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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years: Opportunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered?

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years: Opportunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered?
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Palmer, David Scott , University Press of Florida
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Latin America, Political Science, textbook, foreign policy, international relations, Clinton OGT+ ISBN 9781616101428
Latin American History, Political Issues, Political Science, International Relations, National Security


The first book-length treatment of the Clinton administration's Latin American policies, this timely study reads like an insider's account, based in part on interviews and roundtable discussions with more than 50 participants in the Latin American foreign policy process during these years--from career diplomats to political appointees, White House insiders to jaded professionals. In his balanced analysis of an administration that made some progress in Latin American relations, the author reluctantly concludes that the Clinton presidency failed to build on the favorable international and regional context and on opportunities inherited from the George H. W. Bush administration. The study offers a multifaceted explanation for why Clinton's Latin American policy was, on balance, not able to accomplish many of its objectives in spite of some important successes, including the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the historic Summit of the Americas. Citing the collapse of the Governor's Island accords to return democracy to Haiti and Clinton's reluctant signing of the Helms-Burton bill that imposed new restrictions on Cuba as among the administration's failures, the author allows that policymakers were often handicapped by limitations of leadership at various levels, bureaucratic politics, a lack of resources, unexpected events, competing policy priorities, and the influence of domestic politics. In addition, Clinton and his senior-level advisers showed only sporadic interest in Latin America, which, among other factors, had the effect of hamstringing mid-level policy advocates. Such constraints, rather than a lack of vision or a failure to articulate policy objectives, appear to explain why the administration failed to exploit effectively the historic opening for a new post-Cold War approach to U.S.-Latin American relations. This timely study will be a valuable reference for the foreign policy community at large and for students and scholars of international relations.
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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton YearsFlorida A&M University, Tallahassee Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton Florida Gulf Coast University, Ft. Myers Florida International University, Miami Florida State University, Tallahassee New College of Florida, Sarasota University of Central Florida, Orlando University of Florida, Gainesville University of North Florida, Jacksonville University of South Florida, Tampa University of West Florida, Pensacola Copyright 2006 by David Scott Palmer. is work is licensed under a modied Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit You are free to electronically copy, distribute, and transmit this work if you attribute authorship. However, all printing rights are reserved by the University Press of Florida ( Please contact UPF for information about how to obtain copies of the work for print distribution. You must attribute the work in the manner specied by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. Any of the above conditions can be waived if you get permission from the University Press of Florida. Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the authors moral rights.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton YearsOpportunities Lost or Opportunities Squandered? David Scott PalmerUniversity Press of Florida Gainesville/Tallahassee/Tampa/Boca Raton Pensacola/Orlando/Miami/Jacksonville/Ft. Myers/Sarasota


Copyright by David Scott Palmer All rights reserved A record of cataloging-in-publication data is available from the Library of Congress. r fn-t-tt-tb-n e University Press of Florida is the scholarly publishing agency for the State University System of Florida, comprising Florida A&M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida Gulf Coast University, Florida International University, Florida State University, New College of Florida, University of Central Florida, University of Florida, Univer sity of North Florida, University of South Florida, and University of West Florida. University Press of Florida t Northwest tth Street Gainesville, FL tt-f


For Diane


ContentsList of Tables ix Preface xi Map of North and South America xv Clintons Latin American Policies in Context: e Concerns and the Approach A Constraints Approach Chapter emes e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations Democracy and Anticommunism f Economic Assistance and Anticommunism t Military Assistance and Anticommunism t External and Regional Change t U.S. Policy Change during the Bush Administration t Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview Making Dicult Decisions b Following rough on Bush Administration Initiatives n Reacting to Events Conicting Priorities and Conicted Policy Actors b Chaos and Conundrums: President Clintons Trips bt Conclusions b Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure Ratication of the North American Free Trade Agreement b Policy toward Haiti and the Harlan County Debacle b Death by Misadventure: e Failure of an Ambassadorial Nomination t A Major Achievement, Qualied: e tffb Summit of the Americas b Resolving an Intractable Conict: e Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute n Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: Cuba and the Helms-Burton Act t Drugs or Democracy? e Tension between Policy Objectives in Peru Conclusions n


. Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment Policy Objectives: A Summary Evaluation b Preserving and Strengthening Democracy Promoting Prosperity through Economic Integration and Free Trade nt Eradicating Poverty and Discrimination n Guaranteeing Sustainable Development and Conserving the Environ ment f Conclusions f Notes f Interviews tf Bibliography tt Index tt


Tables .t. Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Latin America, tff and t .. U.S. Security and Economic Assistance to Latin America and to Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, tff n .. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for Latin America, tff f .b. Drug Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, tfft n .. U.S. Trade with Mexico and Latin America, tfnnt n .. U.S. Direct Investment in Mexico and Latin America, tfnnt nb .. Poverty and Indigence in Latin America, tfn n .n. Income Inequality in Latin America, tfnf n .f. Social Spending in Latin America, tfft nn .t. Gender Discrimination Indicators in Latin America, tff nf .tt. Percentage of Women in National Legislatures in Latin America, tfn, tff, nf .t. Environmental Indicators for Latin America, tff and ft .t. U.S. Department of State (DOS) and Federal Government Budget Outlays, tfnft f


PrefacePresident Bill Clinton and his administration are memorable in many ways and have been widely portrayed in print, with good reason. e Clinton years spanned most of the tffs, a time of dramatic change both at home and abroad. Clinton himself was the consummate politician, with keen instincts, extraordinary energy and charisma, and a remarkable ability to mas ter the details of even the most complex issues. He evoked passionate support among his many admirers and equally passionate opposition among his numerous detractors. He was the rst president to preside over almost six years of sustained economic growth and the only twentieth-century president to faceand surviveimpeachment. Even though his interests and experience before assuming the presidency focused almost exclusively on domestic aairs, Clinton also demonstrated on many occasions the ability to grasp quickly and comprehensively the complexity of U.S. concerns abroad. When it came to Latin America, how ever, he seemed to have less interest, even though his arrival at the White House in January tff coincided with a particularly propitious opportunity for the United States in the region. In the early postcold war period, with elected governments in place in most Latin American countries, and with a majority of these committed to economic liberalization and market reforms, the regions goals and aspirations converged more closely with those of the United States than they had in several decades. Furthermore, his predeces sor, George H. W. Bush, had overseen a set of policy departures for Latin America on which his administration could build. With a few exceptions, however, such as the ratication of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the organization of the historic Summits of the Americas, President Clinton and his colleagues failed to seize the moment to build and sustain an eective Latin American policy around the opportunities available in the early tffs. By the time Clinton left oce eight years later, United StatesLatin American relations were largely adrift, and the openings once present had closed. For those of us who follow U.S. policy toward Latin America, such an outcome was both puzzling and dis turbing. is study sets out to explain why. To do so, it places the Clinton years within the larger context of United StatesLatin American policy since World War II and the more immediate context of the George H. W. Bush


xii Preface administration. is background makes it possible to appreciate the signicance of the historical moment that greeted President Clinton upon taking oce. It then proceeds to oer a broad overview of Clinton administration policies and follows with several case studies of success and failure. Finally, it assesses the degree to which progress did or did not take place within the major stated policy objectives of the administration, with longitudinal data that measure various indicators of these objectives. e book is not intended to present an insiders view of the inner work ings of the Clinton administrations Latin American policy. Neither does it try to lay out the details of the entire range of initiatives and approaches. e goals, rather, are twofold. One is to provide a broad-brushed portrait and assessment of administration policy concerns in the region. e other, complementary to the rst, is to explore in greater detail several specic cases of policy for additional insights into process and outcome. roughout, the concern is with nding elements of an answer to the question of why the Clinton administration, in spite of some successes, was generally unable to achieve its policy objectives in Latin America. Important sources for assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the Clinton administration are about individual interviews and group discus sions with career ocials and political appointees involved at the time in the Latin American policy process, as well as with a number of scholars and other close observers of the policy scene. I am most grateful for the willingness of each of those who met with me to share experiences and views at length and with great candor, even with the knowledge that my goal was to write a book on the Clinton administrations Latin American policy. Some I had known for years, dating back to my work at the State Departments For eign Service Institute or over the course of my college and university teaching; others I was meeting for the rst time. Whatever our prior relationship, each oered insights and anecdotes that combined to enhance signicantly both my understanding of policy and process and the quality of the analysis. Put simply, this book could not have been written without their input. e result, the rst book-length overview of Latin American policy dur ing the Clinton years, is intended for scholars and students of foreign and regional policy, members of the foreign aairs community, and interested citizens. It uses a constraints approach to suggest the degree to which U.S. foreign policy in general and Latin American policy in particular were af fected by a variety of bureaucratic, resource, domestic, and leadership fac tors, as well as unanticipated events, that often limited its eectiveness. While scholarly in its treatment, the book is written by one who has served


Preface xiii in both academic and policy community positions, which I hope results in a presentation and analysis of the subject that is clear and understandable to all readers. e opportunity provided by the Inter-American Dialogue for me to come to Washington as a visiting scholar there in t oered an ideal venue to pursue the project. e Dialogues president, Peter Hakim, and his colleagues, particularly Michael Shifter and Ambassador Viron P. Pete Vaky, provided a welcoming setting as well as the impetus for two gatherings of former Clinton administration ocials and interested observ ers to engage in wide-ranging discussions of Latin American policies. Residence at the Dialogue also greatly aided me in my ability to conduct individual interviews in the Washington area, in spite of the calamitous events of September tt and their impact on all of us. Dialogue sta, particularly Joan Caivano, Katherine Anderson, and Rebecca Trumble, helped in many ways with the details of my stay. Even with the assistance of the Inter-American Dialogue, the actual writ ing needed the additional stimulus of a number of individuals and institutions. Christine Wade of Washington College and Phil Brenner of American University put together a panel on U.S. policy at the b Latin American Studies Association (LASA) meeting in Las Vegas and invited me to par ticipate. Here I presented a paper with my initial analysis of the topic. In the discussion that followed, I received constructive critiques from fellow panelists, particularly Larry Storrs of the Congressional Research Service and Bob Pastor of American University, which helped to sharpen my focus for the larger study. Amy Gorelick, the acquisitions editor at the University Press of Florida, saw something she liked in the paper and tracked me down to see if I would be interested in expanding it into a book for her press. Bos ton University granted me a semester leave, making it possible to complete the manuscript. Others who assisted in the books preparation include Michael Williams, sta assistant in the Department of International Relations, who helped with many of the technical details, as did my teaching fellow, Deniz Gungen, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science. Katie Urbanic, my graduate assistant and M.A. candidate in the joint International Relations/ Communications Program, cheerfully tracked down any number of valuable references. Several graduate students in my Fall seminar on United StatesLatin American relations, particularly Anne Delessio-Parsons and Adriana Schmidt, oered valuable comments on the draft manuscript. My wife, Dr. Diane Palmer, Massachusetts coordinator for the Center for Civic


xiv Preface Education, put her formidable editing skills to work to ne-tune everything I wrote, which signicantly improved the nal product. For the errors and omissions that remain, I alone am responsible. Without everyones assistance, however, this book could never have been written. Each of you has my deep and enduring appreciation.


Map of North and South America. Oce of the Geographer, U.S. Depart ment of State.


Clintons Latin American Policies in Context e Concerns and the ApproachPresident William Jeerson Clinton took oce in January tff amid major changes in the international arena. e Soviet Union was no more. e cold war had ended. Communism as an ideological alternative to capitalism had become an anachronism in full retreat. With the demise of the dominant international paradigm of bipolar rivalry that had framed U.S. foreign policy since the tfbs, new opportunities for the United States had opened up in much of the world and particularly so in Latin America. A set of equally momentous changes had swept through almost every country in Latin America. Between tfn and tfft, t Latin American nations turned to or returned to electoral democracy, abandoning the authoritarian regimes that had dominated the region for some years. Such a political shift was unprecedented in Latin Americas long political history, which dates from the independence movements of the early tns. At the same time, the elected leaders of many of these new democracies abandoned state-led economic models to embrace market-oriented economic liberal ization based on principles of free trade and private investment. Such his toric changes in the region reinforced those taking place around the world and provided additional incentives for the United States to make signicant adjustments in its policies toward Latin America. As President Clinton (tfft) began his administration, there were ample grounds for optimism in inter-American relations. His predecessor, George Herbert Walker Bush (tfnff), had responded to the new possibilities that were opening up in the region by pursuing several policy initiatives that departed from past practices. ese included free trade area negotiations with Mexico, foreign debt restructuring and forgiveness initiatives, multilateral support for protecting the new democracies, and regionally coordinated counter-drug policies. In various ways, the Clinton administration continued or built on these policy departures and in others set its own stamp on Latin American policy.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years One of the Clinton administrations important accomplishments was its ability to see through to ratication the tff North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which had been largely negotiated by the Bush ad ministration. Another was to hold in Miami in late tffb the rst gathering of the heads of state of Latin America and the Caribbean in almost years, which was also the rst meeting ever of democratically elected leaders. is Summit of the Americas (SOA) included an ambitious political, social, and economic agenda subscribed to by all attendees. e initial gathering began a process of regular hemisphere heads of state meetings, starting in April tffn in Santiago, Chile, that have continued to the present. U.S. ocials during the Clinton years also responded eectively to such unanticipated events as the Mexican peso crisis in December tffb and the outbreak of a border war between Peru and Ecuador in early tff. Largely behind the scenes, U.S. eorts to assist in the resolution of a long-standing guerrilla war in Guatemala in tff and to help Mexican authorities open up the democratic process there between tffb and made important contributions to conict resolution and free and fair elections. However, such achievements were oset by a number of failures during the Clinton years. e administration was unable to build on the success of NAFTA to expand a free trade area to other parts of the hemisphere, one of its major objectives as well as a primary goal of its Latin American counter parts. It made a disastrous miscalculation in an abortive attempt to restore democracy to Haiti in tff when it prematurely withdrew a U.S. ship carry ing a small multilateral peacekeeping force. Although a year later there followed a U.S.led but United Nationssanctioned military intervention, with signicant economic assistance, these eorts failed to achieve the Clinton administrations goal of restoring a working democracy in Haiti. On Clintons watch, in addition, democracy in Colombia and Peru was signicantly eroded, in part due to the emphasis on counter-drug policies in both countries. Due to events, as well as to pressures from Congress and lobbyists, the administration also failed in its goal to gradually open up relations with Cuba. Furthermore, a reinvigorated U.S. involvement in inter national environmental forums and treaties as well as a regularly asserted commitment to protect and improve the hemispheres environment were not matched by sucient actions to stem the continuing erosion of environmental quality in Latin America between tff and On the whole, then, the Clinton administration found itself unable to make signicant progress on most of its policy objectives. ese objectives, rst formally and publicly articulated in the tffb Miami SOA, focused on four major goals: (t) deepening democratic practice, () achieving economic


Clintons Latin American Policies in Context growth and improved income redistribution within market economies, () eliminating poverty and discrimination, and (b) securing environmentally sustainable development. Democratic forms remained in place in Latin America throughout the tffs, but most assessments concluded that the overall quality of democracy had declined. e shift to more market-oriented economies contributed to signicant increases in trade and investment and net economic growth for the decade but also produced increased inequalities between haves and have-nots. e total number of Latin Americans in poverty, along with unemployment levels, actually increased slightly, even with increased social spending and greater participation by women in economic and political ac tivity. In addition, overall environmental quality in terms of deforestation and carbon dioxide production continued to decline. ese general trends indicate that, over its eight years in oce, the Clinton administration lost the favorable momentum for a new approach to United StatesLatin American relations that had emerged with the historic changes in the region and the world and the largely eective policy depar tures of the Bush administration. ere are a number of reasons that help to explain the inability of the United States to sustain and deepen many of the initial policy successes of the early tffs. Some are contextual or related to circumstances, personalities, and events. Others are more structural in nature, the product of governmental institutions and their interactions, the relative priority of funding for domestic programs over foreign policy activities, and historical patterns. One of the more important considerations is that President Clintons main interest and experience related to domestic issues rather than foreign policy problems. He owed his election, after all, to his ability to articu late his disagreements with his predecessors domestic policies, particularly those related to the economy. Another is that major are-ups in other parts of the world, from the breakup of Yugoslavia and civil war there to the challenges posed by the Soviet Unions collapse and dismemberment, often took priority over Latin American policy issues. A third is that key policy mak ers, including the president and his secretaries of state, had little interest in or commitment to the region. Such a lack of interest was compounded by the fact that those policy makers who were responsible for Latin America often found that they lacked the full condence of their superiors and often received insucient support from them, which frequently had the eect of limiting their ability to operate eectively. A fourth challenge was posed by the progressive and cumulative reduction in Department of State resources. In addition to its demoralizing eect on career professionals, curtailed bud-


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years gets also eroded the executive branchs institutional capacity to deal as fully as needed with the dramatic expansion in the number and complexity of foreign policy concerns during the tffs. Another problem for the Clinton administration was the shift to a Republican-controlled Congress after the tffb midterm elections. e new legis lative opposition leaders were much more interested in domestic concerns and had a deep animus toward Clinton. e result was a signicant increase in tension between the legislative and executive branches for the balance of the Clinton years. Besides the tffn impeachment of the president, which virtually immobilized top leadership capacity to follow through on foreign policy issues for more than a year, signicant dierences also expressed themselves in such specic areas as appointments, drug policy, and Cuba. In addition, multiple domestic pressures also aected the priorities of the administration in the region. One major example was the tension between advancing on the counter-drug production and tracking front, on the one hand, and enhancing democratic procedures and practices, on the other. By focusing on the contextual and structural constraints within which U.S. policy toward Latin America operated during these years, it is possible to appreciate more fully the degree to which policy makers were limited in their ability to take full advantage of the circumstances that initially favored new policy departures. Such a focus also highlights the perceptions and priorities of the leadership that operated within the rather limited space that was available, a leadership that in the Clinton years tended not to focus on the region with any consistency. What also needs to be noted, however, is that the Clinton administration succeeded in some Latin American policy areas in spite of such limitations. is suggests that achievements are possible even when circumstances are far from optimal. Nevertheless, the partial and even ad hoc nature of some of the successes highlights the diculties for U.S. foreign policy in maintaining the momentum set by a previous administration, in taking full advantage of favorable circumstances, or of translating the set of Latin American policy objectives articulated at the tffb SOA into practice. While it is necessary to explore why the Clinton administration was able to achieve some successes in United States policy toward Latin America, it is equally important to explain why it was unable to do more. Much of the discussion below will explore why it was that, instead of seizing the favorable moment in United StatesLatin American relations,


Clintons Latin American Policies in Context President Clinton and his foreign policy colleagues missed a historic opportunity.A Constraints Approache study of foreign policy traditionally focused on an identication of the national interest and the mechanisms that could be applied to achieve it in the international arena. Following this approach, the degree of success was largely determined by the nature of the international environment and the capacity of a nation to eectively use diplomacy or military action for the issue at hand to deal with the foreign actor or actors involved. With the introduction of a bureaucratic politics approach to help explain how foreign policy decisions were made and implemented, greater attention came to be focused on the policy-making process and its eect on outcomes. More recently, a two-level games focus on international diplomacy emphasized the degree to which both domestic and international factors intertwined to explain success or failure in foreign policy. Such a domestic focus for enhancing an understanding of foreign policy was subsequently formalized an a funnel model of the overall process that species the multiple components that aect and limit U.S. foreign policy making. e cumulative eect of these advances in the analysis of foreign policy has been to suggest the large number and complexity of elements that af fect both its process and its outcome. ey serve to highlight the degree to which a variety of constraints within the institutions responsible for foreign policy, within the domestic political arena itself, and among the variety of international actors aect both how the policy is pursued and the degree to which it is successful or not. Policy makers are constantly playing in the domestic and international arenas simultaneously. ey face pressures and constraints from each. No longer are states the actors, rather central decision-makers, legislatures, and domestic groups become the agents. ese considerations serve as the basis for the constraints approach used in this study of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Clinton administration. is approach emphasizes the degree to which the actual space available to policy makers to carry out their foreign policy objectives is limited by multiple forces and factors. ese include the bureaucratic politics of the foreign aairs agencies and departments, the interplay of domestic politics, and the role of both domestic nongovernmental as well as international actors. ey also incorporate a number of other considerations that inuence the decision makers ability to conduct foreign policy, such as the


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years impact of unanticipated events. With special reference to the United States and Latin America, they include patterns of historical relationships that have been based on imposition, a general lack of public awareness of or concern about the area, and the generally low priority accorded by key decision mak ers to the region. e result of the interaction of such a multiplicity of elements limits the space within which foreign policy in general, and toward Latin America in particular, can be formulated and conducted. However, such limited space also poses a constant challenge for policy makers and requires that they work diligently to bring to bear the institutions, resources, and personnel neces sary to accomplish specic goals. e Clinton administration was at times able to overcome these multiple constraints to carry out eective responses to important issues. NAFTA ratication, the SOA, and the response to the late tffb and early tff Mexican peso crisis were three such examples. Where the stakes were not perceived as being as high, or where the glare of public attention was less focused, fewer contending elements were likely to be engaged. Under such circumstances, Clinton ocials were less constrained and could operate more freely to achieve desired outcomes. e Guatemalan peace accords, democracys opening in Mexico, and the resolution of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute illustrate positive policy results when such considerations were present. Overall, however, President Clinton and his policy makers failed to exer cise the decisive and consistent leadership on several important Latin Amer ican policy issues that would have increased their chances of overcoming the multiple constraints within which they operated. From not securing Fast Track renewal (i.e., Congresss acceptance of an up or down vote, rather than scrutinizing individual articles, once the executive branch completes negotiations on a treaty) and withdrawing the USS Harlan County from Haiti to signing the Helms-Burton Act and pursuing counter-drug policy at the expense of democracy, the Clinton administration succumbed to a variety of pressures that limited its ability to achieve its foreign policy goals in Latin America. In spite of some successes, then, United StatesLatin American relations during the Clinton years drifted more than they developed.Chapter emesTo develop the exploration of inter-American relations during the Clinton years, chapter summarizes the broader international, regional, and domestic historical contexts that oer the backdrop for U.S. policy toward the region in the tffs and that serve to frame that policy. In this chapter there


Clintons Latin American Policies in Context is a synopsis of the most signicant policies pursued by the United States in Latin America during the cold war years between tfb and tfnf. e chapter also summarizes the major international and regional changes that combined to open up new possibilities for change in U.S. policy. Finally, the chapter notes the most signicant policy adjustments toward Latin Amer ica pursued by the Bush administration, adjustments that oered incoming Clinton ocials a new set of opportunities in the region. Chapter oers an overview of Latin American policy during the Clinton years. It provides a summary of the principal policy concerns relating to Latin America when Clinton took oce; the challenges of assembling the administrations Latin American team during the rst year; and the combination of decisive leadership, political expediency, and an often chaotic decision-making process in a variety of policy areas that came to character ize Clinton administration policy toward the region. e politically dicult decisions, for example, to push forward with the NAFTA treaty ratication and to bring together a historic meeting of Latin American heads of state in spite of opposition within the government bureaucracy, illustrate the administrations ability to make tough choices and see them through to successful completion. ese contrast with such contrary examples as the failure to implement the Governors Island Accord in Haiti and the decision not to pursue renewal of Fast Track authority by Congress to facilitate future trade agreements, among others. In chapter b, several case studies explore the successes and failures in Latin American policy during the Clinton years and the forces at work that contributed to one outcome or another. One success is the completion of NAFTA negotiations and ratication. A second is the SOA initiative, with its extensive process of bureaucratic coordination and consultation. A third is the long and dicult but ultimately successful resolution of the regions long-standing border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. On the other side of the ledger, one case of failure explored in some detail is Haiti, which includes both the collapse of the Governors Island Accord with the precipitous withdrawal of the USS Harlan County and the inability of the United States as part of the UN peacekeeping mission to achieve its objective of bringing about a working democracy in that country. A second is the failure of the Robert Pastor nomination to become ambassador to Panama, which highlights the tension between the legislative and executive branches of government and the mechanisms employed by a single senator to thwart a favorable predisposition of the majority to conrm the nomination. A third case is a discussion of the shift in policy toward Cuba with Clintons decision to sign the Helms-Burton Act after the shooting down


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Yearsof the Brothers to the Rescue planes. A nal case explores how the tension between two important regional policy goalsto stem drug production and tracking and to enhance democratic practiceplayed out in Peru with negative consequences for democracy there. Chapter brings together the strands of the analysis in the body of the volume to provide an overall summary characterization of the Clinton administrations Latin American policy. While recognizing the commitment to the region as expressed in the articulation of overall policy objectives and an ability at times to make dicult decisions and see them through to suc cessful outcomes, more often than not the Latin American policies of the Clinton years were limited by a variety of pressures and events and a lack of consistent presidential leadership. e discussion focuses on the Clinton administrations four major policy goals in the region, as articulated in the Miami Summit Plan of Action, and provides the documentation in a number of tables to analyze the degree to which progress was or was not made toward achieving them. e overall conclusion is that U.S. policy during the Clinton years failed to exploit fully the opening available for expanding or deepening a new postcold war approach, thus squandering a historic opportunity, in spite of success in specic arenas. e chapter then summarizes the reasons noted in earlier chapters that help to explain why Clinton administration progress was so limited with regard to its overall Latin American policy objectives, as well as why it was able to succeed at times in some areas. ey include both contextual and structural elements, from the level of interest and commitment and how unexpected events were dealt with to the interplay of domestic and foreign policy considerations and of executive and legislative tensions, among others. While the Clinton administration was at times able to manage these constraints, more often than not they limited its ability to act eectively. e focus turns now to the backdrop for the Clinton administrations Latin American policy. Chapter provides a broad summary of the historical context of United StatesLatin American relations from the postWorld War II period to the end of the cold war, and discusses the interplay of inter national, regional, and domestic factors and forces that shaped policy during these years.


