Personal identity

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Title:
Personal identity
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ix, 110 leaves : ; 28 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Nickens, C. A ( Charles Alfred )
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Persons   ( lcsh )
Identity (Philosophical concept)   ( lcsh )
Body, Human (Philosophy)   ( lcsh )
Philosophy thesis Ph. D
Dissertations, Academic -- Philosophy -- UF
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bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1981.
Bibliography:
Bibliography: leaves 107-109.
Statement of Responsibility:
by C. A. Nickens III.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.

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Source Institution:
University of Florida
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
aleph - 000295711
oclc - 07943916
notis - ABS2059
System ID:
AA00002193:00001

Full Text


















PERSONAL


IDENTITY


NICKENS


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FL
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE


GRADUATE COU
ORIDA IN
REQUIREMENTS


NCIL
































Copyright


1981


Nickens































This


dissertation


respectfully


dedicated


both


Mother


and


Father


and


to Gary


Fuller,


person


most


directly


connected


with


development


this


field.
















ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


The


following


listing


those


to whom


wish


express


sincerest


gratitude


their


assistance


completing


this


work,


my degree.


Gary


Fuller


(Central


Michigan


University):


feel


loss


man.


words


Gary


when


trying


worked


with


express


me continuously


appreciation


through


this


devel-


opment


this


area


from


my early


days


as a graduate


student


right


through


time


submission


this


dissertation.


a brilliant


philosopher


and


a good


friend


to whom


will


always


indebted.


Jay


Zeman


(University


of Florida):


regard


Jay


can


only


compared


with


feelings


towards


Gary.


Jay,


that


thank


degree


completion.


both


committee


chairman


good


friend,


supported


encouraged


me every


step


graduate


career,


which


will


be eternally


grateful.


Robert


D'Amico


(University


of Florida


Bob


a com-


mittee


member


that


wish


express


particular


appreciation


E


--









development.


Both


Bob


s contribution


and


friendship,


well


, my appreciation


to him


such,


are


incalculable.


Seigfred


Fagerberg


(University


of Florida):


had


difficult


task


of being


an outside


committee


member;


none-


theless,


invested


the


time


and


energy


required


familarize


himself


both


with


the


subj


area


well


my writings.


has


given


both


support


and


friend


ship,


which


very


thankful.


Tom


Auxter


and


Hershel


Elliott


University


Florida):


These


two


men


offered


some


best


instruction


received


both


undergraduate


and


graduate


study;


addition,


they


were


kind


enough


attend


my qualifying


exam


and


raise


some


thought-provoking


questions.


These


are


many


reasons


why


am grateful


to Tom


and


Hershel.


Dean


ciall


M.V.


thankful


Gannon


to Dean


(University


Gannon


Florida):


taking


am espe-


me on as his


assis


tant


during


the


final


year


study;


just


important,


providing


me with


opportunity


of employ-


ment


after


graduation.


also


wish


thank


Dean


Gannon


contribution


development


moral


character.


Katherine


transformed


Williams


dissertation


(Gainesvill


into


Katherine,


an acceptable


typist,


form.


eac


instance


she


had


solution


situation.









completion


of both


this


dissertation


and


commencement,


am particularly


grateful


to Rien


giving


foresight


recognize


my ability


this


field,


and


giving


the


confidence


that


was


so useful


see


through.


Rien


has


caused


think


about


many


things


hope


I have


done


less


him.


Caroline


Chlebak


(Canada/America):


Caroline


indeed


played


a major


role


the


ultimate


completion


this


dissertation.


She


has


not


only


done


the


typing


until


final


copy,


but


she


has


also


been


willing


listen


and


respond


to material


that


was


trying


to work


through


and


understand.


Moreover,


and


times


much


more


important,


saw


through


times


depression


and


shared


moments


joy.


Love


and


gratitude


are


means


which


can


show


my appreciation.


Perhaps


one


the greatest


displays


of gratitude


that


can


make


endl


ess


sacrifice


made


my parents


completion


this


degree.


Throughout


long


educa-


tional


process s


parents


could


have


given


more


love


support


than


mother


and


father.


have


always


con-


sidered


myself


extremely


fortunate


to have


such


wonderful


parents,


today


admiration


always


way


they


am proud


raised


to be


me can


their


only


son.


summed

















TABLE


OF CONTENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS


ABSTRACT

CHAPTER


a 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 C 4 4 4 4 4 4 C 4 Cii


INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER


DESCARTES


THE


FAILURE


ARGUMENTS


FOR


PERSONS


IMMATERIAL


SUBSTANCES


The
The


Epi


Onto


stemol


ogical


logical


Arguments


Arguments,


Arguments


from


sences


a . a 32


CHAPTER


III.


LOCKE


THE


PROBLEMS


OF A MEMORY


CRITERION


C C 4 4 C 4 4 a S C C C S 45


Philosophical
Conditions


Initial


Analy


Analysis,
of Adequacy
sis and Pro


Unity-


blems


with


Relati


and


Formal


Requirements


. . . . 54


Circu
Notes


arity


Pro


ems


CHAPTER


THE


KNOCKDOWN


APPROACH


POSITIVE


PROOF


THAT


Strawson


PERSONS


An Unsucc


MUST


essful


BE PHYSICAL


Argument


Phy


silC


The Kno


Account


ckdown


the Self


Argument


Positive


S . 71


Proof


Phy


CHAPTER


sical

KANT


Account


of Persons


PROBLEMATIC


PRESSURE


ARGUMENTS


AGAINST
PERSONS


A PHYSICAL


DESCRIPTION


nnp


-- Thn


Pi rt-


--- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ rl -- --- -Y -~ -~U a ..- -'I LLta


a . . 17


S- . . . . . 68


rrrrru


a
Page


P ;1 r~l


nrr~ cm
















Abstract


of Dissertation Presented


the Graduate


Council


University


of Florida


in Partial Fulfillment


Requirements


Doctor


Degree of


of Philosophy


PERSONAL


IDENTITY


Nickens


August


1981


Chairman:


Major


Jay


Department:


Zeman
Philosophy


this


dissertation


we will


be concerned with


nature


persons.


Many


philosophers


have wanted


to hold


that


persons


are radically


different


types


entities


from


ordinary persisting physical


objects.


The main


aim


this


dissertation


pletely wrong,


show


that a


that any view of


correct


this


account


kind


nature


com-


and


persistence


persons must be a


physicalistic


one.


shall


defend


this


physicalistic


account


persons both


attacking


historical and


contemporary


arguments


which


pur-


port


support a nonphysicalistic view


persons


as well










In chapter


two


we shall


show


that


Cartesian


arguments,


although


sympathetically


interpreted


view


that


persons


are


nonphysical


"spiritual


substances"


do not


suc-


ceed.


In chapter


three


we shall


show


sympathy


Locke's


seemingly


nonphysicalistic


"memory"


criterion


persistence


persons


but


argue


that


there


is no conflict


between


Locke


s account


and


memory


must


appeal


some


sort


of physical


continuity.


chapter


four


we will


provide


further


reinforcement


our


physicalistic


account


showing


that


the


whole


conception


of a purely


nonphysical


substance


or event


incoherent


developing


an argument


from


causation


which


shows


that


whole


conception


of a nonphysical


substance


or event


incoherent.


Taken


together


chapters


s three


and


four


constitute


core


our


positive


argument


that


persons


are


physical.


Finally


chapter


five


we shall


examine


certain


resid-


arguments


from


imagination


suggested


Kant's


Paralogisms


which


purport


to show


that


persons


are


nonphysi-


and


we shall


argue


that


there


is no reason


to be


persuaded


them.
















CHAPTER


INTRODUCTION


this


dissertation


we will


defend


view


that


persons


are


physical.


Moreover,


we will


concerned


with


nature


persons


are


persons,


like


and


natural


we will


objects


question


whether


instead


they


or not

are


something


special.


There


are


those


who


believe


that


persons


are,


y nature,


something


special--something


that


cannot


studi


ed by


sciences.


other


hand,


will


argue


that


persons


are


objects


world


just


trees


are,


example.


When


we approach


problem


this


way,


we are


dealing


with


a branch


Mind/Body


Problem.


past,


answers


these


questions


have


been


associated


with


concerns


life


after


death,


moral


responsibility,


rights


science


fiction,


name


just


few.


When


we ask


about


nature


persons


we are


asking


following


questions.


First,


what


nature


persons


particular


time?


Second,


what


to be


person


over


time?


will


approach


these


problems


through










person


stages.


Think


about


even a


seemingly


nonproblematic


object


like


a watch.


Here we can


ask,


what


is a watch


stage?


And


what


two watch


stages


to be


stages


same watch?


To make


the


problems


of watch


identity


even more obvious,


consider


the


following.


When


(for


sentimental


reasons)


are


picking up our


favorite


pocket watch


from repair we,


perhaps


unconsciously,


check


to be


sure


identical


watch


that


we brought


That


say,


we want


our


original


watch,


not


one


that


is exactly


similar.


How


do we know the watch


to be


same?


Generally,


accept a


quick


visual


examination


as conclusive


proof.


we wanted


to get


technical,


then


we may


check


serial


number


listen


unique


sound


it makes,


look


that


scratch


received


on a particular


day.


After


checking


distinguishing


character-


istics


we may


satisfied


that


this


same watch


brought


in.


But


really


same watch?


We question


being


same


watch because


this watch


does


not have


same


collection


parts


as when


it was


brought


in.


The


power


cell


been


changed,


scratched


crystal


replaced,


and


mysterious


hum gone.


these doubts we


may


reply


that









particular moment when


watch


center


our


attention,


the


first moment


saw


it for


example,


time


it was


scratched,


then


that


instance we


were


acquainted with


the identity


watch


at a partic-


ular


time.


When


we determine


that


the


same watch


that we


bought


and


later


scratched,


then


we are


passing


judgment


area


identity


over


time.


What


gives


watch


identity


at a particular


moment,


and


what


that makes


the watch


today


identi-


watch


of yesterday?


What


glue


that


connects


together


these


particular moments?


As we have


already


seen,


we want


the watch


today,


after


some


pieces


have


been


changed,


still


same watch


as before


change,


but


how much


Would


could be changed


it make


without


a difference


affecting


certain


identity.


parts were changed and


others


not?


What


all


the


parts


were gradually


changed?


Would


our


answers


be different


an animal?


Would


our


answers


be different


a person?


we said above,


we will


be concerned with


identity


persons,


as well


the question


of personal


identity--


question


identity


over


time.


complex


questions


are


about


the


identity


of a watch,


just


brought









Descartes,


figures,


Locke


we will


and Kant.


also call


In addition


upon


these


wisdom of


historical


certain modern


philosophers


the Analytic


tradition.


The


framework,


namely


person


stages


unity


rela-


tion,


which


we will be working will


fully


detailed


Locke


chapter;


now we will


list


four


possibili-


ties


we would have


we combined


different alternatives.


Person


stages


are


physical


with


a physical


criter-


over


time.


That


unity


relation between


physical


person


stages


a physical


one.


Person


stages


are


physical


with


a mental


criterion


over


time;


unity


relation


between


physical


person


stages


a mental


one.


Person


stages


are mental


with


a physical


criterion


over


time;


unity


relation between mental


person


stages


a physical


one.


Person


stages


are mental


with


a mental


criterion


over


time;


unity


relation between mental


person


stages


a mental


one.


these


four positions,


we will


be defending


first.


We will


supporting


defending


thi s


position


through


both


positive argument


as well


as attacking


contrary views


held by


different


philosophers.









view


person


stages


and


trancendent


view


the


unity


relation.


will,


terms of


our


framework,


be attacking


view


that


person


stages


are nonphysical.


this


chap-


ter,


we will


not


prove


the conclusions


Descartes


to be


false;


nevertheless,


we will


show


that


the


arguments


uses


support his conclusion are wrong.


stated


above,


Descartes wanted


attribute


personal


identity


something neither physical


nor mental,


something


transcendental


you will.


What kind


identity would we


have


it were neither physical nor mental?


Descartes'


idea


is a purely


temporal


one,


since merely


temporal


enti-


ties


would be nonphysical.


Therefore,


the Descartes


section


we will


argue


against


temporal


entities.


Moreover,


knockdown


section


we will


continue


to show the


weakness


a merely


temporal


account


of personal


identity.


Since


Descartes


only wrote


the area


of identity


a particular


time we will


only


be concerned


with


iden-


tity


of what


we have called


person


stages.


Descartes,


that


persons


are


necessarily not


physi-


based both


on epistemic


arguments


as well


as on


what


we will


call


arguments


from essences.


Briefly,


epistemic arguments


state


that at


particular moment


even


though


cannot


doubt my


own mental









individual


identity,


and


that


physical


existence


not.


Descartes'


section


we will


show


breakdown


epistemic


arguments.


addition,


we will


show


that


arguments


from


essences


are


based


on controversial


assumptions


about


disembodiment.


It will


chapter


that


we will


prove


these


controversial


assumptions


false.


The


third


chapter


will


center


on Locke.


turns


out,


Locke


is concerned


with


the


position


that


the


unity


relation


must


mental.


the


contrary,


we will


show


that


rather


than


unity


relation


mental


that


instead


mus t


physical.


