Summary of accident investigation reports

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Title:
Summary of accident investigation reports
Physical Description:
v. : ; 23 cm.
Language:
English
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United States -- Interstate Commerce Commission. -- Bureau of Safety
Publisher:
U.S. G.P.O.
Place of Publication:
Washington
Publication Date:
Frequency:
quarterly
regular

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Subjects / Keywords:
Railroad accidents -- Periodicals -- United States   ( lcsh )
Genre:
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
periodical   ( marcgt )

Notes

Additional Physical Form:
Also issued online.
Statement of Responsibility:
Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Safety.
Dates or Sequential Designation:
No. 1 (July/Sept. 1919)-
Numbering Peculiarities:
No more published?
Issuing Body:
Issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Safety.
General Note:
Title from cover.

Record Information

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University of Florida
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
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aleph - 004853510
oclc - 05161405
lccn - a 20000942
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lcc - HE1780 .A22
ddc - 656 U576s
System ID:
AA00012192:00001


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IC Iaci. fe..co


INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
BUREAU OF SAFETY



SUMMARY OF

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

REPORTS

No. 60


April, May, and June
1934


UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1934


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. Price 6 cents
Subscription price, 20 cents a year


v"















ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT


An Act Requiring common carriers engaged In interstate and foreign commerce to make
full report of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and authorizing
Investigations thereof by said commission.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That it shall be the duty of the general
manager, superintendent, or other proper officer of every common carrier en-
gaged in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad to make to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, at its office in Washington, District of Columbia, a
monthly report, under oath, of all collisions, derailments, or other accidents
resiltihn- in injury to persons, equipment, or roadbed arising from the operation
of such railroad under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
said commi--iiii. which report shall state the nature and causes thereof and the
circumstances connected therewith: Provided, That hereafter all said carriers
shall be relieved from the duty of r'i pirtina accidents in their annual financial
and operating reports made to the commission.
SEC. 2. That any common carrier fa iliiri to make such report within thirty
days after the end of any month shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
upon conviction thereof by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished
by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each and every offense and
for every day during which it shall fail to make such report after the time
herein specified for making the same.
SEc. 3. That the Interstate Commerce Coiumisiion shall have authority to
investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting in serious
injury to persons or to the property of a railroad occurring on the line of any
common carrier enig;..,il in interstate or foreign commerce by railroad. The
commission, or any impartial iir.--t i-A;i r thereunto authorized by said commis-
sion, shall have authority to in,-.-vtiu:itf such collisions, derailments, or other
accidents aforesaid, and all the attending facts, conditions, and circumstances,
and for that purpose may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony,
and require the production of books, p1llp'r~, orders, memoranda, exhibits, and
other evidence, and shall be provided by said carriers with all reasonable facili-
ties: Provided, That when such accident is inve.sti-aitud by a commission of
the State in which it occurred the Interstate Commerce Commission shall, if
convenient, make any investigation it may have previously determined upon, at
the same time as, and in connection with, the State commission investigation.
Said commission shall, when it deems it to the public interest, make reports of
such invest i-;i t ion, stating the cause of accident, together with such recommen-
dations as it deems proper. Such reports shall be made public in such manner
as the commission deems proper.
SEC. 4. That neither said report nor any report of said investigation nor any
part thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any suit
or action for dmiia-es gi oiwin, out of any matter mentioned in said report or
investigation.
SEC. 5. That the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to prescribe
for such common carriers a method and form for making the reports herein-
before provided.
SEC. 6. That the act entitled "An act requiring common carriers engaged in
interstate commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate
Commerce CGiini-;ioll." alppirived March 3, 1901, is hereby repealed.
SEC. 7. That the term interstate commerce as used in this act shall include
transportation from any State or Territory or the District of Columbia to any
other State or Territory or the District of Columbia, and the term "foreign
commerce as used in this act shall include transportation from any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia to. any foreign country and from any
foreign country to any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.
SEC. 8. That this act shall take effect 60 days after its passage.
Public, No. 165, alpprovenl May 6, 1910.
u
























I NDEX

Inv. no., P'at!
1900l. Chiae.. St. Paul, .Minwitapolis & Omaha fRailway, Northlinei, Wis.,
A pril 3, 1934 ----..- --- -- .............I.. .. .
190)7. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway, Dora, Ala., April 5, 1934 ..----- 2
1901s. Northern Pacific Railway, Big Lake, Wash., April 6, 1934....-... 3
1909. Baltimore & Ohio and Pennsylvani:a Railroads, Kyleshurg. Ohio,
April 19, 1931 .-. --.._ .-- -. ... ... 5
1910. Lchliih Valley Railroad, Bowmanstown, Pa., April 24, 1934....---- 8
1911. Lake Shore Electric Railway. Clyde, Ohio, May 6, 1'.1 ---------.. 9
1912. Chic:.,w River & Indiana Railroad, Chha.a-u.,, Ill., .ly 19, 1934 .--- 11
1913. Norfolk & Western Railway, Nace, Va.. May 20, 1934 .------- 12
1914. Virginian Railway, Cirtsville, W. Va., May 22, 1934-- 14
1915. Pennsylvania Railroad, Graystone, Md., June 6, 1934 ------- 16
1916. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railwaty, Pacific Junction. Okla.,
June 11, 1934 ............ ... .. 17
1917. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway, Indianai Harbor, Ind., June 21'.
1934 -------.------...--- --- ----------------- --- .. 20
1918. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, Fall River, M;.t-..
June 30, 1934 --------------------------------------------- 21
Condensed statement of accidents investigated during the year
ended June 30, 1934 --------------------------------------- 23

1 File number of accident i.r e'IiL tion as shown by records of lBureau of Safety.









































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SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT-INVESTIGATION REPORTS NO. 60,
APRIL, MAY, AND JUNE 1934

I NI IWI.T'A'I'T CO'MM I:II 'E 0M31.11M I-I NI. BUIEAUI OF \I-i.TY

The following is a summary of re.prt:- Iinl- to the Interstate
C0'mnTre, C4olmii0on by the Director of the Biire;ui of Safety
ve'tirilng accident investigations which were c(iompllted (luring the
quarter ended June 30, 1934.
The Aitiiiiient., in these reports of the number of p<.r-ni us killed
and injureil in the accidents investigated are the figures obt: lined at
the time of the investigation of the accidents.
CHICAGO,. ST. PAUL. MINNEAPOLIS & OMAIA IA.\AI.WAY

Der;iii1iie i( of a freight train near Northline. Wis., on April 3,
1934, which re-tiltd in the death of three employees.
This accident was vn.-.ild by a washout.
In the vicinity of the point of a'videuint this was a double-track
line over which trains were operated by time table, train ord'-rs, and
an automatic block-signal sy-tevin. The accident o,.ITrrdl at a point
approximately 1.4 miles w\,t. of the station; approaching this point
from the east. fltnre were several short ,ngen-ts and curves, followed
by 1,271 feet of tangent t raek. the ae-ident occurring on this tangent.
at a point approximately 300 feet from its eastern end. The grade
foir w\v-t-bound trains was 1.286 percent descending at the point of
accident.
The track was laid with 100-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with
an average of 18 ties to the rail length, fully tieplated. and ballasted
with slag to a depthl of about 12 inches. The track was well
maintained.
In the vicinity of the point of acoi(ident, the track was, laid on a
shelf on the side of a ridge of hills which rose on the south to a
height of 100 feet or more above the level of the track; immediately
ea-t of the point of accident, however, the track ran through a cut
in a projecting point of the ridge. The north side of this cut was
about 20 feet in height, while the south side rose quite abruptly to
a height of about 25 feet above the level of the track and then met
the natural slope of the hill through which the cut pa--ed. On the
slope of this hill ju-t above and near the middle of the cut, at a
point approximately 400 feet east of the point of accident. two





INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


channels formed by drainage from the hills converged and the water
concentrated at this point had in times past washed out quite a large
cavity in the south side of the cut; in order to control the eroding
effect of water passing through this cavity considerable riprap had
been provided.
During the night of April 2 there had been a steady rain, and it was
dark and raining steadily at the time of the ecident. which o i--urred
about 2:45 a. m.
West-bound second-class freight Train No. 89 co(un.ited of 44 cars
and a cab',,se, hauled by engine 414, and upon arrival at. Northline.
engine 491 was coupled ahead of engine 414. This train departed
from Northline at 2:40 a. m., and had gone about 1.4 miles when it
was derailed while traveling at a speed estimated to have been be-
tween 15 and 20 miles per hour.
Engine 491 and its tender were partially derailed, and the second
engine turned over on its right side down an embankment on the
right side of the track beyond the point of derailment, its tender
becoming separated and stopping beside the engine; 12 cars were
piled in a heap within a distance of a few hundred feet. The em-
ployees killed were the engineman and fireman of the second engine,
and the head brakeman.
The evidence indicated that during the night there had been a
heavy rain, causing a rush of water down the gully on the south
side of the cut at a point about 400 feet east of the point of accident;
gravel was washed upon the tracks, damming up the ditch along the
south side and causing the water to overflow to the ditch along the
north side of the tracks; the water then cut away a large portion of
the north bank of the cut and undermined the west-bound track just
beyond the end of the cut.

ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY

Derailment of a passenger train at Dora, Ala., on April 5, 1934,
which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 2
employees.
This accident was caused by a bolt having been placed on the
high rail of a curve.
In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a single-track
line over which trains were operated by time table, train orders,
and an automatic block-signal system. The initial point of derail-
ment was approximately 258 feet north of the north passing-track
switch, while the final point of derailment was at the frog of this
switch, a facing-point switch for south-bound trains located about
528 feet north of the depot. Approaching from the north there
were numerous short t;ingents and curves, followed by 923 feet of
tangent track, and then a 60 curve to the right 618 feet in length,






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS


including spirals, the initial point of derailment bring on tllis curve
232 feet from its northern end. The grade for south-boundi trains
was 1.25 percent ascending at the point of accident.
The track was laid with 100-pound rails, 39 feet in length, with
an average of 24 treated ties to the rail length, fully tieplated, and
having about 6 spikes to the tie, ballasted with .-lag to a depth of
from 12 to 20 indiche, topped with chats. The track was well main-
tained. The suiperelevation of the outside rail of the nlirve was 4

The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 3: 05 p. m.
South- ,iiii id pia.s:.-iger Train No. 105 consisted of 1 mail car, 1 U1-
gage car, 1 ciinhinllatioln hi gr'g.-coach, 2 cowil'.-, 2 Plllh;ii sleeping
cars, and 1 lining car, in the order named, all of steel construction,
hauled by engine :-''. This train passed Cordowa, the last open
office, 5.9 miles north of Dora, at 2: 56 p. in., accordniing to the train
sheet, 9 minutes late, and was derailed while appr-ian'l ing Dora at a
speed vAtiiimated to have been bet\veen 30 and 40 miles per hour.
Engiiine 1526, its tediler, the first three cars, and the forward truck
of the fourth car were derailed. The ,iiLine stopped on its right side
about 350 feet south of the point of the switch; the tender also was
on its side, opposite the engine, but the cars rniim iied upright. The
employee killed was the e.ngimnemiiat, while the employees injured were
the fireman and bagLe iniirmn.
The evidence indicated that a -inall bolt liadl been phlaice on the
rail o i the outside of the curve anl( that it caused the engine truck
to become derailed when the engihn ran over it, the engine, continuing
with only the truck derailed until it encountered the north switch
of the pa.--ing track, a facing-point switch for south-bound trains,
the final derailment occurring at the frog of this switch. A -ignial
maintain ni r had been working in the immediate vicinity practically
all day aji n had not observed anyone loitering around the track, and
a freight train had passed about 11/2 hours previously. It further
appeared from the maintainer's statements, however, that shortly
before the accident occurred a number of school children had been
cross ing the track aind it was possible that one of them placed the
bolt on the rail. The bolt was similar to those used in carrier irons
on freight cars, and while it was ru ty, the flattened or mashed part
of it was bright, indicating that it had recently been run over.

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY

Derailment of a passenger train near Big Lake, Wash., on April
6, 1934, which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury
of 1 employee and 1 mail clerk.






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


It was believed that this ;n-ceident was due to a combination of
several factors, including irregular track surface, speed, and dis-
tribution of the tender load which caused the tender to rock suffi-
ciently to derail the rear truck.
In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a single-track
line over which trains were operated by time table and train orders,
no block-signal system being in use. The initial point of derailment
was approximately 1.3 miles west of Big Lake, while the final de-
railment occurred at the switch leading to Tiloh Spur, one-half
mile fa rather east. Approaching the initial point of derailment
from the east, the track was tangent for a distance of 2,754 feet,
followed by a 0O30' curve to the left 833 feet in length and then
tangent track for a distance of 3,896 feet, the initial point of de-
railment being on this latter tangent at a point 758 feet from its
eastern end; this was at the leaving end of a vertical curve 800 feet
in length, which was followed by a slight ascending grade to the
spur track.
In the vicinity of the initial point of derailment the track was
on a fill about 4 feet in height and at the time of the accident there
was about 1 foot of water on the south side of this fill, the nearest
culvert being about 2,200 feet to the west. The track was laid with
90-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with an average of 18 or 19 fir
ties to the rail length, about 50 pern-ent being treated ties; it was
fully tieplated and single-spiked and 4 rail anchors to the rail
length were used. The track was ballasted with gravel to a depth
of about 12 inches.
Speed restrictions through this territory had been 60 miles per
hour for passenger trains and 45 miles per hour for freight trains,
but on August 10, 1933, special bulletin instructions were issued
restricting the speed for passenger trains to 50 miles and for freight
trains to 40 miles per hour.
Tiloh Spur was an industrial track, the switch being a facing-
point switch for west-bound trains, and at the time of the accident
there were four box cars standing on this spur just clear of the main
track. Opposite the spur track the main track was laid on a fill about
12 feet in height.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident which occurred
about 11: 20 a. m.
West-bound passenger Train No. 443 con.-ited of 1 mail and bag-
gage car, 3 coaches, and 1 bhag,,ge car, in the order named, hauled by
(-ngin, 2198. The baggrane cars were of all-steel construction while
the c;i,.ies were of wooden construction. This tr:in left Arlington,
the last open office, 17.6 miles east of Big Lake, at 10: 48 a. m., ac-
cording to the train sheet, 1 minute late, and 1n approaching Tiloh






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS


Spinr was derailed while traveling at a speed -li iin;itil to have been
between 30 and 45 miles per hour.
The rear tenlder-truck wheels were derailed to the right and fol-
lowel the rails until they e.i,,luerl the spur-track switch, a
distance of approximately 2,630 feet. The engine remained on the
track and stopped at a point C9!4 feet beyond the switch, while the
tender relinined coupled to the engine with the front truck doraniled
to the left, the rear tender truck having 1,iumare detached and stop-
ping to the right of the main track 187 feet behind the tender. The
first three ca rs stopped on their right sides at the foot of the fill be-
tween the iaiin and spur tracks; the fourth car was tipped to the
right down the eiih ankmient while thl last car was Iniini!_ against a
box car on the spur track, with its front wheels derailed. The
employee killed was the conductor.
The trarik uiirf:,-'i was found to be uneven, the left rail being 1
-inch high at a point 2:4 feet east of the point of derailment, while
the ties under the joint near the point of derailment were badly
decayed. At the time of the accident the tender had about 1 foot of
water or about 1,800 gallons, and approximately 8 tons of coal. Ow-
ing to the comparatively short wheel base the cientter of gravity of the
tender was quite high and the greater portion of the weight being in
the forward end, its center of gravity was raised accordingly and
the greater part of the weight was being carried on the fr,,nt trucks.
The intermittent flange marks on the ties when the wheels were first
derailed indicated that there must have been a severe rolling action
of the tender just prior to the deIraill nent, which evidently was inten-
sified at the joint where two old and decayed ties were found in the
trak, and it was thought that the condition of this joint lhad a
material effect in rocking the rear wheels of the tender off the track.

BA LTI.MOIE & OHIO AND PENNSYLVANIA RAILROADS
Head-end collision betiweeni a Baltimore & Ohio freight train and
a Penny-lva\niia freight train on joint track of the two roads near
Kylesburg, Ohio, on April 19, 1934, which resulted in the death of
1 employee and the injury of 3 employees.
This accident was caused by the failure of an operator to dis-
play the train-order signal and to deliver a hold order to the crew
of extra 6706, and by his further error in lining up the route and
displaying signal indications admitting this train to a block which
he had pledged to and which was occupied by an opposing train.
This was for the most part a double-track line, but between Out-
ville, 5 miles w-t. and Heath. 2.6 miles eai-t. of Kyle-buitrg, there
was a third track known as the west-bound running track which
was used principally by west-bound freight trains; when running
with the current of traffic, trains weire operated by time table and an
88671-34-1--2






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


automatic block-signal system, a cab-signal system also being in
operation on Pennsylvania engines; trains running against the cur-
rent of traffic were operated by train orders and a manual block-
signal system. The accident occurred on track 3, the west-bound
running track, at a point about 1 mile west of Kylesburg or 1,183
feet west of signal bridge 111.1F; approaching this point from the
west, the track was tangent for a distance of 4,617 feet, followed by
a 1 curve to the right 1,841 feet in length, the accident occur-
ring on this curve at a point 584 feet from its western end. Ap-
proaching from the east, there was approximately 1 mile of tangent,
followed by the curve on which the accident occurred. The grade
for west-bound trains was 0.84 percent ascending at the point of
accident.
The automatic signals were of the position-light type, located
on signal bridges spanning the tracks. Pennsylvania engine 6706,
which was involved in this accident, was equipped with cab signals
which functioned when running forward with the current of traffic
but not when running backward. Under special instructions con-
tained in the time table, engines backing up were limited to a speed
of 15 miles per hour, while freight trains operating over track 3
were limited to a speed of 25 miles per hour.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 5:45 p. m.
East-bound Baltimore & Ohio freight train Extra 2765 consisted
of 53 cars and a caboose, hauled by engine 2765. At Outville the
crew received train order 243, form 19, authorizing them to run
against the current of traffic on track 3; this order read as follows:
B. & 0. extra 2765 east has right over opposing trains on westward no. 3
track, Outville to Heath. Westward trains get this order at Heath.
While approaching Kyle-biirg, the opposing train was observed ap-
proaching, but owing to the curve it was not known upon which
track it was traveling until the trains were only a short distance
apart; the ejlginemiia n then applied the air brakes in emergency,
following which his train collided with Extra 6706 while traveling
at a speed estimated to have been about 25 miles per hour.
West-bound Pennsylvania freight train Extra 6706 consisted of
engine 6706, which was being operated backwards, nine cars and
caboose. The cars were picked up at Heath and at 5: 30 p. m.,
according to the train sheet, the train left that point, with the
caboose being pushed ahead of the engine, without a copy of train
order 243, previously quoted. On arrival at Kylesburg, a closed
office, the caboose was switched back to the rear of the train, and
Extra 6706 departed from that point about 5: 41 p. m. Approaching
signal bridge 111.1F the automatic signal was observed to be dis-






