Farmer-herder conflict and state legitimacy in Cameroon

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Title:
Farmer-herder conflict and state legitimacy in Cameroon
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xi, 290 leaves : ill. ; 29 cm.
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Creator:
Harshbarger, Camilla Lyn
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Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1995.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 278-288).
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.
Statement of Responsibility:
by Camilla Lyn Harshbarger.

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University of Florida
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Full Text









AND


FARMER-HERDER CONFLICT
STATE LEGITIMACY IN CAMEROON


CAI4IL


LYN


HARSHBARGER


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
'THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


UNIVERSITY 01


FLORIDA










ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


I wish


to sincerely


thank my


academic


committee:


Russell Bernard,


Ronald Cohen,


Otto von Mering,


Art Hansen and


Goran


Hyden.


Bernard


taught


writing


skills,


research


design


and methods,


and


the


value


cross-cultural


research.


Cohen


taught


the


value


understanding


historical


trends


social


science


theory


and


how


they


affect


contemporary


paradigms.


order


expand


ability


conceptualize


research


questions,


taught me


how to


reverse


independent


and


dependent


variables.


Cohen


also


showed me


the


dynamic s


and


importance


context-driven research


in Africa.


Special


thanks


to Dr.


Cohen


for


helping


me with


grant


proposals


world


. Dr.


contract


von Mering


research


jave me ar

operates


1 understanding


applied


how the


anthropology.


Special


thanks


to Dr.


von Mering


for employing me during my


tenure


as a graduate


student.


Hansen


shared


with me


a joy


for


conducting


return


the


field


research


university


for


in Africa

doctoral


and


encouraged


studies.


me to

Hyden


taught


me to aim high,


to strive


the


highest


standards


academia


but


remain


grounded


appreciation


for


knowledge


the


grassroots


level.


Special


thanks


to Drs.


Hansen


and


Hyden


working


with


me on this


dissertation.





I wish


to sincerely thank Dr.


Marilyn Swisher who


sent me


Cameroon


1989


on behalf


International


Programs.


wish


thank


the


institutions


that


funded


this


research:


Fulbright


IIE,


the


Wenner-Gren Foundation


Anthropological


Research,


the


Explorers'


Club


and


the


University


Florida


Department


of Anthropology.


thank


the


many


people


Tugi


and


Wum


Villages


who


shared


their


time


and


knowledge


with me


. Special


thanks


research


assistants


Martin


Tebug,


Al fred


Njohjam,


Carol


Fonge,


Martin


Foy,


Rose


Nji


and


Charles


Ebua.


In Tugi


Nji,


Village


Pa Andrew Nji


I wish


and Mary


to particularly


and Helmina


thank


Dr. Ajaga


for opening their


home


me. I


sincerely


thank


the


following


their


support:


Fon


Abraham


Chick


Mbakwa


III,


Kogge


Edward


Bwese,


Emmanuel


Muna,


Sylvester Buriya and Mrs


Jesse Nyamusa,


and Reverend Dorothea


Frank.


In Wum,


help


and


support,


thank


each


chief,


Ardo


Mohammadou


Umaru


and


family,


Njokem,


Nwana


Zacharias


Awa,


Richard


Komengesa,


Kongsen,


Stefan


Cherry,


Father


Tatah


Mbuy


and


Andrew


am also


grateful


help of


. Gertrud


Schreider


and Mme.


Oussematou


in Bamenda,


and Ms


. Roberta


Jones


and


Diane


Russell


Yaounde.


Finally,


I wish


thank


husband,


Tim


Frankenberger,


his


encouragement


and


insightful


comments


on this


work.











TABLE


OF CONTENTS


p42ge


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


ABSTRACT


a a a a a a a a a a a a a ai


a a a S a a a a a a a Z


CHAPTERS


INTRODUCTION


a a a a a a a a a a a a a a 1


STATE,


SOCIETY


AND


STATE


LEGITIMACY


IN AFRICA


. 5


Introduction . .
Theoretical Reflections


a .
the


State


Africa


A Definition
Views on the
State-Society


of State .
Post-Independent
Approach .


* . 6
State in Africa 7
* . . 16


Legitimacy and the State in Africa
Society, Social Control and State
Farmer-Herder Dispute Resolution a
Legitimacy in Cameroon .


Legitimacy
nd State


* a 21
24


. . 26


Research Hypotheses for
A State-Society Approach
Study . .
State Legitimacy and Com
Control Through the Co
Farmer-Grazier Commiss


Cameroon
to the

petition
urts of
ion .


Study
Cameroon


a .
for
the


. 26


Social


S. . 28


Conclus ion


. . . a 31


HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF
STATE RESPONSES TO FARMER-HERDER CONFLICTS
IN AFRICA . .


. 33


Introduction . .
Historical Patterns of Farm
Conflicts . .

Contemporary Comparative
Farmer-Herder Conflicts
West Africa . .


er-Herder


. a a 33


. . . 34


Perspectives
in East and


. a a a 36


. 5
. 6


..,27






Cote d'Ivoire
Mauritania
Tanzania .
Cameroon .


* . . . .. 37
* . . . . 43
* . . . 47
* . . . 50


Analysis:
Conflicts


State


Responses


to Farmer-Herder
S . . 57


RESEARCH


METHODS


FOR


CAMEROON


FIELD


STUDY


. 64


Introduction
Research Design


* ~ 5 a S S S a a S a a a a a 64
-r a a S S S S S S 5 64


Site Selection .
Hiring Research Assistants
Language Acquisition .


* S S S S 65
a a a S a S S 68
*~~ S S S S S a S 70


Critiquing the Study
Human Limitations of


the


Study


. . . 71
. . 74


Cultural Misunderstandings
Racism and Family, Village
Politics . .


and


Global


. . 75


S . 76


Tugi Farmer Ethnographic
Interviews . .
Wum Farmer Ethnographic
Interviews . .
Tugi Grazier Ethnographi
Wum Grazier Ethnographic
Human Compassion: The So


and
. S
and


Survey

Survey


c Inter ews
c Interviews
fInterviews
>ft Side of R


. . 79

* 82
S .. 85
* 86
research . 86


PROFILES OF CHIEFS, HERDERS, FARMERS
FARMER-HERDER DISPUTE MEDIATORS IN
AND WUM VILLAGES


Introduction
Tugi Village


Background .
The Chief of Tugi
Fulani Herders


Fulani-Meta relations
Education and family
Housing . .
Livelihood strategies


AND
TUGI
. 91


* S a a S S S S S S S S S 5 5.91
a a S S S S S S a


. S S S S .91
* a a a a . 92
Sa a S S S S S S . 93


S. .93
composition .. . 94
. . . . 94
. . . . 94
a! S S a a S S S S *S






Meta


Herders


. 98


Education
Housing .
Livelihood


and


family


strategies


composition . 98
* . . . 99
* . . 99


Meta


Farmers


Educa
Housi
Livel
Farm
Ident
Purch
Farm


tion
ng .
ihood
size,
ifica
ase o
sales


and


family


composition


strategies . .
type and land tenure
tion of farm boundary
f fertilizer .
, farm purchases .


* a S 4 4
* S S S *
* 4 4 a a
* S 4 a


Village


Background .
The Village Chiefs
Fulani Herders

Fulani-Aghem rel
Education and fa
Housing .
Livelihood strat


Aghem


Sum
Wum


nations .
mily composition


.eg
egie


Herders


Education
Housing .
Livelihood


and


family


strategies


composition


* a S S 4 S S S S 4
* S S 4 *


Aghem


Farmers


Education
Housing .
Livelihood
Farm size,
Identifica
Purchase o
Farm sales


Farmer-Herder


and


family


composition


strategies . .
type and land tenure
tion of farm boundary
f fertilizer .
farm purchases


Dispute


State Mediators:
Commission
Local Mediators


The


* Si 4 4 4
* S 4 5


Mediators


Farmer-Grazier


.* 4 . . .


Analysis


Wum





CATTLE DESTRUCTION
AND WUM VILLAGES


OF FARMS


IN TUGI


Introduction
Incidents of


Cattle


Trespassing


Snto
into


Farms


Rainy Season 1992
Dry Season 1991-92
Yearly Incidents
Past Incidents


S ~ ~ S S
S ~ ~ S S S S S S S S S S


The Ethnicity of Cattle
Farmers' Explanation of


Trespassers .
Cattle Trespassing


S S S S
S


Local Re
Graziers
Chiefs'
State Di
Farmers'


sources .
' Characteristic
Characteristics
spute Mediators'
Characteristics


Characteri


* .
* .
* .
stics


* .S .5 1
* 1
* 1
1
* 1


Analysis


AVOIDANCE, CONFRONTATION AND
LITIGATION BETWEEN FARMERS


Introduction . .
Farmers Who Avoid Herders
After Cattle Damage Farms
Farmers Who Do Not Report to


Predictive Model of
Report Trespassing


THE
AND


OUTCOME
HERDERS


Dispute


Farmers Who
Herders


Mediators


Do Not


An introduction
Results of the
Results of the


Herders'
Variation
Farms .


to
Tugi
Wum


Responses to
in Grazier


the data
model .
model


analysis


Farmer Contacts
Compensation for


Damaged


Predictive Model
Farmers Without


of Herders Who
Litigation


Compensate


Results
Results


the
the


Tugi model
Wum model


* S S S
* ~ ~ S S S S


Reporting


Cattle


Damages


to Dispute


Mediators





Predictive


Model


Farmers


Who


Win


Cases


The
The


Farmers'


Wum model
Tugi model


Summaries


C C C C C C C C
S C Ct S C C C C C C


of Cases


Analysis: A
Legitimacy


Farmers a
Farmer, H
Farmers,
Farmers,
Official

CONCLUSION: A
LEGITIMACY


Introduction
The Research


Farmers
Farmers
Farmers
Farmers
Office


State-Society


nd Herders .
erders, and Ch
Herders and Ar
Herders and St


STATE-SOCIETY
IN CAMEROON .


Setting


and Herder
, Herders,
, Herders,
, Herders,
ials .


Approach


ief
dos
ate


to State


Mediation


APPROACH


TO STATE


S C C C C C C
C C C Si C C C C C C C C


s .
and Chiefs
and Ardos
and State


Mediation


214
218
220
223
227

229


APPENDIX--LOGISTIC


REGRESSION


MODELS


REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHICAL


SKETCH











Abstract


the


Dissertation


University


Requirements


f


of
for


Presented


Florida


the


Degree


the


Partial I
of Doctor


Graduate


School


the


Philosophy


FARMER-HERDER


CONFLICT


AND


STATE


LEGITIMACY


IN CAMEROON


Camilla


Lyn


Harshbarger


May


1995


Chairperson:


Major


Department:


Russell


Bernard


Anthropology


The


theoretical


assumptions


this


study


are


that


individuals


and


groups


from


both


state


and


society


are


responsible


beyond


creating


dichotomous


a legitimate


paradigms,


the


state i

analysis


n Africa.


uses


Moving

state-


society

conflict


approach


individuals


demonstrate

and groups,


that


environment


including the state,


compete


for


social


control


in rural


areas


. The


dissertation


uses


the


example of


farmer-herder dispute mediation in Cameroon to show


how


farmers,


herders,


chiefs,


ardos


and


state


officials


compete


with


the


state


for political


power


and


resources,


and


social

at the


control


local


micro-level


village


undermine


the


populations.

Legitimacy


These


the


behaviors


state


Cameroon.


The


research


examines


the


dynamics


the


conflicts


between cattle herders


and subsistence


farmers


in Tuqi and Wum


lu ifil iment





villages


the


North


West


Province


Cameroon.


Research


was


conducted


for


a period of


sixteen months


1991


and


1992.


The


data


are


based


ethnographic


and


survey


research,


and


participant


observation.


The


research


focused


cattle


trespassing


and destruction of


farms,


and


the mediation of


the


resulting


conflicts


between


farmers


and herders.


The


research


involved


state


and


local


farmer-grazier


dispute


mediation


officials,


and


herders,


farmers


and


chiefs


three


ethnic


groups


these


villages.


The


results


the


research


and


farmer


survey


data


analyses


show


how


individuals


and


groups


from


the


private


and


public


sectors


operate


operate


both


society-based


and


state-based


economic


and


political/legal


realms.


The


study


shows that


these actors


use


farmer-herder dispute mediation as


vehicle


accumulate


personal


wealth


through


the


shadow


economy,


and


to manipulate


state


law in order to control


local


populations


Although herder


behaviors


vary


by ethnicity,


groups


manipulate


the


system


order


acquire


occupy


farm


lands


close


to the


villages.


Chiefs


and


state


officials


lease


traditional


farm


lands


and


sell


temporary use


rights


herders.


Changing


and


insecure


systems


land


tenure


exacerbate


the


conditions


that


lead


farmer-herder


conflicts.


The


study


shows


that


the


interaction


these


variables


along


with


interethnic


and


gender


relations


affect





whether


farmers


overlook


cattle


damages


farms


report


trespassers


to dispute mediation


authorities,


and


win


or lose


cases.











CHAPTER


INTRODUCTION


Throughout


the


dissertation,


a state-society


approach


used


to analyze


how various


actors


use


farmer-herder


dispute


mediation


vehicle


gaining


social


control,


and


how


this


affects


research


was


the


legitimacy


conducted


two


the


state


villages


Cameroon


the


North


. The


West


Province


Cameroon.


argue


that


the


lessons


learned


from


the


study


increase


our


understanding


state-society


relations


and political


processes under stressful


and changing


economic


and


political


conditions


sub-Saharan


Africa.


In Chapter


I define


the


concept


state


and review the


literature

advantages


on

of


the


using


state


Africa.


a state-society


approach


then

h that


present

goes be


the


beyond


dichotomous


paradigms


order


to understand


the


interaction


state


and


society,


and


political


processes


Africa.


then


define


the


concept


of legitimacy


and


discuss


how


groups


and


individuals


undermine


the


who


exercise


legitimacy


the


authority

state in


and


Afric4


social

a. In th


control

.e final


section,


present


research


hypothesis


and


the


state-


society theoretical


approach


to investigating the


dynamics


farmer-herder


dispute


mediation


Cameroon.


Finally,







explain how


events


at the micro-level


affect


state


legitimacy


the


macro-level.


Chapter


3 is


a review


examples


from


the


literature


farmer-herder conflicts


that vary by geographic and historical


context.


describe


how


farmer-herder


conflicts


the


creation


early


states


in Africa


and


how


colonial


empires


subjugated and displaced agriculturalists and other indigenous


people


various


parts


the


world


order


build


economies


based


on cattle


ranching.


Next,


use


recent


case


studies of


farmer-herder conflict


from East and West Africa


show


how


state


responses


these


conflicts


reflect


problems


of state


legitimacy


and


affect


the


lives


rural


producers.


Chapter


research


methods,


explain


why


selected


Tugi


and


Wum


villages


field


sites.


describe


research


design


and


the


sampling


methods


that


guided


ethnographic

encountered


and


survey


the


field


work.

that


discuss


decreased


various


the


problems


reliability


some


the


data,


and


some


the


"human


limitations"


the


study.


Finally,


briefly describe how my field


experience was


greatly


enriched


when


formed


friendships


based


on mutual


respect


and


reciprocity,


In Chapter


on the


background


the


study,


I briefly


introduce


the


country


of Cameroon


. The


chapter


then


provides


descriptive


profiles


farmers,


herders,


chiefs,


and


state


and


local


dispute


mediators


Tugi


and


Wum


villages.







affect


and


grazier


farmer-herc


trespassing

Ler relation


behaviors,


each


cattle

village.


damages


to farms


describe


how


land


tenure


in each


village


affects


conditions


land


use,


local


politics


and


the


relations


between


farmers,


herders


and


dispute


mediators.


Chapter


reports


the


frequency


cattle


trespassing


onto


farms


each


village


for


the


rainy


and


dry


seasons


1992,


and


annual


and


past


incidents.


then


identify


the


ethnicity


herders


and


report


that


elites


trespass


into


farms


more


frequently


than


other


herders.


Finally,


give


farmers'


explanations,


and


analysis


the


phenomenon


cattle


trespassing


Tugi


and


Wini


villages.


In Chapter


I describe various


scenarios


Tugi and Wum


villages


after


cattle


destroy


farms:


where


farmers


find


the


destruction


and


refuse


speak


the


herder,


they


confront


trespassing


herders


but


never


report


to authorities.


present


logistic


regression


model


explain


why


some


farmers


not


report


farm


damages


to mediation


authorities.


report


how


often


farmers


contact


herders


about


cattle


damages


farms


and


how


herders


respond


these


confrontations.


financial


describe


compensation


where


from herders


farmers

without


manage


involving


obtain

farmer-


herder


dispute mediators,


and


describe


how


frequently


farmers


initiate


and


win


cases.


use


logistic


regression


models


explain


why


herders


compensate


farmers


with


without







litigation.


Finally,


reveal


how


farmers


summarize


the


outcome


their


cases.


In the


conclusion,


Chapter


review the


highlights


the


analyses


the


survey


and


ethnographic


data


and


demonstrate


how


they


support


the


main


theoretical


points


the


study.


The


data


from


the


Cameroon


study


show


how


the


interactions


and behaviors


farmers,


herders,


chiefs


, ardos


and


state


officials


positively


negatively


affect


state


legitimacy through


the


presence


or absence


compliance


with


state


law


and


participation


state


institutions.