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American RelationsFor more than forty years after World War II, United StatesLatin American relations operated within the larger international context of the cold war and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for inuence in the region. In policy terms, this meant that between tfb and tfnf, North-South, or economic and commercial interests, were subordinated to East-West, or security concerns. Such a national securitydriven approach to the region derived from U.S. ocials fear that the Soviet Unions quest for world domination could manifest itself in Latin America through the spread of communism there. If such a preoccupation seems excessive in hindsight, it was quite understandable in its historical context: Joseph Stalins postWorld War II expansion into Eastern Europe, the successful communist revolution in China, the Korean War, and the anticommunist witch hunts of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, led by Joseph McCarthy. During these years, the concern over the possible spread of communism in the region, bordering on obsession at times, aected the entire array of U.S. policies toward Latin America, from political institution building to economic and military assistance. With a condence born of the successful pursuit of World War II, a new set of foreign policy instruments, and a willingness to assume international responsibilities, ocials believed that they could pursue a robust and multipronged approach in the region to ensure that communism did not gain a foothold there.Democracy and Anticommunisme U.S. commitment to democracy in Latin America, though always a stated goal of policy, took a backseat for most of the cold war to the commitment to keep communism out of the hemisphere. When conicts between the two objectives arose during these years, democracy was often sacriced. e most dramatic example is the case of Guatemala in tfb. At this time, the United States abandoned its nonintervention policy, pursued since the tfs, when the Central Intelligence Agency mounted a successful covert


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years operation that overthrew the left-leaning but elected government of Jacobo Arbenz. Another example of U.S. eorts to rid the region of what ocials saw as communist threats included the failed covert Bay of Pigs intervention in Cuba in tft, which had been modeled on the Guatemalan experience. In addition, the U.S. military invasion of the Dominican Republic in tf represented a case of overt intervention during an internal conict for political control that included some leftist elements. After the victory of a left-wing party coalition led by Salvador Allende in Chile in tf, the United States mounted both a covert and an overt campaign to undermine the government and supported the virulently anticommunist and repressive military regime when it took power in a tf military coup. National security concerns also underlay U.S. support for such nondemocratic governments as the Somoza family regime in Nicaragua and the Prez Jimnez military government in Venezuela, among others. Furthermore, security concerns served to justify a major expansion of CIA operations throughout Latin America that were designed to undermine the activities of Soviet-supported communist parties and labor organizations in the region. At the same time, the CIA was the channel for U.S. funding to support noncommunist political parties and unions and the training of political leaders through such organizations as the Inter-American Institute of Political Education and the Institute for International Labor Research. e goal was to work with democratic leaders in Latin America, such as Jos Figueres of Costa Rica and Rmulo Betancourt of Venezuela, to help build a democratic alternative to communist organizations within the region. Nevertheless, U.S. commitments to support democratic practices in Latin American republics were frequently undermined when U.S. ocials perceived a danger in any of these countries from communist groups. By pursuing such a policy in the region, the United States contributed to the erosion of democracy and representative institutions there and to the concomitant spread of authoritarianism in the tfs and tfs.Economic Assistance and Anticommunisme U.S. commitment to provide economic assistance to alleviate poverty was based on the rationale that U.S. resources for infrastructure, education, and health would benet less privileged Latin Americans and simultaneously decrease support for communist groups because policy makers viewed poverty as an incubator for extremism. To pursue this view, the Point Four Program of the International Cooperation Administration (tfbf) and


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations the Alliance for Progress (tft) together provided more than billion in economic assistance for a variety of such programs. eir successor, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), continued economic aid to Latin America in the tfs and tfns with almost t billion over the two decades, which was about f percent of total U.S. economic grants and credits to the region (tf.n billion) during these years. Whatever the rationale, the benecial eects of these major economic as sistance programs on substantial numbers of Latin American citizens were signicant indeed. In combination with resource and institutional support from Latin American governments, tens of millions of citizens in the countries of the region were able to gain access to education and health services for the rst time, as well as to farm-to-market roads, potable water, and improved agricultural practices. Between tf and the early tffs, levels of literacy in Latin America more than tripled, as did the proportion of population receiving basic medical care, while infant mortality rates were cut in half and the proportion of the population at dierent levels of education increased dramatically: a vefold increase at the primary level, sixteenfold at the secondary level, and more than thirtyfold at the university level. ese changes in levels of individual welfare had salutary eects on the ability of many hitherto marginalized from national societies to participate in national economic and political aairs for the rst time. e combination of increased capacities and growing involvement in national aairs induced popular expectations of further improvements in well-being. ese changes, in turn, produced both a growing willingness and a greater organizing ability to pursue newfound aspirations in a reinforcing and cumulative cycle. Such signicant changes over the course of little more than a generation induced a variety of new pressures from below on governments, pressures to which ocials too often could not or would not respond eectively. e frustrations generated by inadequate or even repressive responses were at times exploited by dissident political actors with their own antigov ernment agendas and produced a progressive radicalization of social forces that in some cases included the initiation of guerrilla activity, often with the support of Cubas communist government. us, one of the unintended consequences of signicant improvements in the welfare of previously ex cluded segments of society through major infusions of U.S. economic as sistance was the creation of new, often destabilizing actors by the tfs. is dynamic contributed to a signicant increase in both political violence from below and repression from above in many countries in the tfs and tfns.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Military Assistance and Anticommunisme U.S. commitment to provide various forms of military assistance and training was designed to professionalize the armed forces of Latin America and to make them better able to protect their governments against external or internal threats posed by international communism. From the U.S. per spective, the goal of a more professional military included not only a greater technical capacity but also subordination to civilian political authority. Between tfb and tf, the United States was the sole supplier of military equipment and training in the region, and it retained its dominant position in this policy arena until the mid-tfs. Training programs ranged from two-week specialized courses for noncommissioned military personnel to yearlong immersions for prospective general ocers at the School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone, at military bases and schools in the United States, and in the host countries. Between tf and tf, some t,t Latin American military personnel par ticipated in one or another of these programs. e Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) accounted for the bulk of U.S. military support for its Latin American counterparts between tfb and tf, totaling about t. billion in all. While such U.S. military support to Latin America is considerably less than that provided to most other regions of the world during the same period, it is clear that the United States played a signicant role in strengthening the military institutions of most Latin American countries by the tfs. Stronger military institutions in the region included such elements as greater operational capacities, better equipment, more merit-based promotion procedures, and a more professional ocer corps. At the same time, however, the U.S. training and assistance provided and the close military-tomilitary relationships developed over these years did not achieve U.S. policy objectives. In many cases, the beneciaries used their improved military skills for political purposes, such as coups against civilian governments. In the tfs and tfs, there were such unconstitutional takeovers in t of the Latin American republics. Far from becoming a bulwark of support for democracy, most U.S.trained Latin American militaries subverted it. On balance, the overall result of these core elements of the security-driven foreign policy of the United States in Latin America was to produce exactly what the policy was intended to avoida signicant increase in internal conict, a dramatic decline in democratic procedures and practice, and a proliferation of governments that were hostile to the continued expansion of U.S. trade and investment and often to economic or military assistance as


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations well. Clearly, the U.S. approach to Latin America between the tfbs and the tfs was not able to deal eectively with major issues facing the region in spite of a major transfer of resources. In various ways, then, U.S. policy actually contributed to political destabilization and social unrest. Outside actors, particularly the Soviet Union and Cuba, at times exploited these outcomes to their advantage. Central America is a good case in point. Cuban-trained guerrilla groups emerged in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador in the tfs; they were able to survive government eorts to eliminate them with large-scale military operations and return much stronger and better organized in the tfs. e success of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacin NacionalFSLN) in overthrowing the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua in tff oered a revolutionary model and an inspiration to other guerrilla groups in the region, particularly the Farabundo Mart Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Mart de Liberacin NacionalFMLN) of El Salvador. Jimmy Carters administration (tfnt) failed to keep the Sandinista revolution on a moderate course in Nicaragua and faced in its waning days the December tfn declaration of civil war by the FMLN in El Salvador. As a result, the incoming Reagan administration (tfntnf) soon mounted a major campaign designed to overthrow the FSLN and to keep the FMLN from coming to power. To this end, it helped to create and train a counterrevolutionary force in Nicaragua that came to be known as the contras (counterrevolutionaries), and it began to provide signicant military and economic assistance to the government of El Salvador against the FMLN. Over the course of the tfns, U.S. military and economic assistance to these eorts and to the other governments of Central America totaled more than billion, truly signicant sums for these countries small economies. Whether or not the U.S. role in Nicaragua and El Salvador was a signicant factor in helping to end the internal conicts in both countries remains a matter of heated debate. What is clear is that the violence and destruction associated with these eorts claimed tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars in damage over the course of the decade.External and Regional Changeree major developments changed the underlying elements that had long provided the rationale for U.S. policy toward the region. e most far-reaching was the end of the cold war, beginning with the reform eorts of Supreme Soviet Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev after his succession to the leadership of


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years the Soviet Union in tfn. However, the transformation accelerated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in tfnf, the break-away of the satellite states of Eastern Europe, and the dismemberment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the closing days of tfft. is set of remarkable changes eliminated in very short order the international bipolar system framework that had generated for so many years the security-driven policies of the United States in Latin America and elsewhere. Another was the proliferation of democratic governments in Latin Amer ica. By the end of the transition process in tfft, the region had elected civilian leaders in every country except Cuba. Such an unprecedented historical development was the product of multiple factors. Some derived from U.S. policy. One was the focus on human rights during the Carter administration. A second was the identication of democracy with U.S. national security during the later years of the Reagan administration. A third was represented by President Bushs unilateral intervention in Panama to remove Manuel Noriega in December tfnf. Although the U.S. role was a factor in some instances, the major impetus for returning to or establishing democracy in most Latin American countries stemmed from internal forces. ese included the ineectiveness of the previous authoritarian regimes as well as the courage displayed by a new generation of civilian politicians in pushing for democracy. Such a rapid political transformation opened up new opportunities for collaboration, both among the governments of Latin America and with the United States. e third major development was a severe economic crisis that lasted from the early tfns to the early tffs. Most Latin American governments, under authoritarian or military rule, had overreached their economic capacities in the tfs. eir foreign debt increased from t billion in tf to billion by tfn. Ocials signicantly overcommitted their public expenditures, too often in nonproductive activities. ey were further debilitated by sharply declining prices for their primary product exports in the world recession of the early tfns. Following four decades of net economic growth, Latin Americas Gross Domestic Product (GDP) suered a doubledigit decline between tfn and tff as well as triple-digit ination rates. Such an extended economic crisis in virtually every country except Colombia and Chile led most of the emerging democratic governments to reconsider the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model, which had contributed to economic growth since the end of the Great Depression in the midto late tfs. Many of these governments turned to market-ori ented reform and economic restructuring to regain their economic footing.


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations ey were actively encouraged in their eorts by the United States and the international nancial community within the parameters of the so-called Washington Consensus. ere were several other developments that combined with the three dis cussed above to reinforce the possibilities for new departures in U.S. policy toward the region. One was the Central America Peace Plan initiated by Costa Ricas president, Oscar Arias, in tfn after U.S. involvement in the area had been temporarily neutralized by the fallout from the Iran-Contra scandal. e Arias Peace Plan, as it came to be called, oered a regionally developed alternative to the hitherto U.S.dominated approach to end civil strife in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala through negotiations among the conicts actors. Another was the fortuitous presence of the rst Latin American secretary-general of the United Nations (UN), Javier Prez de Cullar of Peru. His term of oce coincided with growing international support for multilateral responses to conict resolution. Prez de Cullar was receptive to requests from Arias and others for the establishment of UN peacekeeping missions in the region for the rst time. Such developments were reinforced by a growing recognition by the Reagan administration during its second term that support for democracy could serve as a bulwark against communist aggression. Such acknowledgment, while it failed to alter the overall security-driven approach within Latin America, did produce some adjustments in U.S. policy in the late tfns that reinforced democratic processes already well under way in the region. e Reagan administrations shift occurred in the context of growing domestic opposition in the United States, both within Congress and among sectors of the public, to the unilateral interventionist policies being pursued in Latin America. Opposition crystallized with the tfnn Iran-Contra scandal, when some U.S. ocials used prots from arms sales in the Middle East to support the contra rebels in Nicaragua after Congress had suspended such assistance. One result of these revelations and the congressional hear ings that followed was the end of U.S. military support for the contras and a greater willingness to consider regional and multilateral approaches in Central America. Together with the broader changes represented by the end of the cold war, the return to democracy, and the economic crisis, these developments set the stage for the signicant U.S. policy adjustments toward Latin Amer ica that characterized the early years of the tffs.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years U.S. Policy Change during the Bush AdministrationWhile some of the initial responses of the United States in Latin American policy to the new realities in international and regional arenas were evident in the later Reagan years, most occurred during the George H. W. Bush administration. In a number of ways they marked signicant departures from the national securitybased policy trajectory of most of the postWorld War II period. e stage for these policy adjustments toward the region was set by political developments in the United States. One was the election to the presidency in tfnn of George H. W. Bush, arguably the most experienced head of state in international aairs in modern U.S. history. Before his election as vice president under Ronald Reagan, Bush had served in such capacities as ambassador to China, ambassador to the United Nations, and director of the CIA. In formation and temperament, he represented the moderate internationalist wing of the Republican Party. Another was the early appointment and conrmation of a secretary of state, James A. Baker, who had extensive experience in both the legislative and executive branches of government, as well as a close, long-standing relationship with Bush. He was known for his capacity to work well with opponents and for his ability to delegate authority and responsibility to subor dinates. A third development was the decision in the rst months of the administration to name Bernard Aronson as assistant secretary of state for interAmerican aairs. Although not experienced in Latin American matters, he enjoyed the condence of Secretary Baker and, as a moderate Democrat, could reach out to the congressional majority. Aronson also proved to be a quick study [and] a political broker who could work with both parties, even in a polarized environment. e Bush administration built on some of its predecessors policy adjust ments. However, it also initiated programs or responded to proposals from Latin American governments that departed signicantly from those of the Reagan years. r A major shift was an ambitious departure from past eorts to deal with Latin Americas debt problem, known as the Brady Plan, after Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady. Under this plan, the United States was willing to consider debt forgiveness for the rst time, as well as restructuring and


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations rollover in concert with other lending countries, the international banking community, and the private banks. Negotiations under the Brady Plan led to agreements with Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil that included forgiveness of debt in arrears or coming due of between n and n percent. Such success helped restore investor condence in the region and provided a stimulus for the economic recovery that began in the early tffs. Another policy departure was the historic beginning of negotiations for a free trade area. One set was with Mexico in response to a proposal in early tff by President Carlos Salinas de Gotari, to which Canada would also become a party. e Mexican proposal was designed to reinforce and legitimate the economic restructuring that both Salinas and his predecessor, Miguel de la Madrid, had undertaken in the tfns but which also attracted the interest of many other Latin American governments that were implementing internal market liberalization. In addition, the executive branch worked with Congress to secure legislative Fast Track authority to enable complex trade and investment negotiations to proceed and then be submitted to Congress for an up or down vote on the entire document. With Fast Track authority in hand by May tfft, formal discussions with Mexico and Canada for NAFTA began in June, were completed by August tff, and were signed by the leaders of the three countries in October. Only ratication by their legislative bodies remained for the NAFTA treaty to enter into force. ese negotiations took place in the context of the Bush administrations ambitious Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI), a set of negotiated framework agreements with individual countries and subregional groups on trade, investment, privatizations, and ocial debt forgiveness. e Bush administration also formalized a Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to expand exports from the small countries of this subregion to the United States. Such historic U.S. economic policy departures emerged within a Washington Consensus, the product of meetings among governments, private banks, and international nancial institutions during the late tfns to nd ways to overcome Latin Americas severe economic problems. ese were attributed in large measure to the structural limitations of the ISI model that most governments of the region had pursued from the tfs through the tfs.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years e core elements of the Washington Consensus included a reduced state role in the economy, incentives for private sector investment, and free trade to stimulate economic growth. e emergence of such a shared view of the measures needed to produce new capacities for economic growth and development reinforced support for the Bush administration trade, invest ment, and debt initiatives, thereby increasing their chances for success. With drug consumption problems high on the list of the U.S. publics do mestic concerns, another major initiative by the Bush administration was to embark on a multilateral approach to deal with the supply side of the drug issue in Latin America. Labeled the Andean Initiative, it emerged in consort and close consultation with the governments of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the production source of all the cocaine consumed in the United States, as well as a signicant portion of the heroin and marijuana. After meetings of the four heads of state in Cartagena, Colombia, in early tff, the United States committed itself to a billion program of drug crop eradication, interdiction, and alternative development, or crop substitution. is was the rst time that a multilateral approach to the drug production and tracking problem had been attempted. While skepticism continued over a supply-side attack on what many saw as a U.S. demand-driven problem, the Andean governments supported the initiative and worked closely with the United States on its implementation. Given the presence of elected governments in almost every country in Latin America by the early tffs, a logical U.S. policy innovation was to work with these governments to nd ways to protect the new democracies in the region. Responding positively to a U.S. proposal at the Santiago, Chile, meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in June tfft, the governments reached a historic agreement. In the Santiago Declaration, or OAS Resolution tn, member states agreed to meet whenever there were threats to any of their democracies to decide what steps should be taken to restore them or to ensure their continuance. Given Latin American governments long-standing opposition to intervention in their internal aairs as a fundamental principle of their foreign policy, Resolution tn marked a signicant breakthrough.


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations e new mechanism faced its rst test within a few months, in Haiti, after the September tfft military coup there, but was unable to meet the challenge. e application of Resolution tn was more successful, how ever, in responding to its second test, the self-coup by the Alberto Fujimori government in Peru in April tff, when OAS members met and pressured the Peruvian regime to call early elections and restore democracy within a year. Finally, the Bush administration made a number of important policy changes in U.S. Central American policy. Working closely with Congress, ocials reached a bipartisan agreement with legislators on an exit strategy in Nicaragua by agreeing to provide humanitarian assistance to the contras to assist in their reintegration into Nicaraguan society or their relocation, and to support the Arias Peace Plan eorts to end conict in the region. e administration also supported the United Nations initiative in Central America to establish peacekeeping missions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, as well as in Guatemala, where the regions longest running guerrilla war was continuing to destroy the fabric of civil society. rough these policy shifts, the Bush administration succeeded in extracting the United States from its unilateral, military-driven approach to internal conict and supported both regionally based and international multilateral initiatives to nd common ground for denitive settlements of the conicts. ese new approaches represented signicant departures from earlier policies. Less unilateral, less security-driven, and more consultative, they contributed in various ways to improve inter-American relations. Even with such important adjustments, however, the Bush administration retained vestiges of the old policies in some areas, such as with Panama and Cuba and with regard to environmental concerns. Panama In Panama, the United States carried out a unilateral military intervention with some b, troops in December tfnf, after repeated provocations by the countrys military strongman, Manuel Noriega, an erstwhile U.S. ally turned troublesome renegade. Noriega directed repeated harassments of U.S. military personnel still stationed in the country under the transition


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years terms of the tfn Panama Canal Treaties. He was also accused of drug traf cking and illegal military equipment transfers, as well as a blatant disregard for democratic process in Panamas May tfnf elections. e invasion succeeded with the immediate installation as president of Guillermo Endara, the apparent victor in the annulled elections, and with the capture two weeks later of Noriega and his transfer to the United States for trial on drug charges. Nevertheless, Latin American governments united in their public condemnation of the intervention as yet another example of the abuse of U.S. power in the hemisphere.Cuba As for Cuba, the United States retained a hard-line policy, largely due to the political clout of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and its leader, Jorge Mas Canosa, self-appointed spokesperson for the millionstrong Cuban American community. After some uncertainty, the Bush administration decided to support the so-called Cuba Democracy Act. Introduced in Congress by Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), the major provisions of the legislation prohibited subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad from trading with Cuba and required ships calling at Cuban ports to wait six months before being allowed to dock in the United States. e administration also backed the creation of TV Mart to broadcast antiCastro and pro-democracy programs to Cuba, even though Cuban authorities could quite easily jam its programming. In short, domestic political considerations overrode whatever more balanced and pragmatic approaches the Bush administration might have wished to pursue in United StatesCuba policy.Environment Environmental issues in the hemisphere and beyond also proved to be a stumbling block for U.S. policy under President Bush. e Earth Summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro in tff provided the United States with a historic opportunity to pursue new multilateral approaches to deal with the grow ing problem of environmental degradation and global warming. However, internal U.S. policy disagreements on the issue thwarted any breakthrough. e Agenda t document drafted by the meeting that dealt with a wide array of environmental concerns toward achieving sustainable development may have been too ambitious. Nevertheless, it was concern over the documents failure to provide adequate protection of intellectual property rights and over the nancial control given the developing countries that led the Bush administration to reject the proposal.


e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations In spite of such exceptions, however, the main thrusts of U.S. policy toward Latin America during the Bush years responded appropriately and ef fectively to major issues aecting the region. Some argue that the adminis tration came into oce without any real plan for dealing with the ongoing concerns there. Whether or not that was the case, by taking advantage of the openings created by the major international and regional events that oc curred, U.S. policy toward Latin America shifted in signicant and positive ways. ese changes ushered in a relationship that could be characterized as one of pragmatism and partnership. Now that the immediate Latin American policy context of the George H. W. Bush administration has been laid out, attention turns in chapter to a broad summary overview of the major policy initiatives toward the region during the Clinton years, an analysis of the multiple challenges and constraints they faced, and an explanation for the administrations inability in most areas to build on the early successes of its predecessor.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years An OverviewWhen Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in January tff, there was a general consensus that United StatesLatin American relations were evolving in positive and constructive directions. ere appeared to be a new coherence in the U.S. approach to Latin America that was based on the twin principles of support for democratic institutions and support for rebuilding marketoriented economies. e policy goal of the former was to assist elected leaders in the region to strengthen the new democracies that had emerged in almost every Latin American country between tfn and tfft. e policy objective of the latter was to overcome the regions lost decade of serious economic erosion in the tfns through internal structural reform, foreign debt forgiveness and restructuring, and multilateral free trade areas. For their part, Latin American governments were on the same page as their U.S. counterparts on both principles, contributing to the most collaborative relationship between the United States and the region in several decades. At one level, there was ample reason to expect that the incoming administration would reinforce the mostly positive policy dynamics that were already in place. President Clinton had no basic partisan or policy disagreements with most of his predecessors initiatives. Both shared a concern for enhancing democracy, advancing peace negotiations in Central America, as sisting bueted economies to get back on their feet through debt reduction and economic restructuring, and maintaining counter-drug production and tracking policies in the region. Even on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where there was signicant disagreement within his own party, the president-elect committed his administration to work for its ratication with expedited labor and environment side agreements that he hoped would mollify that opposition. e other Latin Americarelated concern that became an issue in the campaign was how to deal with the thousands of Haitian refugees who were eeing a repressive military government. Candidate Clinton opposed the Bush administrations policy of intercepting would-be refugees on the high


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview seas and returning them to Haiti or taking them to the U.S. naval base at Cubas Guantnamo Bay. By the time Clinton took oce, however, Central Intelligence Agency briengs had convinced him that a surge in Haitian migration was imminent, so he decided not to change the policy after all. Such a coincidence and convergence of perspectives between the incoming and the outgoing administrations across most Latin American issues suggested that continuity, which reinforced and deepened the pragmatism and partnership approach, would characterize Clintons policies toward the region. Even so, other considerations entered into the foreign policy equation that aected both process and outcome. One was the fact that Clinton owed his election to a domestic rather than a foreign policy agenda, which included commitments to restore economic growth, reduce the scal decit, and pursue universal health coverage. In addition, the incoming president lacked the foreign policy experience of his predecessor and had little interest in foreign aairs in general. Furthermore, he had no prior exposure to or particular concern for Latin America. ese elements may explain, in part, the failure during the transition to articulate a comprehensive approach to Latin American policy and the delays that occurred in putting into place the new administrations team of regional specialists. Five months after Clinton took oce, the only one in place was the National Security Council representative, Richard Feinberg, one strong indication that the region was not the administrations top prior ity. Reinforcing that view was the selection of Warren Christopher as sec retary of state. Although he was an experienced hand in the management of foreign aairs, Christopher apparently viewed Latin America as a carbuncle that he wished could be lanced so that it would go away. Domestic politics also intervened. Both the Cuban American community and Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) opposed Clintons initial nom inee for the Department of States assistant secretary for inter-American aairs, Mario Baeza, and forced Clinton to withdraw his nomination for this key appointment. In part this was because the president announced his choice without consulting with key gures in Congress or representatives of the Cuban American community. Such early indications did not augur well for either a careful decision-making process or a high level of concern for most Latin American issues in the Clinton administration. ere were exceptions, however. ese included the issue of NAFTA ratication and the immediate and pressing problem of how to deal with the repressive military regime in Haiti. A major component of the Haitian challenge concerned the large numbers of refugees who were attempting to ee the country. Many were spurred on by Clintons campaign statements


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years that he would change the Bush policy of interception and return. Another element was a major disagreement within the U.S. government, particularly within the intelligence community, over how to deal with the ousted Haitian president, Bertrand Aristide. He was seen in some ocial circles as unstable and antidemocratic, in spite of his dramatic electoral victory in tff. Whether he wanted to or not, then, the incoming president was going to have to deal with these inherited Latin American concerns early in his administration.Making Dicult DecisionsOnce in oce, Clinton made policy decisions relating to NAFTA and Haiti that tackled these politically dicult issues head on. With Haiti, he decided to override ocial doubts about Aristide and push for the restoration of democracy there. Pressed by the Congressional Black Caucus, an important Democratic Party constituency, the president committed his administration to getting Aristide back into power and to dealing in a humanitarian way with the Haitian refugee problem. In pursuit of these objectives, the administration supported the June tff United Nations sanctions on Haitis military rulers and the eorts by UN Special Representative Dante Caputo to broker an agreement among the parties, which produced the Governors Island Accord in July. Under this agreement, the military was to leave power within three months in ex change for amnesty and the lifting of sanctions. In addition, a multilateral peacekeeping force was to be put in place in Haiti to facilitate the transition back to democratic rule, and Aristide was to return as president. From the Clinton administrations perspective, implementation of the Governors Is land Accord would also resolve the refugee issue. With democracy restored, the return of the estimated Haitians who ed the military regimes repression could be justied and the possibility of new waves of refugees would be much reduced. Another important decision was President Clintons determination that he should seek early congressional ratication for the NAFTA treaty, already


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview signed by his predecessor and the heads of state of Mexico and Canada in October tff. Many of his closest political advisors felt that the president should concentrate rst on his domestic agenda. ey were concerned that the NAFTA debate would split the Democratic Party by alienating its core labor constituency and free-trade opponents such as the House major ity leader, Richard Gephardt. ey also feared that the ratication battle, whose outcome was by no means assured, would use up the political capital needed to win legislative battles for the administrations ambitious domestic agenda. President Clinton was not to be dissuaded, however. His negotiating team quickly forged side agreements to NAFTA on labor protection for U.S. job losses and on environmental protection standards and reached agreement with Mexico and Canada in September tff. With the support of business interest groups and their representatives, along with generally favorable media attention, Clinton led a full-court press in October to seek ratication by Congress. e result was a narrow bipartisan victory in November, thanks to Clintons ability to secure the support of a minority of the badly divided members of his own party. e House passed the NAFTA legislation by a b vote and the Senate by tn. With passage, NAFTA went into eect on January t, tffb, thus establishing the worlds second largest trading bloc after the European Union. By most accounts, without Clintons leadership and personal involvement, NAFTAs ratication would not have happened.r e Haiti and NAFTA challenges were not the only Latin American is sues that Clinton took on directly and forcefully. A third dicult decision concerned the issue of Cuban refugees. For over years, the U.S. government had encouraged and facilitated the entry of hundreds of thousands of Cubans who were eeing Fidel Castros communist regime. In tfn, when pressures inside Cuba generated a large number of new potential migrants, President Jimmy Carter (tfnt) encouraged them to come to the United States. Castro turned an embarrassing domestic problem into a foreign relations triumph by allowing anyone who wanted to leave to do so. e result was the departure of some t, Cubans for the United States in what became known as the Mariel boatlift, an inux that totally overwhelmed the capacity of U.S. authorities to respond and contributed to Carters defeat in the tfn elections.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years By the early tffs, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of economic support for Cuba, Cubans once again experienced great hardship and began to ee on makeshift rafts in increasing numbers. ese balseros (rafters), rst hundreds and then thousands, threatened to create new problems for U.S. authorities, and Clinton concluded that something must be done. Over the strenuous objections of the Cuban American community, in August tffb the president announced the end of the longstanding policy of preferential treatment to Cuban refugees and mandated that those who were intercepted at sea be remanded to the U.S. naval base at Guantnamo Bay. In September, U.S. ocials reached an agreement with their Cuban counterparts to admit at least Cubans per year, and a few months later they announced that any new balseros would be returned directly to Cuba. e larger issue of setting forth a refugee policy that did not privilege any specic community weighed more heavily with the Clinton administration than the domestic political consequences of antagonizing the Cuban American population. Furthermore, this policy departure, however controversial in some sectors, brought the approach to Cuban refugees more into line with that already being pursued for their Haitian counterparts. A fourth important decision that illustrated Clintons ability to make dicult Latin American policy choices concerned the U.S. response to the Mexican peso crisis of December tffb. is challenge erupted shortly after the elec tion of Ernesto Zedillo as president of Mexico. It was due primarily to a combination of scal proigacy by Zedillos predecessor, Salinas de Gotari, and political assassinations in the election campaign that together weakened public and international condence in the Mexican economy. e result was a run on dollars during the political transition and a collapse in the pesos value. Clinton was initially hesitant to respond to President-elect Zedillos pleas for assistance, perhaps due to the dramatic and unexpected Republican Party victory in the November tffb midterm elections and its takeover of both houses of Congress. However, by February, he had forged a response, after the new Republican majority leadership armed its unwillingness to provide legislative support for a nancial bailout for Mexico. With the guidance of Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, the administration oered Mexico a billion loan from the Exchange Stabilization Fund by executive order


