The Sonoran triumvirate

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Title:
The Sonoran triumvirate preview in Sonora, 1910-1920
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vii, 582 leaves : ill. ; 28 cm.
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English
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Giese, Anna Mae
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Politics and government -- Sonora (Mexico : State)   ( lcsh )
Politics and government -- Mexico -- 1910-1946   ( lcsh )
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theses   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

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Thesis:
Thesis--University of Florida.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 575-581).
Statement of Responsibility:
by Anna Mae Giese.
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Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.

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University of Florida
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THE SONORAN TRIUMVIRATE:
PREVIEW IN SONORA: 1910-1920









by

ANNA MAE GIESE

















A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY







UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1975


_ _~_____~~













PREPACE


The history of Sonora during the years 1910--to 1920

is significant in that Sonora was the home state of the

three men who dominated the national government for fifteen

years after Carranza's death in 1920: Adolfo de la Huerta,

Plutarco Elfas Calles and Alvaro Obregdn. Of the three,

Called emerged as the dominant figure in Sonoran politics

just as he would later come to dominate national politics.

Sonora, from 1910 to 1920, offered a preview of many of his

later practices and policies.

This work does not pretend to be a systematic analysis

of the events in Sonora or a definitive biographic study of

the three major participants; too much data is unavailable

to approach either goal. Rather, this is an attempt to record

the attainment of political power by the triumvirate and what

use they made of that power.

Many persons have helped to make this work possible, and

to them I express my gratitude. To Seffores Enrique Macfas

Buelna and Sergio Antonio Flores Rufz and their staff at the

Archivo General del Estado de Sonora, and especially to Max

for fetching and carrying, my warmest thanks. I must ac-

knowledge the help of Senora Dolores Martfnez de Murillo and


__ ~~








her family; of Manuel Martfnez, an admirer of Pancho Villa,

and Alicia Guerra. In addition, I am grateful to the two

lawyers in the Government Palace who took the time to whip

out a formal petition to the Governor to enable me to work

in the archives; to the staffs of the Latin American col-

lection at the University of Texas and the Houston Public

Library. I am indebted to Neill Macaulay of the University

of Florida for his helpful suggestions in the preparation of

this manuscript;.and I am eternally indebted to Teresa

Alessi, who introduced me to the people of Arizpe and helped

in the difficult transcription of tape recordings. My

thanks, too, to the people of Arizpe who remembered for me.

To my family, for their patience and encouragement, and to

my business associates for their understanding and tolerance,

I owe more than thanks.


iii





I
ARIZONA I



.1? I


Iv 4-J














TABLE OF CONTENTS


PREFACE.....................................................i

MAP..................................................... .i

ABSTRACT............. ........ ....... ............... ..........

INTRODUCTION: BEFORE 1910................................1

MADERO AND MAYTORENA ......o..............................67

A NEW POWER STRUGGLE: 1912-1914. .........................133

MAYTORENA AND VILLA: 1914-1915 .........................1.97

THE CONSTITUCIONALISTAS TAKE CONTROL: 1915-1917..........263

THE ASCENDANCY OF SONORA IN MEXICAN
POLITICS: 1917-1920 ....................................... 334

MONEY AND TAXES............................................379

MINING AND LABOR..........................................418

FOOD AND LAND.............................................. 436

SONORAN "PROGRESSIVISM"................................. ..5

CONCLUSIONS................................................559

BIBLIOGRAPHY... ........................................o3

BIOGRAPHY........................................................... "9











Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


THE SONORAN TRIUMVIRATE:
PREVIEW IN SONORA: 1910-1920


by

Anna Mae Giese


June, 1975


Chairman: Neill Macaulay
Major Department: History

Beginning in June, 1920 the national government of

Mexico was dominated for fifteen years by three men from the

state of Sonora: Adolfo de la Huerta, who served as presi-

dent until December, 1920, had been both elected and appointed

governor of Sonora; Alvaro Obregdn, who succeeded him, was the

nation's pre-eminent military man who had successfully guided

the military aspects of the revolution; Plutarco Ellas Calles,

who became president in December, 1924, also had been an

appointive and elective governor in Sonora.

The attitudes and policies of the three men could be

expected to reflect their prior stands, and in many instances,

did so. Thus the political observer could deduce as each








man took office what to expect from his presidency. De la

UBerta, from his prior roles, could be expected to be.. a peace-

maker, a go-between and an arranger of compromises, who none-

theless retained a radical revolutionary streak. ObregOn

oould be noted as an able manipulator of men, but his position

on many revolutionary programs would be unclear due to his

preoccupation with the military phases of Huerta's overthrow

during the years after he joined the movement. Calles could

be expected to hang onto his power, once attained, by any means

available, and to be constantly involved in political intriguing.

It was largely due to his machinations that Sonora was plunged

into a disastrous civil war in 1914 which placed Joas Marta

Maytorena, the constitutionally elected governor, on one side

and Calles on the other. The Sonoran conflict came to involve

the entire nation and caused continued warfare at a time when

Mexico should have been settling into peace. Carranza did not

take advantage of his opportunities to prevent the war, and

possibly even had reasons to encourage it.

As military governor and governor, Calles issued numerous

decrees and circulars, some of which accepted Carranza's reforms

of the Plan of Guadalupe and some of which were creations of

his own. Notable was his ban on alcoholic beverages, his pro-

motioo:of education, his land use and tax reforms, and his ex-

pulsion of the clergy. Enforcement of these rulings, however,

was usually arbitrary. His attempts to remedy the monetary and

economic crises suffered by Sonora frequently brought him into

conflict with Carranza. To retain his control of the state he


_ __








utilized an army, supposedly necessitated by the continual

difficulties with the Yaqui Indians.

Be la Huerta served Carranza in the Secretariat of

Government, then returned to Sonora as governor in 1916 to

introduce a new issue of paper money. During his term he

promulgated a radical labor program, which alienated the

mining industry, and attempted implementation of land reforms.

ObregOn, after heading the army and serving as Secretary

of War, returned to Sonora to become quickly a wealthy busi-

nessman. His political ambition was widely known and became

a factor in national politics in 1917. His presidential as-

pirations led to the uprising of 1920, the death of Carranza,

and the achievement of national power by the Sonoran

triumvirate.


viii













CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: BEFORE 1910


The state of Sonora is the second largest in Mexico,

encompassing 70,477 square miles, half of which includes

the botanical province known as the Sonoran Desert. The

northwestern panhandle, from the Colorado River eastward

to the area of Altar, is knuwn as the Altar Desert, a re-

gion of scattered vegetation, drifting sand and steep vol-

canic mountains. Mean annual rainfall varies from four

inches west of Puerto Penasco to eight inches in the

region of Altar, but as elsewhere in the desert province,

some areas receive no rain for years on end, and rains,

when they come to a locality, are generally heavy. In the

northwest, winter rainfall during December, January, and

February exceeds the summer rains of July, August and

September. Temperatures vary greatly, from occasional

below freezing days in the winter to record heats in suner.

Temperatures usually exceed one hundred degrees during June,

July, August and September, with the world's record heat

being recorded in San Luis, Sonora on August 11, 1973:

134.40F in the shade.


'The principal sources for this discussion of Sonora's
geography are Roger Dunbier, The Sonoran Desert; Its Geography,
Economy and People (Tucson, Arizona, 1968), 1-98; Jorge L.
Tamayo, Geografia general de Mexico (Mexico, D.F., 1962), 4
vols., scattered references.








Vegetation is denser in other portions of the desert

province; especially toward the south where, with the increase

in rainfall, it becomes almost a forest, albeit low, tangled

and spiny. Daily temperatures are somewhat cooler than in the

northwest; nonetheless, they climb daily over 100*F during the

summer months. Winter temperatures often are uncomfortably

cold, but frosts are rare and the growing season throughout

the desert permits the maturation of two crops per year. The

summer rainy season raises humidity, increasing discomfort

so much that Sonora even today maintains the custom of the

siesta; all businesses except restaurants, hotels and service

stations are closed from one o'clock to three o'clock in the

afternoon. Sunset brings little relief from the heat. Mean

annual rainfall in the eastern part of the desert ranges from

eight to fifteen inches with isohyets running approximately

parallel to the coastline and increasing to the east.

Geologically, Sonora belongs to the Basin and Range pro-

vince whAcht:begins in north central Arizona. Within this

province one is forever encircled by isolated fault block

mountains which form roughly parallel and discontinuous

ranges separated by continuous basins. Through the desert

portion of Sonora the basins are very wide, but moving east-

ward out of the desert into the piedmont of the Sierra Madre

Occidental the ranges increase in width and become higher,

and the basins narrow into river valleys. Temperatures








become more moderate with the increase in altitude and the

annual rainfall increases in the area around Alamos to

thirty inches per year. In the Cananea area, where the

Sonora and Moctezuma Rivers originate, rainfall reaches

twenty-five inches per year. The mountains form a barrier

to communications with Chihuahua on the east, and until the

end of the first quarter of the twentieth century Yaqui and

Mayo Indian rebellions often closed the narrow corridor

giving access to Sinaloa. Sonora is a broken country,

difficult of access.

The rivers of Sonora are, for the most part, seasonal

or intermittent; the Yaqui and the Mayo are the only rivers

which carry any quantity of water throughout the year. Until

the twentieth century, however, the rivers were the only

utilized water sources in the state; the Opata and the Pima

tribes had settled along the river terraces and developed

a primitive, but productive, irrigated subsistence agriculture

which persists, little changed, to the present. The rivers

imposed the pattern of settlement and established the line

of communications. Villages strung along the river valleys

communicated with ease. The distances between villages were

short and for much of the year the river bed, or a portion

of it, made a level, albeit dusty roadway. However, mountain

ranges effectively limited east-west communications in the

colonial era, as well as today. Each valley was an isolated,

independent and self-reliant world.








Sonora's physical isolation supported the growth of a

certain independence in political and economic affairs. The

great distances from Mexico City and the difficulty of communi-

cations resulted in Sonora's often being ignored in Mexico City,

and Mexico City's often being ignored in Sonora. Proximity to

the United States meant that Yankee ideas and Yankee dollars

could exert powerful, if unwanted, influence, especially after

the 1880's. Because of distance the central government, both

colonial and independent, seldom furnished leadership, thereby

permitting opportunists to agitate and involve the state in

repeated power struggles.

The first Spaniards to enter the area today known as

Sonora were probably members of a slave-seeking party under

Diego de GuzmAn which arrived at the Yaqui River in October,

1533, where they fought a battle with the Indians who lived

there.2 Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca, Estebanico, Alonso del

Castillo Maldonado, and Andrds Dorantes, the survivors of



2The following is a partial list of the sources used
for this resumed of the history of Sonora prior to the revolu-
tion. General: Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of the North
Mexican States and Texas (San Francisco, 1886 and 1889);
Eduardo W. Villa, Compendio de historic del estado de Sonora
(Mexico, D.F., 1937). Colonial: Fanny Bandelier, translator,
The Journey of Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca (New York, 1922);
Sidney B. Brinckerhoff and Odie B. Faulk, Lancers for the King
(Phoenix, 1965); Herbert E. Bolton, Coronado on the Turquoise
Trail (Albuquerque, 1949); Elliott Coues, translator, On the
Trail of a Spanish Pioneer: The Diary and Itinerary of
Francisco Garces (New York, 1900); George P. Hammond, "pimerfa
Alta after Kino's Time," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. 4,
No. 3 (1929), 220-238; George Hammond and Agapito Rey, Narra-
tives of the Coronado Expedition (Albuquerque, 1940); Ignaz








Pinfilo Narviez expedition's shipwreck on the Texas Gulf

Coast, wandered over part of the state to reach the Yaqui

River in 1536, although there is no certainty of their route.

The party encountered artifacts which indicated the Spanish

presence, and began to hear tales of Spanish slave raids.

On their arrival in Mexico City, the new viceroy,

Antonio de Mendoza, discussed their travels with them.

Mendoza decided to use to his own advantage the good in-

fluence of Cabeza de Vaca with the Indians, to help him

build an empire in competition with Cortes. Mendoza would



Pfefferkorn, Sonora: A Description of the Province, trans-
lated and annotated by Theodore E. Treutlein (Albuquerque,
1949); Roberto Ramos, ed., Descripci n hecha en el aio de.1778
por el Padre Fray Agustfn de Morfi, sobre Arizpe, Sonora,
capital que fue de las provincias internal (Mexico, D.F.,
1949); Mario Hernandez Sanchez-Barba, La Ultima expansion
espafola en America (Madrid, 1957); Edward H. Spicer, Cycles
of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico and the United
States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960 (Tucson,
1962); Theodore E. Treutlein, "The Economic Regime of the
Jesuit Missions in Eighteenth Century Sonora," Pacific His-
torical Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1939), 289-300; Rufus Kay
Wyllys, "Padre Luis W. Velarde's Relacidn of Pimeria Alta,
1716," New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1931),
111-157. National: Daniel Cosio Villegas, ed., Historia
modern de Mexico (Mexico, D.F., 1955-1972), Vols. 1-9;
Roberty M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army
and the Indians, 1866-1891 (New York, 1973); James D.
Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution,
1900-1913 (Austin, 1968); Rodolfo F. Acua, Sonoran Strongman:
Ignacio Pesqueira and His Times (Tucson, 1974); Robert D.
Gregg, The Influence of Border Troubles on Relations between
the United States and Mexico, 1876-1910 (Baltimore, 1937);
Max L. Moorhead, The Apache Frontier (Norman, Oklahoma, 1968);
Alfred Jackson Hanna and Kathryn Abbey Hanna, Napoleon III and
Mexico: American Triumph over Monarchy (Chapel Hill, 1971);
Robert M. Forbes, Crabb's Filibustering Expedition into Sonora,
1857 (Tucson, 1952); C. L. Sonnichsen, Colonel Greene and the
Copper Skyrocket (Tucson, 1974).








send a small advance party to prepare for a larger force of

conquerors. Thus, a party guided by the slave Estebanico

and including Father Marcos de Niza went northward through

Sonora in 1539; Estebanico separated from Father Marcos and

hurried on before him he met death in northern Sonora.

Father Marcos, following Estebanico's path, allegedly arrived

near Cibola, but the hostility of the Pueblo Indians pre-

vented actual entry. His fantastic account of the journey

and the riches awaiting the conquerors of the northern towns,

possibly written in collaboration with Mendoza, did what the

Viceroy wanted it to dos it lured troublemakers away from

New Spain.

Hernando Cortes saw Mendoza's expedition as an infringe-

ment on his rights to explore the north, and he also dispatched

an expedition in 1539. This exploratory effort, a sea expedi-

tion under Francisco de Ulloa, followed the coast to the

mouth of the Colorado River. Unlike Marcos de Niza, Ulloa

reported no wealthy cities; he could describe only the arid

desolation of the Sonora coastal desert.

The glowing reports of Fray Marcos aroused enthusiasm

among the wealth-seeking Spaniards, and Viceroy Mendoza and

Francisco Visquez de Coronado, governor of New Galicia,

easily found men willing to undertake a mission of conquest.

Early reports by one of Coronado's men, Melchor Dfaz, sent

to verity the priest's tales, described nothing remotely akin

to Fray Marcos' picture. The fledgling expedition almost

died at birth; it took all of Coronado's persuasive powers








to revive interest. The advance party arrived in the Sonora

River Valley in May, 1540, and continued up that natural road-

way past friendly Indian settlements into Arizona. In the

meantime, an associated seaaexpedition had sailed pp the

coast to the Colorado River and up that river to its juncture

with the Gila. The main body of Coronado's expedition

arrived in Sonora after his departure, and organized a town

in the Sonora River Valley, while awaiting orders from Coronado.

