manufactured imports continued to rise. To reduce the level of imp;.)rts, New England leaders began adopting austerity measures, and to preserve a favorable balance of trade, they offered financial induceillents for the local production of cloth and iron. Despite these measures, ho'.vever, the proposed industries failed to attract much inten'st. Instead" as Edward Johnson wrote, the settlers "deem it bettet' for their profit to put away their cattle and corn for clothing, than !,J set upon the making of cloth" (quoted in Bailyn 1955: 74). They did 5':" in part, because enterprising merchants from the Bay colony, proba\'ly through contacts in the English trading centers, became I acqua.,nted with the agricultural needs of Spaniards and islanders across the Atlantic and endeavored to satisfy those needs. 2 0 The diverse overseas markets were not especially large, nor was their expansion certain. But during the 1640s, especially in the Caribbean Sea, planters of such staple crops as cotton and sugar began to demand the grains that glutted the Bay area so they could feed' their' 20 Bailyn (1955: 46-49,61-74) and Rutman (1963: 397-401).'. For more detail on the iront-:orks project, see Dunn, (1962:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ 213 laborers, and they wanted England wood products to construct their estates. They thus afforded enterprising merchants a potentially lucrative opportunity, and the New Englanders moved quickly to enter the widely-flung Atlantic trade networks that arose. They "sought relations with the English houses and their agents, selling their produce through them in order to buildup credits in England against the of goods for importatation into the Commonwealth [of Massachusetts]" (Rutman 1963: 405). In this way, the merchants created new markets to sustain New England agricultural Seeking even greater profits, the merchants tried to expand their investments upon this agricultural basis, and many themselves took up ownership of the land. By the fur trade, the prime attraction early colonial setthment in New England, had become "only one of the forms of investment, perhaps the most speculative form, open to enterprising men" (Buffinton 1916: 177 n.1) .21 Evidently, New England settlers were not indifferent to and, when they could, they promptly took advantage of profL9.ble economic opportunities. But many of the settlers had come to Ameri':a seeking not only profit but also relief from the pressufes ,of relig.louS .persecution in England. When they arrived in New England, they Lncorporatedvillages with the aim of preserving their religious idenLties. To establish their versions of the religious "city upon a hill," the corporate villagers obtained a grant of land for settlement 21 On the growing importance of New England trade in the Caribbean during this period, particularly in Bat"bados, see Harlow (1926: 268-291). See. also Barnes (1923: 137) and Bid\oJell and .Falconer (1925: 42-45, 133-137).. Bailyn (1 76-91,98-105) and Rutman (1963: 401-407, 413-414) have 'focused on the techniques used by the New En.glandmercliants to expand their trade. ...

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.214 from the General Court of the colony. Then, to obtain legitimate title, they had to effect a transfer from the local Indians. The practice of purchasing Indian land progressed very however, if it progressed at all, and many communities justified their claims to land solely on the basis of their effective occupation following a colonial grant. Those villages that did obtain title almost always did so "in order to obtain a favorable settlement in a situation where the same tract of land was coveted by both English and Dutch settlers or by rival English groups" (Nash 1974: 82). Later on, these various and sometimes inconsistent justifications for rightful access to land in New England gave dse to much administrative confusion, and prompted officials of the short-lived Dominion of New England to demand that all. property be 22 But based upon their claims of rightful access, however sound thesE: ultimately proved to be, towns nevertheless allocated land rights to individuals identified as members of the community. In general, the towns strove to distibute the land equitably; all members received a housdot, cultivation land, and rights to common pasture. Of course, there .... ere customary allowances made in some places for so-called ",rank and qualityll among community members (Lockridge 1970: 11-12), for 22 The religious foundations of New England are well known, but historical account tnat links the religiotls.motives of. the New Etlgland settlers to the political isolatiqn of their communities, see DUnn 6-56). Lockridge (1970: 16-19) took this theme one ftHther and, drawing on the :peasant studies of anthropologist Eric Wolf, described. oneearJ.-Alew as a IIChristian Utopian Closed Corporate Community'. II'. On the settl!;!rs I various methods for access tq land,. see, for example, Barnes (1923: 43-44, 176-192),: A"k-agi (1924.: 5-1"3,'15-49), Bid\veLt' and Falconer .. (1925: 49-50), Vaughan (1965: 104-121), Bushman (1967 :41-47), and Cra\'en (1968: 110"-111).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., \ I r i .. .. ,215 differing family sizes, and for the uneven qualities of the soil. ,In addition, some people with recognized abilities as cultivators 'received special consideration in the allotment of farm land. For the most part, however, the market for agricultural produce was so small during the early years of settlement that few New Englanders had sufficient economic grounds for actively seeking more than their fair share of land and for thereby risking disruption of the closely-knit foundations of the new communities. Early New England thus comprised colonies of Puritans who, among other things cultivated equivalent portions of land for narrow local 'markets, and did so largely by themselves, with their own ti:O hands and perhaps with the help of their families. 23 As the New England merchants broadened their networks and found more diverse markets, however, farm production among the Puritans gradually gave rise to specialists in other forms of economic activity, and this development soon soon helped to alter the subtle blend of force:; in the New England towns. By the late 1640s, under the influenc,e of merchants the locus of agricultural production, began to shift from Massachusetts to more fertile land along the, Connecticut Rivet where towns had become, according to one observer, I abou!,ding in corne the fruitfullest places, in all New England" (quoted in Rutman 1963: 409). The produce from these towns was colh:,::ted at various points on the river for transhipment to the port of,' 23 On this last point, see, ,for example, Bushman (l967: 30), who observed that "most men could afford to hire extra hands only at' harvest or when constructing a building. help" they contented themselves with supplyirtg their families and perhaps slaughtering an animal or two to send to market along with a few bushels of II For the principles of distributi'ng land to town members, see Akagi (1924: 103-114), Bidwell and Fal'coner, (1925: 49-58)" Labaree< (1933: 4-14), and Lockridge (1970: 6':;10,'70-74).'

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.216 Boston, where it was then exported across the Atlantic, or used to outfit and provision the ships themselves. But rooted in farm production, all :this trade clearly entailed still further needs: for shipwrights and carpenters to build and repair the ships, for butchers to slaughter cattle and salt the beef, for millers and bakers to process grain and make bread and biscuits, and for coopers to build casks to hold these and 'other products. Moreover, the broad base of increasingly prosperous agricultural communities offered an additional market for which these and other artisans could generalize the knowledge and exper.ience that they gained in the export trade. Coopers could widen their market for containers by making cabinets; carpenters apprenticed to bu:L1d ships could use their skills to. build homes; and butchers and bakers producing for export presumably operated' on a scale sufficiently largf.' that they could offer their products cheaply enough to attract a home 1ilarket as well. 24 With the growth and diversification of economic activity in the 1640s and 1650s, then, artisans, merchants and even laborers became more notic(!able in the New England towns, though of course not always to the same degree. The particular features of the developments varieq I considerably but, in general, given the growing number of people, who had increasingly little use for the agricultural qualities of the .soil, the distiction bet\o1een resident members of the community and the farmers who had proprietary rights to arable land became more and more 24 For an overview of agricultural activity in colonial Connecticut, see Daniels. (1980: 429-434). On the internal trade within early colonial New England, andfor the rise of craft manufactures; see Barnes (1923: 137-149), Labaree (1933: 14-16), Rutman (1963: 407, 410-415) and, again, Daniels (1930: 438-443).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.217 important. In some places, the principle of land distribution shifted from a principle of equal allocations for all residents to one of .. proportional allocations based on previous holdings and use. In almost all cases, the agricultural proprietors formed a privileged soocorporation within the town to tend to'the administration of arable land, while the town council formed another to treat the expanded affairs of the residents in general. The group of proprietors acted especially to protect the interests of landholding farmers against those, including town residents, who sought to narrow or infringe their rights or \olho sought to tax them.25 Proprietors of New England farms thus responded to land-use preSSl,lres at the local level in their towns and at the level. of the respective colony-wide governments. But of the' challenges they confn.mted, none threatened their existence more seriously than those tendcred by the British Crown. New England merchants, farmers and artisans had allied to corner some lucrative overseas markets. for local agrblltural produce at a time when England suffered the. turmoil of the Civil War and Cromwell's Protectorate. This alliance had jelled in. the creation of the fiercely independent, almost impudent, colonies pf l'few I. England. Following the Stuart Restoration in 1660, however, the Crown a concerted effort to establish firmer control over all its colonies, and especially those in New England. 2S Akagi (1924: 4-5, 55-80), Bidwell and Falconer (1925: Labaree (1933: 18-23), Bushman (1967: 43-53), and Lockridge (1970: 80-82) Greene '(i974: 173-180) has provided a helpful t-eview that indicates hO\ol widespread these internal divisions confiicts were in New England.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 218 The Crown did not always formulate its colonial policies clearly and when it did, the policies often met with various kinds. of opposition that prevented their full realization. But, in general, the Stuarts consistently sought two.principal goals: they aimed to realize maximum revenue through customs by regulating trade within the Empire, and they also sought to incorporate individual colonial governments into a.single framework. After some experimentation, the Crown eventually began to create a bureaucratic structure with low-level agents to monitor affairs in the colonies. Customs officials were among the earliest of these agents posted to the colonies. Where royal intervention met with opposition, as it did in New England, the Crown challenged the very basis of the opposition by 9uestioning the original colonial charters. These challenges culminated in New England with the formation during 1685 of the Dominion of New England, an administrative structure that eventually spanned the colonies from Maine to New Jers(q.26 Some in New England saw potential advantages in the closer ties to Enqland that were implied by Dominion rule. Among these were merch:mts who 'hoped to' expand their businesses and perhaps even ,to I parti:: ipate in the trade of plantation products, such as cotton and sugar., that were becoming staples of emergent.British industry. of such people were originally included in the governing Council of the DominiQn. But Sir EdmundAndros, the new Governor-General, frequently ignored the Council the further 26 Barnes (1923.: 11-33), Bailyn (1955: 112-114, 143, 154-170), Craven. (1968: 165-171), and Lovejoy (1912: 126-132). For an focusing on one of the more famous Crown agents' in the in the colonies, see Hall (1960).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ \ 219 chagrin of the merchants, he insisted upon the strict enforcement of the navigation acts. Because these acts favored plantation products at customs, not local farm produce, the merchants \Olere disabled in the international market and, II temporarily at least, trade was completely ruinedll in New England (Barnes 1923: 169). Some merchants began accomodating their economic interests to fit the new conditions, and they s01:1ght to spare the colonies from complete disaster by organizing the increased production of such staples as copper and naval stores.21 Given proper administrative direction and support, perhaps they could have redirected New England production away from its farm basis and odented it more towards plantation production. Andros, however, managed to isolate himself, from all,possible elements of support for such a policy. Without a representative assembly and ignoring the advice of his Council, Andros implemented a tax that :;;,;11 heavily on agricultural communities and on petty merchants. He the number of town meetings residents could hold. PartL:!.llarly galling to staunch Puritans he denied the towns the right to co i.lect the church rate for the support of ministers, and he spon!,cJred the Anglican Church. Finally, and most. disturbing of Andrt'5 attempted to correct the widespread defects in the land titles of the New Englanders. He aimed to repatent the colonists I property, charging a fee for the service, and he brought the matter to issue with a test case in court citing five of largest landholders in the Dominion.28 Z7 See especially Barnes (1923: 8-10, 73-76, 170-172). Also see Bailyn (1955: 169-170, 175-176, 180-182), Craven (1968:218), and Dunn (1970: 63-64).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. i I These concerted actions had the effect of uniting the various 220 parties in New England on only one thing: their utter opposition to Andros and the Dominion. When word arrived in Boston of the Glorious Revolution in England, the miltia mutinied, armed citizens roamed the streets, and the gentlemen of the city directed the arrest of Andros. The Dominion government fell, but the economic effects of its overthrow were largely conservative.29 Although the political future of the New England colonies subsequently remained in doubt for some time, IItrade immediately sought its old channels" (Barnes 1923: 172). The Glorious Revolution in New England thus restored local commerce to its former basis .in widely diverse markets, each of relatively small size, and it reverf:ed the inclination towards large-scale production. But as English colonists thereby secured the place of farm production and of crafts in New England colonies, where original settlers had meant to cultivate the Indian trade, English colonists further to the South in 'virginia struggled to develop the plantations that had served to pr.,vide a staple crop for a lar:ge foreign market almost from the incer,l'ion of the colony. 28 Barnes (1923: 80-100, 113-134, 169-171, Akagi (1924: 115-124), Bailyn (1955: 169-170, 218-222), DUnn 65, 67-69), .and Lovejoy (1972: 29 Barnes (1923: 231-261), Craven (1968:223-227), and\;ovejoy (1972: 235-250).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.221 5.2.2 The English in Virginia: The Development of Plantation Colony Spaniards and New Englanders came to the New World and, one way or another, returned wealth to their respective mother countries. If ,as settlers, they .could not .agree among themselves how best to produce the wealth, they were at least united on other narrow purposes. Early Spanish colonists dedicated themselves to a policy of military conquest, while New Englanders expressed a religious fervor in which they saw their actions justified before God. When the Englishmen who came to settle Virginia landed at Jamestown in 1607, they came prepared to court and, if necessary, to browbeat and bully Powhatan I s Indians for assistance and corn. However, they were not prepared to exert the military belligerance of the New World conquistadors from Spain. And if the Virginians were not united on a mission of conquest neither did they agreethat they bore a mission of salvation. Indeed, the Englishmen who came 1:0 Virginia could agree on almost nothing except that they hoped vague with Richard Hakluyt IIthat thereuppon we may devise what means may Pl! thought of to rayse trades" (quoted in Craven 1949: 35). The Virginia Company was experimental and speculative in its progr'\m to produce goods for trade with England, and the great L,ondC?n I I merchmts who invested in the Company understood that it might take some time for them to see a return on their capital. Lesser merchants who invested in the venture, however, to see quicker action because they could not so easily afford to have their capital tied up for very long. Unfortunately for the smaller investors, indiscipline andother problems of communal organization among the settlers blocked any quick realization of company goals; and none of these problems proved more