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview and successfully worked to garner up to another billion, as needed, from international nancial institutions. However vital a condence booster this support was, it proved unable to stem a short-term economic crisis in Mexico or the ripple tequila eect of negative economic eects in much of Latin America. Nevertheless, within a year, the massive nancial assistance package got both the Mexican economy and NAFTA back on track. As a result, by January tff Mexico had repaid the U.S. Treasury plus t. billion in interest and experienced in tff and tff the countrys most rapid growth in about years. Clintons apprecia tion of the potentially devastating economic consequences for Mexico, Latin America, and the United States itself led him to push for a rapid response in spite of the negative political eects on executive-legislative relations. Each of these decisionsthe steps to restore democracy in Haiti, pursuit of the NAFTA treaty ratication, initiatives to deal with the Cuban refugee problem, and the response to the Mexican peso crisisreects examples of Clintons willingness to pursue a policy because it was the right thing to do, whether or not it was the politically correct approach. Together they suggest that the president and his administration were indeed able to forge an eective policy response to several dicult issues in the region. Beyond such discrete responses to specic problems, the aspirations of the Clinton administration for Latin America achieved their fullest expression in the formulation of the Summit of the Americas (SOA) proposal and its realization in Miami in December tffb. As Richard Feinberg put it, President Bill Clintons decision in late tff to convene a summit of his [West ern Hemisphere] counterparts marked a turning point in hemispheric relationsa moment in which underlying historical currents and individual initiative converged. e outlines of this initiative were rst unveiled in a speech by Vice President Al Gore in Mexico in December tff. Although faced with bureaucratic inertia and major diculties in organization, the summit succeeded in bringing together elected heads of state in a meeting without historical precedent. e gathering served to focus both the U.S. governments and the U.S. publics attention on Latin America. In addition, it signaled the political progress made in almost every Latin American country in a very few years, and it made explicit the goal of a hemispherewide free trade area as a vehicle for economic growth and development.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years While criticized by many as more show than substance, the SOA served, nevertheless, as a high-prole demonstration of the Clinton administrations commitment to the region. It also laid out a specic statement of four basic objectives for inter-American relations, as follows: t. e preservation and strengthening of democracy; e promotion of prosperity through economic integration and free trade; e eradication of poverty and discrimination; b. e guarantee of sustainable development and conservation of the environment. Although these goals expressed common and perhaps utopian aims of all elected governments of the region, they also reected the Clinton adminis trations overarching policy objectives toward Latin America. As such, they can serve as one basis for assessing the degree to which the administration succeeded or fell short in its policies in the region. With the second SOA in Santiago, Chile, in tffn, the mechanism of periodic meetings of the hemispheres elected heads of state began to take on institutional form. Besides serving as a forum to discuss common concerns, the summits also established an implementation review group and responsible coordinators among state, nongovernmental, and regional organiza tions to help turn agreements into follow-up actions. In the articulation and implementation of the SOAs, the Clinton administration demonstrated that it was capable of putting together a long-term, visionary, and proactive initiative in its relationships with its Latin American counterparts. is may be its single most distinctive and enduring policy legacy in inter-American aairs.Following rough on Bush Administration InitiativesGiven the Clinton administrations general agreement with many of the Latin American policy initiatives of its predecessor, it is not surprising that these continued to be pursued. ey included following up on debt relief, encouraging trade and investment, working for conict resolution, and promoting democracy.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview r e Bush administrations Brady Plan, designed to work out foreign debt relief through negotiations with individual countries and their creditors, carried on under President Clinton. e agreements in principle reached with Argentina and Brazil in tff were nalized. In addition, new accords were worked out with the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru that forgave between b and f percent of eligible debt and rolled over pay ment on the rest to lower and more manageable levels. Such agreements in the context of important trade and market liberalization reforms contributed to the restoration of international condence in the Latin American economies. New foreign loans from both private banks and such international nancial institutions as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank increased by almost percent, from bb billion in tff to t billion in Spurred by the Washington Consensus and NAFTA, also Bush adminis tration initiatives, trade and investment ows between the United States and the region increased substantially. Total U.S. private direct investment expanded rapidly, from t billion in tff to f billion a decade later, or by about percent. Overall trade volume also grew at a rapid pace, some b percent between tff and tffn (from tt billion to billion). Although about t percent of the increase in U.S. investment and percent of the increase in overall trade in the region can be attributed to Mexico and NAFTA, virtually all of Latin America beneted from such a rapid expansion in economic relationships with the United States. While responsibility for such trade and investment expansion during the decade rested primarily with the private sector, the Clinton administrations favorable stance on both facilitated their growth. e Bush years had also included a new commitment by the United States to support multilateral mechanisms of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). ese were seen as vehicles that could nd ways to reduce and end political conict in Central America after almost a decade of largely unilateral initiatives under President Reagan. Important successes were achieved in Nicaragua in tff and El Salvador in tff with


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years a combination of OAS election monitoring, a resettlement program, and UN peacekeeping missions. e momentum favoring multilateral resolution of political conict in this subregion continued under Clinton, focusing now on Guatemala, where the longest running and most intractable internal conict had been taking place since the early tfs. Initially, Guatemalan military leaders had voiced strenuous objections to any El Salvadortype solution in the belief that the armed forces could defeat the guerrillas by force of arms. However, their inability to do so, along with the willingness of Guatemalan civilian political leaders and guerrillas alike to use outside state and international organization actors to nd points of agreement, set the stage for the introduction in late tffb of a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission for Human Rights Verication in Guatemala (MINUGUA). Although compromised by its role in the historic covert tfb intervention in Guatemala and by its continuing covert relationships with the Guatemalan military, the United States played an important role in assisting with the complex and dicult peace process there. is relationship included informal contacts with guerrilla representatives, a commitment to nan cial support with the other members of the Paris Consultative Group of Donor Countries after a peace agreement was achieved, constant encouragement for the elected government of President lvaro Arz, and support for MINUGUA. While the historic December tff peace agreement could only have been achieved by the willingness of the aected parties within Guatemala to work out their dierences and the presence of the b-member MINUGUA mission to oversee compliance, the Clinton administration played a positive and constructive role throughout the process. Another way the Clinton administration followed up on its predecessors initiatives was by promoting and protecting democracy. Continued application of the OAS Resolution tn mechanism was one such example. During the Bush years, the military coup in Haiti in September tfft provoked the rst eort to invoke Resolution tn just months after its formulation at the June OAS meeting in Santiago, but this was unsuccessful. With Peruvian president Alberto Fujimoris autogolpe (coup dtat against his own government) in April tff, the OAS utilization of Resolution tn was more eec tive, securing the Peruvian governments commitment to restore democratic process within a year.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano attempted a similar autogolpe in May tff, provoking a quick OAS response as well as strong outside state opposition, including the United States. ese actions thwarted the unconstitutional initiative and almost immediately restored democracy under a new president selected by the Guatemalan congress, Ramiro de Len Car pio. In April tff, Paraguay faced its own democratic crisis after the head of the armed forces, General Lino Oviedo, refused to step down when he was dismissed by President Juan Carlos Wasmosy. rough prompt and vigorous responses by U.S. representatives, as well as those of neighboring countries and the OAS, the principle of civilian supremacy over the military in Paraguay was restored. rough its consistent actions, either through the OAS or on its own, the Clinton administration rearmed its commit ment to democratic principles and practice in Latin America. A much less visible but equally important eort to encourage progress toward democracy was the administrations behind-the-scenes work in Mexico, a focus that assumed added signicance with the tffb assassinations of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario InstitucionalPRI) presidential candidate, Luis Colosio, and the PRI secretarygeneral, Jos Francisco Ruiz Massieu. e deputy assistant secretary for American republics aairs, Arturo Valenzuela, made more than b trips to Mexico during his two-year tenure in the late tffs to demonstrate the administrations commitment to greater transparency and democracy there. By themselves, these eorts would probably not have been sucient to bring about the desired result of a truly open electoral process. When combined with the Mexican governments own commitment, however, par ticularly the steps taken by President Zedillo during his six years in oce, the outcome was historic. Mexicos elections produced a truly open process, one that resulted in the rst presidential victory by an opposition candidate, Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (Partido de Accin Nacional), since the consolidation of the Mexican Revolution in the tfs. In several important areas, then, the Clinton administration continued to implement the policy departures begun by its predecessor. Combined with the dicult decisions made early in Clintons rst term concerning NAFTA, Haiti, the Cuban and Haitian refugee problem, and the larger vision of over all objectives in inter-American relations expressed in the Miami SOA, such policy continuities appeared to reect the retention and even an expansion of the postcold war policy departures in United StatesLatin American relations begun under George Bush.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Reacting to EventsBy its very nature, foreign policy is often subject to events that cannot be anticipated but for which responses are essential. e Clinton administration was forced to deal with a number of them, and it tended to do so in ways that undermined its capacity to maintain policy coherence or its ability to achieve its policy objectives in the region. .. One dramatic example was the killing of tn U.S. military personnel attached to the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia in early October tff. is event immediately reversed the growing U.S. commitment to multilateral initiatives to deal with political conict in troubled countries. Coming just days before a UN-sanctioned response to enforce the Governors Island Accord to restore Bertrand Aristide to power by sending a small multilateral force to Haiti led by the United States, the Somalia tragedy could not help but aect policy makers calculations on how best to proceed. When the ship carrying the lightly armed force, the USS Harlan County, steamed into the Port au Prince harbor on October tt and found the dock blocked and a small band of protesters demonstrating on the wharf, the decision was made to withdraw rather than risk a violent confrontation. is decision scuttled the Governors Island Accord to bring democracy back to Haiti, gave democracys opponents in Haiti a new condence and willingness to engage in political assassination and intimidation, and humiliated both the United States and the Clinton administration. r A second dramatic event that threw the administrations policy into disar ray was the shooting down by the Cuban air force of two unarmed planes of the Cuban American Brothers to the Rescue organization in February tff. Four airmen were killed as they attempted to shower the island with antiCastro leaets. Up until this moment, Clintons policy toward Cuba, while perhaps overly sensitive in public pronouncements to domestic political considerations, had worked slowly to open up ties through expanded exile visits and trips by scholars and members of the U.S. business community. Before the incident, Clinton had opposed the Helms-Burton legislation that was intended to impose a set of drastic sanctions on commerce and invest


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview ment by third countries and Secretary of State Warren Christopher had intimated the possibility of a veto. In the aftermath of the planes downing, however, in spite of the opposition of some of his policy advisors, President Clinton concluded that he had no choice but to sign the legislation, which he did in March tff. For all intents and purposes, the adoption of Helms-Burton, even with a proviso allowing the executive to waive implementation of its discriminatory provision concerning third country trade with and investment in Cuba, represented an abandonment of the administrations eorts to pursue a more moderate course in its relations with the Castro government. In another unanticipated event related to United StatesCuba relations, the Elin Gonzlez incident in November tfff precipitated a crisis within the Clinton administration over how best to respond. Ten-year-old Elin had survived a crossing from Cuba to Florida in an inner tube; his mother had drowned. e U.S. government was torn between allowing him to stay with his mothers family in Miami and returning him to his father in Cuba. Mas sive demonstrations by the Cuban American community to keep him with his relatives in Florida immobilized U.S. decision makers for weeks. Although Vice President Al Gore eventually came out in support of the Cuban Americans position, after much internal debate, in April At torney General Janet Reno ordered Elins removal from the Miami home and his return to his father. However correct the decision in terms of inter national law and however courageous the Clinton administration in making that determination, it also alienated the politically important Cuban American community in Florida and almost certainly contributed to the Democratic Partys defeat in the elections. In addition to the U.S. response to Mexicos peso crisis, the conict between Ecuador and Peru was another unexpected event in the region that did produce a more felicitous outcome for U.S. policy. In January tff, the longest running border dispute in the Western Hemisphere erupted into a war between Peru and Ecuador along a contested segment of the frontier. Although largely o U.S. media radar screens, U.S. diplomatic and military representatives played a major role in helping to facilitate a denitive


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years resolution of the conict. ey worked diligently for over three years within the multilateral framework of an earlier treaty between the parties (Rio Protocol of tfb) to achieve an October tffn settlement to which both parties agreed. Given the large number of unresolved land and sea boundary dis putes in the region, the breakthrough to resolution of a hitherto intractable case sent a signal to other governments that their own dierences could also be worked out peacefully. With the exception of the Peru-Ecuador conict, however, the other major external events that forced U.S. policy responses and adjustments in Latin America during the Clinton years tended to undermine the adminis trations stated objectives in the region. Even the response to the Mexican peso crisis, while successful on its own terms, deected attention from the historic gathering of Latin American elected heads of state at the SOA just days before it broke out. Certainly the argument can be made, in the face of such dramatic developments as the killing of U.S. troops in Somalia or the downing of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, that President Clinton had little choice but to change course in Haitian and Cuban policy. Nevertheless, the eect in both cases was to suggest that Clintons policy could be subject more to situations and circumstances than to a clear sense of underlying national interests and the best approaches to achieve them.Conicting Priorities and Conicted Policy Actorse eective coordination and implementation of foreign policy in the context of multiple bureaucratic and individual actors and multiple policies as well is always a daunting task. Dierences are inevitable, but their successful resolution is essential to forging a set of policies that are generally eective in responding to the main issues of concern. For a variety of reasons, such as the generally low priority that top ocials accorded Latin America, their rather chaotic policy-making style, President Clintons domestic politics focus, and serious policy disagreements among government agencies, the administration too frequently adopted policies toward the region that lacked the coherence of its predecessor. Examples include responses to challenges in Haiti, Fast Track authority renewal, the drug problem in Colombia, and the tension between drug policy and democracy in Peru.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview e abrupt policy turnaround on implementing the Governors Island Ac cord is one such example. Key advisors were virtually paralyzed by the Somalia tragedy. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and some of his sta had been opposed from the beginning to the deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti for military or police training. In spite of the signed agreement, high levels of distrust between pro-Aristide and pro-Cedrs groups continued to fester. Most of the U.S. intelligence community remained wary about Aristides mental competence. Aristide himself demonstrated a great deal of ambivalence about returning without the protection of a major U.S. military commitment. Given such an unhealthy mix of elements, it is not surprising that chaos reigned at the critical moment, with a disastrous outcome for U.S. policy, at least in the short run. In the aftermath of this failure, the administration reassessed the situation. Under growing pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and provoked by the publicity generated by the hunger strike carried out by the director of TransAfrica, Randall Robinson, Clinton and his advisors took steps to ensure Aristides return to Haitibut a year later. e United States supported the renewal and tightening of the UNsanctioned embargo on trade with Haiti. Individuals connected with the military regime there were prohibited from obtaining visas to travel to the United States. In addition, with the strong backing of the administration, the UN authorized the use of all necessary means to restore democracy to the country. As organized violence against Haitian moderates and Aristide supporters increased in mid-September tffb, Clinton authorized a high-level visit to Haiti led by Jimmy Carter. e mission was charged with negotiating the withdrawal of the military from power and the return of President Aristide, but it was not informed about the military intervention preparations. Discussions proceeded, but virtually in mid-conversation the parties learned that U.S. forces were en route to Haiti. is revelation seemed to be the nal impetus for the military regimes decision to step down. Even then, it took some deft last-minute footwork by U.S. embassy personnel and Bob Pastor, the Carter delegation member remaining in Haiti, to ensure that armed confrontations would not take place when the U.S. military landed. After an arrival that was entirely peaceful, the force of some troops prepared the way for Bertrand Aristides return to the Haitian presidency a month later. Even this apparent success, however belated, was tempered by the loss of ,, Haitian lives during the year that passed between the with-


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years drawal of the Harlan County and the landing of U.S. troops. It was also aected by Aristides reluctance to take the economic liberalization measures he had promised that would release signicant aid to help with Haitis recovery; as a result, most economic assistance never arrived. Adding to the diculties was the ambivalence of the Department of Defense (DOD) over the use of U.S. forces for peacekeeping, which produced an early withdrawal of the signicant U.S. military contingent. e remaining UN peacekeeping forces were insucient in numbers to be able to stem the progressive regression of the internal situation in Haiti that included growing economic erosion, political immobilism, and the return to sporadic violence. Even though democratic formalities were retained, the outcome was far from what U.S. policy makers had hoped to achieve in Haitia weakened and ineective government that was progressively degenerating into a vir tual failed state. e U.S. experience with Haiti illustrates the diculties of nding a solution for a problem when U.S. policy makers are divided on the best course of action and when the presumed beneciaries of the policy, the local elites themselves, are unwilling to nd some way to work through their disagreements on behalf of their own nation. For the rest of the decade, the situation in Haiti continued to deteriorate in multiple political and economic crises, a dramatic demonstration of the limits of U.S. power to eect internal change. Haiti is not the only example of an infelicitous policy outcome. e Clinton administrations failure to secure renewal of Fast Track legislation is another. Fast Track allowed the executive branch to negotiate complex trade treaties and gave them an up or down vote without subjecting specic provisions within them to modication. is arrangement had been in place when NAFTA was negotiated and ratied, but it was scheduled to expire in tffb. Given the administrations stated interest in continuing its predecessors commitment to trade agreement expansion in the hemisphere and its suc cess with NAFTA, a push for Fast Track renewal was to be expected. As events developed, however, it didnt happen, largely due to domestic politics. e battle for congressional ratication of NAFTA, though suc cessful, had revealed serious disagreements within the Democratic Party, particularly among organized labor. Because tffb was a midterm election year, Clinton concluded that bringing the party together for the campaign to retain a Democratic majority on the hill was more important than retaining


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview Fast Track. But the Republicans triumphed anyway, in a dramatic November electoral victory that gave them control of both houses of Congress for the rst time since the tfs. Fast Track was a casualty as well. Given this doubly unfavorable context, calls rang hollow at the rst SOA a month later for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the designation of Chile as the next country with which to negotiate a trade agreement. Without Fast Track, it was unrealistic to believe that meaningful negotiations could move forward. Recognizing this fact, the Clinton administration mounted another at tempt to renew Fast Track in tff after the presidents reelection. Even though Republicans continued to have a legislative majority, most supported trade agreements. So it was reasonable to expect that the presidents proposal would pass. However, a group of conservative Republican representatives tied their support for Fast Track to dropping foreign aid to organizations that included abortion in their approaches to family planning. In addition, organized labor mounted a major campaign against renewal based on their fears that new trade agreements would mean a loss of jobs in the United States, a campaign endorsed by House minority whip and presidential aspirant Richard Gephardt and many of his Democratic Party colleagues. To avoid an embarrassing defeat in the House of Representatives, the Fast Track bill was never brought to a vote. Without Fast Track, any pos sibility that the Clinton administration could pursue the U.S. commitment to advance the FTAA by evaporated. While some specialists believed that trade agreement negotiations could proceed even without Fast Track authority, the result for all intents and purposes was to scuttle prospects for the incorporation of other countries into new free trade agreements. Chile in particular was aected, as it had been led to believe that it would soon be negotiating a free trade agreement that would place it in the same status with the United States as Mexico and Canada under NAFTA. Whether or not Fast Track renewal would have been sucient in itself to move negotiations forward, the option was precluded by President Clintons inability to overcome the divisions within his own party. r Another example of Clinton administration decisions that produced an out come creating a set of new challenges and problems for U.S. policy involved the decertication of Colombia in tff and tff. Decertication is a con-


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years troversial U.S. unilateral initiative under Congresss tfn counter-drug legislation that requires the executive branch to certify annually the degree to which governments are cooperating in drug supply reduction eorts in producing and tracking countries. Under the legislation, governments could be certied as cooperating fully, as not cooperating but with a waiver for considerations of national security, or as not cooperating and thus decertied. Any country that was decertied could lose all U.S. economic and military assistance except for humanitarian aid and counter-drug support. However, the annual certication process is not as straightforward as it might seem. Certication on drug cooperation is almost inevitably inter twined with other U.S. policy objectives in specic countries. Furthermore, decertication itself is a very blunt instrument when actually applied. Its use runs the risk of undermining bilateral relations in areas of concern deemed to be at least as important as cooperation on counter-drug policy. By the mid-tffs, concern over increased ows of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana from Latin America to the United States, in spite of signicant U.S. counter-drug assistance, led to closer scrutiny of the regions governments and their levels of support for the programs. Latin American countries that are particularly important in assisting the U.S. eort to reduce illegal drugs production and supply include Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Between them, they produce all the cocaine consumed in the United States, along with most of the heroin and about one-fth of the marijuana. Although both Peru and Bolivia, the source of most coca leaf produc tion in the mid-tffs, were deemed to be cooperating fully with U.S. ef forts, Mexico and Colombia were seen as more problematic cases. Mexico, through which an estimated n percent of the illegal drugs were entering the United States at the time, had an untrustworthy and often corrupt police force and several examples of drug trackers inuence over high ocials with counter-drug responsibilities. Colombia, in turn, was the actual manufacturing source of most cocaine and heroin entering the United States. Even though a strong case could be made that Mexican authorities posed a greater problem for carrying out eective counter-drug policies with the United States than their Colombian counterparts, the dense network of bilateral relationships with Mexico precluded serious consideration of decertication there. With growing pressure on the administration from Congress and the American public to take a tougher line on drug issues, U.S. policy makers chose to focus on Colombia. In tff, they decided that Colombian authorities were not cooperating well, and they decertied the country but gave a waiver out of national security considerations.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview In the tff certication deliberations, however, U.S. ocials received evidence indicating that the newly elected president, Liberal Party candidate Ernesto Samper, had accepted several million dollars from drug trackers, assistance believed to have been decisive in his narrow runo election vic tory. With the support of the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, Myles Frechette, who believed that a strong message needed to be sent to Colombians that democratic practice is corrupted when backed with drug money, the Department of State decertied Colombia in tff without a national security waiver. Among other measures, including the suspension of almost all economic assistance, President Sampers visa to travel to the United States was revoked. A year later, ocials came to the same decision, even though there were indications that Colombia had been taking steps to improve cooperation on drug policy with the United States and in spite of Ambassador Frechettes conclusion that decertication this time would be counterproductive. Although other factors also contributed to the growing diculties the Colombian government was confronting in trying to deal with its multiple internal problems, decertication eroded further the legitimacy of the countrys elected ocials and their ability to respond to the challenges they were facing. Both paramilitary and guerrilla forces increased signicantly in size and operational capacity. eir access to resources generated by drug tracking enabled them to become better equipped than the Colombian military and police, forcing the latter into defensive stances in much of the countryside. Political violence increased markedly, accelerating the declining ability of central government to mount an eective presence in large swaths of the country. e growing precariousness of the situation in Colombia by the late tffs led the Clinton administration to conclude that it needed to make a major commitment there to avert the growing possibility of state collapse. e response was Plan Colombia in a major infusion of military assistance with some support for strengthening democratic institutions as well. De certication certainly sent a strong message to the Colombian government on drug issues, but it also had the unintended consequence of contribut ing to a profound legitimacy crisis for the Colombian state itself that soon forced the U.S. government to mount a major rescue program.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years As in Colombia, conicting policy priorities toward Peru in the late tffs sent a mixed message as to just what U.S. policy was trying to accomplish there. Democracy promotion was one major stated objective. After Perus president Alberto Fujimoris tff autogolpe, the United States joined the OAS in taking strong steps to force its restoration in Peru within a year and a half, including the suspension of a major military training program. After Peru reestablished democracy in late tff, resumed U.S. bilateral aid contributed to the strengthening of the Peruvian government and its ability to respond to an array of citizen needs in the aftermath of a major economic meltdown and generalized guerrilla warfare. e other major U.S. policy objective in Peru was to reduce the produc tion and tracking of illegal drugs. Along with nancial support to reinforce democratic restoration there, during the same period the United States also substantially increased counter-drug assistance. e goal was to work with Peruvian counterparts to reduce coca leaf cultivation and cocaine paste transportation, mostly to Colombia, where it was rened into cocaine and sent on to the United States and Europe. Over the next four years, U.S. support contributed to Peruvian police and military units ability to eradicate coca plantings, provide resources for alternative agricultural development, and interdict small planes on their way to Colombia with cocaine paste. Prices for coca leaf plummeted, and areas under coca cultivation declined by over half. By the late tffs, Peru ceased to be the worlds largest producer of coca leaf. Both components of U.S. policy appeared to be working in Peru. From the mid-tffs onward, however, the tension between promoting democracy and reducing drug supply grew markedly. After President Fujimoris reelec tion by a substantial margin in tff, he and his administration progressively introduced measures that undermined the countrys already fragile democ racy. With a small but pliable congressional majority, they pushed through measures that signicantly restricted free expression and democratic procedures. ese included a blanket amnesty for human rights abuses by the military and police, arbitrary court appointments for supporters, bribes to newspaper owners to control the press, and intimidation of opposition gures. Even so, U.S. ocials continued to work closely with the Peruvian gov ernment on counter-drug activities. eir principal Peruvian collaborator on drug policy was Vladimiro Montesinos, head of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), the very individual who was simultaneously directing the co-


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview vert campaign to keep Fujimori in power. Whatever qualms U.S. policy mak ers might have had about this other side of Montesinos were oset by his ability to deliver on the counter-drug policy and the successes in the eld in reducing coca production and increasing interdiction of cocaine paste. It was not until U.S. ocials found evidence of ocial manipulation in the run-up to the presidential elections in which Fujimori was once again a candidate that they began to voice their concerns. ey broke o their relationship with Montesinos and denounced his actions only upon learning that he was involved in arms tracking to the Colombian guerrillas. Montesinos and Fujimori ed the country, and the regime collapsed. In mid-November, a transition government of former opposition gures began the daunting task of bringing democracy back to Peru. U.S. ocials, having backed Fujimori until almost the end, were largely relegated to watching the transition unfold from the sidelines. Because of the positions taken by U.S. ocials both before the political crisis and as it unfolded, they had little inuence over the democratic transition process in Peru. Although supporting in principle both democratic practice and counter-drug commitments, U.S. policy as it played out in Peru favored drug supply reduction over democratic enhancement. By choosing to work through the architect of the countrys dismantling of democracy because of what he appeared to be able to oer in attacking the drug problem, in this case U.S. policy makers tarnished their countrys consistent commit ment to democratic principles and practice, which had been in place since the end of the cold war.Chaos and Conundrums: President Clintons TripsA major advantage of high-level ocial trips abroad is that they help to focus government attention on policy issues relating to the country or countries and region being visited. In preparing for and following up on such travel, the multiple agencies of the bureaucracy involved with these countries have a major incentive to coordinate their concerns and work out dierences. With fewer trips, there are fewer such opportunities, thus increasing the likelihood that the policies and strategies of individual agencies will lack coherence. Top ocial travel also gets the individuals involved to look more closely at the specic issues that are aecting relations with the governments of the countries visited and helps them develop personal relationships with their counterparts that can be utilized to help resolve problems.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years It was no secret that President Clinton, most of his principal advisors, and his secretaries of state had little knowledge about or concern for Latin America. ey also had many other serious international issues to deal with. Even so, it was unfortunate that the president did not travel to the region until his second term, a fact that his White House chief of sta and close per sonal advisor, omas Mack McLarty III, termed a mistake. Secretary of State Warren Christopher made only one brief trip to the region during his tenure, in February and March tff. His successor, Madeleine Albright, was a more frequent visitor, with tt short trips to t Latin American and Caribbean countries (several more than once); however, these accounted for just over t percent of the ocial international trips she took while serving as secretary. President Clintons brief trip to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Barbados in May tff was long on rhetoric but short on substance. A commitment to build a better future or to promise no mass deportations of illegal immigrants to the Caribbean hardly qualify as solid policy initiatives. His equally short visits to Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil in October tff raised more issues than they resolved. e trip occurred just weeks after the United States lifted a year ban on the sales of high performance aircraft, with an eye to selling Chile F-t supersonic jet ghters. In Venezuela, questions were asked as to whether that countrys air force could secure similar planes, raising the specter of a new arms race in the region. In Argentina, Clintons declaration that the governments commitment to international peacekeeping forces earned the country the special designation of extra-NATO ally, but did not assuage ocial concerns over the implications of possible supersonic ghter plane sales to its neighbor, Chile. And Brazilian authorities were mied by what appeared to be the new special status of its neighbor, Argentina, with the extra-NATO ally designation. As a result, the visit was far from the unqualied success that had been anticipated. When the president traveled to Santiago in April tffn for the second SOA meeting, he talked of his administrations commitment to the FTAA. Without renewal of Fast Track, however, his counterparts concluded that he would be unable to match U.S. policy objectives with concrete progress. Even though other concerns were advanced during the meeting, particularly in support for education and for better follow-up mechanisms, there could be no progress on the matter of greatest concern for most of the regions governments at the time, greater trade integration. e irritations that surfaced on each of the presidents trips reected not only an apparent lack of prior agency coordination and solid background