It will


this


chapter


that


details


will


given


on what


is meant


both


person


stages


and


unity


that


relation.


we will


Concerning


concerned


the


with


arguments


this


from


chapter,


Locke


will


following.


begin


with,


Locke


s position


on identity


a par-


ticular


time


different


from


his


position


identity


over


time.


The


question


identity


at a particular


time


seemed


non-controversial


to Locke;


was


the


question


identity


over


time


that


Locke


struggled


with.


For


ous


Locke,


particular


we can

moments


describe


in a


the


person


connection


life


between


as a unity


vari-


rela-









something


answer will


that connects


ability


together person


recall


stages,


a past and anticipate


future.


Our


attack on Locke's memory,


mental,


or nonphysical


definition


of personal


identity


over


time begins


estab-


lishing what


can


reasonably


be called


a criterion


personal


identity over time based


on memory,


i.e.,


we will


postulate


a memory


criterion.


Once we


have our


criterion


established


we can


test


it with


a series


examples


and


counter


examples.


Before we go on


to question


applicability


our


memory


criterion,


we will begin by


considering the


condi-


tions


The


adequacy


first


that


our


condition


criterion must meet.


adequacy


that we must require


that


it meet certain


formal


criteria,


namely


symmetry


and


transitivity.


turns


out,


the


proposed memory


criteria


encounters


problems when


tested


by these


formal


criteria.


we will


see,


even


if we are


able


surmount


certain


initial


formal


problems


redefining


the memory


criterion,


memory


criterion will


still


have


problems.


problem


that


will


still


remain


that a


purely


mental


criterion


of personal


identity,


such


the memory









greatest


problem


that


the memory


criterion


faces


that


remains,


after


all


of our modifications,


counter


intuitive.


Obviously,


this


section


we will


argue


that


only


way


successfully


overcome


the


problem of


being


counter


intuitive


require


the memory


criterion


to be


supple-


mented


with


a requirement


for the


same


physical body.


In brief,


not only will


body


continuity


be needed


personal


identity


but


the criterion we establish


identity


over


time must also require


that


any memory


criterion


that


we propose


(if we are


use


a memory


criterion)


must


have


a physical


feature.


In concluding


our


section on Locke,


we will


answer


quickly


that Locke


was


right


track when he


said


that


identity


over time


requires memory;


however,


we must,


same


time,


point out


that Locke was wrong


stop


there.


knockdown chapter we will


present


positive


arguments


show


both


impossibility


nonphysical


person


stages,


and


that


unity


relation must be


physical.


This


that


section


self must have a


the dissertation


physical


theoretically


component


proves


insure


identity.


The


arguments


used


this


section


are


so effec-


tive


against


a purely mental


account


of personal


identity


that


we will


refer


to it as


knockdown


section.


This









problems.


second subsection avoids


confusions


and


pitfalls


that Strawson


fell


into


and


establishes


conclusively


that


self


must have


a physical


element


in its


composi-


tion


insure


individuality.


This


forceful


and


conclusive


argument will be


referred


in what


follows


the knockdown


argument.


Both Strawson's


position as well


the knockdown


argument,


argue


that


self must be,


least


part,


physical.


These


positions differ


that Strawson's


position


requires


same


physical body


insure


identity,


whereas


knockdown argument concludes


that


same


physical body


is a problematic criterion.


The


knockdown


argument


unlike


Strawson,


concludes


that when


we say


that


self


must be


physical,

rather an


physical need not mean


Lything physical.


some


a matter


physical body


fact,


but


anything


physical


would


count,


including


a brain,


an aura,


forcefield,


etc.


In brief,


we will


see


Strawson


section,


Strawson


against a

or object


argues


a physical


nonphysical


to have an


account.


account


For


identity,


persons


Strawson,


then


that


arguing


person


object must be


able


to be picked


singled


out.


Moreover,


Strawson,









their


bodies,


consequently


a person


ontologically


depen-


dent


on his


body.


will


argue


against


this


position


grounds


that


even


though


does


mean


we may


that


know


that


one


one


thing


thing


way


cannot


another,


exist


that


without


other.


We will


use


the


example


picking


out,


identify


individual


clothes


is wearing.


we will


show,


just


because


we pick


out


an individual


way


clothes


is wearing


nevertheless,


that


will


allow


to conclude


that


that


individual


would


depend


those


clothes


his


identity.


The


knockdown


argument


takes


into


account


that


there


are


more


ways


to establish


individuality


than


merely


visual


means.


We do not


want


argue


against


visual


means


identification;


however,


we do wish


argue


against


as a


sole


criterion.


Strawson


concludes


that


identify


individuals


their


features,


making


these


features


essen-


tial.


The


knockdown


position


maintains


that


the


only


way


to distinguish


between


individual


identities


require


their


identity


concludes


to have


that


a physical

individual


component.

to maintain


The

his


argument

identity


must


retain


that


physical


something


that


sets


him


apart.


idea


the


knockdown


argument


s basically


that









world.


However,


individual


to have


such


interac-


tions,


then


we will


argue


that


these components


the


interaction


(either


one


thought


interacting with


another


interaction


with


the ourside world)


must be


locatable


time


space.


Purely mental


entities


are,


at most,


temporal;


physical


objects


alone


exist


in both


time


as well


in space.


things


do not have


time


and


space


loca-


tion,


then is


it not


the case


that


intelligent


understand-


would


disappear?


Clearly,


we will


argue


that


it would.


we will


see,


a purely


temporal


basis


identity


would


leave


us problems matching up


the


right


cause


with


right


effect.


It will be our position,


that


a criterion


such


mental


one cannot


provide


us with


a means


this


then


fails


an adequate criterion


personal


identity.


Our


position


can be


laid


out


the


following way.


People,


Things


people,


cannot


mus t


intelligently


interact.


interact without


location.


3. Location

Therefore,


requires


individuals


the physical.

must be physical.


this


point


we have been


concerned with


four


possible


combinations we discussed


earlier.


this


time









Person stages


are


physical


and


their


identity


over


time


irreducible.


examine


the


possibility


these


positions,


we will


turn


to our


chapter


on Kant.


this


sec


tion


will


show,


these


two


final


alternatives will


fail


and


that,


stated


above,


only plausible


alternative


position


number one,


1.e.,


person


stages are


physical


with


a physical


criterion


over


time.


That


unity


relation between


physical


person


stages


is a physical


one.


Even


though


the knockdown


argument has


conclusively


proven


the necessity


self


being physical


one


way


another,


nevertheless,


certain


arguments


remain


that


seem


to place


pressure on


identity.


The


accept


purpose


a nonphysical


final


criterion


chapter will


examine


these


pressure


arguments


and


show where


they


fail.


Since


this


chapter


studies what


we are calling pressure


arguments,


we will


simply


refer


this


part


project


pressure


argument


chapter.


pressure arguments


that we will


be concerned


with


break


down


into


two categories.


The


first


type


pressure


argument


that


we will


look


at is what


we will


calling


arguments


from imagination.


The other


argument


that


we will


be concerned with


is what


we will


be calling


telescope









will


see,


these


arguments


a nonphysical


self


are


persuasive but


resistable.


We begin


these


with


arguments


the arguments


is Kant'


imagination.


s first and second


source


paralogisms,


course,


Kant


is not


putting


forth


these arguments


support


own


position,


rather


arguing


against


those


who


are


using


these


arguments


from


imagination,


1.e.,


rationalist.


Again,


these


arguments


Kant


arguing


against


should


turn


out


to be


successful


then


we would be


forced


to define


self


transcendent,


or nonempirical


terms.


transcendent we mean


application


the concept


cannot be


verified


through experience.


The


problem with


describing personal


identity


in such


transcendental


terms


simply


that


it would reduce our


concept


of personal


identity


level


absurdity.


In other words,


how


could


concept


provide


of personal


a method


identity


be meaningful


of distinguishing


one


does


identity


not


from another,


or establishing


identity


at all


that matter.


order


to work more


efficiently with Kant'


first


and


second


paralogism,


we will


rephrase


them


in more modern


terminology.


course,


we will


use quotes


from Kant


show


legitimacy


our


interpretation.


sum,


our









first


paralogism Kant


is arguing


against


rationalist when he claims,


that


that which


we can


imagine


is possible


not


and


possible.


those


This


things which


belief would


we cannot


force


imagine


to conclude


are

that


the


self


nonphysical


the


following


example


will


show.


can


with no men


imagine myself

tal or physical


a different


connection


time


to my


and


present


place

t self.


Therefore,


am transcendent.


We will


argue


against


this


position


the grounds


that


there


are


different


way s


imagine


from the


first


person


point


view.


When


we look


this argument by the rationalist


little more closely we


find him saying


that even


though


can


imagine being


neither physical


nor mental,


nevertheless,


I must,


in my


imagination,


imagine


that


am existing.


other words,


cannot


imagine my


own nonexistence.


we allow


both


the original


assumption


that


that which


cannot


imagine


not


possible,


and


we combine


with


that


belief


that


cannot


imagine my


own nonexistence,


even


though


can


imagine


that


am neither


physical


or mental,


then


would


conclusion


that


concept


self


transcendent


one.


As we hinted


above,


refutation


this


position











from


need


not


part


the


world


am imagining.


To put


it another


way,


can


imagine


from


a neutral


point


view.


For


example,


when


am watching


a motion


picture


imagining


point


a world


view


from


that


a particular


am imagining


point


this


view;


world


however,


from,


not


part


world


that


am imagining.


second


paralogism


deals


with


what


we will


call-


splitting


cases.


Briefly


the


problem


this,


person


s body


and


mind


were


to divide


into


equal


halves


and


then


each


half


were


grow


into


a complete


whole,


then


which


one


these


two


new


people


would


have


original


identity?


In order


answer


this


question,


rationalist


re-


quires


imagine


view.


imagine


case


this


from


case


first


from


person


first


point


person


point


we must


view,


imagine


then,


that,


the


rationalist


after


split


argues,


as follows:


one


result-


individuals


must


have


received


the


original


identity


time


split.


that


both


body


and


mind


equally


divide


re-


build,


that


identity


is preserved,


that


those


empirical


qualities


the


self,


body


and


mind,


do not


make


, r% 4-. r-. -


A ~ 4-fl


I'- i,. -


.'


. . I


. 9


.. D











Our


response


splitting


cases


will


to substitute


term


survived


the


term


identity.


With


this


exchange


terms


we will


be able


to conclude


that


identity


survives


yet


does


not


remain


whole.


Recall,


the


position


held


rationalist,


order


to be


successful,


required


impossibility


imagining


splitting


term


from


survive,


the

then


inside

there


e


; if

will


however,

no longer


we

be


substitute

a problem,


in t

be-


cause


will


show,


we can


imagine


surviving


a split


from


inside


point


view.


The


central


problem


that


rationalist


having


both


these


paralogisms


very


similar


problems


people


run


into


when


they


try


to describe


time


travel.


mistake


both


rationalist


and


the


person


describing


time


travel


make


that


they


misdescribe


what


going


on.

















CHAPTER


DESCARTES:


THE


FAILURE


OF ARGUMENTS


FOR


PERSONS



The E


IMMATERIAL


pistemological


SUBSTANCES



Arguments


this


Descartes


chapter


we will


look


at arguments


which


support


view


that


person


stages


are


immaterial.


examine


this


position


we will


work


within


framework


thinking


person


stages


as being


unified


certain


way.


Even


though


Descartes


did


not


discuss


problem


identity


terms


nevertheless


seems


person


stages


reasonable


unity


assume


that


relation,


he would


consider


The


both


upshot


nonphysical


Descartes'


the


strong


argument


that


sense


people


the


are


term.


non-


physical.


this


chapter


we will


not


be concerned


with


question


identity,


questions


identity


over


time


will


be dealt


with


both


Locke


and


Kant


chapters.


Our


primary


concern


this


section


will


show


that


attempt


to define


person


stages


in a nonphysical


way


will











arguments


minds


Descartes


from bodies,


put

and


forth


according


assert

to my


the


independence of


reading,


Descartes


meant


ever.


the mind


Our


independent


purpose


from any


to show that


form of


arguments


matter what-


Descartes


used


fail,


however we will


not


prove


conclusion


false.


section


this work


entitled


Knockdown


Chapter we will


prove


the conclusion by


Descartes


a non-


material

section,


just


account o

we will 1

show their


persons


ook at


to be


these


failure,


false.


arguments


but


see


In

by


this


current


Descartes


there


not


a possl-


ability


of patching


them up and


subsequently


having


them go


through.


We will


begin


with


an examination


the


arguments by


Descartes


which


are


taken


from his Second Meditation


(1977).


Our


first


step will


to generalize


those arguments,


second


we will


analyze


the cause of


their


failure,


and


third


we will


show that


attempt


salvage


the argument will


fail


well.


argument,


can be worded


Descartes,


following


the mind/body


informal


dictomy


way.


can


believe


that


exist without believing


that


my body


exists.