A state-


society


approach


the


Cameroon


study


illuminates


how


individuals


and


groups


from


the


private


and


public


sectors


operate


both


society-based


and


state-based


economic


and


political/legal


realms


. The


study


shows


that


these


actors


use


farmer-herder


dispute


mediation


vehicle


accumulate


personal


wealth


through


the


shadow economy,


and


to manipulate


state


law


order


control


local


populations.


These


activities


at the micro-level


undermine


the


legitimacy


the


state


Cameroon.











CHAPTER


STATE,


SOCIETY


AND


STATE


LEGITIMACY


IN AFRICA


Introduction


In this


chapter


I address theoretical


issues of


state


and


society,


this


and


chapter


state


legitimacy


I discuss


in Africa.


a definition


In the


state


and


first


how


part


scholars


describe


present


problems


the


the


arguments


contemporary


scholars


state


who


in Africa.


beyond


I then


dichotomous


paradigms


and


advocate


state-society


approach


under-


standing political


processes


in Africa.


Next,


introduce


the


concept


legitimacy.


discuss


how


groups


and


individuals


who


compete


with


the


state


social


control


undermine


the


legitimacy


the


state


Africa.


the


final


section,


discuss


research


hypothesis


and


theoretical


approach


farmer-herder


dispute


mediation


Cameroon.


In addition,


explain


how the


study


links


micro-


and macro-level


phenomena.


Throughout


the


dissertation,


the


state-society


approach


will


used


analyze


how


various


actors


use


farmer-herder


dispute mediation as


a vehicle


gaining social


control,


and


how


this


affects


the


legitimacy


the


state


of Cameroon.







Theoretical


Reflections


the


State


in Africa


A Definition


of State


Nordlinger


(1981:11)


presents


a conceptually


satisfying


definition


the


state:


It r
that


:efers


those


authorize


decisions
society.
limited


that
Quite


them
are


sim


those


and


individuals


them


binding u
ply, the


ipor


alone,
l any


state


individuals


I


who


who


occupy


to make


and
Ls


all
made


are


offices


and


segmen


endowed


apply
ts of
f and
with


society-wide


decisionmaking


authority


Nordlinger


borrowed


from


Weber


(1964)


but


eliminated


references


institutions


agencies


order


avoid


anthropomorphisizing;


people have preferences


and do work,


not


institutions.


appreciate


the


absence


reference


institutions


bureaucracies


definition


dif-


ferent

state


reason:


and society.


shrinks


This


the


approach


conceptual

is useful


distance


when applied


between

Ito the


African


context


where


empirically,


the


social


distance


can be


quite


short


between


individuals


from


the


public


and


private


sector.


because


Nordlinger


makes


also


favors


reference


definition


equal


weight


over


all


others


public


official


who


are


involved


making


public


policy.


the


African


context,


this


points


to the


continuum


of authority


centralized


government


that


stretches


from


the


executive


office to the


remote rural


offices


Finally,


the author


argues


that


definition


state


is neutral


and


therefore


useful


the


sense


that


makes


reference


legitimacy


and


coercion,


which


he claims


are


theoretically


debatable







As hard


as Nordlinger


tried


to create


a flexible


defini-


tion


that


would


fit all


contexts,


a definition of


state


the


ideal


not


necessarily


one


that


fits


reality.


Even


upon


the


assumption that Nordlinger's definition is


innocuous,


it still


raises questions

questions concern


the


nature


"authority"


e of

and


the

social


state


Africa.


control,


the


The


extent


to which


decisions


are


"binding,


" and


binding


with


regard


"any


and


all


segments


society.


These


questions


are


discussed


later


this


chapter.


short,


the


African


context,


seems


the


only


part


Nordlinger' s


definition


that


not


debatable


"those


individuals


who


occupy


offices


fact,


will


see


throughout


this


dissertation,


a definition


state


post-independent


sub-


Saharan


Africa


eludes


even


Nordlinger's


definition.


Views


on the


Post-Independent


State


in Africa


A state's


capabilities


are


defined


"the


capacity


penetrate

resources,


society,


and


regulate


appropriate


social


use


relationships,


resources


extract


determined


ways"


(Migdal


1988:4).


The


crisis


for


the


post-independent


state


in sub-Saharan Africa


that


failed


to fulfill


these


capabilities


(Azarya


and


Chazan


1987)


. Within


only


decade


two,


the


newly


independent


state's


image


quickly


changed


from


strong


to weak.


Instead


fulfilling


dreams


independence,


most of these states


found


themselves


in crisis:


they


failed


govern


effectively


and


economies


regressed







Part


of the


process


of coming to


grips


with


the crises


the


African


state


understand


our


own


expectations


state


performance


and


how


states


vary


from


an ideal


type


.At


the


close


the


colonial


era


in the


1960s


and


1970s,


social


scientists


advocated a centralized approach to political order


based


on modernization


theory


(Apter


1965,


Huntington


1968).


Now


many


authors


argue


the


centralized


approach


was


wrong-


headed


and


based


on ethnocentric


assumptions


. Migdal


(1985)


points


out


that


these


state-centric


models


were


based


dichotomous


concepts


depicting


the


center


modern


and


strong,


and


the


periphery


traditional,


weak


and


disor-


ganized.


Migdal


(1985:45)


claims


these


dichotomies


are


ethnocentric,


derived


where modernizing


leads


from


notion


to scientific


evolution


which


leads


state


to Western,


and


that


makes


desirable


and


right.


addition,


Migdal


argues


that


the


center-periphery


model


treats


people


the


periphery


as passive


recipients


where


all


activities


occur


reaction


to the


state.


This


approach


objectifies


citizens


the


private


sector


and


overlooks


not


denigrates


their


contribution


state


building.


Migdal


criticizes


Shils


(1975),


a main


proponent


the


model:


never


occurred


him


that


change


generated


the


periphery


might


affect


the


very nature


and capabilities of the center.


" (Migdal


1985:44).


To conclude,


part


the


dilemma


failure


the


state


Africa


belongs


Western


social


science,


development







Western"


African


states


and


societies


has


not


been


a useful


way


proceed.


addition,


dichotomous,


monocausal


approach of economic and political development


that disregards


the role of


society


in that development


simply unrealistic.


Migdal


another


cites


the


contributing


bias


factor


social


why


these


science


models


research


overfocus


the


state


the


expense


understanding


society


and


the


articulation


and


interaction


state


and


society


. Migdal


(1985:44)

social sc


states


:ientists
p* d U.BL


that

becauu


"Centers

se they


are


have


primary


a coherence,


interest

a unity,


agenda-setting


capability


that


peripheries


lack "


seems


that more specifically,


Migdal means that political scientists


are


interested


the center.


Contrary to


Migdal'


assertion,


in general,


anthropologists


have actually preferred to work in


the


periphery.


The


problem


that


many


the


studies


are


micro-level analyses that do not link phenomena


to macro-level


contexts.


Social


scientists


acknowledge


the


limits


these


conceptually


segmentary


and


isolated


approaches


and


for


some


time


have


advocated


studies


that


link


micro-


and


macro-level


phenomena


(DeWalt


and


Pelto


1985,


Azarya


1988,


Chazan


1988a,


Gladwin


1991,


Hill


1986).


The


present


study


Cameroon


attempts


partly


fill


this


lacuna,


shows


how


the


behavior of actors


involved in farmer-herder dispute mediation


at the micro-level


affects


the


legitimacy


of the


state


at the


macro-level.







many


scholars


grappled


with


the


clash


between


paradigms


the


state


and


empirical


reality,


other


scholars


used


the


latter


to observe


and


to explain


that


discontinuity.


Ekeh


(1975)


blamed


the


crisis


the


state


on the


fact


that


the


new state was


imposed


from


the outside,


and


in this


regard


his


thesis


derives


from


dependency


theory.


Ekeh


presented


theory


two


publics


in Africa


that


explained


the


amoral


and


destructive


behavior


African


civil


servants


devastating


legacy


the


colonial


era


(Ekeh


1975).


Ekeh


argues


that


Africa


the


civic


public


(civil


service


and


political


posts)


amoral


and


the


primordial


public


(ethnic,


religious


and


village


associations)


is moral


. The


dialectics


between


these


two


publics


are


core


the


"uniqueness


of modern African politics"


(Ekeh


1975:108)


Simply put,


it is


"legitimate


to rob the civic


public


in order to


strengthen


the


primordial


public"


(Ekeh


1975:108)


This


explains


the


"destructive


results


of African


politics


the


post-colonial


era"


(Ekeh


1975:111)


In the


1980s,


Hyden


conducted


fieldwork


the


periphery


see


how the


behavior


rural


people


affected


economic


and


political


development.


Hyden's


work


contributed


our


understanding


the


state


least


two


ways.


First


looked


at how


societies


affect


the


state,


and


therefore


the


state


became


dependent


variable.


Second,


shifted


responsibility


the


problems


of Africa


to Africans


. Hyden







people

using


avoid


the


and


"exit "


protect

option


themselves


(Hyden


from


1983:71)


the

. The


state

exit


economy

option'


an economic


behavioral


response


poor


service,


quality,


management


that


causes


loss


revenue


that


organization


(Hirschman


1970:4,


From Hyden'


(1980)


perspective,


rural


producers


who


exit


and


disengage


from


the


state


are


"uncap-


tured


peasants"


portrayed


as an obstacle


to economic


develop-


ment


in Tanzania.


Many


other


scholars


have


described


societies'


disen-


gagement


from the state and participation in


the black market,


the


shadow


economy,


parallel


markets


(MacGaffey


1988,


Lemarchand


1988).


These


activities


have


robbed


states


due


revenue.


According


to Lemarchand


(1988:162)


" Where


pricing


and


marketing


prices


and


policies


rural


have


incomes


caused


. the


a sharp


drop


tendency


producer


been


use


the


parallel


economy


against


the


state.


The


smuggling


cash


crops


is the


standard


practice


to avoid


economic


exploitation


by the


state


" Observers


noted


that


public


officials


collabo-


rated


with


individuals


from


the


private


sector


the


illicit


and


lucrative


parallel


market.


The


irony


was


noted


that


the


state


Africa


failed


not


only


capture


the


ingenuous


peasantry,


but


even


own


personnel.


'1
concepts
action
violent


the


?he


par


opposite
r social


exit


science


excellence"


protest"


scenario


where


(Hirsch
neonle


is voice.
analysis


ranging from
man 1970:16).


confront


the


Both have


. Voice


"faint


Voice
state


become


useful


a political


grumbling


is portrayed
with demands


to
in
for







Many


Africanists


responded


studying


not


only


how


society


affects


the


development


and


operation


the


state,


but


how


public


officials


respond


their


tasks


under


the


structural


Ekeh


and


proposed


symbolic


configurations


explanation


why


the


officials


state.

are


Where


munoral,


these


scholars


investigated


how


individuals


acted


out


their


"psychic


turbulence"


(Ekeh


1975:107)


and


how


these


behaviors


affected


the


state


. In


these


studies,


the


authors


demonstrate


that


two


venues


state


officials'


illicit


operations


include


the


economic


and


political-legal


realms.


Several


scholars


noted


that


civil


servants


assume


multiplicity


of roles


where


they work


for


the


state


and


take


from


the


payroll


yet


exploit


their


titular


power


order


accumulate


personal


wealth


and


prestige


(Rothchild


and


Chazan


1988,

her


Wunsch and Olowu


observations


1990, Rasheed ai

Zaire, Janet


Olowu


MacGaffey


1993)


Based on


notes,


"the


political-administrative


class


takes


advantage of


position


the


state


apparatus


participate


heavily


profiteering


activities


. primarily


using


personal


relations


among


themselves


restrict


access


others


resources"


(MacGaffey


1983:363


cited


in Lemarchand


1988:164).


Therefore,


officials


abuse


the


state


economy


siphon


off


funds


and


moonlight

MacGaffey


the


1988)


informal

From an


economy


economic


too.


(Lemarchand


perspective,


these


1988,


activi-


ties


undermine


the


foundation


of the


state


diverting


badly







public

their


sectors

actions


fail 1

(Young


to hold

1989,


these c

Diamond


officialss


1989)


accountable


fact,


for

the


contrary,


their


actions


are


reinforced


elites


the


private


sector


who


form


covert


alliances


with


these


public


officials


Lemarchand


their


(1988:163)


mutual


explains,


profit.


"The


state


inability of


response,


the state to


pay


employees means


that official


tolerance of plunder


and


extortion


is the


nearest


equivalent


patronage.


Exoneration


legal


officials


sanctions


" In


other


the


words,


cheapest


state


way


officials


reward


the


local


central


offices


ignore


their


colleagues'


plundering


and


exploitation


because


releases


the


former


from


the


responsibility


paying


state employees


. Then


there


is more money


in the


pot


use


for


their


own


purposes.


The


legal


realm


another


venue


other


kinds


duplicitous


behaviors


among


state officials


Migdal


describes


the


multiplicity


networks


where


civil


servants


and


elites


manage


acquire


sufficient


facto


power


that,


ultimately,


they


control


local


power


and


resources.


Migdal


calls


these


actors


"alternative


elements


control"


(Migdal


1988).


These


elites


from


the


public


and


private


sectors


have


their


own


laws


and


principles


that


have


long


since


confounded


state


development


(Azarya


1988).


These


actors


often


influence


the

them


design

for


state


profit


laws


(Park,


and

Baro


are usually

and Ngaido


the


first


1993,


to exploit


Goheen


1988,







have


long


established


that


law


not


neutral


and


frequently


manipulated


to benefit


certain


sectors


society


(Malinowski


1926;


Gluckman


1955;


Gulliver


1963,


1975;


Nader


and Todd


1978;


von


Benda-Beckman


1985,


Moore


1985,


1986;


Nash


1989,


Vincent


1990).


In Cameroon,


Fisiy


(1992)


cites


the


example


state


officials


and


elites


who


rewrite


the


land


laws


and


subse-


quently


acquire


large


tracts


of land.


However,


the


problem


not


confined


creating


and


imposing


law to


benefit some and others'


expense


. In addition,


the


legal


realm


further


confounded


civil


servants


who


regularly


stray


ad hoc


interpretations


"state


law.


fact,


officials


use


their


state


positions


implement


personal


strengthen


legal


social


system


and


alongside


economic


"state


law"


arrangements


order


that


preserve


their


own


privilege


and


serve


the


interests


their


clients.


this


regard,


Fisiy


(1992:284)


reports


that


Cameroon


"bureaucrat'


law"


competes


with,


not


usurps


the


power


state


law.


Migdal


(1988:32)


summarizes


the


problem


groups


competing


against


the


state


social


control


the


population:


Leaders


many


environment


the
and
They


state
they,
have


other


conflict


should be
too, have


U


participation
their enclave


determine


how


ised
and


es,


social


social


have


not


predominant
desperately


the


same


legitimation


which
life s


organizations


shared


the


sought


currency c
to protect


they


should be


have


the


belief


entire
social


that


society,
control.


compliance,


and
also


ordered


strengthen
tried to


and


what


the







These


actors,


individuals


or as groups,


constitute


a very


real


threat


the


state


their


perpetual


quest


for


social


control


the population.


We see evidence of


these


threats


the


state


military


coups,


the


activities


opposition


political


parties,


ethnic competition and conflict,


and in


the


behavior


"amoral "


functionaires


who


work


the


state.


Apart


from


the


confusion


generated by the


interaction


state


and


society,


and


state


and


state


personnel,


another


problematic


area


the


state


in sub-Saharan


Africa


concerns


rulers.


The


problems


with


rulers


are


reflected


their


regimes


and


include


"rigid


authoritarianism,


political


monopolism


under


single


party


or military


rule,


and


endlessly


corrupt


patrimonialization


power"


(Young


1989).


Mbutu'


rule


fits


this


description


and


one


example


among


many


(Jackson


and


Rosberg


1982,


Callaghy


1984,


Nzongola-Ntalaja


1989).


There


no distinction between Mbutu


as man


or ruler,


nor


between


personal


state


finances.


MacGaffey


(1988:173)


explains:


Under patrimonialism,


personal rulers and their followers


maintain their support and influence through their access


to state
political
relations


distinction


(or what
whether
wealth.


distinction


resources,


support
" She cj


it


which


are


through .
es Kasfir


disbursed


network
(1983:14)


between a patrimonial
ethnocentrically called


or not


offices


may


patrimonial


between


the


and


rewards


for


patron-client


"The


fundamental


rational-legal


'modern')


appropriated


state


public


and


there


private


for


state


personal
to sharp


domains


These


personal


relations


are


the


rule


the


day


Africa,


and in


most


cases


supersede all


other


forms


c Oower. AS







politics


points


the


blending


overlap


state


and


society.


This


point


their


analysis


essential


accurately


conceptualizing


political


life


in Africa.


The


track


capacity was


record


so dismal


the


that


African


some


scholars


state


perform


questioned


whether


the


state


was


really


state


(Young


1984).


Lemarchand


(1988:149)


put


"Has


the


state


suddenly


become


conspicuous


absence?"


Other


authors


argue,


there


indeed


consensus


that


the


"state "


Africa


really


does


exist,


then


surely


wields


more


authority


the


international


arena


than


within


own


borders


(citation).


The


point


was


that


while


the


centralized


state


may


excel


shuffling


international


funds,


manufacturing


layers


bureaucracy


even


creating


legislation,


managing


internal


affairs


another


story


which


takes


back


the


theme


state-


society


interactions.