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview brieng but also an overall absence of a coherent U.S. policy strategy for Latin America. Initiatives suitable for the government of one country did not necessarily translate into an integrated approach to the region as a whole. On balance, these presidential visits symbolized a rather haphazard policy process with regard to Latin American issues, always troubling, but particularly so well into the second term of his administration.Conclusionsese policy advances and challenges suggest the complexity of United StatesLatin American relations during the Clinton years and the diculty of building consistently on the policy momentum toward the region gen erated by both favorable international and regional circumstances and the multiple initiatives of its predecessor. e impression given, on balance, was of an administration that was unable to take full advantage of the opportunities provided, in spite of some successes, and that tended over time to lurch reactively from crisis to crisis instead of being able to maintain its earlier momentum. e key question, of course, is why? What were the main forces and fac tors that kept the Clinton administration from being able to exploit the opportunities with which it was presented to build a coherent and consistent policy toward Latin America? ese will be among the concerns addressed in chapter b, which explores in greater detail several cases of U.S. policy initiatives and responses.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years Case Studies of Success and Failuree broad review of the Clinton administrations foreign policies in chapter suggests a somewhat confounding combination of eective balancing of dicult choices in some instances with ill-considered responses in others. Clinton ocials and the foreign policy bureaucracy were able to ar ticulate an overall vision of U.S. priorities in the region rather earlyin preparation for the tffb Miami Summit of the Americas (SOA). is vision emerged through an extensive process of intra-agency interaction as well as consensus-building consultation with Latin American governments and nongovernmental actors. Over the course of the Clinton years, however, this general vision blurred in practice when faced with specic policy challenges or unexpected events. e administrations approach to Latin American issues highlighted the diculties of maintaining the coherence of an overarching vision of policy goals and objectives amid the need to forge specic responses to specic problems in the region. e decision-making process tended to be haphazard, even chaotic. An additional diculty arose from policy makers calculations of what would satisfy domestic political constituencies that too often got in the way of policies based on more considered appraisals of national interest and longer-term objectives; politics, after all, was the criterion on which [the Clinton] administration often made its choices and judged its results. As presented below, several more detailed cases of Clinton administration policy toward Latin America provide additional insights into diculties encountered as well as elements that contributed to successful outcomes. Presented chronologically, they include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ratication, the failed Harlan County mission to Haiti, a blocked ambassadorial nomination, the rst summit process and its after math, the resolution of the Peru-Ecuador boundary conict, the circumstances leading to the signing of the Helms-Burton Act, and the conicting policy priorities of promoting democracy and reducing drug production as played out in Peru.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure ese examples deal with only a sample of the full array of policies that could be highlighted. Nevertheless, they were selected in order to reect the variety of challenges and complexities Clinton ocials faced as they tried to deal with some of the dicult issues in the region, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. Once each case of success or failure is described and analyzed, the discussion that follows to conclude the chapter oers a summary discussion of what these cases suggest in the way of general insights about the policy process during the Clinton presidency.Ratication of the North American Free Trade Agreemente battle over NAFTA illustrates the challenges and complexities of secur ing congressional approval for a controversial piece of legislation. Success in this case demonstrates the importance of a rm commitment by the president and his willingness to get into the trenches and use every legal means at his disposal. Without such a personal involvement by Clinton, it is very likely that the NAFTA treaty would not have passed. Even so, it was a very close call and created other problems for the administration as a result. Up until a few days before the decisive vote on November t, tff, it appeared that anti-NAFTA sentiment, concentrated within the Democratic Party and particularly among the party bastion of organized labor, could well prevail. Treaty supporters groused that this was the case because the president had not started early enough to actively campaign for NAFTA, even though he had publicly reasserted his commitment to ratication in July. One illustration was that Clinton selected prominent Chicago lawyer Bill Daley as the head of the pro-NAFTA campaign in August but failed to give Daley a sta or an oce before heading out on vacation. However, Clinton mounted a full court press that consumed most of his waking moments for several weeks. is included dozens of pro-NAFTA speeches across the country, scores of personal calls to wavering or undecided members of Congress, a dinner at the White House, and a virtual shuttle service to the White House from Capitol Hill for chats with both Democrats and Republicans. e president also vowed to crack down on Canadian wheat subsidies and limit citrus, sugar, and textile imports, thus winning over a dozen undecided representatives. A promise of more support for minority businesses garnered another key vote. At the same time, Bill Daley was promising a variety of special projects and contracts to ensure support, commitments estimated to cost as much as billion. When the House vote was taken, NAFTA prevailed, though by a scant t votes. A small number of persuad-


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years able Democrats gave Clinton a victory, even though most Democrats voted against the treaty (tn of ). Clearly, Clintons personal commitment to the ratication of NAFTA and involvement in the process, however belated, was decisive. However, other factors contributed to the ultimately successful outcome. One was the fact that Fast Track legislative authority was in place. is meant that only an up or down vote by Congress on the entire treaty was necessary. Another was that the previous Republican administration had already completed negotiations on NAFTA with Mexico and Canada by tff. Furthermore, the three presidents had signed the treaties, and both the Mexican and the Canadian legislatures had ratied them. Not only did this set of developments put added pressure on the United States to go along, but it also predisposed most Republican members of Congress to support a treaty negotiated under the leadership of President George H. W. Bush. In addition, the Clinton administration, fullling a campaign promise, negotiated side agreements on labor and environmental issues with Mexico and Canada before submitting NAFTA to Congress for a vote. is action served to mollify some wavering Democrats and gained their support even as others criticized the arrangements for not being strong enough. e administration also mounted a major public relations campaign for NAFTA, enlisting scores of government ocials to fan out across the country to speak on behalf of the treaty and bringing former presidents, Democrat Jimmy Carter and Republicans Jerry Ford and George H. W. Bush, to Washington to announce their support. Such eorts were reinforced by multimillion dollar lobbying that included both the Mexican government and major U.S. business interests. A turning point in the public relations campaign, just days before the vote, was a highly publicized debate on primetime television between Vice President Al Gore and former presidential contender Ross Perot, a leading NAFTA critic. With Gores decisive victory in the encounter, the momentum generated to that point by Perots increasingly suc cessful anti-NAFTA campaign was blunted virtually overnight. e debates outcome enabled the administration to take the initiative in what had been an uphill struggle. By scheduling the decisive vote on NAFTA just days before a major meeting of U.S. and Asian heads of state on trade liberalization, Clinton put added pressure on legislators to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the principles of free trade by passing the treaty. e larger context of ongoing General Agreement on Taris and Trade negotiations to set new trade standards as part of the Uruguay Round, in which the United States was a major participant, also favored ratication supporters.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure Without question, the passage of NAFTA represented a high point in Clintons Latin American policy. Even so, victory exacted a high price. e political capital expended on ratication, as many of Clintons advisors had feared, aected the presidents ability to secure much of his domestic legislative agenda, from universal health care to decit reduction. e political chits the president called in to secure support for NAFTA were then not available for other legislative priorities. e weeks of eort expended to pass the NAFTA treaty in a nonelection year left insucient time for the administration to pursue politically sensitive proposals before Congress adjourned. Furthermore, Clintons commitment to NAFTA and his decisive role in securing its passage provoked deep alienation by organized labor, a key Democratic Party constituency. Labors opposition kept many of its members on the sidelines during the tffb midterm election campaign. e unwillingness of many labor locals to engage in their usual get-out-the-vote drives contributed to the Democrats electoral defeat and loss of both houses of Congress in those elections. With Republicans in control of the legislative branch beginning in January tff, a position they were able to retain for the rest of the decade, the presidents ability to pursue his policy priorities on either the domestic or international fronts was severely tested.Policy toward Haiti and the Harlan County DebacleBertrand Aristide, Haitis rst popularly elected president, was overthrown in a military coup in September tfft, the rst in Latin America against an elected civilian government in t years. Between tf and tfft, the region had experienced a historically unprecedented generalization of electoral democracy and a consensus among the governments that democracy needed to be protected. Nevertheless, democratic restoration in Haiti proved elusive in spite of multilateral eorts under the recently agreed upon Organization of American States (OAS) Resolution tn to deal with just such a contingency. e crackdown by the new military leaders against supporters of democ racy in Haiti provoked the additional challenge of thousands of refugees from the island taking to small boats to seek safe haven, particularly in the United States. Although President Bush had committed the United States to restore Aristide to power, his administration faced the more immediate Haitian refugee problem. e U.S. governments response to what became a ood of over Haitians was to round up as many as possible at sea


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years and either return them or take them temporarily to the U.S. naval base at Guantnamo Bay. is was the scenario that faced Clinton when he took oce in January tff. In his election campaign he had promised to end Bushs approach to the Haitian refugee problem. However, after seeing evidence that up to Haitians, anticipating a shift in U.S. policy, were preparing to ee, Clinton decided to keep the Bush policy in place but redouble eorts to restore democracy to Haiti. He concluded that democratic restoration and the increased sense of political security it would bring was the only way to justify the return of refugees and to prevent new outows. However coherent and straightforward this goal appeared to be, in its pursuit the Clinton administration suered a major setback in its Latin American policy. Why this occurred is related to the complex interaction of several factors that aected both policy formulation and implementation. One important element was the high level of distrust between the principal Haitian actors themselves, Aristide and General Cedrs. Another was the often maddening and confounding approach President Aristide took in responding to proposals designed to work out solutions to each impasse and facilitate his return to Haiti; at times he would not respond at all, while at others he would initially agree, only to change his mind a few days later. A third component involved signicant dierences in positions by dif ferent parts of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy. President Clinton and the National Security Council (NSC) were committed to Aristide and his restoration as Haitis civilian head of state. However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had grave doubts about his mental stability and tness for of ce, and the Department of Defense (DOD) was reluctant from the outset to use U.S. military forces in Haiti in support of the policy. Complicating the equation even further was the introduction of U.S. domestic political considerations. Groups of Aristide supporters in Washington, particularly the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica, used the race card as well as his status as an elected head of government to continually pressure the administration to do whatever was necessary to put Aristide back in oce as soon as possible. Against this complex backdrop, the administration decided to work through the United Nations to forge a workable solution. With Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, Department of State (DOS) special advisor to Haiti, as the U.S. representative, Ambassador Dante Caputo for the UN, and designated diplomats of the OAS and Friends of Haiti (Canada, France, Venezuela, and the United States), the parties were persuaded to meet on Gover nors Island in New York Harbor in July tff to work out an agreement for


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure Aristides return. Not surprisingly, the negotiations were extremely dicult, and it was not certain until the very last minute that any agreement could be reached. Much of the uncertainty revolved around the maneuverings of Aristide, who would appear to support a solution at one moment only to backtrack almost immediately. At the eleventh hour, however, just as the Haitian military representatives were preparing to leave, he signed on. In exchange for the lifting of sanctions and a commitment to provide a multilateral force of police and military trainers and engineers who would carry only sidearms, General Cedrs agreed that Aristide could return to his former position by October t. Preparations for the transition went forward at that point, with UN authorization in September for some t, police trainers and monitors and military trainers and engineers. Under this UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), a small advance party of military and police trainers arrived in Haiti by early October. In addition, about civilian human rights monitors sponsored by the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission (ICM) spread out throughout the country. From his Georgetown home, Aristide continued to express uncertainty over the arrangements and regularly undermined his principal ally in Haiti, Prime Minister Robert Malval. Even though the situation in the country remained calm, according to both U.S. embassy accounts and the ICM human rights monitors, the UNMIH military trainer commander, U.S. Army colonel Gregg Pulley, was sending reports to DOD that alleged ongoing chaos and violence, none of which either the U.S. embassy or Ambassador Caputo saw. In the immediate aftermath of the Blackhawk Down tragedy in Somalia on October and as the USS Harlan County was preparing to depart for Haiti with the multilateral contingent, however, a New York Times oped piece, apparently based on information leaked by DOD, deplored the deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti who would carry only sidearms. When Secretary of Defense Les Aspin went on a television talk show on October t to address the issue, a program broadcast in Haiti as well, he revealed that troops would also have boxes of M-t ries. Occurring just before the arrival of the Harlan County, this acknowledgment infuriated Cedrs, who concluded that the United States had deceived him with the promise that mission members would carry only light sidearms. At that critical moment, he ceased what had been a uid communication with U.S. representatives in Haiti, setting the stage for the missions failure. Vicki Huddleston, charg daaires of the U.S. embassy in Haiti, had gone


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years to the Port au Prince dock the morning of October tt to receive the Harlan County when it arrived. However, she found the dock occupied by a Cuban ship and the port gates closed. Her eorts from her car at the entrance to the port to communicate with General Cedrs or the port director to resolve the situation proved fruitless. Soon afterward, a small mob of Haitians gathered around her convoy and staged what she saw as a highly orchestrated demonstration that threatened but did not actually carry out violence. At this juncture, she felt it prudent to leave the scene and return to the U.S. embassy. When the Harlan County steamed into the harbor a few hours later, it could not land and was soon surrounded by several small boats of demonstrators. Although Huddleston advised Washington that there were other docking options and that the Harlan County should remain until she had worked out arrangements, the ships captain received orders to return to the United States, which he did the next day. Both Haitians and all the ocials who had worked so diligently to bring about the peaceful transition back to democracy were stunned. eir mission had failed, and the United States had been humiliated by the Clinton administrations decision to leave, taken without consultation with its representatives on the ground in Haiti. How can this action by U.S. policy makers in Washington, so inimical to U.S. interests and prestige, be explained? Certainly the chilling eect of the loss of U.S. Army Rangers lives in Somalia weighed heavily in their decision. However, other factors were involved as well. First, ocials at DOD had never been comfortable with the mission. ey became even less so with the negative reports from Haiti by Colonel Pulley, however wildly inaccurate. In addition, for reasons related to some of President Clintons positions on military matters, they were not really sure that their chief executive had the militarys best interests in mind. With grounds for doubt already established, DOD found a ready excuse to recommend aborting the mission in the aftermath of events in Somalia. Second, Aristides extended presence in Washington and his personal appeal led many there to be inuenced by his repeatedly stated opposition to the Haitian military and his ambivalent stance on the negotiated solution at Governors Island. Furthermore, his constant maneuverings weakened Prime Minister Malvals ability to work through issues with the Haitian military leadership. At the same time, some high-level military and police of cers, who continued to oppose Aristides return under any circumstances, regularly undercut General Cedrs himself because they didnt think he was taking a tough enough line. ird, the CIA had regularly expressed its doubts about Aristides men-


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure tal stability and democratic instincts, which continued to resonate in some policy circles. In addition, the agency had an ongoing relationship with some of its less democratically inclined assets in Haiti that it was loathe to ter minate. e result was to help strengthen the resolve of anti-Aristide forces, on the one hand, and to weaken the stated commitment of the Clinton administration to restore democracy, on the other. In combination, these elements doomed the delicate process of working through a formula over several months for resolving Haitis political morass. In the aftermath of its collapse with the withdrawal of the Harlan County, the country became more violent as antidemocratic elements organized and carried out assassinations and harassment of those who had worked for a peaceful solution. Although Clinton remained committed to restoring Aristide to oce and his administration, with UN support, pursued harsh measures against the Cedrs regime, success did not come until just over a year later. Whatever the eventual outcome, the withdrawal of the Harlan County was a disaster of the rst magnitude, a personal one, and Clinton knew it.Death by Misadventure: e Failure of an Ambassadorial NominationDr. Robert Pastor is a well-known gure in both foreign policy and academic circles. He served as director of Latin American and Caribbean Aairs on the NSC between tf and tfnt during the Carter administration. Beginning in tfn, he taught political science at Emory University in Atlanta, and he became founding director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at the Carter Center there. In these capacities, he wrote extensively on Latin American policy issues, participated in numerous election observer mis sions throughout the region, and advised Democratic presidential candidates, including Bill Clinton, on foreign policy. Given Dr. Pastors extensive experience and expertise on Latin American and Caribbean matters and his close identication with key gures of the Democratic Party, it was to be expected that he would serve in some impor tant position in the Clinton administration. Since his NSC stint coincided with the historic negotiation and ratication of the Panama Canal treaties in tfn, in which he played an important role, Clintons decision to nominate him as ambassador to Panama seemed appropriate. But it didnt happen. Why a highly experienced and qualied individual did not become the U.S. ambassador to Panama oers insights on the complexities of the appointment process, the tensions between the executive and


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years legislative branches, and the ability of a single powerful senator to thwart the will of the majority. e outcome also suggests how various elements could combine to produce results that most did not wish and that many worked diligently to avoid. Dr. Pastor was one of Bill Clintons advisors on foreign policy issues dur ing the presidential campaign, and most expected that he would enter the administration. A year passed, however, before he was informed that he would be nominated as ambassador to Panama. en another six months passed before his papers went forward in June tffb to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SCFR). Part of the delay can be explained by the tedious, redundant, and usually unnecessary vetting of the DOS security clearance, even though he already had a top secret clearance from the CIA. But the holdup also appears to have resulted from Pastors close relationship with former president Jimmy Carter and the personal tension that existed between the former and current presidents. Even before the formal submission of the Pastor nomination, the SCFRs then ranking minority member, Jesse Helms, requested from Clinton on May t, tffb, a raft of documents related to U.S. policy in Latin America between tf and tfnt, that is, during the time that Pastor was serving on the NSC. Senator Helmss request focused on all documents relating to several sensitive areas. ree of the requests concerned U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. One was general in nature, and another related to President Carters certication of September tfn that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua was not supporting violence in other countries. e third request covered a much later period. It asked for all references to the Carter Centers (and Pastors) role in the Nicaraguan elections and transition of tff. A fourth request concerned any documents relating to gunrunning and narcotics tracking activities by Panamanian leaders Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega between tf and tfnt, which included the period during which negotiations over the Panama Canal treaties were completed and the treaties themselves were ratied. e fth and nal request concerned Grenada, specically the ouster of Prime Minister Eric Gairy in tff by Maurice Bishop and his New Jewel Move ment. For the DOS Oce of Congressional Aairs (H), which had formal responsibility for responding to Senator Helmss request, this was a daunting task indeed. By one estimate, complying fully would mean reviewing some tt. million pages, a task that would take t, people working full time for ve and a half years to complete, at a cost of .n billion! By focusing


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure primarily on DOS material, H identied thousands rather than millions of pages and delivered the rst tranche of unclassied documents relating to the requests in late July and a second tranche of classied material in midAugust. Review of all this material was not completed by the SCFR until late September, more than two months after the committees formal hearing on Pastors nomination on July e practical eect of the delay in receiving the documents requested was to postpone a nal determination by the SCFR on the Pastor nomination until early October. Even though his nomination was overwhelmingly supported when it nally did come up for a vote on October b, by a bipartisan t margin, Helms chose at that point to invoke the senatorial privilege of placing a hold on the nomination. is meant that the full Senate could not vote to conrm Pastor as ambassador to Panama, which appeared all but certain, before Congress recessed on October n. With the Republican landslide victory in the November tffb midterm elections, which gave the party a majority in both houses of Congress and brought Helms to the chair of the SFCR, any eort to reintroduce the nomination in the new Senate would be fraught with uncertainty. Accepting his fate, Pastor asked Clinton to withdraw his name from consideration, which he did. e objective appraisal of Dr. Robert Pastors strong qualications to become ambassador to Panama took a backseat to the objections of one powerful senator, who adroitly managed the mechanisms of the nomination process and the rules of the Senate to block his conrmation. Given the high level of support that the nominee enjoyed within the SCFR and the full Senate, it is possible that a favorable vote for conrmation could have been secured had Clinton sent the nomination forward earlier and had H been able to respond more quickly to the request for documents. However, this case also points up the perils of prior high-level govern ment experience, which on its face should be a point in favor of conrmation. Pastors work on the NSC during a historic if controversial period in U.S. relations was held up to minute scrutiny. Senator Helms blamed him for pushing for President Carters certication that the government of Nicaragua was not exporting violence to neighboring countries when some intelligence indicated it was. Helms also accused him of burying information about President Torrijoss gunrunning and drug tracking to ensure passage of the Panama Canal treaties. And when, in his role as a Carter Center fellow, he was asked by Carter to advise and accompany him to Haiti in September tffb to help facilitate a peaceful return to democracy there, where by all ac counts he played an instrumental role in the successful outcome, he and the


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years DOS were excoriated for not clearing his participation in advance with the SCFR because he had already been nominated for the ambassadorship. None of these charges has much merit, but they highlight the challenges that face individuals who toil in the foreign policy arena to help bring about change in controversial areas when they are asked to return to government service in positions that require the advice and consent of the Senate. Such individuals, as the Pastor case demonstrates, are too likely to nd themselves at the mercy of bureaucratic procedures, executive-legislative tensions, and an individual opponent in a key position whatever their actual qualications for the posts for which they are nominated.A Major Achievement, Qualied: e Summit of the Americase original idea for a meeting of all of the hemispheres elected leaders emerged from various quarters in the immediate aftermath of NAFTAs ratication in November tff. Proponents included some Latin American ambassadors in Washington, as well as some U.S. ocials in DOS and the oce of the USTR. e NSC thought the moment propitious for an initiative to build on the momentum generated by NAFTAs passage and to take advantage of the unprecedented convergence between the United States and Latin America on fundamental political and economic matters. To this end, the NSC quickly drafted an action memorandum for Clintons review and decision. e memorandum proposed that the president invite Western Hemisphere heads of state to a summit meeting, the rst since tf. With the enthusiastic support of Vice President Gore, Clinton approved the initiative. e decision-making process is unusual in this case because it was made rapidly and came from the highest levels of government rather than follow ing the usual process of working its way up through ocial channels. One reason this was possible was that the bureaucracy was already working on a comprehensive review of United StatesLatin American policy that would eventually emerge as a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) in September tffb. Since Gore was already going to Mexico to rearm U.S. commitment to NAFTA and to smooth rued feathers there after the bruising congres sional ratication process, Clinton agreed that Gore would announce the SOA during his visit. In his December t, tff, speech, the vice president extended an invitation to the democratically elected presidents and heads of government of the Americas to a summit meeting to discuss ways of


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure deepening hemispheric cooperation through economic integration and a shared commitment to democratic institutions. Governments quickly announced their willingness to attend. ey also pushed from the beginning for the inclusion of free trade area expansion as the centerpiece of the summit agenda. e SOA initiative and the way it played out reected a number of elements of the Clinton administrations Latin American policy process. e case illustrated the importance of publicly expressed support at the highest levels of government to increase the likelihood of success. It also demon strated the benets of close consultation on all aspects of the meeting with all parties involved, particularly among the participating countries. And it reected how large and complex a task it is and how long it took to work through the layers of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy and the multiple domestic political considerations involved to forge agreement on specic issues, particularly those related to trade. At the same time, the SOA process revealed the diculties in securing ef fective follow-up with limited resources, incompletely constituted organizations, and a lack of presidential involvement. So however successful the SOA itself, the initiative highlighted many of the challenges involved in making eective policy. Working out the details was a more complicated process than initially anticipated, and the actual SOA gathering itself could not be held until more than a year later, even though high-level U.S. government meetings on the topic began in February tffb and Miami was announced as the meetings venue in March. For the U.S. government, particularly within the USTR and the Department of the Treasury, the main issue was whether or not it was desirable to include consideration of the FTAA. ese ocials were con cerned that such a proposal could complicate eorts to complete the Uruguay round of trade discussions through the General Agreement on Taris and Trade and the World Trade Organization. In addition, some of the pres idents political advisors worried that pursuit of an FTAA in the aftermath of divisions over NAFTA ratication could divide the Democratic Party even more by further alienating its labor constituency. ese internal discussions delayed for several months a formal commit ment by the U.S. government to the FTAA as part of the summit. President Clinton nally signed o on FTAA inclusion in October and made the for mal public announcement in November, less than four weeks before the SOA was to take place. In addition, Clintons assent for the inclusion of the specic date of for its completion, viewed as crucial by FTAA supporters within the administration and by Latin American governments, did


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years not occur until just days before the meeting, and would have been unlikely without the pressure of the impending gathering. According to one close observer, its somewhat chaotic and improvised nature was the result of the absence of a comprehensive strategic vision on trade. e other main reason for the delay, beyond the inevitable bureaucratic inertia when there are many months to prepare, was the extensive consultation process with hemisphere governments. High U.S. government ocials, including Vice President Gore, Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Aairs Joan Spero, and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, led six delegations between March and July to meet with ocials of virtually all the countries in the region. With the naming of omas F. Mack McLarty, President Clintons close friend and advisor, as the White House coordinator for the SOA, Latin Americans were reassured that the project was supported at the highest levels of the U.S. government. After the rst draft of the SOA agenda prepared by U.S. government working groups was circulated to all hemisphere participants in August, a new round of multiple consultations took place between the parties and U.S. interagency working groups on good governance, womens rights, sustainable development, education, infrastructure, and microenterprise. Trade issue discussions took place as well, but much later and with a dierent structure in which the U.S. role was more dominant. roughout the process, real consultation and accommodation to concerns highlighted the exchanges, which in many cases also included nongovernmental civil society actors. is permitted the nal formulation and approval of a consensual SOA agenda at a meeting of vice ministers of all participating countries at Airlie House near Warrenton, Virginia, two weeks before the Miami gathering of the hemispheres heads of state. e momentum generated by the Spirit of Airlie House consensus overcame any lingering doubts by participants that the United States was holding the SOA to pursue its own regional agenda and contributed to high expectations for important achievements at the meeting. Without question, the SOA represented a high point in United States Latin American relations during the Clinton years. e symbolic importance of bringing together democratically elected heads of state and the nor mative signicance of this unprecedented event cannot be underestimated. e inclusion of presidents-elect Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil helped set the stage for greater cooperation with those governments. e extensive process of prior consultation with all the parties involved and with many nongovernmental organizations on specic issues helped to


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure create the sense that the SOA was indeed a genuine collaborative enterprise of equals. Furthermore, the massive eort required within the U.S. government bureaucracy to translate a general proposal into a set of specic goals and initiatives indicated that the remarkably complex process of making U.S. foreign policy can produce results when participants perceive that top of cials are committed to the enterprise. e Declaration of Principles agreed uponstrengthening democracy, promoting prosperity through economic integration and free trade, eradicating poverty, and guaranteeing sustainable developmentarmed U.S. policy objectives as well as the aspirations of attendees. In addition, the Plan of Action that accompanied these principles set out specic steps in areas that participating states would take in collaboration as they worked to carry them out. It was further agreed that there would be regular meetings in the future of the hemispheres elected heads of state and that Chile would host the second summit in tffn. For all of its accomplishments, however, the SOA also highlighted some of the challenges in the U.S. approach to inter-American relations. e problem of limited resources was one. Although new funding of t million was proposed for the SOA and its follow-up, the initiative was not vigor ously pursued, so no new resources were appropriated. is made it very dicult to provide the support necessary to ensure that mechanisms to implement the Plan of Action could be eective. e lack of resources also aected the choice of Miami, which was selected in large measure because key Democratic fund-raisers in that city agreed to nd the money to pay for the meeting. e SOA follow-up mechanisms themselves presented another problem. U.S. policy makers decided that the Organization of American States would not be the appropriate institution to have responsibility for implementation. However, the patchwork arrangements that were set up, which in cluded a combination of various governments agencies and nongovernmental entities to oversee the follow-up process, proved unwieldy. As a result, a number of the provisions failed to be implemented, and those that were depended on the individual initiative of individual governments and nongovernmental organizations. A third problem area related to President Clinton himself. Although he was the key decision maker for the SOA process, he was not involved in its details, so he lacked full engagement or commitment. In the SOAs after math, he was distracted by other issues and by the divisions within his own party over free trade expansion in the hemisphere. As a result, he was rarely engaged in follow-up after the meeting.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Another diculty developed over the extended debate within the U.S. government regarding the issue of the FTAA. Because agreement was achieved so late in the SOA preparation process, the mechanisms to pursue the U.S. commitment were never fully articulated. is lack complicated any satisfactory follow-up on trade integration, much to the consternation of the Latin American governments, who had worked diligently for U.S. support for free trade expansion as a core element of the summit. When the Clinton administration failed to secure renewal of Fast Track to facilitate new trade agreements in the hemisphere or legislation for access to NAFTA, their dis quiet turned to disillusionment with the inability of the United States to make good on its promises. On balance, then, the Miami SOA, for all of its symbolic signicance, failed to realize its promise in practice. Chile, which had every expectation of becoming the next Latin American entry to a free trade agreement with the United States, was left in the lurch. Even though inter-American trade expanded markedly during the tffs even without additional formal agreements, many Latin American governments felt that they had been abandoned by the inability of the Clinton administration to make good on its commitment to establish the FTAA. e combination of internal U.S. government disagreement on the issue, internal Democratic Party division, Clintons calculations based on domestic politics, and a recalcitrant Republican Party majority in Congress worked together to frustrate further progress in the hemisphere on free trade agreements.Resolving an Intractable Conict: e Ecuador-Peru Border DisputeA nations foreign policy is often subject to events over which it has no control but to which it must respond. During the Clinton years, several such unexpected developments occurred in Latin America that forced the administration to take action. Some, such as the Mexico peso crisis and the shoot-down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes by the Cuban air force, drew high-level attention from the administration and extensive coverage by the media. Such responses stand in sharp contrast to those provoked by the unex pected outbreak of major armed conict between Ecuador and Peru in January tff over what was at the time the longest running border dispute in the hemisphere. After a brief initial urry of media reporting and expressions of concern by U.S. ocials, their focus soon turned to other matters. In spite