T a rn a F n r a


T mtr


kn4tt











defend


use


the


term


"believe"


claiming


that


logically


possible


separate


two.


second


way


that


we could


overcome


a possible


objection


use


term


believe


would


replace


the


term


belief


with


expression


highest


certainty.


we were


switch


terms


then


argument


would


read


follows.


can


have


the


highest


certainty


that


exist


with-


out


having


highest


certainty


that


body


exists.


Therefore


body.


can


have


highest


certainty


that


am thinking


without


having


highest


certainty


that


body


think-


ing.


Therefore


my body.


above


choice


reworded


of epistemological


arguments


attitude


and


not


show


important


, the


this


argument.


important


feature


above


arguments


general


form


that


they


can


be reduced


therefore,


will


continue


use


the


term


believe.


This


argument


from


Descartes


can


seen


taking


following


general


form.


can


believe


that


F without


believing


that


Therefor


. A a











Consider


example


masked


man.


This


example


shows


that


can


be confronted


with


a masked


man


and


believe


that

the


the

same


masked


time,


man


can


standing


believe,


front


though


me does


mistakenly,


exist.


that


father


does


not


exist.


Nevertheless,


may


turn


out


that


masked


man


is my


long


lost


father.


In other


words,


can


confronted


with


a certain


object


and


believe


certain


things


about


however,


under


a different


description,


can


believe


different


things


about


that


object.


believe


masked


man


exists.


not


Therefore,


believe


masked


that


man


father


is not


exists.


father.


This


above


masked


man


argument


example


form


demonstrates


on an intuitive


invalidity


level.


Clearly,


one


would


have


accept


the


conceivability


that


can


mistakenly


believe


that


father


has


died,


and


same


time


believe


senses


when


they


report


presence


man


wearing


a mask;


and


nevertheless,


have


turn


out


that


father


now


standing


before


his


identity


shielded


cloth.


Clearly


argument


from


Descartes


fails.


fails


because


can


correctly


believe


that


mind


does


exist,


and


same


time


mistaken


abnmit


fIp


hP1- ri~f


+th-


my hnrir


LJI-


H ~


.











examine


this


argument


more


closely


our


attention


can


best


utilized


we consider


most


crucial


part


argument.


The


argument


that


we will


now


present


itself


a sub-argument


the


one


mentioned


above.


believe


that


exist.


case


that


believe


that


my body


exists.


Therefore


my body.


In order


examine


this


sub-argument


more


closely,


must


recognize


tacit


premise


on which


depends,


namely,


Lebinz


s Law


According


L.L.


we say


that


objects


are


identical


then


they


share


their


properties.


Our


argument


would


now


read.


L.L.


believe


that


exist.


Therefore


my body.


can


now


reduce


our


argument


the


following


formal


notation


where


= my,


= my


body,


believe


that


exists


believe


that


exists,


and


both


are


individual


variables


and


a predicate


variable.


L.L.


-Fb


- S


I -F


Y


.L.).










extension


First,


names


and


descriptions


object


(e.g.


"Fido"


of which


refers to

predicate


fido);


true


second,

(blue,


the

all


class

blue


objects


things);


third,


the


extension


sentence


(e.g.,


truth


value).


are


concerned


with


parts


expressions,


i.e.,


sub-


jects


and


predicates.


Predicates


occur


extensionally when


their


extension


helps


to determine


truth


value of


the whole


sentence.


Both names


as well


as predicates


can be extensional;


further-


more,


sentences


can be


said


to be extensional


when


taken


larger


contexts.


extensionally


then a


We will

certain


say that


a sentence occurs


substituting principle


will


work,


i.e.,


the


principle


that


allows


substitution


one


expression


another when


they


both have


same


exten-


sion.


Substitution


serves


truth


another way,


terms


conducted


value of


can


under


the whole


these conditions


sentence.


substituted


pre-


To put


each other


salva


veritate.


a name or


said


description has


to be referentially


extensional


transparent


occurrence,


or to occupy


referentially

extensional,


transparent


then


position.


said


fails


to be referentially


to be

opaque.


With


this definition


terms


in mind as


groundwork,











Even


though


argument


may


look


good


it will


only


through


both


the


and


the


are


referentially


trans-


parent;


therefore,


referential


transparency


will


our


primary


concern.


Moreover,


we will


continue


assume


that


features


whole


well.


both


the


therefore


we said


a and


part


the


above,


must


determine


features


this


occur


the


must


extension


extensional


argument


in referentially


through


trans-


parent


position;


however,


this


argument


they


not,


they


occur


referentially


opaque.


Notoriously,


descriptions


psychological


introduce


and


referentially


epistemi

opaque


names


contexts


and

When


that


names


and


descriptions


are


opaque,


we will


have


following


features


in mind.


First,


attempts


at sub-


stitution


fail.


Second,


attempts


at existential


generaliza-


tion


fail.


we have


already


stated,


the


only


way


that


argument

tially t


can


through


transparent


position


which


terms

they


occur

do not.


in a

The


referen-


terms


occur


in a referentially


transparent


position,


they


occur


in a referentially


opaque


pos


ition.


To demonstrate


invalidity


an intensional


substitution


on an


intui-


tive


level,


consider


following


analoqv.


.e.


w w











different


ways.


First,


man


coming


through


window.


Second,


husband,


person


who


lost


key


and


the


person


just


shot


not


knowing


was


my husband,


Conrad.


Clearly,


Joan


would


not


want


the


jury


at her


trial


accept


combination


It would


in Joan


L.L.


s best


the


interest


argument


accept


Descartes.


such


reasoning


such


thinking


were


stand


then


the


pro-


section


could


substitute


terms


on Joan


and


accuse


her


voluntarily


shooting


her


husband,


Conrad.


That


instead


saying


Joan


voluntarily


shot


man


coming


through


window


we performed


substitution


and


said;


Joan


voluntarily


Joan

argument


an extens


shot


Conrad


s defense


based


ional


coming


as well

the tr


way.


through


as our


eatment


sum


window.


criticism


of Descartes'


intensional


treat


contexts


terms


transparently


then


we run


into


counter


examples


kind


that


Joan


s case


demonstrated;


therefore,


in an effort


patch-up


argument


we will


now


consider


alternative


ways


construing


terms.


first


suggestion


interpreting


terms


that


counter


example


Joan


shooting


Conrad


can


avoided


would


that


terms


do have


reference


which


differs


from


their


nrdina r'v


r farcn r'ca


U I r ~ 1


I I


.-r


| I











man


referring


the


meaning


idea


idea


masked


man.


can


this


new


interpretation


terms,


i.e.,


thinking


them


as referring


ideas


instead


having


their


ordinary


-Fb/


extension,


a b)


into


our


treating


argument


and


pattern


the


same


(L.L.


way


before,


but


now


letting


the


idea


of myself


and


idea


my body.


interpret


things


this


way,


both


and


b would


a referentially


transparent


position


conclusion


that


b would


follow


logically.


treating


the


terms


this


opaque


way,


looking


meaning


ideas


involved,


we could


get


poor


Joan


hook.


However,


we are


accept


this


treatment


terms


we would


uninteresting


conclusion


that


one


idea


different


from


another.


In other


words,


argument


and


conclusion


taken


this


way


would


not


tell


anything


about


the


identity


me and


body,


would


have


me conclude


that


the


idea


of myself


does


not


equal


idea


my body.


Above


tried


repair


argument


thinking


terms


in an opaque


manner.


Clearly,


this


attempt


nalt-h m ci


thp


a r rnim~n 1-


fai se


1 Po


1 L* n nr


I-ba4


a f


^J T-


r


r i\f











that


way


then


we would


only


be able


to conclude


that


one


idea


different


from


another


that


only


idea


would


transparent.


Now


we will


ask


we can


treat


belief,


or what


we have


been


calling


opaque,


statements


such


a way


so as to make


them


transparent


still


have


them


refer


things


and


not


ideas


and


their


validating


the


argument.


idea


would


to construe


belief


sentences


in such


a way


that


both


a and


occur


transparently


and


nevertheless


still


have


their


ordinary


reference.


Before


we begin


examine


the


possibility


mentioned


above


repairing


the


argument,


the


following


points


about


belief


contexts


must


made.


Belief


sionally


statements


and


can


intentionally.


taken


The


ways.


following


exten-


president


example,


which


like


earlier


masked


man


example,


will


illustrate


ambiguity


the


ways


it could


taken.


Supp


ose


John


met


someone


name


Ron


and,


after


talking


this


new


acquaintance,


John


formed


opinion


that


a nice


person.


However,


John


did


not


know


that


this


man


Ronald


Reagan,


President


United


States.


someone


were


to claim


that


John


believes


that


the


Prmc -i aonA-


I"'~~~~~~~? ,, AI a -J -r


F'rI4 aY11 T7


4h anr


I th-


rtn rl hr


1:










President


friendly


then


we would


say


that


that


state-


ment


true


because


an extensional


reading permits


substitu-


tion.


Therefore,


we will


take


things


an extensional


way.


In order


to compensate


for


fact


that belief


state-


ments


can be


taken


two ways,


we need


a way


signal


our


reader


that


intend


use


the extensional


sense.


Based


on our

know,


above

through


president example,

simple English, t


one way


:hat we


to let


intend


the

use


reader

the


extensional


context would be


replace


"believes


that"


with


believes


" Therefore,


we would make


statements


following


nature.


John believes


the


President


the


United


States


that


friendly.


and


John believes of


Ronald Reagan


that


unfriendly.


Concerning


the President


the


United States,


John


believes


of him that


friendly.


Concerning


Ronald Reagan,


John believes


of him


that


unfriendly.


using


this


"believes


context we


force


both


name,


Ronald


Reagan,


as well


the description,


President


v


---- w











argument


is to be


taken


in an extensional


way,


then


we must


sure


fits


our


argument


form.


L.L.


believe


myself


that


exist.


not


the


case


that


believe


my body


that


exists.


Therefore,


my body.


we put


argument


this


way


then


both


and


body


occur


a referentially


transparent


position.


And,


not


only


will


objection


that


terms


are


not


transparent


overcome


but,


addition,


substitution


will


now


possible.


we reinterpret


argument


this


way,


will


through?


That


will


this


approach


be sufficient


validate


our


argument?


Will


our


argument


sound?


Will


be circular?


Even


though


our


argument


is now


transparent,


neverthe-


less


problems


still


remain.


The


argument


seems


circular


because,


have


to establish


established


second


conclusion.


premise,


To explain


we must


the


already


circularity,


consider


following


argument.


John


'believes


the


President


United


States


that


friendly.


.Tnhn


rn0a C


nnfl.-


h-" 1 ; atT


-F~ ~~r Dnrn A r 1~ I- a


F Dnn 31


C ~r ~ C


I


k











We grant John


his


first


premise,


i.e.,


that


President


United States


friendly.


Once we


grant


John


this


premise


and


then we go


ask how the


second


premise


established.


To establish


that


Ronald


Reagan


unfriendly,


he must


first


establish a


description


Ronald


Reagan


which


different


from


the description he


the President


United States.


John must


establish


fact


that


President


United States


different


from Ronald


Reagan


before he can


establish


fact


that


Ronald Reagan


unfriendly,


then he


already


knew the conclusion


before he


knew


premises,


In brief,


which


John


case


wishes


argument


that


circular.


first,


Presi-


dent


United States


friendly


and


second


that


Ronald


Reagan


unfriendly,


then before he establishes


fact


that

the


Ronald Reagan


fact


unfriendly


that Ronald Reagan


he must


not


first


establish


the President


United States,


sum


John


which


argument


to know


just


seems


the answer


what


circular


in order


he wants


that


understand


to conclude.


it requires


the question.


Even


nevertheless,


we were t

problems


o disregard


will


this


particular


still remain.


objection,


problem


which


still


remains


is grounded


the


fact


that


our


argument


to be meaningful


our


nr.di cnrat.ns wnn la


hav0P


'I


.











friendly


under


the


description


the


man


who


intends


help


needy,


and


President


unfriendly


under


description


Before


we point


man

out


who

the


intends

problem


to cut

with t


aid


his


the


argument,


humanities.

recall


following:


not


case


that


believe


body


that


exists.


believed


me to exist


(notice


this


ana-


logous


saying:


small).


The


believed


some


problem


this,


to exist


fully


this


to exist.


means


But


specify


that


notice,


saying


believed


there


X is


under


incom-


patibility


between


the


two


following


statements:


is believed


under


some


description


to exist.


and


is believed


under


some


description


not


exist.


There


is no more


contradiction


between


the


two


state-


ments


above


than


there


between


the


following


state-


ments


small.


and


not


mal.1


description


-.1











Jumbo


(the baby


elephant)


to other


elephants


a proper


de-


scription


Jumbo would be


small.


L.L.


Jumbo


small.


small.


Jumbo


not


small.


not


small.


Clearly we cannot


that Jumbo described


under


one


description


not


same


as Jumbo


under


a different


description,


anymore


than


saying


that


the President de-


scribed


under


one description


not


same


the


Presi-


dent


under


a different description.


however,


argu-


ment


were


to go


through,


then


we would be


forced


into


such


a position.


are


to dismiss


this


conclusion


grounds


that


terms


small


and not


small


need not be


contradictory.