State-Societyv


ADDroach


Cohen


(1978:1)


portrays


the


power


the


state


as being


awesome,


literally moves


mountains


and redirects


rivers


After


reviewing


the


above


scholarly


analyses


the


state


Africa,


almighty


seems


does


obvious


not


that


the


such a


African


portrayal


context.


The


the


state as


question


"What


the


source


our


misconstrual? "


Here


present


two


troublesome


areas


that


might


mislead


our


thinking.


First,


the


African


state


s composed


individuals


from







little understanding of how those


individuals


respond to their


newly


formed


identities


and


duties


under


structural


and


symbolic


configurations


the


state.


I suggest


here


that


important


to emphasize


that


the


"state"


as the aggregate of


individuals


who


occupy


public


offices


composed


indivi-


duals


from


"soc iety.


The


independent


"state"


Africa


therefore,


not


history-neutral


context-neutral


entity,


and


the


personnel


are


not


automatons


. Second,


thanks


dichotomous


paradigms,


have


even


less


under-


standing


the


Above,


interaction


described


how


state


Migdal


and


society.


criticized


state-centric


models


for being ethnocentric and for excluding or discounting


activity


the


periphery


and


effect


on the


state


. In


the


analysis


economic


and


political


development


Africa,


another


weakness


been


overreliance


dichotomous


models


based


one-way


causal


approaches.


For


example,


although


Hyden's


(1980)


work


Tanzania


was


not


state-


centric,


it was


derived from a


dichotomous paradigm of


society


versus

diate


state.

groups


Other


the


dichotomous

private sec


models


*tor,


look


or how


at how

external


interme-

lending


institutions


affect


the


state.


Yet,


many


scholars


emphasize


there


little


separation


between


state


and


society


Africa,


and


their


work


they


use


interactive


state-


society


approach.


the


analysis


state


and


society


Africa,


it may


be worthwhile to


investigate


how both state and







the present author,


a state-society approach holds


individuals


from


the


private


and


public


sectors


responsible


the


condition,


strength,


and


legitimacy


the


state.


As Chazan


(1988a:122)


puts


The contemporary Afr.
neat classificatory


multivariate
continent in
straddling t


ican


texture.


political


scheme
The


recent years


he


dichotomies


3s


experience


devised


message
Lone of
of its


emanati:


defies


capture
ng from


constant movement,
observers.


the
its
the
of


Chazan


(1988a:123)


presents the following state-society model:


State and
secting
political
state ent


society


and


are


conceptualized


potentially


process


ity


does


as
have


the


independent
dependent va:


. as two
variables


riable.


an existence


Thu


own,


a


inter-
with
s, the
nd its


actions may have a profound bearing on social organi-
zation and economic enterprise. Social groups, similarly,
maintain an institutional and resource base which permits


them


act


independently


well


conjointly


with


structures


and
ways


economic
. The m


central


t


the public
fields may


manner
racing


domain.


These


intertwine


articulation


political


political,


social


a multiplicity


these


spaces


flows.


The


state,


therefore,


longer


viewed


the


sole


magnet


social,


constitutes


one


economic


the


and


many


political


social


exchange.


foci


social


actions.


Chazan


uses


this


model


to focus


on the


continuously


changing


state-society relations of disengagement and incorporation.


state


policy


is perceived


to be


positive,


then


social


groups


will


incorporate


and


follow


policy.


state


policy


perceived


to be


adverse,


groups


will


disengage.


These


groups'


"constantly shifting


social reactions


to the


state and


to each


other at various


(local,


regional,


national and transnational)


levels


assume


center


stage"


emphasis


This


approach


r








actors whose behaviors


affect a


political


process which may


shift


from being


state-


or society-dominated,


or the


locus


power


may


overlapping


networks.


Midgal


advocates


state-society


approach


arguing


that


dichotomous approaches


fail


to account


for the competition for


social


control


between


states


and


other


organizations


environment


conflict.


Midgal


pictures


the


state


one


organization


among


many


vying


control


within


society


Migdal


proposes


the


following


state-society model


(1985:47).


The model I am suggesting depicts society as a melange of
social organizations rather than a dichotomous structure.


state


singly or
personal
mobility
strategic:
coercion


seen


as one


tandem


survival
(my e
s is ba


and,


organization


offer
for


emphasis)
Lsed on


organizations


organizations'
social life sh


either
society


use


lould


reinforce


or propose


of
be
the


new


amona


individuals


some,


many,


which


strategies


strategies


Individual


the


can


symbols
ordered.


forms
forms


material


ring
and


choice
incentives


bear


values


These


symb


social
social


and


pward
among
and


the


concerning how
ols and values


control


the


life.


For


the


context


sub-Saharan Africa,


since


this


model


has


the


advantage


viewing


the


state


"one


organization


among


many,


" it


strips


the


state


might


and


grandeur,


and


thus


perhaps


suspends


our


preconceived


notions


what


state


should be


and


how


should


perform.


Thus,


perhaps


this


approach


will


allow


look


beyond


our


own


paradigms


and


generate


Africa.


some


Here,


fresh


the


insights


state


the


not


contemporary


poised


scene


dichotomous


opposition


society,


nor


the


locus


the


state


above


* a __ __l_


The


&


u]


bl


nrrrr: A~


C1 Al. AL~.


t


LE~X


nL rr Lr


llI *L *


L~rn







addition,


Migdal'


model


vividly


depicts


the


field


competition


between


groups


social


control,


and


thi


approach


seems


particularly


suitable


to the


African


context.


The


point here


that we are


short


on information


on how


state


the


and


society


"state"


articulate.


Africa


shares


Since


power


there


and


consensus


control


that


resources


with


"alternative


elements


control,


meaning


various


combinations


individuals


from


the


private


and


public


sector,


may


wise


try


shed


some


light


this


overlap


between


state


and


society


. Acknowledging


the


failure


centralized


governments


underscored


the


need


"reorder"


relations


and strengthen


linkages


between


state


and


society


(Bratton


1989,


Holmquist


1989).


But


before


this


possible,


need


understand


how


state


and


society


articulate,


or more


precisely,


according to


Chazan


(1988:122)


"directly


confront


the


many


interchanges


between


state


and


society


and


to tease


out


their


political


significance.


It is well-documented that state officials simultaneously


operate


state-based

al realms.


and

This


society-based


phenomenon


economic


and


confounded


economic


and


political


development


and


produced


cognitive


dissonance


among


citizenry.


short,


confuses


and


frustrates


people


when


they


fall


into


the


chasm


between


the


expectations


and


reality


state


performance.


These


types


experiences


reinforce


popular


notions


that


the


people


are


po 1 itical /legi







the


"voice"


the


people


within


society


(Kum


1983,


Goheen


1988,


Diduk


1989),


these


behaviors


practiced


state


func-


tionaires


undermine


the


legitimacy


the


state.


The


next


section


deals


with


legitimacy


and


the


state


Africa.


Leaitimacv


and


the


State


Africa


In Funk


and Wagnells


(1973:728)


dictionary,


"legitimate"


(the


adjective)


means


"having the


sanction


law


or custom.


"Legitimate"


(the


verb)


and


"legitimize"


(the


verb)


means


make


legitimate"


tionary,


Eckstein


(1971:5(


justify.

) calls


" Departing

legitimacy


from

(the


the


noun)


dic-

"the


extent


that


support.


a political


a polity


" Apter


regarded


(1965:236)


pattern,


which,


calls


members


legitimacy the


in turn,


provides


as worthy


"rightness


the pattern with


set


proprieties


These


proprieties


"set


limits


governmental


mental


action"


offices.


and


Apter


define


asserts


"right


that


conduct"


the


govern-


viability


government


derived


from


basis


legitimacy,


and


when


legitimacy


withdrawn,


the


government


weakens.


Claessen


(1988:23)


defines


legitimacy


as "the power


base


for


authority


" Power


the


"capacity to


limit


the behavioral


alternatives


other


people"


(Claessen


cites


Weber


1964:38)


either


force


or because


the


responding people


believe


that


the


demands


are


and


fair.


" To Claessen,


the


latter


form


power


authority.


Power


can


be derived


from


a number


"power


bases"


including


force,


supernatural


forces


"the


"j Ust







values


common.


" Claessen


uses


the


latter


power


base


definition


of legitimacy.


Cohen


(1988:16)


presents


a theory


legitimacy:


Lacy of a state governmental
its coercive capacities, the be


compliance,


practices
practices


According to


and
the


Cohen,


the
the c
polity


moral


validity


continuing
members.


coercion


the


system is a
!nefits derived
governmental


evaluation


application


these


power


order


force


people


comply


with


the


wishes


the


state.


Cohen


argues


that


people


will


comply


long


the


state


has


superior powers


force


and


the


willingness


use


. Next,


order


compliance


to continue,


state


elites


must


demonstrate


that


those


who


comply


are


accruing


benefits.


this


regard,


Cohen


asserts


that


state


rhetoric


and


poli-


tical


ideology


are


no substitute


the


expected


rewards


compliance.


If the


rewards


fall


short


a sufficient


amount


of time,


then people withdraw compliance and become subversive


rebel


against


the


state.


The


"moral


validity


govern-


mental


practices"


means


that


citizens'


compliance


indicates


they


accept


"right


and


proper"


the


power


differences


between


the


ruling


elite


and


the


people.


Finally,


based


Cohen'


idea


"continuing


evaluation,


" legitimacy


agreement


among


members


polity


to continue


accept


authority


and


inequalities


because


the


former


are


able


maximize


rewards.


Based


Cohen's


definition,


legitimacy


associated


The legitim
function of


from







African


states


successfully


implement


coercive


forces.


When


the


going


gets


rough,


states


are


only


too


eager


to bring


out


the


guns


in order to


force


people


to comply with


their wishes.


the


state

are a


second


officials


accruing


part

must


Cohen' s


demonstrate


benefits.


definition,


tangible wayt


now


common


assert:

s that


knowledge


that


people


that


Africa,


instead


accruing


benefits,


many


people


fear


the


state'


exploitative


capacities


and


policies,


and


therefore


often


choose


avoid


interacting


with


state


officials


and


avoid


participating


state


institutions.


Rewards


are


definitely


"falling


short"


the


expectations


the


people


and


this


leads


to rebellion,


as Cohen


predicts.


For


example,


Wunsch


and


Olowu


(1990:1)


report


that


only


out


independent


states


have


avoided


successful military coups


. In


addition,


numerous


civil


wars


and


widespread


civil


unrest


associated

validity"


with

wanes


"multiparty

as people 1


elections"


ose


are


confidence


underway.


the


"Moral


ability


state


officials


to perform


a satisfactory


and


fair manner.


Finally,


in many states of Africa,


the


"continuing evaluation"


record of


government practices


is progressively worsening over


time.


This


raises


the


point


that


due


the


process


continuing


evaluation,


a strong


state


that


not


legitimate


will


not


stay


intact


indefinitely.


Claessen


(1988:40)


asserts that when tensions among those


power


and/or


competing


for power


great,


"fission


the







case


Africa


where


fission


policy


occurs


regularly


various


groups


and


individuals


compete


power,


and


control


people


and


resources.


As described


in the


previous


section


of this


chapter,


the


conflictive African


environment,


laws


and markets


fission


and


competing


actors


take


their


piece


and


with


as they wish.


These


fissioning


processes


interfere


with


the state'


ability to


function


to capacity and undermine


the


legitimacy


the


the


tragedy


the


state.


This


commons


can be viewed


scenario,


but


as one


this


version


case


observe


political


actors


competing


resources


at local


and


national


levels


. The


outcome


that


the


state


the


common


resource


spoiled


all.


now


explains


turn


how groups


an examination


and individuals


Migdal


compete with


s work


the


where


state


social


control


and


legitimacy.


Society,


Social


Control


and


State


Leaitimacv


For


tripartite


Migdal,


the


model


theme


social


legitimacy


control


where


embedded


an environment


conflict,


organizations,


including


the


state,


compete


for


social


control


the


population.


These


conditions


can


found


where


"political


leaders


have


not


yet


achieved


predominance,


the


ability


fashion


rules


and


force


their


broad acceptance"


(Migdal


1985:48)


Migdal


(1988


:32)


presents


three


indicators


social


control


for which


states


and


other


groups


compete:







to its
first


demands by
comes with


sanctions,


the
the


population.


use


the


Compliance


most


often


basic


force.


Participation.


seek


more


strength ]
specialized
of the sta


denotes
state-rui


than


Leaders


the


compliance;


organizing


tasks


ite


the


state


they


the


organization


want


population


institutional


organization


repeated voluntary u
i or state-authorized


ise


anc


gain
for


components
participation
1 action in


institutions.


Lecitimation.


the


strength


inclusive


state's


true


and


than


The most


the


either


acceptance,


rules c
right.


the


:potent
state,


factor


accounting


legitimation,


compliance
even apj


game,


for
nore


or participation.


probation,


social


control,


the
as


In this model,


compliance and participation are behaviors


but


legitimation


a belief


or a guide


behavior


. In other


words,


people


believe


that


the


state 's


rules


the


game


are

stat


"true

e laws


and right,


and


" they


participate


are much more


state


likely to comply with


institutions.


For


Migdal,


compliance,


participation


and


legitimation


are the building blocks


for social


control


that enable


states'


to perform


to capacity.


However,


in Africa,


other


groups


use


the


same


"currency"


compete


with


the


state


determine


"how


social


life


should


ordered


and


what


the


rules


the


game


should be"


(Migdal


1985:50).


These


"alternative


elements


control"


(Migdal


1988:33)


resist


the


authority


the


state,


and


interfere


with


the


ability


the


state


to reach


goals.


In Africa,


some


these


political


actors


include


chiefs,


state


officials,


elite


rural


producers,


and


clan


leaders:


often collectively referred to as


"bin men.


" Finally.


3







state-society approach is


the most


useful


conceptual model


capturing


the


interactions


between


the


state


and


these


individuals


and


groups,


and


to note


their


interactive


affect


on political


processes.


Farmer-Herder


Dispute


Leaitimacv


Resolution
in Cameroon


and


State


this


section,


discuss


research


hypotheses


farmer-herder


dispute mediation


Cameroon.


explain


that


state-society


interactions


approach


various


is needed

actors af


in order


-fect


to explain


political


how


processes


the

and


outcomes.


use


Midgal'


model


social


control


as a way


show how the behaviors


actors


involved in dispute mediation


directly


affect


state


legitimacy


Cameroon.


Finally,


make


the


point


that


this


analysis


links


micro-


and


macro-level


phenomena.


Research


Hvpotheses


Cameroon


Study


1989


conducted


a pre-dissertation


scoping


trip


Tugi


village


the


North


West


Province


Cameroon.


conducted several


interviews with female farmers who convinced


that


their


most


important


problem


farming


was


cattle


struction of


farms


also noted


that


Goheen


(1988)


reported


that


the


North


West


Province,


incidents


farmer-herder


trespassing


disputes


were


increasing,


often


ending


fatalities.


developed


hypothesis


that


due


increasing


frequency


farmer-herder


disputes







farmers


seeking


redress


more


frequently


use


state


courts;


therefore,


farmers'


increased


adjudicatory


participation


institutions


state


increases


state


legitimacy.


The


hypothesis


was


that


based


the


concept


that


conflict


between


competing


groups


ultimately


leads


state


building


(Cohen


1978).


The


central


argument


was


that


one


outcome of


farmer-herder conflicts


that


they compel


farmers


who


are


seeking


redress


into


the


state


courts.


argued


that


this


outcome


would


not


only


increase


local


use


state


institutions,


but


would


force


the


state


evaluate


policies on these matters


and eventually improve conditions


rural


areas


received


funding


to conduct


fieldwork


two


villages


Cameroon


to test


this


hypothesis.


A State-Society


AD~roach


to the


Cameroon


Study


the


institutions

institutions,


citizens'

correlates


then


belief

with


first


the


their


legitimacy


participation


appears


state

those


tautological


ask


whether


increased


participation


state


institutions


increases


state


legitimacy.


In order


understand


why


this


question


not


tautological,


necessary


beyond


conceptual


dichotomy of


state


and


society;


this


case


state


dispute


mediator


and


plaintiff


farmer.


state-society


approach


examines


the


interactions


between


the


several


actors







these


interactions


affect


state


legitimacy.


In the


North


West


Province


Cameroon,


several


people


come


together


with


various


agendas


in the court of


the Farmer-Grazier Commission.


While


farmers


file


claims


the


courts


in order


receive


compensation


crops


damaged


by marauding


cattle,


herders,


rural


elites,


chiefs


and


state


officials manipulate


the


court


various


ways


other


reasons.


Some


these


actors


are


state


officials


who


use


their


title


to uphold


not


state


but


alternative


or personal


rules


social


order.;


the


other


hand,


some


the


actors


are


members


society


who


compete


with


the


state


for social


control,


and control


resources


the


local


level.


These


complex


identities


and


behaviors


groups


and individuals


who operate


in the overlap of


state


and


society were


discussed


in the


first


section


this


chapter.


Suffice


say


here


that


the


scenario


farmer-herder


dispute


mediation


unfolds


this


dissertation,


the


state-


society


approach


will


show


how


these


behaviors


undermine


the


legitimacy


the


state


of Cameroon.