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure of a general lack of high-level focus and follow-up concerning these hos tilities, however, the ongoing beneath-the-radar involvement of U.S. actors over almost four years played a decisive role in eventually nding a denitive solution to the dispute. e resolution of the Ecuador-Peru border conict illustrates more than any other principle the crucial role of individual U.S. diplomatic leadership in slowly and patiently working through obstacles and resistances, challenges that, in this case, had developed on both sides of the frontier over almost two centuries. Other elements, nevertheless, also played a role in nding a way to solve the problem. One was the existence of a tfb treaty between the two countries that included a multilateral mechanism of four guarantor countries, including the United States, to assist in helping the parties if requested. Another critical component was the willingness of the elected presidents of Ecuador and Peru to exercise leadership at a decisive juncture. Even so, as both governments asserted after the crisis had been overcome, no solution would have been possible without the deep and almost continuous involvement of the U.S. representative throughout the process. Ever since both countries had gained their independence in the rst decades of the nineteenth century, they had tried and failed at least t times to resolve the boundary dispute through negotiated treaties or arbitration, had fought half a dozen wars without denitive results, and had engaged in close to displays of force between tf and tffb. After a brief tfbt war won decisively by Peru, the resulting tfb treaty (Rio Protocol) appeared to set a denitive border. When geographic anomalies along the frontier showed up upon mapping in the late tfbs, however, Ecuador ceased participating with Peru in setting the nal boundary demarcation as specied by the Rio Protocol and declared in tf that the treaty was null. Periodic skirmishes from the tfs to the early tffs, including a major confrontation in tfnt, exacerbated tensions and set the stage for the tff outbreak. As armed conict enveloped the remaining disputed boundary area between January and March, Ecuador accepted once again the validity of the tfb treaty and asked the guarantor states, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the United States, to assist in solving the dispute. e assistant secretary of state for inter-American aairs, Alexander Watson, quickly joined his counter parts from the other guarantors to work out some way to stop the ghting. Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, they agreed to establish a small peacekeeping force of guarantor military in the disputed area to establish a cease-re and then a demilitarized zone. Along with coordinated representations by guarantor diplomats, the peacekeeping initiative served as the incentive necessary for


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Peru and Ecuador to cease military actions by March tff and within a few weeks to withdraw their forces from the disputed area. For the next year or so, the U.S. government agreed to provide the nancial and logistical support needed to carry out this mission. While the initial objective of the guarantors was to stop the ghting, the longer-term goal was to nd, if at all possible, some form of diplomatic resolution. Each guarantor was to select a representative to work toward this goal. Ambassador Watson concluded, in consultation with his colleagues, that the ideal U.S. diplomat for this task would be Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, a respected Latin American specialist with over two decades of service in policy planning positions in the Department of State as well as a stint as the U.S. ambassador to the OAS between tfnf and tff. Ambassador Einaudi accepted the assignment and soon began to work with the other guarantor representatives on the problem. All were distin guished and respected professionals, and all except Einaudi had continuing responsibilities in their own foreign ministries that limited the time they could devote to the Peru-Ecuador crisis. Partly for this reason, they selected Einaudi as the guarantor intermediary to represent the body between formal meetings; this made him, in eect, the rst among ocial equals. In this role, he came to be trusted by all for his judgment, his fairness, his discretion, and his scrupulous adherence to appropriate procedures. Following the central principle that the parties themselves must lead, he slowly and painstakingly guided the process to a successful conclusion. Various unexpected challenges along the way delayed and almost derailed the negotiations, however. One was the reluctance of U.S. ocials, still wary of peacekeeping missions after Somalia, to continue their nancial and logistical support for the guarantor military mission after the rst year. Fortunately, Brazil stepped in to assume the crucial logistical role, and both Ecuador and Peru agreed to fund most of the missions expenses. Other problems included major internal crises in both Ecuador and Peru in early tff, Ambassador Einaudis illness and retirement from the DOS, and presidential elections in Ecuador in tffn. At the explicit request of both Ecuador and Peru, Einaudi was persuaded to continue in his post as the U.S. guarantor representative. Nevertheless, even after securing agreement on most remaining issues between the two parties by separating them into discrete negotiations, he and his guarantor colleagues could not get the two presidents to determine the nal boundary settlement due to the deep and long-standing political sensitivities involved on each side. Given this impasse, the guarantors were able to persuade Jamil Mahuad, the newly elected president of Ecuador, and Alberto Fujimori of


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure Peru to ask their legislatures to allow the guarantors to determine the denitive settlement, which both did. e basic problem was that Ecuador could not accept any resolution that did not provide some territorial concession, and Peru could not accept any resolution that did. With the concurrence of the guarantors and prior agreement by the two presidents, Einaudi devised a solution that gave Ecuador access to one square kilometer of territory in the area of the ercest ghting, on the Peruvian side of the border, but as private property, and gave Peru the border demarcation originally laid out in the Rio Protocol. Once the congresses had agreed to allow the guarantors what amounted to binding arbitration, the solution was made public and both countries signed the nal document on October tffn. e longest enduring and in many ways the most intractable border dispute in the hemisphere had nally been resolved. e diplomatic process of resolving border problems took place with little public fanfare in the United States and without more than occasional involvement by top U.S. ocials. is success demonstrated the degree to which the exercise of U.S. diplomatic leadership by a single individual with the authority and the room to work for whatever time was needed could contribute to an outcome that reected well on the United States and beneted all the parties involved, even when working within the constraints of extremely limited resources and ocial indierence at the upper levels of the bureaucracy.Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: Cuba and the Helms-Burton ActRelations with Cuba have posed multiple challenges for every U.S. president since Dwight D. Eisenhower. Since the tf agreement with the USSR in which Soviet missiles were removed from the island in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba with military force, U.S. policy makers have had to nd other ways to accomplish their objective of removing Fidel Castro from power. Nothing has succeededneither the stick of the economic embargo nor the carrot of facilitating contacts with the island, negotiating diplomatic normalization, fostering cultural exchanges, or expanding Cuban exile visits. Over time, the million-strong Cuban American community, concentrated in Florida, has become an important actor in U.S. domestic politics. As a result, U.S. policy toward Cuba is often subject more to its ef fect on gaining Cuban American votes than on objective considerations of national interest.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years e tff Cuba Democracy Act (CDA) was sponsored by Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ). Its formulation involved close consultation with the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), a formidable lobbying group led by Jorge Mas Canosa that was established in the early tfns to pursue U.S. government support of restrictive policies toward Cuba. e CDA proposed the closing of loopholes in the embargo by prohibiting U.S. subsidiaries abroad from trading with Cuba and ships that unloaded cargo in Cuba from docking in a U.S. port for six months. At the same time, it relaxed restrictions on travel to the island from the United States by Cuban Americans. President George H. W. Bush initially opposed the bill, but candidate Clinton embraced it as a way to wrest Cuban American nancial and elec toral support from Bush in Florida. Outanked on the right by his challenger, Bush responded by belatedly supporting the bill and signing it into law just two weeks before the tff election. Although Clinton was unsuccessful in bringing Florida into the Democratic column, he did gain about percent of the Cuban American vote, a signicant increase over Michael Dukakiss percent in tfnn. Once elected, Clinton continued his public support for the CDA and the embargo on Cuba in a clear eort to appeal to CANF and the Cuban American community even as most of his advisors advocated a relaxation of restrictions. Over the summer of tffb, however, the growing problem of Cuban immigration in the context of widespread U.S. domestic concern over immigration issues provoked a reassessment by administration advisors of the long-standing policy of granting Cuban refugees virtually automatic U.S. residency. Although not involved in the discussion, Clinton agreed to a policy shift and supported the transfer to Guantnamo Bay of Cubans inter cepted at sea. In the face of immediate expressions of outrage by CANF and the Cuban American community, however, the president hastily met with Mas Canosa and others and mollied them by invoking new sanctions on Cuba. ese included expanded broadcasting by Radio and TV Mart and restrictions on travel and remittances to the island. Over the next several months, Clinton administration ocials worked out agreements with the Castro government, nalized in May tff, to provide up to visas a year for Cuban emigration to the United States in exchange for stopping illegal emigration and acceptance of the return of Cubans intercepted at sea or already at Guantnamo Bay. Clintons responses to both the immigration problem and CANF pres


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure sures reected his calculations of their impact on domestic politics rather than foreign policy considerations. ey also suggest the rather haphazard and ad hoc nature of the decision-making process in the Clinton White House. After Republicans took control of both houses of Congress in January tff following their sweeping midterm election victory, Cuba was one of many items on the new congressional leaderships legislative agenda. Jesse Helms became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and set out immediately to put his stamp on U.S. policy toward the Castro government. He was particularly concerned about some reports suggesting that President Clinton might use his authority to normalize relations with Cuba, an initiative to which he was utterly opposed. With Helms sta assistant Dan Fisk coordinating the initiative, a draft bill was crafted that would require a democratic transformation in Cuba as an explicit condition for any U.S. normalization of relations. Under its provisions, the long-standing embargo was to be tightened and expanded to include the right of U.S. citizens to sue foreign companies that had taken over their former properties conscated by the Castro government. In addition, executives and family members of such oending foreign companies would be denied visas to enter the United States. e bill also contained provisions to codify the embargo into law. is would have the eect of removing the embargo from executive control for the rst time and placing it in the hands of the legislative branch. e bill, rst presented by Senator Helms in February, not surprisingly met with strong Clinton administration opposition. Ocials argued that the existing Cuba Democracy Act of tff, with its two-track approach of sanctions and inducements as determined by the executive, was sucient. Although the House passed the bill by a large majority (fbt) in September, it appeared that an administration counteroensive against the legislation, one that included signicant corporate backing, would be sucient to prevent a favorable vote in the Senate. While the president never explicitly threatened a veto if the bill passed, Secretary of State Warren Christopher had indicated in correspondence with Congress that he would advise Clinton to exercise his veto power. Over the succeeding weeks, the administrations strategy of nding a way to avoid a Senate vote altogether seemed to be working. e February b, tff, Cuban air force shoot-down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes over international waters, completely changed the political dynamics of Helms-Burton. As Richard Nuccio, the presidents special advi-


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years sor on Cuba at the time, noted, Castro had created a veto-proof majority for the bill. Clinton immediately condemned Cubas action and supported new negotiations with Congress to draft and pass Helms-Burton. With Congress now in the drivers seat, Senate negotiators were able to insist in meetings with administration representatives that the embargo be codied into law as part of the bill. ey also reinserted the provision grant ing authority to deny visas to corporate executives of foreign companies holding former U.S. citizens property in Cuba, and insisted that the president not be allowed the right to waive this article. Senate representatives did agree, however, to give the president authority to waive the implementation of provisions allowing suits against foreign companies (mostly Spanish, English, and Canadian) in possession of such properties. On these terms, the revised Helms-Burton bill passed both houses, and Clinton signed the bill into law on March t, tff. Although Latin American policy specialists in the administration opposed the presidents decision, his political advisors argued that he really had no choice in the matter. On its face, Helms-Burton signaled a major setback for those in the Clinton administration who had supported initiatives to progressively open up channels for dialogue and cooperation. Nevertheless, Clinton did his best to pursue as open a policy toward Cuba as possible within the constraints imposed by Helms-Burton. He repeatedly waived implementation of the provision allowing suits against foreign companies. In the context of the popes visit to Cuba early in tffn, he relaxed restrictions on travel and remittances and resumed cooperation on drug and immigration issues as well. Even so, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act represented the reassertion of congressional prerogatives over executive authority and limited the ability of President Clinton or his successors to pursue a more independent course on relations with Cuba without securing legislative consent. e ongoing saga of U.S. policy toward Cuba during the Clinton years also points up the degree to which this president, like his predecessors, approached the issue based more on calculations of domestic political impact than on U.S. national interest considerations. Clinton reinforced the obser vation, attributed to Wayne Smith, former Foreign Service ocer and chief of the U.S. Interest Section in Cuba, that U.S. policy toward Cuba is made not in Washington but in Miami.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure Drugs or Democracy? e Tension between Policy Objectives in Perue Clinton administration, following both the lead of its predecessor and its own convictions, supported without hesitation the maintenance and deepening of the democratic procedures and practices that had been reestablished in Latin America during the tfns. At the same time, ocials continued to pursue the counter-drug policies formulated in Congress and implemented in the region over several administrations. e case of Peru posed special challenges on both policy fronts for U.S. policy as Clinton took oce. Democracy in Peru was under siege from a major insurgency, a profound economic crisis, and the government itself; in tff, the elected president, Alberto Fujimori, had suspended constitutional procedures in an autogolpe (self-coup). As the worlds leading coca leaf producer with an expanding annual output, Peru also posed a serious drug supply problem for the United States. As U.S. policy toward Peru played out, support for democracy was tempered by the administrations eorts to reduce drug production and track ing there. A combination of factors contributed to a policy that progressively favored counter-drug initiatives over insistence that Perus government retain both the forms and the substance of democratic procedure and prac tice. Within the U.S. policy-making process, key elements aecting it included congressional insistence that the Clinton administration pay more attention to the drug problem. Another was a strong drug czar in the White House af ter tff who was able to garner new resources and to push the bureaucracy on the problemoften at the expense of other policy priorities. A third involved the U.S. intelligence community, which was anxious to retain a key contact in Peru. Within Peru itself, the governments leadership, which enjoyed public approval levels of n percent for most of its tt years in power, was able to exploit for its own purposes the higher priority of U.S. policy makers to reduce drug production. Oering full cooperation on U.S. counter-drug policy helped Perus leaders deect attention from their progressive perversion of democratic procedures, beginning in tff, in order to hold on to political power beyond their constitutionally mandated two terms. When largely internal pressures forced an unexpected, rapid, and dramatic collapse of the Fujimori regimes authoritarian project in late the limitations of U.S. policy became apparent.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years At its outset, however, the Clinton administration had supported the OAS in its eorts under the tfft Santiago Resolution (Resolution tn) to restore democracy promptly in Peru. With a new constitution and congres sional elections in late tff, the countrys resumption of democracy triggered the restoration of International Financial Institution (IFI) and U.S. bilateral economic support. Renewed democracy also justied expanded direct U.S. counter-drug assistance within the ongoing Andean Initiative, as well as Perus belated inclusion into the tfft Andean Trade Preference Act. e main purpose of this act was to foster more legal exports to the United States from the major drug-producing countries through tari reductions for over products. By tffb, democracy and economic growth had resumed, ination had been tamed, and the insurgency had been largely subdued. Peru, with substantial U.S. help and encouragement, nally appeared to have overcome its profound economic and political crises. However, after President Fujimoris reelection in tff in a process OAS observers deemed both free and fair, disquieting signs gradually emerged of the manipulation of democratic procedures to ensure the governments continuity in oce. One disturbing measure was a general amnesty for the military for human rights abuses. Another involved the dismissal of Constitutional Tribunal members who opposed a third successive term for the president. e Fujimori government also prevented a popular referendum on a third term, even though its supporters had complied with all of the constitutional requirements. A further example was a steady campaign by the government to place most independent media outlets in the hands of administration sycophants. e architect of these moves to ensure political continuity was Fujimoris closest advisor and director of the National Intelligence Service (SIN), Vladimiro Montesinos, who also had responsibility for Perus counter-drug strategy. U.S. policy makers saw Montesinos as an important intelligence asset indeed, he had been on the CIA payroll for yearsand he could be counted on to get things done on the drug front. ey came to rely on him for infor mation and support that was unavailable from other sources in Peru. Both the U.S. drug czar, General Barry McCarey, and the ambassador to Peru, John Hamilton, continued to work with Montesinos long after clear indications had emerged of his involvement in undermining democratic procedures to help maintain the Fujimori government in power. Only after evidence emerged in midthat Montesinos had directed a gunrunning scheme with several high Peruvian military ocers to supply Colombian guerrillas


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure with arms ostensibly purchased for the Peruvian army did the United States formally break its long-standing relationship with the SIN director. One of the diculties U.S. policy makers had faced in the mid-tffs in their relations with Peru was access to Fujimori and other top gures in his government. Between tff and tfff, neither U.S. ambassador Alvin Adams nor his successor, Dennis Jett, was ever able to meet with Fujimori beyond ceremonial occasions, an ongoing situation that served to increase the importance of the U.S. relationship with Montesinos. In the case of Ambas sador Jett, at least, the explanation can be attributed to his outspokenness regarding the actions of the Peruvian government that were weakening democracy. When Ambassador Hamilton arrived in late tfff, however, he made an eort, under instructions from Washington, to reopen lines of communication with Fujimori and others, and he succeeded. In his view, he could accomplish more by quiet persuasion than by public scolding, and over the course of his tenure as ambassador he believed that he had made the U.S. position supporting democracy clear to key gures in the Peruvian government. Certainly government-to-government relations improved through Hamiltons initiatives. However, such improvement occurred in a local context of growing indications that democratic procedures were being hijacked by the Fujimori administration to ensure victory in the April elec tions. It was not until late January after institutional mechanisms were in place to bring about a favorable electoral outcome, that Hamilton articulated publicly the U.S. governments concern about the quality of democracy in Peru. And only in the aftermath of the April election itself, when it was becoming clear that the Peruvian government was manipulating the count to ensure a rst-round victory (at least percent of the valid vote), did the U.S. government weigh in with its big guns, including President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to protest what was happening. eir statements, along with those of virtually the entire international community, were thought to have kept Fujimori from declaring victory on the rst ballot. Nevertheless, Fujimori went on to win the second round after the secondplace candidate, Alejandro Toledo, withdrew from the race in protest. In the midst of growing opposition among Peruvians and large-scale demonstrations, Fujimori was inaugurated in July for his blatantly unconstitutional third term. Within four months, however, the Fujimori era was over. e spark was


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years the airing of a videotape on Perus one remaining independent television station in September that showed Vladimiro Montesinos bribing an opposition congressman to join the Fujimori forces. In spite of the Peruvian presidents eorts to stem popular outrage by distancing himself from his close advisor and by calling new elections the next year in which he would not be a candidate, he was unable to remain in power. Fearing the political chaos that could ensue were Fujimori not to remain at the helm for the transition, U.S. ocials worked through Ambassador Hamilton to facilitate Montesinoss exile to Panama and to persuade Fujimori to remain in oce until the new elections. However, the president ed to Japan in mid-November; the Peruvian congress, now in opposition hands, declared his oce vacant; and a transition government took control. Slowly but surely, democracy was restored to Peru. e eorts of the Peruvians themselves, however, rather than outside actors, explain the success of the political transition back to democracy. Although concerned about both democracy and drugs in Peru, the Clinton administration devoted most of its attention to the drug issue. U.S. of cials continued to work with an individual who could and did help them to make signicant progress on reducing coca production and cocaine paste tracking, even though this same person was the architect of multiple initiatives to weaken democratic practices and procedures. Whether a more forceful U.S. approach to oppose the antidemocratic measures pursued by the Fujimori regime would have been sucient in itself to prevent Perus decline into authoritarianism is not clear. However, it certainly is the case that the greater focus on counter-drug policy contributed to democracys crisis there by the degree to which it relied on an utterly unscrupulous individual. Furthermore, as the crisis unfolded, U.S. preoccupation with the potential for political chaos contributed to the decision to continue to support President Fujimori, bringing even greater discredit to the ostensible U.S. commit ment to democratic procedures and practices.Conclusionse seven cases of U.S. policies relating to Latin America during the Clinton years discussed above oer more detailed descriptions of context, concerns, and outcomes in these specic arenas of the pursuit of U.S. goals and interests. ey also highlight a number of important factors that inuenced the policy process over the eight years of the administration and that bore signicantly, even decisively at times, on its outcome.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure One is the degree to which the president exercises leadership and per sonal involvement in the process. Under most circumstances, the more fully and publicly engaged the chief executive is with a particular policy, the more likely a positive outcome. In pursuing NAFTA through to suc cessful ratication, for example, Clintons commitment manifested itself in virtually full-time dedication to mobilizing support through scores of phone calls, meetings, and speeches. True, he started late and paid a high political price among his core supporters within organized labor. Nevertheless, there is general agreement that his willingness to take the time necessary to do whatever had to be done to marshal the necessary votes for passage was a decisive element in gaining nal approval. e presidents early and unwavering support for the SOA helped galvanize the U.S. government bureaucracy into action to put together a comprehensive policy approach. His desire to ensure a successful outcome as the meeting days neared pushed those U.S. policy makers who were dragging their heels on the trade issue to agree to the inclusion of the FTAA on the agenda and to set a specic date for the completion of negotiations. e suc cess of the Miami SOA meeting itself, then, owes much to Clintons ongoing and publicly expressed commitment. In policy areas where presidential leadership was limited or lacking, as in following up on the implementation of the various commitments of this rst summits ambitious Plan of Action, particularly with the FTAA, success was limited or not achieved at all. A second factor suggested by the cases is the importance for specic policy outcomes of the role played by individuals below the highest levels of leader ship. When a particular issue or world region lies outside a central concern of top ocials, as matters relating to Latin America often do, the quality and capacity of middle-level leadership assumes greater importance. Neither President Clinton nor his secretaries of state had any particular interest or experience in hemispheric aairs and had many other pressing crises in other parts of the world to deal with. By many accounts, however, either through a lack of condence in their abilities, their own policy management style, or both, they tended not to give DOS ocials at the assistant secretary level the authority or the space they needed to carry out policy in their areas of expertise. e result, in addition to less coherence and eectiveness in dealing with specic issues, was that DOS was often unable to serve as a strong counter weight within the foreign policy bureaucracy to other actors with concerns about particular issues in the region. is enabled DOD, White House advisors, Congress, and other agencies to weigh in to aect policy outcomes.


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Examples include the application of the Governors Island Accord in Haiti, the Helms-Burton legislation on Cuba, and the emphasis on counter-drug policy over democracy in Peru. Even within such constraints, however, individuals did have a major impact on the policy process and its outcome. One such example is Ambas sador Einaudis role over more than three years in helping to work through a particularly dicult border dispute between Ecuador and Peru. General Barry McCarey, in his position as director of the White House Oce on Drug Control Policy, is another. He played a major role in Latin American policy during his tenure through the exercise of strong leadership on drug-related issues. is is demonstrated, among other initiatives, by his ability to gain the support of both DOD and Congress for new resources to ght the drug problem, even as appropriations for other foreign policy agencies were declining. While one result of his eectiveness was a disproportionate focus on counter-drug policies in Latin America at the expense of other priorities, as the Peru case illustrates, he also demonstrated the impact a single person in a midlevel role can have on the process. A dierent kind of example of the exercise of leadership was that of Senator Helms, with his ability, almost single-handedly, to block the ambassadorial appointment of Robert Pastor through delaying tactics and the use of senatorial privilege. On the other hand, the experience of Ambassador Pezzullo as the secretary of states special advisor to Haiti pointed up the limitations of individual leadership in a critical situation. It proved impos sible for him to overcome the myriad personal, institutional, situational, and procedural resistances that combined to cause the failure of the Governors Island Accord implementation, in spite of the extraordinary energy, personal capacity, and wealth of experience he brought to the task. A third policy consideration illustrated by the case studies is the eort required to bring a complex and often internally competing bureaucracy to focus on a specic issue and to work through the political underbrush to put together a coherent and eective proposal. e SOA preparation experience demonstrated both the time required for the task and the fact that it could be done, and done well, in almost every area of concern. However, this complex policy-making process also highlighted how serious disagreement, in this case on the trade issue, could delay resolution to a degree that contributed to an inability by the United States to follow up ef fectively on what was the top priority of most Latin American governments at the time of the SOA meeting. e diculty of marshaling the U.S. gov ernment bureaucracy to coordinate and commit to a specic foreign policy initiative, at least toward Latin America, was illustrated by the fact that the


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure Miami SOA preparations turned out to be the only time during the Clinton administration that such coordination happened to this degree. A number of the cases also highlight a fourth policy considerationthe impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. While this is a fact of political life that aects foreign aairs in any U.S. administration, domestic political considerations tended to weigh more heavily on foreign policy during the Clinton years. is was due in large part to President Clintons greater inter est in and experience with state and national politics and to his nely tuned political instincts. e negotiation of labor and environmental side agreements as part of NAFTA reected the presidents sensitivity to domestic politics. While instrumental in winning ratication, they were not perceived as strong enough to satisfy important Democratic Party constituencies. Contrary to President Clintons hopes, labors disillusionment over NAFTA, even with the side agreements, was an important factor in the Republican Party gains in the tffb midterm elections, with serious negative consequences for the administrations subsequent ability to pursue its policy agenda. Policy toward Haiti was very much aected by Clintons concern over the political eects of immigration as well as by the Congressional Black Caucuss pressure to restore President Aristide to power in spite of the doubts expressed by some government agencies about his democratic credentials. Haiti policy was also complicated by Clintons dicult relationship with the U.S. military establishment and, as a result, the need he felt, in addition to his own personal qualms, to give greater weight to DOD concerns over the deployment of U.S. troops to that troubled nation. Signicant dierences between the presidents political advisors and Latin American specialists within the NSC and the White House often af fected policy decisions, such as with Haiti and the USS Harlan County and with Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation. However, it may also be argued in both cases that unexpected external events had a major impact as well and contributed to decisions that did not advance U.S. foreign policy goals in either. e Republican Partys dramatic midterm election victory in tffb, which gave it control of both houses of Congress for the rst time since the tfs, occurred in spite of the presidents hope that delaying renewal of Fast Track would produce a better political outcome. e subsequent reassertion of congressional prerogatives in foreign policy forced the administration to consider legislators concerns and to try to assuage them. One example was to respond to congressional demands to reemphasize counter-drug policies; another was to recognize that the Pastor ambassadorial nomination could


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years not go forward and to ask that Dr. Pastor withdraw his name from consider ation. A fth factor that can be derived from the cases is the degree to which foreign policy was reactive rather than proactive. Events often forced or precipitated decisions, as illustrated by the eects on Haitian policy of U.S. military deaths in Somalia, the shift in Cuban policy due to the shoot-down of the Brothers to the Rescue planes, and the need to respond to the outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru. When the events generated greater publicity and had a larger impact on public opinion, as with Somalia and the Brothers to the Rescue, the administrations immediate policy responses were less eective in accomplishing previously stated objectives. Where the eect on public opinion was less, as in the border conict, U.S. ocials were able to work largely unnoticed to nd an appropriate and lasting solution that beneted all parties. e success of the Miami SOA, with its articulation of an overall set of policy objectives in Latin America, however general, laid the foundation for what could have been signicant policy advances in the region. However, the Mexican peso crisis that followed almost immediately redirected both public and bureaucratic attention. By the time the dust had settled and the problem had been dealt with eectively, the opportunity to build on the summit success had slipped away. A nal factor suggested by some of the cases, as well as by the more general discussion of Clinton administration policy toward Latin America in chapter is the degree to which the foreign policy process takes place largely out of public view. e extensive interaction within the bureaucracy and with Latin American counterparts that was required to formulate the Miami SOA document is one example. Another was the signicant and ongoing behind-the-scenes involvement of U.S. ocials that helped to bring the parties together in Guatemala to nd a peaceful resolution to the longstanding guerrilla war there under UN auspices. A similar quiet but con tinuing process of working with Mexican authorities and political actors to encourage a more open democratic process contributed to the most trans parent elections in that countrys history in e eventual success in helping to resolve the most dicult and deep-seated border dispute between Peru and Ecuador represented another triumph of quiet diplomacy. While the cases presented above reect only a sample of the policy concerns of the Clinton administration, they serve to highlight the variety of fac tors that inuence the foreign policy process in its eorts to deal eectively and appropriately with issues that aect Latin America. ey indicate the major considerations that bear on policy and the elements that contribute


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure to eventual success or failure. On balance, they suggest the degree to which Latin American policy during the Clinton years was unable to take full advantage of the favorable context of the early tffs and lost a historic oppor tunity in a number of areas to advance U.S. priorities in the region and to respond to some of the major concerns of the hemispheres governments. e chapter that follows provides an overall assessment of the Latin American policies of the Clinton administration by focusing on a dierent set of indicatorsnamely, its stated policy objectives. To what degree was the administration able to achieve its major goals in the regionenhancing democracy, achieving economic growth through free trade, reducing pov erty, and securing sustainable development?