The


problem


that


argument has


lack


detail,


other words


descriptions


are


incomplete.


we are


that Jumbo


small


then


we need


supply


additional


detail


that he


small


compared


to other


elephants.


Just as,


if we wish


to describe


the President


friendly we need


supply


additional


detail


that


friendly wh en


intends


to hsl n


Y


b f


b f


nP PTltl


.


_


I I C


I










this


section


our


Descartes


chapter we


showed his


epistemological


arguments


a nonphysical


account


self


to be


problematic.


the


remaining


section


this


Descartes


chapter we will


the Cartesian


soul


examine


basis of


ontological


the


arguments


self.


The Ontological Arguments


Arguments


from Essences


this


section,


the


previous


one,


we will


take


close


claim


look


that


at arguments


persons


presented by


are Cartesian


Descartes


souls.


for the


previous


section


we examined his epistemological


arguments


nonphysical


logical


ments


self


arguments


or what


this


the


we will


time we will


same.


also be calling


examine


ontological


arguments


onto-


argu-


from


essences,


conclusion


through,


that mind


then we will be


essentially


forced


a nonmaterial


accept


entity.


The


the


first half


epistemological


account


personal


this


Cartesian


arguments

identity.


chapter


Descartes for

that time we


examined

a nonphysical

examined his


arguments


and


found


their weaknesses,


then


tried


rework


those


problems


that


those


arguments


would


then


turn


to be


valid.


we saw,


we were


unable


satis-











which


looked


the


epistemological


arguments.


this


section,


previous


one,


we will


first


look


argument


from


essence


presented


Descartes.


We will


then


attempt


to reconstruct


the


argument


such


a way


avoid


any


problem


that


we may


find


And


the


first


section,


we will


find


that


our


reconstruction


will


fail.


Our


purpose


this


section,


previous


one,


is not


prove


that


self


must


be physical


but


show


that


the


arguments


Descartes


uses


argue


a nonphysical


account


personal


identity


are


nonacceptable.


Recall,


will


prove


that


self


must


be physical


knockdown


argument.


The

logical


argument

argument,


from

seems


essence,


use


like

Lebinz


that


Law


the epistemo-

(L.L.): if tw


objects


are


identical


then


they


share


their


proper-


ties.


Moreover,


ontological


argument


also


shares


same


argument


form


previous


epistemological


argument


which


was:


= y Ox


L.L.


-Fb


Th rTfnrT -


'n Ir I -










Thought


an essential


feature of


myself.


Thought


is not


an essential


feature of


my body.


Therefore,


my body.


and


Being


extended


is not


an essential


feature


myself.


Being


extended


an essential


feature of my


body.


Therefore,


my body.


We will


test


these


two


arguments


both


clarifying


notion


essence


and,


light of


this


clarifica-


tion,


will


critically


also want


analyze


to clarify


the


the


two


premises.


notion


In addition,


essences


along with


introducing


both De


as well


as De Dicto


necessity.


will


begin


our


ground work with


a description


of what


mean by


both


a De Re and


a De


Dicto


reading


necessity.


starting place


our


discussion,


consider


following


statement:


Necessarily


the


president


the


president.


How


are we


to interpret


the necessity


interpreted


necessity


De Dicto


sense,


then


would


take


saying that necessarily whoever


president


president,


logical


terminology


that


necessarily


all


x if


president


then


x is president.











necessity


operator


in S1


we would be


forced


conclude


that


Ronald


Reagan


is necessarily


president,


i. e. ,


that


could not


have been otherwise.


Furthermore,


are


accept


the De


reading,


then


we would be


forced


conclusion


that


there


could not


be a


possible world


which


Ronald Reagan


both


existed and


was


not


also


president.


De Re necessity


similar


referential


trans-


parency


referential


previous


transparency


section.


De Re


that


necessity


either


resembles


remain


true


we must be


able


switch


terms


in our


argument and


still


have


that argument remain


valid.


Notice,


however,


that a


Re reading


necessity


operator


in Sl


is not


possible.


is not


possible because


substituted


terms


in our


statement


then


our


statement


would


longer


remain


true.


would not


remain


true


under


a De


reading


precisely


because


there are


circumstances


under which


we could


imagine


Ronald


Reagan


existing


and not


being


president.


above


reasoning


can


also


be expressed


terms


possible


worlds.


Consider


the


following


statement.


can


imagine


a world,


much


like


our


own,


in which


Ronald


Reagan


not


our


president,


yet


does


exist.


terms


of possible worlds,


De Re necessity


differs










Dicto


world


interpretation merely


which Ronald Reagan


requires


that


president


possible


then


he must be


president


that


world.


truth of


suiting


side,


sense,


De Dicto


definitions


establishing


truth


would require


truth


a De Dicto


necessity


terms


established by


used;


of De Re necessity,


to consult


reading


the world.


necessity


con-


the other


in some


To establish


of S1


would


use


following procedures.


Examine each


world.


Find


the


person


who


president


Vertify that
president.


the


individual


in question


also


Here


"President


President"


simply means


that


this


sentence


true


in all


possible


worlds.


In contrast


the


De Dicto


necessity mentioned


above,


a De


reading


necessity


would have


that


the man


who


president


actual


world is


also


president


worlds


which he


exists.


To falsify


Re necessity


the


statement


all


we would have


trace Ronald Reagan


across


possible


worlds


until


find


possible world


in which Ronald Reagan


both


exists


is not


president.










being


thinking thing,


when


placed


terms of


De Re


neces-


sity,


would


supply


us with


the


following


claim about


essence:


am necessarily


thinking


thing.


the


same


way,


expression


lack


the essential


feature of being


extended


would


translate


into:


is not


the case


that


am necessarily


extended.


With


our


these


Cartesian


distinctions


arguments which


in mind,

we will


we can now return

reiterate below.


Thought

Thought


is an

is not


essential


feature of


an essential


myself.


feature of


my body.


Therefore,


my body


and


Being


extended


is not


an essential


feature


myself.


Being


extended


an essential


feature of


my body.


Therefore,


my body.


can


now


reformulate


the


two arguments


above


following


necessity.


am necessarily


thinking thing.


My body


is necessarily


not


thinking


thing.


Therefore,


my body


and


am not necessarily


extended.











every


possible world,


exist


then


thought must


exist,


and based on


the


second


version


that


thought


can not


an essential


feature of my


body;


every possible


world,


can not be extended necessarily


and my


body must


extended necessarily.


Returning


the


analysis of


our


two Cartesian


argu-


ments,


our


starting place


interpret


the


necessity


each


premise


in both arguments


in a


De Re


way.


Under


a De


reading,


and my


both


body


arguments


occur


are


valid because


in referentially


transpar


the expressions

ent positions.


This


being


case,


we can not


criticize


these


argu-


ments


logical


the grounds

arguments of


that we


the


criticized


previous


section;


two

i.e. ,


epistemo-

the alleged


subjects


are


not


occurring


transparent


positions.


Instead,


we will


center


our


attack


these


arguments


their premises.


Furthermore,


sake of


argument,


we will


allow


both


that


extension


is necessary


my body


and


that


thought


necessary


my mind.


following


statements


will be


the


subject of


our


examina-


tion.


Thought


is not an


essential


feature


my body.


and


Extension


is not an


essential


feature of


myself.


__


.











which


will


turn


out


to be


intuitions


about


what


happens


cases


that


stretch


over possible worlds.


Consider


following


claims.


am not necessarily an extended

am necessarily not an extended


thing.

thing.


Notice


theless


that C1


to refute


is making


the weaker


a weaker

claim is


claim


than


to refute


never-


stronger


claim.


are


attacking the claim


that


thought


not


essential


feature of


body.


Descartes wants


to hold


view


that


, as a


thing which


thinks,


am necessarily


not


an extended


thing.


can


put


the


same


idea


terms


essences


saying the


following,


not being


extended


is an


essential


feature of


me.


our


purposes,


we do not need


to interpret


Descartes


this


strong


sense.


All


that


is necessary


interpret


Descartes


the weaker


sense which


am not necessar-


extended


thing.


if we were


to put


same


idea


terms


essences we might


say,


being


extended


not an


essential


feature of


mine.


turns out


Descartes would


have


suppose


that


there


some


possible


world


which


totally


disem-


bodied.


Where


disembodiment


would mean


not


inst


therP


w











a brain,


an aura,


force


field,


or even


a position


space.


To claim


that


anyway whatever,


persons can not


to make


strong


be physical


claim.


entities,


How would


test


such


a claim?


test


such a


claim we would rely


our


intuitions of


essences.


To begin


with


would


imagine


extension,


a world


i.e.,


where


both


a world


exist and


where


am not


where I


embodied.


do not have


Again,


disembodiment


here would not merely mean


lack


physi-


features


but micro


features


as well.


Initially,


trouble


does


imagining


not


a world


seem


that


where


there would be


am not


embodied


any


any


sense;


however,


we must be careful


and monitor


our


reasoning


because


too often our


imagination


uses


bad


intuitions.


instance


we attempt


where


imagine


we must


time


supervise our


travel.


intuitions


Superficially,


when


we may


think


that


is possible


travel


backwards


time


and


live


world


subsequent


time of


without having


that world


any


once we


effect


on it


returned


time


whence

enough


we came.

detail w


However,


re suddenly


if we

realize


press

e that


our


imagination


if we


truly


did


return


an earlier


time,


while


present


there,


did


have


a ff~n1-


thnh o


4-4----


.,r- -


III I i Cu 'Aul~ I5.o ir oI.


-~ -


4-hara


11 r 1 rn t r a


1r ~'


1 1 1











the


same


way,


if we


try to


imagine


a world


where


persons


fines


exist but


are not


embodied,


term disembodiment,


we will


he way

quickly


Descartes


find


that


such


intuitions


intuitions


that


are

led


just as


questionable


us to believe


that


those


an individu.


invalid

al could


travel


another place


time


and have no


effect


those


times


whatsoever.


Both


the Cartesian


concept


disembodi-


ment


well


concept of


possibility of


time


travel


break


down because of


intuitions


used


imagina-


tion


to conceive of


such.


knockdown


chapter we will


explicitly


show


how


intuitions


used


trying


imagine disembodiment


astray.


We will


briefly


sketch


the


knockdown


argument


below.


must


have certain


causal


properties.


Anything that has
extended.


causal


properties


must be


This


knockdown


argument


will


prove


the


failure of


second


version


the Cartesian


argument,


i.e. ,


showing


that


second


premise


false.


L.L.


Being


extended


not


myself.


an essential


feature


RP innr


~nf cccon-i i1 x


aF n 4-,, t a


PVtPn~ PTJ


m~ r ZI rr rl r r


''


nr^--











will


now turn


our


attention


the


proposition


that


thought


is not


an essential


feature of my


body,


which was


argued


first


version.


Recall


the


first


version.


L.L.


Thought


an essential


feature


myself.


Thought


is not an


essential


feature


of my


body.


Therefore,


my body.


Based


this


version of


argument,


we would


con-


clude


that


thought


is not


an essential


feature of


body.


Here


tendency might be


argue


from a De Dicto claim


certain De


Re claim.


necessary


The


De Dicto


that all bodies


think;


claim would be


however,


that

does


not


follow


from this


that my


body


does


not


think.


After


all,


why would we not


want


that bodies


think?


will


want


show that


there


is no reason


think


that


bodies


can not have


That


bodies


can have


essential

thought


feature of


thought.


as an essential


feature


can


brought


out


through


the


following


analogy.


Com-


puters,


one


example,


their


are entities


essential


with


features


complex


their


structures


ability


compute, i

with being


.e.,


having the ability


a computer.


to compute


From here one may


identical


go on


argue


4-1-,....t-rvnrfn r tarr'n Ir C rrn FC Ylr C -i 4 i


ChC


I r_ _


rrhmn 1


~C rrlnCltYh


n n~h ~n~


r-


t-


It











argument


against


saying


that


if my


body


can no


longer


think


then


is no


longer my


body?


Here


the


objection


might be


that


property


of being


able


to compute


identical


some


this objection


feature of


would


that


computer.


The


capacities


response


think


were


physical


features,


then bodies


could have


them and have


then


essentially.


Therefore,


we could


that my


body


has


the essential


feature of


thought


objection


this


thinking were


position by


a physical


feature.


someone might be


that


thinking


is not


a physical


feature.


Furthermore,


one


reason


why my


body


does


not


think is


because


that


not


sort


thing


that my


body


does.


these kinds of


arguments


were


raised,


then


fol-


lowing


counter


argument


would be


presented.


If by


physical


feature


one means


either


feature which


is mentioned


physical


sciences


reducible


to physical


science,


then


certain


not


clear why physical


irreducible


features.


objects


Consider


should not have


following


analogy with


color.


Suppose


that


feature of


being


red


turned out


to be


irreducible


features mentioned


physical


science;


this


would


not.


however.


Prevent


from savina


that


red


-l-


.7 n










mental


features


and


some of


these mental


features


may


essential


seems


remain


that


the


Descartes'


same.


premises


Based


about my


this


body


reason-


not


having


thought as


an essential


feature are


very


doubtful.


