Arthur L. FUNK
DE GAULLE BETWEEN WASHINGTON, LONDON, AND MOSCOW 1943 r
or (. \ 11
MARIANNE ADRIFT -<..A'
How She Was Rescued by the British Lion .
Pecked at by the American Eagle "
And Hugged by the Russian Bear ,
To a large extent, American policy toward France during the Second ''
World War was made and implemented by Franklin D. Roosevelt. At times,
as in the matter of trusteeships, the President would collaborate with
his secretary of state, Cordell Hull; but at other times, as for example
after the St.Pierre-Miquelon incident, he found Hull's anti-de Gaulle
outburst too strong. Thereafter Roosevelt tended to exclude Hull from
the policy formulation process. For opinions he came to rely on his
military advisers, Stimson, McCloy, Marshall, Leahy.
Yet there was a secondary level of American-French relations, pro-
gressing behind the scenes, sometimes in opposition to Presidential policy,
pragmatically solving problems which Roosevelt's adamant positions made
difficult. Thus a Lend-Lease agreement operated without a recognized
French organ to administer it; de Gaulle gradually gained control of
Giraud's army in spite of presidential opposition; and Eisenhower was
able to expand his military authority to cover civil questions which
Roosevelt did not want to settle.
Whatever the diverse attitudes which the President maintained, there
is a consistency in American policy toward France. First, not unexpectedly,
comes security and defense. Difficult as it may be now to believe, con-
sidering that Hitler never crossed either the Dardanelles or Gibraltar,
American military planners were obsessed with the dangers of a German attack
on the United States. England and Iceland must therefore be held in the
north, and in the south every effort must be made to keep the Nazis out
of Dakar, only 1800 miles from the Brazilian coast. Nor must Germans have
access to Martinique or Guadaloupe, where several Vichy warships rode out
the war. Thus the Vichy policy. With no reason to break with Vichy,
American planners felt that a neutral United States could negotiate with
an immobilized but unoccupied and quasi-independent France to safeguard
French North and West Africa, French Guiana, and the French West Indies.
Once Germany struck at Russia, the vulnerability of Dakar lessened
and the concern for security became proportionately smaller. Americans
could think about France's future. Roosevelt's attitude was paternalistic:
the President saw France as a group of profligate children who had dis-
graced the family by fighting ineptly and remaining under their victor's
influence. Only one of the children, little Charles, kept on fighting,
trying to make his elders take notice that he had remained loyal to the
family tradition. But the older brothers, although wicked and misguided,
had grace and beauty, together with a potential for power, and Uncle Franklin
was prepared to welcome back the prodigals, should they prove properly
chastened, obedient, respectful, and above all, grateful. He was willing
enough to feed little Charles the crumbs from his table, but he assiduously
sent CARE packages to the prodigal brothers that they not be absorbed com-
pletely into the enemy camp. A gesture of resistance and all would be
forgiven. What Uncle Franklin chose to ignore was that the brothers demon-
strated no progress while Little Charles grew stronger and healthier every
day. Not inclined to humility, Charles became increasingly bitter that
Uncle Franklin would not abandon his elder brethren.
Indeed, the United States never abandoned France and the French people.
There were consistent efforts to bolster up French morale by sending consumer
'Arthur .L Funk
3445 N.W. 30th Blvd.
Gainesville, FL 32605
goods to the Metropole and to North Africa. U.S. policy,
which was 180 degrees out of phase with the British blockadeA held that
consumer goods would stiffen the French will to resist and that no articles
would get to the Germans. Similarly the Americans later accepted the res-
ponsibility of arming all the non-Gaullist French soldiers that former
Vichy officers in North Africa could provide. While Roosevelt consistently
opposed recognition of a Provisional French government, he did not prevent
the training of a modernized army which would surely give its leader an
edge in dominating a liberated France.
One factor peculiar to Roosevelt, in delineating policy toward France,
was his stubborn adherance to a position frequently described as Wilsonian.
The applicable principle, self determination, enshrined in the Atlantic
Charter and continuously extolled by the President, implied that no person
or group should have allied recognition as a government unless the voice
of the people had been heard: This principle was also applied by Roosevelt
loosely to French overseas territories--especially Indochina--as well as to
metropolitan France. If any American policy endangered relations with
France, with the Resistance, and with the other Allies, it was this
Rooseveltian anti-colonialism which so irritated both Churchill and de Gaulle.
Allied wartime policy toward France divides itself (as properly
a Gallic policy should) into three phases, the Vichy period, the North
African period, and the Gaullist. Intrinsically interesting as the first
two may be one has to admit that the policies affecting de Gaulle have
been the most significant in their long-range impact on post-war France.
3445 N.W. 30th Blvd.
Gainesville, FL 32605
The antipathy of President Roosevelt toward de Gaulle is well
documented but difficult to explain. As this attitude developed long
before the President met the French leader at Casablanca in 1943, it
clearly derived from principle, rather than from personality. Basic
to Roosevelt's thinking lay the sense that France was politically bank-
rupt, which provided him with an opportunity to influence its recovery
and to reconstruct the French Empire. It was not necessarily a weak
France which the President desired--France would remain weak for a long
time after its liberation--but he hoped for leaders who would be malle-
able. General de Gaulle, with his intransigent positions and bold
leadership, did not fit the proposed scenario. The President wished
to postpone important political decisions until after the war, leaving
military strategy as the interim determinant. De Gaulle, with ungrounded
pretentions to head the French provisional government, and with no appre-
ciable armed force to support him, was simply unacceptable.
One of the few written formulations of the presidential position
is found in a note wherein Roosevelt directs General Marshall to explain
his position to Eisenhower:
When you get over there, tell General Eisenhower that I
have read his memorandum to you but that I still think he
does not quite get the point.
He evidently believes the fool newspaper stories that I
am anti-de Gaulle, even the kind of story that says I
hate him, etc., etc. All this, of course, is utter
nonsense. I am perfectly willing to have de Gaulle
made President, or Emperor, or King or anything else
so long as the action comes in an untrammeled and un-
enforced way from the French people themselves.
But it is possible in an election so to influence it,
so to restrict the vote,-so even to count the vote,
that the people in power can swing it overwhelmingly
their way. .