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years An Assessmentis chapter brings together the strands of the analysis in the body of the volume to provide an overall summary characterization of the Clinton administrations Latin American policy. e administration did articulate a set of policy objectives toward the region and was able at times to make dicult decisions and see them through to successful outcomes. On the other hand, the pursuit of specic policies was all too often aected in negative ways by the variety of forces, pressures, and events discussed in chapters and b. While such limiting factors are inherent to the U.S. policy process, they seemed to weigh more heavily on more occasions during the Clinton years. To a greater extent than on George H. W. Bushs watch, one combination or another produced results in various policy arenas that did not advance U.S. interests in Latin America. e overall assessment of President Clintons Latin American policies is based primarily on an analysis of his administrations four principal objec tives in the region, laid out at the rst Summit of the Americas (SOA) in Miami in December tffb. e chapter begins by stating them and briey char acterizing the progress or lack of progress made for each. en the chapter analyzes in greater detail the degree to which each stated objective advanced over the tffs through sets of longitudinal data that provide measures of various aspects of the four policy goals. Finally, a concluding discussion encapsulates the analysis with a summary of why the Clinton administration failed to accomplish its overarching policy goals in the region in spite of some positive outcomes in several discrete policy areas.Policy Objectives: A Summary Evaluationt. Preserving and strengthening democracy. Democratic forms were gener ally retained, but many governments became increasingly racked by crises of corruption, increased criminal activity, political violence, and restrictions on democratic practice. Drug production increased, with its attendant violence and corruption. Popular condence in democracy declined.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment Promoting prosperity through economic integration and free trade. Over the course of the Clinton years, there were signicant advances in the region in economic liberalization, foreign investment, and increased trade. ese combined to produce modest net economic growth in Latin America for the decade, in spite of a recession between tff and However, the failure to expand the free trade area or to incorporate additional countries into NAFTA-type agreements meant that most of the eects of these advances were concentrated in Mexico. In addition, there was a lack of signicant new job creation in Latin America; high unemployment and under employment continued to characterize most of the region. Eradicating poverty and discrimination. In spite of net economic growth in the tffs, poverty and income concentration among the most wealthy both increased. ere were more poor people in Latin America at the end of the tffs than at the beginning, even as most governments social spending (education, health, housing, and social security) increased. b. Guaranteeing sustainable development and conserving the natural environment. ere was virtually no progress beyond rhetorical commitments to environmental protection. In the tffs, the region experienced further deterioration in environmental quality.Preserving and Strengthening DemocracyFor the rst time in Latin Americas turbulent political history, most countries in the region have had elected governments for the past t years. e challenge many face, however, is how to consolidate these formal democratic processes. is involves the dicult process of building both eective political institutions and a routinized and predictable process that can deal eectively with the growing array of citizen needs and demands. Recognizing that a hemisphere of stable democratic states is in the best interests of the United States at various levels, the Clinton administration was committed to doing what it could to strengthen democratic practice in Latin America, as elsewhere. Nevertheless, a review of some important indicators of the level and quality of democracy between tff and such as political rights, civil liberties, and corruption, suggests that U.S. ocials were less successful in meeting this goal during the Clinton years than they would have wished. Because of the corrosive eects of drug production and tracking on democracy, the SOA document included counter-drug policy within the strengthening democracy objective. Over the course of the tffs, however, in spite of a major push by the U.S. government and its counterparts in ma-


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years jor drug-producing countries, they failed to reduce areas of cultivation and quantities of cocaine and heroin and the corruption and violence associated with them. Counter-drug policy, then, provoked additional challenges for democratic practice rather than helping to strengthen it. r One measure of the overall level of democracy in individual countries, though admittedly not nely calibrated, is the annual Freedom House rating of the level of political rights and civil liberties. When the summary data for tff and t for Latin America are examined to determine the changes that occurred in these two indicators of democracy over the course of the Clinton administration, there is little dierence for the region as a whole (see table .t). In both tff, the year before President Clinton took oce, and t, the year after he left, nine Latin American countries were classied by the Freedom House assessment as Free, nine as Partly Free, and two as Not Free. Even so, there were, on balance, some overall improvements in political rights (three countries more up than down over the period) and in civil liberties (four more up than down), most notably in El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. However, these cases were largely oset by deteriorat ing conditions in other Latin American nations, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Honduras. Furthermore, several countries experienced unorthodox, if not blatantly unconstitutional, regime changes in the face of internal crises and popular unrest between tff and ere were two such shifts in Ecuador (tff and ), one in Paraguay (tfff), and one in Peru (). Turmoil that had been building for some time manifested itself in seven other cases of ir regular changes of governments after Clinton left oceArgentina in t and Venezuela in Bolivia in and Haiti in b, and Ecuador, again, in Certainly multiple factors, many of them internal and idiosyncratic, help to explain the erosion in the quality of democracy over the decade. Given the explicit goal of U.S. policy to strengthen democratic practice, however, and the sharp increases in both U.S. social and economic aid and military and police assistance for Latin America during the late tffs (table .), the results are disappointing. Unfortunately, stasis and slippage rather than progress toward more stable and consolidated elected governments in the region characterized the Clinton years.


Table 5.1 Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Latin America, 1992 and 2001 Country Political rightsa Civil liberties Freedom statusb 1992 2001 Changec 1992 2001 Changec 1992 2001 ChangecArgentina 2 3 3 3 0 PF Bolivia 2 1 + 3 3 0 F F 0 Brazil 2 3 3 3 0 F PF Chile 2 2 0 2 2 0 F F 0 Colombia 2 4 4 4 0 PF PF 0 Costa Rica 1 1 0 1 2 F F 0 Cuba 7 7 0 7 7 0 NF NF 0 Dominican Republic 2 2 0 3 2 + F F 0 Ecuador 2 3 3 3 0 F PF El Salvador 3 2 + 3 3 0 F PF Guatemala 4 3 + 5 4 + PF PF 0 Haiti 7 6 + 7 6 + NF NF 0 Honduras 2 3 3 3 0 F PF Mexico 4 2 + 3 3 0 PF F + Nicaragua 4 3 + 3 3 0 PF PF 0 Panama 4 1 + 3 2 + PF F + Paraguay 3 4 3 3 0 PF PF 0 Peru 6 1 + 5 3 + PF F + Uruguay 1 1 0 2 1 + F F 0 Venezuela 3 3 0 3 5 PF PF 0Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Country Ratings 1972 through 2003 (New York: Freedom House, 2004), (July 22, 2005). a. Numerical ratings range from 1 to 7 and are derived from a 10-question Political Rights (PR) checklist and a 15-question Civil Liberties (CL) list completed by some 30 analysts and advisors and complemented by outside news and other reports, contacts, and country visits, as well as discussions among regional analysts and specialists. For additional information, see Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003: Survey Methodology, (accessed July 23, 2005). b. F = Free, PF = Partly Free, NF = Not Free. Final determination of F, PF, or NF status is based on overall point totals for the 10-question checklist for PR and the 15question list for CL, in which each question receives 1 points. Totals of 68 = F, 34 = PF, and 0 = NF. c. e overall pattern of the Freedom House indicators of political rights, civil liberties, and the status of freedom for Latin America as a whole shows a mixed pattern between 1992 and 2001. While half of the regions republics showed improvements in either political rights or civil liberties or both during this period, an equal number stayed the same or deteriorated. e overall pattern for the status of freedom remained unchanged, with as many countries judged as moving from partly free to free as moved in the opposite direction (four) and the rest staying the same (ve F, ve PF, and two NF).


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Table 5.2. U.S. Security and Economic Assistance to Latin America and to Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, 1996 (in millions of current dollars) Military/ Security Social/ Economic police Total aid to economic Total aid to Year aida to BCMPb BCMP (%) aid to BCMP BCMP (%) 1996 161 98 61 547 150c 27 1997 270 210 81 585 186 32 1998 298 210 70 634 185 29 1999 497 412 83 783 210 27 2000 977 889 91 953 497 52 Change (%) 1996 507 807 74 231 Source: Washington Oce on Latin America (WOLA), Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and Center for International Policy, U.S. Security and Economic Assistance to the Western Hemisphere, Just the Facts: A Civilians Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, (April 15, 2005). a. Both military/police aid and social/economic aid include assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. b. Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru (BCMP) are the four major countries in Latin America that produce and trac illegal drugs. c. Between 1996 and 1998, Colombia received less than $1 million each year from the United States in social and economic aid as the result of the 1996 U.S. decertication of Columbia for not cooperating in counter-drug eorts. e presence of corruption within elected governments reduces both their capacity to govern eectively and their legitimacy among the citizenry. While ascertaining levels of government corruption with any degree of certainty is a very dicult enterprise, the nongovernmental organization Transpar ency International (TI) has attempted to do so. Since tff, TI has compiled annually from a number of surveys of businesspeople and country analysts a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that provides their collective assess ment of the degree of corruption they believe is present in the countries they follow most closely. Although not complete due to the absence of a sucient number of sur veys for individual countries in some years, the information available for Latin America is quite disheartening (table .). With only one consistent exception (Chile) and two others for some years (Costa Rica and Uruguay), Latin American countries cluster in the lower half of the nations covered by the annual CPI. Most have scores that are below on a scale from t to t, levels that for TI suggest perceptions of signicant corruption by public of


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment Table 5.3. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)a for Latin America, 1995 Yearb Countryc 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Argentina 5.2 3.4 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.5 2.8 Bolivia 3.4 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.0 2.2 Brazil 2.7 3.0 3.6 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.0 Chile 7.9 6.8 6.1 6.8 6.9 7.4 7.5 7.5 Colombia 3.4 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.9 3.2 3.8 3.6 Costa Rica 6.5 5.6 5.1 5.4 4.5 4.5 Dominican Republic 3.1 3.5 Ecuador 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.2 El Salvador 3.6 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.4 Guatemala 3.1 3.2 2.9 2.5 Haiti 2.2 Honduras 1.7 1.8 2.7 2.7 Mexico 3.2 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.7 3.6 Nicaragua 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.5 Panama 3.7 3.0 Paraguay 1.5 2.0 1.7 Peru 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.0 Uruguay 4.1 4.3 4.4 5.1 5.1 Venezuela 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.5Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, annual, 1995, (accessed July 22, 2005). a. e CPI score ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating lower levels of perceived corruption. Each annual score is derived from a compilation of surveys by several independent institutions that were conducted over a three-year period among businesspeople, academics, and country analysts. ey reect their perceptions at the time of the survey of the level of corruption in the country or countries they follow. e number of surveys reviewed has ranged between 5 and 15, depending on the year, and the number of countries assessed worldwide has ranged between 41 and 102. No country is included without at least 3 surveys; for Latin America the number has varied between 3 and 10, with a tendency to increase over time, as it has for the rest of the world. b. e number of countries in the CPI by year is 41 in 1995, 54 in 1996, 52 in 1997, 95 in 1998, 99 in 1999, 90 in 2000, 91 in 2001, and 102 in 2002. e CPI ranking worldwide for individual Latin American countries ranges from a high of 14 (Chile, 1995) to a low of 98 (Paraguay, 2002), with most countries most years in the bottom half of the rankings. Transparency International considers a CPI below 5 to reect substantial levels of corruption among politicians and public ocials. By this benchmark, only Chile has been consistently perceived to have relatively low levels of corruption. c. Cuba is not included.cials. Equally if not even more telling is the downward trend over time for those Latin American governments for which longitudinal data are available. Although a few have registered slight improvements over time in their CPIs and Brazil and Uruguay have made considerable progress, fully two-thirds (t of tn) experienced a decline in the CPI index between tff and One of the conclusions of a report by the U.S. General Accounting Oce on the overall eects of U.S. support for democracy-building initiatives in


U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years six Latin American countries that received the bulk of American economic and technical assistance between tff and (Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru) is that the results of anticorruption programs have been modest so far. Projects have been hindered by politicization and a lack of consistent political support. e reports authors believe that it is unlikely that U.S. governance-related assistance will be able to produce sustainable results without ongoing, long-term involvement. Many factors contribute to corruption among political elites, including long-standing internal practices, personal values, the absence of eective enforcement, and a degree of public tolerance, if not acceptance. However, the persistence of high levels of perceived corruption in most Latin American countries during a period in which the U.S. government was providing substantial assistance, with an emphasis on adherence to the rule of law as a key component of its goal of strengthening democracy, also points up the failure of the Clinton administration to contribute to the advance of eective democratic governance in the region. Some Latin American countries have been major producers of illegal drugs for U.S. consumers for more than three decades. e Andean region is the worlds only source of coca leaf, the raw material for cocaine, and such countries as Mexico and Colombia also provide a portion of the heroin and marijuana consumed in the United States. As part of its overall counterdrug strategy, successive U.S. governments have pursued crop eradication, interdiction, and legal crop substitution policies in their eorts to reduce the supply of drugs reaching the United States. e drug trade and the U.S. response to it also have had a signicant impact on the producing countries in the region. Although tens of thousands of small farmers and their families benet from the cash income they receive for their coca, opium poppy, and marijuana crops, the main beneciaries are the drug manufacturers and trackers. e drug trade also generates signi cant corruption and violence, with major negative impacts on the ability of elected ocials in aected countries to govern eectively. Such a connection explains the inclusion of a component in the Miami SOA Plan of Action that considers drug production and tracking reduction within the strengthening of democracy objective. Particularly during Clintons second term, the U.S. government commit ted signicant new resources to the counter-drug campaign. Military and


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment police assistance increased vefold between tff and and economic and social aid grew by b percent (table .). While almost every Latin Amer ican and Caribbean country received some of these new funds, governments of the major illegal drug-producing and tracking nationsBolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Perugarnered the largest share. Between tff and the share of total U.S. support for the region going to these four countries increased from f to ft percent of military and police aid and from to percent of social and economic aid. In spite of such a signicant U.S. eort in the late tffs, the impact on drug production was modest indeed. Estimates of hectares of coca leaf cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru combined did show a t percent decline between tff and t, in the context of an expansion of coca leaf eradication by some percent over these same years (table .b). In spite of such major eradication eorts, however, total potential cocaine produc tion actually grew by f percent over this period. Opium poppy cultivation (for the production of heroin) and potential yield in Colombia and Mexico showed a similar pattern, with a b percent decline in estimated hectares between tff and t but a t percent increase in total production (table .b, note a). On balance, the Clinton administration failed to support and strengthen democracy in Latin America by reducing illegal drug supplies of cocaine and heroin in order to counterbalance their corrosive eects on democratic institutions through corruption and criminal activity. Cocaine production estimates actually increased during Clintons years in oce, and opium yield estimates, though declining signicantly over the eight years, rebounded af ter tff. In all four major drug-producing countries, the CPI remained at levels that suggested the presence of signicant corruption, even though some improvement was noted in Colombia and Mexico between tff and t (table .). e civil liberties scale showed no improvement over the period, while the gains registered in political rights in Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru can be attributed to a variety of factors unrelated to U.S. counter-drug policies.Promoting Prosperity through Economic Integration and Free TradeIn the aftermath of the extended economic crisis in Latin America in the tfns, most of the now elected governments in the region decided to adopt economic liberalization reforms as a way to restore economic growth. En-


Table 5.4. Drug Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 1992a Change Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (%) Net coca cultivation (in thousands of hectares) Bolivia 45.0 47.2 48.1 48.6 48.1 45.8 38.0 21.8 14.8 19.9 -56 Colombia 37.1 39.7 44.7 50.9 67.2 79.5 101.8 122.5 136.2 169.8 +358 Peru 129.1 108.8 108.6 115.3 94.4 68.8 51.0 38.7 34.1 34.0 -74 Totals 211.2 195.7 201.4 214.8 209.7 194.1 190.8 183 185.1 223.7 +6 Net coca eradication (in thousands of hectares) Bolivia 3.2 2.4 1.1 5.5 7.5 7.0 11.6 17.0 7.7 9.4 +190 Colombia 1.0 .8 4.9 8.8 5.6 19.0 43.2 47.0 84.3 +8,333 Peru 0 0 0 0 1.3 3.5 7.8 13.8 6.2 3.9 +163 Totals 4.2 3.2 6.0 14.3 14.4 29.6 19.4 54.0 60.9 97.6 +2,224 Potential cocaine production (in metric tons) Bolivia 225 240 255 240 215 200 150 70 43 60 -73 Colombia 60 65 70 230 300 350 435 520 580 839 +1,298 Peru 550 410 435 460 435 325 240 175 154 140 -75 Totals 835 715 760 930 950 875 835 765 777 1,039 +24bSources: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Aairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy (INCSR) Report, 2000; INSCR Report, 2001; INSCR Report, 2003, (July 24, 2005). a. Latin America produces all of the worlds cocaine (almost entirely in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru) and small portions of opium (heroin) and marijuana (mostly in Colombia and Mexico). Net opium poppy cultivation in Colombia and Mexico declined from 23,300 hectares in 1992 to 10,900 in 2001. Some 19,800 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 1992, and 21,700 in 2001, an increase of 10%. e potential yield of opium gum also decreased, from 240 metric tons in 1992 to 136 in 2001 (39%). Net marijuana cultivation also decreased over these years, from 20,400 hectares to 8,900 (56%). However, overall potential yield increased during the same period, from 9,500 metric tons to 11,200 (18%). INCSR Reports, 2000. b. Potential production of cocaine in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, as of 2003, had declined to 771 metric tons, a drop of 8% from 1992 gures and 26% from 2001, entirely from reductions in Colombia. INSCR Report, 2003.


Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment couraged by the United States and International Financial Institutions in the context of the Washington Consensus, they reduced tari barriers to open up trade and ended many private investment restrictions to foster an inux of new capital. In the more open economy that emerged in most of Latin America over the course of the late tfns and tffs, both U.S. trade with the region and investment there expanded markedly. By t, U.S. exports to Latin America and imports from the region had increased almost threefold from their tfnn levels and represented a steadily growing share of U.S. global trade (table .). U.S. direct investment in Latin America grew from just over billion in tffn to almost tf billion by t (table .). e market reforms that opened up new opportunities for trade and investment and the responses they generated from both international and domestic private sectors contributed to Latin Americas net economic growth during the tffs. Table 5.5. U.S. trade with Mexico and Latin America, 1988 (in billions of current dollars) Latin Latin America Mexico American trade (%) (except Cuba) World Trade(%) Year Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 1988 20.6 23.3 52 48 40.1 48.9 12.5 11.1 1989 25.0 27.2 56 50 44.4 54.8 12.2 11.6 1990 28.3 30.2 57 49 49.5 61.0 12.6 12.3 1991 33.3 31.1 57 52 58.9 59.5 14.0 12.2 1992 40.6 35.2 57 54 71.3 65.5 15.9 12.3 1993 41.6 39.9 57 56 73.3 71.3 15.8 12.3 1994 50.8 49.5 60 58 87.8 85.7 17.1 12.8 1995 46.3 62.1 51 61 90.7 101.3 15.5 13.6 1996 56.8 74.3 55 62 103.7 119.8 16.6 15.1 1997 71.3 85.9 56 63 127.9 135.9 18.6 15.6 1998 79.0 94.7 58 67 135.6 142.0 19.9 15.6 1999 86.9 109.7 64 67 135.9 164.4 19.5 16.0 2000 111.3 135.9 68 67 163.7 203.3 20.9 16.7 2001 101.3 131.3 66 68 152.7 193.4 20.9 16.9 Change (%) 1988 +97 +51 +78 +34 1992 +174 +286 +130 +211 1994 +119 +175 +86 +140 1988 +391 +464 +281 +295 Sources: 1988, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (SAUS) 1990, table 1406, 806; 1989, SAUS 1993, table 1351, 813; 1993, SAUS 1995, table 1341, 819; 1995, SAUS 1999, table 1328, 805; 1999, SAUS 2004, table 1298, 814, (August 1, 2005).

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Table 5.6. U.S. Direct Investment in Mexico and Latin America, 1988 (in billions of current dollars) Latin American Latin America World investment Year Mexico investment (%) (except Cuba) (%) 1988 5.7 16.2 35.3 10.5 1989 7.3 18.2 40.0 10.8 1990 10.3 23.5 43.9 10.2 1991 12.5 25.4 49.2 10.5 1992 13.7 24.9 55.1 11.0 1993 15.2 25.2 60.3 10.7 1994 17.0 24.9 68.0 11.1 1995 16.9 20.3 83.0 11.9 1996 19.4 20.3 95.4 12.0 1997 24.2 20.7 116.6 13.5 1998 26.7 20.6 129.3 12.9 1999 37.2 23.5 158.2 13.0 2000 39.4 24.7 159.2 12.1 2001 52.5 37.9 138.6 9.5 Change (%) 1988 +140 +56 1992 +589 +351 1994 +132 +134 1988 +820 +292 Sources: 1988, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (SAUS) 1990, table 1338, 801; 1990, SAUS 1993, table 1329, 809; 1992, SAUS 1999, table 1317, 797; 1998, SAUS 2004, table 1288, 806, (August 1, 2005). e negotiation and ratication of the North American Free Trade Agreement in tff was viewed as the rst major step toward the economic integration of the hemisphere through what was to be the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Its formal articulation at the tffb SOA reected an unusual consensus among all participants on the importance of this initiative and the need to move forward with its implementation. e promise and potential benets of the FTAA may be seen in Mexicos trade and investment expansion, which took place within NAFTA between tff and Mexico accounted for fully percent of the increase in Latin American exports to the United States (n of tt billion), as well as for n percent of U.S. export expansion to the region ( of billion) during the rst six years NAFTA was in eect (table .). Although the increase in U.S. investment in Mexico from tffb through compared with Latin America as a whole, was less dramatic ( of ft billion, or b percent), in t this proportion increased substantially ( of t billion, or t per cent) (table .).

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Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment Between tffn and t, trade between Mexico and the United States increased on average by about t percent per year, more rapidly than for all of Latin America, and U.S. investment rose at more than twice the rate in Mexico than in the rest of the region. While Mexicos proximity to the United States and its relatively early market liberalizing reforms undoubt edly aect these dierences, NAFTAs role is also an important factor. Unfortunately, the promise of the FTAA as laid out in the Miami SOA was not to be realized, much to the disappointment of the Latin American heads of state who had committed a great deal of their political capital to the enterprise. e Clinton administration was divided on the issue on domestic political and substantive grounds. With the ssures created within the Democratic Party over the bruising battle to win ratication of NAFTA, the president and his political advisors did not feel that they could press for Fast Track renewal without incurring even greater political fallout within their own partys ranks. e Republican majority in Congress, relishing the political benets of the Democrats divisions, refused to give the president a victory on the issue, even though most supported the free trade objective. Both Department of the Treasury and Oce of the U.S. Trade Representative ocials disagreed on the value of pursuing the FTAA and Fast Track, as their foot-dragging on an agreement for the SOA demonstrated. President Clinton himself, having led the charge for NAFTA ratication and for a successful SOA that included the FTAA, was not prepared to ex ercise his leadership in their aftermaths to ensure that promises turned into deeds. On balance, then, the progress that occurred during his two terms in oce on both economic integration and free trade, though considerable, came about largely through advances in NAFTA and the U.S. private sec tors role in pursuing the trade and investment opportunities available after the Latin American governments own economic reforms. U.S. leadership, though at one point poised to take advantage of the historic opportunity that was then available, failed to follow through.Eradicating Poverty and DiscriminationClearly, any ocial commitment to eliminate poverty and discrimination in Latin America, as the U.S. government and its counterparts in the region stated as a goal of the Miami summit, is a long-term project that cannot be achieved in just a few years. Furthermore, any reduction in either that might result during the course of a U.S. administration would come about through the interplay of a variety of factors, from internal manifestations of political

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years will within the countries to the interaction of international economic institutions and market forces. In addition, the indicators available to measure levels of poverty and discrimination are incomplete and imprecise. In spite of these important caveats, however, it should be possible to make some preliminary and tentative assessments of progress accomplished during the Clinton years in reducing poverty and discrimination in Latin America. e data available suggest that the record on lowering levels of poverty over the course of the tffs is a mixed one. e positive news is that the proportion of the population of Latin Amer ica below the poverty line declined by over t percent between tff and t. e indigent among them fell even more, by almost tn percent. Over the same period, however, the total number in poverty increased by almost tb million, or percent, from million to almost tb million (table .). Unemployment rates also increased markedly and continuously, almost doubling from b. percent in tff to n. percent in tfff. Over roughly the same period, income inequality within the countries of the region, measured by the proportion of total income held by the richest Table 5.7. Poverty and Indigence in Latin America, 1980a (in millions of people, 19 countries not including Cuba) Poorb Indigent Total Year Number Population Number Population Number Population (%) (%) (%) 1980 73.5 21.9 62.4 18.6 135.9 40.5 1990 106.8 25.8 93.4 22.5 200.2 48.3 1997 115.0 24.5 88.8 19.0 203.8 43.5 1999 122.0 25.3 89.4 18.5 211.4 43.8 2000 118.7 24.4 88.4 18.1 207.1 42.5 2001 122.2 24.7 91.7 18.5 213.9 43.2 2002 124.0 24.6 97.4 19.4 221.4 44.0 Change (%) 1990 +14.4 -4.3 -1.8 -17.7 +6.8 -10.6Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America 2002, UN Pub. LC/G 2209P (Santiago, Chile: UN Publications, May 2004), tables I.2 and I.3, 50. a. is table is based on country-by-country tabulations of household survey data. For population percentages of poverty and indigence by specic country, 1990, see source cited, table I.4, 54. b. Poverty is dened in terms of a per capita income by household below what members must have to meet their basic nutritional and nonnutritional needs; indigence, below what is needed to meet nutritional needs only. For further discussion, see source cited, box I.1, 51.

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Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment decile of the population, increased from percent to .b percent (table .n). Improvements in wealth distribution in such countries as Uruguay, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico were more than oset by increased concentration in others, including Paraguay, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia. e failure to make the progress desired in reducing poverty or income distribution inequality occurred in spite of signicant increases in both social spending by most Latin American countries (table .f) and outlays of U.S. economic and social assistance during the decade (table .). e major increases in U.S. trade with Latin America and direct investment in the region were also insucient to have any material eect on the number in poverty or income distribution. e overall result, then, was the persistence of unacceptably high levels of poverty as well as some further concentration of income among the already wealthy, along with steady increases in unemployment. ese outcomes were at odds with the Clinton administrations commitment to improving the well-being of Latin Americas citizens. Table 5.8. Income Inequality in Latin America, 1989a (17 countries,b by percentage of total income, richest 10%) First measurement Last measurement Country (1989)c (2000) Change (%) Argentina 34.8 42.1 +21.0 Bolivia 38.2 41.1 +7.6 Brazil 43.9 46.8 +6.6 Chile 40.7 40.3 -1.0 Colombia 41.8 (1994) 39.1 -6.5 Costa Rica 25.6 30.2 +18.0 Ecuador 30.5 34.3 +12.5 El Salvador 32.9 (1995) 33.3 +1.2 Guatemala 40.6 36.8 -9.4 Honduras 43.1 39.4 -8.6 Mexico 36.6 33.2 -9.3 Nicaragua 38.4 40.7 +6.0 Panama 34.2 32.7 -4.4 Paraguay 28.9 (1997) 37.3 +29.1 Peru 33.3 33.5 +1.0 Uruguay 31.2 27.3 -12.5 Venezuela 28.7 31.3 +9.1 Latin American average 35.5 36.4 +2.5Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2002, UN Pub. LC/G 2209P (Santiago, Chile: UN Publications, May 2004), table I.6, 73. a. is table is based on country-by-country tabulation of household survey data. b. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are not included. c. Methodology and qualications are noted in the source cited, box I.7, 78.