We have


attacked both


Cartesian arguments


attacking


their


premises


and


we have


subsequently


shown


failure


both


arguments.


sum


terms of


person


stages


and


unity


relation,


have


shown


that


Cartesian


like arguments


nonphysical


person


stages


fail.


knockdown section


will


present


positive


arguments


which will


prove


that


these


that

the


person


proof,


problem of


stages


we will


identity


must be


physical.


two things.

over time;


Before


First,

second,


turn


we will

we will


look

say


little


bit


about


person


stages


unity


relation.

















CHAPTER


LOCKE:


THE PROBLEMS OF


A MEMORY


CRITERION


Historically,


Locke


was


concerned


with


questions


personal


identity


over


time


and Descartes


was


interested


problems


with


the contrast between


persons


and


physical


objects.


The


relation between


the Cartesian


and Lockean


like questions


concern


not as


is with Locke'


clear


as one might


s type of


problem.


think but


For


here,


Locke,


personal


identity must be based on


one of


three


follow-


possibilities:


same


body,


same


spiritual


sub-


stance,


memory.


Locke


ruled


out


possibility


same


spiritual


substance being


a basis


of personal


identity,


and


our purposes


so will


we.


Therefore,


this


paper,


we will


concerned with


the competition between a memory


criterion


the one


hand,


and a


bodily


criterion


other.


Historically,


Locke'


discussion


was


picked


up by


Butler


and Reid,


and


in more


recent


times,


using


analytical


tools,


same discussion has


been


carried


on by


Perry,











matter


of degree.


3 Both


Grice


and


Quinton


carried


Locke's discussion


further


development


the memory


criterion,


Grice's


discussion being


the more


sophisticated


two.


6 Williams,


the other


hand


supports


a bodily


criterion.


have


used Perry's


discussions8


a starting


place


same


for my


way


own and I


he did his;


have


up my


however,


have


discussion


tried


in much


spell


conditions


adequacy more


carefully


than he


did.


especially


indebted


to Perry


terms


unity-relation


and


person-stages.


will


conclude


attempting


show


both


that


physicalistic


that


account


of personal


a physicalistic account


inconsistent


with a memory


identity


of personal


account.


correct


identity

arrive


need not


this


conclusion


combining


insights


of Grice,


Williams,


and


especially P

We will


erry whose conclusion


begin with


is closest


few preliminary


to my


remarks


own.

about


philosophical


a memory

formal D


account


problems.


analysis.


Next,


personal


Finally,


we will


identity


we will


attempt


can


want


show


surmount


to conclude


that


certain

that any


nonphysicalistic memory


account


personal


identity


will


run


into


problems


of circularity


but


that


those


problems


can


be overcome


.-, V


usmina


a ohvsicalistic


account.











reaching


back.


He writes:


. and


this


con-


sciousness


can be


extended backwards


any past action


thought,


reaches


identity


that


person;


same


self


now


it was


then;


and


by the


same


self


with


this


present one


that now


reflects


that


that


action


was


done.


Thus


Locke memory


basis


personal


what Locke


identity.


But what does


interested


is what


this


amount


we might


Roughly


call


prob-


lem


personal


identity


over


time.


The


idea


that


some-


how we


time,


understand


and


what


what we want


to be


to spell


a person at


out


a particular


what


person


over


time.


So a modern


way to


Locke'


ques-


tion


and


analyze


the


following:


person at


time


same


what


are


person


and


as person B at


referring


time


to here?


But


There


now


are


possibilities.


persons.


Second,


First,

A and B


A and B

could be


could be


referring


persisting


person


slices


stages.


In what


follows we will


to set


the question


terms


of person-stages


that


we will


really


asking


what


A and B


to be


stages


the


same


person.


will


see


that,


setting up


the question in


way we


are


analvzinat


relation


identity


directly v


rathPr what


1- L


s o


.J _











Philosophical


Analysis,


the


Unity-Relation,


and


Conditions


of Adequacy


When


we puzzle


over


question


of personal


identity,


we are


trying


to discover


those


basic


concepts


of what


person


that


we have


been


using


all


our


lives,


trying


to put

had.


into

Daily


words

life


those i

requires


ntuitions

various


we have

identity


in a sense

judgments


always

which


we consider


to be


nonproblematic,


other


words,


our


intuitions


always


have


an immediate


answer.


studying


problem


of personal


identity


a philosophical


manner,


are a

these


attempting


judgments,


come


and


with


those


to determine


how


implicit

each pr


principles


inciple


links


with


others


and


what


makes


them


important.


goal


will


to clarify


those


principles


we use


in our


nonphilosophical


moments,


and


then


using


that


knowledge


deal


with


both


the


more


baffling


cases


and


test


our


current


beliefs


to determine


they


are


useful


they


stand


they


need


to be changed


or modified.


what


kind


are


our


principles


What


are


we asking


when


about


personal


identity?


What


are


our


principles


that


natural


whole


determine


idea


and


what


would


then,


to be


think


a method


a persisting


a persisting


analysis,


person?


person


to breakdown











that


connects


parts.


spell


out


this


strategy


little


better


consider


the


following


analogy.


Suppose


we have a


young


child


that we want


teach


how


to write.


a starting point we want


to explain


difference


between a


random group of


letters


on a page


and


group of


letters


that are


forming


a word.


We begin by


writing various


words


down


him and


explaining what


they


are.


Soon


the child


feels confident and can


recognize his


name,


mother


s name,


and so on.


this


point,


would


want


that he


understands


concept of


a written


word?


Perhaps


not.


Imagine


that after


a bit


conversation


we discover


that he


thinks


that


letters


page


can make


up one big word


or any


group of


letters


must make


a word.


Here,


standing


we would not want


concept


a written


that he has


an under-


word.


What


block?


that


could


the child


that he


not


is making


getting?


the wrong


Where


kinds


identity


judgments.


The child


gives wrong


answers


question


"are


these


letters


part


same word?"


when


letters


are


scattered over


entire


sheet


paper.


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In other words,


the child


understand


concept


a written


word,


in a


sense,


he will


have


learn


answer


following


question:


Under what


conditions


are written


individual


letters,


letters


in one


single word?


Naturally we will


not


expect


child


answer


this


question


when


put


these


terms;


however,


we will


expect


child


to be able


to make


correct


judgments,


given


proper


conditions,


about whether written


letters


are


related,


this


sense


that


he will


have


to know


the conditions


under which


individual


letters


belong


to one


word.


This


not


unreasonable question.


However,


start


answer


it we would need


follow


something


like


scientific method,


first


trying


simple answer


(perhaps


letters


occur


the


same


line of


same


page)


and


deciding


consequences


for various


actual


imagined


word


events.


our


suggestion


does


not


work


sug-


gested


answer


does


not) ,


we will


change or


drop


continue on.


We will


want


to continue


until


our proposed


hypothesis


can handle


those


cases


with


which


we have


clear


intuition.


With


such


a hypothesis


we may want


attempt


answer


those questions


which


our


intuitions


are


w


v










Our


tions:


that


can


question


whatever


asking


theory we


obtain between


propose


individual


for the


has


letters.


relational


specify a

Notice


condi-


relation

that


here


we are not


dealing with


the relation


identity.


What


are


trying


to analyze


is what


we might


call


unity-


relation,


that


say,


the relation


that must


obtain


between


letters


they


are


to be


letters


the


same


word.


The


unity-relation between


letters of


same


word


is not


to be mistaken


the


identity-relation


between


words,


nevertheless


the


two are


very


closely


related.


The


close


connection between


the


two


relations


exhibited by


following plausible


equivalence


which


and


are


representing


individual


letters):


xRwy
w


(i.e.,


is part


the


same


word


as y)


word


of which


is a part


identical


word


of which


part.


Above


we asked,


what


to be a word?


found


that


our


answer was


based


on showing


and


clarifying


the


unity-


relation between


letters and not


the


identity-relation


between


words.


We noted


that


even


though


the


unity-relation


was


not


same


identity,


nevertheless


was


closely









want


stages,


to know what is


that


unity-relation between


the relation


person-


which must hold between


stages


they


are


to be


stages


same


person.


Again,


as with


letters,


the


unity-relation between


person


stages


not


identity-relation between


persons,


yet


it is


very


close


The close connection


is exhibited by


an equiv-


alence


analogous


the one


above


(except


that


this


time


and


are


representing


individual


person-stages).


(i.e.,


x is a stage of


same


person


as y)


= the


person

a stage


of which


identical


person


which


stage.


When


use


the expression


person-stage we do


informal


sense,


and


we mean something momentary.


For


example,


when


one


says of


another


that A


is writing


and


later


says


that B


reading then


we say


this


individ-


that


he has


singled


out


person-stages.


individ-


recognizes,


after observation,


that


the


same


person


that


now


reading that was


writing


before


then


would be


inclined


think


that he


is aware


the


unity-


relation between


two person-stages


otherwise we


would


not


think


he knew what


to be


a persisting person.









Even


though


unity-relation


R is


not


identity-


relation,


therefore


as we have


seems


seen


intuitively


closely


plausible


related


that


to it;


R should


and


have


formal


properties


identity.


That


should


borrow


from


identity


the


formal


properties


of reflexivity,


symmetry,


and


transitivity.


In other


words,


person-


stage


mus t


R related


itself


(reflexivity);


person-stage


related


x is R related


(symmetry);


to person-stage


person-stage


then


R related


to person-stage


and


R related


to person-stage


z then


R related


to z transitivityy).


We have


conditions


adequacy,


one


formal,


one


not.


First


, we would


expect


the


analy


Si-S


preserve


cer-


tain


formal


properties.


In other


words,


relation


that


appears


analysis


will


have


to have


the


three


formal


properties


mentioned


above.


Second,


the


analysis


must


fulfill


certain


non-formal


conditions


adequacy


non


circularity


and


non-counter


intuitiveness.


Noncircularity--If


we are


to define


the


expression


terms


a memory


criterion,


we must


demand


that


that


description


one


that


is noncircular.


To put


different


terms,


we can


not


allow


a situation


which


our


definition


presupposes


understanding


of what


we are










properties


example,


those


but


would be clearly


the relation


formal


"the


requirements


counter


same height


that we demand,


intuitive.


would


however


For


satisfy


it would


clearly


be absurd


that


person


stages


that


happen


"the


same


height as"


each


other


are


stages


the


same


person.


Initial Analysis


and Problems with


Formal Requirements


With


these


conditions


adequacy that any proposed


criterion must


fulfill


we will


now seek a


description


R relation.


between


The


temporally


first


suggestion


distinct


to define


person-stages


R relation


will


simply


require


a memory


different


link


or connection


person-stages.


Puttin


to obtain between

g it another way,


later person


stage can


remember


some


experience of


earlier


person-stage


then


this


suggestion


we will


that


person-stages


are


R related.


We will


describe


our


initial


memory


criterion


( MC)


the


following way:


Person-stages


x and


are


R-related


and only


person-


stage


x remembers


some experience of


person-stage


from the


inside


point


view.


simply


put:


x remembers


from


the


inside


(xMy).


TAm71 t


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VUKI~~th 'I~l II!af.. -


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counter


examples.


One


counter


example


might


follow-


J.ng:


can


easily


remember


friend


Pete


being


angry


yesterday,


was


made


aware


his


anger


the


time


observing


outward


behavior:


yelling


and


screemlng.


this


case


we would


not


want


that


am the


same


person


as Pete


just


fact


that


remember


his


experiences,


that


would


memory


from


the


outside,


which


is not


what


we want.


Therefore


we will


want


to restrict


our


account


imposing


qualifier


"from


inside"


In


this


way


will


be enough


that


remember


Pete


being


quick


tempered,


must


remember


being


quick


tempered


from


inside


point


view


to be Pete.


To clarify


what


we mean


memory


from


inside


will


make


following


point.


Notice


the


difference


tween


following


remember


being


claims.


in agony I


remember


x b


eing


in agony.


memory


claim


from


the


inside


point


view


would


not


normally


expressed


example


(Charles)


remember


Charles


being


worried


about


but


rather


"I remember


being


worried


about


A number


standard


section


the


memory


criterion


really


have


to do with


analysis


failing


to meet


the










same

later


person,

time.


later


however,


For


stage.


example


this


x exists


at an earlier


an earlier


case our


criterion


time


stage of


would


and


at a


John


force


that


x and


y are not stages


the


same


person.


There-


fore,


memory


does


not


give


us necessity,


for we may


know


that


and


are


stages


the


same


person,


but because


time,


our


criterion would


give


us a wrong


answer.


The


other


formal


problem deals with


transitivity


and


demonstrated


Reid's


officer paradox.


Suppose


a boy


James


was


flogged


stealing


apples;


this


he remembers


later while


performing


a brave


deed as


an officer;


this


brave


deed he


remembers even


later,


as a general.


But


then he has


case


forgotten


the


we would want


general


flogging.


that


the


Certainly,


the brave


brave officer,


officer


yet


one


such


the boy,


suggested


that


general


not


the boy we would


want


of him


that


this


counter-intuitive.


These objections


are problems


with


formal


require-


ments.