SUMMA.IIY OF AC(CIDNT INVESTIGATION REPOI:TS


playing a clear indication, and as the e i la--.d under thie bridge
at a speed -.tiii,;inted to have been between 12 awl 15 u miles per hour
the indication ciinged to stop, the ,,iiriliemlan --ll iiin, that this
was caused by the tender p:--ing the sirgnil: shortly afterwards
the opposing trail was o-.rvI approaclUhig. awlnd when it was
realized that both trains were on the same trick the ,inrjiliinman
applied the air brakes in emergen Iy and his train either had stopped
or was rarely moving when it was struck by Extra 276.5.
The tender of enmgilne 6706 was derailed and hardly d:,ii u.igd. while
the tender of engine 2705 was practically destroyed aml nine empty
tank cars.' inmiediately behind it were derailed, blorkilg tra'k 1
and 2, while the thirty-eighth car, a box car, collapsed. The em-
ployee killed was the head brakeman of Extra 2765; the employees
injured were the enginimean and fireman of that train and the
firemanli of Extra 6706.
The operator cl;ainmed that he had been under the impression that
the train-order signal should have been displayed only for track 1,
the west-bound main track, and for that reas.oni he did not display
the -ignsail when lihe had a hold order for we-t-bound trains on track
3, as he thought that in the event it was displayed under such cir-
cumstances it might result in uni nce-an rily stopping a west-bound
train on track 1, and that once a train-order signal was displayed
it could not be taken down under any consideration until the
order was completed; the rules, however, provided that an operator
could not clear the signals for an approaching train unless he knew
the train was not the one to which orders were addressed. He said
that movements similar to those involved in this case were frequently
made, but that the hold order would not be delivered to the west-
bound train involved; that train, being controlled by -i-nal indi-
cations, would not be permitted to proceed until the order was ful-
filled by the east-bound train, and annulled by the dispatcher and
the block clear. When Extra 6706 was ready to depart, however,
the operator forgot the order, which was lying on his table.
A a fv-ty device, known as a keeper or reminder ". was pro-
vided and required by the rules to be used on the lever of the inter-
locking machine to preclude the possibility of a conflicting movement
being authorized after the block had been pledged. In this instance,
however, the operator removed the reminder from lever 3 in order
to arrange for another train movement at Heath, and then he forgot
to replace it; overlooking the fact that he had pledged the block
to the ea-t-bound train, he then lined the route for the west-bound
train and permitted it to enter the occupied block without having
delivered a copy of the hold order or having displayed the train-
order signal.






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD

Derailment of a freight train at Bownianstown, Pa., on April 24,
1934, which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of
4 employees.
This accident was caused by excessive speed on a sharp curve.
In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a double-track
line over which trains were operated by time table, train orders, and
an automatic block-in211a1l and train-stop system, the latter being of
the intermittent-inductive type. A storage track paralleled the main
tracks on the south, the tracks being numbered, from north to
south, 1, 2. and 4; the accident occurred on track 2 at a point 1,720
feet west of the station at Bowmanstown: appria,:ching this point
from the west, the track N an tangent for a distance of appri'xi mitely
1,275 feet, followed by a 5 curve to the right 443 feet in length,
tangent track for a distance of 60 feet, and then a 7037' curve to the
left 1,053 feet in length, the accident occurring on this last-imentioned
curve at a point 283 feet from its western end, or 163 feet from the
leaving end of the spiral. The grade was slightly descending for
east-bound trains, being 0.28 percent at the point of accident.
The track was laid with 136-pound rails, 38 feet in length, with an
average of 24 ties to the rail length, fully tieplated, and was bal-
lasted with crushed stone; the track was well maintained. The speed
of trains on the curve on which the accident occurred was restricted
to 40 miles per hour, speed-limit signs being located along the right-
of-way just west of the 50 curve and also on the 7037' curve just
east of its western end.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 2: 48 a. m.
East-bound freight train BNY-2 con(,i-ted of three cars and a
caboose, hauled by pas-uinger engine 2020. This train departed
from Packerton, 5 miles west of Bowmanstown, at 2: 42 a. m., passed
Lehighton, 1.6 miles beyond, at 2:44 a. m., and was approaching
Bowmanstown when it was derailed while traveling at a speed esti-
mated to have been between 45 and 60 miles per hour.
The entire train was derailed, the engine and tender being over-
turned on their right sides with the rear end of the engine on track
4 and the forward end against an embankment on the south side of
the trn, ks, 252 feet east of the point of derailment. One of the cars
went down the enimbankiment to the left and stopped in an upright
position in the Lehigh River approximately 180 feet beyond the
engine. The other two cars were practically upright and diagonally
across the tracks opposite the engine, with the caboose upright and
against the rear of the engine. All of this equipment was badly
damaged. A string of empty hopper cars was standing on track 4,






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVLSTI.'rCATION REPORTS


and the derailed train scraped the sides (if 2 of Ihe,., cars, lightlyy
damgiing them, and then derailed a1nd destroyed tihe following 7
hopper cars. The employee killed was the enginleman, and the
employees injured were the fireman, conductor, brakelman, and flag-
man.
None of the survive ng employees appeared tb( have been playing,
particular attention to the .pedl, althoiugl the conductor later saii
that the -perd might have been in excess of 50 miles per hour after
passing Lehiglhton, and the ibrakemlian -Hlid that it could have been
601 miles or more per hour at the time of the accident. The best
evidence. however, to indie.te that the speed wa, excessive was thlia
which was obtained from examination of the track and equipment.
This examination failed to disclose any defective condition that could
have contributed to the cause of the accident, but it did reveal that
the only marks on the track at the point of derailment were on the
high or outside rail of the cm rve and on the outer ends of the ties
east of this mark. There were no marks of any kind on the low
rail, or between the rails, thus indicating conclusively that the engin.,
turned over from cenitrifugal force without first being derailed; this
would account for the marks near the tops of two coal cars standing
on the storage track opposite the point of accident, while marks
entirely around the circumference of wheels on the right side of the
,engine also indicated that the engine had been tilted sharply to one
side while the wheels on that side still were on the rail.
The brakes had been inspected and tested before the train left
Packerton, and a tc-t of the brake apparatus removed from the engine
-iib-e'niiiit to the accident ,disclu,.ed that. it was in working order,
while the enggineman appeared to have been in normal condition
before starting the trip and must have been alive very shortly before
the accident. in view of the fact that the fireman observed him easing
off on the throttle about 25 or 30 seconds before the accident occ'-rred.
Under these conditions it was impossible to say why he filed to
reduce the speed of his train in co-'pliatince with the 40-miile-per-hour
speed re-triction in effect on this curve, although it was noted that
this was only a 3-car freight train which was being hauled by a
p)a--eIgerr-type engine and the engineman hadl received instructions
to make as good time as possible consistent, with safety.

LAKE SIIORE EIJU.' I'C RAILWAY

Collision between an electric iiiteriirhan freight train and a motor
bus at ClI.de. Ohio. on May 6, 19,34. which resulted in the death of
2 pliaeiigers on the b's. and the injury of the bus driver. 1 stuideint
1, is driver, 2 bus porters, and the motorman and conductor of t11-
electric train.






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


This accident probably was caused by a blowout of the tire on
the left front wheel of the bus.
In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a single-track
.lect ric line over which trains were operated by time table and
train orders, no block-signal system being in use. The accident
occurred within the corporate limits of Clyde, on State Street,
2,900 feet west of the station and 530 feet west of a regular stop-
ping point for the bus involved in this accident; approaching this
point from either direction the tirck was tangent for a consider-
able distance, and the grade was 0.3 percent descending for west-
bound trains.
State Street extended east and west and the railway track was
laid in the center of the street, with the improved highway, which
was known as U. S. Route 20, paralleling the track on either side
at the point where the accident occurred. The highway proper
was composed of macadam about 10 feet in width on each side of
the track, outside of which there were well-settled shoulders from
7 to 10 feet wide, d( re.-.ed with medium crushed stone and slag;
the center strip upon which the car track was laid was about 10
feet in width and filled in between and along the outside of the
rails with medium crushed rock and stone to the tops of the rails
and was approximately level with the adjoining macadam surface
of the highway.
The speed limit through Clyde for electric railway trains was 25
miles per hour, while highway vehicles were limited to a speed of
35 miles per hour.
The weather was clear and day was breaking at the time of the
accident, which occurred about 4:15 a. m.
West-bound interurban freight train Extra 28 consisted of motor
28, of wooden construction, with an underframe reinforced with steel.
On arrival at Clyde several bundles of Sunday newspapers were un-
loaded, the car departing from the station at 4: 12 a. m., according
to the train sheet, and it was proceeding westward on State Street
at a speed estimated to have been about 18 or 20 miles per hour when
the left front corner was struck by the bus.
East-bound Great Eastern Stage-, Inc., bus 135, was carrying pas-
sengers from Chicago, Ill., to Cleveland, Ohio, and points east; the
body of the bus was of wooden construction, reinforced with thin-
gage sheet steel. This bus left Toledo, Ohio, about 2:45 a. m.,
passed through Fremont, located about 32 miles beyond, about 3:45
a. m., and was pruieeding eastward on State Street in Clyde at a
speed estimated to have been about 15 miles per hour when it swerved
suddenly to the left and collided with the electric car.
The entire left side of the bus was torn off, together with o nve of
the seats on that side, and the top was ripped open, while the front






SUMMAIlY OF ACCIDENT IN'VESTIGAT'rION REPORTS


axle and .steering gear w-er, bent; the bus stopped on the opposite side
of the stmct -car track with its front end again-t the corner of a
culvert about 250 feet east of the point of impact. Motor car 28 was
not derailed, but the left side of the front vet-ibule \was torn off,
the motor car stopping with its rear end about 125 feet west of
where the collision occurred.
Ex.ainiii;l ion of the tire in question showed evidence of a blow-out
having occurred either before or at the time of the acciblent, and
the condition of the tire and the marks on the rn:ldway, as well as
the daim;ige sustained by the bus and the motor car, coupled with
the statements of the bus driver and the motorman to the effect
that the bus served suddenly into the motor car when it was only
a few feet distant, led to the conclui.ion that the tire blew out and
caused the bus to head directly toward the electric car, too late for
either the bus driver or the motorman to prevent the accident. The
reason for the blow-out was not determined; the bus had just passed
over 2/ miles of very rough road, where the surface was being torn
up and vehicles were moving only at their own risk, but no statement
could be made as to whether the tire sustained damagee on this rough
road which subsequently caused it to blow out.