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years e question of discrimination is subject to the same qualications as for poverty, income inequality, and unemployment. In this area, however, progress during the tffs characterized most areas measured that relate to gender discrimination. Female employment increased by over percent between tff and tfff, and female education levels among the economically active also advanced, especially among the university educated (table .t). e only disquieting note is the increase in female unemployment over the decade, which more than doubled, from .t percent in tff to tt. percent in tfff. is suggests that, as more women entered the workplace, an increas ing number were unable to nd or maintain full-time employment. e representation of women in elected positions in Latin American legislatures showed increases between tff and in almost every country studied, more than doubling in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay (table .tt). While a variety of factors contributed to this positive development, including the institution of party list quotas by several Latin American governments, there is little doubt that the greater attention to the issue by U.S. ocials stimulated a heightened awareness among their counterparts in the region. Table 5.9. Social Spending in Latin America, 1990 (18 countriesa in 1997 dollars) Total social Public Education Health spendingb spending spending spending Years per capita (%) per capita per capita 1990 342 41.5 1992 399 43.5 1994 404 45.2 1996 432 45.8 118 95 1998 470 46.1 2000 494 48.4 139 110 Change (%) 1990 +44 +16.6 +18 +16 (1996) (1996)Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2002, UN Pub. LC/G 2209P (Santiago, Chile: UN Publications, May 2004), table IV.1, 175; table IV.3, 178; table IV.4, 184; table IV.5, 185. a. Cuba and Haiti are not included. b. Includes government spending for education, health, housing, and social security.

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Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment Table 5.11. Percentage of Women in National Legislatures in Latin America, 1980, 1990, 2000a Country 1980b 1990 2000 Argentina 11 14 30 Bolivia 9 13 16 Brazil 2 5 13 Chile 8 12 15 Colombia 6 10 25 Costa Rica 9 12 19 Dominican Republic 20 12 23 Ecuador 0 7 15 Mexico 15 31 32 Nicaragua 12 19 10 Paraguay 6 10 21 Uruguay 1 6 22 Venezuela 5 10 10 Average 8 12 19Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2002, UN Pub. LC/G 2209P (Santiago, Chile: UN Publications, May 2004), table III.10, 169. a. Percentages shown in the table are the sum of the percentages of elected female legislators in both houses where bicameral legislatures exist (all except Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, which have unicameral legislatures). b. Except for Chile (1970) and Uruguay (1972). Table 5.10. Gender Discrimination Indicators in Latin America, 1990 (15 countries,a national totals, in percentages) Female employment Female unemployment Female years Year (%) (% of Economically Active) of education 0 6 10 13+ 1990 31.5 5.1 28.0 30.3 39.8 36.7 1994 32.4 7.2 29.8 30.6 38.9 37.0 1997 33.1 8.7 30.1 31.1 38.0 40.8 1999 33.4 11.2 30.3 31.0 38.1 41.1 2002 38.4 11.1 35.8 35.1 41.3 45.5 Change (%) 1990 +6.0 +119.6 +8.2 +2.3 -4.3 +12.0Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2002, UN Pub. LC/G 2209P (Santiago, Chile: UN Publications, May 2004), table III.5b, 158. a. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, and Venezuela are not included.

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years Guaranteeing Sustainable Development and Conserving the EnvironmentEnvironmental issues reected important dierences in perspectives between the U.S. government and most of its Latin American counterparts. For some years U.S. ocials had viewed with growing alarm the progressive erosion of forest cover in the region, particularly in the Amazon, and the increasing production of greenhouse gases there, especially carbon dioxide, which were contributing to the depletion of the ozone layer over Antarc tica and southern South America. ey urged Latin American governments to take steps to reduce and control the degradation of the environment in their countries. However, at important gatherings to address such issues, such as the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in tff, Bush administration representatives were unwilling to provide the nancial support necessary to assist their counterparts in dealing with the problem or to back a multilateral initiative that was to deal with environmental issues on a global level. From the Latin American perspective, developed countries in general and the United States in particular were responsible for most of the environmental degradation that was occurring, particularly in levels of air pollution. erefore, the developed countries governments were the ones who needed to set specic standards for its reduction. Although the European countries agreed, the Bush administration did not. Since all participants at the Rio summit needed to sign on to any such accord, U.S. reluctance ensured that no progress was made there on this important environmental issue. With Clintons electoral victory and arrival in the White House, most expected a much greater concern for environmental issues during his ad ministration. His vice president, Al Gore, joined him with a reputation as a strong advocate for environmental protection. Clintons insistence on an environmental side agreement for the NAFTA treaty seemed to demonstrate the administrations commitment. Nevertheless, the specics of the agreement failed to provide an eective enforcement mechanism and relied on individual governments to implement environmental policy change. While the side agreements on the environment and labor helped to mollify some members of Congress and secure NAFTAs ratication, then, they lacked the teeth required to make them eective instruments in practice. As the preparations for the rst SOA took shape, they oered a new opportunity to make environmental issues a major focus. Gore succeeded in his insistence that one of its specic objectives be sustainable development and improvement in the quality of the environment, a goal that was sup ported by the heads of state at the Miami gathering. Although the com-

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Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment mitment to improvement in environmental quality in the hemisphere was reiterated at an environmental summit in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, in tff and at the second SOA in Santiago, Chile, in tffn, the record of change in key environmental indicators in Latin America between tff and suggests that deeds failed to match rhetoric (table .t). Air pollution, as measured by total carbon dioxide emissions, increased over the decade by almost percent, while the regions total forested area continued to be depleted at a rate that was twice that of the rest of the world. Tree cutting for industry, fuel, and charcoal grew by about percent between tff and while fertilizer application, which also contributes to pollution, almost doubled. Progress was made in protecting some forested areas during these years, however. e number of protected forest areas increased by or almost t percent, and the total area protected grew by more than b million hectares. Even so, protected forests still accounted for less than t percent of the total forested area in Latin America, and most lacked the government budget or personnel needed to ensure enforcement of their status from the encroachments of loggers and farmers. Progress was also made in the tffs in providing Latin Americas population with access to potable water, especially in urban areas, which reached Table 5.12. Environmental indicators for Latin America, 1990 and 2000 (in thousands of hectaresha, tonstn, cubic metersm3, or people, 17 countriesa)Indicator 1990 2000 Change (%) Total forest area (ha) 1,005,469 958,647 -4.7 Total wood production (industrial, fuel, charcoal, in m3) 349,594 427,324 +22.2 Air pollution (total CO2 emissions, in tons) 843,997 1,138,900 +34.9 Fertilizer use (tons) 6,792 12,855 +89.3 Protected forests Total number 1,436 2,162 +50.6 Area (ha) 146,374 200,729 +37.1 1990 1998 Change (%) Access to potable water Rural population 73,508 71,465 -2.8 Percentage 63.7 61.4 -3.6 Urban population 253,067 340,374 +34.5 Percentage 86.3 93.2 +8.0Source: United Nations Environment Program, Global Environmental Outlook (GEO): Latin America and the Caribbean, 2003 (San Jos, Costa Rica: UNEP, November 2003), 258, 262, 270, 274, (accessed August 7, 2005). a. Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are not included.

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years over f percent by tffn, an increase of over n million people. However, rural residents did not receive similar benets and even declined slightly in the proportion served and in total numbers (table .t). Many factors contributed to this overall lack of advancement in improv ing environmental quality in Latin America during the tffs. ese included the pressures associated with economic growth and foreign trade expansion, the eorts of millions of poor farmers to eke out a living by accessing new land, and the limited ability of governments to enforce environmental legislation. However, U.S. environmental policy during the Clinton years also contributed to this failure. e commitment in principle was not matched with specic measures or nancial resources. A failure to enact more stringent environmental controls at home, the largest single source of the worlds air pollution, made it more dicult to press for them in the less developed economies of Latin America. e U.S. goal of expanding regional trade, for all of its benets, put new pressure on the regions governments to exploit their countries resources rather than to conserve them. On balance, top U.S. ocials failed to provide the leadership necessary on the regional environment improvement objective to make the progress they envisioned become a reality.ConclusionsAs the discussion above indicates, the Clinton administration was not able to advance very far in accomplishing its major policy goals toward Latin America as articulated in the SOA Declaration of Principles. While this may be due in part to the goals overly ambitious nature, the lack of progress also suggests the presence of a variety of inhibiting factors. More often than not, the multiple challenges to implementing an eective and coherent policy toward the region limited policy makers abilities to accomplish their objec tives and produced less than satisfactory results. e Clinton years were marked by a number of quiet and cumulative successes, related primarily to continuing or following through on the positive initiatives of the Bush administration, from the Brady Plan to NAFTA. Other successes derived from eective responses to unanticipated events, as with Mexicos peso crisis and the Ecuador-Peru border war. e adminis tration was also able to forge a new regional multilateral forum for dealing with common concerns in the SOAs, an initiative that also demonstrated leaderships ability to coordinate the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy and to engage in eective consultation with its Latin American counterparts. Such successes indicate that those responsible for regional policy during

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Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment the Clinton years had a vision of what needed to be accomplished and the capacity to make dicult decisions at times to deal eectively with a number of important problems. At the same time, however, a variety of constraints limited the ability of the Clinton administration to achieve its major goals in Latin American policy. ese related primarily to leadership perceptions and priorities, the multiple consequences of external events, tensions between domestic politics and foreign policy, and conicting policy priorities in the region. Major problems in other parts of the world often took priority over regional issues. Key policy makers, including the president and his secretar ies of state, had little interest in or commitment to Latin America. ose policy makers who were responsible for the region often found that they had insucient support or condence from their superiors, thereby limiting their ability to operate eectively. e progressive and cumulative reduc tion in Department of State resources, besides its demoralizing eect on career professionals, eroded the governments institutional capacity to deal eectively with policy issues. After a signicant increase in Department of State (DOS) budget outlays during the George H. W. Bush administration, spending declined substantially over the course of the Clinton years (table .t). When ination rates are taken into account, the DOS budget increased by tt percent between Table 5.13. U.S. Department of State (DOS) and Federal Government Budget Outlays, 1989 (in billions of current dollars)Fiscal year Federal budget Change (%) DOS budget Change (%) 1989 1,143.7 4.58 1990 1,253.2 +10 4.80 +5 1991 1,324.4 +6 5.15 +7 1992 1,381.7 +4 5.94 +15 1993 1,409.5 +2 6.41 +8 1994 1,461.9 +4 6.80 +4 1995 1,515.8 +4 6.27 -8 1996 1,652.6 +9 5.74 -8 1997 1,601.3 +3 6.03 +5 1998 1,652.6 +3 5.38 -11 1999 1,702.9 +3 6.46 +20 2000 1,788.8 +5 6.85 +6 1993 % change 446.7 +32 0.44 +7 2001 est. 1,856.2 +4 9.30 +36Source: Data from U.S. Government, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oce, 2001), table 4.1, Outlays by Agency: 1962, 73.

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U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years tfnf and tff, but declined by about t percent between tff and e erosion was particularly marked over the course of Clintons rst term, some percent, although DOS outlays did rebound by about percent in ination-adjusted dollars during his second term. e overall decline in the DOS budget between tff and occurred even as total federal government expenditures were increasing, after ination is taken into account, by about b percent. ese disquieting DOS budget gures were also reected in employment trends within the U.S. governments foreign aairs community. Department employees were reduced by over t,t between tffb and tff, or by more than b percent. e impact on other agencies was even greater, with the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) losing about t percent of its sta and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) shedding almost percent of its employees during this period. e failure to provide the resources and sta necessary to keep pace with rapidly increasing U.S. government worldwide responsibilities during a par ticularly critical period reected poorly on both the executive and legislative branches. True, this pattern of insucient funding for foreign aairs is a long-standing one and reects a preoccupation with domestic concerns. Nevertheless, the unwillingness of top ocials in both branches during the Clinton presidency to push for signicant increases in funding to take advantage of a favorable international environment represented a major failure of political leadership. As a result, the lack of sucient resources served as a signicant constraint on the U.S. governments ability to accomplish its ambitious foreign policy objectives in Latin America, as elsewhere in the world. e shift to a Republican-controlled Congress that was much more interested in domestic concerns and had a deep animus toward Clinton signicantly increased tension between the legislative and executive branches. Congresss decision to impeach Clinton began a drawn-out if ultimately unsuccessful process that virtually immobilized top leadership capacity to follow through on foreign policy issues for more than a year. In addition, signicant dierences between the two branches also expressed themselves in such specic areas as appointments, drug policy, and Cuba. Multiple domestic pressures also aected the priorities of the adminis tration in the region, most particularly in the tension between advancing on the counter-drug production and tracking front on the one hand, and enhancing democratic procedures and practices on the other. Policies to ward Peru in the late tffs illustrated the challenges faced and the negative consequences of the decisions made.

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Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment e overall result of the interplay of these multiple constraints and policy leadership perceptions and priorities was to limit in various ways the ability of the Clinton administration to pursue eectively the vision and goals of its Latin American policy agenda. ese limitations signicantly inhibited the policy makers ability to take full advantage of the favorable circumstances in the region that were initially available to them. Accomplishments and continuities were too often oset by reactive and ad hoc responses that conveyed the impression of a policy adrift. On balance, although the Clinton administration may be credited with policy successes in several discrete areas, from NAFTA ratication and the Mexican peso crisis response, to the Guatemalan peace agreement and the Ecuador-Peru border dispute resolution, among others, it lost a major opportunity to build a coherent and comprehensive policy toward Latin America. Multiple constraints and unanticipated events limited the space available to forge eective policies, and exercises of eective and decisive leadership, though present on occasion, were too few and far between to break through the barriers they posed. By squandering the opening provided by a felicitous convergence of forces in the late tfns and early tffs, President Clinton and his advisors contributed to renewed disquiet in the region over U.S. policy intentions as well as the seriousness of its commitment to Latin America.

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NotesChapter Clintons Latin American Policies in Context: e Concerns and the Approach t. Latin America usually refers to the independent countries south of the United States that were once colonies of Spain (tn), Portugal (t), or France (t). is designation includes three countries in the Caribbean (Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti) and is the one used in this text. e Caribbean usually refers to the independent countries that once formed part of the British (t) and Dutch (t) empires that are in or that border on the Caribbean Sea or the Gulf of Mexico, but often includes the dependent territories in the region as well as the three nations noted above. Huntington, e ird Wave, provides a worldwide perspective on the democ ratization phenomenon in the late twentieth century and the historical context. For a summary of the waves, or historical cycles of authoritarianism and democracy in Latin America, see Palmer, e Military in Latin America, Among other recent studies addressing the trajectory of Latin American politics and its contemporary elements, see Smith, Democracy in Latin America, esp. t, and Peeler, Building Democracy, esp. tbtb. b. As laid out in the Declaration of Principles, in Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, appendix D, tt. Among others, Peeler, Building Democracy, tb; Smith, Democracy in Latin America, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), A Decade of Light and Shadow, fftn, tb. ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, b, tn, tf, t, tn, tnb, tn. n. United Nations Environment Program, Global Environmental Outlook, n, f. Among others, Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tft. t. Numerous comments by career foreign policy ocials interviewed by the author in Washington in t and noted on this problem and the degree to which they felt constrained in their ability to follow through on specic policies toward the region. tt. See table .t for details on the annual budget of the Department of State. t. e issues raised in these policy areas are among those considered in some detail in the cases discussed in chapter b. t. e case of U.S. policy toward Peru in the late tffs highlights the problem of choosing between these two desirable objectives and is developed in chapter b.

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tb. Morganthau, Politics among Nations. t. Allison, Essence of Decision, tbbnb. t. Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics, b. t. Wittkopf, Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, f and g. I.t, b. tn. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, b. tf. As developed, e.g., in Schoultz, Beneath the United States.Chapter e Changing International and Regional Context of Inter-American Relations t. Kennan, Latin America, tnn. Wood, Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, esp. tff. Schoultz, Beneath the United States, b. Immerman, CIA in Guatemala. e U.S. covert initiative in Guatemala was a major turning point in U.S. policy toward Latin America. e most prevalent inter pretation of the intervention is that it was designed to protect U.S. business inter ests in Guatemala, specically the United Fruit Company. However, within weeks of Arbenzs replacement by the compliant Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, the U.S. attorney general brought an antitrust suit in federal court against United Fruit for monopolizing foreign trade. is action marked the beginning of the end of the companys dominance in Guatemala. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit f. e message that the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration (tft) appeared to be sending, in bringing forward the suit against United Fruit at this time (a suit originally prepared by the Harry Truman administration [tfb]), was that its primary goal in Latin America generally, and Guatemala in particular, was to root out communism, not to protect U.S. business. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, nf. One result of this dramatic failure was to seal Cubas alliance with the Soviet Union and to solidify communist control of the island, precisely the result the United States was trying to avoid. Lowenthal, Dominican Intervention, argues persuasively that the U.S. intervention exacerbated rather than attenuated the conict and produced a political out come that was inimical to democracy in that country. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, esp. f. In the context of growing U.S. public opposition to its governments policies in Vietnam and the festering Water gate scandal, the U.S. role in Chile served to galvanize Congress into hearings and initiatives to reassert its role in foreign policy. Such responses to executive branch abuses of power helped to precipitate signicant shifts in foreign policy by the midtfs that placed much greater emphasis on human rights issues and support for democracies. n. Schoultz, Beneath the United States, bn. f. See, e.g., Agee, Inside the Company, for a detailed discussion of CIA activities in Latin America in the tfs, Ecuador and Uruguay in particular. t. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica, n, nn, tb. tt. U.S. government economic assistance under the Point Four program, adminNotes to Pages

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istered by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), totaled some billion from the late tfbs through the tfs. National Planning Association, United States and Latin American Policies, btfb. Economic development aid within the parameters of the Alliance for Progress (tft) came to a total of b. billion, a gure that includes U.S. ocial development assistance, U.S. bilateral economic support, and the Agency for International Development (AID). Food for Peace (P.L. bn) assistance for the same period was an additional t. billion. Hansen, U.S.Latin American Economic Relationships, table t, tntf. t. U.S. economic assistance information for the tfnf period was compiled from the Foreign Commerce and Aid section of the annual Statistical Abstract of the United States. Total U.S. grants and credits to Latin America include aid under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Food for Peace Program (P.L. bn), and the Peace Corps. t. For education gures, Arnove, Franz, and Morse, Latin American Education, tb. For infant mortality, World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, xvi. For health and literacy data, Wilkie, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, sections on Health Care and Education. tb. is is what Gunnar Myrdal refers to as the virtuous circle, in Myrdal, Asian Drama, vol. appendix tnb and tnt. t. Among others, Huntington, Political Order, esp. tf. t. Palmer, Military in Latin America, t. North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), U.S. Military Training Programs, n. tn. Ibid., tf. Fitch, Armed Forces and Democracy, esp. tt. Palmer, e Military in Latin America, table t. Kryzanek, U.S.Latin American Relations, table n.t, f. For an overview of U.S. policy in Central America, Leogrande, Our Own Back yard. On Nicaragua, see Walker, Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua. On El Salvador, see Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador. On Carters policy, see Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy, esp. ttb, t, f. On the Reagan administration, see International Commis sion for Central American Recovery and Development, Poverty, Conict, and Hope, esp. On Panama, see Scranton, e Noriega Years, tnn. b. Diamond and Linz, Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America, tn. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, table bb. See, e.g., Roett, Debt Crisis and Economic Development. Cardoso and Dantas, Brazil, tables b. and b.b, tt. n. Williamson, ed., Political Economy of Policy Reform, esp. chaps. t, and t. f. Leogrande, Our Own Backyard, chapter t.Notes to Pages

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. De Soto, International Missions and the Promotion of Peace, t. t. Menges, Inside the National Security Council, ffn; Wiarda, Finding Our Way? b. Leogrande, Our Own Backyard, chapter esp. bntb. Wiarda, United States Policy in Latin America, t. b. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, nff. Ibid., f. Cline, International Debt Reexamined, t, and table ., b. Morici, Grasping the Benets of NAFTA, bfb. n. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, fnff. f. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, n. b. NAFTA became operative on January t, tffb, after the U.S. Congress ratied the treaty in November tff, during the rst year of the Clinton administration. See chapter for details. bt. Hakim, Good Neighbors Again? t. b. Williamson, Political Economy of Policy Reform, n. b. Washington Oce on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers, bb. Hakim, Good Neighbors Again? b. Palmer, e Often Surprising Outcomes. b. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, ff. b. Scranton, e Noriega Years, tfn. bn. Brenner, Overcoming Asymmetry, tt. bf. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tt. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, fn. t. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tb.Chapter Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Overview t. Hakim, e United States and Latin America, bf. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tt. Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, f. b. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tft. e author participated in a Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research brieng on Latin American issues for the new administration in May tff in which all the U.S. government participants except for Richard Feinberg were either Bush holdovers or prospective Clinton appointments. See also Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, ttb. Comment by a former senior Department of State ocial who asked not to be named, in a personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., Similar sentiments were expressed by other former ocials, if in less graphic terms, in personal interviews with the author. Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, ff. Notes to Pages

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n. Brian Latelle, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., October b, t. Similar perceptions are reected in Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti. f. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, ttt. t. Comments by Mack McLarty in a meeting of former Clinton administration ocials at the Inter-American Dialogue in which the author participated, December t, t. tt. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tttb. t. Ambassador Charles A. Gillespie Jr., personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February tb, t. Smith, e Closest of Enemies, tt. Bill Clinton also attributes his reelec tion defeat as governor of Arkansas due to riots of Cuban prison inmates. Clinton, My Life, fn. tb. e Cuban economy declined by about b percent between tfnf and tff. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, t. t. Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, fb. See also Smith, Talons of the Eagle, b. t. e larger economic context that produced the peso crisis is discussed in Dominguez and Fernndez, United States and Mexico, t. t. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, t. tn. Sanger, Mexican Rescue Plan; Rubin and Weisberg, In an Uncertain World, n. tf. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tt; Rubin and Weisberg, In an Uncertain World, b; Smith, Talons of the Eagle, b. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, t. t. Ibid., appendix E, tn. Ibid., ttnb, and table t.t, t. is case is discussed in more detail in chapter b. b. Cline, International Debt Reexamined, table ., b; Palmer, Democracy and Its Discontents, t. Wilkie, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. n (), table ftb, fb. For U.S. investment, Wilkie, ibid., vol. f (tff), ttn, and vol. n (), fbb. For trade, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States n, and Wilkie, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. n (), nf. Al Matano, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., October t, t. Assistant Secretary Matano, a -year Department of State veteran, noted that in his experience he had never seen an administration as pro-business as Clintons. n. On Nicaragua, see Lincoln and Sereseres, Resettling the Contras; on El Salvador, see Holiday and Stanley, Under the Best of Circumstances. f. Jonas, Between Two Worlds, f. Richard Nuccio, personal interview with the author, Newport, R.I., October t.Notes to Pages

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t. Holiday, Guatemalas Long Road to Peace; Jonas, Between Two Worlds, fntt. Cameron, Political and Economic Origins, Millett, Central Americas Enduring Conicts, t. b. Valenzuela, Collective Defense of Democracy ; Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool Arturo Valenzuela, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., Oc tober t, t. Incln Oseguera, Judicial Reform and Democratization, esp. chapters and Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, chaps. t and t, b, provides details of the events leading up to the decision to withdraw the USS Harlan County, an explanation for the decision, and an assessment of the consequences for U.S. policy. e author is the son of Ambassador Larry Pezzullo, U.S. special advisor to Haiti between March tff and April tffb. n. is case is discussed in greater detail in chapter b. f. Richard Nuccio, personal interview with the author, Newport, R.I., October t; see also Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, bb. b. is case is discussed in greater detail in chapter b. bt. Palmer, Overcoming the Weight of History. is case is discussed in greater detail in chapter b. b. Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., October t. b. Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti. bb. Pastor, e Delicate Balance, tf. b. Fatton, Haitis Predatory Republic, tt. b. Ambassador Charles A. Gillespie Jr., personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February tb, b. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, f. bn. e view that trade integration policy could proceed without Fast Track was articulated by some of the former Clinton ocials who participated in the InterAmerican Dialogue meeting with the author, and this became the subject of an ex tended debate there. Washington, D.C., December t, t. bf. U.S. Oce of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy nt. David Beall, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., September t. t. For drug production information, see table .b. Observations by Congressional Research Service (CRS) Latin American analysts in a meeting with the author, Washington, D.C., October t. Ambassador Myles Frechette, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., January t, Notes to Pages

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b. Ibid. Frechettes sentiments were echoed by Ambassador Alexander Watson, personal interview with the author, Arlington, Va., October b, t. Ramrez Lemus, Stanton, and Walsh, Colombia, tt. e Plan Colombia document is available in Bergquist et al., eds., Violence in Colombia, f. Roberts and Peceny, Human Rights and U.S. Policy, t. is case is discussed in greater detail in chapter b. n. In his comments at the Inter-American Dialogue meeting on Latin American policy in the Clinton years with a group of ocials who worked in various government oces during his administration. Washington, D.C., December t, t. f. Albright, Madame Secretary, n. Breene, Latin American Political Yearbook tb. t. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, t. Breene, Latin American Political Yearbook t, tf, tb. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, .Chapter Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: Case Studies of Success and Failure t. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo, in a personal interview with the author, of fered his perspective on the degree of disorganization in policy discussions in the White House and within the National Security Council (NSC) during his tenure as the special advisor for Haiti in tff and early tffb. Baltimore, October f, t. His experience with Haiti policy was conrmed for other Latin American policy issue areas over the course of the Clinton administration by the authors personal inter views with several other ocials who participated in similar high-level discussions in their areas of responsibility. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool tt. is point was reinforced in a number of personal interviews by the author with U.S. government ocials in the Clinton administration. Martin, Clinton Steps Up Campaign for Backing over NAFTA, t. b. Walsh et al., Combatants in the Bruising NAFTA Battle, t. Turner, President Pulled Out All the Stops, t. Garland, Harbrecht, and Dunham, e NAFTA War Is Won, b. Turner, President Pulled Out All the Stops, t. n. Lowell Fleischer, as director of the Washington oce of the Council of the Americas, a New Yorkbased organization whose membership includes most U.S. businesses with interests and/or investments in Latin America, believes that the ex tensive lobbying role of U.S. business on the Hill was crucial to NAFTAs ratication. E-mail communication with the author, August t, f. Ill, e Free Trade Accord, t. t. Rosenbaum, e Free Trade Accord, Atb. tt. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, f. t. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, ttt.Notes to Pages

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t. ese concerns and issues are derived from various sources. ey include Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, esp. chapter b; Ambassador Pezzullo, personal interview; Dr. Brian Latelle, former national intelligence ocer for Latin America at the CIA, personal interview by the author, Washington, D.C., October b, t; and Ambas sador Vicki Huddleston, former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Haiti, personal interview by the author, Cambridge, Mass., May tb. Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, ms., chapter tn. t. Ibid., chapter n, tbt. t. Ibid., t. Ibid., chapter esp. t, and chapter tb, nf, tn. Ibid., chapter t, f; Ambassador Huddleston, personal interview. tf. Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, chapter t, tt; Ambassador Huddleston, personal interview. Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, chapter t, f; Ambassador Huddleston, personal interview. t. ere is some uncertainty over just how the decision to withdraw the Harlan County was made and who made it. According to Ambassador Pezzulo, who at tended meetings at DOS and the White House, the decision was made in the White House, but it wasnt clear if Clinton was involved. Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, chapter t, Another account notes that Clinton was furious and blamed his NSC sta for putting him in a lose-lose situation. Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, Ambassadors Pezzullo and Huddleston both noted that the president was closely involved in details of the Haitian situation and almost certainly made the decision to withdraw the Harlan County over the objections of DOS and Vice President Gore. Ambassador Huddleston and Ambassador Pezzullo, personal interviews; Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, chapter t, Pezzullo, e Leap into Haiti, chapter t, bbb. b. Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, e author rst knew Dr. Pastor in this capacity in tf while serving as the director of Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State between tf and tfnn. On several occasions, the author and his U.S. government foreign aairs students visited NSC oces to receive clas sied briengs on Latin American policy issues conducted by Dr. Pastor. e author conducted a personal interview with Dr. Pastor in Washington, D.C., on May He is grateful to Dr. Pastor, now professor of international relations and director of the Center for Democracy and Election Management at American University, for making available numerous documents relating to his nomination. Dr. Pastor, personal interview. e tension between the two presidents seems to have originated with the Mariel boat lift of Cuban refugees in tfn, when then Arkansas governor Clinton accepted the plea of President Carter to house several hundred of them at the Fort Chafee, Arkansas, military base, but then embarrassed Notes to Pages