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.222 detrimental than those that derived, at least in part, from the very nature of the Company's program. Because of its speculative nature, the Company a disproportionate number of English gentlemen who supplied needed, funds but who, with their' attendants, also wished to accompany their investment to the new colony. In addition, because of its experimental nature, the Company recruited a great variety of craftsmen to process the many different riches that the sponsors 'hoped to find.3o The Company thus included as colonists an oversupply of people who were distinctly unsuited to carving a settlement from the New World wilderness. Artisans, gentlemen and attendants simply did not have the stamina nor the will to endure the backbreaking toil of clearing land, raising fortifications and tilling the soil. For such-tasks, the Company sought cheap laborers and made attractive offers of indenture to lure England's poor and wayward to the New World. But then, even after this motley assortment of settlers had endured several years of bicke!. ing hardship and had finally established a foothold on the land, they .Jere dismayed to find so little wealth. The settling of Virginia was l:ot intended as a gold hunt, but the colonists fully to, I find gold, and they were disappointed and became even more quarrelsome when they did not. The timber and sassafras that counted among the early exports of the colony largely proved unprofitable and, by 1619, the Ilprincipall weal thll of which discouraged settlers like John Pory could boast, IIconsisteth in servants," that is, in other settlers (quoted 3D See, for example Craven (1949: 46-47, 60-61, 82-88)" Bailyn (1959: 92-93) Morgani1975: 44-45, 71-86, 92-93).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.223 in smith 1947: 13) .31 Theoretically, the Virginia Company aimed to support a and balanced program of colonial production. But at a very early stage, the demand of many investors for a quick return of capital caused the company to emphasize the extractive industries. And the impatience of these investors was hardly lessened by the apparently dissolute character of the Company's settlers. The Virginia colonists were unwilling, or ooable, to produce enough food to feed themselves, and they grew desperate for a means of exchange to obtain needed subsistence goods. Experiments with Virginia tobacco in the.London market in 1614 seemed promising and, despite the opinion of King James I, who detested the weed as an "abomination to the devil II and who sought to tax it out of existence, the trade soon expanded (Williams 1957: By 1615, merchnnts imported nearly 13,000 pounds sterling worth of tobacco from Virginia and, by 1621, they imported over 55,000 pounds sterling worth. The dllty on the leaf began to fill the King' s treasury and to soften his obje<' tions. Meanwhile, the success of the tobacco trade encouraged Virg:t.1\ians like Edwin Sandys to believe that his fellow settlers would eventually be able to produce other, more "staple and solide commodities II (quoted in Horgan 1975: 95) .3Z As the tobacco trade expanded, however, the settlers only planted more uf the weed. :They thus made wider terri todal claims on Virginia' s soil and this, of course, was not lost on the local Indians. In 1622, 31 See further Smith (1947: 8-16). Also see Craven (1949: 67-71, 88;;'90, 108-109) and Morgan (1975: 45, 86-89, 94-98, 106-107). 32 Craven (1949: 47-48, 115,123-124, 139-146), Williams {1957: 102-105, 108-113), and Menard (1980: 123, 125-129).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.224 powhatan I S son launched an attack on the colony and massacred several hundred settlers. The remaining colonists retaliated swiftly and brutally. But their prompt reaction .could not hide the underlying decay of the original Virginia Company. Now nearly bankrupt, the Company had tried to implement goals that were too broad for the financial resources that it had available, and too demeaning for its leading personnel. Servants continued to arrive in the colony without the supplies to sustain them and, if the settlers did not perish from disease and starvation, they were left vulnerable to Indian attack. Moreover, weak and ineffectual, the Company could not prevent private traders from plying virginia I s waterways and stimulating increased production of tobacco. Operating what one scholar has characterized as IImoving taverns, II these traders exchanged spirit for smoke, quenching the planters I thirsts and taking as payment the weed that would othentise have benefited the Company (Morgan 1975: 113). Some of the big r:.tanters got to the merchants first, engrossed needed commodities and i.}me to dominate the local trade by forcing smaller planters to sell their tobacco crop to them at reduced prices in order to obtain neces';ary items.s3 While the tobacco market thus boomed virtually unchecked, crudely ambitious t.obacco planters sought to consolidate their control .by seizing what little power was left in the council offices of the Comp
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.225 of servants" (Morgan 1975: 123-124). Following a royal inquiry, James finally dissolved the Virginia' Company. and plac.ed the' colony under' his-personal controL Charles I, James I son and successor in 1625, shared his father IS distaste for the course Virginia was following and,wi th' the carrot of representative government, he tried to lure the owners of tobacco plantations toward more diversified economic practices. By 1627, however, he. had to recognize the strength.of their addiction to the weed, and he aptly exclaimed that the colony was IIwholly built upon smokell (quoted in Beer 1908: 91). By 1630, the planters had claimed the privilege of representative government as their right and, in 1635, they used it to advantage by successfully having a quarrelsome royal governor recalled to England. 34 By the late 1640s, the merchants trading" for Virginia tobacco hailed not only from London, but also from Bristol, New England, and the The planters welcomed the merchants whose very diversity of ori.gin indicated that tobacco had come to hold a market that, if it was n;Jt booming as it had in the 1620s, was at least large and broadly-centered New England and Bristol merchants, however, brought only J limited range of goods in return for transporting tobacco,. The I Dutch were more experienced traders, offering goods that satisfied most of th,} settlers I needs, occasionally making credit available and slaves to the very few who could afford them.. But it was the London merchants who could best service the Virginia I s needs for caplt.\31, for cheap indentured laborers, and for consumer goods." And 34 Craven (1949: 147-164), Bailyn (1959: 93-98), and Horgan (1975: .'117 ... 130. 143-145);-