CHICAGO RIVER & INDIANA RAILROAD

Derailment of a yard engine and a cut of freight cars at Chirago,
Ill., on May 19, 19:4. which resulted in the death of 2 employees
and the injury of 2 employees.
This accident was caused by insecure track.
This was a switching line over which movements were made under
yard rules and -pecial instructions, no time table, train orders, or
block signals being in use. Within the yard in which this accident
occurred there were five running tracks extending east and west
through approximately the center of the yard, these tracks being des-
ignated from north to south as lead track 1, tracks 2, 3, and 4, and
lead track 5. Lead track 5, on which the accident occurred, was
used by trains, cars, or engines of various railroads moving in both
directions in entering or leaving the stockyards. This track was
tangent for praeti' ally its entire length of approximately 2,800 feet,
the accident occurring at a point near the center of this tangent.
The grade was level at the point of accident.
The track was laid with 105-pound rails, 33 feet in length, with 20
ties to the rail length, and was ballasted with cinders to a depth of
about 3 feet.
Special instructions required all trains and engines to move at
restricted speed prepared to stop short of train, obstruction, or any-
thing that might require the speed of the train to be reduced.






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


The weather was clear and hot, with a temperature of 920 at the
time of the accident, which occurred about 12: 35 p. m.
Engine 360, east-bound, with a caboose and 21 cars, in the order
given, entered the western end of lead track 5 and had proceeded
about half way through the yard when it was derailed while travel-
ing at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles per hour.
The engine was derailed to the left and stopped on its left side,
while the tender remained coupled to the engine, leaning at an angle
of about 45. The caboose and the first five cars also were derailed,
the caboose being demolished. The engineman and fireman were
killed and the conductor and a brakeman were injured.
On the morning of the accident the section gang had been renew-
ing ties; the section foreman said he had put in 38 ties, some of which
had been left unspiked while he and his men went to lunch, but about
30 minutes after the accident the assistant roadmaster found 36 ties
not spiked out of a total of 75 -iicce.esive ties. In addition, the track
had been materially wtakwened by the removal and refilling of ballast
where the ties had been renewed, and this fact, coupled with the fail-
ire of the *ect ion foreman to spike the ties, was believed to be ade-
quate to account for the occurrence of the accident. Flag protection
had been provided while the men were at work, being removed during
the lunch period; in view of the uncompleted condition of the work
this track should not have been left unprotected.

NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY

Derailment of a freight train near Nace, Va., on May 20, 1934,
which re-ilted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 1
employee.
The cause of this accident was not definitely determined.
In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a single-track line
over which trains were operated by time table, train orders, and an
automatic block and cab-signal system. The accident occurred ap-
proximately three-fourths of a mile south of the station at Nace;
apl),,'_.,1'ii iw' this point from the north, there was a 7 curve to the
left 382 feet in length and then the track was tangent for a di- an .c
of 1,315 f.-t, followed by a 5030' curve to the left 1,147 feet in length,
the accident occurring on this last-mentioned curve at a point 272
ft-( from its northern end. The grade for south-hioniii trains wa.
(,de-,:iling for a distance of 900 fiet. ranging from 1.05 percent
to 1.20 percent, leading to a vertical cir~ e, and then it was 0.74 per-
ce(lit. aidingg for a lii-ta ce of 1,127 feet to the point of accident.
and for some distance beyond that point.
The track hwa laid with 130-pinuiid rails, 39 feet in eiilgtli, with
an average of 24 hardwood ties to the rail length, fully tieplated.






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVIESTIGAT'rION REPORTS


single-spiked, tqulipped with from 1 to 5 rail anchors to the rail
length, and was 1:ill:i-leid with crushed stone to a depth of about 8
inches, underlaid with slag. The track had been raised ire.,nrtly but
no ballast had been added, the result !,ing, thAlii there was no ballast
between somine of the ties while in other cases it varied up to :1l)1i1,t
4 inches above the bottoms of the ties; the ballast under the ties,
however, was firm. The maximum speed permitted for fi'ight trains
was 45. miles per hour.
The weather was clear and hot at the time of the accident, which
*occ1Irred about 2: 50 p. m.
Southboulnd freight train Extra 2012 consisted of 5 1,.,ad1d and 70
empty cars, and a. caboose, hauled by engine 2012, of the 2-8-8-2
type. This train left Waynesboro, 81.5 miles north of Nace, at
11: 30 a. m., passed Lithia, 5.4 miles from Nace, at 2:31 p. m., and
was derailed shortly afterward while traveling at an estimated
speed of from 25 to 30 miiles per hour.
The engine and tender were derailed and stopped on their left
sides against the eimbankiient. to the left of and parallel with the
track, with the front end of the engine 360 feet south of the point
of derailment. The first car and the fifth to the twelfth cars, inclu-
sive, also were derailed, the first car stopping immediately behind the
tender and the other derailed cars being scattered in various posi-
tions. The engine was badly damaged, one car was destroyed, and
the other cars were more or less badly damaged. The employee killed
was the engiiema nn, and the employees injured wre the fireman and
the head brakeiman.
The stateiiments of the section foreman and roadmaster were to the
effect that the tr' ck w\vas left in good condition after having b'een
raised 3 weeks prior to the accident, and it had been inspected by
the section forenmian the (lay preceding the accident, while the last
train to pa-s over it was south-bound passenger Train No. 1, which
passed Troutville, the next station south of the point of a.,ident, at
8: 04 a. m. An inspection of the track by the rn ;ni mi ster and super-
intendent subsequent to the accident did not disclose anything which
could have contributed to its occurrence, nor did the road forlen-min
of engines, general formcinn,. or assistant to the superintendent of
motive power discover any mechanical defect about the ,.nrgine that
could have contributed to its derailment. A careful inspection of
the trick and engine by the Conmmnission's in-pectors also revealed no
defects that might have caused the accident.
The temperature on the day of the accident was about '0 and
consideration was given to the possibility that the track might have
buckled due to this warm weather, when coupled with the fact
that additional ballast had not been added when the track was





INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


raised. It was not definitely determined that this was the case,
however, nor did it appear that there was any question as to exces-
sive speed, and examination of the marks on the rails, the absence
of marks on the ties, and the manner in which the t rack was found
to be out of line, first several inches to the left or inside of the
curve, then several feet to the right for a short distance, and then
several feet to the left for a considerable distance, coupled with
marks which indicated that the right front driver of the low-pres-
sure engine had been running on the outside of the rail with the left
back driver on the inside, without marking either ties, rail bases, or.
spikes, failed to lead to any definite conclusion as to the cause of
the accident. The train crew had no warning of anything wrong
prior to the derailment, and it was apparent that evidence as to
the cause of accident was destroyed as a result of damage to the
engine and track following the derailment.

VIRGINIAN RAILWAY

Head-end collision between two freight trains at Cirtsville, W. Va.,
on May 22, 1934, which resulted in the death of 2 employees and
the injury of 1 employee.
This accident was'caused by failure to obey a meet order.
In the vicinity of the point of accident this was a single-track line
over which trains were operated by time table and train orders,
no form of block-signal system being in use. The passing track
at Cirtsville was 3,722 feet in length, paralleling the main track
on the north, and the accident occurred at a point approximately
1,446 feet east of the east switch of this passing track. Approaching
the point of accident from the west, there was a series of short
curves and tangents, followed by a 7 curve to the right 992 feet
in length, tangent track for a distance of 577 feet, and a compound
curve to the left 1,845 feet in length, the curvature varying from
2056' to 448', the accident occurring on this compound curve at
a point about 641 feet from its western end where the curvature
was 325'. Approaching from the east, the track was tangent for
582 feet followed by the compound curve on which the accident
occurred. The grade for east-bound trains was ascending, it being
1.49 percent at the point of accident.
The view had by the engineman of an east-bound train approach-
ing the point of accident was restricted to less than 300 feet, while
the engineman of a west-bound train could not see the point of
accident for a distance of more than 600 feet.
The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred
at 4:27 p. m.






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS


East-bound freight train Extra 718 conlsisted of engine 718, ; cars,
helper engines 72-' and 716, and a caboose, in the order named. At
Page, their initial terminal, 20.7 miles west of Cirt-ville, the crew
received copy of train order 41, form 19, directing then to run extra
from Page to Gulf Junction and to meet two trains not involved
in this accident. The train departed from Pag,. at 1:22 p. m., ac-
cording to the train ,Iieet, and at Oak Hill Junction, 9.1 miles
beyond, the crew received train order 45, form 19, directing them
to neet Extra 722 at Harper. Extra 718 departed at 2:35 p. m.,
after picking up 6 cars, and at Pax, the last open office, 3 miles west
of Cirt.sville, the crew received train order 48, form 19, changing the
meet with Extra 722 to Cirtsville instead of Harper; there was no
open office at Cirt-ville. Eighteen additional cars had bii picked
up, and Extra 718 then consisted of 93 cars, helper engines 729 and
716, and a caboose. This train departed from Pax at 4:15 p. in.,
passed Cirtsville, and collided with Extra 722 while traveling at a
speed estimated to have been between 15 and 20 miles per hour.
West-bound freight train Extra 722, conti-ting of 29 cars and a
caboose, hauled by engine 722, departed from Gulf Junction. 29.6
miles east of Cirtsville, at 2: 10 p. m., and at Slab Fork, 11.4 miles
beyond, the crew received a copy of train order 48, previously men-
tioned. This train departed from Slah Fork at 2:56 p. mi., and
at Harper, the last telegraph office, 5.5 miles east of Cirtsville, the
middle copy was received of the order fixing the meet with Extra
718 at Cirtsville instead of Harper. Additional cars had been picked
up en route and on leaving Harper at 4: 15 p. m. Extra 722 consisted
of 33 cars and a caboose; it was approaching Cirtsville when it
collided with Extra 718 while traveling at a speed estimated to
have been between 6 and 10 miles per hour.
Engines 722 and 718 were badly damaged but remained upright,
although engine 722 was partially derailed. Fourteen cars through-
uit Extra 718 were derailed and badly daimiaged, and the first
four cars in Extra 722 were derailed and damaged. The engineman
and head brakeman of Extra 718 were killed and the fireman of
Extra 718 was injured.
Under the provisions of train order 48, Extra 718 was required
to stop clear of the east switch of the passing track at Cirtsville
and await the arrival of Extra 722. The meeting point with Extra
7'" first had been fixed at Harper by train order 45, but at Pax,
train order 48 was received changing the meet to Cirtsville. The
conductor delivered the order to the fireman but had no understand-
ing either with him or with the en ginieman as to the contents of this
order, which restricted the rights of their train. The fireman read
it and then handed it to the engineman, and it was apparent that






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


both the enlgineiiiain and fireman misread the order and erroneously
assumed that it was a middle order and that the meeting point
at Harper was unchanged. It was the practice on this railway to
allow the use of orders on form 19 when restricting the rights of
a superior train; when such a practice is in effect, however, care
must be taken to guard against mistakes which experience has
shown may arise under the train-order method of operation. In
this particular case the order changed the meeting point and was
the most important order the crew had received, yet the conductor
first and then the fireman and engineman passed it aroutir1 without
making sure that it was correctly read and understood.