In October, 1540 Melchor Diaz arrived to take command in

Sonora and the main body moved up to join Coronado.

DIaz set out to make connections with the sea expedi-

tion, traversing the desert to the coast, which he followed

until he crossed the Colorado River and then veered into

California. Neither Coronado's expedition to the great plains

nor his collateral expeditions found any great source of gold

or mineral wealth, and their portraits of Mexico's northwestern

territories did not encourage a great rush of settlement. The

Spanish moved only to occupy lands along the Rio Bravo del

Norte (Rio Grande) among the docile Pueblo Indians.

In the 1560's Sinaloa and Sonora became a part of the

province of New Biscay (Nueva Vizcaya), which had its capital

in Durango, with the appointment of Francisco de Ibarra to

conquer and rule the northern regions not yet under Spanish

dominion. Ibarra crossed a part of Sonora traveling to

Sinaloa, but made no effort at conquest; that would occur

peacefully through the efforts of the clergy. Sonora remained

a pathway to the north for occasional explorers, though








Spanish dominion ended at the Sinaloa River. Spain's hold

on New Galicia was tenuous, but during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries the Franciscan and Dominican orders

worked earnestly to bring the natives south of the Sinaloa

River into the Church-and civilization.

The Company of Jesus arrived in New Biscay in 1590

and in 1591 entered Sinaloa, where they established a mission

on the Sinaloa River. In 1605 they moved to the Puerte

River, but advance to the Mayo and Yaqui Rivers was delayed

until the more ferocious tribes which occupied those valleys

could be pacified. Campaigns between 1602 and 1610 subdued

the tribes, and the first mission in Sonora was established

on the Rio Mayo in 1613. The Mayo Valley was divided into

three districts with missions at Etchojoa, Navojoa and Camoa.

So well was the mission system accepted, that by 1620 the

Jesuits claimed 30,000 converts among the Mayos. The Yaquis,

too, became converts in 1617, and settled into eight pueblos

along the river.

Once past the Mayo-Yaqui barrier the missions progressed

rapidly along the north-south valleys inhabited by the seden-

tary Opata and Pima tribal groups, which easily adopted to

mission life. By 1648 the missions reached to Bacoachi

the Sonora River, to Cucurpe on the San Miguel River and

Bavispe on the Bavispe River. Northeastern expansion stalled

on the border of the area ravaged by the wide-ranging Apaches,

and western expansion was contained for many years by the








recalcitrant Seri of the western desert.

Sinaloa and Sonora, which was already known by that

name, were considered as one province until 1640 or 1641,

when the two were temporarily separated, and a new capital,

San Juan Bautista, was established in the Sonora River

Valley. The division persisted until possibly 1650, when

the provinces were reunited. In 1693 the provinces were

again separated and Domingo Jironza Petrfz de Crusate, the

ex-governor of New Mexico, became the captain-governor and

promptly began a campaign against the Apaches and allied

bands who were raiding on the northeastern frontier.

The missionaries advanced with the benefit of presidio

soldiers; the first rush of Spaniards into Sonora did not

come until the discovery of silver in lamos in 1684. By

1678, there were thirty priests in Sonora serving approx-

imately 40,000 persons; of those possibly 500 were Spanish

or mixed blood. Jesuit documents from about 1688 list small

mining camps in the Sahauripa-Arivechi and Batuc areas and

mention a mining camp on the lower Yaqui River with thirty

Spaniards. There was only one permanent garrison, at

Pronteras, positioned to stave off Apache aids,

The only likely remaining field for missionary endeavor

lay among the Upper Pima tribes and the related Papagos, who

farmed along the desert rivers of northwestern Sonora.

Their conversion was due primarily to one remarkable ar-

thritic priest, Father Eusebio Francisco Kino, who came to

Sonora first in 1685, visited California, and then returned





10


to Sonora to work and explore. It was Kino who opened an

overland route to California, which would be followed in

1776 by Juan Bautista de Anza (the younger) when he led

colonists from Sonora and Sinaloa to settle San Franisco.

Before his death in 1711 Father Kino established missions in

the inhospitable desert from the Magdalena River on the

south to the Santa Cruz River in the north. Kino always had

trouble securing priests to serve in his missions, but

the combination of royal indifference and active opposition

from the military government after 1703 made his task im-

possible. After his death only two priests remained active

in his mission sphere although another arrived in 1720; the

missions were abandoned. Not until 1730, with the arrival

of several new priests, was any further attempt made to reach

the Indians.

The cruelties and oppressions of the Spanish soldiers

and the servants of the clerics in the missions in the Pima

presidios sparked a revolt at Tubutama in which a priest was

killed. In retaliation Jironza's men massacred fifty

Indians, then thinking the deaths would intimidate the sur-

viving Pimas, the soldiers left to fight Apaches. As soon

as they were safely gone, the Pimas resumed the wholesale

destruction of mission properties in Father Kino's domain.

Governor Jironza called on the presidios for aid and the

soldiers, in a campaign for which no details have been

preserved, forced the Indians back to the missions. Through








missionary influence a general pardon was granted to the

Indians.

In 1696 another uprising was planned by a native

neophyte who accused the Spanish of taking Indian lands, and

making his people virtual slaves. The Pimas had suffered

more deaths and cruelties at the hands of their Spanish

protectors, he said, than they had from the Apaches. Jironza,

with the help of loyal Indians, succeeded in putting down the

revolt. More Apache wars followed in 1698, and in 1699 the

Series began a long war against Spanish encroachment.

Kino's problem with the Spanish in Sonora stemmed in

part from a change in government. Jironza was replaced in

1701, and his successors reflected the more general attitude

of the Spanish settlers. Even the army was composed largely

of men seeking wealth, and chasing Apaches would not make

them rich. The miners and settlers wanted laborers, and

Apaches did not fill that need. With the tales of Pima

treachery then current, it was not difficult to find excuses

to enslave the Pimas, although Spanish law forbade the

labor of mission Indians in repartimientos for twenty years

after their baptism.

During the first quarter of the eighteenth century

Sonora suffered from neglect. The military commanders were

noted for their corruption, and the ranks were never filled,

but the scant records available indicate that there were

some campaigns against the Apaches. In a 1724 report a








royal inspector made a statement which would be current for

the next one hundred and fifty years: The whole province was

threatened with ruin by Apache raids, unless a more effective

means of defense would be devised. In 1730, the Seris and

other coastal Indians again became a menace.

The provincial government was reorganized in 1734,

when Sinaloa and Sonora were reunited under one government.

The provincial capital was located in Sinaloa, but for all

practical purposes it was at Pitic or at San Miguel de

Horcasitas, because public affairs forced the governor to

spend most of his time in Sonora. The governor was also the

commandant of all military forces; under him were the

presidio captains to handle the military affairs and the

alcaldes mayores to administer civil affairs. There was a

rebellion in the Pima mission in 1737, and in 1740 and 1741

a serious revolt by the Yaquis and Mayos occurred, probably

as a result of conflict between the Jesuits and the settlers.

In 1736 a very peculiar mining discovery was made in

the upper Altar Valley (to the west of Nogales near today's

international boundary) on a small ranch known as Arizona or

Arizonac. Supposedly, an Indian had revealed the existence

of rich desposits of silver; the silver, when located, lay

on or close to the surface dn massive balls and chunks, one

of which weighed more than 2500 pounds. Word of the strike

brought the vagabond miners, common to the era, rushing to

the site; their mining camp was named Real de Arizona. Word

of the unusual nature of the mine also brought Captain Juan








Bautista de Anza, acting as judicial officer in the north,

from the presidio at Fronteras. Anza ordered a halt to all

mining pending a legal decision on the ownership of the mine.

Anza asked for a viceregal opinion on what portion be-

longed to the crown; he wondered if it might not be classi-

fied as a hidden treasure, or a "growing place" to which

the king would have exclusive rights, instead of the

usual one-fifth interest. The Viceroy decided in favor

of the miners, but a royal decree in 1741 declared it to

be a "growing place" which would be worked for the royal

treasury. By the time the decree was issued the mine was

no longer being worked; it was either exhausted or Indian

hostilities had driven the miners out; Arizona was abandoned

as a mineral district, but remained as a mission area, known

as San Antonio de Arizona. Later attempts to relocate the

mines were not successful, and Arizona riches remained a

legend and a lure for later adventurers.

Don Agustin Vildasola became governor in 1741, and

new presidios were established at Pitic (today Hermosillo)

to protect the inland Indians from the coastal Seris, and

at Terrenate to protect the Upper Pimas from the Apaches.

The new governor complained about the Jesuits and his lack

of money and authority---even more so after the Viceroy,

in an economy drive, ordered the new presidios closed and

the new province defended by the Spanish settlers. The

Governor persuaded him to keep the presidios open by point-

ing out that the Spanish were few in numbers, scattered









in location, and too poor to take time away from their

employment for military purposes.

Vildasola had stirred up so many-factional disputes

that he was replaced in 1749 by Diego Ortfz Parilla, on

the recommendation of a visitador general. The visitador

made recommendations for changes to be made by the new

governor, which actually stated only that the existing laws

be obeyed; he also made a complete report on the Indian

problems, which threatened to eradicate two hundred years of

missionary work, and made suggestions for their resolution.

As usual there were no practical results.

In 1751 there were nine Jesuits working in the Upper

Pima missions and eighteen others scattered among the older

missions. In November 1751, a Pima leader, who had been

made a captain general of the western Bimas as a reward for

leading his people in warfare against the Seris, incited

a rebellion among the Pimas. When the war ended in 1752

all of the missions and towns of the northwest had been

destroyed and approximately one hundred Spaniards killed.

The Pima leader appeared before Governor Parilla to explain

the reasons for the outbreak: the culprits were the Jesuits.

The Christian fathers, he stated, had usurped the best Pima

lands, and Indian cornfields often lacked water because the

Jesuits had diverted it to water their own. His arguments

impressed the Governor, who pardoned him.

Recriminations on the causes and the suppression of

the uprising flew between the Jesuits and the Governor. The








Governor utilized all the charges made against the Jesuits

by the jealous and greedy settlers, and the Jesuits pointed

out the humaneness of their mission system. Repercussions

from the Pima War continued for several years; in the mean-

time a new governor arrived and the Seris made peace over-

tures. The Seris'demands, however, could not be met and

their var continued. In 1755 Juan de Mendoza became governor

and began to press the Seris militarily until they again

sued for peace. They asked only for time to collect their

scattered families; when this was granted they moved into

the Cerro Prieto, between Guaymas and Hermosillo, which was

easily defended. Governor Mendoza tried in vain to capture

their stronghold, until he was killed in 1760 by a dying

Seri chief.

To counter Apache raids, expeditions were sent into

the haunts of the Apache in northern Arizona, but the

Apaches had no permanent villages, no crops, and no property

which could be destroyed, so the forays accomplished little.

It often happened that, with the presidio forces occupied

away from their bases, the Apaches slipped in behind them

to range at will.

The already bad conditions deteriorated after Mendoza's

death; the Jesuits increasingly lost control of the Indians;

missions, mines and towns were abandoned, and the native

and Spanish populations declined. In 1766 the government

decided to act; the first remedy to be attempted was a

military expedition under the general supervision of the









vistador general, Josd de Galvez. But before the arrival

of the expedition a decree from Spain announced the ex-

pulsion of the Jesuit order from all Spanish territories.

Father Ignaz Pfefferkorn, one of the deported Jesuits,

described the conditions in Sonora at the time of their

departure. The chance to convert the Apaches had been

lost, he said, through the treachery of Spanish soldiers,

while Apache and Seri depredations caused many Spanish

colonists to leave. The mines were abandoned, not only

because of the Indians, but also because they required

large investments and the costs exceeded the profits.

Only areas within sight of the villages were still planted,

because more distant fields could not be protected, and

the stock raising industry was ruined by thieving Indians.

In a land of abundant cattle, the well-to-do Spanish

scorned beef and served mutton. Wooden ploughs were still

used, since iron was too expensive. The alluvial terraces

were very fertile and farmers secured good crop yields with-

out fertilizer, but seeds of European plants were difficult

to obtain and required diligence that Sonoran farmers

would not give. Some sugar cane was grown although there

were no mills for commercial refining, and the cane was

milled and cooked to make panocha (a brown sugar candy

still much prized).

The datas raised cotton and made a coarse cloth for

clothes, but the other Indians were content to be naked.








The Spaniards demanded linen clothes, which came from

Mexico City at great expense, although they might demean

themselves to wear cotton undergarments which, not being

visible, would not reflect disgrace on the wearer's noble

heritage. Indian cotton was used to cover Spanish tables.

To operate a mine, new or old, Pfefferkorn reported,

the prospective operator must notify the governor and pay

a small tax, before he would be given permission in the

name of the king, with the understanding that he must

begin work within two months. The mines yielded great

wealth, bat soon they would fill with water or the quality

ore would be depleted. Silver was discovered at Cananea

in 1762, Pfefferkorn noted. He had visited the site of

the Real de Arizona, so he knew the mine had been worked.

Most Spaniards who acquired wealth from mining spent it

on real property and livestock, and the Apaches deprived

them of both. By 1770, the province had five gold mines

in operation, six silver mines, and one lead mine. All

of the other minerals were neglected. The missions'

agricultural surpluses were sold to the mining settlements.

The king allotted three hundred pesos per year for

each missionary in Sonora. In the case of the Jesuits,

before their expulsion, the total allotment went to the

Jesuit factor in Mexico City who acted as purchasing agent

for the missions; up to one half of their fundshowever,

was spent on freight. It cost six pesos to send twenty-

five pounds the seven hundred miles from Mexico City


~


-- I









to Sonora. The mission at Cucurpe spent two hundred pesos

per year on white wax for candles and wine for the Mass.

Ten gallons of Spanish wine cost sixty pesos--the cost of

sixty sheep in Sonora. Local products would not suffices

Sonoran wax was of a poor quality and smelly, and the Jesuits

had failed in their wine making attempts. The candles

burned during Holy Week alone amounted to twenty-five pounds,

the equivalent in cost of fifty sheep, fifty pounds of

salt, seventy-five pounds of chocolate, or two hundred

pounds of cloth.

As protection against the Apache, the king maintained

five companies of calvalry, each with fifty men and three

officers. Pfefferkorn did not think too highly of their

capabilities. The position of frontier captain was given

in Mexico City to a man who could prove his military

worth with a 12,000-14,000 peso cash payment; no mili-

tary experience was necessary. To command such a price,

the position had to afford lucrative opportunities for

graft since the yearly salary for a captain was only six

hundred pesos, and it did. The captain bought all of the

company's supplies by means of purchase orders which he

would send to a merchant acting as his agent in Mexico

City. The merchant would have received the money allotted

to the captain from the King's treasurer in Mexico. The

goods were delivered to the captain at Mexico City

prices plus shipping costs, and he had an upper and lower


__ ~X _^ _








price limit for which he could sell. Naturally, he charged

the fixed upper price to the soldiers, who had to buy their

food, clothing, equipment, and six required horses from

him. In good years, when Mexico City prices were low, he

could make fifty percent, minus the freight charges, on

every item sold. His men were paid four hundred pesos per

year; most of that salary probably returned to the captain

for purchases. Many times, the captains had extra goods

which were sold at even higher prices to the Spanish

settlers.

Pfefferkorn stated that he knew of no heroic deeds

by the soldiers. They did chase the Indians, but they

seldom caught them. Their orders, he said, were to range

over the country to drive out the Indians, "but the king

orders in Madrid; and in Sonora one does what he wishes."3

Pfefferkorn also had some pithy comments about

Spaniards in Sonora. Besides the governor, the officers and

the merchants, there were few full-blooded Spanish in Sonora.