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. 226 there the tobacco trade concentrated.35 Moreover, it was through London that a new infusion of wealth and talent began entering Virginia at mid-century. The immigrants included refugees of the English Civil War, but the most important among them were lithe younger sons of substantial families well connected in London business and' governmental circles" (Bailyn 1959: 98). They came to virginia, made substantial investments in tobacco production, commanded mdentured laborers, parlayed small properties into larger ones, expanded the fringe of settlement, and sought to express their power through the local county jurisdictions.36 The arrival of this new elite, however, marked the beginning of profound changes in the character of the colony. The actions of new and wealthy planters tended to exacerbate some of the persistent difficulties in the "organization of Virghlia I s staple economy at a time when new problems began to mount to crisi;;; proportions. Mortality had been high in the .early years of the colony, partj among the indentured servants who labored for the tobacco Few laborers had lived much beyond the end of their terms of serv:ke, which averaged about five years. But once plantation I begall to accumulate some wealth, they established well-managed orchards, improved their cattle stock, cultivated corn, and in other ways devebped a local food supply. As a result, mortality began to decline. Servants survived their periods of indenture in reasonably good health, and moved to enter tobacco production on their own. Some even received 35 Craven (1949: 239-242) '. 36 See further Bailyn (1959: and Rainbolt (1970; 412-414).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.227 a grant of land as part of their freedom dues. As death thus loosened its grip on "the colony, Virginia's tobacco planters soon discovered that their system of labor "organization had a built-in mechanism for creating each year a new wave of producers who couid only serve to stiffen competition in an already tight market. number of planters added to the total tobacco supply and thereby put an increasingly downward pressure on the price of the leaf.37 A secular rise in production and a long-term fall in price, however, did not necessarily mean that competing producers suffered a corresponding squeeze in profits. Low prices stimulated a steady growth m sales until the 1680s when the European tobacco market became virtually saturated. Moreover, the costs of storing and transporting fell in the seventeenth century. So growing sales volume and savintJs in the costs of production both tended to offset declining returns. Diligent freed men thus could and did find room in the comp(,titive world market to become tobacco producers in Virginia at But they did not always find it easy to realize their econoilllC ambitions. 3 B 37 Horgan (1975: 101, 158-163, 175-177, 180-185, 215-216). See also Wertenbaker (1922: 39-41), Carr and 11enard (1979: 208-209) and Walsh (1977: 115-116). 38 Fetr conditions in the tobacco market, see Menard (1980: 113-116, 134-135, 143-149, 153). The opportunities available for newly freed men to enter tobacco production at this time have been better studied for the neighboring colony of Haryland: But .indications are that the general conclusions apply equally to colonial Virginia. So see, for example, Walsh (1977) and Cair and Menard (1979). See also"Kulikoff (1979: 516, 519-5"31).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.228 During the third quarter of the century, not only did newly freed men in Virginia have to contend with established tobacco planters and have to brace themselves against future competition from present servants, they alsohad to respond to the aggressive new group of planters from England. With their wealth and political connections, these immigrants quickly circumscribed available opportunities and made the position of others less and less secure. The new elite engrossed choice tracts of land, for example, and ex-servants found themselves pushed in search of soil to the frontier, where their dreams of proprietorship' and productive gain could only materialize under the constant threat of Indian attack.. Many refused to submit to the dangers of fnmtier life, and resolved to rent unoccupied land for tobacco tion from other proprietors in settled areas. Still others turned shift, less and idle. 3 '3 But even if those ex-servants who did manage to enter tobacco prod',i,:tion were, notcoritp1ete1y .. discouraged by 'o'f security, .' ,', eithc'i" on the frontier or on rented land, then surely the welter of expen'3es, including the taxes levied by local representatives and the duties collected by the Crovtn, continually threatened tq drag I them into insolvency. In addition, following the Stuart Restoration in 1660, the Crown's determined enforcement of the Nayigation Acts cont ributed even more to the woes of the poorer tobacco planters. Under the provisions of the Acts, Dutch merchants were prohibited from trading. 3'3 Sailyn (1959: 104), Breen (1973: 5-6), Horgan (1975: 218-238), and Walsh (1977: 113) A great cause for worry about land security actually originated with the King himself. \.,.ho granted land' in the Northern Neck of Virginia to his cronies without for that other settlers had already obtained. See Morgan (1975: 244-246), Cra' :en-(196S: 11) and Leonard (1967: 67:"70).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.229 in British territo.ry. The tobacco market in Virginia thus became tighter and more competitive as tobacco producers lost an important outlet for disposal of their product. And war with the Dutch and French in the 1660s and 1670s did little to assure them that the economically protected English market was militarily a safe one. With these matters all pressing, idlers in the colony soon became a nuisance. They were expensive to control and, if nothing else, they represented a waste of much-needed cheap labor. So county courts returned those they could catch to servitude. The assembly lengthened the terms of service for new arrivals, and the county courts did likewise for residents found guilty of transgressions. The promise of freedom thus gradually diminished in Virginia. Hopes gave way to anger. And discontent 40 For years, particularly when the tobacco market was depressed, CrOVli' authorities, planters and assorted prophets called attention to the HIs of a narrow dependence on a single crop, and they urged Virglnians to diversify their economy. Indeed, early leaders had intended to found a colony that produced a wide variety of useflll products. But the original intentions had failed, and I suggestions largely went unheeded.41 By the 1660s and 1670s, as conditions proceeded to deteriorate, renewed calls sounded to. remedy Virginia I s tobacco addiction Governor Berkeley promoted peaceful 40 Craven (1949: 375-379: 1968: 39-40, 129-130, 138), Bailyn (1959: 100-102, 105), Breen (1973: 6), and Morgan (1975: 196-211, 216-218, 239-244). For a different view, see Carr and Menard (1979: 235-238) and Menard (1980: 134-135). 41 Beer (1908: 91, 94-97, 99, 243-249), Craven (1949: 140-142, 147, 162-163, 244-245, 251-253) and Morgan (1975: 95-96,\109, 134-135, 186)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.230 change through more diversified production and through the development of towns. Others, however, thought violence a better elixir: for nearly two decades, uprising racked the colony, and the largest and most serious of was known as Bacon I s Rebellion. Sir William Berkeley, who belonged to an old royalist family, governed Virginia for nearly three decades during the period 1640-1680. He was also a successful tobacco planter. Talented and imaginative, he identified with Virginia and its problems. He experimented with products other than tobacco and, shortly after the Stuart Restoration, he sought support for a broad effort to diversify Virginia's economy. Berkeley was convinced that, with the help of the Crown, Virginians could produce a varied number of important commodities. The King and his listened attentively to his proposals, but they offered litti.;:; more than words of encouragement. England I s monarch was much more with his need for immediate revenue. He was not willing to s;.\crifice current funds in support of new production that might not a return for years, if it brought one at all. The King therefore agrepj only to authorize a further increase in taxes so that the Virg:inians themselves could raise enough capital to finance div)'sification into the lines of production that Berkeley had sugg!lsted. The Virginia Assembly accordingly voted to 'use the addil:ional levy to pay a bounty, for example, on every ship built .locany in the colony ,on every yard of cloth woven, and on every pound of silk made. 42 42 Leonard (1967). See also Craven (1968: 12, 39-42) and Morgan (1975: 136-195)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.231 Incentives like these were not enough, however. For the. Governor I S program fully to succeed, he had to induce plantation owners simply to stop planting tobacco. But they had no intention of doing so voluntarily as. long as merchants expressed their reluctance to trade in anything other thah the leaf. Berkeley thus invoked more drastic measures, calling for a temporary halt in all tobacco planting in Virginia. So that competing producers in Maryland would not obtain an unfair advantage by such an action, Berkeley obtained assurance from the Crown that Lord Baltimore would work for a corresponding cessation in Maryland. By 1667, successful tobacco planters finally agreed to halt prodllction for a year, although not because they suddenly realized the merits of diversification. 43 At the time, largely because of war between England and Holland, the tobacco market had slumped badly and merchants had difficulty selhng the leaf. Well-to-do plantation owners, who could afford to their stock for a year or so, thus saw in Berkeley I s plan a way to a quick and easy, if somewhat delayed, profit. A temporary halt in pnJduction would eventually mean a diminished supply of tobacco and, by the time production was allowed to resume, a greatly inflate? price I at \-lhich they could sell off their accumulated store. By contrast, poorer plantation owners would have clearly been at a Indebted and at the edge of bankruptcy, they would have had to sell off their tobacco at a meager price rather than hold it in anticipation of a bettar return later. In addition, they would have faced ,the loss of all sales, however low, for more than a year as they experimented with 13 Craven (i949: 312; Leonard (1967: 55, 58.) and Morgan (1975:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.232 relatively unknown crops in virtually untested markets. Such planters began grumbling and Lord Baltimore, fearing the possibly disastrous consequences of .a widespread planter revolt, quickly withdrew his support for this aspect of Berkeley's plan. Having no guarantee that Maryland planters would limit their tobacco production, Virginia planters also withdrew their support, and hopes for diversification. sagged. 44. The prospect of more varied production then all but dissipated when efforts to establish urban areas crumbled. From the colony's inception, Virginia was notoriously devoid of compact settlements. Those who may have populated towns--those, for example, who administered the tobacco trade and processed the staple crop--found it more economical to concentrate their activities in the receiving ports of Thus, the absence of towns in the colony reflected in part the stru;;:t:ure of the world tobacco market. But many in Virginia believed that the failure of urbanization was not only a symptom, but also a dire;;;:. cause of the .i11sof a poorly diversified local economy that was fOCll;;ed so narrowly on the production of a single staple crop According to one contemporary observer, as long as people lived, in I widely scattered homes and remained IIsolitary and unsociable," trade in eveqlthing but tobacco tended to be "confused and dispersed" (quoted in Raintlolt 1969: 344). In 1697, several colonists writing for the British Board of Trade stated this view of the problem even more explicitly: "FOl" want of Towns, Harkets, and Honey, there is but little Encouragement for Tradesmen andArtificers, and thereforelittle Choice 14 Menard (1930: 134"-136) and Horgan (1975: 192-195).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.of them, and their Labor is very dear in the Country (Hartwell et al. 1697: 9). Presumably, if more Virginians lived in towns, they would 233 concentrate the market for trade in other goods, and thereby stimulate the industry of a variety of producers, such as artisans. In his efforts to diversify Virginia I s economy i ,.Governor Berkeley did not overlook the possibility of achieving his goal through the development of urban settlements, and he managed to achieve some equivocal support. But into the 1680s and 16905, long after Berkeley left office, the matter was still openly debated and far from settled.45 Some tobacco merchants and large planters supported the establishment of a limited number of port towns which, they hoped, would serve as central places for shipping tobacco bulk, and would thereby make smuggling more noticeable and easier to control: Crown advisers went along with the notion of a few shipping shipping centers because they saw the opportunity for better control of customs and the more effident collection of duties. The burgesses in the Virginia assembly, howe;,,:!r, represented the power of Virginia I s county seats, and none of them .. anted to see the tobacco trade of his own county centered else':,here. So they approved a plan calling for the development, of .a I town in each of Virginia I s twenty counties. As might have been the Crown, supported by the merchants and the largetobacco, planters, nullified the action as too costly. Stalemated, the opposing parties made little progress before the end of the century toward a 15 See especially Rainbolt (1969). But see also Craven (1949:242-243, 312-313,399-400; 1968: 17, 42), Leonard (1967: 55, 60), Carr (1974: 139-145), and Horgan (1975: 188-191, 283-285, On the economic conditions of world trade in tobacco, which contributed to the absence of in Virginia, see Price (1974:' 163-174) and Earle andHQffman (1976: 11-14, .19-68).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., .. 234 policy of urban growth that might have promoted more diversified production And the work of reaching an eventual compromise was repeatedly interrupted by the need of all parties to deal with a brewing violence in the colony that finally boiled over in 1676 with the outbreak of Bacon' 5 Rebellion. 46 Between 1663 and 1682, according toone colonial historian, "there were no fewer than ten popular and servile revolts and revolt plots in Virginia" (Allen 1975: 44). But the uprising in 1676 amounted to virtual civil war. It followed' a series of Indian incidents on the fringes of settl,ement, in response to which the Virginia Assembly, under Governor Berkeley's guidance, approved a proposal to build forts on the frontier and to man them with colonists from settled areas. The costs of implementing the proposal would have been enormous, requiring an added levy on an already tax-burdened populace. Moreover, manned, forts would hardly have provided an effective defense against Indian woodsmen who plantations scattered on the frontier and then quickly vanii'.hed into the bush. Convinced that the Assembly's action would be a boonJoggle of expense and ineffectiveness,' Virginia frontiersmen decided to 'uke matters into their own hands and, led by some of the new Londrm-bom tobacco planters, including Nathaniel Bacon, they launched a vicious and indiscriminate crusade against the Indians. When Governor refused to support and instead branded them as rebels, Bacon and his followers turned their fury against members of the colcmial government, and against the large, established owners of, plantations. Bacon died suddenly, however, the rebels disbanded, and 46 Rainbolt (1969: 349-360) and Carr (1974: 139-145). See also Leonard (1967: 71).. \

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.235 the crisis subsided, but not before Jamestown, the capital, had burned to the ground and many large estates had been looted of their wealth.47 Given their accumula.ted grievances--the poor return on tobacco, the squeeze on land, mounting insecurity, and the high cost of government--the so-called rebels in did not find it difficult to vent their frustration against the established powers. Insurrections continued into the next decade, and included the crop-cutting riots of 1682. Unfortunately, as Edmund I10rgan recently observed, Bacon's rebellion was one "with abundant causes but without a cause. It produced no real program of reform, no revolutionary manifesto, not even any revolutionary slogans" (1975: 269).48 And so the rebellion, and like it, did little to shift the colony from its narrow emphasis on tobacco production. Indeed, as tobacco'planters moved to reco'.'cr what they had lost in the violence; the focus became in many ways even more concentrated and malign. After a brief upturn at mid-decade, the tobacco market again slipped. There was another temporary' boom at the turn of the century but, by the late 1680s, the market had stagnated and it would show almost no substantial gro\olth for almost thirty years. 49 As it became I I appi'li:'ent that the economy would not soon improve, the owners of tobacco 47 For brief accounts of Bacon's Rebellion from varying perspectives, and for references. to the more detailed studies, see Craven (1949: 360-393; 1968: 126-153), Bailyn (1959: 102-106), Breen (1973: 8-12), and Morgan (1975: 250-270). 48 For a similar evaluation of the effects of Bacon I s Rebellion, see. Craven (1968: 145-146). On the continuing violence, see, for eKample, (1949: 398-399), Breen (1973: Allan (1975: 46), (1975: 286-287). 49 Nenard.(1980: 135-142,150-154).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.236 plantations struggled to economize their costs of productionand'thereby to maintain, if not improve, their position. They had relatively minor technical expenses: even in the closing decades of the seventeenth century, according to Morgan, Virginians "required no more than a piece of land, a hoe, an axe, a few barrels of corn, and a strong back to set up a tobacco plantation" (1975: 223). So planters still had to economize on the costs of acquiring the strong backs they needed, and this at a time when laborers were now becoming more difficult to find and more expensive to hire. Tobacco planters, merchants and Crown representatives continued to propose and reject plans for diversifying the economy and for creating tOTims. Even widespread violence failed to produce changes that would make the colony a more attractive place for laborers who wanted to impI\We themselves. With few opportunities for advancement, Virginians to leave the local labor market did so, and potential laborers in Engl:rod increasingly stayed put.50 Wages climbed in the colony and, in the absence of people immigrating under terms of indenture, the use of slav;)s became more and more attractive. African slaves first appeared in Virginia in 1619, and I in the colony almost from the beginning. l-Ioreover, colonists had long esta,blished the necessary legislation to distinguish among the various of unfree persons. In the early years, however, settlers willingly came to the colony as servants and they proved a better investment for the planters. To purchase slaves on the world market, sa Breen (1973: 15-16), Clemens (1977: 158-159), Hain (1977: 139-140);' Carr and Menard (1977: 230-231, 233-235, 238-239), Kulikoff (1979: 531-532). and Henard (1980: 121, 138). ." ..