The


first


with


symmetry,


the


second with


transi-


tivity.


defining


Formal


a more


problems,


complicated


however,


relation


can be compensated


suggested by Grice


which


will


now turn


our


attention


Following Grice


and


others,


we can handle


formal










Step


xM1y


(def)


xMy


v yMx


Secondly,


we define


terms


ancestral


(which


we symbolize


Step


revised


as M1.


xIMy


(def)


analysis


now


x M1y.

becomes


xRy


-- xIMy.


An explana-


tion


notion


ancestral


a relation


follows.


Take


objects


a and


and


a relation


there


sequence


of objects,


has


and


x2 ...x


so on,


such


until


that


finally


a has


has


R to


to b,


then


are


can


long


related


short


the


as we need


ancestral


to be.


The


For


string


example,


while


my great


grand


parent


does


not


have


relation,


"parent


" to


does


have


the


ancestral


parent


relation,


virtue


sequence,


great


grandfather,


my grandmother,


mother,


me.


The


ancestral


parent


relation


same


relation


we call


"being


ancestor


new


more


complicated


memory


relation,


namely


the


indirect


memory


relation,


seems


to handle


formal


prob-


lems.


was


not


symmetrical


but


and


hence


IM is.


M and


are


not


transitive


but


Two


problems


remain.


The


first


problem


comes


situation


where


we have


isolated


experience,


dreams


iS.










assume


that


content


the


dream


does


not


connect


with


dreaming


individual


s conscious


life.


Further,


except


when


individual


awakes,


assume


that


does


not


remember


dream


nor


that


had


one.


The


problem


this,


our


analysis


would


force


say


that


person


who


conscious


the


body


day


different


from


person


at night.


Clearly


such


suggestion


is counter


intuitive,


violates


our


conditions


adequacy.


The


second


problem


is concerned


with


splitting


cases


and


spelled


out


the


following


example.


Imagine


that


science


has


just


perfected


an operation


which


a surgeon


can


divide


an individual


into


equal


parts,


and


then


each


those


halves


fill


out


to be a whole.


our


analysis


would


conclude


that


both


halves


are


united


unity-


relation


therefore


that


each


half


identical


original.

therefore


Clearly,


our


distinct


analyst is


this


ca


things

se, as


can

the


not

one


identical


above,


would,


accepted,


lead


violate


our


conditions


adequacy


it would


counter


intuitive).


Even


though


problems


remain,


this


account


takes


quite


along


way


terms


a memory


account.


The


main


problem


though


the


problem


of circularity.


.e.










to be circular


because


we are


to understand


what


means


latter


person-stage


to correctly


remember


being


earlier


person-stage


then


we must


already


understand


what


means


an individual


to be


the


same


person


over


time,


which


just


what


we are


trying


to define.


Hence,


understanding


standing


this


of what


definition


we are


presupposes


attempting


an under-


to define


first


place


Recall,


we are


wanting


analyze


our


primitive


idea


memory


(xMy).


Furthermore,


direct


memory,


is circular


then


will


more


complicated


relation


indirect


memory.


However,


we are


able


rescue


M from


a charge


circularity


we will


rescue ing


IM at


the


same


time.


What


can


be done


to eliminate


possibilility


circular-


ity?


first


suggestion


to eliminate


possibility


circularity


our


M relation


will


revise


terms


seeming-memory


(SM).


important


to note


that


when


use


expression


"s eeming-memory"


we do


in a neutral


sense.


In other


words,


when


we say


that


x is having


"seeming-memory"


we do


not


mean


to imply,


any


way,


that


he d


oes


not


really


remember


experiences


that










complicated


relation


indirect


seeming-memory


which


will


be defined


in an analogous


way


the


way


we defined


The


revised


analysis


then


becomes:


xSM1y


converse


Now


(where


and


problem


SM1

SM1
not


union


ancestral


circularity,


SM and


of SM1).


a differ-


ent


sort.


main


objection


the


analysis


terms


seeming


memory


that


is counter


intuitive.


To begin


with,


seeming


memory


forces


the


unity


relation,


to hold


between


an earlier


and


later


person-stages


when


they


are


clearly


pointed


not

out,


stages


looks


the

like


same

two


person.

clearly


And, as Williams

distinct person-


stages,


existing


one


time,


could


be stages


same


person.


The


problem


with


seeming


memory


is not


merely


that


can


be mistaken,


but


rather


that


someone


might


have


a seem-


memory


which


accidently


fits


the


earlier


experiences


someone


clearly


distinct


from


him.


For


example,


suppose


John


Wayne


had


experience


(from


the


inside


point


view~


of making


the


movie


"The


Sands


Jima"


coincidence,


have


a dream


which


mirrors


content


Wayne's


experiences,


a genuine


memory.


and


furthermore,


In brief,


believe


problem


the

this,


dream


seeming










but


corresponds


someone


else


s memory,


we would


still


have


more


serious


type


of objection


raised


Williams.


The


Williams


objection


can


put


the


following


way.


not


logically


impossible


that


clearly


distinct


particular


individuals


later


time


should


have


the


same


seeming


it would


memories


be clearly


some


counter


earlier


individual.


intuitive


to suggest


Nevertheless,


that


separate


distinct


individuals


could


share


the


same


identity.


Due


the


numerous


problems


involved


with


seeming


memory,


we will


return


the


notion


real


memory


and


attempt


to define


in a noncircular


way.


The


suggestion


analyze


real


memory


terms


seeming


memory


plus


causation.


terms


of a combination


seeming


memory


plus


causation


we might


try


to define


real


memory


terms


seeming


memory


plus


justification.


In other


words


we might


analyze


really


remembers


follows.


= x seemingly


remembers


some


experience


and


x is


justified


believing


that


this


seeming


memory


true.


Trying


analyze


real


memory


terms


seeming


memory


plus


justification


seeming


memory


fails


both


as a










are


not.


One


part of


the dream was


an experience


really


had but


repressed,


and


therefore


the experience


did


link


with


other memories.


After


awake


seem


justified


saying


that


that


part of


dream was


not


real.


In brief,


this


analysis


is not necessary


there


may


be a case where


there


is memory,


and


yet because


lack


justification


false.


analysis


involved


also


the memory


not


thought


sufficient


to be


following


example


will


show.


Suppose


seem to


remember


driving


rusted blue


Buick on


a particular


sunny


day


in May.


Further


assume


that


someone


did drive a


rusted blue Buick


that


particular


day.


Also


imagine


that my


belief


that


was


driving


a rusted blue Buick


that


day


justified by


following


inductive


support.


First,


have


a rusted


blue


Buick;


second,


drive


it everyday.


However,


turns


out,


was


sick


that


particular


day


and did not


drive my


car.


example


shows,


there may


be a case where


have


seeming memory


and


am justified


in believing


that


seeming memory


is genuine


yet


it may


turn


out


to be


case


that


analysis


seeming memory


not


sufficient


is not


either.


real,


therefore,


In addition


this


this


analy-


may


be circular


because


it may


turn


out


that


notion


memory


justification may require


real


memory;


or to put









sufficient and


choosing


possibly


justification


circular,


we will


therefore,


stay with


rather


the original


than

sug-


gestion


seeming memory plus


causation


to define


real


memory.


To bring


causation


require


that


there must be


a causal


connection between


the


earlier


stage having


experience


and


the


latter


stage having


the memory.


causal


analysis of


real memory,


then,


looks


something


like


this:


= x seemingly


remembers


some


experience of


and


experience


causes


X' S


seeming memory.


Notice


that requiring


cause


to be


part


our


analysis


are


able


avoid


counter


examples


coincidental memory


like


those mentioned


above.


stands we can build


counter


examples


analysis


providing


sufficient


condition.


One


such


counter


example might be


following.


Suppose


as a


teenager my parents


told me


about


an experl-


ence


had


toddler,


then


a few years


later when


thought


remembered


experience as


the actual


toddler,


experience and not


believed


just


that


the memory


my parents


telling me about


Clearly


this


example


shows


that


analysis


is not


sufficient.










initial


experience.


Our


analysis


of real


memory


needs


to be


supplemented


with


requirement


that


the


causal


chain


must


remain


within


the


body.


The


revised


analysans


thus


becomes:


xSMy


experience


causes


x's seeming


memory


via


causal


chain


which


remains


inside


persisting


body


which


x and


share.


Will


this


new


definition


of real


memory


be adequate


First,


see


whether


is necessary.


turns


out


a chain


through


body


will


necessary


otherwise


could


not


avoid


either


case


of reduplication


that


Williams


brought


out,


or the


case


where


the


individual


thought


was


remembering


an experience


from


his


childhood


but


was


only


remembering


his


parents


telling


him


about


experience.


new


analysis


gives


us a necessary


condition,


but


following


counter


examples


show


there


remain


problems

forgetful


about

blind


sufficiency.


individual


that


First,


has


assume


to remember


we hav

some


some


infor-


mation


a meeting


next


day.


Being


aware


his


inability


to remember


inscribes


required


information


brail


like


marks


onto


the


palm


of his


hand.


next


day


meeting


quite


predictably,


cannot


remember


necessary


information


that


he needs


however,


feels










The


the


second


suggestable


type of

state p


counter


problem an


example

d will


is what we will


described


call

the


following.


The


situation


in brief


this.


An individual


vivid


experience


and


that


vivid


experience


causes


him


develop


long


term suggestable-state and


his


being


that


state causes


him to


seem to


remember


the original


experl-


ence.


spell


out


this


example


little more detail


consider


following.


Suppose John has


an experience


Joan


telling


him that


loves


him,


then


when he


thinks


of her


thinks


that


will


nice


things


him.


then


begins


confuse


memory with


imagination.


So when John


thinks


of Joan


now


may


have


seeming memories


that


said nice


things


that


really


did not


say.


a consequence of


this


suggestable


state


may


have


a seeming memory


that


said


love


you"


when


she did


such but


we may


not


want


to call


memory.


She


said


such


and he has


a suggestable


state.


other words,


where memory,


regardless


it being


correct,


not


memory


but


suggestable


state.


There


may


even


arise a


situation


when


she gives


him a


gift


even


thought he


forgets


that


gave


to him,


neverthe-


less,


because of


suggestable


state,


credits


her with










chain


was


used.


These


two


examples


show,


then,


that


causal


chain


going


through


body


is not


sufficient


condition


real


memory.


In order


come


with


an appropriate


sufficient


condition,


might


helpful


what


kind


test


one


would


generally


use


to di


stinguish


between


the


hand


case


and


real


memory


one


hand,


and


suggestable


state


situation


and


real


memory


the


other.


The


first


suggestion


test


of ordinary


cases,


which


hand


instance


was


an example,


would


to ask


greater


detail.


the


individual


could


produce


the


re-


quired


that


information

is a case


then


real


we would


more


memory.


cas


likely t

es where


o believe

a sug-


gestable


state


was


influencing


memory


we could


test


real


memory


following


ways.


First,


hand


case


we could


ask


greater


detail;


second,


we could


supply


person


with


false


prompting


and


then


check


see


if his


response


those


false


prompting


was


positive


negative.


In other


words,


we distinguish


seeing


individual


the


disposition


come


with


more


detail


(DI)


and


lacks


disposition


react


positively


false


promptings


Our


new


analy


then


becomes










Unfortunately


this


new


analysis


still


fails,


because


even


though


presence


and


lack


certainly


provide


evidence


real


memory,


they


not


provide


con-


elusive


evidence.


this


point,


looks


like


the


way


to get


around


this


problem


bringing


in a specific


inner


body


causal


mechanism,


one


that


appeals


to something


like


a physical


memory


trace.


Therefore,


we would


require


a definition


"real


memory"


that


would


not


only


involve


some


kind


bodily


continuity;


but


addition,


the


continuity


physical


memory


trace


of somekind.


Our


final


analysis


thus


becomes:


xMy


= xSMy


and


s experiences


carries


s seeming


memory


via


an inner-body


mechanism


which


involves


a physical


memory


trace.


can


give


a noncircular


account


of real


memory


terms


causation


via


physical


memory


trace,


and


hence


can


give


an account


unity


relation


terms


memory.


Locke


was


the


right


track


then


trying


give


account


personal


identity


terms


memory,


but


was


wrong


thinking


that


the


success


a memory


account


would


mean


that


personal


identity


was


something


nonphysical.










Notes


Chapter


standing, Vol.
pp. 439-470.


Butler, J.
in 1736, re
(University


of Lockes'


Essay


(New York:


The Analogy


printed


Concerning


Dover


Religion,


in Personal


of California Press;


Human


Under-


Publications,


first


Identity,


1975),


ed
PP.


1959),


published
. John Perry
99-107.


Reid,
essay


Chapter


in Reids'


Man, first
Identity,


Press;


Grice,


1975)


H.P.


in Personal


4 of


"Of Memory,


Essays on The


public


. John Perry
, pp. 107-113


Mind, Vol.
Identity, e


California Press;


1975),


" which


third


Intellectual Powers


785, reprint
(University


(October,
John Perry
P. 73-95.


ed in Personal
of California


1941) reprinted
(University of


Quinton,


(July,


1962


John Perry
PP. 53-73.