State


the


Lecritimacv


Courts


and


the


Competition


Farmer-Grazier


r Social
Commissi


Control


Through


The


following


a discussion


how


Migdal'


model


social


control


links


farmer-herder dispute resolution to


state


legitimacy


Cameroon.


discussed


earlier,


the


three


components


the


model


are


compliance,


participation


and


legitimation.


Compliance


refers


to conforming


and


following


state


v w







trespass


into


each


others'


lands.


Lack


compliance


happens


when


herders


graze


their


cattle


farm


land


(and


farmers


trespass


onto


grazing


land2)


Participation


refers


farmers


who


engage


state


institutions


claims


and


against


interact


with


trespassers


state


the


administrators


court


the


filing


Farmer-Grazier


Commission.


Absence


participation


demonstrated


the


numbers


farmers


who


experience


cattle


trespassing


into


farms


and


crop


losses


but


refuse


to file


claims


Legitimation


refers


the


situation


where


farmers


have


enough confidence


in court of


the Farmer-Grazier Commission as


being


"just


and


fair"


use


Legitimate


behavior


among


dispute mediators


ideally means that,


for example,


they follow


the


letter


the


law


regardless


ethnic


identity,


and


personal


and economic


relations


with


clients


Presently,


this


ideal


does


not


exist,


yet


the


system


not


"all


bad.


" In


spite


the


corruption


historically


associated


with


state


dispute


mediators,


"making


case"


may


the


only


channel


open


to farmers


who


want


to legally


fight


for


their


land.


One


advantage


of the


court


that


put


the


dispute


on record;


publicly


and


historically


documents


incidents


alleged


trespassing.


Therefore,


the Farmer-Grazier Commission provides


Although


overwhelming


farmers


number


do trespass
tresDassina


onto
cases


grazing la
are filed


nds,


the


against


-- -


- -


v-







service


farmers


more


immediate


political


than


financial


compensatory


benefits.


Absence


legitimation


means


that


people


not


comply


with


laws,


they


not


engage


state


institutions


and


not


believe


state


laws


and


state


"rules


the


game"


and


being


"true


and


right


" Farmers


know


that


state


law


forbids


trespassing,

Therefore,


and


farmers


they

want


seldom

herder


trespass


onto


treat


grazing


them


with


land.

mutual


respect,


and


comply with


state


law.


In this


light,


people


who


believe


and


participate


state


courts


are


voting


with


their


feet--they want


the


state


system


government


to work,


and


they want


cattle


to keep


out


their


farms.


Thi


one


way the


Cameroon


study


links


behavior


at the


micro-level


with


state


legitimacy


the


macro-level.


discussed


the


previous


section


this


chapter,


when


legitimacy


absent


sufficient


amount


time,


people


rebel


against


the


state.


In the case of


Cameroon


the


court


the


Farmer-Grazier


Commission,


farmers


withdraw


legitimacy

empirical


when


they


outcomes


observe


Based


on my


gap


state


ethnographic


promises


findings


and


and

the


analyses of


the


farmer-grazier crises


in Wum


(1981)


(Kum


1983)


and


Mmen


(1981)


(Ottiger


1992,


Cameroon


Post


1991),


there


evidence that when a


sufficient number of


farmers


over time


are


negatively


affected


the


corrupt


behaviors


state


adjudicators,


they


lose


confidence


the


legitimacy


the







resolution


are


"true


and


right"


(Migdal


1988:32).


Then,


they


rebel


against


the


state by conducting public protests


of these


problems


(see


Chapter


The


protests


are


often


violent.


this pc

earlier


point, "I

focused


peacefull


cattle


conflicts"


(Weber


trespassing


and


1964a:132)

compensation


that

for


crop


losses


transform


into


protests


and


violence


against


ethnic


group--Fulani


cattle


herders.


the


next


chapter,


argue


that


the


addition


ethnic


strife


into


the


farmer-


herder


conflict


equation


further undermines


the


legitimacy of


the


state


refueling


potentially


explosive


hostilities


and


drawing


national


attention


local


problems


. This


point


illustrates


another


way


that


the


Cameroon


study


links


micro-


and


macro-level


phenomena.


Conclusion


This


chapter


reviewed


definition


state


and


the


literature


on the


contemporary


state


in Africa.


I presented


state-society approach to understanding political processes


Africa,


and


concurred


with


authors


who


argue


that


where


the


boundaries


state


and


society


are


not


distinct,


this


approach


more


appropriate


than


previous


state-centric


dichotomous


models


state


and


society.


The


state-society


approach


demonstrates


how


state


officials


and


members


the


private


sector


operate


both


state-based


and


society-based


economic


and


political/legal


realms,


and


how


these


behaviors


confound


economic


and


political


development.


I then


presented







control


the


of local


micro-level


populations


undermine


I argued


the


that


these


legitimacy


behaviors


the


state


Cameroon.


presented


research


hypothesis


that


farmer-


herder


conflict


increases


state


legitimacy


because


increases


farmers


participation


the


state


courts.


described

throughout


the

the


state-society

dissertation t


approach


that


o analyze


will


Cameroon


used


study


farmer-herder


dispute mediation.


Finally,


proposed


that


the


study will


demonstrate


how


the


behaviors


of state


officials,


farmers,


herders,


chiefs


and


ardos


Tugi


and


Wum


affect


state


legitimacy


the


macro-level.











CHAPTER


STATE


HISTORICAL
RESPONSES


AND


COMPARATIVE


FARMER-HERDER


PERSPECTIVES


CONFLICTS


IN AFRICA


Introduction


This


chapter


presents


from


the


literature


a spectrum


examples


farmer-herder


conflicts


that


vary


geographic


and historical context.


I describe how farmer-herder conflicts


led


to the


creation


early


states


in Africa.


In Latin Amer-


ica,


the Spanish and Portuguese subjugated and displaced agri-


culturalists


and


other


indigenous


people


order


build


colonial


empires


based


on cattle


ranching.


Britain


used


live-


stock


to dominate


several


colonies


New


Zealand,


Australia


and


other


parts


the


world.


Later,


beef


and


other


animal


products


exported


from


these


colonies


were


used


fuel


the


industrial


revolution.


Where


these


early


examples


show


that


farmer-herder


conflicts


were


rooted


processes


coloni-


alism,


recent


examples


show


that


these


conflicts


stem


from


dislocations


in state


and


local


political


processes.


Here


use


contemporary


case


studies


farmer-herder


conflict


from


East


and West Africa


to show


how state


responses


to these con-


flicts


reflect


problems


state


legitimacy


and


affect


the


lives


rural


producers


argue


that


the


lessons


learned







from


these


examples


increase


our


understanding


state-


society


relations


under


stressful


and


changing


economic


and


political


conditions


Historical


sub-Saharan


Patterns


Africa.


of Farmer-Herder


Conflict


Cohen


(1978)


describes


the


process


where


the


19th


century,


Fombina


farmer-herder


competition


control


over


resources


created conflicts


that


to the emergence of


a new


state.


Through


lihad


(holy


war)


the


Fombina


region,


Fulani


Muslims


led by


Adamu


conquered


and


enslaved


indigenous


agriculturalists.


Adamu,


who


became


the


emir,


created


central


government


to administer


and a military to control


the


new


state


(1978:154)


Cohen


suggests


that


the


15th


century


Borno,


warfare


with


indigenous


farmers


and


the


erection


walled


towns


allowed


previously


seminomadic


Magumi


to form


centrally-administered


state


(1978:147)


. Although


the


Borno


case


not


straightforward


the


history


Fombina,


Cohen


cites


farmer-herder


competition


resources


partial


explanation


the


circumstances


that


led


state


formation


(1978:156)


the


16th,


17th


and


18th


centuries,


the


Spanish


and


Portuguese


used


warfare


and


other


forms


violence


to create


colonial


empires


the


Americas


primarily


based


on cattle


ranching


. Ranching


was


used


force


occupy


lands


and


displace


indigenous people,


many of whom were agriculturalists


or mixed farmers


Ideal


environments


for ranching included


the







the


llanos


Venezuela


and


northern


Mexico


and


parts


the


American


Southwest


(Grigg


1974).


Conflict


may


have


been


minimal


the


llanos


Venezuela


where


the


Spani


sh occupied


relatively


unpopulated


areas.


Colonial


regimes


other


parts


the


world


also


dominated


indigenous


peoples


and


introduced


ranching


strengthen


the


economy


empires.


South


Africa,


the


18th


century,


the


Dutch


Boers


and


British


transformed


the


political


landscape


with


merino


sheep


and


eventually


the


Angora


goat


(Grigg


1974:250).


the


same


time,


the


British


imported merino


sheep


into


Australia


(Davidson


1994)


and


then


into


New


Zealand


where


livestock


quickly


occupied


almost


those


rural


lands.


Under


colonial


frontier


expansion


the


Americas,


Australia,


New


Zealand,


and


South


Africa,


cattle


and


sheep


ranching


grew


out


conflict


with


and


the


annihilation


indigenous


human


cost


people.


It is


building


preposterous


colonial


try


empires.


to estimate


However,


the


many


these colonial


target areas


later supplied England with needed


resources


that


were


the


driving


force


behind


the


industrial


revolution


(Ross


1987).


When


the


textile


industry


took


off,


England had a huge market


for wool


and


for meat.


Wool


kept


the


mills


going


and


beef


and


mutton


immigrant


mill


workers.


Urban

meat.


and


colonial


England


had


elites


earlier


also


created


colonized


Irelanc


strong

Sand S


market


;cotland


for

and







economy.


When those channels


folded,


England looked elsewhere.


the


19th


century,


Englis


capital


and


expanding


markets


supported


the


development


refrigerated


transportation


infrastructure


export


economy


Australia


and


the


Americas


(Ross


1987:32)


Contemporary


Conflicts


Comparative


East


and


Perspectives


West


Africa


Farmer-Herder


Currently,


many


farmer-herder


conflicts


occur


sub-


Saharan


Africa


where


newly- formed


African


states


fail


provide


conditions


to minimize


or eliminate


these


conflicts


(McCabe


1994;


Fratkin


1993,


1994)


In contrast


to the


areas


the


world


described


above,


two


factors


that


helped


farmer-


herder


conflicts


to eventually


subside


are markedly


absent


sub-Saharan


products


Africa.


place


These


and


are


support


export


herders


market


thriving


animal


national


economies


and


the


legal


enforcement


land


laws


and


related


legislation


to protect


the


resources


and


livelihoods


rural


producers.


This


section


a review


literature


on the


conflicts


between


farmers


Mauritania,


and


and


herders


Tanzania.


Cameroon,


examine


the


Cote


problems


d'Ivoire,


between


herders


and


farmers


from a


"state-society "


approach


and


argue


at the


intersection


where


state


officials


interact


with


subsistence


well


producers


local


and


traditional


elites


from


chiefs,


the


and


private


where


sector


these


actors


interact


with


each


other


various


combinations,


that


we can







conflicts


each


setting.


spite


the


variation


cultural and historic contexts


each scenario raises


in which


these conflicts occur,


questions of how each state'


response


these (

control


conflicts


and


reflects


therefore


that


legitimacy


state's


strength


defined by Migdal


social

1988).


Cote


d'Ivoire


After the Sahelian drought of


1969-1974,


large numbers of


Fulani migrated


into


the


Ivory Coast.


In addition


to escaping


drought


the


absence


cattle


taxes,


relatively


higher


prices


for cattle,


and low population densities


the


savanna region


attracted Fulani herders


into


the country


(Bassett


1988:461).


In 1974,


in order


to boost


beef


production


and


to reduce


food


imports,


the


Ivorian government designed a development project


the


Katiali


Region


encourage


Fulani


herders


to settle.


However,


the


problem


cattle


trespassing


into


local


Senufo


farms


soon


complicated


the


picture.


1980,


farmer-herder


conflicts


became


a national


issue


when


political


candidates


promised


expel


the


Fulani


(Bassett


1988:468


-469).


Senufo


farmers


interpreted


the


politicians'


position


against


the


Fulani


as an endorsement


violence.


Senufo


farmers


attacked


Fulani


herders


1980


and


1981


(Bassett


1988:468).


Gendarmes


quickly


arrested


the


aggressors,


and


President


Houphouet-


Boigny


personally


reprimanded


local


political


leaders


for


From


rate of


1970


to 1985


percent,


twice


Fulani


the


cattle


rate


increased


locally-owned


an annual


cattle.


w w


w n







their

farmers


negative


campaign


believe


that


platforms,


they


and


supported


for le

attacks


lading


Senufo


against


the


Fulani


(Bassett


1988:468)


spite


the


President's


efforts,


1985.


Fulani


Bassett


expulsion


reports,


became


"What


campaign


were


issue


originally


again


localized


tens ions


between


farmers


and


herders


over


the


issue


uncompensated


crop


damage


had


now


become


an explosive


inter-


ethnic


conflict"


(1988:468).


1986,


due


the


continuing


problem


cattle


trespassing


and


uncompensated


damages,


Senufo


farmers


killed


Fulani


. Continued


violence


led


massive


Fulani


outmigration


"hundreds


camps


and


tens


thousands


animals"


(Bassett


1988:468)


This


time


the


response


the


central


government


was


delayed;


a delegation


appeared almost one year


later to mediate the crisis


Finally,


1988,


the


livestock development project closed due to


these


political


problems


as well


as a flawed


program


design.


There


were


many


features


the


three


phases


the


livestock


development


program


that


spelled


out


eventual


doom.


First,


the


projects


catered


to Senufo


elite


herders


and


neglected


poor


herders.


Second,


the


projects


were


located


an area of


tsetse


flies


Third,


the projects were


specifically


designed


to integrate


livestock


systems


with


peasant


farming


systems


SHerders


were


dependent


on associations


with


farmers


to acquire


land


and


project


rotated


and


integrated


farms


and


grazing


lands.


Farm


plots


and


grazing


plots


with


coter-







farms.


Other


problems


were


that


the


schemes


were


based


false assumptions:


that the


Fulani


would actually grow grasses


for


improved


pastures,


and


that


the


Fulani


were


exclusive


pastoralists


who


would


not


interested


farming


manure-


rich


plots.


Furthermore,


the


majority


Fulani


immigrants


offended


farmers


because


they


did


not


consult


local


chiefs


before settling.


Some of


the Fulani had only temporary grazing


rights


land


that


could


revoked


farmers


(Bassett


1988).


Bassett


explains


farmer-grazier


conflicts


with


political


ecology


model


that


describes


the


linkages


between


Ivorian


society,


political


economy


and


the


environment.


cites


two


"ultimate"


causes


the


Senufo-Fulani


conflicts


the


"impoverization


peasants


through


excessive


'surplus'


appropriation and the policy of promoting


livestock raising


the country"


(Bassett


1988:455)


Surplus


extraction takes


two


forms:


government


taxation


farmers'


cotton


crops


and


farmers'


uncompensated


crop


damages


Since


Senufo


villagers


rarely


eat


beef3


, they


complained


that


the


state


livestock


development


project


only


benefits


urban


elites


(Bassett


1988:467).


2
price
their


Farmers


cotton


annual


only
i and


incomes


receive


about


households


lose


uncompensat


one-fourth
ias much a
ed crop da


the


world


is one-fifth


images


(Bassett


1988:466)


An FAO


survey


1985


found


that


urban


people


eat


six







Although


Bassett's model


of political


ecology


holds


land


and


usufruct


rights


key


variable,


still


funda-


mentally


a Marxist


world


systems


model.


The


model


primarily


explains


farmer-grazier


conflicts


surplus


extraction


external


forces- the


state


and


world


economies


However,


this


explanation


dichotomizes


state


and


society


and


doing


oversimplifies


situation


that


more


complex


and


dynamic.


fact


the


conflicts


Cote


d'Ivoire


were


not


circumscribed


a dichotomy


state-versus-peas ant


Senufo


farmers


An approach


that examines


the


interrelations


between


state


and society


holds more explanatory power.


In the case of


Cote


d'Ivoire,


understanding


the


history


the


behaviors


and


the


alliances


between


elite


Senufo


cattle


owners,


elite


Fulani


herders,


and


state


officials


who mediate


farmer-grazier


disputes


crucial


providing


compre-


hensive


Senufo

between


explanation


farmers

Senufo


and


the


Fulani


farmers


an(


intensity


herders

d each c


Finally,

these a


fighting


the


actors


between


relationships

individually


and


the


aggregate


must


be considered.


First,


Bassett's


analysis


overlooks


the


role


that


elite


Senufo


herders


played in


the


scenario.


In fact,


after the


1986


violence


when


many


Fulani


had


fled


the


area,


only


Senufo


herders


enrolled


the


third


phase


the


project.


These


herders


were


"affluent


urban merchants,


politicians


and


civil


servants"


who


exploited


the


spoils


project


including







subsidies,


increased use of


fertilized land,


improved pastures


and


fenced


areas


(Bassett


1988:464).


Second,


the analysis completely overlooks the role of the


crop


damage


committee


the


history


farmer-herder


conflicts.


The


crop


damage


committee,


composed


primarily


civil servants,


mediates disputes between farmers and herders.


In short,


they


evaluate


cattle


damages


farms


and


present


farmers with herders'


compensations.


However,


the adjudicative


process


unaffordable


many


farmers


and


fraught


with


corruption.


Most


often,


herders


pay


off


committee


members


decide


cases


favor


graziers.


fact,


some


these


state mediation officials are


famous


for building


large cattle


herds


from


their


profits


in farmer-herder


dispute


mediation


(Bassett


1988:466).