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.237 planters had to advance a larger initial expense than they did to obtain a servant Unfortunately, because adult mortality was so high, slaves rarely lived longer than the term of a servant1s indenture. Thus only when mortality in the colony declined, did slaves truly provide the long-run advantage of lifetime service. But even then the cost of purchasing a slave was too high.51 During the latter half of the century, the ability of Virginia tobacco planters to pay for slaves gradually improved in relation to Caribbean sugar planters, and such bondsmen accordingly became more available in the colony. By the. 1680s and 1690s, the owners of Virginia plantations increasingly realized the economy of purchasing slaves. To save the costs of continually replacing indentured laborers, many of them :lbtained the bondsmen for a lifetime of service, .and expanded the of their production to compensate for the prevailing low price of tobac(:o. Then, when Africa was opened to free trade in 1698, the price of s:).,wes finally fell and, by the end of the century, fully "half of the .labor force was already enslaved (Morgar. 1975: 307).52 51 01\ the early use of slaves and on the legal distinctions among the nrying degrees of unfreedom in Virginia, see, for example, Craven (t949: 215-218; 1968: 295-298) and Handlin and Handlin ZOO-210). Wertenbaker (1922: 124-127) and Smith (1947: 29-30) discussed some of the advantages of slavery over servitude, and' Morgan (1975: 297-300, 308-310) argued forcefully that most planters did not even bother to seek those advantages until mortality in the colony declined. 52 On the influx of slaves to Virginia beginning in the last two decades of the seventeenth century, see Wertenbaker (1922: 130-132), Handlin and Handlin (1950: 214), Allen {1975: 49:-50), Clemens lS9-160), Main (1977: 139-141), and Menard (1980: 121-122). See Horgan (1975: 300-307) for consideration of the Virginia planters' increasing ability ,to afford slaves despite a falling tobacco price. For general distussicns of the shift from indentured to slave labor, see Bean and (1979). \

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.As owners of Virginia tobacco plantations quickly discovered, however, slaves did have their disadvantages. Such bondsmen had no 238 prospect of a be,tter life and so they had little incentive to perform the labor required of them. To make slaves work, planters had to be prepared to apply a great deal of force.53 Of course, brutality only increased the chances that disaffected bondsmen would flee the plantations, or would find common cause to join in revolt with others, particularly malcontent white laborers who often were treated little better than slaves, and who had previously contributed to widespread violence in the colony. Although the owners of Virginia plantations did not hesitate to use force on their laborers, they thus were eager to take advantage of any device to minimize the potentially dangerous conSt!quences. By their inaction on plans for diversification and urbanization, for example, they had already blocked the local of alternative employment options in the fields and in the crafL:, and trades, all of which may have provided laborers the spark of hope ,inducing them to flee or to ignite acts of rebellion. Then, as the seve.ilteenth century came to a close, the tobacco planters found in the rapidly shifting political alliances of the colony still another I opportunity to ease the threat of slave revolt. From 1680 on, the Crown had begun to pursue a more ,energetic colonial policy It sought,' in part, to insure permanent revenues based on trade. The new' assertions of royal prerogative brought welcome support for legislation that authorized the coercive measures needed by 53 This was one of the arguments that Adam Smith (1937: 365), among many others. advanced against slavery. In this conteltt, s,ee Horgan (1975: 310-313). -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.239 plantation owners to force laborers to produce more tobacco. But otherwise, the Crown moved to take, greater shares of the colony I s wealth and to diminish the local power of the largest tobacco planters. The royal governors and the powerful owners of local plantations thus squared off, and turned for support from lesser men in the colony. The house of burgesses, for example, acquired greater leverage as the conflict developed, and its members found it relatively easy to enact, legislation that served to isolate blacks from whites. Miscegenation was severely penalized and certain legal rights and duties were accorded by race. Whites, including even servants, were allowed to hold property, to sue and to give evidence in court, and to serve in the militia. But blacks, free and slave alike, were denied these pdvHeges. The racial differences thereby established virtually insufi!d that blacks could find no common cause with whites of any class. In V ;.rginia, by 1700, the trickle of slaves into the colony had become a floC1i.(, and the freedom of whites rested securely on the enforced slavery of b;,acks. s 4 Like West Indian and Guianese producers who tried to accumulations of capital and endeavored to secure themselves economically in colonial situations of great social complexity", would-be producers in New England and Virginia initially could not afford large' and other labor-saving devices. ." .. And ,technical expenses were so low, entry into production in S4 Handlin ,and Handlin (1950: 210-222), Bailyn (1959: 102, 111-114), Rainbolt (1970: 418-434), Breen (1973: 11,16-16), Allen (1975: 50-58)! Horgan (1975: 313-362).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.240 all these places was easy, competition was stiff, and the pressures were great to cut costs especially in the expenses required to hire laborers,. spanish producers in Mexico, however, differed,from the owners of West Indian plantations (and from producers in New England and Virginia) because they had to contend with the vagaries of product markets that, for various reasons, sometimes grew very large and, at other times, disappeared altogether. In response to such a market, Spanish producers set up haciendas and relied on the spread of indebtedness to keep laborers readily available in times of need, yet independent of them in times of trouble. Given market conditions and political circumstances :' that differed fundamentally from those which plantations, Mexican hacenderos thus tolerated such independent activities as artl:ianry that could help occupy members of the local laboring popUlation, especially in bad years, outside the domains of, their esta!:es. In other places, particularly in the English and Dutch colonies of the New World, the markets for colonial products remained relatively, despite the occasional gluts, the periodic disruptions by war and ileather, and the cyclic rise and fall of prices. Over the 19n9 I I term, some markets grew steadily large and became concentrated in European ports, while others remained small and decentralized. In New Englr.'tnd, for example, unlike the Caribbean area colonies and the colony of Virginia, the colonists pursued the small decentralized markets for farm products, such as wheat. and corn. They politically resisted attempts to channel' local production to the ,large and concentrated markets for staple crops. Horeover, New Englanders cut labor cos ts in ......

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.241 the period of accumulation, not by forcing others to work for them,'but by defending the right to labor for themselves on individual Under these specific political and economic conditions, there arose in New England a rich and flourishing array of artisan crafts and trades to service both the local farms and the vigorous trade infarm products Virginia, by contrast, most resembled the colonies in Barbados, Jamaica, and Guiana. In the Old Dominion, as in the Indies, small technical investments, stiff competition, large product demand, and a secm'e market provided some of the essential conditions for colonists to accumulate capital on plantations. Plantation owners in all these placp.s, however, could only keep up with the great demand for their products by forcing others to work for them. in Virginia, as in the West Indies, planters could realize the economic advaritages of putting labClt.ers to work by force only if they had put still further conditions in They required a cheap and plentiful supply of bondsmen, and. they needed the political sanctions to make. their subjects obedient. In addition, because the use of force represented a significant investment in t and money, planters wanted to be sure in the broader political aren that the capital they tied up in labor would be reasonabl safe. AboV0 all, they did not want their bondsmen, be they indentured or ensJaved, to find comfort in flight or rebellion. Early on, the owners of Virginia plantations had engrossed local ,access to land and thereby frustrated the dreams: of free proprietorship that any plantation laborer may have harbored. Later, to isolate their African bondsmen from potential allies in' the rest of the populace, they manipulated racial differences among the lower social classes.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.! 242 Furthermore, in the context of these broader actions to safeguard their agricultural investments, Virginia planters also discovered a strategy enabling them to extend their control from the internal economy of their own individual.plantations directly to the wider local economy: they politically stalemated the struggle for more diversified kinds of production, such as farmirig in the fields andartisanry in the proposed new towns, and so they struck at the promise of local economic freedom that might have spurred bondsmen to escape the plantation or to rise up in revolt. Once they had obtained the necessary power to force people to for them, and as they began to find increasing supplies of bondsmen, planters thus strode the political ground of Virginia in seardl of ways to insure that they would not easily lose their power and, with it, their economic stake in the developing system of agriculture. The control that Virginia planters managed to impO!ie on the \-1ider economy played an important role in providing this insurance, at least during the early stages of capital accumulation on the:Lr plantations. Whether or not it played an essential role, it is still impossible to say without much more, careful and I res(:!"rch. Nevertheless, the results of the present study, tentative thol.Jgh they may be, do seem to warrant a general conclusion: .that, by coni:rast to the development of haciendas in Mexico and the advance of farming in New England, and much like. the early rise of plantations in VircJinia, the process of capital accumulation on plantations in Barbados, Jamaica and Guiana led the owners and managers of these agricultural institutions to seek and to establish by various means the \,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.243 ,.' political controls to limit the development of such alternative ; activities in the wider local economy as the practice of artisan manufacturing. ..

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.Chapter VI CONCLUSION: TOVlARD FURTHER STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETHEEN PLANTATION AGRICULTURE AND ARTISAN l1ANUFACTURE They will maintain the state of the world, And all their desire is in the \O/ork of their craft. --Apocrypha, Ecclesiasticus: 38 (34) Artisans contribute to the wealth of nations by combining capital invested in skilled labor, including particularly the skilled labor of their own two hands, with capital invested in relatively small amounts of the technical means needed for the production of manufactured goods. In t;1eir production processes, artisans help lay the e'conomic foundations for the concentration of capital, under favorable concHtions, in technically more advanced forms of manufacture--in factories, for example. But the struggle initially to accumulate wealth fro!:' any form of production, be it manufacture or agriculture, is atways arduous. Quite often, it is simply overwhelming. To sell their products, artisans must interact with merchants, or I I act as merchants themselves. The institutional arrangements that arise from such activity may serve to extend the markets for artisan -products, and to encourage the expansion of manufacture. But the roles of artisan and merchant may easily conflict and prevent such expansion. Moreover, institutions that develop to advance the production and sale of goods in' other economic sectors such as agriculture, may actually serve to inhibit artisans from ever interacting in a market. Thus, the \ 244 -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.245 arrangements made to sell. staple crops produced on plantations in the British West Indies and elsewhere in the New World favored the rise of processing crafts in the metropolitan .countries, but not in the plantation colonies. Indeed, within the colonies, producers who struggled to accumulate capital in plantation agriculture worked vigorously to protect their investments in forced labor by stifling the crafts in the wider local economy outside their domains, and by sUbordinating artisanry on their estates to the production of the staple crop. As a result, the plantation colonies of the West Indies and elsel,ihere provided lIonly minimal opportunity for the local growth of artisan groups or intermediate classes of skilled workers, and little or no ol,portunity for the in-migration of craftsmen, doctors, ministers, stonkeepers, teachers and all those other specialists and serv.i.ce-renderers associated with the growth of differentiated and arth:ulated rural communities.1I The plantation system, at least in its ear.1;:-stages, thus was nothing less than lIa species of sociological blightll (Mintz 1967: 145-146). But although the malady was serious and perchring, it was not alt-lays permanently damaging. The prosperous development of garment-making on the front lands of the largest sugar estate in Guyana is one striking case in which independent artisans eventually helped arrest and reverse the general tendency for plantation owners and managers to inhibit the growth of healthily diversified economies in the Indies. But even within the present study, which has focused on the origins of that debilitating tendency duI"ing the long peJ:"iod of capital accumulation on Indian