Arthur C. Funk
~5 N.W. 30th Blvd.
ainesville, FL 32605
It is awfully easy to be for de Gaulle and to cheer
the thought of recognizing that Committee as the provi-
sional government of France, but I have a moral duty that
transcends "an easy way." It is to see to it that the
people of France have nothing foisted on them by outside
powers. It must be a French choice--and that means, as
far as possible, forty million people. Self-determina-
tion is not a word of expediency. It carries with it a
very deep principle in human affairs.
President Roosevelt's attitude toward de Gaulle and the French
Committee stood in marked contrast to that of the Soviet Union. Indeed,
from the very beginning de Gaulle, undoubtedly recalling the pre-World
War-I dual entente, saw that France should be allied with Russia, a
term habitually employed by the Free French leader. Soon after Russia
was invaded by Germany in 1941 de Gaulle undertook to develop direct
relations with the Soviet Union in order by bypass his British host as
intermediary. After a preliminary contact via the Soviet ambassador
in Turkey, representatives of the French Committee met with Maisky in
London. On September 26, 1941, while the United States still retained
an ambassador at Vichy, the Soviet Union recognized de Gaulle as leader
of the Free French.
The good relations continued to improve throughout 1942, with a
Gaullist representative, Roger Garreau, together with a military
attache, GeneralE. Petit, going to Moscow. In London, Ambassador A. E.
Bogomolov, accredited to the various governments-in-exile, developed
personal relations with de Gaulle and his entourage. As a gesture of
r^ good will toward Russia, de Gaulle dispatched the Normandie Squadron,
a group of over 50 pilots and ground crews, to fight on the eastern
front. When Molotov came to London in May 1942, he had a long conver-
sation with de Gaulle, assuring him of the good will and support of
the Soviet Union. (Molotov's principal mission, of course, was not to
encourage Free France, but to encourage the opening of a Second Front
Although the United States still recognized the Vichy Government
in France, American representatives did keep in touch with the French
^ National Committee in London, through the office of Admiral Harold
Stark, commander of U.S. naval Forces in Europe. It is true
that President Roosevelt, and especially Secretary of State Hull, bore
no great enthusiasm for de Gaulle, but it is noteworthy that during
this period, Lend-Lease shipments came to the Free French.
Molotov's trip to London, and later to Washington, held great
significance for the French because out of the Commissar's talks with
Roosevelt came the American commitment to establish a "European" front
before the end of 1942. That this front became North Africa, not the
European continent, brought dismay to the Russians but it held great
significance for the French, who considered Algiers part of France.
Serious preparations for TORCH, the occupation of North AFrica,
began in July, with Eisenhower designated as commander-in-chief. De
Gaulle and the Free French were assiduously denied any part in this
planning, while contacts made in North Africa by Robert Murphy were
carefully followed up. Murphy was in touch with legitimate members of
the French Resistance, but in general they were Rightist in orienta-
tion, and had no allegiance to de Gaulle. Principal among these was
General Henri Giraud, untainted by Vichy because of his imprisonment
in Germany until 1942, but nevertheless a high-ranking regular officer
in the French Army, whose orientation and attitudes were not unlike
those of Marshal Petain.
/" As both the Soviet Union and the Free French were excluded from
/ the planning for TORCH, they were able to empathize to the extent that
their mutual interests were served. When de Gaulle, after the staunch
military efforts of General Koenig in North Africa, changed "France
Libre" to "la France Combattante"--Fighting France--Moscow extended.
its recognition, affirming that de Gaulle's National Committee had
"the sole right to organize the participation of French citizens and
territories in the war and to represent French interests to the govern-
ment of the USSR." During this period the French Communist Party
accepted the National Committee and began to cooperate with it.
; Prominent French Communists who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union,
like Maurice Thorez and Andre Marty, gave de Gaulle their support.
S-Increasingly miffed by American and British actions which took little
account of the National Committee, de Gaulle and his adherents sought
support and reassurances from Moscow. The reassurances were forthcom-
ing but at a time when Russia desperately needed allies in the west,
Stalin was not inclined to favor de Gaulle at the expense of alienat-
ing Churchill and Roosevelt. In August, Benes told the Gaullists that
while the Soviet Government favored recognition of the French Committee
as the government of France, it had informed him that now was not the
Operation TORCH, the'invasion of North Africa, brought an
entirely new dimension to French-Allied relations. The Americans who
by reason of a deal with Churchill held a preponderant position, had
first proposed General Giraud as the principal French leader. How-
ever, when Admiral Darlan fortuitously appeared on the scene, they
recognized him as administrator for Morocco and Algeria. Although
a reluctant Churchill acceded to this so-called "temporary expedient,"
neither Stalin nor de Gaulle could brook such pandering to a hated
collaborator. With Darlan's assassination at the end of 1942, the
way was opened for possible collaboration between the Admiral's
successor, Giraud, and de Gaulle, between whom negotiations continued
after the "shotgun wedding" inflicted on them by Roosevelt and
Churchill at Casablanca.
So long as German forces remained in North Africa, Eisenhower
would not consider anything but a military establishment to the rear.
Ignoring de Gaulle, he gave all his support, in terms of military and
economic supplies, to the politically naive General Giraud. Although
the inept Frenchman would ultimately be supplanted by de Gaulle, he
must be given credit for having persuaded the Americans to rearm the
Rearmament of the French caused many problems for Great Britain
and the United States. Even before America entered the war the British
had undertaken, from its few supplies, to furnish de Gaulle's Free
French with arms and equipment. By 1943 these forces amounted to
approximately two divisions: General le Clerc's Free French armored
division which had marched from Chad to join the British Eighth Army,
and General Koenig's, whose units had fought bravely at Bir Hacheim.
When the Americans came on the scene, imbued with their optimism
and faith in the unlimited expansion of U.S. production, they quickly
calculated that they could afford the rearmament of twelve or thirteen
French divisions. But herein lay a potential Anglo-American conflict
for, by the very size of their support, the Americans would within a
year be in a position to dominate French military operations and conse-
quently to exert undue influence in liberated France. Worse, from the
British point of view, the American assistance would go not to de
Gaulle and the Free French, but to General Giraud and the Vichy army
of 120,000 residing in French North Africa. With this potential power,
Giraud could,with political acumen and will, become the foremost con-
tender for postwar leadership--entirely indebted to the United States
for his promotion. Alas for Giraud, and for his sponsor, the French
general wanted only to fight Germans. His political ineptness permitted
de Gaulle to shunt him away before French forces were significantly
deployed, and his incapacity for logistics lost him the support of
Eisenhower and all the American advisers in North Africa.