The Journal
), reprinted
(University o


of Philosophy, Vol. 50,
in Personal Identity, ed.
f California Press; 1975),


Grice,


H.P.


in Personal
California P


Mind, Vol.
Identity, e


ress;


1975) ,


(October,
John Perry
P. 73-95.


1941) ,


reprinted


(University


Williams,


sity


Press;


Problems


The


Self


(Cambridge


Univer-


1973).


Perry, J.
(September


"Can


1972).


Identity," pp.
The Problem of


Identity,


Press;


the Self


Perry,


3-33


and


Divide?"


"Personal


Circularity.


ed. John


Perry


Journal


"The Problem of


Identity,
135-159,


(University


of Philosophy


Personal


Memory,
Personal


and


of California


1975)


Scheffler,


Knoff;


The Anatomy


Inquiry,


(New York,


1963).


Perry, J.
Personal


"The


Problem of Personal


Identity,


John Perry


Identity,


(University


pp.
of


of


7-12,


v


T --










We will
section
Relation


explain what


we mean by


"person-stage"


entitled Philosophical Analysis,


and Conditions


I


Unity-


of Adequacy.


two


articles


Perry uses
Personal Id
(University


listed above


the analogy


entity"


games


in Personal


of California


Press;


in Footnote


"The Problem of


Identity,


1975) ,


ed.
pp.


John Perry
7-9.


Ibid.


am indebted


I.
the


Sheffler


to G.


See


Conditions


Fuller


Footnote


was


e formal
helpful


criteria.


clarifying


of Adequacy.


Reid,


Footnote


Both Perrys'


"The Problem of


Personal


Identity,


and


Personal


Grices


' "Personal


Identity,


Identity,


John Perry


" pp. 73-99,
(University


in
of Cali-


fornia


Press;


nevertheless,


more


simplistic


1975) ,
I have


discu
tried


ssions


were


to restate


very
their


helpful,
ideas i


terms.


Armstrong,


York:


A Materialist


Humanities


Press,


Theory


Mind


(New


1968).


Parfit has


Personal


fornia


This


a discussion


Identity,


Press;


is one


article


Personal


fornia


1975),


of splitting


John Perry
. 199-220.


interpretation


Personal


Identity,


Press;


1975),


of Butlers
Identity,


John Perry
. 99-107.


cases


(University


' objection
" reprinted


(University


in
of Cali-


found
in
Cali-


Williams,


sity


Press;


Problems of The Self


(Cambridge


Univer-


1973).


"Personal


Self,


Identity
Williams,


and Individuation,
ibid.


Problems


The
exc
* -


next


ellent
11It-


few pages


are


an attempt


discussion by Martin and


rn t 2- 1 1 2


summarize


Deutscher,


9arn r-


the


"Rember-


D. M.


t


/


__~1


1










Martin


and Deutscher


get


this


example


from J.L.


Mackie.


Martin and Deutscher


"Remembering,
191.


discuss


" Philosophical


suggestable


Review


states


(1962),


in
186-


Martin
article


and Deutscher
"Remembering,


discuss


brain


" Philosophical Review


186-191.


(1962),


th e i r


trace

















CHAP TER


THE


KNOCKDOWN


THAT


APPROACH:


PERSONS


MUST


POSITIVE


PROOF


BE PHYSICAL


Strawson:


a Physical


Unsucces
Account


sful


Argument


the


Self


Our


purpose


arguments


the


Descart


Descartes

es for a


section


Cartesian


was


soul


show

were


that

falla-


cious.


Even


though


that


section


we showed


his


arguments


to be false


a Cartesian


we did


soul


not


was


however


false.


prove


now


that


focus


his


our


conclusion


attention


proving


that


conclusion


false.


Before


our


proof,


section


that


follows,


that


self


must


physical,


we might


ask


there


already


such


a proof


existence.


Strawson


(1959)


his


book,


Indi


viduals,


attempted


argue


against


immaterial


account


self,


unfortunately


his


arguments


failed.


this


examinin


section

a his m


we will


mistakes,


show

which


the f

will


failure


put


of his


arguments


a better


p051-


tion


avoid


such


confusions


in our


own


account.


Strawson


intends to


argue


a physical


account










used


against


a Cartesian


account


persons,


and


that


precisely what


we will be concerned


with at


this


time.


Strawson


trying to


show that


concept of


Cartesian


(person


stage or


ego


slice)


is meaningless.


Before


we map out his


argument,


we will


little


about


identity


of objects.


For


our


purposes,


it will be


enough


that,


for Strawson


identify


an object


that


is necessary


Moreover,


that


is to be able


to be able


to pick


identify


single


an object is


it out.

to be


able


answer questions


about


that


object.


That


terms


communication


one


person must be


able


tell


another


just


which


object


that


he has


in mind,


i.e.,


which


one


is meant.


a merely

allow fo


That


temporal


r positive


Strawson


account


would want


identity


identification.


because


For


to argue against


would not


example,


John


wanted


tell


Charles


about


a particular piano


would not


enough


the one


that


existed on


fifth


June


1981


because


there


are many pianos


that


existed


that


time.


John


said


the only piano


in Gary'


house,


then


Charles


would know which


piano John meant.


Strawson's argument


can


put


following way.


The


slice)


concept


is one of


Cartesian

an entity


ego

that


(person


can


stage or


exist


independently










can


only


apply


the concept of


a Cartesian


ego


others


if we could


identify


other Cartesian


egos.


We can


only


identify


other Cartesian


egos


by way


bodies


they


are


attached


can


only


identified


by way


of Y,


then X


ontologically


dependent on


i.e.,


X cannot


exist


independently


Therefore,


the concept


of a Cartesian


ego


unintelligible.


regard


concept


this


a Cartesian


argument,


ego


if we


meaningful,


suppose


and


that


take all


premises


together,


except


the


first


one


we get


the conclusion


that


the ego depends


the body,


but


this


conclusion


contradicts our


first


premise.


Consequently


argument reduces


to adsurbity.


In other words,


first


premise


says


that


egos


are


independent.


accept


that


premise


as being true


and


then


combine


it with


the other


premises


where we


are


trying


show


that


the


concept


meaningful,


we contradict


ourselves


and


therefore


we con-


clude


that


the concept


is meaningless.


This


argument


attempts


to show


that a


Cartesian


meaningless,


that an


ego


cannot


exist


in a


disembodied


form.


this


argument


successful?


turns


out,


there


are


problems


with


a number


the


premises.


Even


though many










so without


using


a body.


The


problem is much


like


the one


we found


with


pianos,


how


could we


pick


out a


particular


Cartesian


ego with


only


temporal


reference,


point


there


can be


so many


at any particular


time.


Clearly,


a merely


temporal


reference


will


not be


sufficient


sake of


identification.


maybe


body


is necessary.


But


problem is,


does


follow


from


this


that


if we


concede


to Strawson


that


the


body


is neces-


sary


a means


identification


then must


we also


allow


additional


move


that


the body


is necessary


the exist-


ence of


that


individual?


In other words,


can


the move


made


from identity


dependence


to ontological


dependence?


assist


following


this


automobile analogy.


consideration


For


we will


our purposes we


consider


will


define


a motor


that which


powers


a car,


i.e. ,


auto-


mobile


that


s engine.


which holds


We will


the motor


define


and


car


is powered by


or automobile


Suppose we


wish


to discuss


various motors with


someone who


knows


very


little


about


them,


and as


a matter


convenience we


refer


those motors


by way


the cars


they


are associated


with


typically.


We may,


for


example,


wish


to describe


a particu-


engine


the car


in because


this


person


familiar with


a Pontiac


firebird but


does


not


understand


not











either


particular


one


engine


of

by


these


the


examples


automobile


we are


which


identifying


is mounted.


But


would


we want


to claim


that


that


motor


would


not


have


had


identity


were


never


placed


a car?


that


would


lose


identity


were


changed


from


one


car


another?


Clearly,


we can


pick


motors


out


cars


they


are


in but


we would


not


want


that


motors


must


identifiable


they


are


to be motors.


Clearly,


there


were


no means


distinguishing


one


engine


from


another,


we would


still


not


in a position


that


each


motor


would


not


have


an identity.


Based


same


reasoning,


even


the


human


body


were


onl


means


that


we could


distinguish


one


individual


from


another,


we would


still


not


in a position


to claim


that


an indi-


vidual


must


have


a body


remain


existence,


or even


begin


existence.


Where


does


reasoning


askew?


What


would


wrong


with


associating


ontological


dependence


with


identity


pendence?


a particular


something


necessary


identity


dependence


it not


case


that


that


feature


also


neces


sary


ontological


dependence?


The


problem


that


individuals


can


identified


nonessential


features.


Even


thnirrah


WP mf V


~9jmnj f f7


mninrc


Ir


h-bi r


nnr^c


arE


I


31l_










Regarding


this


automobile example,


we may


encounter


problems.


It may


be argued


that


even


though


typically


identify motors


the cars


they propel,


nevertheless


this


does


not


mean


there


any


dependence between


the


two.


Therefore we


will


present


the


following


example.


How


identify microphysical


particles


electron


alpha


would

would


particle


say which


identify


example)?


electron I


an electron,


To put


meant?


it another way,


The answer


example,


how


that


appealing


gross


physical


object,


a meter perhaps,


which


can


detect


The


point


typically


identify


those


things


that we


can


observe


terms


those


things


that


are


observable.


The


can


same


convey


point


can be made


another


individual


following way,


identity


how


a partic-


ular


spacial


latitude


and


location?


The


longitude of


problem


that


spot,


even


furthermore,


give


even


that


have


spot


were on


to know


the equator;


place of


nevertheless,


physical


objects


would still


order


establish


those


coordinates.


The


we may


upshot


know


above examples


the micro


the macro,


this,


nevertheless


even t

s this


hough

does


not mean


that


we can not know the micro without knowing


macro.


terms


our


electron


example,


we may


only


know










Another way


attacking this


same


premise


saying


that


those


features we


use


identify


objects


are


not


essential


features of


that


individual.


For


example,


one


wanted


single out a


particular


individual


a crowd


may


so by


saying


"Joe Boggs,


the


person wearing the dark


blue


and


light blue


shirt.


" In


this


particular


case


person


identifying


Joe Boggs


did


so by way


color


of both his


shirt and his


tie.


However,


we would not want


that


the


identifying


feature


this


particular


instance,


color


of his


clothes,


necessary


continued


existence of


that


individual.


We would


still


believe Joe Boggs


to be Joe Boggs,


and he would


still


believe


ent


himself


colored


to be


clothes.


same


Moreover,


person,


even


when he wears


if his


differ-


body were


change


appearance beyond


the


possibility


of reidentification


through


plastic


surgery,


the ageing process,


etc.,


Joe Boggs


would


still


be Joe Boggs.


In conclusion


this


argument


does


not


prove


impossi-


ability


a Cartesian ego,


does


show


that


Cartesian


out by


will


egos do


the bodies


prove


exist


they


then


they


inhabit.


impossibility


are most easily picked


following


a Cartesian


section


soul


ego.










Furthermore,


that


there could not be


such


things


Cartesian


egos or


immaterial


soul


substances.


showing


impossibility


such,


we will


have


also


shown


that


there


could not be Cartesian


substance


stages;


and,


addition,


we will have


also


shown


the


impossibility


immaterial memory


trace


inhereing


a Cartesian


substance.


turns


out


immaterial memory


traces


cannot


inhere


Cartesian


substances


simply


because


there


is no


such


thing


as a Cartesian


substance.


The


basic


argument which we will


use against


Cartesian


egos


iS a


very


simple one.


The


argument


is based


following


ideas.


First,


idea


that


persons


are


kinds


things


that


enter


into causal


interactions.


The


second


idea


based


nature of


causation,


i. e. ,


the


idea


that


causal


relations


can


only


hold between


physical


entities.


Before we


cover


the argument


in detail,


we will


first


show


how this


chapter will


relate


rest


dissertation and


especially


to both


Descartes


and


Locke


chapters.


because


This


that


chapter


section


relates


we looked at


Descartes


both his


section


epistemologi-


arguments,


as well


arguments


from essences.


Both


those


two arguments


tried


to show that


persons


are










stages.


Recall,


the


first


Cartesian


argument,


one


based


on epistemology,


second


simply


Cartesian


failed.


argument,


The


argument


as we saw,


would


from


only


essence,


succeed


persons-becoming


completely


disembodied


were


a real


possibility.


Since,


this


chapter,


we will


show


that


persons


must


embodied,


then


we will


have


shown


fail-


ure


this


second


argument


well.


Locke


section


we presented


arguments


show


that


unity


relation


which


explains


identity


over


time


mus t


physical.


criterion


We did


criterion


this

just


showing


mean


that


an adequate


an account


relation


had


to be explained


terms


of a causal


chain


which


appealed


to a physical


memory


trace.


one


were


object


this


position


the


grounds


that


the


memory


trace


could


nonphysical,


then


our


response


would


that


showing


impossibility


of Cartesian


egos


show


impossibility


a nonphysical


memory


trace.


With


above


serve


introduction,


we can


now


begin


our


analysis


the


main


argument


which


can


put


following


way.