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.246 plantations, there is evidence to show that, from about 1620 to 1880, plantation development afforded artisans and other petty producers some local room for maneuver, 'and did so in as many as three respects. Artisans and others could insinuate themselves into the interstices of early West Indian plantation colonies depending (a) on the differing lengths to which plantation owners and managers were prepared to go in different places to suppress alternative activities outside their estates; (b) on the degree to which planters relied on coerced laborers, within their domains, to supply all or part of those manufactured and other goods needed to operate the plantation, or to sustain the estate population; and (c) on the differing political and economic abilities of the planters to respond to changing market pressures and to assaults on their supplies of laborers, and thereby simply to remaIn in business Compared to planters in Barbados and Jamaica, those in the Guiana colonies apparently exercised much more sweeping control over the ecollmny outside their estates. Thus, in the context of West Indian plan i:ation economies, and given the three possible sources of early crah. development, the antecedents of Rose Hall artisanry seem to repose prim<'trily in the so-.called IIbreachesll of plantation slavery, and, in .the I special ability of Guianese plantation o\mers and managers to shift their emphasis from the accumulation of capital to its concentration. This general assertion is tentative', of course, pending further reseolfch. Nevertheless, it will comprise the starting point for a subsequent study, which will examine the progressive concentration of capital on plantations in Guyana since 1881, this process helped give rise to the development 'of peasant agriculture on the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.247 courantyne Coast, and show hO'tl Rose Hall area merchants and artisans eventually combined successfully to exploit the expanding consumers I market for cloth and clothing in a predominantly agricultural region. By way of concluding the present study, .then, and to prepare the way for further work, including my own, on the problems of manufacturing in caribbean political economy, I want to shift from the primary focus of this volume on the ways that plantation agriculture has limited artisan manufacture. Instead, I want briefly to consider some dimensions of the reciprocal relationship. Thus, I concentrate, first, on the early forms of artisanry that emerged on West Indian estates during the period of accumulation, and did so in spite of the various adverse pressures arrayed against independent economic activities. I that) with more careful investigation, it will 'eventually be possible to show how different types of artisans, weakly developed thouqh they generally were in their own internal economic organization, stiJ..l were able, in turn, to affect and to help circumscribe the course of rLantation development. I then shift to a more general consideration of the significance of artisanry within West Indian political economy, pan.:i.cularly in the face of increasing capital concentration on local I pla:otations. 6.1 THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF ARTISANRY ON WEST INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOHY DURING THE PERIOD OF CAPITAL ACCUI-IULAfiON It is, of course, an exaggeration to claim that any single social institution is, or can be, entirely self-sufficient or all-encompassing in its effects. But several noted Caribbean.scholars have found the hyperbole useful to describe Caribbean plantations. Ge'orge Beckford,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.248 for example, has asserted that the plantation is always and everywhere lIall-embracing in its effects on the lives of those 'within its territory and community" (1972: 12) Similarly, Lloyd Bes t has regarded the plantation as an "ideal frame\-lork" that served "to encompass the entire existence of the work force" (1968: 287). And Raymond Smith has compared the plantation to a "total institution, II in which IIstaffll is totally responsible for allocating economic and other roles to lIinmates" (1967: 229-232).1 Unlike Beckford, however, both Best and Smith meant their comparisons to apply only within rather specific temporal limits, and primarily within the time frame that I have referred to as the period of capital accumulation, during \-1hich plantation owners and managers first responded to rapidly expanding markets for staple products and coupled small, investments in stagnant technology to large investments in forced, labDr'. Thus, Best argued that the need for l'lest Indian planters to be arose during the early colonial period when a '''shift to productionll occurred (1968: 289). He then warned that it is dif:,::icult to make "generalizations concerning the response of the various economies to the ending of the mercantile era" (ibid.: I SHU, despite the difficulties, he outlined several types of such reS[Jonse in the Indies and one, which he designated as the "mixed plantation economy,1I consisted of developments that made the ,plantation no longer so all-embracing. Similarly, Raymond smith cautioned that if his own comparison of the plantation to a total institution was at all 1 For further discussion of the importance of the IItotal institutionll metaphor in recent theories of caribbean plantation see the lucid and very helpful article by Eenn (1974: 253. 256-257).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.249 credible, it applied only to the stage of lithe plantation employing unfree labor" (1967: 228). Like Best, he argued that beyond this early stage, West Indian society became "much more differentiated economicallyll (ibid.: 237). Because Beckford ignored the temporal limits to which Best and Smith confined their arguments, he sacrificed historical accuracy for a forceful, unqualified assertion that plantations always dominate laborers in an all-embracins sense. But neither Beckford nor Best also acknowledged that the very idea that a single social institution is all-encompassing is itself hyperbolic. Only Raymond Smith carefully noted that he was stretching the truth. about the self-sufficient nature of social institutions when he argued that in the early stages of colonial development "each plantation was an effective unit of society, as as being a unit of production" (ibid.: 229). Smith presumably drew attention to this source of exaggeration in orck:f to emphasize that his comparison of the slave plantation to a totnl institution could not account fully for the early forms of this unit of agricultural production. But exaggerated as it may be, in Smith I S hands the analogy does serve usefully to highlight the broad : ; outlines of life on early Indian estates To follow the metaphor: staH members (the owners and of a total such as the plantation, can leave freely, and so they have identities and roles to fulfill outside its limits. Inmates (the slaves), however, have no freedom to leave; their social life is effectively determined, within the boundaries of the social unit, by the staff members who allocate economic and other roles to them. The inmates "live out all aspects of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.250 their lives within the institution and all activities are tightly scheduled in terms of a single rational plan designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution" (ibid.: 230). In addition to these internal features of estate life, the exaggerated comparison of the slave plantation to the total institution also illumines some of the wider features of plantation economy. ,For example, according to smith, the dependence of plantation "inmates II on "staff members'" for allocation of their roles "helps explairi the peculiar impoverishment of local culture with its almost complete absence of arts, crafts and literature" (ibid.: 231).2 Leaving aside the question of literature, the arts and crafts withered in local West Indian culture because planters limited the needs of "inmates" and thereby smothered the local market for many of the products of artisans. Hon:(lller, they withered in local culture because planters provisioned the remaining needs of the "inmates" by importing goods from an external marl;nt, or by allocating arts and crafts to certain II inmates II and so fosbring them within the sphere of the plantation. Thus, by regarding the slave plantation as a total institution, one can even specify, at least in part, the nature of the barrie,rs j by the plantation against artisan production in the wider econ",my. But to the extent that planters singied out some of their for special roles, such as that of artisan, within their estates, 2 I recognize, of course, that the analogy of the ,itotal institution" has very many other implications for the study of plantation slavery, and that these implications have been widely exploited in defense of various positions on' aspects of sla':e life, ranging from language to kinship and family relations, and to religion and psychological habits. For some of the discussion, see especially essays by Thorpe, Fredrickson and Lasch" Bryce-Laporte, and Elkins in Lane (1971)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.251 the usefulness of the "total institution" metaphor ends, and the exaggeration becomes explicit. As Smith recognized, the "staff" of an institution can never totally determine the roles that they allocate to lIinmates" as long as it tolerates, if not actually promotes, "various segmental distinctions," such as those observed among the "inmates" of various plantations (ibid.: 232). Quite apart from their relations to the staff, different segments of inmates stand in relation to each other, and thus manage to determine at least some aspects of their social life independently of the staff. In some cases, the level of among segments of inmates, including those filling artisan roles, could have quite serious implications for the very existence of the "total institution. II Although much more detailed studies of artisan on early West Indian plantations are needed to say what kinds of artisans achieved what levels of and with what effects on plantation political ecoclnmy, the results of the present investigation can help indicate in whL:,h directions such research can usefully proceed. As we have seen, the owners and managers of many West Indian plantations, "for reasons of economy, convenience, and an I supply, encouraged the training of slaves in a variety of skilled occupations" (Handler 1974: 123). First, under certain conditions, it was economical for planters to train slave artisans. Planters needed manufactured goods, such as wheels and barrels simply to prosecute their business. They and their slaves also needed consumers' goods, such as garments and baskets, to clothe themselves and to prepare and store food. Still other goods--those manufactured by carpenters, for

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.252 example--had considerable value in both the business and domestic sides of plantation life. ,Planters ultimately had to provide such items, and if they directly trained slaves to manufacture all or some of them, or if they no more than encouraged knowledgeable slaves to produce them on their own time, then the economic survival of the plantation was ,less closely staked to the availability of funds needed otherwise to acquire the goods on the open market. Besides being economical, it was also highly convenient for planters to educate their slaves as artisans. If they did so, they would not have to depend for the importation of manufactured goods on distant markets that were so frequently subject to disruption by war, weather and depression. Finally, if plantation o"mers and managers slave artisanry, they would not have to worry about hiring WOrb;!fS to manufacture goods. Because slavery is a lifetime status, the);' would always have ready at hand an assured labor supply and, if theix slaves ",ere highly skilled, they might even be able to turn a profit by hiring them out. For all these reasons, West Indian planters to foster artisanry, at least to some extent, on their estates. The special skills held by bondsmen made them extremely v,aluable I for the development of early West Indian plantations, and this did not go :mrecognized by their masters. For the economies and convenience that artisans afforded them, plantation owners and managers paid top prir.:es for skilled slaves. 3 But then neither did the me'tribers, 6f 'Wesi Indian slave communi ties. fail to recognize the value of' the' artisans. West Indian slaves appear to have held the craftsmen among them in high '-. 3 See, for example, BraithHaite (1971: 155) and Goveia (1965: 140).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.253 esteem, and the bases for such estimations, when they are better understood, will undoubtedly prove to have afforded at least some kinds of slave artisans positions of leadership, through which certain groups of slaves could apply leverage and significantly alter the course of local political and economic developments in individual plantation colonies, or parts of such colonies. In Jamaica, for example, slaves generally held that craft skills marked their fellows as people of special accomplishment and, "if they were unable to acquire such skills -themselves, they avidly sought them for their children" (Patterson 1967: 62). It is doubtful, however, that counted among the accomplishments of artisans the relatively high prices that they brought for their masters. More likely, West Indian like their counterparts in the American South', considered the of artisans to include the acquisition of a number of qua.lities, all of them desired because they each helped enhance the ability of the slave to determine his own life, independently of the will of his master. Those qualities included: II (1) mobility, which allr:Med the slave to leave the plantation frequently, (2) freedom from corl"itant supervision by Vlhites, (3) opportunity to earn money, and (4) I provision of a direct service to other blacks" (Blassingame 1976: 141-142) Once he achieved such qualities, .. the sense of I superiority I and I recognition I remained with a slave artisan throughout his life,1I and it was not something he readily relinquished (Stavisky 1958: 41). -The-qualities valued-in artisans by their fellows, however, undoubtedly differed for different types of artisans. West Indian slaves simply could not expect to develop expertise in any craft on all