Nevertheless, the American armament program, even without Giraud,
left a legacy of problems not easily resolved. The ascendency of de
Gaulle to military control meant that months had been lost in reorgan-
izing the hierarchies of power. From the single command of Giraud, the
French army came under control of a Minister of War in de Gaulle's
provisional government, which would consider the political as well as
military use of French troops. A further delay developed with the
conversion of the two British-equipped divisions to American tables of
organization. This was required because the French forces would be
fighting, whether in Italy or -in France, under the command of those who
could provide spare parts and supplies--the Americans. By the end of
1943, the United States had effectively supplanted the British as
underwriters of French military power, now counted as eight divisions;
the Americans had thus indirectly achieved a preponderant influence in
decisions involving the French armed forces.
This preponderant American influence might have been benign if
British, Soviet, and American objectives had been identical. However,
this was not the case. Undoubtedly Churchill, although he had many dif-
ficulties with de Gaulle, would have backed him and recognized the
Committee as a provisional government if it had not been for Roosevelt's
adamant position. Stalin, farther away from the West, would in a show-
down have chosen Roosevelt over de Gaulle but in 1943 he could afford
to continue the policy which had been essentially in effect since 1941.
De Gaulle had appealed for Soviet backing in his struggle against Wash-
ington and its Giraudist policy, but Moscow refused to go out on a limb,
contented itself with advocating support for "all anti-Hitlerite forces"
and emphasing "unity" as the necessary ingredient for a powerful front.
There also began to appear some potential clouds of discord in connec-
tion with Poland: Moscow's support of the Union of Polish Patriots
ran counter to de Gaulle's dealings with the Polish Government-in-Exile
Unity seemed to have been achieved when, in June 1943, Giraud and
de Gaulle joined together to establish the French Committee of National
Liberation (FCNL) in Algiers. With this compromise apparently sanctioned
by England and the United States, the Soviet Union moved for immediate
recognition. Churchill, appreciating more completely than Stalin how
strongly Roosevelt felt, and seeing himself as the architect of the
fragile French structure, quickly urged Stalin to soften his enthusiasm
in the interests of Allied harmony Although this placed him in a
slightly embarrassing position vis-a-vis the French, Stalin
reluctantly agreed to do so.
De Gaulle certainly appreciated the willingness of the USSR to
recognize the new Committee, but he realized that more meaningful
advantages would come from recognition by the Western allies. If
especially the United States would view the Committee, not General Giraud
(the Commander-in-Chief), as the body dealing with Lend-Lease, armament,
sovereignty in North Africa, then de Gaulle could negotiate at the
level he aspired to--directly with the Big Three. Furthermore, a large
issue loomed on the horizon: the possible surrender of Italy. Not only
did France have frontier questions with Italy at stake, but precedents
of AMGOT (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory) might affect
France. Recognition could also play a part in de Gaulle's future rela-
tions with Russia and the French Communist Party. If de Gaulle believed
he had firm backing from the United States and Great Britain--with
possible entry into a postwar western bloc--he would not need to solicit
so ardently the support of Stalin. Obviously Churchill clearly analyzed
this possible drifting away of France, and he bent all his considerable
persuasive efforts to woo Washington into a policy of recognition.
As early as June 25 the State Department set out a number of
requirements which so restricted the French Committee that it could
scarcely be called recognition; and indeed, Roosevelt wrote Churchill
on July 22 that on military matters we should deal with Giraud, and
that political matters should be left to the people of France; he did
not want to use the word "recognition" at all.
No formula had been arrived at when the overthrow of Mussolini,
with significant impact on future Allied policy toward Italy, led to
Churchill's meeting with Roosevelt at Quebec in August. The two leaders
decided there to see if they could resolve their differing positions
toward the French Committee. It is ironic that while a major decision
at Quebec involved landings in France, the two major powers could not
agree on the extent to which they would cooperate with de Gaulle and
Giraud. The foreign ministers, Eden and Hull, who were charged to work
out a formula, fouhd themselves so far apart that, although no one
wished to reveal cracks in the solidwall of the Grand Alliance, they
found it necessary to make separate statements.
The American formula bluntly refused any favorable gesture to
the French Committee:
This statement does not constitute recognition of a
government of France or of the French Empire by the
Government of the United States.
It does constitute recognition of the FCNL as func-
tioning within specific limitations during the war.
Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammeled
manner, will proceed in due course to select their own
government and their own officials to administer it.
The British did not want to antagonize the Americans by wandering too
far from Roosevelt's position, and came out with a formula stating that
they "recognize the committee as a body qualified to ensure the conduct
of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied
The British and American positions were published at the end
of the conference and appeared simultaneously with the unambiguous
Soviet recognition which had been held back at the request of the
western powers. Some newspapers in the United States thought the
announcements unseemly. For example, the New York Herald Tribune:
The grudging air of the American statement is very
unfortunate. In particular the question of the
procedure to be adopted when the invasion of metro-
politan France begins is left unanswered. In
comparison with the broad and simple formula which
the Soviet Union has adopted the elaborate
qualifications deemed necessary by the Western Allies
would benefit from a tone of cordiality.
With the statements emerging from Quebec it seemed to Moscow that
there should be no further objection to Soviet representation in Algiers.
Once the occupation of North Africa occurred, in November 1942, Robert
Murphy, already in Algiers, had become political adviser to Eisen-
hower. Later he was joined by a British representative, Harold
Macmillan. So long as the fighting continued in Tunisia, Eisenhower
had some legitimate reason for refusing to have Soviet observers in
North Africa, but once de Gaulle joined with Giraud in establishing
the FCNL, a refusal to permit Alexander E. Bogomolov, already accredited
to the French while in London,had no realistic basis. Moscow kept
urging for the Soviet Ambassador's right to take his place along
with Murphy and Macmillan, now representing their countries with the
Eisenhower, at this time heavily involved in the Sicily campaign
They were soon to be replaced by Edwin Wilson and Duff Cooper.
and in negotiations with the rightist Badoglio, undoubtedly did not
want to be bothered by Russians in North Africa, but it was the State
Department which held up approval. Even after the Quebec recognition
declarations, Bogomolov had to cool his heels for another month before
the diplomatic arrangements could be made. Finally, on October 9,
1943, the portly Soviet Ambassador, with a retinue of 25, made his
appearance inAlgiers. By this time, with Sicily and Corsica in Allied
hands, with the Italian surrender, with the Italian campaign under-
way, a new phase in Mediterranean activity had been inaugurated.