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD
Deirnliiient of a pa;:--enger train at Graystone, Md., on June 6,
1934, which resulted in the death of 1 passenger and 2 employees.
This accident w;is believed to have been due to excessive speed
on a sharp curve.
This was a double-track line over which trains were operated
by time table, train orders, and an automatic block and cab-signal
systemii. The initial point of derailment was 225 feet east of bridge
27.12, and most of the derailed equipment stopped in the stream
bed opposite the bridge. Approaching from the east, there was a
3 curve to the right 1,053 feet in length and then 390 feet of
t0ngenit, followed by an 80 curve to the left 1,004 feet in length, the
initial point of dernilienit occurring on this curve at a point 378
feet from its eastern end. The grade was, ascending for westbound
trains, varying from 0.09 to 0.81 percent, and was 0.35 peirtent across
the bridge.
Bridge 27.12, located approximately 250 feet east of the station
at Gray-tone, was a steel bridge of the deck-girder, open-floor type,
having- stone masonry abutments and a concrete center pier:;'its
total length between back walls was 80 feet 4 inches and the depth
from the base of the rail of the west-boiund track to the bed of the
stream was 26 feet. The track was laid with 130-pound rails, 39
feet in length, with an average of 22 ties to the rail length, fully
tieplat,.d1 and spiked. The ballast was of trap rock, about 12 inches
in depth, laid on a cinder subgrade. The track was well maintained.
The superelevation of the outside rail on the 8 curve varied from
4%-/ inches to 5', inche,. while the gage varied from 4 feet 8%
inches to 4 feet 9 inches. Both the high and low rails of the curve
showed fairly equal distribution of wear, and there was only slight
fIn ce xvwear on the high or outside rail. The speed limit for pas-
.V(Inger trains in this territory was 55 miles per hour, while on the
curve involved, the speed was limited to 30 miles per hour.






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS


The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 8: 18 p. nm.
West-bound pa-ingerr train Extra 1:',7, consisted of 1 coach and I
combination pa.-- ,r and hlggage;_ car. both of all-steel construc-
tion, hauled by engine 1387, of the 4-6-2 type. This train left
Cockeysville. 12.3 miles e;i-t of (Graystone, at : 02 p. in., stopped at
Corlieit, 7.4 miles beyond, to discharge a passenger, and was ap-
proaching (iraystone when it, was derailed while traveling at a speed
,estimated to have been at least 35 miles per hour.
Engine 1387, t(,ogetlric with its tender and the coach,. were derailed
and plung',.d1 off the north side of bridge 27.12; the combination pas-
-iiger and UNiL'gage car continued over the bridge and stopped up-
right on the roadbed 350 feet west of the initial point of derailnent.
The engine and tender were on their left sides in the stream bed
and the coach was south of and opposite them, 1,;iilly dia.ig1d. The
employees killed..were the ciigiii'il;iii and firiiain.
The investigation brought out considerable evidence that the train
involved in this accident was beiiiL, operated at an excessive rate of
sp*edlt. The c('r.-ingL watchman at McCullough Cr,'--i iig stated that
as the train approached and pa--t.d his cri,--ing the engine was rock-
ing far more than -ii;i. Although this ri',iiing was located only
430 feet east of the beginning of the curve on which the accident oc-
curred, the statement of the cr,--iiii-, watchman indicat,,1 that the
brakes were not applied until the rear end of the train had passed
some distance beyond the cro-sing, and that a heavy application of
the brakes was then made as he saw fire flying from the wheels. In
addition, the engine, tender, and first car were thrown clear of the
track, while the momentum of the third car carried, it 350 feet beyond
the initial point of derailment, notwithstanding that this car was
derailed and the ob-tiructions which it encountered en route set up
con(.-iderable retardation. There was no evidence of draijiiriLrn or
otherwise defective equipment, and the track in both directions from
the scene of the accident was -ub.,tanitially construicted and well
maintained. It therefore appeared that the train approadlid the
curve at relatively high speed and that the brakes were not applied
soon enough properly to reduce its speed before entering upon the
curve.
CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & P.'II If' RAILWAY

Side collision between a pia--t'eger train and a freight train at
Pacific Junction, Okla., on June 11, 19'14, which resulted in the
death of one employee.
This accident was caused by failure of the conductor of the pas-
-e.nger train properly to control the speed of his train during a
backl-up IllovPillent.






INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


This accident oiciirrel on a single-track line over which trains
were operated by time table and train orders, no block-signal sys-
tem being in use. In the vicinity of the point of accident the
general direction of this subdivision was north and south, but time-
table directions were east and west and these latter directions were
u-,d1 in this report. There was a wye at Pacific Junction, the pas-
,iiger cut-off forming the east leg, the wye track the west leg, and
two tracks dhe-ig-iited as the new main and the old main forming
the north leg. The latter two tracks converged into the single-
track main line a short diltaintce west of the wye track, and the
accident occurred within yard limiit-, at the fouling point of these
tracks 131 feet east of the junction switch. At a point 124.5 feet
east of the main track or junction switch another track, known as
the freight belt track, led off the old main, while 151 feet farther
east the wye track led off the freight belt track to the right and
connected with subdivision 48. Approaching the point of accident
from either direction, the track was tbingenit for a long distance.
followed by a 10 curve 2,268 feet in length which extended to the
left for east-bound train-, and the accident occurred on this curve
at a point 807 feet from its western end. The track was slightly
descending in both directions toward the junction 'switch, but was
level at the point of accident.
The switches involved were the junction switch, the freight belt
switch, and the -Nye track switch. The switch stands were equipped
with lamps mounted approximately 8 feet above the head-block
ties; the junction switch lamp displayed a red indication when the
switch was lined for a moveiiimnt to the old main from the west
and the other two switch lamps displayed green indications when
the track was lined to the freight belt. All three stands were
located on the engineman's side of an east-bound train moving
toward the freight belt, while a clear view of the switch lights
could ordinarily be had for a distance of approximately 1,460 feet
from the leading car of a train backing westward on the new main
track, but during such a movement the engineman's view of them
would be materially restricted on account of the curvature and
his position behind the train.
The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which oc-
curred about 11: 29 p. m.
E;i-tliund -,'*,',id-class freight Traiii No. 996 conii-i-ted of 68
freight cars, 1 p1i.-,enger car, and a caboose, hauled by engine 2706.
This train departed from Chickasha, 32.7 miles west of Pacific
Junction, at 6: 55 p. m., 40 minutes late, stopped at Pacific Junction
about 11: 20 p. m., 2 hours and 20 minutes late, and then proceeded
to pull into the freight belt track at a speed of about 10 miles per
hour, and it was while this movement was being iin;ul that the
train was sideswiped by Train No. 44.






SULAIMAl'Y OF ACCIDENT IN V -STI.; I ION IEPUOl l'


Ea:l(iii nd i);i-- ,4111i''r coach and 1 ba-gLag. carl in the order named, being showed
by gas-electric motor 9000. Th'lis train left El Reno pa,;--n'iiger -tia-
tion, 3,9)36 feet east of Pacific Junctiiin, at 11: 25 1) p. m., 10 minutes
late, and wa.-\ moving westward on the new main track. preparatory
to heading a.st\ward around the wye track and tlhence to its destina-
tion on subdivi-iion 48, when it striirk Train No. 996 while traveling
at a speed estimated to have been between 6 and 10 miles per hour.
The left leading corner of the coach in the pm-.eviger train struck
the forty-third car in the freight train, derailing the forward end of
the coacli to the right and crushingi in its corner. The forty-third
car wa\s damaged but not derailed, while the forty-fourth car was
Derailed and badly damiiaged; none of the other equipment was
derailed or lamiiaged. The eiiillyee killed wa- the brakclina of
Train No. 44.
Under special instructions contained in the time table, irst-cla-s
trains approaching Pacific Junction were required to move at re-
stricted speed expecting to find engine, or trains turning on the wye.
Tli. rules defined restricted speed as pr'c i,.,ding prepared to stop
short of a train, obstruction. or anything that required the speed of
the train to be rdiii,'ed. The rules further provided that a signal
improperly displayed, or the absence of a signal at a place where a
signal was usually shown, should be regarded as the most restrictive
indication that could be given by that -ignal.
According to the statements of the conductor of the pa--'nger train
it was so dark that visibility was materially re-t ricted and he did
not see the cars of Train No. 996 until his train collided with them,
although he had previously given the enginemnan a slow signal and
the -peed had been reduced to -in, extent. His first intimation that
the track was occupied was when the brakeman shouted a wani iii
very shortly before the collision occurred and he ininediately applied
the brakes in em er eni'iv with the tail hose valve, but it was then
too late to prevent the accident. He had seen two gr'ei switch lights
which appeared to be flirkering. but th(ioughtt this was caused by wind
getting under the bottoms of the lamps, and it did not occur to him
tliat the intermittent display of these lights might be caused by pass-
ing cars. Tests conducted subsequent to the accident, however, re-
vealed that these switch lights could not be seen from a train
approaching from the east while a train was enteringLr the freight belt
track except when a low car passed them, and if the conductor had
seen these lights only at intervals he should have realized that some-
thing was wrong and should have brought his train either to a stop
or under such control that he could definitely ascertain what caused
this unusual condition before it was too late to avert the accident.





INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


ELGIN, JOLIET & EASTERN RAILWAY
Derailment of a freight train at Indiana Harbor, Ind., on June
26, 1934, which re-ulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury
of 2 employees.
This accident wau. caused by a cocked or partly opened switch.
This was a double-track line over which movements were made
under yard rules and special instructions, no time table, train orders,
or block signals being in use. The accident occurred at the switch
leading to the west lead to Buffington yards, this switch being located
approximately 1,315 feet east of Michigan Avenue crossing; ap-
proaching this point from the wist, there was a 2 curve to the
right 525 feet in length, tangent track for a distance of 611 feet,
and a 2 30' curve to the left 197 feet in length, followed by tangent
track 3,987 feet in length, the accideiit occurring on this latter
tangent at a point 1,465 feet from its western end. The grade was
practically level at the point of accident.
The switch involved was a faiing-point switch for eia.st-bound
trains, with a no. 10 turnout. The switch stand, located on the south
side of the east-bound tar;ck, was a Star stand, manufactured by the
Pettibone Mulliken Co., and was of the high revolving type with
switch light roundels 6 feet 9 inches above the head block ties, dis-
playing a green indication when the switch was lined for the main
track and a red indication for the diverging route. The stand was
equipped with a red fish-tail banner 12 by 30 inches which was
3 feet 4 inches above the head blocks; this banner was displayed
only when the switch was lined for the diverging route. The view
of the switch was unobstructed for over 1,400 feet.
Special time-table instructions provided that switch engines,
engines running backward, and engines not equipped with pony
trucks should not exceed a speed of 20 miles per hour.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
at 6: 30 p. m.
The east-bound transfer train, consisting of 64 loaded cars and a
caboose, hauled by engine 336, of the 0-8-0 type, departed from
South Chicago at 6 p. m., and on reaching the switch at the west
end of Buffington yards it was derailed while traveling at a speed
v.tiimated to have been between 15 and 25 miles per hour.
The engine stopped at a point 225 feet beyond the switch, between
the east-bound main and lead tracks, tipped to the left, with the
tender across the two main tracks behind the engine. The first eight
cars were derailed and stopped in various positions, badly damaged,
between the tender and the switch. The employee killed was the
elngineman and those injured were the fireman and head brakeman.
The evidence indicated that the engineman saw the partly opened
switch in time to apply the air brakes in emergency just before






SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS


reaching tih switch, but prior to his death he stated that the red
target was not displayed. Subsequent to the accident it was found
that a small piece of the switch point was broken off, indicating that
it had been struck by a driving wheel; the switch lock was open and
hanging on the chain, the lever was out of its socket, and the target
displayed a red indication.
A switchiiiman in the crew of engine 577 who last uied the switch.
on the morning of the accident, .tated that he bruised his hand in
closing the lock, and after the accident. it was found that it required
force to snap the lock together. It was po,-ible that the lock was
not securely fa:,tened when the switchman attempted to lok it, as
s.ub-sequeliit to the investigation of this aceidient a statement was
obtained from a 10-year-old boy in which he said he found the look
hanging on the chain and attempted to open the switch, but was
unable to turn the lever entirely around, stating that he wanted to
change the color of the switch light but was unable to do so.

NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & IARTFORD IAII;OAID
Head-end colli-ion between a gas-electric rail car and a passenger
train at Fall River, Mass., on June 30, 1934. which res-ulted in the
injury of 6 paeiingers and 7 employees.
This accident was caused by the gas-electric car departing from the
station on the main track instead of on another track designated in
a clearance card and in verbal instructions received from the opera-
tor; also by the failure of the enginemen of both trains involved to
move under proper control within yard limits.
In the vicinity of the point of accident, this was a single-track line
over which trains were operated by time table, train orders, and a
manual block-signal system. The accident occurred within yard lim-
its on the main track at a point about 4,640 feet south of the station
at Fall River, ju-t north of the viaduct at Anawan Street; approalih-
ing this point from the north, the track was tangent for a distance of
about 300 feet, followed by a 50 curve to the right 443 feet in length,
the accident occurring on this curve at a point about 55 feet from its
northern end. The grade at the point of accident was 0.86 percent
ascending for south-bound trains. Track 5 paralleled the main track
on the west, and there was a cross-over cone, ting these tracks, ex-
tending from northeast to southwest, located about 550 feet north of
the station.
The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred
about 1:10 p. m.
South-bound pai-eiiger Train No. 841 coni.-ited of g;i -electric rail
car 9101. It arrived at Fall River, where its schedule tvrmiinated,
at 1:03 p. m., on time and the passengers w.re discharged and the
work of unloading mail. express, and h minroge was performed. The





INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION


operator verbally instructed the conductor to make a back-up move-
ment northward on the main track to the cross-over and then pro-
ceed southward on track 5 to the enginehouse, and he also delivered to
the conductor two copies of a clearance card, form A, which gave au-
thority to pass the train-order signal on track 5. Instead of backing
northward to the cross-over, however, the gas-electric car departed
southward on the main track and collided with Extra PX 827 while
traveling at a speed estimated to have been about 15 miles per hour.
North-bound passenger train Extra PX 827 consisted of three cars,
ali of steel c' nst ruct ion, hauled by engine 827. This train left Ferry
Street station at 1: 08 p. m., and had pr weedeil 1,795 feet beyond
that point when it collided with gas-electric car 9101 while traveling
at a speed estimated to have been between 10 and 15 miles per hour.
The force of the impact drove gas-electric car 9101 backward a dis-
tance of about 70 feet and crushed in its forward end; the front end
of engine 827 was d;iiiiaged. The employees injured were the en-
gineman, fireman, and trainman of Extra PX 827, and the engine-
man, conductor, and baggagemaster of gas-electric car 9101, as well
as an engine preparer who was deadheading on the rail car.
It appeared that on his arrival at Fall River station, the conductor
of the gas-electric car went into the office and registered, and when
he retuiiired to the rail car he did not personally deliver a copy of
the clearance card to the engineman, but merely indicated to the en-
gineman that he had received it, and did not give the engineman the
verbal instructions of the operator to make a backup movement to
the cross-over and to use track 5 to the enginehouse. The engineman
said that on returning to the rail car from the office the conductor
said all right down the main ", while the conductor said that ordi-
narily the engineman asked whether it was "all right down the
main but did not remember having heard the enginieman say any-
thing of this nature on this occn..ion; the conductor apparently over-
looked or forgot the clearance card and the verbal instructions of the
operator. The clearance card designated the trniok to be used, and
had the engiinemiiia secured or been given a copy of it the accident
might have been averted.
Under the rules, extra trains were required to move within yard
limits prepared to stop unless the main track was seen or known to
be clear. On the arrival of extra PX 827 at Ferry Street station,
the engineman was informed by the yardmna ter that the crew of the
rail car had been instructed to use track 5 from Fall River station
to the enginehouse and to a certain extent the engineman relied upon
this information for protection. This information, however, in no way
relieved the engineman froii complying with the requirements of the
yard-limit rule; in fact, had both crews observed the yard-limit rule
andmoved prepared to stop, the accident would have been averted.









Accidents investigated during the year ended June 30, 1.9.3;


Name of road


Date








1933
July 7

10

12


21


21

23

24

25


Location of
accident









Trinidad, Tex--..--

Blillings. Okla ....-

('IPv%-l.and, Ohio -



Cornish, Maine. _


Gladwin, Iowa..---

Avoca, Pa-...-..-

Sullnintiille, N.Y.

Baltimore, Md--- .


Altoona, Pa.


M arion, Ill-. ---


Kind of
accident









Derailment ..-

-...----do ---------

Collision, rear-
end.


Collision, head-
end.

Dlerijldini _..

-.... ----do.-------......

.....--- do-.....-...

----....- (do ...... --------



--- Ao ---------
..... do. i. de..

('ulhsin. t.side..


Per-
sons
L T


Method of
operation
(indicated
by *)

Block
system *



.1

x E .


Kind of trains
involved









Freight -------

.....do......-

Switching
movement
and transfer
train.
Freight and
light engine.

Freight -------

.....do ..- -.

I',.i- rn a .

Freight ...



Passenger....


P.i tri. .r and
III1\+ l


--- 1

2....

* 1

2



4


*)1 1


Condi-
tion of
weather


Time


Causes


Clear 7:10 a. in- Defective condition of side bearings of tank
car.
--do ..-- 6:05 p. m. Sun kink.

-- do 2:57 p.m Failure of rwt-ii'ii-iii properly to control
speed within yard limits and failure of
flagman to provide proper flag protec-
tion.
Rain---- (6:05 a. m.. Failure of engineman to know the correct
time, r, -,ilt inU in failure to clear superior
train in accordance with train order.
Clear 11 a. m.i. Not definitely determined.

.--do..-! 3:11 p. m. Not definitely determined but thought to
have been dragging break rirci.'i'.
- do-. 2 p. m.._ Motor truck driven upon ir.--iI in front
of ['ij-rL, n hiil:- i r titi
...do 3:29 p.m ii Falso e h.r iniirl,,cki.- I ign.il indication
an I f inire ,f i.[,r ttrt and levermnan to
take proper steps after warning devices
indicated soil., I..jrt iif plant was not
fri t j il hii 2 iii rr-lc
.do 9:47 p. iii Nor .Iriiilel];. d tirriniiii'l. but lih u..' ilh to
have been dw it., f iltiirt of some part of
S v-,'itn- truck.
--do St)_. a. in-. Failure of Chicago & 1-.i-ririin Illinois tire-
man to maintain proper lookout; failure
of each engineman to approach crossing
under full control.