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.254 plantations in every colony, and only some trades practiced by slaves directly filled the consumer needs of other slaves. Thus, to understand the possible effects of artisanry on the slave community, and on the wider political economy of West Indian plantation colonies, one must grasp not only the features that slaves particularly valued. among artisans. One must also determine the kinds of artisans who best embodied those features, and this requires a much more thorough analysis than is presently available of the various types of artisans that comprised the internal segments of West Indian slave communities. The distinction between crafts used for the prosecution of plantation business and those employed for the satisfaction of various consumer needs on the estates is obviously important. But one must also note that in some cases, plantation owners and managers could afford only a few on their estates: a carpenter, a blacksmith, and perhaps one or two others. All other crafts were practiced only sporadically and not at all by specialists, but by jacks-of-all-trades, who could ofti:'!\ be found, when necessary, working shoulder-by shoulder in the with the other slaves. In other cases ,though, artisan org.;Hlization seems to have emerged in sufficiently varied forms, to I req'.lire an analysis as complex as Harcus Jernegan I s fivefold typology of slC:1'/e craftsmen in the American South. Jernegan differentiated types of manufacturing primarily ,according to the type and extent of the market that a slave artisan served, and the types included: (1) individual manufacture for home consumption; (2) individual manufacture for the purpose of disposing a surplus within the colony; (3) individual manufacture for the purpose of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.255 exploiting a surplus; (4) cooperative manufacture by an artisan and owned or hired slaves for the purpose of reaping a profit; (5) factory manufacture by slaves for the purpose of making a profit.4 The evidence at this stage is little more than fragmentary, but most of these types, or ones closely parallel to them, seem to be mirrored also in the Caribbean. Thus, Jerome Handler has provided an account of slave artisans in Barbados who produced goods both for home consumption and for circulation within the colony; Sidney Mintz and Douglas Hall have suggested that some of the craft goods that circulated in Jamaica's internal market were also exported. And both Hall and Barry Higman have indicated that master craftsmen in Jamaican towns and on local plantations had handicraft gangs under their direction.s Given a more adequate typology along these lines of artisan organization during the period of capital accumulation in West Indian plantation economies, it may eventually be possible to identify i.sely which kinds of artisans the slaves most valued" and which were abh thereby as leaders,to help shape the internal forces of plantation chanqe, however modestly, in the slaves I favor. Whatever the actual effects turn out to have been, though, those in power in the Hes,t Indian I plantation colonies certainly believed that artisan slaves were perhaps uniquely placed to apply pressure in several highly sensitive arenas of the fragile social order on which the plantations and their systems of labor coercion had been carefully, founded. Of course, on those West Indian plantations, mainly the smaller ones, where certain kinds of' 4 Jernegan (1920: 239). See also Stavisky (1958: 44-45). 5 Handler (1963a), Mintz and Hall (1960: 17), Hall (1959: 215), and Hlgman (1976: 37-39)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission., 256 artisans frequently had to set down their craft tools and work beside the field hands, the internal differentiation among slaves was rather too fluid for the role of craftsmen to have exerted much effect. But the situation was potentially much different on other plantations, where specialist craftsmen had the opportunity steadily to practice their trades. Some of these kinds of slave artisans aroused the ire of white and colored freemen in the colonies, who resented the competition. In these cases, occupational similarities between blacks, coloreds, and whites did not help bridge, but rather served only to widen the already yawning racial gap of power and privilege in the West Indies. 5 Moreover, although many planters tried to isolate the most respected of their slaves, such as certain classes of artisans, for special elite privileges, and so to use potential leaders to-help control the slc:rie population in a dangerously unbalanced social structure, these tactics did not always work according to plan. Orlando Patterson has reported, for example, that on some plCl:ii:ations in Jamaica, an elite corps of slave drivers and tradesmen "onen formed themselves into courts and settled issues among the generality of field slaves, even to the extent of imposing fines and I othr:r penalties II (1967: 63). Such cases of success give support to the notion advanced in respect of the West Indies, the American South and elsewhere, that craftsmen, drivers and domestic slaves, composed an identifiable plantation elite or aristocracy that stood over and against 6 See Goveia (1965: 164. 229). Hall (1972: 202), Handler (1974: 122-125), and compare Jernegan (1920: 239), Pinchbeck (1926: IS, 36, 66-67), Spero and Harris (1931), Berlin' (1974: 236-2.41), and Genovese (1974: 389).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.257 the body of field slaves.' But given their education and the varied contacts they made during the practice of their trades, many slave could grow quickly resentful of their bonded status and; with access to manu,facturing tools, they could easily fashion weapons to arm their rebelliousness. Thus, as those in the colonies who opposed the proliferation of skilled slaves had often warned they would, slave artisans seemed to figure prominently in slave rebellions, and they frequently were listed in the published notices of slave runaways.s Indeed, the spirit of self-reliance and self-determination that slave artisans evidently inspired among their fellow's, and that some appeared to tncourage more than others, almost'certainly explains why planters, who sought primarily to economize production, found support for their use of artisans among the abolitionists, of all people, who otherwise 0PPi,lsed the planters every move. 9 There is, then, much room to build on the present study, and on the earlier work on which it is in part based. The various types of arti,5ans that emerged in the West Indies not only depended on the atb:mpts of early plantation owners and managers to make their estates men:: self-sufficient, slave craftsmen also appear themselves to, have had I 7 See, for example, Goveia (1965: 131-140), Patterson 1967: 58-59), Schuler (1970: 380, 384-385), craton and Walvin (1970: 141-142, 147), m'ld Brathwaite (1971: 235), and compare Hoore and Williams (1942: 3S0), Phillips (1929: 206-207), and Stampp (1956:151, 333). 8 See, for example, the suggestive assertions in the following sources: P.J!ckord (1968b: 119), Schuler (1970: 375, 380, 382), Brathwaite (1971: 205-206), Price (1973: 20, Craton (1974: 231; 1979: 104, 112, 116-118; 123; 1980: 5-7, 9), Sheridan (1976b: 293, 303), Gaspar (1978: 317-320), and Genovese (1979: 27-28, 35); and compare the detailed analysis for parts of the U. S. South in Mullin (1972: 82-98, 141, 147-148,160-161. 9 Stavlsky .(1958: 203).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.258 consequential effects on the early colonial social order, on its racial and political structure, for example. More precise knowledge of which artisans had such effects, and \Olhy, is absolutely essential for a proper understanding of the dynamics of plantation life during the period when plantation owners and managers depended so thoroughly on the use of force to accumulate their capital. Indeed, "this category of slave was perhaps most important," as Edward Brathwaite has written of artisans in early nineteenth century Jamaica, IIfrom the point of view of the future development of society" (1971: 160-161).' But given this perspective, the problem then is to trace the progress of artisanry--or the lack of it--in the Hest Indian colonies as plantation owners and managers began to concentrate their accumulated capital. 6.2 THE ROLE OF ARTISAN HANUFACTURING IN WEST INDIAN POLITICAL ECONOl1Y DURINGIHEPERIOD OF CAPITAL CONCENTRATIoN: A BRIEF OVERVIEW As the owners and managers of sugar plantations in the British West IncHes lost the power of enslavement at Emancipation, and as market pre':;sures gradually pushed planters to consolidate their capital by im7;';sting in changing technical stock and in wage labor, one of the most striking developments in the economies of the region \Olas the emergence of various kinds of peasant farmers. With respect to this development, George Beckford has maintained that it is sufficient to describe West Inciian economies in terms of a IItwo-sector" model of economic rivalry (1972: 48). Beckford did not distinguish an agricultural sector from manufacturing or some other kind of economic activity; rather, he divided his model into ttvO distinct branches of agriculture, one comprising plantations, the other peasants.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. 259 general, the organization of peasant agriculture is sharply opposed to the structure of plantations. For example, by definition, peasants always (though not exclusively) produce some of their own food, while plantations always (though not exclusively) produce crops for export. Moreover, although peasants and plantations must both employ capital to produce crops for contrasting markets, specifically capitai invested in suitable land, peasants characteristically cultivate small parcels of land, use cheap, relatively unsophisticated tools, and invest in their oto7n labor, or that of their families. 10 By contrast, planters typically work large tracts of land, invest in up-to-date technical equipment, and employ labor .of There is thus lIa .' .. structural deficiency of land and labor in the peasant sectorll (ibid.: 181). But in West Indian economies, according to Beckford, there is alsDa dynamic interaction which tends thoroughly to subordinate various forn'is of peasant agriculture to the various forms of organization within the plantation sector. Referring to the question of suitable land, Beckford argued that in the plantatlon world at present, plantations have forced peac;ants on to the most marginal land available in every country II (ibid.: 179).11 Because they have access at least to some land, peasants 1D 'l'he focus on economic criteria in this definition of peasants is not meant to be exhaustive, although it follows the emphasis in definitions advanced by, among others, Firth (1951: 87), Wolf 453-454; 1966: 12-59), and, more recently, Bernstein (1979). For, differing interpretations of the significance of such emphasis, hO\oleVer, compare Ennew, et al. (1977) and Silverman (1979). See alsp Beckford's comments (1972: 18-19). 11 Compare (l959b: 136), who asserted that the plantation "tended to push rival social groups toward the periphery of its sphere of influence to eke out a marginal existence.1I See also Mintz (1967: 14S).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I 260 can generally produce some of their food and so may not need regularly to seek employment on the plantation. However, because the plantation largely "controls the land on which labor services can be applied, II peasants often find that lithe demand for labor resides largely with the planter class" (ibid,,). Thus, although they may have sufficient access to their own land, some peasants simply cannot afford to cultivate it. Laborers may be scarce and expensive, and the market for their potential crop may be weak. To earn an adequate livelihood, such people may have no recourse but to sell their labor-power to the plantation. And if the demand for labor there is not sufficiently strong, peasants may then find it necessary to enter, on a small-scale basis, production of the plantation crop itself. In such cases, they win usually have to purchase planting and cultivation materials from plantations, and to sell the harvested crop back at a price dir.t3.ted by those plantations. Despite the emergence of peasant agriculture, then, by controlling much of the land, by preempting much of labor, by dispensing capital supplies, and by monopolizing the 10("11 market for the crop, lithe plantation still dominates the economic lib of the region" (ibid.: 48). Indeed, according to Beckford, I plantations are always and so completely in control that the Indies con:3ist of "' two-sector' economies in which the dynamic sector for gfl::wth (the peasant sector) is bottled up by the other sector (the .plantation sector) which contributes to growth elsewhere," usually in the metropolitan countries of Europe {ibid.}.12 12 For further elaboration of some of these assertions, see Beckford (1979; 347-357).-

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.261 Although Beckford's argument on these points is generally convincing, ,there are several important details that require qualification, especially if we are eventually to the role of artisan manufacturing in the context of the development of plantation agriculture during'the period of capital concentration from the 1880s to the early 1970s, and in the context of the related emergence of peasant farming. First, plantations during the period did not simply "bottle up" peasants. Second, plantation owners and managers did not direct their institutions with unlimited autonomy, but had their range of choices effectively limited by the actions of peasants. Finally, the varied control that plantations have maintained in the political economies of the region was not confined solely to the branches of agr .i.eul ture, but extended to cover, and in turn was limited by, actions in lither economic sectors as well. Beckford admitted that "the extent to which peasant production is con,;trained by plantations varies from place to place according to cii.'::umstances" (ibid.: 48.,49). He did not elaborate this statement to either the range or circumstances of variation. He merely imiisted that plantations constrain peasants and that this is "general in most plantation economies" (ibid.: 49). It is a general phenomenon, Beckford argued, because 'the need of planters for a "sr.ranglehold" on peasants rests on the conflictful relation between the tW(l types of productive organization, on their direct and "stiff competition" for "very scarce resources" (ibid.: 23). Plantations either deprive peasants of needed resources, or they suffer themselves. And according to Beckford, this has always been the case.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.262 To support his position on the supposedly eternal conflict between plantations and peasants, Beckford relied, in part, on a particularly forceful assertion by Sidney 11intz. As Hintz described the process, the emergence of caribbeanpeasantries "represented a reaction to the plantation economy, a negative reflex to enslavement,. mass production, monocrop dependence, and metropolitan control. Though these peasants often continued to work part-time on plantations for to eke out their cash needs, their orientation was in fact antagonistic to the plantation rationale II (1964: xx-xxi; quoted in Beckford 1972: 22). Despite the reaction, the negative reflex, and the antagonism of peasants toward plantations, however, the two modes of agricultural organization often have supplemented each other in important ways, and have mutuallY'. .. Peasants in the Indies, for example, have often emerged as producers of many of the agricultural products needed by plantation laborers and others on the home market, and this has often meant, as Hintz himself has asserted, that peasants and plantations "typically occupied different. ecological zones, participated in different market relationships and, for the most part, did not interdigitate sociallyll (Hintz 1967: 145). When the market for i or another of their crops weakened or collapsed, it is true that West Indian peasants have sought added income by working, however rel.uctantly, on the plantation. But then, so too, plantation workers have frequently sought more stable incomes in peasant modes of agriculture.13 Thus, as Hintz has emphasized, "it would be misleading to 13 Wolf described these two-way movements between peasant and plantation forms of adaptation as a kind of "cultural-straddling." They are "ways maintaining two alternative sets of ties which can be played against the for the important end of improd'ng the balance of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.suppose that the coexistence of plantations and peasantriesis always marked by open conflict between these two very different modes of agricultural adaptation" (1974a: 133). 263 The owners and managers of West Indian plantations certainly have acted to constrain local peasants in ways that have been antagonistic and full of struggle for scarce resources, but some have also acted to support and even nurture the growth of a peasantry, and they have done so in such a way that peasants have provided plantations with needed agricultural products and a source of needed In both cases, plantation owners and managers have dominated peasants and determined the limits of their development. But this has not meant that the bahmce of the relationship has leaned totally in favor of the plantations. Although they have suffered economic subordination, pea:,ants have weighed heavily against the plantation forms of orgAnization, especially in instances where they have gained independent acc'?ss to the world market for some of their products, such as rice, toblCCO and coffee. And even t-lhen such independence has not been pO!ldble, peasants still have limited and defined the courses of action open to plantation owners and managers simply by their existenc,e in the I economy, and thus they have limited and defined the institution of. the plantation itself. The particular relationships of economic conflict and interdependence that have emerged historically between WestIndian plantations and peasants have made it necessary for plantation owners and managers to maintain their control over the local political economy life" (l959b: 143).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission... .. 264 by adopting one strategy rather than another, by following this course and not that one. What planters have done at a particular stage of plantation development has depended, of course, on the character of the world-wide product market "in which they have competed. But how plantations have accommodated particular market conditions has depended in turn on the character of the relations of particular planters with other organizations in opposing branches of agricultural production: on whether it has been convenient to encourage peasants to produce needed goods, on whether peasants have competed. for needed land and labor, and on y,hether peasants have become strong enough in their own markets, and in the local political arena, to withstand measures designed to .impede their expanded use of scarce technology and labor. In short, plantations that have tried to consolidate and maintain their capital, just as those that tried desperately to accumulate it, have stood in a special relationship by which they have controlled an!1 limited productive organizations in other branches of agriculture, but by \.;hich they themselves have also been defined and limited. Being in a dOf(linant position with regard to the command of technology, labor and the home market for certain goods,plantation owners and managers may have free to act, but not in an unlimited number of ways. One can see planters I freedom and independence by viewing all the vat:iants. of organization in isolation. But to grasp the limits of the plantation and the historical fragility of its dominant position in any particular case, one must view the institution in specific relationships with, for example, the peasants it has supposedly dominated

