Cason vs. Baskin Outline of Defendant's Brief for the Supreme Court (3 pages)

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Material Information

Title:
Cason vs. Baskin Outline of Defendant's Brief for the Supreme Court (3 pages)
Series Title:
Cason vs. Baskin Outline of Defendant's Brief for the Supreme Court (3 pages)
Physical Description:
Mixed Material
Language:
English
Publication Date:
Physical Location:
Box: 8
Folder: ason vs. Baskin. Outline of Defendant's Brief for the Supreme Court, typed ms. 3 p. This item was received with the Oliver accession (1998) of MKR-NB correspondence.

Subjects

Spatial Coverage:
North America -- United States of America -- Florida

Record Information

Source Institution:
University of Florida
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
System ID:
AA00003081:00001

Full Text



Cason vs. Baskin

OUTLINE OF DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

for the Supreme Court


The plaintiff seeks to state her alleged rights

against the defendant in four counts. The first and second

counts are founded on the novel theory that the name and

personality of an individual are so sacred that an author

can not make mention of them in a literary production

without paying a substantial amount for the privilege.

While there are differences in form between the two counts,

there is no difference in substance and they should be

considered together.

The third count sounds in libel and is founded

upon the theory that the attributing of the use of profanity

to any individual is libelous per se,- or, putting it another

way, so offensive that as a fact of common notoriety the

court presumes that damages result.

The fourth count is'founded upon the unique theory

that the use of a name and depiction of a personality in a

literary work entitles all the persons so mentioned to

share in the author's profits from the sale.

The argument will thus naturally be divided into

three phases, as follows:

1. There has been no legal invasion of the plain-

tiff's privacy.

2. It is not to be presumed that attributing the

use of profanity to an individual will cause that individual

to suffer recoverable damages.

3. An author who does not offend the privilege of

free speech can not be required to share her profits with








those whose names or personalities have been useful in the

writing of a literary production.

INVASION OF PRIVACY

The recent origin of the doctrine.

The careful limitation of its application by statutes

and court decisions.

The unfailing accompaniment of the invasion of privacy

by some other wrong recognized by the law in those cases

which approve the doctrine.

The failure of any court to apply the doctrine against

the author of a literary work. Its application has been uni-

versally rejected by the courts because they considered any

incidental injury, less than libel, to an individual was more

than outweighed by the value of the literary work to the

public. PROFANITY

The attribution of the use,of profanity to an indi-

vidual is not so offensive as to create a presumption of

legal damages.

The distinction between libel per se and libel per quod.

The use of profanity as described in the third count

does not constitute a criminal offense under the laws of Florida.

(It is well established that to state that a person has com-

mitted a crime punishable by imprisonment constitutes libel

per se).

The Florida Supreme Court is committed to the doctrine

that there is no proper legal distinction between a libel

against a man and a libel against a woman.

The decline and fall of the Puritanical prejudice

against profanity.

The increasing oral and written use of profanity and

the recognition of its therapeutic value.

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Analysis of the characterization of the plaintiff

(in the third count only) to demonstrate that it is well

calculated to create an impression that in the aggregate

is favorable.

THE MENTION OF A PERSON IN A BOOK,
MAGAZINE OR NEWSPAPER DOES NOT ENTITLE
SUCH PERSON TO SHARE IN THE PROFITS OF
THE AUTHOR OR PUBLISHER.

The plaintiff did not in the lower court advance

any reason or authority to support the unique doctrine of

the fourth count that the mention of a person in a book

entitles such person to share in the author's earnings,-

nor have we been able to find any.


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