Persons


are


necessarily


kind


things


that


can


be involved


causal


interaction.


Anything


that


can


enter


into


causal


interactions











not


physical


they


would


only


exist


time.


We will


argue


that


persons


cannot


entities


that


exist


only


time.


Before


we proceed,


will


useful


something


about


conclusion


that


persons


are


physical


things


and


that


persons


cannot


disembodied.


this


section


our


purpose


will


to show


that


persons,


to be


persons,


must


embodied.


embodyment


could


be making


stronger


or a weaker


claim.


We could


mean


gross


physical


body


the


stronger


sense,


and


weaker


sense


we would


just


mean


that


a person


must


embodied


in some


physical


stuff.


is our


claim


that


per-


sons


must


be embodied


something


physical


not


that


they


must


be enbodied


the


gross


physical


body


that


they


may


People


causally


interact.


They


can


causally


interact


in either


an external


intersense.


exter-


nal


causal


interaction


we mean


that


there


is causal


inter-


action


with


something


nonidentical


person


in question


(perceptions


would


an example).


internal


interaction


just


mean


that


there


can


be be


interaction


with


self


(memory


example).


External


interaction


means


that


there


can


causal


influence


the


world,


and


that


the


world


can


be causally


influenced.


xamrle


influenced


erceotion


.


.
.


s VL


UL


JV L


i










interaction


exists,


i.e. ,


interaction


between


both


person


and


an outside,


or external,


object.


persons


are


perceive


an act


then


they


must


abl


to enter


into


causal


interactions.


Must


who


people


believe


be able


a disembodied


perceive


self


and


also


act?


believe


These


that


thinkers


these


disembodied


persons


could


both


perceive,


as well


act


world,


perhaps


through


psychokinetic


ways


think


that


they


perceive


what


s going


on in


the


world.


Someone,


however,


might


object


that


we can


imagine


more


external


form


of disembodiment


which


person


no perceptions


the


world


(perhaps


something


like


living


in a personal


dream


world


example)


Treating


di sembodi-


ment


this


way


we need


not


suppose


those


things


which


are


external


us actually


happen,


yet,


as we shall


see


, we


still


cannot


deny


that


causal


interaction


still


must


occur.


We will


now


out


argue


that


even


we presuppose


external


involvement


neverthel


ess


still


must


accept


that

sons


causal


are


we say


interaction


the kinds


s because


of

we


still


things

feel


must


that

that


occur.S


could c

persons,


Certainly,


:ausally

such a


per-


interact,


s ourselves,


interact


with


world


because


interact


with


our


oss


body.


there


were


a case


where


a person


did


not


act











internal


causation.


A second


example of


internal


causation


would be


following.


We would


assume


that


Cartesian


egos


are


type of


entities


that


think


ration-


ally;


however,


rational


thought


would


seem


presuppose an


internal


interaction between


ideas,


i.e.,


internal


causa-


tion.


After


all,


any


thought


an earlier


time


must be


able


to causally


Therefore,


influence


very


thoughts


least,


to be


later


a person


time.


requires


internal


causation.


this


point we have


been


concerned with


our


first


premise where


idea


was


that


for persons


to be


persons,


they


must


interact either with


themselves


or with


other


things.


Now we will


go on


to consider


causation.


Namely,


things


causally


interact


then


they must be


physical


sense of


having


both


temporal


and


spacial


attributes.


This


argument


was


put


forth by


Foster


(1964).


preview


the argument,


we will


make


the


following


remarks.


Any


adequate analysis of


causation


would have


insure


that


right


cause will


go with


the


right


effect


condition


adequacy).


Any


analysis


that


satisfies


this


requirement


will have


to assign both


spacial


and


tem-


oral


locations


causal


int rr ls>1 .0f


tPn1- 1 i


Mnc4-


LV LI1C











intuitive


idea


following:


causes


analysis


into


A occurs,


B occurs,


whenever


type


things


type


things.


example,


consider


following.


A rock


being


thrown


caused


the window to


break when analyzed


becomes--


rock

that


was


thrown,


whenever


the window


a rock


broke.


thrown


with


Therefore,

a certain


we might

force,


the window


breaks.


form of


generalization


cannot


just


involve


time.


cannot


involve


just


time because


it did


then


we would


end


saying


something


like


the


following.


When-


ever--at


a certain


time--a


rock


thrown,


then a


short


time


later


a window will


break.


The


reason


why we would


not want


to make


such


a generalization


because


it will


allow


improper


pairing


between a


cause


and an effect.


we were


to work


only with


time,


then I may


throw


rock


at window


and by mere


coincidence


(chance)


window


breaks


then


analysis would have


that


rock


being


thrown at


x caused


to break.


problem is


this,


our


test


is only


temporal,


then


coincidental


cases


are not ruled out.


could


we modify


the analysis


tobe


sure


that


a -


to be


that


w w











regularity.


Then


we would


require


that


This
that


rock


window


being


thrown


caused


to break,


we mean


This


rock


was


thrown.


That


window


was


broken.


Whenever


rocks


are


thrown


with


a certain


force,


short


time


later


they


will


break.


The


breaking


(particular


window


window )


was


only


window


breaking


that


occurred


shortly


after.


This


analysis


would


allow


assign


each


cause


unique


effect.


Problems


with


this


anal


still


remain.


trouble


that


in a case


where


we have


a coincidence


we would


forced


that


actual


breaking


(particular


point


window)


was


this,


not


two


effect


windows


broke


rock


one


throwing.


coincidence,


then,


this


anal


:zls


we would


forced


accept


that


coincidental


breaking


window


effect


was


caused


same


cause


that


caused


particular


window


to break.


The


problem


that


our


analysis


lets


much


cer-


tainl


single


rock


thrown


did


not


break


both


windows.










example


above,


then


we would


have


to draw


counter


intuitive


conclusion


that


the


rock


throwing


caused


neither


window


to break.


Our


conditions


adequacy


are


violated


instances,


and


therefore


our


conditions


remain


unsatisfied.


were


require


that


just


one


window


breaks,


and


windows


happen


to break,


then


we would


violating


one


our


necessary


conditions


and


we would


counter


intuitive


conclusion


that


there


was


no causation


work


between


rock


being


thrown


and


original


window


breaking.


In brief,


onl


y way


give


satisfactory


analysis


assi


gning


not


only


temporal


attributes


individuals


but


spacial


positions


as well.


Our


law


now


becomes,


whenever


a rock


thrown


window


which


stands


in a unique


spacial


relation


rock


and


thrown


with


a certain


force


then


that


window


will


break.


This


new


approach


will


get


around


our


coincidental


problems;


however,


we got


around


that


problem


assigning


spacial


position


effect.


Clearly,


to get


around


these


problems


we must


assign


a position


in space


to both


cause


as well


the


effect.









Because,


example,


whenever


a Cartesian


ego


wills


raise


arm,


problem


may


shortly


arise


after


that


an arm


decide


will


But


raise


arm


now


but


coincidence


someone


else


s arm


goes


problem


another


way,


suppose


we have


Cartesian


different


egos.


Cartesian


time


ego


both


go up.


arm


How


and


right


arm


Cartesian


paired


with


right


body?


How


can


we be


sure


that


one


Cartesian


ego


does


not


effect


more


than


one


body?


our


intuitive


answer


would


pair


them


up by


causation


but


as we have


seen,


that


would


require


assign


spacial


location


persons


which


just


what


Descartes


wants


deny


account


persons


(Cartesian


ego


's) .

















CHAPTER V


KANT:


PROBLEMATIC PRESSURE ARGUMENTS


AGAINST


A PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION


OF PERSONS


this


Kantian chapter we will


be concerned with


question


identity


over


time,


more


specifically we


will


examine


view


that


persons


are nonreducible,


i.e.,


that


such


they


cannot be


a position


was


described


outlined


terms


our


of body


list of


or mind.


different


alternatives


as numbers


five


and


six.


using


our


terminology,


that


that


is what


we wil


unity relation

1 be calling


nondefinable,


transcendent.


When


we define a


concept


transcendent we mean


that


application


that


concept


can


not be decided


directly


indirectly


experience,


at least


in many


cases.


To


see


just


why


would be


undesirable


to define


self


transcendent manner,


consider


following.


the


concept


person


was


forced


to be defined


transcendent,


then


personal


identity would


entail


all


sorts


of obsurd


consequences.


For


example,


it would be


possible


for


nprsnn'~


i c + pnl-i 1-u


'(Irn 7 -


c ni, 4-rh


1-.rj


f 1 I


n Cn


~lnh C~hr


'LC










defining


self


transcendent


this:


we do


then


we may


be led


(for


instance)


to believe


that


the


con-


cept


self


completely


void


meaning.


Clearly,


define


the


concept


the


self


transcendent


would


distasteful.


Kant,


his


Paralogisms,


attacking


rationalist2


breaking


"principle


significance.


" In


light


this


ing,


interpretation


modern


paralogisms.


the


terminology,


Our


Dialectic,


certain


reformulations


we are


arguments


will


reformulat-


from


modern


termi-


nology


however,


as our


quotes


will


show,


our


reformulations


will


remain


faithful


to Kant's


thoughts.


This


section


the


paper


will


divided


into


two


parts.


The


first


part


will


deal


with


the


first


paralogism.


second


part


will


deal


with


second


paralogism.


case


three


each


things.


two


First,


paralogisms


shall


shall


reformulate


attempt


argument


rationalist


rationalist


we mean


someone


that


uses


prior


reasoning)


that


Kant


attacking.


Second,


shall


show


that


the


conclusion


argument


forces


accept


concept


self


as a


transcendent


notion.


Third,


shall


show


that


argument,


or at least


our


interpretation


unsound,


and


in so doing


avoid


hav-










Section


One--The


First


Paralogism


turn


first


paralogism.


We will


begin


showing,


arguing


for,


the


proposition


that


rational-


Kant


is portraying


attempting


infer


a person's


immortality


first


paralogism.


To do


this


we will


center


our


attention


on just


one


way


which


conclusion


of immortality


can


inferred


from


the


opening


arugment;


and


show


that


accept


the


argument


and


conclusion


would


force


to define


the


concept


person


transcen-


dent.


Since


concept


person


transcendent


undesirable,


we will


show


how


this


argument


rational-


can


be countered


effectively.


Interpreting


Kant


industrious


undertaking


and


commentators


themselves s


are


unclear


just


how


to do


These


commentators,


Bennett


(1974)


example,


have


differ-


ent


interpretations


sion


immortality


just


to be


how


inferred


that,


from


conclu-


opening


argument.


Again,


this


paper


will


concentrate


on one


way


which


inference


immortality


can


be made,


and


inference


we cons


ider


grows


out


some


remarks


made


Bennett.


based


This


upon,


inference


an argument


immortality


stemming


developed


from


out


imagination


and


basis


located


following


part


second


so.









There


are


two


possible


ways


in which


this


clause


could


interpr


eted.


First,


the


weaker


sense,


we could


interpret


mean


that


judge


something


to be


case


then


that


am doing


the


judging.


The


other


possible


interpretation,


the


one


that


both


making


stronger


claim


and


that


will


be of


concern


us here,


that


any


judgment


make


a judgment


about


in other


words--in


any


judgments,


I must


the


topic


those


judgments.


than,


When


whenever


extending


imagine


this


anything


idea


imagination,


mus t


be included


content


linguistic


of what


form,


imagine.


when


to put


imagine


same


x" then


thought


what


really


doing


using


short


hand


for:


imagine


that


example,


witnessing


or observing


case


that


when,


example,


claim


imagine


own


funeral


that


what


really


mean


that


imagine


that


witnessing


own


funeral


then,


according


argument


rationalist,


am involving


myself


in a contradiction.


one


hand,


imagine


that


cease


to exist


funeral);


exist


words,


other


who


rationalist


hand,


am witnessing


argues,


am imagining


the


ask


that


funeral).


someone


still


other


to imagine


own


nonexistence


to ask


something


of him


which


beyond









can


not


imagine


own


nonexistence,


then


nonexistence


not


possible.


Spelled


more


detail


then


the


argument


becomes:


Premise


can


not


possibly


imagine


something


then


that


something


not


possible.


Premise


can


not


possibly


imagine


own


nonexistence.


The


conclusion


nonexistence


is not


possible;


to put


it in


another


way,


necessarily


will


not


cease


to exist.


This


interesting


argument;


however,


to accept


that


necessity


will


not


out


of existence


would


said


transcendent


earlier,


concept.


turn


The


the


thought


following


self


line


into


reasoning


shows


how


above


argument


turns


the


concept


the


self


into


transcendent


one.


Premise


necessity,


will


not


out


show


existence


immortality


then


to hold


no empirical


or not


investigation


to hold.


can


Premise


when


discussing


myself,


the


self


which


the


topic


of dis-


cussion


was


something


empirical


then


whether


or not


this


self


immortal


would


depend


on empirical


matters.


Premise


The


rationalist's


conclusion


for


the


immortality


soul


is a necessary


one.


In conclusion,


concept


self,


not


an empirical


concept.


In what


follows


shall


argue


against


this


particular