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.265 Ultimately, by turning to the various links between plantations and peasants, IIwe turn wholly away from the plantation as sociological' 'revelation'--that is, as a unitary explanation of Caribbean societies 11 (Hintz 1974a: 41). Instead, we open to systematic scrutiny the variable impact that peasants have on plantation organization, and thus we allow for more careful evaluation of the nature of economic independence that particular forms of plantation organization have enjoyed with respect to local political economies. Above all, we are forced to challenge people like George Beckford, who have boldly and erroneously insisted that lI\olhere a peasantry emerges, its existence depends in large measure on the plantation and there are in fact no social forces leading to the disintegration of the systemll (1972: 44). But just as the analysis of the plantation cannot totally explain caribbean societies (or, for that matter, the economy or the plantation neither can an analysis of two branches of agriculture. An ecoMmy is composed not only of an agricultural sector, but of manufacturing and other sectors as well, and each branch of each sector is, in turn, entwined in a network of markets and institutional arr.:1ngements that spin out into the political economy of the \odder world. To control and manipulate a local economy and its wealth, plantations thus have had to command much more than various types. 'of pe.3.:iants. Conversely, to define and limit the extent of plantation dominance, peasants have not stood alone before the institution in ways both conflictful and expressive of need. At various points in the history of the region, they have been joined by persons bearing "all kinds of skills, II including ,"craftsmanship, fishing I trade, veterinary science, hunting, and much else" (Mintz 1974a: 155). \,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.\ \ 266 During slavery, plantations dominated many types of non-agricultural production because planters controlled the allocation of economic roles among slaves. Planters used artisan skills, for example, to provide for their manufacturing needs, while' they found ways to counteract the inevitable conflicts with artisans who grew independent, and sometimes openly of aspects of the plantation regime. When plantation owners and managers completely lost the power of forcing laborers to work for them, and in some cases even before, some forms of non-agricultural production moved outside the plantation boundaries. As it did so, however, the diversity of occupations in rural areas of the West Indies often became IIconcealed" (Mintz 1974c: 305-306). The activities that individuals of an area.held in common, such as peasant farming or plantation work tended to overshadow alternative economic activities both in terms of money earned and time spent. The alternatives to pe".:;ant and plantation employment occupied individuals only on a part-time basis, and sometimes individuals engaged lIin several occupations in as short a time as one week or even one dayll (R. T. Smith 19%: 43). Although the alternatives to agricultural employment in the West Indies sometimes engaged little time, and this made them hardly noticeable, it is nevertheless clear from many reports that agriculture rarely been the sole activity of individuals in rural areas of the re0ion. In rural Barbados, for example, Jerome Handler has estimated th
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.267 income-producing activities II (Handler 1965: 17). In some areas of Barbados, these activities have included employment in the pottery industry originally developed during slavery. Elsewhere in the West Indies, and in the wider Caribbean area--on Trinidad, Martinique, Puerto Rico, Jamaica, Cuba, and in erstwhile British Guiana--many people engaged in agriculture have found employment in subsidiary, non-agricultural occupations as gamblers, peddlers, musicians, prostitutes, and as highly skilled tradesmen including, besides potters, technicians, cobblers, electricians, masons, carpenters, butchers and bakers, and tailors and seamstresses.14 A review of the mixed vocational pattern so common in the Caribbean region, and particularly in the West Indies, thus reveals a of employment opportunities in a variety of sectors outside of agticulture, and so it caUs into question the .neat typology dividing local employment between the peasantry and the plantation. Analysis of the pattern, however, does not totally reveal the role of anyone of th"'5e sectors in relation to any others, including the agricultural sec tor Individuals may have harmonized employment in various types of occupations so that their life employment history formed an "in,tegrat.ed economic complex" (Comitas 1964: 41) .15 And, in that complex, a particular economic sector may have contributed more or less than other 14 See, for example, Comitas (1964: 44-45), Handler (1963b: 314), Hicks (1972: 75-79), Horowitz,.(1967: 22), Johnson (1972: 75-79), Mintz (1956: 353-360), Padilla (1956: 284), Richardson (1973: 366), M. G. Smith (1956: 82-83), Smith and Kruijer (1957: 76-80), T. Smith (1956: 26-47), and Wolf (1956: 257-258). 15 See also Richardson (1970: 233-234), Johnson (1972) and D. B. Smith (1966), and compare Frucht (1967), tlintz (1959: 95, n.3; 1974c: 300-301, n.4) and Wolf (195gb: 43).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.268 sectors to the total livelihood of a particular individual. But, of course, such a role has differed for each sector in the case of each individual. As ,a result, lithe distribution of the population among occupations of different types, or in terms of different employment, ", '-.-: .. : ...... '. the' economic activities are arranged,' or how they affect one another or the population as a whole" (Smith and Kruijer 1957: 77). But'if the role 'of, say, artisan employment in the mixed vocational pattern of a particular individual does not totally reveal the role of that type of employment in local West Indian economies, it doe:; so at least partially. The various economic sectors evidently have beeji integrated in such a way that particular individuals could (or had to) find employment in several sectors. Certain features of particular employment patterns suggest the nature of that integration and, in many runl areas of the region, the evidence certainly seems to indicate that th:, plantation has controlled the order of relationships. Throughout the region, for example, diverse non-agricultural occupations have been especially important to people as sources of but only during certain seasons of the year during time, II the slack period between major harvests when plantation de;:land for labor is weakest.16 People have taken employment \-,hen, they conld as artisans and peasants to "widen the base of their opportunities" (Holf 1959b: 147). But, having divided their alternative occupations in this way with work on the plantation, they have remained 16 For discussion of dead-time employment, see, for example, Handler (1963b: 324-325), and compare Hicks (1972), Mintz (19$6: 253; 1964: xx:{ho .. xliii), a11d Padilla (19%: 234).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.269 permanently at no job. Their lives thus have been governed largely by plantation rhythms, and the failure of non-agricultural sectors of local economies in West Indies to expand enough tooccupy people fully. is undoubtedly the result, at least in part, of the continuing ability of local plantations to corner such capital resources as labor, technology and credit. But, it must be remembered, over the long term and espeCially during the period of capital concentration, the owners and managers of West Indian plantations have generally striven to rationalize their production processes, to dismiss part-time, supposedly "unreliable," workers with allegiances to more than one occupation, and to employ, on a full-time basis, a corps of disciplined and relatively well-paid laborers. In Guyana and elsewhere, the gradual development of such a work force has been a necessary, though not sufficient, ingredient for growth of a home market for manufactured goods. But whether those beiJring craft skills in the local popUlations of the region have found this market large enough and profitable enough to justify full-time in';estment of their skills and tools in local production has depended on a of other factors: on whether the home market for manufactured gO:':ids has grown with demands arising in other branches of agriculture, an(1 in other sectors of the local economy; on whether foreign. trade poUcies foster competition from cheap foreign manufactures; and on whether the symbolic structure of local taste leads people to favor foreign or domestic goods for reasons other than simple evaluations' of relative price and quality of construction. And these various elements, to the extent that they have raised or lowered the level of employment

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.270 available in local economies outside the plantation have; in turn, affected the freedom of estate owners and managers to layoff workers. as they have endeavored to keep pace with technology.1 '7 The complex nature of these and other. relationships between artisan manufacture and plantation agriculture during periods of capital concentration deserve much more careful and rigorous analysis. But, for purposes of this discussion, the point should be clear that the owners and managers of West Indian plantations have dominated producers in ways similar to the control they have exerted over peasants. They have. enforced economic constraints in their own interest, yet they have tempered these with occasional opportunities for other forms of production to expand when it is convenient. They have been open to action, but constantly defined in' their_range of options. limitations suffered by artisans and others in their subordinate roles have shaped and limited the choices that planters have had available and have had to exercise if they were to conserve plantation c"p i tal, and keep it from turning permanently away and into something Assuming, then, that plantation owners and managers have cOiltrolled labor, technology, including the.technical features of the sc:il, and the local market for certain crops, then their .has in the West Indies over rural economies composed of a diversity l'i For a discussion of some of these problems with reference to plantations in British Guiana, see Reubens and Reubens (1962). 1 Compare r'lintz (1.973: 101): !lIn sum, the activities in which poorer peasants or landless laborers engage \"i thin a I peasant society I in order to survive are linked both to the perpetuation of the peasant sector and to its potential something else ,II

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.271 of comparatively undeveloped productive sectors. Given the relative completeness of such control during the period of capital accumulation. on plantations the region, artisans, peasants and other branches and sectors of the economies have subsequently faced a slow, painstaking process of wresting control from the planters, of taking advantage of the freedom to expand when convenient, and of resisting the constraints when possible. Ultimately at stake in the process has been the diversification of West Indian economies: the ability to produce wealth on an expanded basis; the ability, that is, of particular organizations outside the plantation to find the wherewithal to. concentrate fully on their particular form of production.19 Although, in general, the plantation has maintained a dominant rola, the process has been highly variable, being to the vadable process of capital accumulation on plantations and to va1:'iations in the subsequent ability of plantation owners and managers to concentrate their capital. Because of the wide variation, much careful consideration is needed of the roles of particular branches and sedors of production in specific cases. But it must be recognized, at ledst as a point of departure for any such investigation, if not I I ult.imately as a point of conclusion, that those branches and sectors have historically played a role subordinate to that of the plantation ITl respect of the manufacturing sector, one must recognize that the role of artisan organization ha's been cast on various West Indian stages opposite the leading character of the plantation, a character moved on See Smith and Kruijer 77): liThe number and quality of these non-agricultural specialists in any rural area is an important indicator of the ... ealth of the district, or its dependence on other activities besides farming. II \.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.272 each stage by various shifting conveniences and conflicts, and against \ .. whose motives in each case the role of artisans must be carefully and specifically drawn.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.REFERENCES Adamson, Alan H. 1972 Sugar Without Slaves: The Politicai Economy of British Gii'1aiia, 1838-1904. New Haven: Yale University Press. Akagi, Roy H. 1924 The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies: Study their:oevelopment, OrganIZatIOn, Activities and controversies, 1620-1770. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963. Allen, Theodore 1975 III They Would Have Destroyed Me.l : Slavery and the Origins of Racism.1I Radical America 9: 41-63. Althusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar 1970 Reading Capital. New York: Pantheon Books. Anderson, Dennis and Mark W. Leiserson 1980 "Rural Nonfarm. Employment in Developing Countries.1I Economic Development and Cultural Change 28: 227-248. Anderson, Ralph V. and Robert E. Gallman 1977 "Slaves as Fixed Capital: Slave Labor and Southern Economic Development. II Journal of American History 64: 24-46. Arnauld, 1981 Eric J. "Petty Craft Production and Zinder, Republic of Niger. II 61-70. Ashton, T. S. the Underdevelopment Process in Dialectical Anthropology 6: 1948 The Industrial Revolution, 1760-1830. London: Oxford University Press. Aufhauser, R. Keith 1974a "Profitability of Slavery in the British Caribbean. II Journal of Interdisciplinary History 5: 45-67. 1974b IISlavery and Technological Change.1I Journal of Economic History 34: 36-50. Ayub, Hahmood Ali 1981 Hade in Jamaica: The Development of the r-ranuiacturing Sector in Jamaica. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. -273 -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.274 Bachman, Van C1eaf 1969 Peltries or Plantations: The Economic Policies of the Dutch West Indiacompany in NewTetherland, 1623-1639:-Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bacon, Francis 1625 "0f Plantations." In his Essays. London: Oxford University Press, 1937. Bailyn, Bernard 1955 The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1959 "politics and Social Structure in Virginia." In Seventeenth Century America: Essays in Colonial History, James Morton Smith, ed. Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press. Pp. 90-115. Banaj i, Jairus 1972 "For a Theory of Colonial Modes of Production.1I Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay) 7(52): 2498-2502. Bank of Guyana 1979 Annual Report. GeorgetovTn: Bank of Guyana. Barnes, Viola 1923 The Dominion of New England. New Haven: Yale University Press. ---Barrett, Ward 1965 "Caribbean Sugar-Production Standards in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries." Herchants and Scholars: Essays in the History of Exploration and Trade, COllected in the Memory of James Ford Bell, John Parker, ed. Minneapolis: University-of Press. Pp. 145-170. Bartels, Dennis 1977 "Class Conflict and Racist Ideology in the Formation' of; Modern Guyanese Society." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 14: 396-405. Bateman, 1981 Fred and Thomas Weiss A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of Industrialization in the Slave Economy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Pres-s-. Bctie, R. C. 1976 Sugar? Economic Cycles .and the Changing of Staples on the English and French Antilles, 1624-1654." Journal of History 8: \.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.275 Beachey, Raymond W. 1957 The British West Indies Sugar .Industry in the. Late 19th Century. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ------Bean, Richard N. and Robert P. Thomas 1979 liThe Adoption of Slave Labor in British America. In The Uncommon l1arket: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Henry and Ian S. Hogendorn, eds. New York: Academic.Press. Pp. 377-398. Beckford, George L. 1972 Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the New World. New York: Oxford University Press. 1979 Beckles, 1981 "Plantations, Peasants, and Proletariat in the West Indies: Agrarian Capitalism and Alienation.1I In Anthropology and. Social Change in Rural Areas, B. Berdechewsky, ed. The--Hague: Houton PublisherS":"""Pp. 347-61. Hilary McD. "Rebels and Reactionaries: The Political Responses of White Laborers to Planter Class Hegemony in Seventeenth Century Barbados. II Journal of Caribbean History 15: 1-19. Beer, George L. 1908 The Origins of the British Colonial System, 1578-1660. New York: The Macmillan Company. Benn, Denis M. 1974 liThe Theory of Plantation Economy and Society: A Methodological Critique." Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 12: 250-259. BI:lmett, 1958 1964 1965 J. Harry Bondsmen and Bishops: Slavery and Apprenticeship on the Codrington Plantations of BarbadOs, 1710-1838. Berkeley: University of California-Press. "Carl Helyar, Merchant and Planter .of Seventeenth-Century. Jamaica. II William and Hary Quarterly, 3rd series, 21: 53-76. "Peter Hay, Proprietary.Agent in Barbados, 1636-1641."' Jamaican Historical Review 5(2): 9-29. 1967 liThe English caribbees, 1642-1646." William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 24: 359-377. B,:rlin, Ira 1974 Slaves Without Hasters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South. New York: Vintage Books. ----