There were mestizos, mulattoes, and lobos, none of whom could

become priests. There were a few Creoles, but most of the

"people of reason" were rabble attracted by the mines. He

noted that the Spanish had a real genius for idleness, that

they would walk nowhere on foot, and that they were

lackadaisical farmers. The only real work whichiinterested

them was cattle raising. Expert horsemen and potentially


3Pfefferkorn, Sonora: A Description, 295.








excellent soldiers, they were eager to volunteer, and when

accepted, received no training. Soldiering was a happy

life for them because it involved nothing of what they

considered work; there was no fixed term of service and

they took no care of their equipment.

Long-awaited military aid finally came in 1768 in

the form of one hundred Catalin volunteers. The visitador

Josi de Galvez left the actual military operations to

Colonel Domingo Elizando while he went to California for an

inspection tour. The official reports filed at the end

of the campaign in 1771 told of a victory over the marauding

Indians, but private correspondence indicated that the victory

was something less than complete. Attempts to rout Seris

from their mountains failed and peace talks in 1769 and

1770 fared little better; the reason for the Seris' decision to

lay down their arms in 1771 is not known.

At the end of 1771 Sonora was again free of Indian

rebellions and the presidios could defend the frontier from

Apaches. As a result of recommendations made by Jose de Galvez

for the defense of the Spanish frontier, four presidios were

assigned to Sonora, Fronteras, Altar, Tubac and Terrenate.

None were new, but they were to be moved so that they would be

separated by approximately forty leagues, each manned by

forty-seven officers and men, plus ten Indian scouts. Apache

raids diminished for a few years, but overall, the effect was

minor.

The missions abandoned by the Jesuits were placed under








the care of a royal commissioner, who wasted or embezzled

the properties, contributing to the decadence of the

missions. Whereas missions in Sinaloa were to be secular-

ized, those in the Yaqui River Valley in Sonora were to be

turned over to the Franciscans. A year's lapse between the

departure of the Jesuits and the arrival of the Franciscans

gave the Indians an independence which made them reluctant

to return to the confinement of mission life. The friar's

jurisdiction was over the Indians alone; they could do

nothing about the contentious Spanish settled in the

vicinity, and in the entire northern half of the state, only

two churches served the Spanish.

As a result of his visit to North America, Gilvez

formulated plans for the reorganization of the government,

-which included plans for the separation of the northern

provinces from viceregal jurisdiction. By a royal order

of August 22, 1776, the provinces of New Biscay (which had

come to denote Chihuahua and Durango) Coahuila, Texas, New

Mexico, Sinaloa and Sonora, and the Californias were desig-

nated Interior Provinces. The Provinces were to be ruled

by a combined governor and commanding general who would be

independent of the viceroy, though judicial authority would

remain in Guadalajara. His chief duty was the defense of

the frontier, but the imperfectly defined range of his

power led to later clashes with clerical and civil authorities.

The new governor, General Teodoro de Croix, arrived in

1777 and made an inspection tour of the eastern'portion of the








Interior Provinces. Their immensity led Croix to recommend

that the provinces be divided into eastern and western

divisions. The great distances, which had caused the

separation from Mexico City, made it impractical to attempt

to rule Texas from Sonora. Croix selected Arizpe as capital

for the Interior Provinces because of its central location

between Coahuila and California.

In 1785, with a change in viceroys, the provinces

came under the limited control of the viceroy, and at the

same time they were divided into three separate military

commands: Texas, Coahuila, New Ledn, and New Santander;

New Biscay and New Mexico; and Sinaloa, Sonora and California.

The complicated relationship between the commanders of the

separate provinces was too cumbersome for success, and in

1787 the two western provinces were united to form the two

provinces originally proposed by Croix. In 1788 the commanders

were once more made subject to the viceroy, but with some in-

dependent authority. In 1792, after another reorganization,

New Le6n, New Santander and the Californias remained

subject to the viceroy, but the other provinces regained

their independent command. The introduction of the inten-

dancies in 1786 seemed to make little difference in the

north; Sinaloa and Sonora became the intendancy of Arizpe.

Governmental reorganization did not end the Indian hostilities

and the century closed with Sonora having progressed little

economically and socially, and religiously, having regressed.

The revolt against Spain passed almost unnoticed in Sonora









although Hidalgo had partisans there. An attempt by the

rebels to capture the north was abruptly ended when a force

under Jose Maria Gonzalez Bermosillo was routed in Sinaloa.

Further efforts were forestalled by Hidalgo's defeat and

flight. The province was required to contribute to the

support of the royal armies after 1811 and there was some

interruption of commerce, but Sonora furnished no soldiers

to either side. Indian depredations continued undiminished,

and in 1820 the (patas, the most docile and civilized of the

tribes, rebelled.

In the same year governmental changes were effected

by the liberalized Spanish constitution with the establish-

ment of the provincial congress in Arizpe, which was also

given power over the Californias, and of town councils

(ayuntamientos). Within a year, however, independence from

Spain was being celebrated throughout the provinces; its

only immediate result in Sonora was the creation of a military

district with the same geographical limits as the intendancy,

but subject to the commandant in Chihuahua. This lack of under-

standing of the problems of the northwest caused protests,

and proposals for the division of Sonora from Sinaloa.

The northern provinces supported the destruction of

the Emptie and the creation of a federation in 1822. But

not until 1824 did a congress with representatives from

Sonora and Sinaloa meet in Sinaloa to discuss the.reorganiza-

tion of the northern provinces. While the congress met,









the Yaquis revolted, making separation seem less desirable

to the Sonorans. The delegates decided to retain their

combined status and in October, 1825, the State of the West

was created, with five departments, and the capital in

Villa de Fuerte, Sinaloa. The new state had its own command-

ing general, with residence in Arizpe, and nine frontier

garrisons. The separation controversy had not been laid

to rest and the legislature was forced to reconsider the

subject; in October, 1830, the division of Sonora from

Sinaloa was agreed to by the Congress in Mexico City.

The Yaquis had seen independence as a chance to gain

the privileges of citizenship, but they were disappointed.

While local administration did not change, intruders were

no longer excluded and settlers began to encroach on lands

the Indians regarded as theirs. Moreover, they were now

expected to pay taxes from which they previously had been

exempt, and in 1825, when tax assessors appeared, they

protested to the authorities. The official response was the

arrival of troops to enforce the assessment, and the Yaquis

resisted under a leader generally known as Banderas. This

persuasive leader kept the Yaquis (soon joined by the Mayos)

in the field for two years, but the original motivation for

the war became obscured and for many it degenerated into

raids for booty. When the government made partial concess-

ions the rebels yielded in April,1827. A law in September,

1828 confirmed their citizenship, and made them eligible for

military service, education, and land distribution. The









Yaquis rebelled again in 1832 when a decree surpressed the

office of general held by Banderas. Banderas was captured

and executed early in the struggle, which lasted for nine

months. The new Yaqui leader managed to discourage another

attempt at revolt in 1834.

Sonora, despite its remoteness, was soon involved

in the disputes racking the central government. Political

liberalism as it developed in early republican Mexico in-

cluded strong anti-church and anti-military programs, and

often unthinking support for the federalist form of organi-

zation as established in the Constitution of 1824. This

form of liberalism reached its apogee in 1833 under the

presidency of Valentfn Gomez Farfas, and resulted in a series

of revolts by horrified conservatives. The clergy and the

army issued the Plan of Cuernavaca, which demanded the

nullification of all of the laws and decrees passed under

G~mez Far(as, and a strong central government. Out of the

confusion and into the presidency walked the man whom

conservatives lauded as one of their own, a man who blew

with the political winds, General Antonio L6pez de Santa Ana,

now rid forever of his disguise as a liberal.

The new president threw out the liberal Congress and

installed his own hand-picked legislators. The new Congress-

men, extreme conservatives all, restructured the government

in conformity with the Plan of Cuernavaca, eliminating the

federal system in October of 1835. Sonora became a

Department with four prefectures and Manuel M. Gindara as






26


the new governor. Opposition to the congressional action

resulted in the Texas war, and Santa Ana had to have the

glory of leading the Mexicans into battle again.

One of Santa Ana's subordinates in that war was

General Jose'Urrea, a native of Tucson, Sonora. Urrea led

the assault on the presidio of Goliad, and oversaw the mass

execution on Santa Ana's orders of the three hundred men

captured there. His military prestige was not diminished

by Santa Ana's defeat and denunciations, and in 1837 he

was named military commander of the Department of Sonora.

Strangely enough, Urrea was a known federalist, and in

December be led Sonora in a rebellion against centralism.

Urrea's protest was announced in the Plan of Arizpe

of December 27, 1837 and was directed specifically against

the Siete Leyes of 1836 which enforced the centralist

government by eliminating popular elections of the president

and extending the presidential term to eight years, and by

creating a Poder Conservador which watch-dogged all

legislation. Anastasio Bustamante, who was elected president

for an eight-year term under the Leyes, took office in April,
1837. The Plan called for a government that would be popular,

representative and federal. It called on the President,

General Anastasio Bustamante, to convoke a special national

Congress to last six months, for the sole purpose of reform-

ing the Constitution of 1824. The states which supported

and adopted the Plan were to organize an interior provisional








government and promulgate the reformed Constitution. The

Plan was a repudiation of unrestrained centralist power,

and seemed to assume that all states would support it. Did

Urrea intend to form a separate federation of assenting

states? The intentions are not clearly stated.

Governor Gandara convoked the special congress in

accord with the Plan in March 1838 and then tendered his

resignation as governor in favor of Urrea, as he had earlier

agreed to do. The legislature ratified Urrea as governor

and military commander, then notified President Bustamante

that (1) the state would never renounce the prerogatives

of sovereignty; (2) the change had been instituted by a

Congress unqualified to take such actions and done without

the expressed approval of the majority of the nation,

hence Sonora felt no compunction to accept it; (3) Sonora

had declared it wanted the popular federal form of govern-

ment.

With the federalist ideas firmly in control in Sonora,

Urrea assumed the task of converting other states. With

three hundred men he sailed to Sinaloa where he easily de-

feated several small forces, but was himself defeated when

faced with government forces under General Mariano Paredes.

Ten states had seconded his plan, including Michoacan and

San Luis Potosi, but the uprisings there were quickly

squelched. So Urrea could count on little help, as he

marched east from Sinaloa with the remnants of his column.








With the alternatives of annihilation by a powerful army

under President Bustamante, or of accepting a generous

amnesty offered to all federalist rebels, Urrea and most

of the federalist forces surrendered.

In June, 1839 the Minister of War ordered Urrea to

leave the country. He was taken under guard to Veracruz

where he escaped to join a federalist general still in the

field. The combined armies of President Bustamante and

General Santa Ana, again popular in spite of his loss of

Texas, easily defeated them, but Urrea evaded capture.

Refusing to give up his support of federalism, Urrea

returned to Arizpe where he assembled the surviving veterans

of his Sinaloa column and, in an audacious move, marched

on Mexico City, surprised the garrison there, and seized

and held the capital city for ten days. Urrea hastened to

talk to Bustamante, but instead of deposing him, as would

have been normal under the circumstances, he chose to

petition again that Bustamante use his power to reinstate

the federal system. This the president agreed to do, and

the gullible Sonorans believed their cause was won. They

could not hold Mexico City, the center of conservatism, and

had to evacuate.

As soon as Urrea had left Sonora for Sinaloa, Gindara

changed his political coat back to centralist and led a

counter- revolution. For aid, he turned to the Yaquis and

Papagos, promising plunder as a reward for their services.








Urrea returned once to put down his enemies in Sonora, but

when he left again to pursue the federalist wars, Gandara

gained control of the state.

For several years Gandara and Urrea battled for

control of Sonora with Gandara using the Indians, to the

detriment of the rest of the population. Urrea was defeated

in November, 1844 and he fled south. On the national

stage the federalists were successful and expelled the

dictatorial Santa Ana in late 1844; with his overthrow

federalism was reinstated in Mexico. Sonora once again be-

came a state and the governmental offices established under

the centralists were abolished. The Constitution of 1831,

now reinstated, was reformed in 1848 and the state was

divided into nine partidos which were later recreated as

prefectures. The prefectures, or districts, were subdivided,

on the basis of population, into several units. The largest

of these units was the municipality, which was governed by

a town council, and the major town in each district was de-

signated as a cabecera, which acted as the district seat of

government. Also within the district were smaller population

units, all subject to the district prefect. At one level,

a town might be ruled by three justices; at a still lower

level was the town with only one justice; this justice

supervised the police commissioner who acted as mayor and town

council in the smallest unit.

The change in governmental form in Mexico was once more








a prelude to war, although it was not a contributing factor

in itself. In April, 1846, war began with the United States,

and Santa Ana, again espousing federalism, took office to

save the Republic. As in 1833 he promptly left the presi-

dency to the old liberal, Valentfn Gomez Farfas, and took the

field to build his military lustre; serving under him as

before was his erstwhile enemy, General Jose Urrea. And while

Santa Ana was once again leading powerful Mexican armies to

inglorious defeat, Sonora got a small taste of the war with

a blockade and some naval skirmishes, and the appearance of

Stephen Kearney's ragtag force in Arizona. The war, however,

left Sonora relatively unscathed: it was the peace that left

the scar. By the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the

war, the United States acquired California and New Mexico

and Sonora's previously undefined northern boundary was fixed

at the Gila River.

While negotiations were under way to end the war,

another event occurred which was to cost Sonora more territory

and bring invaders to her borders. On January 24, 1848,

James W. Marshall discovered gold in the Coloma Valley of the

American River in California. Sonora learned of the strikes

in August, and thousands hurriedly left for California over

the old trails blazed by Kino and Anza. The acquisition of

California and Arizona by the United States had brought the

Yankee to Sonora's doorstep, and the political chaos in

Mexico and the state made Sonora appear to be a plum ripe for









picking, the next logical step in United States expansion.

Gandara had managed to retain power until the elections of

1848, and a new governor, Jose Aguilar, took office in

April, 1849. Pressures by the Gindara faction made the

office untenable, and he retired in 1851.

In 1851, the central government of Mexico granted a

large territorial concession for mineral exploration to the

"Compania Restauradora de los Minas de Arizona." The organ-

izer of this company was Jean-Baptiste Jecker, of "Jecker,

Torre y Compai(a," and the project had as supporters the

governor of Sonora and the French minister to Mexico. The

door was now open for the stage appearance of the most fan-

tastic figure in Sonoran history, the Count Gastdn Raousset

de Boulbon.

Raousset, the son of an ancient French family,

dreamed of restoring the Divine Rights of the French Kings

and conquering territory in foreign lands that would add

to French glory. His dreams led him to settle in Algiers,

where he lived the life of an adventurer and lost his

fortune. After the proclamation of the Republic in 1848

he returned to France, having decided that perhaps the

republican form of government was suitable for France. He

promptly announced his candidacy for Deputy, and to support

himself and to further his political career he launched a

periodical which had little chance of success. His own

class, the aristocracy, viewed him as a traitor, and to the









republicans he was an intruder. So at thirty years of age

this man of ambition found himself without friends and with-

out money in his own country.

Raousset began to listen seriously to the tales of

newly discovered and illimitable wealth in California, and

raised enough money to secure a third-class passage to

America. He arrived in California in August, 1850, but a

few months in the mining camps convinced him that he would

not recoup his fortunes there. Returning to San Francisco,

he worked as a stevedor, also unprofitably, then began

buying cattle in Los Angeles to sell in the gold camps.

Neither was that profitable.

The Mexican consul in San Francisco, aided by the

French consul, had begun to promote settlement in Sonora,

partly to replace the thousands of its already small popula-

tion who had followed Anza's trail north to the gold fields.