The


livestock


development


project


increased


their


profits


even


more.


Third,


Bassett overlooks


the process whereby elite Senufo


cattle owners exploit Fulani herders through the Senufo-Fulani


cattle


entrustment


system.


Senufo


cattle


owners


hire


Fulani


herdsmen


to guard


their


cattle.


In spite


repeated


cattle


trespassing into


farms,


Senufo


herd owners continue to entrust


their


cattle


the


Fulani,


perhaps


numbers


that


stress


Fulani


herding


capabilities.


During


the


time


rampant


farmer-herder


conflicts,


the Fulani


herders


were


being perse-


cuted


for


these


incidents,


not


Senufo


owners.


Finally,


an important


factor


understanding


the


crisis







mediators


the crop committee


and Senufo and Fulani herders.


Bassett


(1988:465)


reports


that


"one


factor"


that explains


Senufo


hostility


towards


the


Fulani


the


lack


compensa-


tion


for


crop


damage.


This


wrongly


implies


that


accep-


table


cattle


enter


farms


long


the


farmers


are


compensated


the


damages


(see Ottiger


1992


:8).


In reality,


the


process


filing


a claim


order


to be


compensated


for


damages


requires


ample


time


and money.


Furthermore,


compensa-


tion


usually


pays


too


little


money


order


make


that


investment


worthwhile.


The


roots


the


Fulani-Senufo


violence


preceded


the


livestock


development


project.


Cote


d'Ivoire,


state


officials


failed to enforce herder compliance with


trees


passing


laws.


For


some


time,


farmers


were


disillusioned


first


cattle trespassing


and loss


of control


of their


land and


live-


lihoods,


and


second


dysfunctional


farmer-herder


mediation


systems


that


facilitate


civil


servants'


profit


and


result


farmers'


uncompensated


crop


damages.


Therefore,


when


the


livestock


development


project


arrived


in 1974,


the conditions


for violent


conflict were already


in place.


When large numbers


Fulani


immigrated


into


Cote


d'Ivoire


and


the


state


encouraged


them


stay


through


the


proposed


benefits


development project,

integration of farming


incidents


and grazing


trespassing


lands was


soared.


a horrendous


The

flaw


in the project design


that


facilitated rampant cattle trespass







Fulani


and


Senufo


elite


cattle


owners,


along


with


state


mediators'


visible


accumulation


wealth


the


expense


farmers'


livelihoods,


pushed the trespassing problem beyond an


acceptable


threshold.


Farmers


who


earlier


were


frustrated


crop


losses


due


to cattle


trespassia ng


into


farms


and


corrup-


tion among state officials


decided


to shift


their


focus


to the


problem of unwelcome Fulani.


The conflicts then assumed ethnic


dimensions of


epic proportions


Senufo farmers


started killing


Fulani


herders,


the


Fulani


killed


Senufo


farmers,


and


the


Fulani


became


refugees


who


fled


the


border.


Mauritania


The


Senegal


River


valley


a resource


for


farmers


and


pastoralists


many


ethnic


groups


Senegal


and Mauritania,


well


tanian

farmers


for


military

after


migratory hE

imprisoned


dispute


orders.


and


between


April

killed


1989,


two


Senegalese


Mauri-


Senegalese


farmers


and


Mauritanian


Peul


herders


over


cattle


trespass


into


farms


Diawara.


Ten


days


later


Mauritanian


troops


imprisoned


two


Senegalese


farmers.


When


Senegalese


youth


protested


these


events


Dakar,


a young


Bidan


Mauritanian


shot


and


killed


black Senegalese.


Rioting ensued where the Senegalese military


forces


tried


to defend


the


Moors


from


the


attacking


Senega-


lese.


Then,


April


24th


and


25th,


mob


primarily


Haratines


killed


least


and


injured


hundreds


Senega-


lese


in Nouakchott,


the Mauritanian capital


. This


event


led


S~~~~~I 5-


a


I


I I


II


4 J


1 r


r










the destruction


of virtually all Bidan shops


in Senegal.


Bidan


authorities


in Mauritania


sparked


a ripple


effect


of violence


when


they


announced


the


events


Senegal


were


due


to racist


policies


(Park,


Baro


and Ngaido


1993:88).


An airlift


repatri-


ated


nationals


between


Dakar


and


Nouakchott,


others


fled


foot and thousands


of Mauritanians


ran


to The Gambia


(Horowitz


1989).


All


told,


at least


60,000


Senegalese


were


deported


otherwise


expelled


from


Mauritania


and


perhaps


twice


that


number


Moors


left


Senegal


(Horowitz


1989:2).


Amnesty


International


reported


that


during these


events,


the state of Mauritania used excessive extrajudicial


violence,


executions


and


engaged


numerous


incidents


criminality


(Park,


Baro


and


Ngaido


1993:89).


The


state


Mauritania


was


further


implicated


official


who


directed


atrocities


with


hand


radios


and


trucked


Haratines


into


Nouakchott


destroy property


and


to riot


(Park,


Baro


and Ngaido


1993:90).


The


authors


conclude


that


both


Senegalese


and


Mauritanian


governments


exhibited


criminal


behavior,


but


the


latter


was


excessively


brutal.


The


crisis


was


linked


to the


construction


of dams


the


1980s


on the


Senegal


River to


promote


irrigation


agriculture.


The


white


ruling


Bidans


Mauritania


had


long


ago


abandoned


the


river


valley


and


more


recently


the


French


colonial


government


allocated


the


area


black


Mauritanians.


When


international


development


agencies


funded


the


construction







old


lands


and


to take


advantage


new


land


laws


that


facili-


tated


individual


reclaiming


because


the


title.


lands


of prolonged


Bidans


safety


drought


were


also


net


conditions


interested


grazing


the


animals


north.


the


same


time,


foreign


investors


used


new


land


legislation


that


promoted


commercial


development


acquire


large


tracts


land


(Horowitz


1989).


With


huge


international


investment


the


development


project,


elite


Bidans


who


earlier


had


interest


agriculture


saw


least


two


opportunities:


exploit


the


flow


capital


investment


agriculture


and


exploit


the new


land laws


in order to quickly accumulate


large


tracts


land.


The


Bidans


c ircumvented


the


legal


process


eviction


and


forcibly


displaced


black


farmers,


creating


refugee


crisis


(Horowitz


1989:5).


Since


independence,


international


treaties


specified


that


the


creation


the


Senegalese-Mauritanian border did not give these countries


the


right


to interfere


with


indigenous


patterns


land


ownership


and


cultivation


the


river


valley.


Therefore,


some


valley


residents


interpreted


the


state


"deliberately


breaking


international


law


in order to dispossess


residents


land,


favor


development


schemes


aimed


benefitting


Bidan


investors"


(Park,


Baro


and


Ngaido


1993:88)


Ethnic


and


racial


factors


with


far-reaching


historical


roots


were


also


operation


during this


crisis.


'White ruling


For


greater


detail


the


complex


history


ethnic


.







Bidans


Mauritania


used


the


development


scheme


as an oppor-


tunity


to assert


their


power


over


black


subordinate


farmers,


especially


the


Halpulaar-en


who


farmed


the


north


bank


the river.


This was


usually done by


declaring those Halpulaar-


en with


Senegalese


relations


or roots


as Senegalese


citizens


and


expelling


them


(Park,


Baro,


Ngaido


1993:115).


The


Mauritanian


government


also


freed


more


land


expelling


Senegalese


farmers


from the valley,


in spite of


customary


land


tenure


rights,


and


intermarriage


family


ties


with


Mauritanian


citizens.


How


did


ordinary


incident


cattle


trespass


into


farms


transform into


a crisis


that brought


two countries


close


to war?


Park,


Baro


and Ngaido


(1993:90)


explain


the


events


a problem of


"definition


state"


with regard


to what


sort


nation Mauritania should be under tough conditions of


economic


crises


and


the


questionable


influence


international


policies.


The


Mauritania


case


study


quite complex,


and


"defini-


tion


history


valley


state"


cattle


(Horowitz


many


layers


trespassing


1989)


of meaning


into


evidence


farms


that


First,


the


the


the


Senegal


state


long


river


of Mauri-


tania


failed


to enforce


citizens'


compliance with


trespassing


laws


their


. However,


the


analysis


authors


the


not


cri


elaborate


. Second,


donor


on this


point


policies


along


with


new


state


legislation


on land


tenure


created


opportuni-






land


the


river


valley


the


expense


farmers.


Third,


elite


Bidans


used


extrajudicial


means


including


violence,


force


and


the


fabrication


of national


citizenship


to displace


large


numbers


Mauritanian


farmers


from


the


river


valley.


Fourth,


ultimately,


the


Mauritanian


government


used


the


aftermath of


rioting


as an excuse


to annihilate certain ethnic


and


racial


segments


the


population.


Dimensions


discri-


mination by race and class


that dominated


these events


and are


discussed at


length by


Park,


Baro and Ngaido


(1993).


An ironic


twist


to the


incident


that


the dam construction project


for


irrigation


agriculture


failed


miserably.


Tanzania


The


Datoga5


are


traditional


pastoralists


who


live


Tanzania


near


the


Rift


Valley.


Competition


for


natural


resources


began


accelerate


between


the


Datoga


and


their


neighbors


the


1940s


when


other


pastoral


groups


moved


into


traditional


Datoga


grazing


areas


. In the


1970s


and


1980s,


the


Datoga


lost more


lands


due


to the


advancement


agricultural


technology


and


cash


crop


farming.


1978,


the


government


expropriated


40,000


commercial


hectares


wheat


of the


project.


best

The [


Datoga


grazing


pressure


land


Lands

and


competition


natural


resources


escalated


and


inter-ethnic


conflicts


soared.


There


has


always


been


stock


raiding


between


the


Datoga


and


their


neighbors,


but


increased


the


1980s


along


with


increasing


beef


prices


and


the


worsening


the


I_







national


economic


crisis.


But


incidents


stockraiding


peaked,


murders


and


property


destruction


became


integral


part


of the


scenario


(Ndagala


1991:71)


. Gangs


with


as many


50 men


armed with machine


guns


and power rifles


marauded,


even


daylight.


groups


The


Datoga


most


the


had been


blamed


stockraiding


by neighboring


and


despised


ethnic


their


traditional


murder


ritual


cattle


thieves.


State

"corridor"


forces

area


did not


that


stop

part


the raiding


Datoga


and killing

territory (


this


(Ndagala


1991


76).


people


organized


communal


defense


groups


based


tradition.


These


village


defense


groups


created


huge


ambush


where


the


Datoga


killed


Sukuma


May,


1985


. By


1985,


agriculturalist


coalesced


destroy


and

Datoga


agropastoralist
6 flA "^LZ1sU -


L.


f~lyrLurLUL1


neighbors

Sukuma mc


groups


,bilized


and


elicited


the


participation


the


nearby


Iramba.


They


killed Datoga


on sight,


stole


or killed Datoga


livestock,


and


burned


Datoga


fields


. These


groups


took


over villages


and


Datoga


fled


neighboring


districts.


Civil


servants


took


sides


with


their


respective


ethnic


groups


and


therefore


the


state


offices


offered


security


Datoga


who


requested


protection.


Consequently,


the Datoga complained that


they were


discriminated


were


against


controlled


local-level


primarily


state


non-Datoga


institutions


personnel


that


(Ndagala


o Ndagc
different


ala (1991)
ethnic a


destruction.


any


found


roup
rate,


- -


that
Eor


wa


police


records


orchestrating
s difficult for


implicated


most


the


observers


t
f


r





*I







1991:80)


The Datoga were


left with the alternatives


of hiding


the


forest


or by


becoming


refugees


and


migrating


live


with


family


living


outside


the


corridor.


Ndagala's


(1991)


concluding statements are


first that


the


displacement


pastoral


people


will


continue


unless


the


government of Tanzania and non-governmental organizations help


them


to obtain


considering


the


legal

needs


rights


all


over

rural


their


territories.


producers,


Second,


especially


the


resource needs


of pastoralists who are often marginalized,


the


state


should


limit


the


amount


land


they


alienate


in rural


areas


(Ndagala


1991:81).


In the corridor


area of Tanzania,


the economic crisis


and


shrinking


lands


due


to agricultural


development


were


at least


two

tion


problems

, the si


that


tate


put p

failed


pressure


stop


on rural

Slawless


producers. In addi-

traditional stock-


raiding


between


ethnic


groups.


the


1980s,


fundamental


shift


in raiding


practices


occurred with


the


use


automatic


weapons


and rifles.


Pastoralists and mixed farmers were pushed


beyond


threshold


where


they


could


no longer


tolerate


this


form


excessive


violence.


Two


ethnic


groups


"took


the


law


into


their


own


hands"


and


banned


together


against


the


Datoga


who were accused of


conducting multiple


livestock raids.


These


two


ethnic


groups


expelled


the


Datoga


from


the


corridor


area


and


the


latter


became


refugees


. Throughout


the


crisis,


state


officials


sided


. .


- a


with


non-Datoga


ethnic


groups


and


refused


a -- a







Cameroon


From the


llth


to the


14th centuries


Fulani


cattle herders


migrated


east


from


Senegal


the


Lake


Chad


area,


generally


through


migratory


drift,


but


sometimes


outcome


Islamic


lihads


(holy


wars)


(Stenning


1959,


Abubakar


1977,


Frantz


1980).


Jihads


led


to the


creation


Fombina


and


other


Fulani


states


that


provided


safe


passage


Fulani migration


from


the


north


and


west


into


Nigeria


(Stenning


1959,


Horowitz


1975,


Frantz


1975a).


These


newly- formed


states


were


supported


centralized


governments,


military


coercion,


taxation


and


slavery until


the


British


intervened


and


created


the


colonial


state


Nigeria.


A subsequent major migratory wave


occurred


at the


begin-


ning


the


20th


century


that


brought


increased


numbers


Fulani


into


Niger,


Ivory


Coast


and


Cameroon.


the


1900s,


pastoral


Fulani


migrated


into


eastern


areas


of Niger,


response


the


"great


famine"


and


new


French


rule


that


made


conditions


safe


the


"movement


strangers "


(Horowitz


1975:390)


. Bassett


(1988:237)


reports


that


the


Fulani


also


migrated


into


the


Ivory


Coast


that


time.


About


1908,


pastoral


Fulani


migrated


into


and


settled


on the


Plateau


Nigeria


emirate


Plateau,


(Frantz

Bauchi,


which


1975b).


and


turn


The


they


created


British


developed


safe


defeated

mining


conditions


the


nearby


the


Fulani


migration


(Awogbade


1986)


Drought and rinderpest epidemics


- a


a *I .---.


.. I ~IL?


r- I


L rl I






In 1917,


Fulani


from


the


Plateau moved


further


south


and


west


into


the


grasslands


Cameroon,


area


free


tsetse


flies yet rich


in grass


and water


(Carter


1967,


Kaberry


1960)


The British colonial administration welcomed the Fulani


as a vehicle


for


developing


the


economy


the


area


(Kaberry


1959).


the


accelerated


put


1930s,


Fulani


pressure


increasing


immigration,


natural


numbers


and


resources.


local


cattle


population


Competition


for


herds,

growth


land


increased as


local


Cameroonians


started rai


sing cattle,


and as


farming


patterns


shifted


from


subsistence


to cash


cropping.


This re

between


Ssulted


farmers


Subsistence


female


intense

and gra


and


ziers


farmers


frequent

(Frantz


suffered


conflicts


1981,


from


crop


over


Suliy


loss


land


1990).


due


cattle


trespass


into


farms


. But


result


the


Fulani


immigration,


colonial


administrators


benefitted


from


ianuali


(cattle


head


tax)


that


1950


accounted


for


almost


one-half


the


government


revenue


(Fisiy


1992:68)


Local


chiefs


benefitted


from


the


payment


tribute


the


form


cattle


or cash.


Around


1945,


the


British


colonial


government


delineated


boundaries


for


grazing


land


and


farm


land


to limit


livestock


production


(Carter


1967,


Frantz


1981)


The administration also


restricted


herd


size


and


specified


quotas


herdsmen.


These


policies were rarely implemented


(Kaberry


1960,


O'Kelly


1960).


Conflicts between farmers and graziers continued to


intensify.


Tn 1QdL;


amnthhrnnl nrr4 at


Dhwl a1 M


ranhorrrtr vronf-a


a lot-i-o


-+n th







Governor


warning


him


that


"the


administration


may


against


serious


trouble"


if cattle


trespass


into


farms


did not


stop


(see


Fisiy


1992:248)


. In


1959


Kaberry


documented


female


farmers'


allegations


discrimination


against


farmers


these


litigations with Fulani herders by


local


chiefs,


village


heads,


native


court


and


British


court


officials


(see


Fisiy


1992:249).


When


women


could


not


find


satisfaction


through


these in

Hundreds


institutions,


women


they


confronted


resorted


authorities


additionall

in 1958 i


sanctions.


-n Bambuluwe


(Mezam

famous


Division)


anlu


(Fisiy


(traditional


1992:249-250)


female


and


association)


1959


the

Kom


uprising


(Menchum Division)


and in several


other nearby villages


the


North


West


Province


(Diduk


1989).


1960,


after


independence,


conflicts


between


farmers


and


graziers


escalated


competition


natural


resources


increased


with


the


development


cash


crops


(Kaberry


1960,


O'Kelly


1960)


In the


1970s,


the expansion of


land


growing


coffee depressed


the


growth


livestock production.