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him when the president did not return the favor by failing to provide the federal assistance he requested when many rioted and escaped. Clinton attributed his subsequent reelection defeat in large measure to the political fall out in Arkansas from the riots. Clinton, My Life, bnb. n. Published in the Senate Executive Report, td Cong., d sess., October tffb, appendix N, ttt. f. e rough calculation of a DOS archivist consulted by H and Dr. Pastor. Additional Views of Senator Jesse Helms, Senate Executive Report, td Cong., d sess., October tffb, b. t. Statements by Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Alan Simpson, Congressional RecordSenate, tb, no. tb, S t-S t, td Cong., d sess., October n, tffb. Dr. Pastor summarizes his experience in his op-ed piece in the Washington Post, Delay and Obstruct. Summary drawn from Additional Views of Senator Jesse Helms, tb. b. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, Ambassador Alexander Watson, then assistant secretary of state for American republics aairs, observed that he was an early proponent of a summit and discussed it with DOS and NSC ocials, including Richard Feinberg. Personal interview by the author, Arlington, Va., October b, t. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, Text in ibid., appendix B, Richard Feinberg, as senior director of interAmerican aairs at the NSC, tfff, was the author of the original draft. Ibid., t. n. Ibid., f. President Clintons personal involvement in the decision to announce the summit proposal through Vice President Gore is conrmed by Richard Feinberg in ibid., t. is version contradicts observations by several of the individuals interviewed by the author in Washington, D.C., between September and December t that the president did not play a role at the outset. b. As cited in ibid., nf. bt. Ibid., f. b. Ibid., n. b. Ibid., bb. Ibid., and tn. b. Ambassador Charles A. Gillespie, former DOS coordinator of the SOA, per sonal interview by the author, Washington, D.C., February tb, b. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, t, tt. b. Ambassador Watson, personal interview. bn. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, appendix D, tt. Ambassador Wat son views the articulation of these principles and their acceptance by the governments of the hemisphere as conrming the U.S. agenda for the region and its support in the region. Personal interview.Notes to Pages

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bf. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, appendix E, tnb. Ibid., nb. t. Ambassador Gillespie, personal interview. Feinberg, Summitry in the Americas, tt. As suggested here by Feinberg, the OAS was viewed as primarily a debate forum that lacked the capacity needed to eectively track Summit implementation. Several other U.S. ocials the author interviewed shared this view, even though some of them still disagreed with the decision not to use the OAS for follow-up coordination. Although Feinberg, in ibid., ttnb, acknowledges some of the diculties in implementation inherent in the complex follow-up arrangements, his assessment of progress is more positive than the authors, who found, in a tff search of about a dozen of the contact points for information on post-summit advances, only one that was actually functioning at that point in time. b. Ibid., f. Ibid., t. Among others, St. John, Las relaciones Ecuador-Per, ftb. Palmer, Overcoming the Weight of History, b, bn. n. Palmer, Peru-Ecuador Border Conict, ttn, t, tbtntt. f. Ambassador Watson, personal interview. Weidner, Peacekeeping, t. Ambassador Watson, personal interview. Ambassador Einaudi provides his own account in e Ecuador-Peru Peace Process. For a fuller account of the process and its ultimately successful outcome, see Palmer, Overcoming the Weight of History, bb. b. Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, fbf. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, ttf. Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, b. Ibid., b. n. Brenner, Overcoming Asymmetry, f. Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, bb; Nuccio, Unmaking Cuba Policy, b. Vanderbush and Haney, Policy toward Cuba, bb. t. Ibid., b. Ibid. Dom, La poltica de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba, ttt; Nuccio, Unmaking Cuba Policy, b. Palmer, Peru, the Drug Business, and Shining Path, b. Palmer, Fujipopulism and Perus Progress, McClintock and Vallas, e United States and Peru, tbb. Washington Oce on Latin America (WOLA), Drug War Paradoxes, t. n. Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., October t. Notes to Pages

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f. McClintock and Vallas, e United States and Peru, nnn. n. Ambassador Dennis Jett, personal interviews by the author, Lima, Peru, July t, tffn, and July t, tfff. nt. Ambassador John Hamilton, personal interview by the author, Lima, Peru, January tn, n. At a forum on the upcoming elections cosponsored by Transparencia and the National Democratic Institute in Lima, Peru, attended by the author, January tn, n. As an OAS electoral observer sent to Chiclayo for Perus election, the author witnessed rsthand computer manipulation of voting results in this region after they had been compiled and sent to Lima. e author, having returned to Lima to help prepare the nal regional report, also viewed the various protests by impor tant international gures on the only television station reporting them and saw at close hand the impact they had on government and opposition alike. Following these statements, Fujimori ocials pulled back almost immediately from their projections of rst-round victory, and t of the tt opposition party presidential candidates joined forces to lead a signicant popular protest. April t, nb. McClintock and Vallas, e United States and Peru, t. n. Balbi and Palmer, Reinventing Democracy in Peru, n. n. Ambassador Viron P. Vaky, personal interview by the author, Washington, D.C., September tf, t. n. Various former and current DOS ocials, both in Washington and in Latin America, reected on this problem in personal interviews with the author. Several contrasted this experience during the Clinton administration with that under his predecessor, where Assistant Secretary Bernard Aronson enjoyed the condence of Secretary of State Howard Baker, who, like his successors under Clinton, had no particular interest in Latin America. Such condence and a hands-o management style gave Aronson the latitude he needed to formulate and follow through on policies toward the region. nn. Col. Jay Cope (Ret.), personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., October t.Chapter Latin American Policy during the Clinton Years: An Assessment t. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Country Ratings through Latin American Weekly Report, April e latest example, in Bolivia, occurred after publication of this summary of unorthodox regime changes. U.S. General Accounting Oce, Foreign Assistance, t, b. Among a number of critical analyses of the U.S. drug policy is Bertram et al., Drug War Politics. A historical overview of the issue may be found in Walker, ed., Drugs in the Western Hemisphere. See table source for annual Political Rights and Civil Liberties scaling. Many analysts, including those cited in note b above, argue that the U.S. supply-oriented counter-drug policy in Latin America cannot be successful as long as U.S. consumer Notes to Pages

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demand for cocaine and heroin remains high, and that the policy has a signicant negative impact on democratic governance in the aected countries. eir argument that the policy should be abandoned, however, runs counter to U.S. domestic political realities, especially among elected ocials who want to be seen as forceful on the drug issue, making any major adjustment to the policy unlikely. Ambassador Charles Gillespie Jr. noted that the trade issue was only t of not decided among the initiatives to be on the agenda of the SOA at the preparatory meeting held at Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia, just days before the summit. He attributed the lack of agreement on trade to dierences between White House policy and political advisors and within the Oce of the Trade Representative (OTR), resolved only at the last minute by the decision of OTR director Charlene Barshevsky. Gillespie was serving at the time as the coordinator for the SOA meeting. Personal interview with the author, Washington, D.C., February tb, Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool, tt. n. e gures for other years were .n percent in tffb, percent in tff, and f. percent in United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America, table III.a, tn. f. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, fn. t. Ibid., nn; Gallagher, Free Trade and the Environment, f. tt. Ambassador Alexander Watson, personal interview with the author, Arlington, Va., October b, t. t. United Nations Environment Program, Global Environmental Outlook, b. t. Ibid., t. tb. Gallagher, Free Trade and the Environment, bf. t. Such concerns were expressed by a number of U.S. government ocials in per sonal interviews with the author in Washington, D.C., in t and particularly among Foreign Service ocers and midlevel Civil Service employees in the Depart ment of State. t. e Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by tf percent between tfnn and tff and by percent between tff and U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract table nt, bt. t. DOS employment in tffb was ,f and in tff, b,bnf. USIA had ,nnn employees in tffb and ,n in tff, while USAID went from b,f in tffb to two years later. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract table bn. tn. Bacchus, Price of American Foreign Policy, ttt. Notes to Pages

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Interviews with Former Clinton Administration Ocials, U.S. Government Personnel, and Foreign Policy Analysts David Beall, executive director, Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, Organization of American States (OAS). Washington, D.C., September t. Guillermo Belt, career OAS ocial, retired. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Barbara Bowie-Whitman, economic ocer, U.S. delegation to the OAS, tfff. Washington, D.C., September t. James Buchanan, director for South America, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Sean Carroll, coordinator for congressional aairs, Inter-American Dialogue (IAD). Washington, D.C., October b, t. Jay Cope, colonel, U.S. Army (ret.), National Defense University. Washington, D.C., October t. Peter De Shazo, deputy director, U.S. mission to the OAS. Washington, D.C., October b, t. Miles Frechette, U.S. ambassador to Colombia, tffbfn. Washington, D.C., January t, Charles A. Gillespie Jr., U.S. ambassador to Chile, tfff, senior direc tor for Western Hemisphere aairs, National Security Council (NSC), tff f, coordinator, Summit of the Americas, tffb. Washington, D.C., February tb, Peter Hakim, president, IAD. Washington, D.C., August f, t; October t, t; December tn, t. John Hamilton, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, tffft. Lima, Peru, January tn, Margaret Daly Hayes, director, Institute for Hemispheric Security, National Defense University. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Vicki Huddleston, charg daaires, U.S. embassy, Haiti, tff. Cambridge, Mass., May Dennis Jett, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, tffff. Lima, Peru, July t, tffn; July t, tfff.

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Interviews Brian Latelle, deputy director, Latin America Oce, Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, D.C., October b, t. Al Matano, assistant secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Legal Aairs, State Department. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Cynthia McClintock, professor and director of Latin American studies, George Washington University. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Richard Nuccio, senior policy advisor, State Department, tfff. New port, R.I., October t. David Passage, director, Oce of Andean Aairs, State Department, tffff. Arlington, Va., September t; December t, t. Robert Pastor, fellow, Carter Center, tfff. Washington, D.C., May Larry Pezzullo, U.S. special advisor to Haiti, tfffb. Baltimore, October f, t. Anthony C. E. Quainton, U.S. ambassador to Peru, tfnff, assistant secretary for international security, tffbf, director general of the Foreign Service, tfff. Washington, D.C., October t. Riordan Roett, professor and director of Latin American studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Nina Serano, Congressional Research Service (CRS). Washington, D.C., October t. Michael Shifter, vice president for policy, IAD. Washington, D.C., September t, t; October b, t; December t. Michael Southwick, special advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, t. Washington, D.C., January t, Larry Storrs, CRS. Washington, D.C., October t. Mark Sullivan, CRS. Washington, D.C., October t. Joseph Tulchin, director for Latin America, Woodrow Wilson Center. Washington, D.C., October t, t. Viron P. Vaky, senior fellow, IAD. Washington, D.C., September tf, t; December t, t. Arturo Valenzuela, deputy assistant secretary of state, Bureau of InterAmerican Aairs, State Department, tffbf; senior director for West ern Hemisphere Aairs, NSC, tffn. Washington, D.C., October t, t. George Vickers, director, Washington Oce on Latin America (WOLA); director, Open Society Institute, tffn. Washington, D.C., February t,

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Interviews Alexander Watson, assistant secretary of state, Bureau of Inter-American Aairs, State Department, tfff. Arlington, Va., October b, t. Robert White, director, Center for International Policy. Washington, D.C., October b, t. In addition to the individual interviews and conversations noted above, the Inter-American Dialogue sponsored two closed meetings of senior Clinton administration ocials to review and assess Latin American and Caribbean policies during the Clinton years. ese were held on December t, t, and on February t, e following individuals attended: December Lael Brainard, deputy national economic advisor and deputy assistant to President Clinton for International Economic Aairs. Georges Fauriol, director, International Republican Institute. Jon Huenemann, Oce of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Michelle Manatt, director of legislative aairs, Oce of National Drug Control Policy, State Department. omas F. McLarty, White House chief of sta, counselor to the president, and special envoy for the Americas, tfffn. Larry Pezzullo, special advisor to Haiti, tfffb. Ted Piccone, associate director, Latin America Oce, Defense Depart ment, tfff. Mark Schneider, director for Latin America, U.S. Agency for Interna tional Development (USAID), tffff; director, Peace Corps, tffft. Michael Shifter, IAD. Viron P. Vaky, IAD. Arturo Valenzuela, deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Aairs, State Department; senior director, Western Hemisphere Aairs, NSC. February Harriet Babbitt, ambassador to the OAS, tfff. Jane Bussey, reporter, Miami Herald. Robert Gelbard, U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, tfnff; director, Oce of International Narcotics and Legal Aairs, State Department, tfff. Peter Hakim, IAD. Jon Huenemann, Oce of the U.S. Trade Representative. Rich Klein, assistant to omas McLarty. Kenneth McCay, White House advisor to President Clinton, tfft.

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Interviews John OLeary, U.S. ambassador to Chile, tffnt. Pedro Pablo Permuy, sta assistant, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives. Ted Piccone, Defense Department. Peter Romero, U.S. ambassador to Ecuador, tfffn; assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere aairs, State Department, tffft.

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Bibliography Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.Latin American Relations. d ed. New York: Oxford University Press, Smith, Wayne S. e Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic History of the Castro Years. New York: W. W. Norton, tfn. St. John, Ronald Bruce. Las relaciones Ecuador-Peru: una perspective histrica. In Ecuador-Per: Horizontes de la negociacin y el conicto, ed. Adrin Bonilla, nftt. Quito: FLACSO, Sede Ecuador, tfff. Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index. Annual, tff. (July ). Turner, Douglas. President Pulled Out All the Stops for Huge Victory on NAFTA. Bualo News (November t, tff): t. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Social Panorama of Latin America UN Pub. LC/G. f-P. Santiago, Chile: UN Publications, May b. A Decade of Light and Shadow: Latin America and the Caribbean in the s, ed. Jos Antonio Ocampo and Juan Martin. Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, July United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Global Environmental Outlook: Latin America and the Caribbean. San Jos, Costa Rica: UNEP, November (August ). U.S. Department of Commerce. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oce, annual. (accessed August tb, ). U.S. General Accounting Oce (USGAO). Foreign Assistance: U.S. Democracy Programs in Six Latin American Countries Have Yielded Modest Results. GAO-n. Washington, D.C.: USGAO, March (July tn, ). U.S. Oce of National Drug Control Policy. National Drug Control Strategy Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oce, Urrego, Miguel ngel. Social and Popular Movements in a Time of Cholera, tf tfff. In Violence in Colombia, : Waging War and Negotiating Peace, ed. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Pearanda, and Gonzalo Snchez G., ttn. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Books, t. Valenzuela, Arturo. e Collective Defense of Democracy: Lessons from the Paraguayan Crisis of Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conict. New York: Carnegie, tfff. Vanderbush, Walt, and Patrick J. Haney. Policy toward Cuba in the Clinton Administration. Political Science Quarterly ttb, no. : nbn. Walker, omas W. Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, tfft. Walker, William O., III, ed. Drugs in the Western Hemisphere: An Odyssey of Cultures in Conict. Jaguar Books on Latin America, no. t. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Books, tff.

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Bibliography Walsh, Kenneth T., David Hage, Jim Impoco, and Linda Robinson. Combatants in the Bruising NAFTA Battle Begin to Dig In eir Heels. U.S. News and World Report tt, no. t: t. Washington Oce on Latin America (WOLA). Drug War Paradoxes: e U.S. Gov ernment and Perus Vladimir Montesinos. Drug War Monitor, a WOLA Brieng Series. Washington, D.C.: WOLA, July b. Clear and Present Dangers: e U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. Washington, D.C.: WOLA, tfft. Weidner, Glenn R. Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley: A Regional Response to Crisis. In Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conict, ed. Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes, b. Miami: North-South Center Press at the University of Miami, tfff. Wiarda, Howard J. United States Policy in Latin America. Current History nf, no. b (January tff): tn, t. Finding Our Way? Toward Maturity in U.S.Latin American Relations. Washington, D.C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, tfn. Wilkie, James W., ed. Statistical Abstract of Latin America. Vols. tn, f, n. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center, tf, tff, Williamson, John, ed. e Political Economy of Policy Reform. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, tff. Wittkopf, Eugene R. e Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. d ed. New York: St. Martins Press, tffb. Wood, Bryce. e Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy. Austin: University of Texas Press, tfn. World Bank. Social Indicators of Development, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, tff. Youngers, Coletta A., and Eileen Rosin, e U.S. War on Drugs: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. In Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: e Impact of U.S. Policy, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, ttb. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,

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Adams, Alvin, Agenda t document, Air pollution, f, ft, f Albright, Madeleine, b, Allende, Salvador, t Alliance for Progress, tt Andean Initiative, tn, Andean Trade Preference Act (tfft), Anticommunism, ft, ttt, tt Anticorruption programs, n Argentina, extra-NATO ally, b Arias Peace Plan, t, tf Aristide, Bertrand, b, bt Aronson, Bernard, t, tnn Arz, lvaro, Asia, b Aspin, Les, bf Authoritarian regimes, t, tb Baeza, Mario, Baker, James A., t Balseros (rafters), Bay of Pigs, t Bipolar framework, t, tb Bolivia, drug production, nt Border conict, Peru-Ecuador, b, nt, Brady Plan, tt, f Bureaucratic politics approach, bb Bush, George H. W. (Herbert Walker): Clinton administration compared, ; Clinton following up on initiatives, nt; Cuban embargo, ; end of cold war, ; NAFTA, b; policies analyzed, t; policy changes, tt; policy initiatives, t, Caputo, Dante, b, bn Carbon dioxide production, Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, Caribbean, use of designation, fnt Caribbean Basin Initiative, t Carter, Jimmy, t, b, Carter Center, t, b Case studies, Cedrs, General, bn, bf, t Central America: conict resolution, tf, f; Reagan policy, t; U.S. policy ef fects, t Central America Peace Plan, t Chile: free trade agreement, n; U.S. intervention against Allende, t, fnn Christopher, Warren, b, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency): on Aris tide, bn, t; assets in Haiti, t; cold war expansion, t; Guatemala tfb intervention, ft; Haitian immigration, See also Intelligence community Civilian governments, tb Civil liberties, nt Civil society actors, Clinton, Bill (William Jeerson): interest in Latin America, xi, b, f; political skills, xi Clinton administration: achievements summarized, xi; appointments, ; back ground conditions summarized, xixii; George H. W. Bush administration compared, ; failures, ; Latin American team, ; policies characterized, b, bb; policy objectives, ; successes, b; summarized, Coca-leaf production, n, n; strategies and levels, nnt, nt. See also Drugcontrol policies Cold war, ftt Cold war, end of, t, ttb Colombia: decertication, f; drug production, nt. See also Drug-control policies Conicted policy actors, bbt Conicting priorities, bbt Conict resolution, tfIndex

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Index Congressional Black Caucus, t Constraints approach, xii, n, f, fb Consultative process, Contras (counterrevolutionaries), t, t, tf Corruption, nn, f, nt Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), nf, f t Council of the Americas, tnn Counter-drug policies. See Drug-control policies Cuba: Brothers to the Rescue yovers, b; G.H.W. Bush era, ; Clinton era, tb; embargo, b; Elin Gonzlez, ; new sanctions, ; popes visit, b; relations summarized, Cuba Democracy Act, Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), Cuban Americans, t Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act. See Helms-Burton Act Cuban refugee issue, Debt crisis, tb, tt Debt forgiveness, t Debt relief, f Decertication, Colombia, f Deforestation, ft, ftt Democratic Party: fast track renewal, ; free trade, ; FTAA, ; labor and environmental side agreements, t; NAFTA, bb, b Democratic practice/promotion, ; anticommunism and, ft; Clinton policy goals, ; counter-drug policy related, ; drug-control policy versus, n; follow ing up G.H.W. Bush goals, t; recent trends, nt; summary evaluation, b Democratization phenomenon, fn Department of Defense, bn, f Department of State: budget outlays, ffb; leadership by, f; resource reduction, b Department of the Treasury, n Discrimination objective, nn, nf; summary evaluation, Domestic issues, primacy of, ; drug war pressures, fb, tnn; foreign policy versus, bb; impact on foreign policy, t Dominican Republic, U.S. invasion of, t, fnnb DOS Oce of Congressional Aairs (H), b Drug-control policies: aid levels, nnt; Andean Initiative, tn; Andean nations, n; G.H.W. Bush, t, tn; Colombia, f; critical arguments, tnn; democracy related, ; failure of, ; impact, nt, n; McCarey emphasis, ; Mexico, n; Peru, bbt, n; production levels (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru), n; Republican inuence, t; summarized, n. See also Coca-leaf production Economic aid, n, n, n, ffnt Economic crisis, tbt, nt Economic growth, summary evaluation, Ecuador. See Border conict, Peru-Ecuador Education, tt Einaudi, Luigi, Eisenhower administration, fnnb El Salvador, guerrillas, t Endara, Guillermo, Enterprise of the Americas Initiative, t Environmental issues, ff; Bush I era, ; indicators listed, ft; summarized, ; summary evaluation, Exchange Stabilization Fund, Exports, tb, n, nt Family planning ban, Fast Track authority/renewal, t, b, b, n, t, n, tnbn Feinberg, Richard, Fisk, Dan, Foreign aairs, funding for, fb Foreign direct investment, f, n, nb, n Foreign loans, f Foreign Military Sales (FMS), t Foreign policy, as reactive versus proactive, Foreign policy bureaucracy, bb, f, tnt; employment, fb, tnnt Foreign policy process, Frechette, Myles, f Freedom House assessment, Free trade, t; Asia, b; Bush I policies, ttn;

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Index Clinton on, b; Democratic Party, ; Miami summit, ; opponents, ; summary evaluation, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), b, ; disagreement over, t; disappointments, n; extended debate, n; NAFTA and, nb; potential benets, nb Friends of Haiti, bn Fujimori, Alberto: authoritarian collapse, ; border dispute settled, t; repression, bbt; second term, ; self-coup, tf, b, ; third term, n; U.S. access to, See also Peru Funnel model, Gender discrimination, nn, nft General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT), b, Gephardt, Richard, Gonzlez, Elin, Gore, Al, b, b, f, tnf Governors Island Accord, bnbf, ; summarized, b. See also Haiti Greenhouse gases, f Guantnamo Bay naval base/detention center, bn, Guarantor military mission, f Guatemala: peace process, ; Serranos self-coup, t; U.S. tfb intervention, ft, fnnb Guerrillas: Central American, t; Colombia, f, bt, ; frustrated expectations, tt; Guatemala, tf, ; Peru, b Haiti: Carter trip, b; Clinton policy on, b, bt; peacekeeping venture, tf, ; policy discussions, tnt; policy inuences analyzed, t; refugee issue, b, bbn; trade embargo, See also Governors Island Accord Hamilton, John, n Helms, Jesse: on Cuba, ; Pastor nomination, b Helms-Burton Act, n, b Historical relationships, Huddleston, Vicky, bf Human rights: Carter, tb; Peru, b, Impeachment attempt (tffn), b, fb Imports, n Import substitution industrialization (ISI), tb, t Income inequality: nn, tnnn; summary evaluation, Indigence, n Infant mortality, tt Intelligence community: Haiti, t; Peru, Inter-American Dialogue, xiii Interventions, U.S., ft; Dominican Republic, t; Guatemala, ft; Haiti plan, ; Latin American nations on, tntf, ; Panama, tf; unilateral, t Iran-Contra scandal, t Jett, Dennis, Job creation, summary evaluation, Labor and environment side agreements (NAFTA), b, b, t Labor sector, f Latin America, use of designation, fnt Leadership, limits on, b, f; consistency, n; Helms example, ; middle-level, f Literacy, tt McCarey, Barry, McLarty, omas Mack, III, b, Mahuad, Jamil, Malval, Robert, bf Mariel boatlift, tbn Market economic models, t; Clinton era, f; economic eects, ; Haiti, ; liberalization reforms, nt, n Ms Canosa, Jorge, Mexico: drug-control policies, n; opening up political system, t, ; political as sassinations, t; political parties, t; trade increase, n, nbn. See also Peso crisis (Mexico) Miami Summit of the Americas (SOA), n, b; analyzed, bn; building on success of, ; bureaucracies involved, bb; counter-drug programs, n; environmental issues, fft; summarized, ; U.S. goals, n. See also Summit of the Americas (SOA)

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Index Middle-level leadership, f Military assistance: anticommunism, tt; major drug-producing nations, nt; Peru, b; Plan Colombia, f; recent trends, n Military establishment, U.S., t Military regimes, eects of military aid, tt. See also Authoritarian regimes Military sales, b Montesinos, Vladimiro, bbt, n Multilateralism, f NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement): fast track authority, ; FTAA and, nb; peso crisis, ; price of, b; ratication, b, bb, f, n, tnn. See also Labor and environment side agreements National security, f, t, tt, tb National Security Council, t, b Nicaragua: Pastors role questioned, ; Sandinistas, t; Somoza supported, t Noriega, Manuel, tf OAS/UN International Civilian Mission (ICM), bf Ocial trips abroad, advantages of, btb Opium poppy cultivation, nt Opportunities for United States, xi Organization of American States (OAS), f, b, bn; Santiago Declaration, tn; summit follow-up, tn; view of, tn. See also Resolution tn Panama: Pastor ambassadorial nomination, tb; U.S. invasion, tf Panama Canal treaties, Paraguay, t Paramilitary death squads, f Paris Consultative Group of Donor Countries, Party list gender quotas, nn Pastor, Robert, tb Pastor ambassadorial nomination, tb, t; summarized, Peacekeeping forces: Ecuador-Peru border dispute, f; Haiti, tf, Peace process: Central America, f; Guatemala, Prez de Cuellar, Javier, t Perot, Ross, b Peru: drug-control policies, bbt, n; drug production, n; electoral fraud, n, tnn; Resolution tn, t. See also Border conict, Peru-Ecuador; Coca-leaf production; Drug-control policies; Fujimori, Alberto Peso crisis (Mexico), b Pezzullo, Lawrence, bn, Plan Colombia (U.S. military aid), f Point Four Program, t, fnffntt Policy makers, constraints on, Policy objectives, summary evaluation of, b Policy strategy assessed, b Political rights, nt Potable water, ftf, ft Poverty: economic aid, ttt; eects of market-oriented models, ; levels, n; poverty eradication objective, nn; summary evaluation, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD), b Pulley, Gregg, bf, Reagan administration, t, t Reno, Janet, Republican Party: animus toward Clinton, fb; control of Congress, b, b, nt Resolution tn, tntf, t, b, Rio Earth Summit, Rio Protocol (tfb), f, Robinson, Randall, Rubin, Robert, Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, t, Santiago Declaration, tn Santiago Resolution. See Resolution tn Santiago Summit of the Americas, as forum, n School of the Americas, t Security aid, n Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, b, Serrano, Jorge, t Smith, Wayne, b Social spending, n, nn Somalia, bf, Soviet Union, former, t, ttb

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Index Spero, Joan, Spirit of Airlie House consensus, Summit of the Americas (SOA): Declaration of Principles, f; follow-up mechanisms, ; Plan of Action, n, f; policy objectives, b; preparation experience, tnb; presidential involvement, f. See also Miami Summit of the Americas Sustainable development, ff; summary evaluation, Talbott, Strobe, Tequila eect, Toledo, Alejandro, Torricelli, Robert, Trade: G.H.W. Bush administration initiatives followed up, f; environment related, f; Haiti embargo, ; private direct investment, f; summit agenda, tnn; U.S. with Mexico/Latin America, n. See also Market economic models Transparency International (TI), n TV Mart, Two-level games focus, UN (United Nations), t, f Unanticipated events, impact of, United Fruit Company, fnnb UN Mission for Human Rights Verication in Guatemala (MINUGUA), UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), bf USAID (United States Agency for International Development), tt, fb U.S. Information Agency (USIA), fb USS Harlan County, bft, tbnt USTR (U.S. Oce of Trade Representative), n, tnn Valenzuela, Arturo, t Venezuela, dictatorships supported, t Washington Consensus, t, ttn, f, n Watson, Alexander, f, Women, in elected oce, nn, nf World Trade Organization (WTO), Yugoslavia, conicts in former, Zedillo, Ernesto, t,

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David Scott Palmer is professor of international relations and political science at Boston University. Before coming to his present position, he served for twelve years as director of Latin American and Caribbean studies at the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State, where he was also coordinator for the advanced area studies program and associate dean for programs in the School of Area Studies. He consults with the Department of State, the National Intelligence Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development on policy issues related to terrorism, conict resolution, and problems of democracy in Latin America. He lectures widely at colleges and universities in the United States, Latin America, and Spain on these and other topics, and is the author of books on Latin American politics and articles on United StatesLatin American relations, among other subjects.