De Gaulle continued to pursue his difficult path, seeking a
way to exert his power over that of Giraud, to obtain support from
both Communists and rightists, to obtain concessions from the United
States. He faced frustration after frustration.
Having been "recognized" at Quebec in August, de Gaulle waited
to see what would follow. He knew of course that Russia had given him
clear-cut support, but the Soviets had no significant voice in the
issueswhich confronted the French leader; continued rearmament bungled by
Giraud's inefficiency; pressure of French Communists to have more of a
voice in the Committee; purge of old Vichyites. But above all stood
the example of Italy, with Sicily overwhelmed in July, and negotiations
for an Italian surrender proceeding in August.
Stalin and de Gaulle shared common interests in regard to Italy:
Stalin sought representation in the Mediterranean, from which Ambassador
Bogomolov continued to be excluded. Taking the initiative, Stalin wired
Roosevelt and Churchill while they were at Quebec. Among other points
I consider that the time has come to create a mili-
tary-political commission of representatives of the
three countries--USA, Great Britain, and the USSR .
Up to the present time the USA and England have con-
sulted and the USSR has received information regarding
the results of the consultation of the two powers in
the capacity of a third, passive observer. I must say
that it is impossible to tolerate such a situation any
longer. I propose that this commission be created and
to fix its place for the present instance in Sicily.
Stalin even recommended that the FCNL be represented on this new Com-
mission. Surprisingly Roosevelt voiced no objection, pointing out that
the United States was arming ten or eleven French divisions, which
would certainly be assigned to fight in either Italy or southern
France. He did not, however, want the French involved in the occupa-
tion of Italy.
Once the Italians surrendered, on September 8, Stalin wished
to have the new Mediterranean Commission to start functioning at once,
and named Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinsky as
Soviet delegate. The Russian assumption (as well as the French) was
that the Commission would function as an advisory and directing board
for the military commander in charge of the occupation. It soon
became apparent that Washington was clouding the issue by developing
an entirely different sort of formula, with possibly Chinese,
Brazilian, Greek, and Yugoslav members, to make broad recommendations
but with no implementing authority. When the revised articles of the
Italian surrender terms were released, late in September, the Soviets
and French noted to their dismay that behind the military would be an
Allied Control Council, with for the moment only American and British
members. The Soviet Union vehemently protested this development and
the whole question of supervisory commissions had to be placed on
the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of Hull and Eden with Molotov
at the end of October.
This was a tremendously vital issue. One could argue that as
the occupation of North Africa did not involve the defeat of an Axis
power, international supervision need not have been imposed. But
Italy was different: a major belligerent, a nation which had sent
divisions against the Soviet Union, and incidentally,a vocal Communist
Party. Moscow maintained there existed a legitimate reason for being
a member of an Allied Control Council. The treatment of the USSR on
this occasion would provide a powerful precedent once the question of
an ACC for Poland, Bulgaria and other countries came up.
Unrepresented at the proposed Moscow foreign ministers meeting,
de Gaulle could only hope that his cause would be championed by Molotov.
He was faced at this time by another problem, involving French Commun-
ists, who had been insisting that they have seats in the FCNL. The
surrender of Italy brought in its wake an uprising in Corsica, engineered
to a large extent by the Corsican Front National. During September,
French troops liberated Corsica, but to de Gaulle's chagrin the opera-
tion was masterminded by General Giraud in contact with Communists.
Thus de Gaulle was doubly irritated: Giraud had acted without con-
sulting the FCNL's Commissioner of War, nor had he worked with the
De Gaulle was now'confronted with serious issues: how to keep
French Communists under control, and at the same time placate the
Soviet Union, seemingly his only ally in high Allied councils. At
this juncture, he went to Corsica to give a stirring speech celebrat-
ing the island's liberation. At the end he said eloquently:3~
Here we are in the middle of the Mediterranean, this sea
from which our civilization came to us; this sea which
touches France on the north and French North Africa on
the south; this sea by which so many secular influences
have brought indestructible friendships with the Near
East; this sea which penetrates and links to us the valiant
Balkan people; this sea, finally, which is one of the routes
to our natural ally, dear and powerful Russia.
It ws de Gaulle's genius that in moments of deepest adversity he
could act as if France's eternal glory remained unimpaired. In 1943 the
National Liberation Committee controlled no part of metropolitan France,
commanded only a few poorly-equipped divisions, and exercised no
more than a tenuous sovereignty over the unoccupied areas of the ex-
tensive French empire. But while this address served warning to the
western powers that de Gaulle could not be relied on necessarily to
support a purely west-European bloc, nothing would be more erroneous
than to assume that thoughts about a Russian alliance were generated
solely by antagonism toward Roosevelt or Churchill, even though they
had frequently frustrated de.Gaulle's ambitions for equal status.
De Gaulle sometimes reasoned more comfortably in a pattern of nine-
teenth-century power politics than he did in terms of collective
security; he had witnessed the League of Nations' helplessness before
Hitler, and nothing he had experienced personally was calculated to
upset his belief in the value of Bismarckian diplomacy. French
policy required that Germany be contained, and no matter how de-
pendent he may have been, in 1943, on the two western powers, de Gaulle
never lost sight of the ultimate value to him, and to France, of
That de Gaulle could make gestures toward the Soviet Union at
all during the war is the more remarkable when one considers the dis-
trust he felt toward Communists and his fear of their domination once
France was liberated. He well knew that the Communist Resistance had
proved itself to be dedicated and effective, and he thoroughly under-
stood that only the most careful maneuvering could plot a course
which would keep French Communists in their place at the same time that
he curried favor with Moscow. This was especially true so long as
Russia, even though remote from the Mediterranean theater, possessed
goals the realization of which might be helped by de Gaulle and,
ultimately, by France. For example, Moscow hoped to persuade de
Gaulle that Maurice Thorez, head of the French Communist Party, should
be enabled to leave Russia and assume a ministerial post in the French
Committee of National Liberation. Thorez did not come to North Africa,
but de Gaulle in the autumn of 1943 i'd offer the Communists two
seats in the French Committee. The negotiations were protracted, and
the Communists only entered the FCNL in the spring of 1944.
Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministers were meeting in Moscow, and it
soon became apparent that the Soviet concept of a military-political
commission would have to evolve into something different. Eden took
the leadership in proposing that the commission should become two:
ultimately, after much argumentation, the European Advisory Commis-
sion (EAC), in which the FCNL would not be represented, and the
Italian Advisory Commission, which would have a French (as well as
possibly a Greek and Yugoslav) member. Although the IAC would have
only consultative and advisory functions, Stalin seemed to consider
it significant enough so that he appointed Vyshinsky as the Russian
representative, with Bogomolov as deputy. Great Britain and the
United States named Macmillan and Murphy respectively as members.
Out of the Moscow meetings the French had obtained a seat on the
Italian Advisory Commission, but they felt let down not to have been
invited to join the EAC. Rumors trickled out of Moscow that the
Russians had not been willing to support the French at the expense
of alienating England and the United States. According to Macmillan,
Bogomolov "took an unfavorable view of the French. They had
already tried to make trouble by playing off each of us against
the other, but we must present a united front. Britain,America, and
the Soviet Union--these nations alone mattered." Murphy also received
r a report that de Gaulle feared Russia was playing off the French
Y) against the Americans and British. Molotov told Eden that the French
Committee had complained against Russia for opposing a seat for the
French. Eden replied to the effect that a complaint had reached him
regarding British lack of support, as against Russian approval:
"a clear indication the French were playing the Soviet and British
governments against each other."
During November, while the Big Three converged on Cairo and
Teheran, de Gaulle went through a series of crises, of which the
most important was certainly the elimination of Giraud from the FCNL,
leaving de Gaulle as undisputed president. Any fears that Washington
would come vigorously to Giraud's assistance proved ungrounded, and
de Gaulle faced the new year, 1944, with many problems, but basically
in a stronger position than before. In obtaining a seat on the
Italian Advisory Council, filled by the French foreign commissioner,
Rene Massigli, de Gaulle for the first time achieved a sort of
diplomatic acceptance. That the IAC never significantly controlled
affairs in Italy (by April 1944 Vyshinsky, Macmillan, and Murphy had all
been replaced) did not altogether lessen this achievement.
If de Gaulle never ceased to think in terms of an ultimate
Russian alliance, he was not so unrealistic as to believe that Soviet
support could amount to more than a graceful gesture so long as France's
liberation depended completely on Anglo-American good will. No matter
how cordially he acted toward Bogomolov or Vyshinsky, de Gaulle did not
slight Eisenhower and other members of the Allied command. On the
contrary, he had such a warm and comprehensive conversation with
Eisenhower at the end of December 1943, that Captain Butcher, in his
My Three Years with Eisenhower, referred to it as a "love-fest," and
de Gaulle himself felt so reassured by Eisenhower's forthright support
that he permitted himself unwarranted optimism regarding his future
relations with Washington. All Eisenhower needed, as Supreme Commander
for the cross-channel invasion, was a directive from Roosevelt and
Churchill empowering him to cooperate with the French Committee.
To look ahead into 1944, it is worth noting that three months
\ after de Gaulle's provisional government was installed in Paris, the
U French leader worked out, even before the war had ended, an agreement
with the Soviet Union.
Later succeeded by Couve de Murville.
Negotiation of the Franco-Soviet pact in December 1944 was
hailed in France as a diplomatic triumph, and only a few cynical voices
/ were raised to pcint out how little it really meant. With Stalin un-
willing to commit himself to final boundary arrangements without con-
sulting Roosevelt or Churchill, bilateral agreements between France
and Soviet Russia achieved only academic significance. At the end of
1944 no one knew what sort of peace treaty would be worked out or how
influential the proposed United Nations organization would prove to
be. Some observers feared that the bilateral pact would alienate the
United States, which might interpret the agreement as an effort to bypass
Dumbarton Oaks. The State Department denied that Washington opposed
the alliance, but it is not unlikely that Roosevelt, although register-
ing no formal objections, harbored some misgivings about this apparent
revival of power politics before the San Francisco Conference had even
At the time the Cold War had set in and the philosophy of NATO
developed, Charles de Gaulle, whose political thinking was so deeply
imbued with lessons drawn from Bismarck and the historical logic of
power balances, had gone into semi-retirement at Colombey-les-Deux-
Eglises. When he returned to power in 1958 he was confronted by an
alliance which he had not made and which he did not like. It is true
that in the intervening years he had evolved in political subtlety,
and had learned much about practical diplomacy, but it should not be
assumed that de Gaulle had altered in his basic conviction, expressed
over twenty years earlier, that an understanding with Russia was
fundamentally in France's interest. He wrote, in his memoirs,
referring to his proposed visit to Moscow in 1944: "Perhaps it
would be possible to renew old Franco-Russian solidarity which, though
repeatedly betrayed and repudiated, remained no less a part of the
natural order of things, as much in relation to the German menace as
to the endeavors of the Anglo-American hegemony." There is no sound
of NATO in this; it is a carry-over from the Franco-Russian under-
standing of 1892.
There is another dimension to American-French relations, less glamorous
and exciting than the Roosevelt-de Gaulle alterations, but more basic,
more long-lasting, and from the point of view of long-range historical per -
spective, more significant than political shifts of tide. It is as if France,
badly hurt in an accident, is rushed to a hospital. There she is tended
by her own physicians, and some foreign ones, who have diverse diagnoses
and regimes. The doctors argue and quarrel, some quitting and being replaced,
some trying this remedy, others that. Meanwhile the nursing staff remains
much the same, both French and foreign, providing under difficult conditions
S\ not only tender and loving care, but sometimes giving the patient medica-
tions that the doctors don't know about, and might in fact not administer
) themselves. The doctors, however, are busy with other and higher concerns;
they do not too much interfere (there are rumors that they don't really
understand) and as the patient seems to prosper they content themselves with
heated arguments theoretical and abstract.