Farm and


grazing boundaries were still


official


on paper but


in reality


administrators


failed


to enforce


them


as a mechanism


for


land


management.


During


this


era,


government


Cameroon


granted


civil


rights


to the


Fulani


and


mandated


that


they


longer


viewed


as strangers


(Frantz


1981).


the


1980s


and


again


the


1990s,


conflicts


between


farmers


and


graziers


continue


to escalate


(Tegah


1989)


. Under


- I'A .......- -


r


. S


__ -


L I


-


- --- ----







publicly


protest


the


problem


divisional


headquarters.


However,


in many


aggressive


cases,


acts


thai


local |

t lead


populations


violence


protest


(Shanklil


engaging

n 1988),


civil


disorder


(DeLancey


1989)


and


death


(Goheen


1988,


Kum


1983,


Tegah


1989,


Fisiy


1992,


Ottiger


1992)


. Farmer-herder


conflicts


that


began


as disputes


over


cattle


trespassing


and


protests


corrupt


state


mediators


often


end


attacks


against


the


Fulani


as an expression


ethnic


hatred.


Here


present


brief


case


study


farmer-herder


conflict


in 1981


in Wum


village,


located


in Menchum


Divis


ion


the


North


West


Province


of Cameroon.


In 1950,


led by


a prosperous


ardo


(Fulani


chief),


Fulani


migrated


from


Plateau


to Wum


(Menchum


Division)


.At


that


time,


three out of


seven local Aghem chiefs


offered


them


three


grazing


areas


three


different


village


quarters.


The


remaining


four


chiefs


argued


they


did


not


have


enough


land


share


(Kum


village


1983).


farms.


The


These


Fulani


grazing


traded


zones


meat,


were


butter


from

and


town

milk


and

for


food


with


the


local


Aghem


people,


and


paid


tribute


the


chiefs.


1967,


cattle


trespassing


into


farms


had


become


tangible problem.


Furthermore,


Aghem villagers were annoyed by


the


Fulani


practice


burning


hills


the


dry


season


when


the


former


need


grass


for


roof


thatching


(Kum


1983:22)


.By


1969,


female


farmers complained


that state authorities did not


enforce


the


herders'


penalty


E payment


for


damages,


and


lack


m







herders.


In Wum


1971


farms


were


badly


damaged,


and


cases


were


backlogged


due


the


inefficiency


state


officials.


When


farmers


happened


compensated,


the


amounts


were


insultingly


small.


Finally


the


Aghem


population


decided


protest


the


Fulani


problem.


In 1973,


women boycotted


the market and banned


the


sale of


food.


Thi


embarrassed


the administration,


and


Fulani,


traders,


civil


servants


and


other


townspeople


suffered.


Women


also


closed


the


markets


the


neighboring


villages


We and


Esu


(Kum


1983:28).


They


demanded


that


the


Fulani


keep


their


cattle


in the


three


original


grazing


zones.


Next,


the


women


Wum


marched


kilometers


Bamenda


protest


the


problem


front


the


Governor of


the North


West


Province.


In order


to mitigate


the


problem,


a local


committee


was


formed to demarcate


farm land and grazing


land boundaries,


but


they


were


not


enforced.


In 1980,


Fulani cattle


seriously damaged


three


farms


The


women


reported


the


damages


administration,


and


offi-


cials


were


busy


organizing


an official


event


but


promised


investigate


the


problem


(Kum


1983).


Meanwhile,


the


women


formed


a large


group


to evict


from


farmland


the


three


accused


Fulani


. Sixteen


women


and


two


Fulani


were


hospitalized.


Then,


most


the


village


involved,


except


couple


village

home. A


quarters


Lmob


where


of Aghem


the


men,


chief

women


ordered


and


the


children


people


destroyed


stay

many


~_







villages


. To


no avail,


the


chief


police


and


other


adminis-


trators


ordered


the


Aghem


to stop


the


destruction.


Then,


the


chief


police


ordered


the


forces


shoot


into


the


crowd,


and


eight


people


were


killed,


including


one


child


who


was


the


way to


the


store


to buy


bouillon


cubes


mother who


was


at home cooking.


This


action shocked Aghem people who


then


refused


their


farms


(Kum


1983)


The


1981


crisis


was


rooted


excessive


destruction


crops


Fulani


cattle,


and


the corruption


state


officials


who mediate


farmer-grazier disputes.


7Kum


(1983:46)


cites


four


forms


corruption:


cases


were


frequently


delayed;


farmers


frequently


lost


their


cases


and


were


left


uncompensated


for


damages;


compensation


was


insultingly


small;


and


finally,


graziers


bribed


dispute


mediators.


The


crisis


manifested


ethnic


dimension


because


the


Aghem


farmers


did


not


protest


against


or attack Aghem


graziers


whose cattle


presumably


also


caused much


destruction.


Kum


(1983)


points


out


that


the


state


administration


was


ineffective


preventing


cattle


tres-


passing


and


even


benefitted


In desperation,


the


Aghem


people


took


the


law


into


their


own


hands


and


created


a public


crisis.


In spite of


the


lessons


learned from the


1981


Wum crisis,


the


problems


associated


with


cattle


trespassing


and


farmer-


herder


dispute


resolution


still


persist.


For


example,


II







October


1991


Mmen,


village


kilometers


from


Wum,


hundreds


farmers


accompanied by


jujus


occupied


and


started


farming


a huge tract


of grazing


land.


They had


earlier


applied


farm


the


land


but


received


no response


from


the


state


administration


(Ottiger


1992).


The


chief


of Mmen


had


ordered


the


villagers


to farm


the


land


. The


farmers


refused


to vacate


the


land


upon


the


request


state


authorities


and


the


latter


sent


team


gendarmes


evict


the


farmers.


The


result


was


riot


where


four


Mmen


residents


were


shot


and


killed


gendarmes,


hundreds


citizens


and


several


gendarmes were


injured and a several


villagers were


imprisoned


(Cameroon


Post


1992,


Ottiger


1992)


. Then,


most


Mmen residents


fled


the


village


and


went


into


hiding.


Only


Fulani


and


gendarmes were


left


the village.


The


latter were accused of


looting


empty


compounds


(Cameroon


Post


1992).


The


Cameroon


examples


show that


for various


reasons


that


are


described


later


this


dissertation,


Fulani


and


Aghem


herders


trespass


into


the


farms


Aghem


subsistence


farmers.


Due to collusion among


herders


and state officials who mediate


farmer-herder disputes,


state personnel


fail


to enforce herder


compliance


suffering


with


and


trespassing


economic


laws.


This


hardship


the


results


farm


human


household.


Farmers


feel


powerless


the


corruption


present


the


state


court


that


manifested


strength


the


economic


partnership


between


herders


and


state


officials.


These







competition


between


farmers


and


herders


for


control


over


natural


and


political


resources


some


point


farmers


decide


"take


the


law


into


their


own


hands


" Farmers


who


were


earlier


concerned about


crop


losses


due


to cattle


trespassing


and a corrupt


state


system of


adjudication now focus


on ethnic


differences.


Instead of sanctioning Aghem herders whose cattle


have


also


damaged


farms,


farmers


instead


overlook


their


offenses


and enlist


their support


an attack on


the


Fulani.


Unable


to quell


the unrest,


the


state responds with force,


and


in each


case,


Aghem


people


are


shot


and


killed.


Analysis:


State


Response


to Farmer-Herder


Conflicts


From


a comparative


perspective,


these


case


studies


show


that


the


problems


between


farmers


and


herders


are


rooted


complex


relations


between


state


and


society.


In the


examples


Cameroon,


Cote


d'Ivoire,


Mauritania


and


Tanzania,


these


relation

various


involve


locales,


subsistence


newly


farmers,


arrived or


herders


indigenous


relatively recently


settled


Fulani


herders,


urban


elites,


state


officials,


state


delega-


tions


and


presidents


states.


These


case


studies


show


that


not


only


the


livelihoods,


but


literally


the


lives


rural


producers


are


indeed


quite


tied


to the


state,


not


tied


a strangle

liaisons b


hold.


between


Cameroon


elite


and


herders


Cote

and


d'Ivoire


state


are


official


cases

s show


where

r that


pastoralists


are


quite


integrated


into,


not


participating


the


daily


affairs


civil


servants


posted


rural


areas


- -


..







politically


convenient


land


tenure


laws,


subsistence


farmers


were


not


only


expelled


from


the


Senegal


River


Valley


but


became refugees of


that country.


The Tanzania


case study


shows


how


when


under


attack,


pastoral


group


living


remote,


"marginal"


lands


failed


obtain


protection


from


state


officials


due


the


latter'


ethnic


allegiance.


From


comparative


perspective,


these


data


counter


myths


recently


being


challenged


that


pastoralists


live


the


periphery


state polities


and economies


(McCabe


1994,


Fratkin


1993,


1994,


Fratkin,


Galvin


and


Roth


1994,


Koster


and


Chang


1994,


Galaty


and


Bonte


1991)


A related,


and


the


major


theme


the


present


study


that


East


and


West


Afric a,


understanding


the


interactions


numerous


actors


the


intersection


state


and


society


between


explains


herders


and


much


farmers


the


. The


dilemma


dilemma


the


here


conflicts


a matter


the


strength


control


(Migdal


the


1988)


state


that


the


the


state's


comparative


level


data


social


show directly


affects


the


frequency


and


intensity


farmer-herder


conflicts.


using


state-society


approach,


farmer-herder


conflicts become a vehicle


to understand that


individuals


from


both


private


and


public


sectors


contribute


the


state'


level


social


control.


Compliance,


participation


and


legitimation


(Migdal


are


the


1988:33)


indicators


First,


with


social


regard


control

these


used

data,


here

the


i


__


_







individuals


from


the


private


sector


and


individuals


who


work


for


the


state


can


and


fail


comply


with


state


law.


Second,


the


case


studies


demonstrate


varying


degrees


to which


farmers participate


in state


institutions


and varying types


behaviors


that


state


personnel


use


the


operation


or in


their


own


participation


state


institutions.


Third,


the


comparative


data


show


that


members


private


and


public


sectors


have


interdependent


role


play


the


legiti-


mation


the


state


approving


and


accepting


the


state's


rules


the


game


and


rules


of conflict


resolution.


These


examples


conflicts


between


farmers


and


herders


and


farmers


and


agropastoralists


exhibit


similar


general


pattern.


First,


population


rural


producers


fails


comply


with


state


law


way


that


negatively


affects


second


population.


Second,


state


officials


fail


to force


the


first


population to comply with the


law.


Third,


certain events


cause


conditions


to change


where


a threshold


reached


and


the


second


group can


no longer tolerate


the


lawless


behaviors


the


first


group.


Fourth,


frustrated


with


state


officials,


the


second


group


"takes


the


law


into


their


own


hands"


where


laws


public


order


and


security


are


violated.


This


can


interpreted as


an episode of backlash--if


the


first group will


not


comply


with


state


laws


then


the


second


group


will


not


comply


either.


Fifth,


the


conflict


shifts


nature


from


legal


ethnic


and


scope


from


personal/local










Cote


d'Ivoire,


the


conditions


were


quite


similar;


farmers


were


frustrated


cattle


trespassing


and


uncompen-


sated


damages.


However,


the


situation


was


exacerbated


development


project


that


enormously


benefitted


elite


graziers


and

and


state


officials


aggression


at farmers'


towards


Fulani


expense. Farmers'

crescendoed when


antagonism

candidates


running


local


and


national


political


offices


exploited


ethnic


animosities


and


promised


to expel


the


Fulani


from


the


country.


Although


these


political


actors


were


reprimanded


President


Houphouetet-Boigny,


they


later


again


used


Fulani


hatred


fuel


their


campaigns.


thi


case,


political


candidates


put


their


short-term


career


needs


ahead


the


public

toward

in the


security of


the


the


immigrating


public


eye


Fulani

Fulani


no less,


people

. Here


and ahead


we see


undermining


the


state


policy


political figures,

President's social


control


and


desired


social


order.


The


outcome was


that


Senufo


farmers


"took


the


law


into


their


own


hands"


and


expelled


thousands of


Fulani


and


their cattle


from the


settlement


area.


This


act


ran


counter


to the


administration's


wish


to welcome


the


Fulani


strengthen


producers


the


national


beef


economy


who


reducing


could


food


potentially


imports.


In the example of Mauritania,


the


legitimacy of


the state


was


peril


every


stage


the


crisis


. The


lure


exter-


nal


funding


seduces


a weak state


to institute questionable and


short-sighted


land


tenure


laws


promote


irrigation


--


--


-







the


private


and


public


sector


exploit


this


legislation


order to reclaim


"their"


land in


the Senegal


River


Valley,


and


to acquire money


and


resources


from


the


project.


However,


the


state


fails


to enforce


compliance


with


legal


eviction


proce-


dures


. Bidans


"take


the


law


into


their


own


hands"


and


use


extra judicial


means


displace


local


farmers


and


herders.


Here


the


Bidans


"take


the


law


into


their


own


hands"


not


"right


a wrong"


the


other


case


studies),


but


con-


tinue


engage


illegal


activities


using


their


ethnic


identity


and


titular


power


to illegally


and


ruthlessly


drive


black


farmers


out


the


river valley


and


out


the


country


Invalidating the


identity cards


of Mauritanian citizens


based


on race


and


ethnicity


also


undermined


the


legitimacy


the


state.


Then,


seething


situation


exploded


over


shooting


incident


at Diawara


over


cattle


trespassing


into


farm


land.


State


personnel


followed.


These


participated


activities


were


the


riots


overtly


and


killing


lawless


and


that


des-


tructive,


and created a crisis of


legitimacy and even


identity


for


the


state


Mauritania.


Tanzania,


the


government


did


not


stop


lawless


stockraiding


behavior


rural


areas.


The


use


automatic


weapons


stockraiding


pushed


pastoralists


and


agropastor-


alists


beyond


a threshold


where


they


could


no longer


tolerate


the


violence.


People


gave


waiting


for


the


state


provide


protection


and


they


"took


the


law


into


their


own







the


Datoga.


State


officials


posted


in the


area


had


alliances


with opposing


ethnic


groups


and so refused


to provide


security


for Datoga who requested protection.


State officials


put


their


personal


and


ethnic


alliances


ahead


their


duties


per-


sonnel


who


serve


the


state.


In Cameroon


a weak


state


is unable


to enforce


compliance


with


trespassing


laws


in rural


areas


and


so herders


regularly


trespass


into


farms


Under conditions of weak economies,


state


official


struct


who


work


channels


farmer-grazier


farmers'


legal


dispute


redress


mediators


accepting


ob-


pay-


ments


from


herders


decisions


favoring


the


latter.


This


sabotages


dispute


farmers'


adjudication.


participation


Local


the


agricultural


state


court


populations


feel


victimized by insurmountably corrupt adjudicative institutions


that


operate


the


profit


civil


servants


and


elite


graziers


Farmers


realize


that


state


personnel


are corrupting


the


state'


rules


farmer-grazier


dispute


mediation.


For


farmers,


these


actions


reduce


the


legitimacy


that


state


institution


enough.


. As


herders


group,

fail


farmers

to comply


decide

with


that

state


they

law


have

and


had


state


officials


fail


to comply


with


state


laws,


then


farmers


will


not


comply with


state


laws


either.


Instead,


farmers


"take


the


law


into


their own hands"


and occupy the disputed


grazing


land


or destroy


Fulani


property,


and attack Fulani herders


Because


of the


public


violence,


the


conflicts


then


assume


a different







were


dispatched


to quell


the


unrest


and


people


were


shot


and


killed.











CHAPTER


RESEARCH


METHODS


FOR


CAMEROON


FIELD


STUDY


Introduction


This


chapter


presents


research


question


and


follows


with


a description


of methods


used


to conduct


a comparative


study


farmer-herder


conflict


and


dispute


resolution


two


villages


in the


North


West Province of


Cameroon.


discuss


the


proce


sses


site


selection,


and


language


acquisition.


assess


the


study


design


and


discuss


potential


problems


with


the


reliability


and


validity


the


data.


Next,


describe


some of


the more dynamic


"human


limitations"


the


study that


can


not


measured


but


need


acknowledged.


then


describe


survey


the


samples


methods


and


used


describe


create


various


the


data


ethnographic


sets


and


. I conclude


with


a story


of how


I experienced


various


acts


reciprocity


with


adopted


family


Tugi


Village.


Research


Design


As de


scribed


in the


second


chapter,


in this


dissertation


use


use


a state-society


farmer-herder


approach


dispute


to analyze


mediation


how


various


as a vehicle


for


actors

gaining


social


control,


and


examine


how


these


behaviors


affect


the


legitimacy


the


state


Cameroon.







My research


design


compares


survey


and


ethnographic


data


on the conflicts


between


farmers


and graziers


two villages,


Tugi


and


Wum,


the


North


West


Province


Cameroon.


conducted


ethnographic


interviews


with


farmers


and


graziers,


village


chiefs


and


state


dispute


mediators.


used


ethnographic


information


to understand local conditions and to


inform


and


the


Wum.


design


The


and


survey was


analysis


designed


a survey


to quantify


farmers


and


Tugi


to partially


explain


incidents


cattle damages


to farms


grazier

, and th


trespassing


ie processes


onto


and


farm


outcomes


land,

of the


resulting


cases


that


farmers


file


in the


court


the


Farmer-


Grazier


Site


Commission.