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.276 Bernstein: Henry i979 "African Peasantries: A Theoretical Framework.1I Journal of Peasant Studies 6: 421-443. Bernstein, Henry and Michael Pitt 1974 "Plantations and I10des of Journal of Peasant Studies 1: 514-526. Best, Lloyd 1968 "Outlines of a Model of a Pure Plantation Economy." Social and Economic Studies 17: 283-326. Bidwell, Percy W. and Falconer, J. A. 1925 History of Agriculture in the Northern United States,' .. 1620-1860: Washington:-Carnegie Institution. Blassingame, John W. 1976 "Status and Social Structure in. the Slave Community: Evidence from New Sources." In Perspectives and Irony in American Slavery, Harry P. Owens, ed. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Pp. 137-151-Bolingbroke, Henry 1807 Voyage to Demerary. London: Richard Phillips. Bolland, 1981 Bcumert, 1977 O. Nigel "Systems of Domination After Slavery: The control of Land and. Labor in the British West Indies after 1838." Comparative' Studies in Society and History 23: 591-619. A. and S. B. Kroonenberg "Manufacture and Trade of Stone Artifacts in Prehistoric surinam. II Ex Horreo (Universitat van Amsterdam, Albert Egges van Griffen-rnstitut voor Prae-en Protohistorie) 4: 9-46. Borah, Woodrow 1951 New Spain's Century of Depression. Berkeley: University of California Press. BL'1dby, Barbara 1975 liThe Destruction of Natural Economy.1I Economy and Society 4: 127-161. Brading, D. A. 1971 Miners and Herchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763-1810. London: Cambridge University Press. 1978 Haciendas and Ranchos in the Me.xican Baj io: Leon, 1700-1860. London: Cambridge Press.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.277 Brasser, T. J. C. 1971 liThe Coastal Algonkians: People of the First Frontiers. II In, North American Indians in Historical Perspective. 'Eleanor Burke Leacock and NancyOestreich Lurie, eds. New York: House. Pp. 64-91. 1978 IIEarly Indian-European contacts.1I In Handbook of North American Indians, 'vol. 15: Northeast, Bruce G. Trigger, ed. Washington, Smithsonian-rnstitution., Pp. 78-88. Brathwai te, Edward 1971 The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820. London: Oxford University. Press. --Breen, T. H. 1973 IIA Changing Labor Force and Race Relations in Virginia, 1660-1710.11 Journal of Social History 7: 25. Brenner, Robert 1976 IIAgrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Preindustrial Europe.1I Past and Present 70: 30-75. Brewster, 1967 Havelock, anq Clive Y. Thomas The Dynamics of West Indian Integration. University of the West Indies, Institute Economic Research. Mona, Jamaica: of Socia! and Bridenbaugh, Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh 1972 No Peace Beyond the Line: The English in the Caribbean, 1624=1690. New York: oxford UniversitY-Press. Brown, Adlith, and Havelock Brewster 1974 IIA Review of the Study of Economics in the English-Speaking Caribbean. II Social and Economic Studies 23: 48-68. Btieher-, Cad 1901 Industrial Evolution. s. Morely Wickett" tr-ans. New York: Bl.lffinton, 1916 Augustus M. Kelley, 1968. Ar-thur-H. IINew England and the Western Fur Tr-ade, 1629-1675. Publications of the Colonial Society of Hassachusetts, Transactions,-r9rs:1916, 18: 160-192. Burr, George Lincoln 1897 liThe Evidence of Dutch Archives as to European Occupation anq. Claims in Wester-n Guiana. II In Report and Accompanying Paper-s, 1: Historical, United States commission on the Boundary-Between Vene:::uela and Bl"itish Guiana. \'lashington: Gover-nment Printing Office.--Pp. 121-406.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.278 Bushman, Richard L. 1967 From Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in COriiiecticut, 1690-1765.' Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bythell, Duncan 1978 The Sweated Trades: Outwork in Nineteenth-Century Britain. New York: St. Martinis Press:-Cairnes, 1862 J. E. The Slave Power: Its Character, Career, and Probable 'Designs: Being an Attempt to Explain the Real Issues Involved in the AmerIcan Contest.-New York: Carleton, Publisher. -cambell, P. F. 1977 "Barbados: The Early Years. II Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society 35: 157-177. Cardoso, Ciro F. S. 1975 liOn the Colonial Modes of Production." Critique of Anthropology 4-5: 1-36. Carr, Lois 1974 Carr, Lois 1979 Green III The Metropolis of Maryland I: A Comment on Town Development along the Tobacco Coast." Maryland Historical Magazine 69: 124-145. Green and Russell R. Menard "Immigration and opportunity: The Freedman in ,Early Colonial Maryland." In The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo=Anlerican SocietY and.Politics, ,Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman, eds. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Pp. 206-242. Chevalier, ,Franc;:ois 1952 Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda. Alvin Eustis, trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. Chilcote, Ronald H. 1974 IIDependency: A Critical Synthesis ,of the Literature." Latin American Perspectives 1(2): 4-29. Chuta, E. and Carl Liedholm 1979 Rural Non-Farm Employment: A Review of the State of the Art. MSU Rural Development Paper-No.4. East'Lansing,:Michigan: Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural Economics. Clemens, Paul G. E. 1977 '''Economy and Society on Maryland's Eastern Shore, 1689-1733.11 In Law, Society, and Politics in Early Haryland, Aubrey Land, Lois Green Carr,' and Edward C. Papenfuse, eds., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 153-170. ... '" ::,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.279 Coleman D. C., ed. 1969 Revisions in Mercantilism. London: Methuen and Company, Ltd. comitas, 1964 Lambros "Occupational Multiplicity in Rural Jamaica. II In Proceedings. of the 1963 Annual Spring Meeting of the American EthiiOIogiCal Society. Pp. 41-50. ---Cook, Scott 1970 "Price and Output Variability in a Peasant-Artisan / Stoneworking Industry in Oaxaca, Mexico: An Analytical Essay in Economic Anthropology. II American Anthropologist 72:' 776-801. 1976a 1976b 1981 liThe I Market I as Location and Transaction: Dimensions of a Zapotec Stoneworking Industry ." In Markets in Oaxaca;:, Scott Cook and Martin Diskin, eds. Austin: University of Texas Press. Pp. 139-168. "Value; Price, and Simple Commodity Production: The Case of the Zapotec Stoneworkers." Journal of Peasant Studies 3: 395-427. "Crafts, Capitalist Development, and Cultural Property in Oaxaca, Mexico." Inter-American Economic Affairs' 35: 53-68. Cc.oper, Eugene 1979 liThe Period of Manufacture in the Development of the Chinese Art-Carved Furniture Industry: A Study in the Evolution of the l-lode of Craft Production. II In New Directions in Political Economy: An Approach from-xnthropology, Madeline Barbara Leons and Frances Rothstein, eds. Westport, Ct.: 1980 Greenwood Press, Inc. Pp. 159-171. The Wood-Carvers of Hong Kong: Craft Production in the World capitalist Periphery:--tondon: Cambridge University PreSS:-CGornaert, E. L. J. : 1967 IIEuropean Economic Institutions in the New World: The Chartered Companies." In Cambridge Economic History of' Europe, 4: The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth. and Seventeenth Centuries, E., E. Rich and.C:-H:-Wilsoil, eds. London: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 220-274 Courtenay, P. P. 1965 Plantation Agriculture. London: Bell and Sons, Ltd. Craton, Michael 1974 Sinews of Empire: A Short History of British Slavery.' New York: Anchor Books: --1978 Searching for Invisible Man: 'Slaves and Plantation Jamaica. Cambridge, Ilass.: Harvard University PresS:---. \

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.283 Eshelman, Catherine Good 1981 "Arte y Comercio Nahua: E1 Amate Puntado de Guerrero." America Indigena 41: 245-263. Evans, Robert, Jr. 1970 "Some Notes on Coerced Labor." Journal of Economic History 30: 861-866. Eversley, D. E. C. 1967 "The Home Market and Economic Growth in England, 1750-1780." In Land, Labor and Population in the Industrial Revolution E. L. Jones and G.:E: Mingay. eds:-London: Edward Arnold. Farley, Raw1e 1954 "The Rise of the Peasantry in British Guiana.1I Social and Economic Studies 2(4): 87-103. 1955a liThe Economic Circumstances of the British Annexation 9f British Guiana (1795-1815).11 Revista de Historia de America 39: 21-59. 1955b liThe Shadow and the Substance.1I caribbean Quarterly 4(2): 132-153. 1964 liThe Rise of Village Settlements in Guiana.1I Caribbean Quarterly 10: 52-61. Originally published in 1953. Firth, Raymond 1951 Elements of Social Organization London: Watts and Co. F'0ster-Carter, Aidan 1978 liThe Modes of Production Controversy.1I New Left Review 107: 47-77 Frucht, Richard 1967 IIA Caribbean social Type: Neither 'Peasant' nor Proletarian. 'II Social and Economic Studies 13: 295-300. f"'.lrley,O. W. 1965 "Horavian l-lissionaries and Slaves in the West Indies." Caribbean Studies 5(2): 3-16. 1968 IIA Replyll (toM. Reckord's comment). Caribbean Studies 8(1):. 74. Garrity, Monique 1981 "The Assembly Industries in Haiti: Causes and Effects, 1967-1973.11 Review of Black Political Economy 11: 203-215. Gaspar, David Barry 1978 "The Antigua .Slave Conspiracy of 1736: A Case Study of the Origins of Collective Resistence." William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 35: 308-323.

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