Particularly, he tried to entice French colonists, with some

success. The French possibly had something other than

colonization in mind, for France had secretly sought a foot-

hold in Mexico for some years. Then Raousset reappeared in

San Francisco, his visions of easy wealth shattered. The

colonization scheme might have reawakened his old dreams of

conquest for France, or perhaps he had heard of the legen-

dary Arizona wealth from Sonoran forty-niners. He was eager

to go. The French consul recommended him to the French

vice-consul in Guaymas, who in turn wrote to the French

minister in Mexico City. The minister then personally got









in touch with Raousset and recommended that he come to

Mexico City.

Armed with laudatory letters from the consular

officials, the Count arrived in Mexico City and was quickly

introduced to Jean-Baptiste Jecker. The two men immediately

signed a contract under which Raousset was to raise and arm,

at the Jecker company's expense, one hundred and fifty men

in California. This small army was to furnish protection from

the Apaches for company men who would explore and exploit

their gigantic concession in the Arizona mining region. For

his efforts Raousset would receive half the profits and half

the properties.

With the fund of thirty thousand pesos entrusted to

him for recruiting and outfitting, Raousset collected two

hundred and forty men, all French, bought four cannons, and

rented a ship. On June 1, 1852 he landed in Guaymas where

he was happily received by the people of the port, who

thought he would open a rich new area for the state. His

arrogance and martial air, and the four cannons, convinced

some residents, however, that he had come for some ulterior

purpose, and they promptly communicated their fears to the

state's military commander, General Blanco de Estrada, in

Arizpe.

The Commander ordered the count to move his men out

of the port, but he refused. Intervention by the decker

representative averted open hostilities; he attended to the

formalities for landing that the Count had ignored, and






34


sought permission for him to continue the trip to Arizona.

General Blanco gave permission for the trip, providing the

intruders followed the route he laid out for them and that

the Count came to Arizpe to explain his conduct, Raousset

had no intention of following anyone's itinerary but his

own, and in addition, he accused Blanco of representing a

rival mineral company, which had been founded in Sonora

simultaneously with the Compaiia Restauradora. After a

brief delay in Hermosillo, where he quarreled with Jecker's

representative over accounts, Raousset marched north to

Magdalena, which he made his headquarters. He intended to

use Magdalena as a base from which to seize Hermosillo and

Arizpe.

General Blanco belatedly realized Raousset's inten-

tions and ordered the garrison in Hermosillo reinforced.

During a rapid march to the town, Blanco lost numerous men

and armaments, and arrived there with only one hundred and

sixty men. In Hermosillo he found sixty additional volun-

teers, all untrained. He had no time to prepare for defend-

ing the town, however. Raousset arrived before the General

had anticipated, attacked at eight-thirty in the morning,

and at ten-thirty the town belonged to the French. Blanco

retreated across the Sonora River to Villa de Seris, and

then to Guaymas to establish a center of operations.

Raousset egotistically believed himself already the

owner of Sonora. To the residents of Hermosillo he pro-

claimed that he brought liberty to the state, never








understanding that to the people of Sonora he represented a

rival mining company vying for a concession, not a foreign

liberator. He convinced himself that he would be joined by

those disaffected with the government and various outstanding

citizens. He lost no time in approaching them, but their

lack of response convinced him that his conquest was imaginary

and that his position was extremely precarious. Not knowing

then what to do with the territory he held, he petitioned

Blanco for a peaceful embarcation, enforcing his request

with pleas from governmental officials he held as hostages.

General Blanco acceded to this demand, requiring only the

surrender of the arms and munitions. Raousset and his men

sailed away.

In March, 1853, the conservative centralists returned

to power in Mexico City and Santa Ana was formally given

dictatorial powers. His Most Serene Highness dissolved

the state governments and appointed new officials. Sonora

became a department with a council to replace the legisla-

ture, and Manuel M. Gindara, who had been re-elected in

1852, was not installed until confirmed as an appointee of

the central government. The capricious Santa Ana changed

his mind the next year and replaced Gindara with General

Josd Maria Yaiez, a more capable military man. Blanco had

been removed for his generosity to Raousset, and now the

latter was preparing another filibustering expedition.

Early in 1853, he began the formation of a new force in

California to take Sonora, using as a pretext an alleged breach








of promise by the Mexican president to give him protection

against the Apaches. Again, his efforts were abetted by

the French consul in San Francisco and the French minister

in Mexico City. The latter, believing that the new Presi-

dent, Santa Ana, would agree to the entry of agricultural

colonists who were not from the United States, encouraged

Raousset to adopt this guise. But Santa Ana was not de-

ceived. He learned from the United States' press and from

private sources what was in the wind, and sent orders to

the military commander in the state to prepare a defense.

All able men in the state between sixteen and fifty years

old were called to arms, federal taxes were pledged for their

support, and the surrounding states were ordered to help.

Santa Ana's unexpected reaction caused the French

minister to write to the consul in San Francisco that he

should advise Raousset that he would no longer have official

support. Raousset then declared that he would call off his

invasion since he had no grudge against the present Mexican

administration; in fact, he would offer his services to

Santa Ana. The President, thinking he had frightened

Raousset, accepted with alacrity, and once again, the Count

journeyed to Mexico City. There he presented an absurd

military and colonization project for Sonora. To end the

Apache menace in Arizona and Sonora the government should

give him fifty thousand pesos, a five hundred man army, with

himself as commander, of course, which would operate against

the Apaches independently of the other forces in the state.








The government would pay for all campaigns, for his share

he asked a rather large salary, the rights to one-half

of all mines, current and future, in Arizona, and other

equally outrageous benefits. Santa Ana could not sustain

such proposals, but as a gesture offered to commission

Raousset a colonel in the national army. That dreamer of

grandiose dreams was insulted and angered and left Mexico

City vowing a terrible revenge.

Back in San Francisco, Raousset conceived the idea of

provoking a federalist movement in Mexico which would

restore the Constitution of 1824 and awake the not-yet-

moribund federalist-centralist controversy. When the move-

ment triumphed, as he was certain it would, he would declare

Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa as

seceded and form a new nation. Naturally, Raousset envisioned

himself as chief of this new nation. For this new enterprise,

he gathered fifteen hundred men. In the meantime, William

Walker, a United States citizen, had also decided that he

wanted to rule a part of Mexico, and invaded Baja California

while Raousset was still making preparations. The Walker

filibustering expedition prompted the Mexican government

to order that all individuals forming parties of armed

adventurers be shot without trial.

Santa Ana knew of Raousset's continuing activities.

To counter them, he told the Mexican consul in San Francisco

to enlist all who wanted to aid Mexico, except United States

citizens, to come to Mexico at government expense to serve








in diverse army units. If, after one year's service a man

desired to leave the army, the government would furnish him

lands and the means to work them. Three hundred and eighty-

six men, all French, quickly volunteered to go to Mexico and

were sent to Guaymas early in April, 1854.

Shortly after this group sailed from San Francisco

the Mexican consul there wrote to the military governor of

Sonora, General Jose Maria YAnez, warning him to maintain a

careful vigil over the arriving Frenchmen. For Santa Ana's

proposal had fitted nicely into Raousset's plans, and among

the newly arrived group were some of his most trusted cohorts.

Shortly after arrival in Guaymas, they organized themselves

into the "French Battalion." The consul's warning was un-

needed; Y9iez knew everything happening within the group

from the moment it landed.

Raousset himself arrived July 1, 1854. After meeting

with the officers of the French Battalion and taking over

its command, he met with Y&Aez and declared himself to be at

his service to fight Apaches. Yd4ez told Raousset that he

must leave the country immediately, and the Count responded

with several proposals that Yaflez knew were simply ploys

to gain time. The Mexican commander played the game, watch-

ing each move of the Frenchmen, and waiting for them to

initiate hostilities. There was irony in the fact that most

of the army of Frenchmen had been housed, fed, and armed by

his own government.

The expected battle came on July 13. When the smoke








cleared, the Count and his men were prisoners of a smaller

Mexican force. A council of war condemned Count Gaston de

Raousset Boulbon to death, and he was executed on August 12,

1854.

Before Raousset had completed his preparations for

his second invasion of Sonora, Santa Ana bartered away

another piece of the territory which the Count hoped to rule.

In part, this territorial loss stemmed from the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo, which set the Sonoran boundary at the Gila

River but described only vaguely the line's continuation

from the Gila River to El Paso. The border there was based

on an 1847 reprint of an 1828 plagiarism of an 1826 reproduc-

tion of part of an unsurveyed 1822 publication. The

inaccuracies could cost the United States three million acres

of fertile land in the Mesilla Valley in New Mexico, which

alone probably necessitated a new treaty.

A definitive boundary demarcation was necessary for

other reasons. Article II of the treaty committed the

United States to prevent Indian raids across the border, and

Mexican claims for Apache depredations quickly mounted. In

addition, the United States was interested in a southern

railroad route to California which would avoid the high

mountains. Santa Ana, who needed money to pay the army that

kept him in office, agreed to the sale of a strip of land

from the Rio Grande to the Colorado River, the Gadsden Purchase.

Thus Sonora lost more territory to the United States, a loss









which would in later years, with the coming of the railroads,

tie her economy to that of the United States.

The Southern Pacific railroad was still thirty years

in the future, and the border area in 1853 could hardly be

called civilized. Apaches and renegades from both sides of

the border ranged at will through the area. The United

States built Fort Buchanan twenty miles east of Tubac, now

in Arizona, to stop the Apache raids in 1856, and with this

seeming protection, prospectors flocked to southern Arizona.

The Arizona Mining and Trading Company, organized in San

Francisco, reopened the old mines at Ajo, and other miners

allegedly found the fabled mine of Arizonac, which still

lay in Sonoran territory. Sonoran troops chased the stray-

ing miners from the state.

The political chaos in Mexico and Sonora was to grow

even worse before it got better. Yanez was recalled because

Santa Ana disapproved of his magnanimity to Raousset's men.

He was followed by two replacements before Santa Ana finally

went into exile in August, 1855. The second of these resigned

in September, 1855 when the news of Santa Ana's fall arrived

in Sonora, and Gindara seized the offices of governor and

commanding general. The central government had other ideas

and named Jos& de Aguilar and Pedro Espejo to the respective

posts, but Gandara, backed by the council, refused to publish

the decree appointing them. He succeeded in forcing the de-

portation of Espejo, then yielded the governorship to Aguilar,

who was his brother-in-law. Gandara retained the title of








military commander. His actions were opposed by a young

colonel in the national army, Ignacio Pesqueira, who was

illegally removed from his military command for his opposition.

With near anarchy existing in the state, two Californians

arrived in Guaymas to push a colonization plan; they were

Henry A. Crabb and his brother-in-law, Agustfn Ainza,

supposedly related to a prominent Sonoran family. Through

family connections in Sonora, the two men approached several

political figures, including Governor Aguilar and Ignacio

Pesqueira. Aguilar opposed the plan, but Pesqueira secretly

supported it as a means of securing power for himself.

Gindara accused Aguilar of encouraging an invasion, and used

that untruth as a basis for a revolt. He arrested and

replaced Aguilar, but Pesqueira came to the rescue, and

routed Gandara at Ures on July 15, 1856. The rest of the

state quickly fell under his power, and Gandara appealed to

the Yaquis and the clergy for support. A series of defeats

for Gindara followed, after which he fled to Chihuahua,

leaving his brother to carry on the fight in Sonora. The re-

form movement had taken office in Mexico City after Santa

Ana's exile, and a new constitution was promulgated in

February, 1857, and, after a year of turmoil in Sonora,

Pesqueira, as a supporter of the liberal reforms, became the
military and political governor of the state.

Henry A. Crabb had not given up his colonization scheme.

He entered the state at the oasis town of Sonoita in the

northwest, and from there sent a letter on March 26, 1857, to





42


the prefect of the Altar District. In it he stated that he

had come in conformity with the colonization laws of Mexico

and by specific invitation of some of the most prominent

citizens of Sonora. He came, he said, with a hundred men

as a vanguard of nine hundred more, all of whom hoped to

make their homes in Sonora. He was well armed, but that was

customary when crossing the Apache-infested regions. Crabb

further stated that he knew that Mexicans and Indians were

being aroused against him, and wells were being poisoned.

Such measures would lead to retribution, he warned, but

be would not draw the first blood.

Crabb's letter was forwarded to Pesqueira, who had

learned previously of Crabb's imminent entrance into Sonora

and had ordered that the invaders be fought without quarter.

To the people of Sonora he proclaimed that they must prepare

themselves to reject the invaderswho posed as colonizers

and bringers of civilization. He reminded Sonorans that

Texas was lost because of treasonous colonizers.

Three hundred men raised by the prefect of Altar

rushed to Caborca to intercept the filibusterers. The Crabb

party arrived in Caborca on April 1 to find the Sonoran

defenders barricaded in the church. After five days of

stalemated fighting, reinforcements from other districts

entered Caborca, and the next day burned Crabb's men from

their stronghold in the houses surrounding the church. A

summary trial condemned the captives, including Crabb, to









death, and all were executed two days later.

G&ndara resumed his conflict with the liberal faction

in mid-1857, as the conservative influence waxed in Mexico

City. Yaqui aid was enlisted again, and with clerical back-

ing the crusade against the liberals continued, with Sinaloa

becoming the battlefield at the close of 1857. Pesqueira

went to Sinaloa and remained to aid the liberals until 1860.

While he fought in Sinaloa, Gandara again aroused the Yaquis,

and the Opatas joined them with Gandara claiming the governor-

ship of Sonora. Pesqueira had to get help from Sinaloa to

dislodge him.

With this outbreak of the Civil War in the United States

both sides courted Pesqueira to obtain the rights of passage

for war materials, but the French intervention distracted

Sonoran attention from the neighbors on the north. A large

contingent of state troops was sent to fight the French in

Sinaloa in 1862, and Pesqueira received fulsome praise from

Benito Juarez for his efforts against the invaders. But almost

all of the troops deserted before meeting the enemy. Their

loyalties lay in their villages, not with Mexico, for which

they paid taxes and received nothing. The army rank and file

were conscripts and the state had no money, so it could not

buy their loyalty.

Napoleon III wanted to acquire the legendary Sonoran

mines and tried to persuade Pesqueira to join the French.

After being rebuffed, he appealed to Maximilian to cede








Sonora to him, but Maximilian refused and Napoleon did not

push his desires. Sonora remained relatively uninvolved,

although French naval forces several times blockaded Guaymas.

Gandara launched an abortive revolt in 1862, after which he

retired to Mexico City; Pesqueira was re-elected governor in

1863.

The French finally landed in Guaymas in March, 1865, and

with them came Gandara. Pesqueira had had three years in

which to prepare, but his troops were inexperienced and badly

armed, and he decided to retire rather than waste manpower on

a certain defeat. He retreated to Hermosillo, which the

French attacked and took in July. Conservative uprisings

prodded by Gandara erupted over the state. The Yaquis, Mayos,

dpatas and Pimas joined, and soon much of the state belonged

to the French. After Hermosillo fell Pesqueira had falledt,

back to Ures which was in turn beseiged; with its fall he fled

to the United States, not out of cowardice, but because of

personal misfortune. He was ill, his young son died in

flight, and his ill wife died a few months later. His wife's

brother remained to lead the resistance until Pesqueira re-

turned in March, 1866.

Many of the French troops were withdrawn to meet pos-

sible intervention by the United States when the Civil War in

that country ended, and native monarchists had to struggle on

their own. With help from Sinaloa the liberal elements began

to regain control, and town after town was recaptured, slowly,


_ ___~ ~_ __ ___








with heavy losses and deliberate destruction. The decisive

battle was a victory by the liberals on the Guadalupe Plains

near Ures, on September 4, 1866, and on September 15 the

remaining French troops sailed from Guaymas. The Yaquis

and the Mayos were not subjugated until November.