Selection


selected


Tugi


and


Wum


research


sites


for


specific


reasons


. To


begin


with,


chose


Tugi


because


was


already


established


the


village


from


earlier


visit.


July


1989,


faculty


the


University


Florida


International


Programs


sent


Dschang


University


Center


(UCD)


Dschang,


Cameroon,


assist


Florida


faculty


with


short


course on curriculum development


also used my time


there


conduct


a pre-dissertation


site


visit.


Ajaga


Nji,


UCD


rural


sociologist,


invited


visit


family


Tugi


Village.


Nji


had


earlier


mentioned


perception


that


Tugi


graziers


were


driving


women


off


their


farms


. Dr.


Nji


noted


n the


previous


chanter,


the


Farmer-Grazier


a a-


r







was


a well-respected


introduced


figure


Tugi


in his village,


and


endorsed


and


work,


felt


others


that


there


would


also


give


me support.


This


encouraged me


to visit


Tugi.


interviewed


approximately


female


farmers.


asked


all


kinds


questions


but


noticed


that


without


fail,


the


res-


pondents


guided my


interviews


to highlight


their


experiences


with


cattle


trespass


onto


their


farms


. They convinced me


that


cattle


trespass onto


farm land and


the resulting crop


loss


was


their


most


pressing


problem


farming,


and


that


posed


threat


their


livelihoods.


Upon my return


to the


Univer


sity of


Florida


I wrote


grant


proposals


to conduct


doctoral


field


research


on the


conflicts


between


farmers


and


herders.


In 1991,


received


funding


and


returned


to Tugi


order


to continue my working


relationship


with


the


Meta,


and


to create


the


conditions


conducting


longitudinal


study


on this


topic


Having established myself


in Tugi,


then selected Wum as


my second


site.


did


so for two


reasons


. The


first


reason was


that


Wum


famous


in Cameroon


a 1981


conflict


where


the


police


shot and killed eight


people during


a public


protest


the


corruption


associated


with


farmer-grazier


dispute


media-


tion


(see


Chapter


felt


professionally


obligated


understand


the


history


these


conflicts


Wum.


Second,


chose


Wum because


so different


from


Tugi


with


regard


population


size,


and


local


politics--Wum


divisional


A


--







and


court


the


Farmer-Grazier


Commission.


later


grew


understand


many


more


differences


between


the


two


villages.


Although


was


quite


excited


intellectually


about


conducting


a comparative


study


and


felt


quite


confident


about


choice


of Wum


as a second


village,


when


was


actually


the


field


and


was


time


move


from


Tugi


to Wum,


had


second


thoughts.


In Tugi,


was


just


starting


to hear


the


good


gossip


and


feel


home.


Walking


the


hills,


observed


changes


the


color,


texture


and


content


the


farms


as we moved


from


the


rainy


the


dry


season.


While


in Tugi,


literally


observed


what


farmers


told me


would


happen;


saw the


cattle moving


down


from


the


hilltops,


closer


the


farms


saw


cattle


the


farms.


story


was


unfolding


would


before


lose one


eyes.


the most


heart,


valuable


felt


educational


left,


opportunities


a life


time.


knew the


frequency


cattle


trespass


would


accelerate


day


day.


The


farmers


would


calling


their


farms


see


the


damages.


And


now,


according


the


schedule based


on my research


design,


was


time


for me


to Wum.

tunity


graphic


I wondered


obtain


richness?


These


are


was


comparative


took


some


making

e data


a deep


the


a mistake


worth


breath


. Was


losing


and


problems


Sthe

this


packed


faced,


oppor-

ethno-


bags.


and


other


anthropologists


face


the


field.


Once


arrived


Tugi


was


natural


for me


to be


passionate about my work.


I wanted


- n


-- i


,,







moving


to Wum


was


the


best


thing


could


have


done.


The


work


did


there


clarified


theoretical


issues


research


problem.


then


realized


the


value


doing


comparative


research


Hirina


Field


Assistants


In Tugi,


first


two


field


assi


stants


were


recommended


me by


adopted


family


(described


later


this


chapter


and


in Chapter


. The


first


assistant


whom


used


as a tutor


and


interpreter


Pidgin


English


described


below


. My


second


assistant


helped


many


ways


throughout


the


Tugi


ethnographic


and


and


cartographer,


survey work.


an interpreter


Martin


worked


in Meta


and


as a field

sometimes


guide

Pidgin


English,


and


the


evenings


helped


schedule


the


next


day'


work


confirming


appointments


with


respondents


the


village


Martin


had a multifaceted


status


the


village


that


believe


contributed


in a positive


way to


my project


. First,


he has


a positive


attitude,


and he


a hard


and


loyal


worker.


believe


that


he always


tried as


hard


as he


could


to keep


the


project


moving


the


right


direction.


Second,


has


few


cattle


himself


. It


ssible


that


the


fact


that


hired


cattle


owner


to work


with


me may


have


helped


balance


out


image


in the village,


case


anyone noticed


that


(due


to time


constraints)


had


spent


more


time


working


with


farmers


than


herders


. Third,


the past Martin had worked


at the


Tugi


corn


mill


where


the


Fulani bring their


corn


to be


ground


for making


m


m


R


,,







was


well


respected


that


community.


believe


that


possible


that


some


way,


this


could


have


helped


me obtain


interviews


with


almost


the


Fulani


Tugi


village.


hired


third


research


assistant


Tugi


upon


the


recommendation


home


economics


extension


agent.


Alfred


Njohjam helped me by


independently conducting


a portion of


the


Tugi


farmer


surveys.


was


quite


reliable.


worked


well


together


and


worked


well


with


Martin


as well


. His


father


was


a retired cattle control


agent


from another


area and owned


some


cattle.


Before


I hired Alfred,


asked


him


if he thought


that


his


fathers


former


career


would


any


way


affect


the


quality


data


or the


research


project.


He answered


that


would


not,


and


trusted


judgement.


still


believe


that


was


correct.


research assistants


Wum were excellent.


Three out


the


four


people


hired


were


temporarily


unemployed


professionals


due


the


economic


crisis


Cameroon.


For


example,


the


first


was


school


teacher


and


the


second


banker.


A third assistant had experience working


in one of


the


ministries


. The


fourth had


no work


experience.


Three


had


been


born


and


raised


Wum


and


therefore


were


native


speakers


Aghem.


Almost


interviewed
exceptions
stealing c


or
were


little.


of th
to pa
two
They


ie


Meta


and


irticipate
brothers


Fulani


in
who


disappeared


the
wer<
when


herders
survey
e often


agreed ti
. The
accused


arrived


o be
only
of
the







first


research


assistant


was


the


sister


an assis-


tant


colleague


mine


who


was


German


agricultural


economist


working


Bamenda.


Eventually


first


research


assistant


recommended


and


introduced


the


next


two


who


had


been


her


school


mates.


The


fourth


and


youngest


assistant


was


recommended


Agriculture.


to me by


They


an extension


successfully


helped


agent


at the Ministry of


me compete


farmer


surveys


and


approximately


grazier


surveys.


Their


perfor-


mance was


commendable because


the peak of


the rainy season,


they


worked


with


day


and


then


attended


meetings


night


to review the


day's


work


and


prepare


the


work


the


following


day.


Lancuaae


Acquisition


Based


would


on my


have


first


learn


experience


Cameroonian


in Tugi


Pidgin


in 1989,


English


knew


order


conduct my fieldwork and


to live


the village.


I designed my


own multifaceted


language


learning program.


photocopied


and


studied


a copy


the


Peace


Corps'


textbook


An Introduction


Cameroonian


Pidain


(Bellama,


Nkwele


and


Yudom


1983).


hired


tutor


and


translated


and


rehearsed


scripts


had


written


mock


interviews


with


farmers


and


herders.


recorded and


frequently


listened


to tapes


my tutor


repeat-


ing


phrases


from


the


Peace


Corp


text


and


reading


through


the


mock


interviews.


ability


speak


Pidgin


progressed,


wanted







Pidgin

farmers


tutor

. After


interpreter


a few weeks


and


working


started


with


interviewing


interpreter,


realized


the


sooner


learned


speak


Pidgin


English,


the


better


off


would


Sometimes,


translating


Pidgin


during


interviews,


assistant


used


tell


me what


she


thought


needed


to know,


instead


translating the


respondent'


input


verbatim.


This


was


very


disturbing


me.


addition,


sometimes


in-between


questions


when


was


writing,


she would


conduct


a private


conversation


with


the


respondent


. This


was


a serious


problem,


because


destroyed


the


continuity of


the


interview,


and


also


positioned


an outsider


time


when


needed


build


rapport


with


the


respondent


. Even-


tually,


was


able


independently


conduct


interviews


Pidgin,


yet


always


had


a Meta


assistant


with


case


needed


help


with


either


Meta


or Pidgin.


Critiauinca


the


Study


For


two


reasons,


began


to suspect


that


farmers


under-


reported the


frequency of


trespassing incidents


and the number


cases


filed


against


herders.


First,


many


respondents


did


not


want


to take


the


time


to tell me


detail


about more


than


one or


two cases


because


they needed


to go


to the


farm.


By the


end


the


interview,


some


farmers


were


literally


sitting


the


edge


of their


stools,


ready to


take


off


as soon


as I


gave


them


the


"we're


finished"


signal.


A second


reason


for


sus-


pecting


underreporting


that


the


incidents


trespassing







Killworth,


Kronenfeld


and


Sailer


1984).


tried


to minimize


this


problem


asking


about


events


that


occurred


the


same


rainy


and


dry


season


that


conducted


the


survey.


In fact,


the


conduct


these


cases


quite confusing


as they occur


on the


spot,


them


and


and


think


to recall


would


them


difficult


a coherent


anyone


fashion.


to recount


Therefore,


went


the


records


the


Farmer-Grazier


Commission


tally


these


formal


disputes


between


farmers


and


herders,


sure


would


count


a higher


sum.


But,


even


the


frequencies


trespassing


and


claims


filed


are


underreported,


they


are


certainly


alarming


enough


Some


the


grazier


survey


data


turned


out


to be


unreli-


able


Although


I surveyed herders


in both villages,


due


to the


problematic


and


unreliable


nature


those


data,


use


them


here only for ethnographic


interpretation.


First,


in Tugi,


few


graziers


admitted


ever


having


been


reported


farmers


for


cattle


trespassing


the


Farmer-Grazier


Commission.


Yet,


after


briefly


examined


the


records


the


Commission,


saw


that most


graziers


indeed


had been


reported


. Second,


Tugi,


when


asked,


noticed


that


several


Fulani


graziers


told


that


they


owned


cattle.


wondered


why


everyone


would


have


the


same


number


cattle,


but


there


was


way


verify


the


numbers


they


gave


me.


Fulani


are


well


known


underreporting


the


number


cattle


they


own,


and


there fore


written


ianaali


(cattle tax)


records


were


likely to


just as







Wum,


did


not


have


time


examine


Farmer-Grazier


Commission


court


records


compare


reported


and


documented


numbers


cases


between


farmers


and


graziers.


But,


I had


different


problem


that


made


the


herder


data


interesting


ethnographic material but not


for quantitative analysis


was


not


able


survey


a representative


sample


herders.


For


the


Wum


grazier


survey,


I used


ianaali


records


as a


sampling


frame


to select


a representative


sample


herders


for


the


study.


The


design


looked


nice


on paper,


but


imple-


meeting


was


a different


story.


was


the


rainy


season


Wum


and


the


roads


were


a muddy


nightmare.


The


graziers


lived


very


far


out


town


and


quite


honestly,


research


assis-


tants were not willing to


trek to their compounds


because they


said


would


take


too


much


time,


and


we would


never


be able


finish


the


job.


consulted


the


ardo,


and


agreed


summon


people


selected


the


study to various


school


houses


on designated


days.


research


assistants


and


I each


took


room


and


administered


the


survey with


individual


graziers.


It turned out


that not everyone who was


summoned actually


came


for


the


interview.


Since we


were


short


on time,


we ended


working


with


the


herders


who


reported


site


either


their own volition or


because they followed


the ardo'


orders.


Therefore,


the


Wum


grazier


sample was


representative.


Our


team


had


just


finished


the


400-farmer


survey


Wum


that


was


representative,


and after


that work,


was


disappointed


. S


a


e


11 I


q










sample.


In order


to obtain


a representative


sample,


would


have


had


acquire


four-wheel


drive


jeep,


driver,


and


more


money


pay


research


ass


istants


a more


lengthy


stay


the


field.


soon


realized


was


trying


fulfill


unrealistic


expectations


one


field


study.


worked


with


the


Fulani,


realized


that


was


asking


questions


that


social


scientists


had


never


asked


these


people.


assistants


and


were


fact


piecing


together,


bit


bit,


the


story


the


lives


farmers


and


graziers


village


with


history


conflict


that


made


national


history.


This


constitutes


legitimate


social


science


research,


even without the


"scientific "


representative sample.


After


all,


the


most


significant


works


anthropology


have


been


ethnographies


. The


ethnographic


data


that


I collected


the


Fulani


complemented


the


survey


data


on the


farmers


Wum


and


Tugi


villages


. In


the


end,


benefitted


from


the


deb


ate


the


advantages


nomothetic


versus


ideographic


approaches


anthropology


using


either


approach


where


appropriate.


Human


Limitations


the


Study


hard


try


in social


sc ienc e


to be


"scientific"


and


"objective"


factors


at play


about

that


. our wor

confound


the


our


work


field


and


there


impede


are


our


many


search


"the


truth.


Without


launching


into


post-modern


interpretation


work


in Cameroon,


wish


to acknowledge


:k
I


__







intellectual


approach


work


and


may


have


affected


the


quality


data


as well.


Here


limit


discussion


experience


with


cultural


misunderstandings,


and


racism


and


family,


village


and


global


politics.


Cultural


Misunderstandings


There


were


few


times


that


experienced


misunder-


standings


due


to cultural


differences


Cameroon.


This


would


seem


to be


a natural


happening


for


someone


who


living


different


culture


for the


first


time.


These misunderstandings


assume many forms,


some more serious


than others


I often felt


confused when


did not


understand why people


behaved


in a way


that


seemed


I walked


with


to be


harmful


one


me or my work.


research


assistants


For


for


example,


one-half


once


hour


and


found no


one


home


at a compound where we were


scheduled


an interview.


assistant


commented


that


the


person


had


told him earlier that he would be out.


Why didn't my assistant


inform me


so that we could do


something


else?


To me,


seemed


assistant


had


sabotaged


our


work


schedule.


But


assistant


argued


that


did


not


tell


about


the


change


because


did


not


want


to undermine


authority,


or behave


like


knew more


about


business


than


I did.


took


some


time


for me


to appreciate


point of view,


but


eventually we


met


half-way


this


point


contention


when


gave


him


permission


to correct


me in


the


future.







Racism


and


Family.


Village


and


Global


Politics


had


village


finished


quarters


the


farmer


Tugi.


One


surveys


sunny


two


morning


the


when


three


two


research


assistants


and


strolled


into


Njaah3


village


quarter,


we were


abruptly


stopped


one


the


shop


owners.


This


person


asked


what


were


doing


and


who


gave


permiss


to do


answered


that


was


doing


a study


farmer-grazier


disputes


(didn't


everybody


know?)


and


that


course


the


chief


Tugi


gave


me permission


to do


soon


realized


that


was


caught


in the middle of


a dispute


that


had


nothing


to do with me or my work.


The quarter


head


was


leading


a movement


Njaah


secede


from


the


village


that


could


become


litigation


for


chief. He

some time,


and

and


the

there


fon

were


had

bad


been


involved


feelings


between


the


two


them.


According


this


local


merchant,


the


fon'


authority


did


not


extend


into


Njaah


By the


same


token,


to my


surprise,


although


Nji


from


UCD


was


"big


man"


in Acha


and


Tugi


village


quarters,


because


this


intravillage


rivalry,


in Njaah,


his name carried little weight.


Under these


conditions,


I had


to ask this


facto chief


for permission


conduct


the


survey


Njaah.


did


quickly,


avoid


drawing


attention


the


matter,


and


hoped


that


the


act


would


not


be interpreted


as a betrayal


of loyalty


the


fon


3


As


explained


greater


detail


the


next


chapter,


- -


..


,


r







Tugi.


ended


the


quarter


head


easily


granted


permits


sion


to do


my work.


have


way


knowing


ties


with


the


fon


and


Nji


as part


adopted


family


affected


the


quality


data


Njaah,


or anywhere


else


for


that


matter.


The


point


here


that


a researcher,


almost


impossible


to be


aware


or even


all


at the


the


political


household


level


dynamic s


the


that matter.


village

In this


level,

case,


privately,


I actually was


loyal


to the


fon'


cause


and


wished


that


would


win


the


lawsuit,


as he


eventually


did.


However,


luckily,


I did not


have


to make


public


allegiance,


and


was


able


to finish


the


survey.


Although


the


quarter


head


gave


me permission


to work


Njaah,


the


shop


owner


persisted


harassing


SAfter


the


first


incident,


made


the


following


proposal


based


national


popular


explanation


the


explosion


at Lake


Nyos.


The


Israelis


had


made


a pact


with


Paul


Biya


test


an atom


bomb


Lake


Nyos.


Because


Lake


Nyos


was


located


anglophone


area,


and


the


president


francophone,


Biya


was


happy to


oblige


the


Israelis.