See f',iii..'I*. at end of table.


St. Louis-Soiuth eferni
of Texils
Chin ;iii. Rock Island &

Wheeling & Lake Erie-.


Maine Central ---------


Cli at.i,. M il i naker.
"'I IV.0il & I'. 0tlce
Delaware & Hudson_..-

New York, Ontario &
\\ e rn. i.
Pennsylvania --..........--



.. d o ..... ..........


Chicago & Eastern Illi-
nois; Illihiii Central.


Aug. 3


1 5 *(I)










Accidents investigated during the year ended June 30, 1934-Continued


Name of road


Date








1933
Aug. 9

12

13

14

21

24

26


26

29

Sept. 1



1

5


Location of
accident


Moseley, Colo----.

Fruitland, Md....

Spearfish, Wash---

Attalia, Wash.....


Angola, Ind. ..------

Washington, D. C..

Muncie, Ind ------


Cedar Run, Pa-...

Hargis, N. Mex.--

Westeolang, Pa_.-



Pleasant Valley.
Ohio.
Binghamton, N. Y


Kind of
accident


Derailment....- -

---do ------.....

---...do-------.....

----.... do ....-----


Collision, head-
end.
Derailment----

Collision, head-
end.

Collision, rear-
end.
D ,r lihnonT .. .

Collision, head-
end.


Derailment..----

Collision, rear-
end.


Per-
sons


Freight ------- 4 5


Kind of trains
involved


Passenger.....-

.... do-.......

Freight-.......

--...do........-

Freight and
freight.
P.i-wn.; or.-----

Rail-oiling
train and
transfer.
Fr.-ich1t, and
freight.
Passenger ----....-

Gasoline motor
cars.


Passenger and
milk.


14 32 *(4)


Method of
operation
(indicated
by *)

Block
system S



o o S


*


---- 1


Condi-
tion of
weather


Clear --.

Cloudy -

Clear- --

--_do..-..

--_do-....

Rain .--.

Clear --

F .

Rain ----

Clear----


Time


11:25 a. m.

1:20 a. m_

4:15 p. m.

8:10a. m..

12:33 p.m.

3:26 a. m.

10:25 a.m_


6:14 a. m_

4:20 a. m.

4:30 p. m_


--do---....- 6:15 p. m_

-___do ...--- 7:23 p. m


Causes


Broken head rod of switch.

Rail joint disconnected account malicious
tampering.
Track buckled account heat.

Broken journal due to overheating.

Failure to deliver meet order.

Center pier of bridge undermined bY high
water.
Failure of company to make adequate pro-
vision for safe operation of rail-oiling
train.
Failure of engineman properly to control
speed in occupied block.
Earth fill supporting bridge abutment
undermined by high water.
Failure of operator to obey rules governing
operation of motor cars in centralized
traffic-control territory and to have defi-
nite understanding with extra gang fore-
man as to movement intended.
Burned-off journal.

Failure of engineman properly to obey
signal indications; contributing cause was
failure to provide full flag protection.


Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy.
Pennsylvania ----------

Spokane, Portland &
Seattle.
Oregon-Washington
Railroad & Naviga-
tion Co.
New York Central.....

Pennsylvania -----------

New York, Chicago &
St. Louis.

New York Central ..

Southern Pacific --------

Erie--------------------



Baltimore & Ohio ---.....---

Erie --------------------


1-1









VirglniLn ............. Amigo, W. Va....


11

18

18


28

29

Oct. 9
14


25


26

No-. 1



2

16

18


23


29

29
Dec. 2

3
6

8


Boston & Maine........

Denver & Salt Lake-....


Union Pacific ...........


Grand Trunk XVW-t. rn..

I h.bi on. Topeka &
r- n Ia Fp
Delaware & Hudson..-.
Indiana Harbor Belt...

Chi-apenke & Ohio....


Southern Pacific-........

New York Central-.....



.....do........-- .......--

Cleveland, Cincinnati,
Chicago & St. Louis.
Western Maryland-.....

Chesapeake & Ohio.....


New Y. .rk. New Ilven
& Hartford.

Louisville & N.'. l 1le..
Atlantic Coast Line....

Great Northern---......
Richmond, Fredericks-
burg & Potoniac.
Chesapeake & 1 ,lii .


S,1, f,..tnit.< at end of table.


West Concord,
M ass.
Utah Junction,
Colo.
Slbn, Nebr-.....--



Fenton, Mich-.....

Enterprise, Kans..

s.tr.inrln, Pa-......
("hicnio Ridge,
Ill.

South Richmond,
Ind.

Monterey, Calif...

National Junction,
N. J


New Lexington,
Ohio.
Worllhingto, Ohio.

Henry, W. Va....


Wayne, Ind-.......


All innc. Mass....


Woodrow, Tenn...
lh i riL- -\ lile, .. C.

Miliii., Wash--...-..
Cherry lill, Va-._

1lopetown, Ohio...


Collision, head-
end.
Collision-......

Collision, head-
end.

2 derailments--


Collision, head-
end.
Collision, rear-
end.
Per.dilmi"nt ...
Collision, rear-
end.

Collision......-


Collision, rear-
end.
Derailment.. -



Collision, head-
end.
jerI-ln ent....

Collision, rear-
end.

.....do-..........


---.....do-...--..-

Derailment....-
---... (do--..-......-

---.....do-----.....
2 derailments.

j ) 'r.lI ntill .I


I 11


- 10

--. 4


Passenger and
freight.
Freight and
freight.
Passenger and
switch en-
gine.
Freight and
freight.


Pa'senger and
3 '%" ichers.
Relief and
freight.
Pay train ..-..-
Freight and
freight.

Freight and
yard engine.

Passenger and
freight.
Transfer.---..



Freight and
light engine.
P.iseniiger ..--..

P'j.-enger and
freight.

Freight and
freight.


Passengerand
passenger

Freight-........
I'u.;.-tnger.....

F'reit-ilii-....-..-
I reiln and
passenger.
Passenger ---.....


I ...do-....

(1i .. ., n ....

1 _.do. ...


--..()1


... 7 (


- 1 1


.... 1


---do.....


Cloudy.
F ce .....

Clear-....
---do-.....


Cleir...


..-do....-

Clear.--



Cloudy

Clear-..

...do-....


11:50 a.m.

8:15 a. m.

8:54 p. m.


1:20 p. m.


5:07 p. m.i

7:08 a. m.

1:41 p. m_
10:59 p m.


I p.m .


5:03 p. min

12:10 a. mi



4 a. m...

3:30 a. mi

4:07 p. m.


Cloudy.. 7:30 a. m.


.... 4 Clear...


* I ..do-....
* 1 Smoky-.

... 1 Clhnr ..
.. 2 Rain....

.... 2 Cloudy.


8:24 a. m.


9:45 p. m.
6:05 p. m.

10 p. mi..
3:06 a. m -


Failure of engineman properly to control
.peed approaching meeting point.
Failure properly to control back-up move-
mnent around wye
Crew of wt itn h engine overlooked passenger
train

Welder allowed train to pass over fi,,'ing-
point switch in process of being built up
by welding, derailed train fouling another
train passing at the time.
Crew handling switchers overlooked pas-
senger train.
Failure of conductor and flagman properly
to pr'lect train.
Not definitely determined.
Failur" of conductor and flagman properly
to protect train.

Failure of yard crew to provide flag protec-
tion and failure of freight train to be
operated under proper control within
3ard hmoi -.
Failure of conductor and flacani properly
to protect train.
Runnimu off derail, crew not anriting
switch imnprnperly lined and then 1.-
cepiin. iignail idiciiatiin which did not
govern track in whii h they had been
diverted.
E npinitmnri overlooked superior train and
-likreg ir'iedl signal at stop.
Broken rail

Running on short time ,il f il, ire,, en-iie-.
man properly to control speed after being
flagged.
Failure of enriin main 10 operate under
proper ( r ri.ol in otn.tupiei block and fail-
tre of tuitl or and ila.'mnii properly
to protect train.
F:iliir of engineman properly to obey
signal indications and stop signals of ilia.-
man.
Broken rail.
Open switch, probably due to unauthor-
ized lr.'riin in possession of switch key.
Rock slide.
Land slide.


11.22 p. m| Excessive speed on sharp curve.


- 3 ....

1 2 *


--I 1










Accidents investigated during the year ended June 30, 1934-Continued


Name of road


Southern ..........----------..
Chicago, Milwaukee,
St. Paul & Pacific.
C1,1 L':,, & Eastern Il-
linois and Southern.

Louisville & Nashville__
International-Great
Northern.
.\t.hi..n. Topeka &
S~.jt.a Fe
Virginian..-.............

Chiii L..-. St. Paul, Min-
Grei".,lq & Omaha.
St. Louis-San Francisco.

Pennsylvania-...........

Northern Pacific---.....
Reading-...............

Chicago & North West-
ern.
Oregon Short Line-......

Norfolk Southern-.......

Sp.,kine. Portland &
Se'ai t lei


Location of
accident


Hot* "-riin-- N.C.
Java Junction,
S. Dak.
Princeton, Ind. -


Wadsworth, Ala.
Black Bridge, Tex.

San Bernardino,
Calif.
Hardy, Va ------..


Omaha, Nebr- .-

Swift, Mo..-------

Deans, N.J-....-.

Arrow, Idaho ----
Blandon, Pa ..-.

Monico, Wis ------

Woods Cross, Utah

Grimesland, N. C.