Pesqueira was re-elected in 1867 and 1873. The Yaquis,

angered by continued encroachments on their lands, revolted

in June, 1867; a massacre of the Indians in the church at

BDcum preceded the peace in 1868. A new state constitution

was promulgated in 1873, which led to a short revolt in

Alamos; then, with the state at peace, Pesqueira retired

to his ranch in 1874.

State elections were held in 1875. Pesqueira did not

seek the governorship, but backed his relative, Colonel Jose

J. Pesqueira, for governor while he himself ran for vice-

governor. Jose's opponent for the governorship was Ignacio's

brother-in-law, General Jesus Garcla Morales, and the

organizer of the opposition in Alamos was a young political

newcomer, Ramon Corral. The Pesqueiras' opposition carried

the districts of Alamos, Altar, Arizpe and Magdalena, but

violence and military force prevented their success in the

five other districts and the state legislature nullified

the votes of the first four. The election abuses caused

Sonorans to feel that Pesqueira had imposed his candidate,

and, under General Francisco Serna of Altar, dissidents pro-

claimed the Plan of Altar and petitioned the President to


_ ______II____________________I_









nullify the elections and appoint an interim governor. In

the initial armed conflicts the rebels were defeated, and they

crossed to the United States to regroup. The Yaquis rebelled

in September, and Serna successfully resumed his campaign in

November, causing the Governor to appeal to Mexico City for

help.
President Lerdo de Tejada named General Vicente

Marischal as the new military commander in the state and he

arrived in March, 1876. Marischal saw his role as that of

mediator, not as a prop for Pesqueira's government. On

March 14, he declared martial law in the state and assumed

political control

Porfirio Dlaz had announced his Plan of Tuxtepec on

January 1, 1876 in opposition to the candidacy of the incum-

bent president, Sebastiano Lerdo de Tejada. National elections

held in October, 1876 favored Lerdo, but the Chief Justice

of the Supreme Court, Jose Maria Iglesias, denied their legality

and claimed the presidency for himself. Marischal and

Pesqueira supported Lerdo, but a decisive victory by Diaz

forced Lerdo to flee to the United States, and Iglesias took

office in November; shortly afterwards he would yield the

presidency to Diaz. In the meantime, the Pesqueiras conferred

at Ignacio's ranch and then Jose J. told Marischal that his

commission was no longer valid and that the power had reverted

to him. When Marischal refused to yield the government, the

Pesqueiras revolted; but Pesqueira popularity had waned, and


_ I __I 1_1_ _








Ignacio fled to Chihuahua when the first attack failed.

With the election of Luis Emetario Torres in 1879,

a new political triad appeared to dominate Sonoran politics,

that would retain control of the state until deposed by the

revolution in 1911. Carlos Ortfz succeeded Torres in 1881,

but political pressures forced him to seek a leave of ab-

sence. He was replaced by Ramon Corral, the second member

of the triad and at the time Senator in Mexico City, who had

been a member of the legislature which had battled Marischal.

Torres was re-elected in 1883 and 1891, but in the latter

year, in accordance with a previous agreement, he took a

leave of absence and the Vice-Governor, Rafael Izabel, the

third member of the triad, served the entire term.

The election of 1887 made it obvious, if it had not

been before, that the Torres-Izabel-Corral faction had the

backing of the central government. Jose Marfa Maytorena,

Sr.,of Guaymas, who claimed to represent the liberal element

of the state, wanted to be governor. A newspaper in Alamos

launched his candidacy in December, 1886, and was followed

by other papers and the formation of political clubs. The

state suspected that Luis E. Torres would run again, but he

surprised the populace and announced the candidacy of his

brother, Lorenzo. Ram6n Corral, who had been Secretary of

Government for the state,was named as the vice-gubernatorial

candidate. Sonorans wondered if the governship would become

a dynasty, as was the case in other states; they speculated


~_ N~1_~l_ Icn~rrmr--l~u~n~---rr--,-rr~--- ---~n _- ----- _









that one could determine the length of tenure for the dynasty

by the number of brothers the candidate had. Torres responded

to Maytorena's opposition with the use of federal military

forces.

The elections were held April 24, and Maytorena's

supporters insisted that their candidate won; the Governor,

fearing a rebellion, called out the troops. The opposition

was not prepared to resist militarily, so there was no

bloodshed. Immediately after being sworn in, Lorenzo Torres

took a leave of.absence, leaving the governorship in Corral's

hands. Until he left the state to serve as the governor of

the Federal District and later as Secretary of Government in

Mexico City, Ramon Corral was a member of the state govern-

ment continually from 1882, although not always in an elective

capacity.

In 1901, President Diaz became ill, and seemingly for

the first time he and Mexico thought about his mortality.

Diaz solved the problem by amending the constitution to

provide for a vice-president, at the same time extending the

presidential term to six years. There was much speculation

and political excitement over the idea of a new office to

fill, and there was a long list of potential candidates.

Elections were to be held July 11, 1904. Diaz sent a list

of his choices for the various offices to the governors in

late June. All the important people in the capital were

shocked by his vice-presidential choice: Ramon Corral, a









man they had not considered because he was a nobody.

A simulated convention was held and Corral was officially

named as candidate, scarcely one week before the elections.

There was no time to build opposition. The results of the

elections in the Federal District were speedily tabulated

in Mexico City on election day, and at ten-fifteen that

evening the unanimous choice was Dfaz and Corral. A committee

went to tell Corral that he had won; he prudently replied that

he did not know if the results would be the same all over

Mexico.

The political stability which was the result of repres-

sion permitted Sonora, as the rest of Mexico, to make some

economic and even some social progress. Corral's slogan was

"Government for All," but the "All" did not include the poor

or the Indians, since the intellectuals of his era judged

those groups to be inferior. Despite their ignoring them,

however, the economic and social programs current in Mexico

helped numerous Sonorans, for the state did not suffer many

of the abuses caused by twisted interpretations of the

Constitution of 1857.

It was in their concern with education that the triad

revealed a progressive spirit. Corral, especially, was a

fanatic about improving education in the state. Ortiz had

opened the first secondary school in Hermosillo, the "In-

stituto Sonorense" in July, 1822. Hermosillo had become

the state capital in 1870; prior to that Ures had served, and









it was in Ures that the state's most advanced educational

facilities were found. The Hermosillo school proved to be

impractical and revealed the truly sad state of education in

Sonora; there were very few students eligible for entry

because few had completed the necessary primary work, and

it was too expensive for most students. Wealthy parents

opted to send their children to the United States to study.

The "Colegio Sonora," soon to be the state's pre-eminent

secondary school, opened January 1, 1889 in Hermosillo;

among its young teachers in the early 1890's were several

men who would later be important in the revolution, Plutarco

Elias Calles, Francisco Chapa and Epifaneo Vieyra. One of

the early students was Adolfo de la Huerta.

The population of the state was widely scattered in

small settlements and ranches, making the founding of schools

very difficult. Corral pushed for the opening of more schools

and insisted that qualified teachers be brought in to sup-

plement the few competent ones in the state. Educational

councils were established in the principal towns. Funds

were always a problem; in 1871, 1872 and 1873 the state spent

12,000 pesos per year on education, but by 1880 the figure

had risen to only 15,000 pesos. Figures are not available

for appropriations from 1881 to 1910, but educational progress

was evident. Between 1895 and 1910, the percentage of adult

Sonorans knowing how to read grew from twenty-three percent

to thirty-four percent.









Contributing very importantly to the economic advance

during the Dfaz era was the suppression of the old scourge

of Sonora, the Apaches. Between 1790 and 1810, the Spanish

had gained some control over them through the use of bribes,

which were paid if the Indians remained near the presidios.

However, the newly independent nation could not afford the

costs, and the raids again escalated. The Yaqui wars in

1827 and 1832 drew men from the northern presidios and the

Apache depredations extended past Arizpe to the vicinity of

Ures and Hermosillo. The populace left the smaller communities

in the north, mines were abandoned and missions were deserted.

After the Yaquis were suppressed, there was.a concerted

effort to eradicate the Apaches, but citizen zeal languished

after several victories. The Governor was determined on

extermination, and with the inducement of a generous bounty

for each Apache scalp, waged a successful campaign until the

Indians retired to the north. The condition of the central

government and its involvement in the war in Texas prevented

any help from that quarter. By 1850, the northern frontier

was practically deserted, with a population only in the larger

towns, such as Altar, Magdalena and Arizpe.

As most of Mexico settled into quiet after Diaz took

over, more and more troops could be dispatched to the frontier,

with varying success. The United States had attempted to

contain the Apaches by putting them on reservations after

1872, while at the same time furnishing them with rifles for









hunting. Furious Sonorans claimed that the United States

wars against the Indians only served to drive many of them

into Mexico; and when Apaches left the reservations, as they

did in 1885, they had the latest weapons. Because of the

flights from the reservations, the United States made several

reciprocal-crossing agreements in order to pursue the

marauding Indians. The capture of Geronimo in 1886 effectively

Bnded Apache threats from the United States, though some

renegades continued causing sporadic trouble into the 1890's.

Maritime commerce had been slow to develop in Sonora,

although Guaymas was an excellent port. A large part of

the state was outside the area of commercial influence of

the border ports as well; due to poor communications and

distance, production and consumption was localized. The

towns near the northern frontier, such as Altar, Arizpe,

Magdalena and later, Cananea, relied on the United States

for supplying their necessities.

Until late in the Dkaz era and the development of the

mines and the railroad, Sonora produced little but agricultural

products which had no market because of the lack of transpor-

tation. Some cotton fabric of poor quality, used in serapes

and blankets, was produced, but there was no wool because
almost all the sheep had been taken or killed by the Apa.Las.

There were several cartmakers and saddleries, and palm straw

hats and mattresses were also produced, mostly for local

markets. The state lacked good wood workers, ironworkers,








silversmiths, tailors, tanners and shoemakers, so their pro-

ducts had to be imported.

Cattle were Sonora's most important agricultural product,

but the internal tax structure hindered their movement. Too,

they were of inferior quality, range cattle unhindered by

fences, so that blood lines were lost when introduced, which

was seldom. For at least half of every year, they were

pitifully thin because of lack of forage during the dry seasons;

they were usually marketed at the end of a rainy season. Under

normal conditions, there was little market in the United

States for Sonoran cattle, except for their hides.

Under the Daaz policy of encouraging foreign investments,

several large stretches of land were sold to American

cattle companies in Sonora and other northern states. The

Sonora Land and Cattle Company acquired about 1,300,000 acres

and the West Coast Cattle Company, about 230,000 acres. The

Cananea Cattle Company, with approximately 700,000 acres,

was formed in 1901 as a subsidiary of the Cananea Consolidated

Copper Company. The American companies utilized more advanced

stock-raising techniques than Mexican ranchers, and fenced

their pastures and introduced blooded herds to upgrade the

native cattle.

The average size of an hacienda in Sonora ranged from

5000 to 7500 acres. Although some of the abuses common in

central Mexico were found on the haciendas in Sonora, they

were not prevalent. A peon in the Guaymas district was paid

six to eight pesos per month, plus about a bushel of corn,








wheat or garbanzos; his counterpart in central Mexico made

twenty-five centavos per day. The debts owed to the hacendado

were limited by state law in December, 1881 to the equiva-

lent of three months' pay, but in 1883 the limit had to be

raised to six months' pay. The owners used the debt as a

means to keep the workers on the land.

Around Banimichi, the aparcerfa, a work system similar

to the tenant farmer system in the southern United States,

was used frequently. The hacienda owners furnished the land,

work animals, seeds and implements, and the aparcero received

two-thirds of the crop. If the owner furnished only the

lands, the tenant received three-fourths of the crop.

Aside from the cattle lands which fell into foreign

hands, foreign owners took over some of the most productive

and fertile agricultural lands in Sonora, those located in

the Yaqui River Valley, and not with happy consequences. The

state government and the national government disliked seeing

the well-watered lands claimed by the Yaquis going uncultivated

when good lands were in demand. A national law had ordered

the surveying and colonization of vacant lands; the survey

would be conducted by private companies which would receive

as compensation up to one-third of the lands which they sur-

veyed. The remainder of the lands belonged to the government

and could be sold to individuals or companies. In either case

land ownership was to be limited to 6200 acres.

The law was subject to much abuse, and attempted


_ __ i_







implementation in 1885 led to a Yaqui revolt. In 1887, the

law was suspended until the Yaqui case could be studied; it

was decided to establish a legal fund for each Yaqui pueblo,

allotting so much per family, or per single male.4 The Yaquis,

who had always declared that God gave the river to the Yaquis,

not a piece to each Yaqui, did not favor the division. The

plan was opposed also by mine and ranch owners, who wanted

cheap labor. The surveying continued, and by 1892 lands had

been allotted to seven Yaqui pueblos and four Mayo pueblos.

An uprising in 1886-1890 did not stop the building of canals

by concessionaires, nor the arrival of colonists; it merely

gave the federal army, which had nothing else to do, some

valuable field experience. The largest grant went to Lorenzo

Torres and his family, nearly one million acres. The lands

around BScum and Cocorit were divided in 1904; they were par-

celled out not to the Indians, but to the colonists. The

Sonora and Sinaloa Irrigation Company received 400,000 acres

in the 1890's; when that company was sold to the Richardson

Construction Company of Los Angeles, the lands acquired by

the latter near Bicum and Cdcorit raised the total to equal



4The fundo legal denotes municipal lands under the con-
trol of the town council. Unlike the ejido, the lands are
not common lands, but may be sold for town lots or farms, or
donated to the indigent; they are not strictly agricultural.
The state legislature establishes the legal fund for each
town and it may be increased at the discretion of the state
legislature.


_ __ __ __ __ ~____I___ ~I __ ~~__~ _____








that belonging to the Torres family. Richardson paid six

pesos and sixty centavos per hectare (2.471 acres).

There were more Yaqui wars in 1902 and 1908; indeed

there was seldom truly peace. The campaigns were ruthless

and cruel,with innocent Indian women and children dying or

being divided among the "civilized" population. The Yaqui

responded with equal brutality. Attempts to bring peace

met with little success, and one of the plans proposed was

that of deporting the Yaquis. Ram6n Corral bore the onus

of the plan, but it was not hies the Secretary of War sug-

gested it, as did the Governor of Sinaloa, who wanted slave

labor for his hacienda. The Governor of Sonora in 1902

approved a plan to move them elsewhere in the state, but

the most severe punishment was the transfer to other states,

principally to Yucatan. Governor Torres considered the

deportation a magnanimous gesture on the part of the govern-

ment; at least the Yaquis were alive. Diaz decreed the

deportation in 1908; one colonel stated that he had shipped

15,700 Yaquis to Yucatan in the succeeding three years at

sixty-five pesos each. However, he said he only received

ten pesos for each; the Secretary of War took the rest. Torres

said the claim was not true, and denied that there was a plot

to take the Yaqui lands.

Mexico was not a metal consumer under Diaz, although

the mining of minerals and petroleum constituted her largest

industry. The market lay outside the country. To make the








mining profitable in remote areas like Sonora, cheap transport

had to be available, and that came with the railroad. Mineral

products, which had been Sonora's chief economic resource

throughout the colonial era, yielded a total income of

4,243,683 pesos during the period 1867 to 1870.