This


Njaah


shop owner


concluded


that


"whites"


blew up


Lake


Nyos


He proposed


that


since


was


"white,


" maybe


was


a spy,


and maybe


even


had


something


do with


the


Lake


Nyos


incident.


looked


at him


straight


the


eye


and


said,


"Look


me.


you


really


think


that


a spy?"


concluded


that


this


person


was


using


the


Lake


Nyos







incident


as an excuse


to pick on me,


to single me


out,


because


am white.


can


never


know


how


many


other


people


worked


with


distrusted


or despised me


because


race.


And


can


never


know


that


how my


I felt


race


affected


humiliated


the


when


quality


the


notion


data


race


was


only


know


introduced


into my


field experience


cringed when


people


in the village


called


the


United


States


"White


Man'


Country.


also


resented


being


associated


with


other


"white


people"


who


were


part


the


colonial


history


of Cameroon.


had


cook


who


said


past


worked


had


worked


"for


other


Europeans,


" missing


the


point


that


am an American.


used


to refer


to himself


as a "bad boy"


when he was


angry with


me.


was


shocked


this


self-denigration,


but


then


realized


that


was


a way


him


to show


disdain


white


people.


This


behavior


made


feel


grossly


uncomfortable,


because


it reduced


our


relationship


to a dynamic


race.


dismay,


this


person,


and


perhaps


others,


repre-


sented


the


colonial


oppressor.


When


public,


always


tried


to set


myself


apart


from


tourists


and


other


expatriates


. The


problem


that


many non-


Africans


not


know


how


to conduct


themselves


appropriately


among


Cameroonians;


how


bargain


goods


the


market


place,


or how


to bargain


with


taxi


drivers.


grew


to under-


stand t


hat


one


level,


these


situations,


Cameroonians










wasteful


and


careless


way


to be


the


world.


also


found


these


behaviors


because


offensive,


race


and


as one


did not


many


want


people


who


to be


stereotyped


behaved


this


manner.


I also


tried


to avoid becoming


the


stereotype


a white


researcher with


lots


money,


but


this


was


almost


impossible


avoid.


pictures


several


For


on days


months,


example,


that


I hiked


only


allocated


everywhere


carried


camera


doing


and


just


took bush


and


that.


taxis,


took


For


along


with


everybody


else


Tugi


village.


But


the


dry


season


when


the


young


male


bush


taxi


drivers


drank


beer


and


raced


each


other


along


the


roads,


after


incident


near-


collision,


decided


to buy


a car.


After


this,


status


Tugi


village


increased


because


was


apparent


that


had,


relatively


speaking,


substantial


financial


resources


. Some


people


were


delighted,


others


were


jealous,


and


at least


one


person


was


furious,


but


such


small


village,


was


everybody'


business


Tucai


Farmer


Ethnouraphic


and


Survey


Interviews


The


Tugi


farmer


ethnographic


sample


was


purposive,


not


representative


. A few


days


following


arrival


the


vil-


lage,


used


the


purposive


sample


to begin


work


and


find


out


what


was


going


between


farmers


and


graziers.


This


method


worked


well


the


work


schedule


was


structured


and relentless,


and


I became


fully engaged


the work.


I made










village


quarter


heads,


school


teachers,


entrepreneurs,


come-


dians,


old


and


young


people,


male


and


female


farmers,


know-


ledgeable


farmers,


farmers


with


cattle-damaged


crops


and


graziers


wanted to


hear all about


farmer-grazier conflicts,


all


the


stories--including


the


lies,


half


-truths


and


truths


limited ethnographic


interviews


to Tugi Quarter because


Acha


and Njaah Quarter


are


located


kilometers


down


the


road


(see


Chapter


beginning


the


I did


farmer


however,


survey


pilot


Acha


test


and


before


Njaah


officially


quarters.


With a Meta interpreter,


interviewed 99


farmers


in Tugi


Quarter;


men


and


women


ages.


asked


them


about


the problems


between farmers


and graziers,


and asked questions


about


farming


general.


made


sure


visited


each


neighborhood.


When


came


time


to plan


the


survey,


I decided


to limit


the


study


female


Meta


farmers.


Many


men


grow


plantains


around


the


compound


and


tap


raffia


the


forested


valleys.


But


women


grow


the


food


crops


and


almost


are


full-time


farmers.


also


excluded


retired


female


farmers


from


the


sample,


and


women


who


market


and


trade,


but


do not


farm.


In order to


build a


sampling


frame


for the


farmer survey,


we drew


a map


and


conducted


a census


of all


the


compounds.


We recorded


the


names


the


compound


heads,


and


the


resident


adults


We recorded


the relationship of


each adult


--


..







was


also


a way to


begin


to identify


local


herders.


I excluded


children


from


the


census


because


would


have


taken


too much


time


for


adults


the


compound


count


them.


Instead,


planned


to record


that


information


during


the


survey.


Conducting


the


census


gave me


the


opportunity


to be


seen


everywhere,


each


village


quarter.


People


began


ask


when


they


would


interviewed.


Farmers


pulled


aside


tell


me about


their


latest


dispute


with


a grazier,


and


often


invited


farms


to observe


firsthand


cattle


damages


and


crop


losses.


This


gave


well-rounded


education


the


scope


farmer-grazier


problems


. In


addition,


I saw with


own


eyes


the


variation


infrastructure


and


social


and


economic


characteristics


between


village


quarters


We recorded


Njaah.


Retired


active

female


farmers


farmers


. Acha,

were


in Tugi


recorded


but


and

not


counted.


Using


the


chi-square


formula


confidence


interval,


determined


that


the


sample


should


contain


farmers.


decided


survey


farmers


from


each


village


quarter


assigned


a number


each


farmer


and


used


random


number


table


sample


selection.


We surveyed


farmers.


The


farmer survey consists of three data sets


The


farmer


household


data


set


has


cases;


from


Tugi


and


from


Wum.


The


"Itseol


survey


inquires


about


the


number


and


relationship


between


people


the compound,


respondents'


and


children'


education.


The


survey


asks


how much


money


farmers


-~~ ~~ ~ ~ - 0- .S.


0


r


-0 5


r


1


-- -,L


I


i







includes


information


farm


and


off-farm


livelihoods


for


respondents


and


their


spouses.


addition,


open-ended


questions


query


farmers


about


their


attitude


toward


and


understanding


of cattle


trespassing.


The


"f arms"


data


information


4,572


farms


Tugi


and


Wum


Villages


contains


data


respondent


farms;


the


number,


type


and


size


they


cultivate


or keep


in fallow,


method


acquisition,


type


of environment,


and


other


variables


. The


third


data


"cases"


information


on 1,889


farmer


reports


cattle


destruction


farms


over


various


time


periods.


contains


many


variables


that


tell


the


story


how


farmers


cope


with


crop


losses


due


to cattle


trespassing


. For


example,


the


data


reveal


who


reports


cases,


ethnicity


trespasser


and


the


conduct


and


outcome


those


cases.


Wum


Farmer


Ethnoaraohic


and


Survey


Interviews


I arrived


Wum,


my second


field


site,


on June


1992


I remember wondering what


of the


talk was


about


concerning


the


"bad


road"


to Wum.


On that


day of


the


dry


season,


road


seemed


just


fine


had


idea


that


upon


departure


four


months


later,


would


sleeping


truck


that


road


under


a full


moon.


The


truck


would


one


many


lined


single


file


behind


a huge


flatbed


truck


overloaded


with


bags


cement,


stuck


a very


deep


pit


road


a cliff


arrived


Wum


on a Saturday,


went


to church


on Sunday,


and


started work Monday morning


at seven


Although


was


confident







the


survey


instrument


for


the


Wum


setting.


interviewed


farmers


and


administrators


and


then made adjustments


in the


survey


accordingly.


As I prepared


to administer


the


farmer


survey


in Wum,


could not


find an appropriate sampling frame.


Annual


tax rolls


were


very


spotty


because


people


refused


pay


taxes


due


feelings


that


the


government


was


not


legitimate.


This


act


and


other


organized,


widespread


acts


civil


disobedience


were


collectively


called


"Ghost


Town.


" The


year


study,


1991,


was


the


year


Ghost


Town,


organized


John


Fru


Ndi,


the


leader


Cameroon


the


called


most


the


powerful


Social


opposition


Democratic


party


Front.


Ghost


the


time


Town meant


that


markets


were


closed


and


there


was


public


transpor-


station


available


or travelling


allowed


personal


vehicles


Monday


through


Friday.


People


boycotted


state


fees


for


taxi


permits,


vehicle


registration


papers


and


taxes


order


stymie


government


revenues.


continued


search


for


viable


sampling


frame.


The


voters registration rolls would also be an inadequate sampling


frame


because


the


absence


national


political


reform,


people had been refusing to vote.


Furthermore,


the schools


had


reliable


records


parents


students.


The


Ministry


Education


only


had


lists


names


economically


successful


"leader"


farmers


. The


recent


census


materials


that


reportedly


would


have


contained


list


household


heads


village







from


Bamenda.


instead


of allocating


any more


time


to the


search


a reliable


I found


sampling


an old map


Wum.


frame,


created


pencilled


own.


about


dots


around


the perimeter


of the


town.


I used a


random number table


to select


pairs


of dots


and


then


drew


about


lines


between


them.


Then,


numbered


the points


created by the crisscrossing


lines


across


the


map.


Again,


used


a random


number


table


to select


dots


and colored


them bright


pink.


I decided


that


the


team


and


I would


interview


1 female


farmer


each


the


first


compounds


found


close


proximity


to each


pink


dot


(Bernard


1988:109)


"Creating randomness"


seemed


to be


the best


way for me


build


representative


impossible


for me


sample


to stratify the


(Bernard

sample b


1988:109)


y village


was


quarter or


population


density.


The


map


had


little


information


about


the


boundaries


between


village


quarters


Nor


did


the


village


chiefs


or experts


the


Ministry


Survey


agree


on village


quarter


boundaries


also did not


have the population density


each


village


quarter.


But,


based


the


1976


Regional


Plan,


I did


estimate


the


population


Wum


adults


from


years


age


8,330.


There


was


insufficient


information


to disaggregate


that


figure


sex,


which


would


have


been


useful


since


wanted


survey


female


farmers


. But


was


not


a problem.


We surveyed


a representative


sample


farmers


based


chi-square


formula


confi-







Tuai


Grazier


EthnoaraDhic


Interviews


With my


Meta


interpreter,


interviewed


Meta


men


who


have


cattle.


interviewed


competitive


grazers


and


men


who


only


have


few


cows


they


join


with


other


herds.


For


the


ethnographic


interviews,


defined


grazierr"


anyone


who


owns


cattle.


Working with


the


Fulani


required


a little more


planning.


It was


extremely


important


for me to


be accepted quickly among


the


Fulani.


First,


there


are


few


Fulani


graziers


Tugi


so I


really


needed


the


participation


each


individual.


Second,


there


was


little


time


for


long-term


rapport


building;


it took


a lot


time


and


energy to


hike out


to the


compounds,


each on


a satellite


hilltop


a few


kilometers


from


the


village.


There-


fore,


hired


the


imam' s


Muslim


religious


leader)


son


translate


Fulani


grazier


interviews


from Fulfulde


to English.


was


an English


major


at the


University


Yaounde,


and


turned


out


conscientious


and


accurate


translator.


Since


was


more


integrated


into


the


Meta


than


Fulani


com-


munity


Tugi,


decided


would


appropriate


sign


respect


to conduct


the


interviews


the


respondents'


first


language.


In addition,


I had spent


of my time working with


farmers,


and


I did


not


want


Fulani


graziers


feel


that


the


conflictive


environment


was


taking


sides


with


Meta


farmers


did


not


want


appear


at the


doorstep


of the


ardo


the


company


a Meta


research


assistant.


hired







community


Perhaps


the


interviews would have gone


just


as well


Pidgin


with


a Meta


field


assistant--but


was


following my


intuition


maximize


opportunities


for


successful


field


encounters


After ge

my translator


tting permission


and I


from and


interviewing the


conducted 10 ethnographic


interviews


ardo,

based


on a purposive


sample


among


Fulani


graziers


Tugi


quarter


Wum


Grazier


Ethnouraphic


Interviews


In Wum,


I conducted several key


informant interviews with


Fulani


and


native


graz iers


aimed


to capture


the


local


his-


tory

ences


the


betwe'


research p:

an Fulani,


problem


and


Aghem


to identify


and


Meta


general


herder


differ-


populations


between


villages.


Human


Compassion:


The


Soft


Side


Research


propose


share


glimmer


the


soft


side


res


earch


experience


in Tugi


No research


strategy


can


succeed


without


mutual


support


and


compassion


between


res


earcher


and


research


participants.


In my


field


experience,


I behaved


as a


social


scientist,


but developed compassion for the Cameroonian


people.


In Tugi


village,


was


adopted


into


the


Nji


family


and


this


gave


the


opportunity


to develop


some


intimate


rela-


tionships


laughed


and


cried


with


Andrew


Nji


and


his


wives,

their


Helmina


losses


and


. This


M~ary.


emotional


shared


their


closeness


happiness,


was


not


suffered


replicated


any


other


venue


field


research.







started


work


first


day


Tugi.


that


Sunday,


was


re-


introduced


the


Presbyterian


Church


congregation.


Afterwards,

together,


many


they


the


thanked


women

for


gathered


gift


around


salt


me,

that


and

was


distributed


after


departure


1989


was


pleasantly


surprised.


I spent


the


rest


of the


week hiring


household


help


and an interpreter/research assistant who


trusted and known


the


village.


wrote


descriptions


ass


istants,


who


had


never


held


jobs


before.


developed


a field


schedule


and


budget


for


the


Tugi


component


the


research,


and


wrote


a dissertation


outline.


I maintained


a high


profile


Tugi.


attended


church


every Sunday,


and after


interviews,


attended most market days


was


at 5:00


am each


day


(except


for


Sunday)


and in bed by


8:30


9:00.


assistant


and


conducted


preliminary


ethnographic


interviews on the farmer-grazier problem in those


first


few


weeks.


Meta


farmers


saw me


hiking


and


down


the


hills,


going


into


the


bush


"where


they


" trekking


out


Fulani


satellite compounds


and


coming


home


exhausted,


just


they


came


home


exhausted


after


working


all


day


the


farm.


Through


visibility


and


intense


work


schedule,


became


legitimate


person


their


eyes


Meta


women


farmers


and


I had


something


common--when


came


our


work,


did


not


joke.


" They


often


commented


was


thin


and


did


not


have


the


strength


carry


anything


to the


farms.


But,


they


insisted







had


more


endurance


than


they


long-distance


walking.


enjoyed


the


compliment,


even


was


not


true.


Meta


philosophy


food


living


theme,


central


society:


"food


life.


heard


this


over


and


over


again


during


the


time


spent


Tugi


village.


Food


an important


resource


among


Meta


people,


and


value


not


taken


lightly.


Food


given


and


exchanged


daily


intricate


systems


reciprocity


between


households.


Food


also


the


medium


of exchange


that


heavily


obliges


people


to each


other


detailed


reciprocal


arrangements


funerals


and


other


celebrations


Eating food,


and understanding the importance of


and


respect


for


food


Meta


society


brought


me closer


family.


Pa Nji


taught


that


the


Meta


philosophy


on food


inextricably


linked


to my work


on farmer-grazier


conflict.


explained


work.


benefit


that


can

from


the


not

this


food

live

food


we eat

without

should


giveE

food

not


the


power


And,


abuse


to do


graziers


farmers,


and


our

who

cows


should


not


eat


food


crops


and many


other


farmers


believe


that


food


gives


life,


and


cattle


continue


eat


food


crops,


Meta


people


will


die.


Providing


food was


one way my


family took care of me,


and


them


did


not


have


time


cook


they


observed me,


over time,


family saw that


adored


almost all


Cameroonian


dishes.


Indeed,


after


years


having


a diet


that


excluded


red


meat,


Helmina


proudly


convinced







into


heart,


and


responded


eating


way


into


their


hearts.


At night,


on stools


around


the


fire,


usually


Helmina'


kitchen.


Soon,


understood


that


was


sitting


circle


safety.


These


people


were


going


to protect me


(from


God knows what)


and support my work.


We were connected


to each


other,


and


was


relieved


to be


on the


inside


this


circle.


After


developed


time,


between


mutual


all


feelings


us.


respect


ability


and


speak


love


Pidgin


improved,


people


breakthrough


swallowed


laughed


when,


speech,


jokes.


finally,


could


who


understand


was


big


slurred


and


and


could


understand him.


Pa taught me


how to


tap palm wine,


and


I loved


the


strenuous


trek


to his


raffia


bushes.


cherished


our


time


to be alone


privately.


together


Coming


the


home,


bush,


would


when


show


could


off


speak


carrying


to him


on my


shoulder


an unwieldy


and


long raffia branch


for


firewood.


The


journey


for me was


a spiritual


one;


our way of


being together.


Later,


when


was


hospitalized


the


Acha-Tugi


Presbyterian


Hospital


with


liver


cancer,


took


two


weeks


off


work


take


care


of him.


I cooked


Helmina


and


him,


and


carried


hot


bath


water


the


room


. I read


and


translated


text


into


Pidgin


him


from


the


Bible.


His


eyes


filled


with


light.


And,


was


the


information manager on Pa'


condition.


That


consulted


friend


Beat


Schneider,


a Swiss


physician,