As early as 1940, the American government sought ways of mitigating
the plight of those French people who were suffering,in terms of food and
consumer goods, from the Nazi attack. While political motivations--that is,
keep France friendly to the United States--cannot be excluded, a large pro-
portion of pure humanitarianism impelled Washington toward this policy. From
the beginning the aid program was subjected to opposition. It was denounced
by those who saw economic assistance to the French as bolstering the unsavory
Vichy regime and indirectly favoring Germany. It particularly irked British
policy makers who wanted to blockade France and Vichy French Africa; but
the policy also had plenty of opposition in the United States from Gaullist
supporters and from elements within the government which ultimately
constituted The Board of Economic Warfare. Robert Murphy who as the
President's special representative in North Africa, had signed an agreement
for economic aid with General Weygand in February 1941, continually ran into
opposition either from the British blockadeAor from hurdles set up by BEW
In actual fact, the deliveries either to unoccupied France or to North
Africa never amounted tc much, and whatever the aims of the program, the
implementation sometimes did as much harm as it did good. The agreement,
which enabled the United States to send observers into North Africa, caused
the Germans to intensify their surveillance and ultimately to place pressure
on Petain to remove General Weygand, who had been in Roosevelt's secret
hopes, a potential champion of resistance. But also, the meagre supplies
which arrived, far short of the promises, exasperated the French and Arabs
t who had expected significant economic assistance. French North Africa was
not bursting with pro-American sentiment, much as the President may have
assumed that it was.
. Once the North African landings took place, in November 1942, the possi-
bility of sending aid to France ended. The Vichy Gamble was bankrupt. But
new programs began: first, the American commitment to equip General Giraud's
twelve divisions, and second,-an undertaking to continue the Murphy-Weygand
concept of bringing in civilian goods for the population.
The situation was a curious one. The United States had approved Lend-
Lease to deGaulle's Free French but not to the pro-consuls in North Africa,
whether Weygand, Darlan, or Giraud. For Lend-Lease, an agreement was gener-
ally made with a government whose defense the President deemed vital to
the defense of the United States. The situation in North Africa was
unique: as the United States, the occupying power, was already making
payments for use of French facilities, and as France had billions in frozen
assets, the American government concluded that the French could pay cash
for civilian goods. It was also assumed, in order to obtain French coopera-
tion behind the lines, that the military command had an interest in prevent-
ing "disease and unrest." The question thus became: should the Army develop
and administer a minimum program (undoubtedly the most efficient) or should
a civilian administration organize enhanced aid programs?
Ultimately the latter concept prevailed. One is concerned to ask how
and why? Was an aid program, in 1943, considered at the highest level as
an aspect of post-war policy toward France?
In fact, economic aid was more or less taken for granted. With the
Lend-Lease Act already accepted, with the tradition of Herbert Hoover's
post-World War I program, with the thinking that was to lead to UNIRA,
the principle that economic stability underlay the kind of world the United
States wanted, was not much debated. It was rather the details, of how
much and to whom, the degree to which Congress would support, whether assis-
tance could go to unrecognized organs like the CFLN, which provided grist
for argumentation. With foreign civilian needs in liberated areas an
anticipated concern, the United States in June 1943 established the Office
of Foreign Economic Coordination, which in September evolved into the Foreign
Economic Administration under Leo Crowley. In October UNRRA, headed by
Herbert Lehman, came into existence. In North and West Africa, a temporary
Lend-Lease arrangement, the Modus Vivendi on Reciprocal Aid, had been set
up in September. That there should be such aid was generally assumed:
Murphy spoke of increasing imports to meet "the populations industrial
and economic demands;" assistance was to be furnished, according Lo the
administrators, "on the basis of need and contribution to the war effort."
Into this situation had come that most effective and able French nurse,
Jean Monnet. Highly esteemed as banker and economist, at home in the highest
financial circles of France, England, and the United States, Monnet had
chaired the Joint Anglo-French Purchasing Mission, established to obtain
supplies from America. When France fell his differences with de Caulle
kept him from joining the Free French, and he placed his services at the
disposal of Churchill, who asked him to continue his work in the LUni.ed
States on behalf of the British. It was Monnet who had coined the- sogan
"Arsenal of Democracy." Personally acquainted with Assistant Secretary of
War John J. McCloy and Lend-Lease Administrator Harry Hopkins, Monnet
remained close to American decision-makers. In 1943, when the North African
administration, under the inept Giraud, began to falter, Roosevelt asked
Monnet to see what he could do in Algiers. In June, when Giraud joined
de Gaulle to form the French Committee of National Liberation, Monnet
became, ostensibly on Giraud's si de, the Commissioner for Armaments,
Suprpes, and Reconstruction. During the next few months, while political-
military wrangling absorbed Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, Monnet quietly
negotiated the modus vivendi on Lend-Lease. By early 1944 the United States
had sent to North and West Africa almost 500,000,000 tons of civilian supplies,
valued at more than $125,000,000.
Monnet soon realized that a larger issue, assistance to post-war
France, needed his attention. This he could scarcely negotiate from Algiers
which, with the war front moving to Italy and France, was in danger of
becoming a backwater. He needed to go to Washington and in November
prevailed on de Gaulle, now sole chairman of the FCNL (already being referred
to as the provisional government but not so recognized), to send him to
the United States to negotiate an increased program of aid.
That France was able to obtain a "Master Agreement" on Lend-Lease was
due largely to the extraordinary negotiating ability of Jean Monnet. Yet
even he, while able to cope with the second echelon of "nurses," ran into
almost insuperable odds when the "doctors" intervened. By the time of the
Normandy invasion Monnet had developed a basic scheme which emphasized not
simply military needs but also the requirements of thecivilian population.
A month later, when de Gaulle visited Washington in July, he generated good
will and confidence, apparently establishing cordial personal relations
between himself and Roosevelt. As a result, the President approved a
limited Lend-Lease agreemeKt which (although Monnet immediately protested the
narrowness of its scope) seemed to pave the way for France to be equated with
England and Russia as primary Lend-Lease recipients.
Would it be possible to recapitulate wartime American policy toward
France in terms that would comprise the policy of the United States, rather
than that of the President, the State, War or Justice Department, or Congress,
or the people in general? I think it is. Details and specifics may vary,
but there are generalities which prevail.
First, the United States was disturbed and disillusioned at France's
weakness. During the pre-war isolationism, even though Americans did not
wish to get into the war, they wanted Hitler restrained. When France
abjectly fell it was as if a first line of defense had collapsed. Britain
would be next. A German march into Morocco would bring Hitler first to
Dakar, then to Brazil. Martinique and Guadeloupe, a short flight from
the Panama Canal,would be threatened. In East Asia, when Japan walked
into Indochina, the Philippines were flanked.