There had been numerous proposals for railroads

since 1861, and several concessions had been granted, in-

cluding an extortionate one under Pesqueira, but it was not

until 1880 that work actually began from Guaymas to Hermosillo

with American capital. In 1882, the track reached north to

Nogales, which was connected to the Southern Pacific Rail-

road at Benson, Arizona,the same year. The railroad, earlier

opposed in Mexico City because it would tie Sonora more

closely to the United States, had been planned to join the

capital via Guadaljara. Work began southward from Guaymas

in 1904, and westward from Mexico City. By 1909 the stretch

from Guaymas reached Mazatlin; the revolution interrupted

construction and the railroad was not completed until 1927.

There were several short railroads built specifically

to serve a particular mining area, most of which were des-

troyed during the revolution beginning in 1911, or in the

Yaqui wars. The census of 1910 showed branches leaving the

main north-south line at Navojoa for Alamos; from Corral,

near Cocorit, up the Yaqui River past Tdrin to Tonichi;

from Nogales to join the branch from Naco to Cananea; from

Agua Prieta eighty-two miles south to Nacozari; from Torres









to Minas Prietas to the Yaqui River and from Sierra Pinta

to Bahia San Jorge. There were no east-west connections

across the Sierra Madre Occidental; a traveler from

Chihuahua to Sonora had to utilize the United States lines,

or travel to Mexico City and then to the west coast, then

go via boat to Guaymas.

Sonora had, and has, extensive coal deposits which

were worked, but the coal for the railroads came from

Colorado and New Mexico. The state's coal production was

over 50,000 tons per year after 1902. Coal was necessary

for smelting and refining of ores, but Sonoran coal was

never used by the northeastern mining companies. State

coal powered the small steam flour mills and cooked the

food.

Copper was not an important mineral until the end

of the century and the influx of American money. American-

owned claims were scattered over the large Arizpe district

and around Moctezuma and Altar. The Guggenheims gained

control of the mines at Pilares de Nacozari in the early

1890's, and sold them to the Phelps-Dodge interests in 1897.

The Nacozari mining camp was linked to the Douglas, Arizona

smelters and boundaries of Phelps-Dodge in 1901, when the

company completed a railroad, but the most important copper

mining center in all Mexico was developed in the hills

surrounding Cananea, where Colonel William Cornell Greene

built his empire.









Cananea was an old community, originally a Pima Indian

village already in existence when Father Kino came to Sonora

in 1687. Since those early days the area had been known to

be rich in minerals, especially copper, but the Spaniards

who came to Sonora were interested not in copper, but only

in the gold and silver which is often found in association

with copper. The surface deposits had been worked for their

precious metal contents by a Spanish soldier who did well until

they were exhausted; the subsurface deposits were known but

remained untouched. Apache raids, long distances, and high

costs prevented any subsequent development of importance until

the nineteenth century. In 1820 the mines were reopened, but

once again they were worked only for the precious metals. A

smelter was built near Cananea Vieja, which functioned until

the Apaches forced its abandonment.

In 1862 and 1863 several California companies exploited

mines in the state, with an investment of more than 3,000,000

pesos in machinery and salaries. The French intervention and

the lack of government assistance in fighting the Apaches

forced the companies to abandon their efforts before any real

developments had been made. Until late in the century Sonora

had no refining facilities, especially necessary for the low-

grade ores which were plentiful, and state law forbade the

export of rock minerals until 1868; in that year the law was

modified and a state tax imposed on the value of the gold and

silver content of the ore being exported.










when General Ignacio Pesqueira became governor, he

acquired the mining properties from some families who had

unsuccessfully attempted to develop them. Pesqueira had

considerable wealth and was able to build and man a fort

to protect his mines. Be rebuilt and enlarged the smelter

into an elaborate facility for that time and place, turning

out partially refined copper (matte) from all the mines in

the area. The matte went to Guaymas by ox-team, and then to

Swansea, Wales for refining. Even with the long sea

voyage be made a profit. After Pesqueira's death, his

enterprise declined, but other operators moved into the

area, mostly men from the United States.

William Cornell Greene was one of the Americans look-

ing for mining properties near Cananea in the late 1880's

and early 1890's. Under Mexican law no foreigner could own

land within one hundred kilometers of the border, but the

exceptions ruled more often than the law, since the Diaz

government actively promoted foreign investments. Greene

began building his empire by leasing the Pesqueira properties

and organizing the Cananea Copper Company on December 3,

1896, after a merger with another group of mine holders.

Three more mines were added to the original holdings in 1898.

After much financial manuevering and long courtroom

battles in the United States, Greene incorporated the

Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, S. A. as a Mexican

corporation in Nogales, Sonoraon October 9, 1899. Two


I


~








days later he deeded all of his Mexican holdings, twenty-

four mines and groups of mines, to the new company, soon

to be known through Sonora and southern Arizona as the 4C's.

Then in February, 1900 Greene and some of his financial

friends formed a holding company, the Greene Consolidated

Copper Company, to which he turned over all of his capital

stock in the 4C's.

The 4C's wasted no time in exploiting its mines, but

a multitude of problems went along with exploitation. The

mines and smelters had to have workers. The workers had

to have a place to live; they had to be able to buy food

and clothes; there had to be schools, town buildings, a

cemetery, a jail and parks for a community. Before any of

these there had to be land. Since mineral rights were

separate from surface rights, Greene had to buy a large

tract around the mines. The company set aside land and

furnished a part of the money needed for civic buildings

for the town it was creating and the company built stores,

a bank, a hospital, a school, a slaughterhouse, a laundry,

an ice-plant, and a church, and pumped in an adequate water

supply. On October 13, 1901 the state legislature granted

Greene's new town the status of municipality.

The mines could not be run profitably without adequate

transportation and this, too, the company had to provide.

A branch of the Southern Pacific Railroad ended at Naco,

Arizona. All material entering or leaving Cananea had to









travel forty-five miles of poor road in horse-drawn wagons,

and communications were no better by way of Magdalena.

By the end of 1900, there were 1800 horses pulling company

wagons over the Naco road, an expensive and slow method. To

replace the horses, Greene bought steam tractors to pull

the ore wagons; their weight necessitated rebuilding the

road. The best solution, he knew, was a railroad, but he

could not get the Southern Pacific to build an extension.

So he built it himself, inaugurating service in January,

1902. The railroad became a part of the Southern Pacific

system in July, 1903.

Colonel Greene's Cananea became the setting for what

many Mexican historians refer to as the opening battle of

the revolution, the strike against the 4C's in 1906. The

town furnished the perfect ambience for the growth of the

syndicalist-socialist-anarchist political clubs mushrooming

throughout Mexico, formed by followers of the Flores-Magon

brothers, Antonio I. Villarreal or others, most of whom

were in exile in the United States. Through the presence

of American miners and occasional agitators, the community

was made aware of the unionizing efforts in the mines north

of the border. Most importantly for the revolutionary

movement, Cananea had a small middle class to furnish leader-

ship, men of some education who were storekeepers, company

clerks, etc.

There were several of these supposedly secret societies









active in Cananea and its associated mining camps. Early

in 1906 a new club, the "Liberal Humanity Union," was formed

by Manuel M. Dieguez, Esteban B. Calderon and Francisco M.

Ibarra, acknowledged leaders in this underground political

world. Lazaro Gutierrez de Lara, a lawyer and president

of the other liberal club in Cananea, joined the new group

also. Gutierrez was a socialist and a member of the Liberal

Mexican Party which worked to organize labor in the northern

Sonora mining camps, with aid from the Western Federation

of Miners in the United States.

The social and economic conditions in Cananea furnished

them with a plethora of inequities and injustices which

members of the Union could exploit with their developing

nationalistic fervor. The numerous company officials and

supervisory personnel were all foreigners, mostly from the

United States, and showed in many cases the American disdain

for all Mexicans as inferiors. Hence there was a built-in

antipathy available for exploitation. To make matters worse,

a part of the ordinary workmen were also from the United

States and were paid double the wage earned by Mexicans in

the same category, seven pesos to the Mexican's three and

one-half. In this situation national differences created

economic injustices. All economic realities could be

successfully made to focus on this one point. The new

society played on the worker's discontent, reiterating the

wage differential and the government's culpability. The








Union incited the workers to a strike, but warned them that

the government would view a strike as insubordination;

Diiguez, personally, did not favor a strike.

The strike began peacefully with the early morning

shift on June 1, 1906, but degenerated into violence before

the morning was over, when the workers learned that the 4C's

was not disposed to grant their demands. Greene pleaded

with the workers to go home, and pointed out that their

wage was already double that of all other miners in Mexico.

Their prices in the company store were the lowest in all

Mexican mining camps. He also reminded. them that Diaz,

under pressure from other mine owners who considered the

high wages as unfair competition, had asked for a reduction

in their pay.

The initial violence occurred at the company lumber-

yard, where the managers were killed and the yard burned;

from there it spread like a brush fire among both labor and

management. Greene called on Governor Izsbel for help, and

notified Douglas, Arizona, of what was happening. Knowing

that Izabel could not get troops there for two days,

American volunteers filtered across the border to aid Greene,

stirring an international incident. After the arrival of

Emilio Kosterlitsky's rurales the next day, the Americans

returned to Douglas without firing a shot, and calm

descended on Cananea, since no one wanted to be in Kosterlitsky's

bad graces. Twenty of the ringleaders were arrested, and


______;_C __ __________ ~









some, like Diiguez and Esteban B. Calderon, were sentenced to

serve fifteen years in San Juan de Ullua prison; others,

like Gutierrez, escaped to Arizona. The workers returned

to the mines, partly at Greene's urging, and partly due

to the speech made by General Luis E. Torres, in which he

promised that everyone not back at work in two days would

be drafted and sent to fight the Yaquis.

The miners at Cananea gained nothing immediately from
the strike, but over the next few years the workday was

gradually cut back to eight and one-half hours, pay increased

by about one hundred pesos per year, and Americans, who made

up thirty-four percent of the work force in 1906, were

reduced by 1912 to only thirteen percent.

The 4C's was already in financial trouble when the

strike began, and late in 1906 the Rockefeller-owned

Amalgamated Copper Company forced a merger, with Greene

yielding his directing role. In May, 1907 refined copper

brought twnety-five cents per pound; in September, the price

dropped to fifteen and one-half cents, with no takers. The

company curtailed production and finally shut down to make

repairs. Resuming operations in 1908, the 4C's was producing
six million pounds per month by October 1911, for a price of

nine and one-half to ten cents per pound.

Dias told the United States ambassador in June, 1906,

that the twenty leaders at Cananea were only a handful of

those holding the same sentiments, and asserted that Cananea


_ __









was only the beginning. Because of United States sur-

veillance, the arrests of leaders, and the capture of

membership lists in El Paso, the armed cells scattered

over Mexico could be crushed. Raids in Arizona netted

fifteen leaders from Sonora who were sent to San Juan de

Ullua; that prison came to hold almost one thousand men,

of whom five hundred died. Some of the Sonorans were

eventually given provisional freedom by the Diaz government:

others, like Dieguez, were not freed until pardoned by

Madero.

The arrests did not stop the formation of political

clubs in Sonora. In Guaymas, an anti-Diaz group, with

Adolfo de la Huerta as one of its most active young members,

held its meetings on park benches to evade the scrutiny of

the police. The group supported Bernardo Reyes when he

was a potential candidate for vice-president in 1910, and

when Reyes left the scene, formed the nucleus of the

Maderista anti-Re-electionist Club in Guaymas, with Eugenio

H. Gayou, Carlos E. Randall, Carlos Plank, Plutarco Elias

Calles, and Jose Maria Maytorena among its members. In all

the state's larger towns, local intellectuals ignored the

official opposition to associate with men of like political

thought.














CHAPTER II
MADERO AND MAYTORENA


The famous James Creel interview of February 17,

1908 with Porfirio Dfaz was printed in Mexico City in El

Imparcial on March 3. Dfaz told Creelman:


It is an error to suppose that the future of
democracy in Mexico has been endangered by the long
period in which one president has occupied the post.
I can say sincerely that the post has not corrupted my
political ideals, and that I believe that democracy is
a true and just principle of government, even when in
practice, it is only possible for highly advanced
nations.

I will see with pleasure an opposition party in
Mexico.


He further stated that he would retire in 1910.

Such a seemingly sincere declaration had the immediate

result of legitimatizing the heretofore clandestine activ-

ities of the nation's politically ambitious. The highest

post open for newcomers, however, turned out to be the vice-

presidency; as Daaz announced on May 30, 1908 that he,

after all, would be a candidate for the presidency. The

political clubs which had continued their precarious exist-

ance after the persecutions of 1906 now had several poten-

tial candidates; early opposition to Diaz centered around

General Bernardo Reyes, although liberals had to close their

eyes to his past record in order to support him. Reyes knew


~








what the consequences of opposing Diaz could be and insisted

time and again that he would not be a candidate. Even after

he announced his own support of incumbent Vice-President

Ram6n Corral, Reyes' candidacy was pushed; hope sprang

eternal until DIaz sent him to Europe on a military study

assignment in November, 1909.

To replace Reyes as a presidential alternative for

the voters there was a small, kindly man from a powerful

and wealthy Coahuila family, Francisco I. Madero. Madero

appeared on the political scene with the publication of a

thin volume entitled The Presidential Succession in 1910.1

In it he raised questions about Diaz' successors, using the

phrase that was to become the national slogan in the near

future: "Real suffrage, no re-election."

Dfaz, at first, paid little attention to the upstart

politico who seemed to present no threat; but as 1910

approached, the President was forced to concede that Madero

had a large following. Unofficially, Diaz ordered that

Madero be prevented from making public speeches, and that

hotels refuse lodging to his party. The antagonism of Diaz

did not deter Madero and he continued to tour the country

in a pre-campaign swing.

On January 7, 1910 Madero, his wife and two friends
arrived in Guaymas, Sonora where he was greeted by Josd

Maria Maytorena. The anti-Re-electionist Club in Guaymas



James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the
Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin, 1968), 124.








had decided to hold a rally in the plaza; to do so they

needed the approval of the prefect. The Club sent Eugenio

H. Gayou and Carlos E. Randall to obtain the permission,

which was refused without explanation. The secretary of

the Club, Adolfo de la Huerta, then appealed for the permit.

Again it was denied, but the prefect explained that the

Governor had issued strict orders to prevent Madero from

making contact with the public. Madero spoke to a private

gathering at the Hotel Albin that evening, excoriating the

Indian policy of the Diaz regime with tears pouring down

his cheeks.

nadero traveled to Navojoa the next day hoping to con-

fer with Benjamin G. Hill, the recognized opposition leader

of the Alamos district and a member of the town council of

Navojoa. Hill was in Klamos at the moment, so Madero was

received by two of Hill's active collaborators, Flavio A.

Borquez and Colonel Severiano Talamante. After talks with

other followers in the area, he moved on to Alamos to con-

sult with Hill.

Alamos officials would not permit a public meeting.

To circumvent them, one of Madero's supporters arranged a

private dance, to which were invited the known political

independents in the district, thereby giving Madero the

opportunity to make his views known. Hill, learning that an

attempt might be made to assassinate Madero, furnished him









with a bodyguard for the rest of his tour through Sonora.

Madero traveled to Hermosillo, where he met an enthusi-

astic reception, despite the Governor's pressure. None of

the major hotels would accept him as a guest, however, and

he was forced to lodge in a small hotel near the railroad

station. The town's coachmen also refused his trade, except

for the most popular and best-known coachman in the capital,

who put his carriage at Madero's disposition. In spite of

the intense winter cold and threats of reprisals, a crowd

gathered before his out-of-the-way hotel,and Madero went

out to meet them informally. The police were present in

force, mingling with the crowd to learn the names of the

adherents, who could be jailed on the charge of being

enemies of order." When a crowd spontaneously called for

Madero to make a speech, his efforts were greeted with de-

risive shouts and insults by government agents, making it

impossible for him to be heard.