Carson, Wash -


Kind of
accident


Derailment-- .--
Collision, head-
end.
C.llii.nri,. side--


Derailment --
----- do --------

Collision, side--

Derailment..----

--.... do........-------

Collision, head-
end.
Collision -----

Derailment -
-----do----- ...

-.- do.--.....

Collision-.....-

Collision, head-
end.
Collision, side..--


Kind of trains
involved


P
so


Passenger-.-- 1
Passenger and 2
passenger
Passenger and ---
transfer.

Freight ----- 1
...----do --.-----.. 5

Passenger and.
equipment.
Freight -------... 2


Passenger --.-- 3

F-'reihl and ---
freight.
Passenger and 2
motor truck.
I'.i-; ger .- 1
-...---- do------ 2
----- do-------I 2

Passenger and 1
motor truck.
Freight and ---
freight.
-----do--------- ---


I I


Metho
er- operati
ns (indica
by :

Block
system





Z



37 -(4) ....
52 -- -



7 ----
--- ---- ----


-


Condi-
tion of
weather


1 of
on
ted








(10)
po)

* -


7:32 p. m.
6:35 p. mn

11:47p. m--


11:52 a. m-
12:10 a. m-

12:12 a. m-

6:27 a. m..

12:34 p. m.

3:15 a. m..

4:29 p. m..

3:30 a. m.__
6:25 p. m..

10p.m ....

11:26 a. m.

6:32 p. m..

8:43 p. m-


Causes


Excessive speed on sharp curve.
Failure of engineman properly to control
speed approaching meeting point.
Air hose on C. & E. I. train improperly
coupled, resulting in brake system not
being in proper operating condition.
Pieces of wood on high rail of curve.
Cattle on track.

Engineman misinterpreted hand signal of
switch tender.
Rock slide.


Motor truck driven upon crossing in front
of approaching train.
Failure to obey wait order.

Motor truck driven upon crossing in front
of approaching train.
Washout.. .
Automobile ran off highway at grade
crossing and stalled across track.
Speed on curve too high for elevation
provided.
Motor truck driven upon crossing in front
of approaching train.
Failure to obey wait order.

Running on short time against opposing
superior train.


Date


1933
Dec. 12
22

24

26
27

29

31

1934
Jan. 1

3

3

23
25

Feb. 8

9

12

13


Fog ....
(hIr .r

._do....

_do .-. -
Cloudy -

Hazy....

Fog .-

Cloudy.

Clear..---

.-do --..

Cloudy-
Clear -

---do --
Cloudy -

Clear ...
-.-do .....









19

20

21

22

25
Feb. 26

26
28
Mar. 4

6

8


10

22


26

27

Apr. 3


5

6


19



24

MNi. 6

19

20
22

June 6


ClinIai.'n, %M il IIIkT.,
St. PI'iul & Pacific.
Long Island...---..--..

New York Central-....

C luh ii.',,, M ill, ..,ki.*,,
I 1' iii & Pacific.
l mii ," .\r,,n..i.,,ki....
l' l \ l- .II i .. ..

.....do ..---...--.--....----
liall inre & Ohio --.---
...--do-..----- .-..-----

Chlii. '., Milwaukee,
Si Pal & Pacific.
Poenrs 1 iiiA .m .....


Washinijgin & Old
I)OIIIIIII' II
Pennsylvania .........


Chestnut Ridge ........

Atchison, T"i.pk;, &
Santa Fe.
Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis &
Omaha.
St. Louis-San I r:In-
cisco.
Northern Pacific --------


Baltimore & Ohio and
Pennsylvania.


Lehigh Valley........------

Lake Shore Electric--..

Chicago Inter and

Norfolk & Western.....
\ ns I i l an i .

Pennsylvania .......i..


WVegd.ihl, I inn.

Rtckv ille Center,
N.Y.
Weehawken, N. J.

Iron Mountain,
Mich.
State Road, Maine
Delphos, Ohio ---....

i' -rl.lr h. Pa---....-
.-,andl P1.1 Ii, Pa...
Mount Airy, Md.

Spechts Ferry,
Iowa.
Columbia 'City,
Ind.

Jackson, Va -------

Eiirn[t., Pa---.. ..----


Delaware Ave-
nue, Pa.
Lynn, N. Mex....

Northline, Wis ....


Dora, Ala ........

Big Lake, Wash_..


.... di ... .

Derailment -_

....--do --....-..--

.....do...--....

.....do....-----
..--...do -------

.....--do-- .. ----
.....d0... ...
.....do.. --------

Collision,
head-end.
Collision,
rear-end.

Collision,
head-end.
Collision,
rear-end.

Derailment-...

Break-in-two..

Derailment ----


--.....do...------

----.....do.....--------


Kylesburg, Ohio.. Collision, Freih tl and
head-end. freight.


Bow manstown,
Pa. *
Clyde, Ohio ---......

Chic wo. Ill.......

Nace, Va .......-..
Cirtsville, W. Va

( lr'.\ '[W.... M d---


1)erailment ...-

C .Il -ll l .. .

Derailment -...

. .. do .........
('ill-i-iri, head-
end.
I)erailnment


Frei lit ... ..

Freight and
motor bus.
Yard transfer.

I-lre'l Ir _.
l-'releli .a n d
frvi'Iii
Passenger. .


Passenger and
p L: ni.'n_'er.
Sno.% Pl.Iw....

Equipment...

Passenger ---

Freight -----.
Passenger---...

--.....-- do---.......
F r,-' lil .-- -
..... do .....--.

Pa,-*,.ner .nr ii
fr.iA:hl.
Freight and
2 light en-
gines.
Passenger and
work.
Transfer and
engine push-
ing caboose.
Fre ll .

-.--do .------.. -

Freight... -.-- -


Passenger ---..--

--....do ......------


-_ 1

1


.... ... ( 12. ,



1 i


... 1
-. ... 2

*(4) .... 4
... 2
.- 2

--- 1

*1- --- 2


. .
Cloudy.

Cl.ir ..

.--do.....

- do.....
Cloudy

.--do-..-.
I'le ir.
-- do --....

---do.....

...do-....-


Snow...
CIou.1% J


C lerd....

--do--

Rain---....


Clear- .-

.._do....--


..do.....



-.-do--.....

--- do.....-

-..do-.....

.--do ......
Cloudy

Clear ..-


See footnotes at end of tabli.


2:05 a. m.. Failure of engineman to stop at meeting
point and ascertain way was clear.
3:20p.m.. Snuw and ice packed on highway grade
crossing.
3:05 a. m.. ).irn aee] switch, it having been run
Ihr.,uih by a previous movement.
9:43 p. m.. Broken wheel.

4:00 p. rn Deep hard-packed snow on one rail.
3:53 a. In Motor truck driven upon crossing in front
'f alI prii hine train.
9:32 p. m. E .e-.. ]\e p'ee'i -in sharp curve.
9:42 a. m I tfr t i% e i i loul 'r yoke.
1:07 p. m. Low coupler, draft gear apparently having
been damaged when road engine slipped.
4:30 a. m. Failure to obey meet order.

11:14 p. n Failure of enginerncau prperl. to observe
and obey signal ind.Ii aILun., also stop
ii'n.ik of atrnan
1:45 p.m.. Running or hurt i ime

9:55 p. m__ Failure of transfer to be protected either
by flagman or marker.

5:35 a. m. Cocked switch.

11:45 a. m Broken knuckle.

2:45 a. m_ Washout.


3:05 p. m._ Bolt placed on high rail of curve.

11:20 a.m. Uneven surface of track, coupled with
speed and poor distribution of weight
on tender trucks.
5:45 p. in I Operator f.ile.I to i-Il i. train order -ignil
and to deliver hold order, and then ad-
mitted train to block already pledged to
and occupied by opposing train.
2:48 a. in Excessive speed on sharp curve.

4:15 a.m.. Blow-out of front tire on bus caused it to
swerve against electric freight train.
12:35 p. m. Insecure track, section foreman not pro-
tecting tie-renewal work.
2:50 p. m. Cause not definitely determined.
4:27 p. mn. Failure to obey meet order.

s:18 p. in Excessive speed on sharp curve.












Accidents investigated during the year ended June 30, 1984-C6ntinued


Name of road


Date








1934
June 11
26
30


Location of
accident


Pacific Junction,
Okla.
Indiana Harbor,
Ind.
Fall River, Mass-


Kind of
accident


Collision, side--
Derailment---....-
Collision, head-
end.


Kind of trains
involved


Passenger and
freight.
Freight-------
Passenger and
empty
equipment.


Method of
operation
(indicated
by *)

Block a
system B
r0


Condi-
tion of
weather


Cloudy -
Clear-..
-..-do ...--


Time


11:29 p. m-
6:30 p. m.
1:10 p. m.


Causes


Failure of conductor properly to control
speed of back-up movement.
Cocked switch.
Failure of empty equipment to be moved
from station on designated track, and
failure of both enginemen to operate
under proper control within yard limits.


1 Supplemented by cab-signal system.
2 Each railroad a single-track line with no block-signal system.
Centralized traffic control and automatic train stop.
4 Supplemented by automatic train stop.
5 Yard.
SEn eine involved in first derailment fouled freight train passing on double-track line.
7 Trains operated by book of rules and special instructions.
8 Interchi n e tracks operated as double track.
Supplemented by 2-speed continuous control and cab signals.
10 Automatic signals on Chicago & Eastern Illinois; manual block on Southern.
1 Accident occurred at entrance to station where switch tender's signals governed.
12 Accident occurred at switch at end of double track.
13 Accident occurred in yard leidine to station.
'* Controlled manual block wir h autnmatic signals for spacing following movements.
15 Accident occurred on over yard tracks which trains were operated by operating rules and special instructions.
16 Pennsylvania engines equipped with cab signals, but engine involved, operating backward, not equipped for that'type of operation: B. & 0. train moving against current of
traffic under annual block.

0


w--



















a -n
0
0



0
0



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-0


('hwic.i, Rock Island &
E irm. Joliet & Eastern-
New York, New Haven
& Hartford.




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