France could not be counted on. The country had revealed itself to
be second rate. It would take a lot of proof for the United States to
accept France again as a great power. Much as de Gaulle was hailed by
liberals in the United States, there prevailed among Americans in general
an undercurrent of distrust and even contempt. It was evidenced, after the
war among the soldiers who preferred Germans to rrenchmen; its echoes re-
sound in high-level dispatches which refer to frogs. And this was
reciprocated. What Frenchman has not said "Je me mefie des americains?"
The French saw the United States ready to devour their empire, prepared to
keep France inferior the better to serve American interests. While this
mutual antipathy, muffled by the "Lafayette we are Here "syndrome, is diffi-
cult to detect, it nevertheless crept out to taint imperceptably all levels
of Franco-American relations.
Second, insofar as France could not defend those areas crucial to
American defense, the United States had to make certain that they did not
pose future threats. Washington had an interest especially in Morocco,
French West Africa, the French West Indies, French Indochina. They should
not go back to France, or if they did, only under circumstances whereby
American security would be safeguarded. To affirm the foregoing is some-
what different from affirming that the United States was anti-imperial or
Third, France's potential as a wartime ally should be exploited to
the extent that it would help the war effort and save American lives;
but not beyond. Washington generally accepted the Army's policy of
avoiding "disease and unrest" behind the lines, but proponents of going
much farther than -that minimum ran into opposition. If the United States
did go beyond the minimum, it was more due to Jean Monnet's persuasive
genius than to an American desire to build up a strong post-war France.
Similarly with military aid: Washington approved without demur arms for
a French Army of 8-12 divisions, but when de Gaulle asked for fifty,
the problem changed. (Of course the problem changed again when the Cold
War intensified, when Communism threatened, when Ho Chi Minh challenged
western suzereinty.) The United States was prepared to assist France when
it was clearly advantageZous, from the point of view of wartime strategy,
to do so; but the United States did not consider it in her interest to re-
build France into a great power.
Fourth, the United States did not really care profoundly what sort of
government France had (though preferably neither fascist nor communist),
so long as it would abide by the tenets of the Atlantic Charter and other
precepts of American economic foreign policy. When de Gaulle's provisional
government signed the Lend-Lease Master Agreement it accepted to take action
directed (among other things)
"...to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce, and to the re-
duction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in
general, to the attainment of all the economic objec-
tives Eof the Atlantic Charter]." 44
De Gaulle was unable to obtain a seat at Yalta or Potsdam, but France was
permitted to send a delegate to Bretton Woods. When Roosevelt kept in-
sisting that there should be "self-determination" in France, he presumably
felt that elections would bring forth the voters who had supported the
Reyna:-ds, the Daladiers, the Chautemps, the Jeanneneys, the Tardieus, the
Lebruns, tue Herriots--solid folk, not tainted by Vichy, who would emerge,
or whose counterparts would emerge after the liberation. Folk who could
be counted on to support a post-war world geared to avoid the economic
chaos tlat had followed World War I. Could one count on an unknown like
de Gaulle? An arrogant and imperious upstart who would not recognize
France's new second-place role in world affairs; who dealt with Communists
and Socialists from France's underground Resistance; whose basis of power
seemed to lie with those very elements who opposed France's traditional
elite. President Roosevelt may not have disliked de Gaulle as a person,
but he did not regard him as the kind of leader he would like to see in
liberated France. Regardless of how deep self-determination constituted
a principle in men's affairs, the President was prepared to overlook it
in two of the Big Four who were to maintain order in the post-war world
Concert. One has to take note that thee antipathy to de Gaulle was purely
Rooseveltian. By 1944 every principal adviser, Stimson, McCloy, Marshall,
Murphy, even Leahy, encouraged the President to recognize the French
Committee of Liberation.
Indeed, between 1946 and 1958 the United States had pretty much the
sort of French government it could work with. But when de Gaulle returned
to power the seeds of wartime disdain and mistrust had sprouted, grown
and come to flower. Franco-American relations still remain delicate,
tinged with mutual suspicion, cooperating but uncooperative. The legacy
of World War II remains.
Arthur I. Funk
3445 N.W. 30th Blvd.
G-inesvill., FL 32605
1. The subject of many studies, Roosevelt's relations with de Gaulle have
been most recently analyzed in Julian G. Hurstfield, America, and the French
Nation, 1939-1945 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1986). See especially pp. 225-40,
"Franklin Roosevelt: A Retrospect." For earlier analyses see Arthur L. Funk,
Charles de Gaulle: The Crucial Years, 1943-44 (Norman, Okla., 1959); Milton
Viorst, Hostile Allies (N.Y., 1965); Raoul d'Aglion, De Gaulle et Roosevelt
On de Gaulle, of primary importance are his Memoires de Guerre, 3 vols.
(Paris, 1954 ff.). For recent biographies see Nikolai Molchanov, Charles
de Gaulle (Russian edition, Moscow, 1980; English edition, Moscow, 1985);
Jean Lacouture, Charles de Gaulle, Vol. I (Paris, 1984).
Regarding Churchill, besides his own memoirs (see note 17 below),
significant studies include Elizabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at War
(N.Y., 1978), 68-102, and Frangois Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle
(N.Y., 1982), 231-319 (for 1943).
2. Roosevelt to Marshall, 2 June 1944 (Map Room, FDR Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.).
See also FDR Memorandum, 8 May 1943, and editor's commentary, in Warren Kimball
(ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence (Princeton, N.J.,
1984), II, 208-10; FDR conversation with Edwin Wilson, 24 Mar., 1944 (U.S.
National Archives, RG 59, 851.00/3185 1/2).
3. Memo of conversation, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, 3 Aug. 1941, in
em p i I -_ rr. : Sovetsko-Frantsuzkie Otnosheniia .(Soviet-French
Relations during the time of the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945) (Moscow,
1959), No. 2. Hereafter cited as SFO.
4. Maisky to de Gaulle, 26 Sept. 1941, SFO, No. 6.
5. De Gaulle, Memoires, II, 36; Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, 1940-
1946(Paris, 1946), 181-83.
6. Conversation of Vyshinsky and Garreau, 20 May 1942, SFO, No. 28.
7. Conversation of Molotov and Garreau, 24 May 1942, SFO, No. 29. De Gaulle,
Memoires, II, 248.