Madero did not spend the night at his small hotel. A

partisan, fearing further molestation on the part of the

authorities, insisted that the Madero party sleep in his

home, and there numerous visitors came to discuss their

disgust with the government.

After two days in Hermosillo, Madero went to Nogales,

bypassing Cananea, the most populous town, because of

threats against him; from Nogales he entered the United





71



States to go to Chihuahua.2

Anti-Re-electionist delegates met April 16, 1910 in

Mexico City and named Madero as their presidential candi-

date, and Francisco Visquez-G6mez as vice-presidential

candidate. Madero vent to Veracruz to begin his campaign,

going from there to Puebla and Monterrey. In the latter city

he was arrested, charged with sedition, and imprisoned. The

nation voted for a new president o0 June 26; no one was sur-

prised at Dfaz' overwhelming victory. With the election

quietly over, Dtaz permitted Madero liberty under surveillance

in San Luis Potosf, where he had been transferred, until the

pomp and circumstance of the centennial celebration was safely

past. Then Madero was able to elude his watchdogs and flee

to Texas.



2Gustavo Casasola, Historia grlfica de la Revoluci6n
Mexicana (10 vols., Mexico, D.F., 1973), I, 143; Charles Curtis
Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero (Austin,
1952), 92-93; Roberto Guzmdn Esparza, Memorias de Don Adolfo
de la Huerta segin su propio dictado (Mdxico, D.F., 1957), 42;
Antonio G. Rivera, La Revolucidn en Sonora (Mexico, D.F., 1969),
174-178; Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero; Apostle of
Mexican Democracy (new York, 1955), 89-90; Alfonso Taracena,
La Verdadera Revoluci6n Mexicana; Primera etapa (Mdxico, D.F.,
1960), 89. Material covering Madero's trip through Sonora
is sparse and inconsistent. Rivera gives the most complete
review but has Madero arriving in December, 1909 at Navojoa,
which is doubtful since Guaymas is the port. Taracena says he
was in that town on January 8. Rivera and De la Huerta agree
that he was in the Hotel Albin in Guaymas on January 7, and
De la Huerta claims to have pressed the subject of the Yaquis.
Taracena said he made the Indian speech in Navojoa, but it
is not mentioned by others as being there. Casasola agrees
only that he was in Bermosillo January 11 and 12, and tells
of the arrest plot. Ross mentions the attempt on his life, and
Cumberland, the Hill bodyguard.









From San Antonio Madero issued his Plan of San Luis

Potosi which called for an armed rebellion to begin on Novem-

ber 20. There, also, on November 6, he met with collabora-

tors and formed a provisional government, designating Josd

Marfa Maytorena, who was present, as the provisional governor

of Sonora. He also commissioned Benjamin G. Hill and Adolfo

De la Huerta as colonels in the provisional armed forces.

However, prior to Madero's naming of his provisional

officials, another junta of pro-Madero revolutionaries met

in September in San Isidro, Chihuahua and named Juan

Antonio Garcia as governor from Sonora.3

In September Maytorena had moved to Nogales, Arizona

to coordinate the efforts of the anti-Re-electionists who

had taken refuge in the southern part of that state. Join-

ing him there at his request were De la Huerta, Carlos E.

Randall, Eugenio H. Gayou, and Carlos Plank. The rival

claims for leadership had to be resolved, but Maytorena had

left the document naming him governor at his home in Guaymas.

After De la Huerta risked going to Guaymas to obtain it from

Maytorena's sister, all the maderistas present decided to

recognize Maytorena as governor. Garcia accepted the de-

cision without protest. While the others worked as pro-

pagandists and fund raisers in Arizona, De la Huerta slipped


3Rivera, La Revolucion, 180.







back into Mexico to establish connections with revolutionary
juntas inside the country.4

The anti-Re-electionists in Sonora had not been idle.

In Cananea a new group of leaders had developed to replace

those arrested in 1906. Among these, Juan G. Cabral was the

cashier in the rebuilt lumberyard, Salvador Alvarado was a

small merchant, and Pedro F. Bracamonte was a mechanic.

Cabral, especially, had been active in the opposition since

his school days; as a seventeen-year-old student, he had

attacked the state and national authorities in a speech in

La Colorada, his family's home. Only public indignation

had prevented his arrest at that time.

The Cananea club had worked fervently to promote re-

bellion. By early 1910, its members had accumulated arms

and set the day for the commencement of hostilities as June

19. One of the members weakened at the last moment and de-

nounced the conspiracy to the authorities. Cabral learned

of the betrayal and warned Alvarado; together they fled to

Arizona where they shortly afterward established a small

store in a mining camp in which numerous Mexican laborers

resided. All profits gained from the enterprise they in-

vested in arms and ammunition. Late November, 1910 saw

them crossing the border to begin a military campaign in

Sonora.



4Ibid.; Guzm n Esparza, Memorias, 12-13.




74


Benjamin G. Hill of Alamos was born into a well-known

family in that town, and he, too, had several years of

revolutionary activity behind him. After 1908, he corres-

ponded with various revolutionary groups, but particularly

with the Puebla unit. The increasing threat of rebellion

throughout the state provoked reprisals from the Governor,

and Bill and his associate, Flavio A. Bdrquez, were arrested

and imprisoned in Hermosillo.5 Others of the group escaped

into the mountains, hoping to join the rebellion in Chihuahua.

The family of one refugee attempted to persuade him to throw

himself on the mercy of the Governor, but he refused, saying,

"I'm no jailhouse hero'. He joined Colonel Severiano

Talamantes and his sons in the mountains and headed to

Chihuahua.

Maytorena continued to work in southern Arizona, travel-

ing between Nogales and Tucson enlisting the aid of wealthy

Mexicans, recruiting volunteers and buying arms and ammuni-

tion. The Diaz government was fully aware of the prepara-

tions being made on United States soil, and Francisco Le6n

de la Barra, the Mexican ambassador, protested in Washington.


5The exact dates for Hill's imprisonment could not be
ascertained. Consul Louis Hostetter of Hermosillo said that
he was in prison for three months. United States, Department
of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico,
1910-1929 (microfilm, Washington, D. C., 1959), 812.00/2061.
Hereinafter cited as USDS, 812.00/varying numbers. Rivera
(La Revolucion, 183) said that Hill attended the junta of
notables in Hermosillo, so he must have been arrested
immediately after the junta disbanded. Why he was released
in time to take part in the campaign at Alamos remains a
mystery.
6Rivera, La Revoluci6n, 171.


_____








Philander Knox, the Secretary of State, replied to the com-

plaint, stating that being a revolutionary in another country

did not make Maytorena's presence illegal, nor was it illegal

to ship munitions from the United States for any reason. It

was illegal, he said, to use the United States as a base to

mount a military expedition.7

The Arizona-Sonora boundary had few soldiers on either

side in late November, 1910. The United States had a

cavalry company patrolling between Naco and Douglas, about

thirty miles of empty desert. Mexican federal forces in the

north included approximately eighty-five men at Cananea,

sixty at Agua Prieta, forty at Naco, and twelve at Nogales.8

Most of the border was unpatrolled, unfenced and absolutely

open to smugglers. Customs agents and army officers had no

doubt that arms crossed the border easily and frequently.

There were too many railroad records of weighty shipments

of arms and ammunition; they did not tally with the recorded

sales in the neighborhood. One hundred and forty-one pounds

of guns and 3105 pounds (about 27,000 rounds) of ammunition

arrived in Nogales during November and December, listed as

such, but were not sold in the local stores. Large shipments


Knox to Francisco Le6n de la Barra, Jan. 24, 1911,
USDS, 812.00/654.
8Dye to SecSt, Nov. 27,.1910, USDS, 812.00/528.

9Dye to SecSt, Jan. 7, 1911, USDS, 812.00/637.








of sizes not generally used in the United States had an

obvious destination.

It was rumored in southern Arizona that Maytorena

planned an uprising in Guaymas for the last days of Novem-

ber, but it did not materialize; Cabral and Alvarado did

cross the border then and seized a village south of Agua

Prieta.0 Another small force of rebels, or possibly ban-

dits, appeared in late December in the Moctezuma district,

where there were no federal forces. The prefect and a group

of thirty volunteers pursued them, capturing their mules and

provisions.11 Another raid on Tepache in the same district
12
a month later met with the same fate. The Minister of

War announced, possibly to instill confidence and forestall

more rebel attempts, that the revolutionary character of the

movement had ended.13

Public confidence was expressed by the federal govern-

ment in Mexico City; in Sonora, however, Governor and

General Luis Torres had to face reality. Early in January,

Vice-Governor Alberto Cubillas, acting for Torres, who was


0Dye to SecSt, Nov. 27, 1910, USDS, 812.00/528

11Hostetter to SecSt, Dec. 30, 1910, USDS,812.00/620.

12Dye to Secst, Jan. 7, 1911, USDS, 812.00/637.

13H. L. Wilson to SecSt, Jan. 10, 1911, USDS,
812.00/626.








on leave to organize the state's military defense, sent a

circular telegram to all the prefects. He instructed them

to order the municipal presidents to invite all the eminent

men in their municipalities to join them in a trip to Hermo-

sillo. More than three hundred men overflowed the reception

hall of the government palace in the capital; among the faces

were many representatives of the Madero faction.14

The Governor asked that someone from each district sup-

ply him with information on the general conditions and pol-

itical attitudes in each area. Governor Torres also inquired

as to how the government ought to face the menace to public

tranquility which was undoubtedly coming. From the question-

ing he hoped to determine each man's private attitude toward

the administration. Those attending were not deceived by

the questioning, and their replies were reserved.

During the second session of the "junta of notables," as

Rivera called it, the Governor pleaded eloquently to those

present to be "men of order," painting them a tragic picture

of a nation torn by anarchy, in the hands of bandits or the

lower classes. He appealed to them as the upper classes to

maintain the integrity of their social position.

The strongly pro-Diaz elements responded by volunteer-

ing assistance from their districts. Having noted what would


14The following account of the junta at Hermosillo is
taken from Rivera, La Revolucion, 182-191. No other source
mentions this junta.









be forthcoming, the Governor rose to speak again, and this

time he had a surprise for the assembly. He tied his plea

for public order to the local elections, which were to be

held in April,then declared that Vice-President Corral had

obtained from Diaz the right for Sonora to hold free elec-

tions for state representatives and local officials.

The audience greeted his announcement with wild enthu-

siasm. One of the delegates present from Navojoa answered

with an oration declaring that the military movement already

begun was revolutionary, despite statements to the contrary.

Arms alone would not stop it, he said; the rights of the

people must also be recognized.

While the crowd was still signaling its approval of

this second speech, General Torres received a telegram which

obviously upset him. The meeting was interrupted and, amid

frenzied speculation, reset for the afternoon. Only then

did the state's premier citizens learn that rebels had at-

tacked Sahuaripa. General Torres met with the prefects and

municipal presidents, and directed them to organize contin-

gents in their areas of jurisdiction by any means necessary,

including impressment.

The military commander in Ures did resort to impress-

ment. He sent squads out in the middle of the night to sev-

eral of the neighboring communities where they aroused the

farmers from their beds and marched them off under guard to

Ures. The new recruits were treated more like prisoners








than citizens, and among themselves decided to escape to

join the rebels. In order to lull their guards into a re-

laxed vigil they pretended to become resigned to their

service, then, on a pre-arranged signal, they overpowered

them and fled with all available arms. They were pursued

immediately and forced to fight, but surprisingly, there

was no response to their shots. They waited. A federal

officer approached under a white flag and said that they

could return to their homes without fear of future molesta-

tions if they would surrender the arms they had. The farmers

accepted the offer and the terms were honored on both sides.15

In Arizpe, Prefect Ignacio F. Pesqueira, a porfirista,

recruited a small force from among the townspeople, and the

local schoolboys also formed a squad. But in Arizpe, as in

most of the isolated villages throughout Sonora, the locals

were apolitical or porfiristas, with little interest in poli-

tical reforms or in leaving their village to fight. They

were absolutely content to till their small plots or to herd

their cattle, and were more concerned with the rain or lack

of rain than with who ran the state. The men and schoolboys

of Arizpe drilled and stood sentry duty, and when the

maderistas appeared the male residents vanished. To avoid

any chance of impressment, the wealthier men headed north

to cross the border into Arizona; the farmers, herders and

laborers took refuge in the mountains until the maderistas


5Ibid., 193-195.




80


moved on. The women and small children remained alone in

town. Unfortunately, the Sonora River Valley, in which

Arizpe is located, also contained the major population cen-

ters in the state and offered the easiest access, other than

by railroad, to the north. So time and again, throughout

the revolution, Arizpe was overrun by retreating or advan-

cingforces; in between, life continued peacefully. Only those

who subsisted on the edge of the law, not bandits but not

settled farmers either, the adventurers, the ne'er-do-wells

joined the ranks of the passing armies.16

It was not in the border districts that the first

important fighting occurred, but in the central sierras east

of Bermosillo. Colonel Severiano Talamantes had assumed

leadership in the Xlamos district after the imprisonment of

Hill, and he and his men were en route to Chihuahua through

Sahuaripa when he learned that that district was already

under the control of rebel leader Juan Antonio Garcfa.

Sahuaripa had been taken without fighting because the prefect's

men bad all deserted him. For several weeks Sahuaripa became

a staging center for rebel contingents that were preparing to

move into other areas. Its strategic location, however,

as a gateway for invasion from Chihuahua, assured that the

Governor would attempt to retake it.


16Interviews with Ignacio L. Pesqueira, Mariana Corella,
Elena Sotomayor de Pellat, and Maria Jesus Fuentes in Arizpe,
Sonora on October 5 and 6, 1974. Pesqueira told of his trip
north to the border in 1911 as a young man of twenty. His







Colonel Talamantes remained in Sahuaripa with a garri-

son of only seventy-two men as the other maderistas dispersed.

The town was as fortified as was possible, given the

paucity of armaments of the maderistas. On January 27,

three hundred cavalry under the command of Colonel Francisco

Chapa. (or Chiapa), ex-schoolmaster and now prefect of

Moctezuma, and five hundred infantry under Colonel Pedro

Ojeda, advanced on the town. After two days of fighting

another small rebel force slipped into town; however,


father, Ignacio F. Pesqueira, the son of Governor and Gen-
eral Ignacio Pesqueira, had been prefect in Arizpe until
illness forced him to resign. He had gone to Arizona, but
the son had remained behind against his mother's wishes.
Learning that his father was not expected to live, he and a
ranch-hand set out for Querobabi to catch the train for
Nogales, without thinking to carry provisions. The sight-
ing of some Yaquis en route caused them to veer to the
north. At a ranch where they asked for food they were able
to obtain only an orange; so they shared the orange for
lunch. At' another ranch, twelve miles out of Magdalena,
they again tried to get food, or at least food for the
horses. The horses were fed, but the two men had only
coffee and a cigarette for supper, and a cigarette for
breakfast. On arrival in Magdalena they learned that the
town was suffering from a yellow-fever epidemic, and if they
entered they would not be permitted to leave. They had to
enter to find something to eat although almost every house
in town had a yellow flag.
Colonel Emilio Kosterlitsky of the rurales (Gendarmeria
Fiscales) was in command in Magdalena, and to-d him that to
leave he would have to get the permission of the Governor.
Back at his hotel his friends told him to speak authorita-
tively to Kosterlitsky; to let him know who was boss. The
next day he again approached the Colonel, this time saying
simply that he was leaving. Kosterlitsky laughed and said
that he must be the son of the General (Pesqueira), and
let him leave. However, only persons going to ranches could
use the train; there were no passengers to Nogales or
Hermosillo because of the epedemic. So the two went by
horse to Terrenate, then south to Estaci6n Llano by train to
await a train for Nogales. There was no normal movement
because the troops were being shuttled here and there, and
the two men also wanted to avoid the soldiers.