8. Direct contact was made principally by LCDR Tracy B. Kittredge.
9. Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC, 1961 ff.), 1941
II, 573, 578, 583. Hereafter cited as FRUS.
10. On the invasion of North Africa, see Arthur L. Funk, The Politics of TORCH
(Lawrence, Kansas, 1974).
11. Communique of the Soviet Government and the French Committee of National
Liberation, 29 Sept. 1942, SFO, No. 41.
12. Alfred J. Rieber, Stalin and the French Communist Party, 1941-47 (New
York, 1962), 51-57.
Arthur L Funk
3445 N.W. 30th Blvd.
Gainesville, FL 32605
13. Maisky to Moscow, 1 Oct. 1941, SFO, No. 10; Bogomolov to Moscow, 22 Jan.
1942, SFO, No. 17; Maisky to Moscow, 29 Jan. 1942, SFO, No. 18; Bogomolov
to Moscow, 26 Sept. 1942, SFO, No. 40.
14. Dejean to de Gaulle, 7 Aug. 1942, De Gaulle, Memoires, II, 348.
15. See Funk, Politics of TORCH and works cited in Note 1. For the reactions
of the American and British representatives in North Africa see, respectively,
Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (N.Y., 1964), Harold Macmillan, The
Blast of War (N.Y. 1967).
16. Comments ma the armament program are based essentially on Marcel Vigneras,
Rearming the French (Washington, D.C., 1957).
17. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, V, Closing the Ring (Boston,
1951), 90, 172-86, 651.
18. Bogamolov to Garreau, 11 May 1943, SFO, No. 55.
19. De Gaulle describes a protest by Bogomolov in March 1944 regarding
economic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile,in M'moires, II, 208.
20. Churchill to Stalin, 23 June 1943, in Correspondence between the Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the
Prime Ministers of Britain (Moscow, 1957), I, 136; Stalin to Churchill,
26 June 1943, ibid., 139-40. Kerr to Molotov, 15 June 1943, SFO, No. 60;
Molotove to Kerr, 19 June 1943, SFO, No. 65; Kerr to Molotov 23 June 1943,
SFO, No. 69; Vyshinsky memo, 23 June 1943, SFO, No. 71.
21. Details of the recognition problem can be found in Funk, De Gaulle, 148-76,
and in French in Revue d'histoire de la 2e guerre mondiale (Jan., 1959), 37-48.
See also The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (N.Y., 1948), II, 1226-41.
22. On Quebec, see FRUS: Conferences at Washington and Quebec (Washington,
1963); editorial note and documents in Kimball led.), Churchill and Roosevelt,
429-40; Churchill, V, 80-97.
23. FRUS, 1943, II, 185; Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War (London, 1962), II, 224. See Churchill's communication to
Macmillan, V, 182-83.
24, Funk, De Gaulle, 162.
25. Conversation of Standley and Molotov, 2 July 1943, SFO, No. 76; Gromyko
to Moscow, 5 July 1943, 5 July 1943, SFO, No. 78; Conversation of Schmidtleir.
and Molotov, 26 Aug., 1943, SFO No. 91.
26. Macmillan, Blast of War, 342. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 205-08.
27. Stalin to FDR and Churchill., 22 Aug. 1943, FRUS, 1943, I, 783.
28. Roosevelt to Stalin, 6 Sept. 1943, FRUS, 1943, I, 784.
29. Stalin to Roosevelt, 12 Sept. 1943, FRUS, 1943, I, 786.
3445 N.W. 30th Blvd.
Gainesville. FL 32605
30. On discussions of the "poltical-military commission," see FRUS, 1943,
I, 782-800. Cf. Items No. 104 to 114 (26 Sept. to 30 Oct. 1943) in SFO.
31. De Gaulle, Memoires, II, 142-48.
32.De Gaulle, Discours, 358. In his memoires published in 1956, de Gaulle
describes this speech (II, 147)but has no comment on his reference to
"la chere et puissante Russie."
33. De Gaulle, Memoires, II, 150-51.
34. A detailed account of the Moscow conference of foreign ministers can
be found in Keith Sainsbury, The Turning Point (Oxford and N.Y., 1985),
69-109. On French matters see also FRUS, 1943, I, 604-13, 619-20, 662-65,
710-12, 758-60. Cf. Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1283-1305; Woodward,
British Foreign Policy, II, 584-87; Anthony Eden (Earl of Avon), The Reck-
oning (London, 1965), 414-181 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 209-10.
Curiously, V. Trukhanovsky, in his critical study, Anthony Eden (Russian
edition, 1974; English version, Moscow, 1984), does not mention Eden at
the Moscow foreign ministers' conference, which is also not referred to.
35. Macmillan, Blast of War, 345; FRUS, 1943, I, 804-05; Conversation of
NKVD member with French representative, 29 Oct. 1943, SFO, No. 115; Con-
versation of Vyshinsky with Garreau, 6 Nov. 1943, SFO, No. 116.
36. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (N.Y., 1946), 473;
De Gaulle, Memoires, II, 674-76.
37. De Gaulle, Memoires, III, 62-83. It is interesting that de Gaulle's
Soviet biographer, Nikolai Molchanov, describes the treaty from de Gaulle's
point of view, and rather guardedly shares the cynical view here expressed.
After citing de Gaulle's enthusiasm at being regarded as a major power, Mol-
chanov writes: "It is different matter that these new perspectives opened
up by the Franco-Soviet treaty later proved to be cancelled out by the anti-
Communist tendencies of the French ruling circles (215)". Again, "De Gaulle's
foreign policy gradually lost the integrity and clarity it had during the
war Now [Sept. 1945], a Western bloc with a clearly anti-Soviet
purpose was on the agenda (218)." Discussion of these issues lies, un-
fortunately, outside the parameters of this paper.
38. Exchanges between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin (Churchill, VI,
39. De Gaulle, Memoires, III, 58.
40. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, 66-117.
41. FRUS, 1942, II, 313, 345.
42. Discussion of economic programs is based on James J. Dougherty, The
Politics of Wartime Aid (Westport, Conn., 1978) and Jean Monnet, M&moires
43. De Gaulle, Memoires, II, 236-41, Monnet, Memoires, 247-48.
44. FRUS, 1945, IV, 795; 1944, III, 748-63; Dougherty, Wartime Aid, 231-32.
Arthiur V. Funk
E/2 3445 N.W. 30th Blvd.
SAGainesville, FL 32605