82


"instead of shooting bullets at the enemy, he spit harangues

at his troops."17 The new arrivals slipped away again with-

out making their presence felt. Early in the third day the

eleven remaining defenders, including the Colonel and his

two sons, used up their ammunition and were forced to

surrender. After a summary court martial the Talamantes

were shot on January 30.18 Sonora had its first martyrs.

Even as Sahuaripa fell into the hands of the federal,

the tide was turning against them. Maderista forces in-

creased until the average operating unit numbered two.hundred

and fifty to three hundred and fifty. Flexible and highly

mobile, they easily lost themselves in the mountainous

eastern half of the state, living off the land. Communi-

cations were poor or entirely lacking in most areas, mak-

ing it relatively easy for them to avoid the federal troops

whose movement was largely along the railroads. The maderistas

had no supreme commander, thus there was competition. Ban-

dits calling themselves maderistas could pillage and destroy

with impunity in the remote mining camps which were their

favorite targets.

The revolutionaries were greatly abetted by the scarcity



1Rivera, La Revoluci6n, 208.
18bid., 203-210. United States consular reports
placed the number captured as forty-five. Ellsworth to
SecSt, Jan. 31, 1911, USDS, 812.00/783.







and incompetence of the federal troops. United States

Brigadier General W. S. Schengler, visiting the Arizona

border on an inspection tour early in February, stated that

west of Ciudad Juarez there were few Mexican troops worthy

of the name "soldier." Furthermore, he said, "the inferior-

ity of the enlisted men is only equaled by the incapacity

of the officers in command of them..19 Numerous small

settlements had no government troops nearby; their conquest

was merely occupation. Cabral and Alvarado had occupied one

such mining camp on the railroad south of Agua Prieta late

in November, without any conflict with federal troops.

From there they unsuccessfully attacked Fronteras, then

crossed the divide to the Sonora River Valley. Arizpe,

the major population center on the upper river, offered no

resistance on March 7, when they entered; in the one hundred

miles between Arizpe and Ures was no village populous enough

to hinder their approach. The maderistas already held Ures;

the lieutenant in command of the garrison had joined rebel

ranks bringing with him one hundred men and one hundred rifles.

In Ures the rebels from the north and central districts con-

gregated to prepare an attack on Hermosillo.

General Torres could not permit the maderistas to retain

control of Ures because of its proximity to Hermosillo. He

forced them into a battle near the town at the San Rafael


1Schengler to Adj. General, March 5, 1911, USDS,
812.00/974.







ranch; after three bloody days the rebels, who held the mill

buildings, evacuated when they learned the federal intended

to dynamite the mill. They retreated to Ures and then dis-

persed into small bands to continue their guerrilla warfare.

The federal troops moved into Ures unmolested, but as the

threat to Hermosillo had been relieved, Torres moved them

out of necessity to the north where the rebels were again

gathering.20

For the next month, the northern border towns and rail-

road centers were the objects of federal soldiers and rebels.

Control passed back and forth as the thinly spread federal

moved from one area to another. Cabral sent an ultimatum

to the public officials of Cananea: leave or fight.

Colonel W. C. Greene, who resided in Cananea even after he

lost control of the 4C's, rode out to Cabral's camp to confer

with him. He decided that Cabral had enough troops to

easily overpower the tiny federal garrison, so he advised the

Governor by telegraph to evacuate his men and save lives.

To cinch his argument he pointed out that the miners would

all join Cabral, given an opportunity. The porfiristas

quietly left town at four o'clock on May 15; one hour later





20Rivera, La Revolucidn, 215-225; also, a series of
letters and telegrams from Consul Hostetter in Hermosillo to
the Secretary of State, beginning March 9, 1911 through
April 6, 1911, all in USDS, 812.00/984, 1074, 1109, 1120,
1142, 1166, 1254, 1289 and 1302.








Cabral entered.21

After Cananea fell into maderista hands General Torres

withdrew his inadequate garrisons from the other northern

towns to reinforce Hermosillo. By mid-May the Altar district

was already completely abandoned by all government troops

and there was no communications from that region. Possibly

five hundred to eight hundred rebels ranged at will through

the desert mountains, but claimed to be independent socialist

(or magonista) units which cooperated with the maderistas.22

Only Nogales, on the border, and Magdalena and a few small

hamlets along the railroad to Hermosillo, and Guaymas re-

mained under his control. Governor Torres could see no

use to continue fighting since the people wanted a change
23
in government and peace.2 He was spared a probable attack

on Hermosillo by maderista successes in Chihuahua and

elsewhere.

In the Alamos district, meanwhile, a separate war was

fought. The United States consular agent in Alamos reported on




21C. L. Sonnichsen, Colonel Green and the Copper Sky-
rocket (Tucson, 1974), 253-254; Green to SecSt, May 13, 1911,
USDS, 812.00/1749 & 1753; G. A. Wiswall to SecSt, May 13 &
14, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1754 & 1757; Dye to SecSt, May 13,
1911, USDS, 812.00/1759.
22Dye to SecSt, May 3, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1688; Hos-
tetter to SecSt, May 1, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1748.

23Hostetter to SecSt, May 13, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1913.







March 3, that the revolutionaries in the field were mostly

miners and ranchers from isolated mountain districts, not

representative of the men who were behind the revolt and

who would form the government. In Alamos, the adherents

comprised the majority of the leading families, and nearly

all of the local citizens who had no dependence on the

federal government. Part of the district was isolated by

nature, another part by the burning of railroad bridges

south of Corral, near Esperanza. There were frequent

clashes with indecisive results.24

The maderistas had made contact with the Yaquis early

in the campaign, and the Indians joined because of Madero's

promise to restore their lands. Fructoso Mendez organized

some of them to aid the rebels around Alamos.25 In March,

Chief Bule, who had been cooperating with Torres, notified

the Governor that Yaqui sympathies now lay with Madero be-

cause the Indians had no hope of justice from Diaz. They

withdrew into the mountains to fight in their own fashion.26

Then early in May, a rebel chief asked the revolutionary

junta in Nogales to send someone who could convince the

Yaquis to cooperate in the taking of Estacion Ortlz. The


24M. S. MacCarthy to Hostetter, March 5, 1911, USDS,
812.00/984.

Rivera, La Revolucion, 201.

26Ellsworth to SecSt, March 22, 1911, USDS, 812.00/
1082.








junta suggested De la Huerta, knowing the history of his

long friendship with the Indians.27

De la Huerta and Carlos Plank, who wanted to accompany

him, caught a freight train for Hermosillo where the Yaqui

chief resided. The latter sent an emissary to arrange a

meeting; on his return the two rode south to Cruz de Piedra

on a railroad handcar handled by two friends of De la Huerta's.

At their destination, they met General Sibalaume, one of the


27
2De la Huerta's friendship with the Indians was a
family inheritance. Early in the nineteenth century three
brothers left Spain for America. One settled in Argentina,
another in Mexico City, and the third, Torcuato de la
Huerta, settled in Huiviris, one of the eight Yaqui pueblos.
He devoted himself to mining and agriculture, teaching the
Yaquis better farming methods, and introducing better cattle
raising methods. He was a peaceful man, beloved by the
Yaquis.
In 1838, the Mexican government made war on the Yaqui.
When Torcuato learned of the impending war he went to talk
with the leader of the expedition and to explain that the
Yaquis were at peace and had done no wrong. The expedition
leader ignored his pleas and continued his preparations,
and Torcuato continued his pleading. The General then
ordered him arrested as an accomplice of the Indians, but a
Frenchman with the federal troops, Juan Marcor, believed
De la Huerta and helped him escape. He returned to the
Indians, and with the arrival of the troops, was again ar-
rested, and killed. The bloody campaign that followed ended
with the defeat of the Yaquis.
With the death of Torcuato, his family moved to Guaymas,
where his son married the daughter of Juan Marcor and was one
of the defenders of the city against Conde Gast6n de
Raousset Boulbon. This was the father of Adolfo de la Huerta.
The Yaqui tribe had consecrated Torcuato de la Huerta
for his defense of them and his name passed to succeeding
generations. Rivera, La Revolucidn, 22 footnote. It was
because of these family connections that De la Huerta had
such influence with the Yaquis; presumably, also, his grand-
mother had been a Yaqui, for portraits indicate a not far-
removed Indian bloodline. De la Huerta mentions telling
Rivera of his family's Yaqui connections.







Yaqui war chiefs, and together they traveled to Ortiz,

which the federal abandoned. Sibalaume wanted to pursue

the withdrawing troops but De la Huerta managed to dis-

tract him with a phonograph that he found in a local shop,
28
the first phonograph that the Chief had ever seen.2

Even as De la Huerta dealt with the Yaquis, events

elsewhere in the state made his efforts superflous. On

May 19, Manuel Bonillas arrived in Nogales en route from

Ciudad Juarez to a maderista governorship in Sinaloa. While

in Nogales he sent a circular telegram addressed to all

"Chiefs of the Anti-reelectionist forces at all stations in

Sonora and Sinaloa," in which he declared that Madero had

asked for a cessation of hostilities. Bonillas further

asked the Perrocarril Sud-Pacifico de Mexico to deliver his

message to any known rebels along their telegraph line.29



2Guzman Esparza, Memorias, 13-14. The Yaquis had a
complex government for each pueblo which was a hangover
from the Spanish Jesuits. Each town had a series of officials
elected annually from a slate nominated by the local clergy.
There were five governors in each town, one with civil juris-
diction, one with military jurisdiction, one with church juris-
diction, and two officers who attended to the rituals related
to the supernatural. All officers were equal and all were
called governor. The military organization was entirely sep-
arate; the war chiefs were recognized as able in war, and
were referred to as "generals." Luis Bule, Luis Espinoza,
Sibalaume and others were all chiefs, and there was a distinct-
ion among these as to whether they supported the government or
the rebels, or whether they fought only for the Yaquis. Edward
H. Spicer, Pdtam; A Yaqui Village in Sonora, American Anthro-
pological Association, Vol. 56, No. 4, Part 2, Memoir No. 77,
Aug. 1954, 55-71.
29Dye to SecSt, May 21, 1911, USDS, 812.00/1954.




89


The railroad refused the use of their telegraphic

facilities to publicize the Madero message, thus delaying

the announcement of peace in the more remote parts of the

state. Benjamin Hill, released after three months in prison,

once again was in command of forces in the Xlamos district,

preparing to advance on Alamos, which was still under federal

control. He had reached Minas Nuevas, a mining camp about

five miles from the town, when word of the peace agreement

reached him. He refused to accept the report from the

Alamos Committee of Public Safety until he could be sure

of its authenticity.

The United States consular agent in Alamos intervened

with the railroad for the use of their wires to check on

the veracity of the peace report. The local prefect re-

fused to request the confirmation from Hermosillo, thinking

that it might be interpreted as a sign of weakness if the

hostilities continued. General Torres, in response to the

agent's request, affirmed to the prefect that Diaz and

Corral had resigned two days before and that the nation had

a new cabinet. A telegram from Madero on the same day

ordered Hill to suspend his attack. Hill decided that the

peace messages were authentic, and on May 25, announced the

cessation of hostilities in a proclamation from Minas Nuevas.30


30MacCarthy to Asst. SecSt, May 25, 1911, USDS,812.00/
2056; Bostetter to SecSt, May 27, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2061.
Hill had several motives for prolonging the state of rebellion:
he had made extravagant pay promises to secure volunteers; the
rebels were slow in forming a new state government; and he de-
sired to revenge himself on the prefect who had had him arrested.




90


De la Huerta and Plank were still working among the

Indians at Cruz de Piedras when they heard of the peace

declaration. De la Huerta was content to remain there,

but Plank, whose father had been killed by Yaquis, preferred

to leave. They went to Guaymas to seek confirmation of the

peace and to contact the revolutionary junta in Nogales.

While in Guaymas, De la Huerta met an old friend from

Navojoa, the proprietor of a flour mill, who, as a man of

some wealth, had been a porfirista. The miller, together

with a young man he introduced to De la Huerta as Alvaro

Obreg6n, were fleeing the maderistas, and had arrived in

Guaymas from Yavaros, a small port south of the Rio Mayo.

Obregon, upon learning that De la Huerta was a maderista,

asked him what the maderistas had gained, and would gain

from the revolution. De la Huerta, in his idealistic

fashion, assured him that they had gained much already in

achieving the right to hold free elections, and spoke of the

benefits for the humble people which could accrue from the

labor movement and the destruction of the hacienda system.

And could an enemy, or one who had been neutral, Obregon

wondered, become part of the maderista movement if he had

popular support? "If an enemy has popular support he is no

longer an enemy."31 Obregoln never forgot De la Huerta's

sincere belief in brotherhood and forgiveness, and the goals

of the maderistas, although he would later describe them as


31Guzman Esparza, Memorias, 21.








"dreams of a man who is not seeing reality. 32

From Guaymas, De la Huerta went to Cananea to join

Eugenio H. Gayou, chosen by Madero to act as provisional

governor and to receive the submission of the porfirista

troops in that area. From there he returned to Guaymas with

a stop in the state capital. In Guaymas, he discovered

that his old schoolmaster, Francisco Chapa, the prefect

responsible for the shooting of the Talamantes, had been

arrested and sentenced to death. De la Huerta pleaded with

Maytorena to intercede with Madero in behalf of the school-

master, which he did, although Gayou would offer no assist-

ance. Madero ordered that he be sent into exile in the

United States.33

While Gayou acted as governor in the north the porfirista

government to function in Hermosillo. The House of Deputies

chose Abelino Espinoza to act as interim governor on May 27;

late that same night General Luis E. Torres, Alberto Cubillas,

and Colonel Chapa left Hermosillo secretly on a special train


32Ibid., 20-21. In his memoirs, Obreg6n glosses over
this period of his life, never mentioning his early acquain-
tance with De la Huerta nor his flight from the maderistas.
De la Huerta (Ibid., 20) points out that the story of his
flight was published in Excelsior by his nephew. Obreg6n
says he sympathized with the maderistas and felt ashamed
of his lack of involvement; he had done nothing except pro-
test when the municipal president tried to make him sign an
act of adhesion to Diaz. Alvaro Obregdn, Ocho mil kildmetros
en campana (Mexico, D.F., 1959), 5-6.

33Guzman Esparza, Memorias, 14.










for Nogales.34 Their absence was not noted until the next

morning; then the populace went wild with one-half day of

mob rule, until the interim governor called out the troops

and restored order.35 Nogales still had a federal gar-

rison; the lack of communications and conflicting reports

left them in confusion. On his arrival, Torres informed

the porfiristas of the true conditions within the state,

and all municipal officials and federal troops crossed the

border on June 2,36 leaving the state completely in

maderista hands.

Two days after he took office, Governor Espinoza re-

signed and the legislature elected Francisco de P. Morales

to the post. Three days later, with Maytorena's return to

the capital, Morales resigned and Maytorena suggested Gayou

to replace him. Gayou took office on June 1; he served

until July 4, when he handed the office to Carlos E. Randall

so that he could enter the political campaign as candidate




34Rivera says Torres left on May 22, but De la Huerta
sent a telegram from Guaymas on May 23 asking about the
peace, and Torres answered. The U. S. consul gave his
departure date as May 27. The De la Huerta telegram was
printed in El Correo de Sonora, a Guaymas newspaper, on
May 24.

35Hostetter to SecSt, May 29, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2088.

36ye to SecSt, June 3, 1911, USDS, 812.00/2067.