Learning in foreign policy

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Title:
Learning in foreign policy the case of U.S. development assistance, 1982-1992
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ix, 242 leaves : ; 29 cm.
Language:
English
Creator:
Nolan, Richard A
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Subjects / Keywords:
Political Science thesis Ph. D
Dissertations, Academic -- Political Science -- UF
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Notes

Thesis:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1994.
Bibliography:
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 228-241)
Statement of Responsibility:
b Richard A. Nolan.
General Note:
Typescript.
General Note:
Vita.

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University of Florida
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All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
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THE


CASE


LEARNING IN FOREIGN POLICY:
OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE,


1982-1992


RICHARD


NOLAN


A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
















my wife,


Kim,


who


has


stood


patient


love


and


friendship.



















AKNOWLEDGEMENTS


would


like


extend


thanks


number


individual


who


have


made


dissertation


both


possible


and


bearable.


indebted


members


doctoral


committee


their


interest


and


patience


. To


Steven


Hook,


must


express


particular


gratitude


in encouraging me


with


kind


words,


providing


me with


a structured


approach


an array


ideas


, challenging


with


constructive


criticism,


and


providing me


with


a role


model


of genuine


profess


ionalism.


noteworthy


relations and U


contributions


foreign


policy


the


study


, and his


international


principled approach


classroom,


keeping


John


close


Spanier

basic


played

elements


an

of


important

global


role


politics.


Gary


Goertz


helped me


shape


my approach


inspiring me


to ask


questions


move


new


directions.


I have


also


benefited


from


the


unique


insight


provided


Goran


Hyden


through


both


course


work


thoughtful


conversation.


also


must


thank


Alan


Agresti


who


ass


sted


see


simplicity


where


saw


complexity.


-- A-t nA -e --


nl


A


-~~L... ---L


1 1 A ^ ** I 1


rr 1








particular


must


extend my


thanks


to Kenneth


Wald


for giving


opportunities


that


have


enhanced


profe


ssional


development.


am grateful


to the


faculty


who


showed


interest


progress


, particularly


Michael


Martinez


and


Michael


Scicchitano


who


never


fail


to offer


advice


and


answer


any


questions


had.


To Hazel


Pridgen,


Debbie


Wallen,


and


Marty


Swilley


must


express


appreciation


their


assistance,


counsel,


and


good


humor.


Among


those


who


assist


working


through


some


technical


methodological


issues


are


Diane


Roux


and


John


Dixon


Activiti


the


es.


Center


Jean-Louis


Instructional


Grolleau


and


OECD


Research


Computing


Publications


and


Daniel


Gallik


of the


U.S


. Arms


Control


and


Disarmament


Agency


also


were


helpful


providing


me with


information


prior


publication.


With


deepest


love


affection,


must


extend


a tender


thank-you


wife


, who


has


supported


hopes


dreams


with


unqualified


assistance


since


first


met.


Her


willingness


to believe


and


faithfulness


supporting


me over


the


long


haul


kept


me going


when


nothing


could.


Dedicating


this


dissertation


to her


an understatement


the


gratitude


owe


her


standing


by me


of these


years.


children,


Christopher


Kelly


thanks


keeping


me straight


as to what


really


important


. Finally,


-*


I *


_..~. ... .


I ~1


r


* *

















TABLE OF CONTENTS


Dape


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.......................................


TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................


LIST OF TABLES......


111

v

Vll


viii


CHAPTERS


THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM


, STATE LEARNING,


AND


FOREIGN POLICY.


The International


System and Foreign


Policy


Goals.......


The Nature of the State System..
The Nature of Nation States.....


Systemic


* .
* .


Context and State Behavior


State Goals and State Learning..........
Choice and Outcomes................
Systemic Effects and State Learning


State-Centric Considerations of


0......0.
...B.....


.........
...000..0


State


Learning.. ......................
Psychological/Cognitive Approaches to
Learning........................


Overview to


the Analysis


of U.S.


Development


U.S.


FOREIGN POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE....


System Structure,


Patterns of


Continuity,


and


U.S.
Means an


Foreign Policy...................


d Ends:


U.S.


Foreign Aid and U.S.


Foreign Policy.........................
The Cold War and the Truman Doctrine.


* .
. S .


* o
* *SS


U.S


. Foreign Assistance Policy Since


World War


II......


.0.. ...... 1


. 4


... 56


ABSTRACT...............................................


Assistance Policy.........................


I









The End of the Cold War:


New World Order.....


Political


Ramifications of U.


Foreign


76


Aid...... .


Concluding Remarks..


RESEARCH DESIGN:


STATE LEARNING AND THE


FOREIGN-


POLICY MODEL OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.....

Statement of Research Questions...................


Research Design:


Analyzing Relations Over Time


Definition of Concepts.


S.... 94


Policy


Interests in Aid Transfers..


Threats to Validity....


ANALYZING U.S.


........
00...O..
0 .0.0. 0.. 0


ODA-RECIPIENT RELATIONSHIPS........


Hypotheses . ...... ...
Statistical Analysis.......
Bivariate Correlations
Regression Analysis...
Regional Variations...


* .
* .
* *
* .


...........0


.O.O........


..0....

0.0000..


Overview


: The Changing Context of U.
Policy....................


ODA


CHANGING COURSE:


PROSPECTS


FOR A.I.D.


AND


U.S.


ASSISTANCE POLICY...


Learning


Foreign


Policy


in a


Changing


International Environment.


The A.I.D.


Mandate in a New Global


Impediments


to Restructuring


Context


Assistance


Policy..............D...................
Defining the Mission of A.I.D................


Matching Means and Ends:


Changing


Assistance Policy.....


CONCLUSION:


CONTINUITY


, CHANGE,


AND


LEARNING


IN FOREIGN POLICY...


Continuity


Change


Foreign Policy


Perspectives...


REFERENCES ..... . . . . . . . .


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH....................................















LIST OF TABLES


Table


Correlation Matrix:


U.S.


ODA and Recipient


Profile Characterst


C cs


Regression Matrix:


U.S.


ODA and Recipient


Profile


Period


Characteristics


Comparisons Correlation and Regression


Matrices.........


U.S.

U.S.


ODA to Egypt and Israel 1982-1992.......


ODA to Africa and Latin America


Period Comparisons


Matrices


U.S.


Correlation and Regression
ODA and African States


Profile Characterstics........


Period


Comparisons Correlation and Regression


Matrices U.S.


ODA and


Latin American


States Profile Characteristics..........


HBERH















Abstract of Dissertation Presented to


of the University
Requirements


r


of Florida


in Partial


the Graduate School


Fulfillment of the


for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy


LEARNING


THE CASE OF U.S.


IN FOREIGN POLICY:


DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE,


1982-1992


Richard A.

December


Chairman:


Nolan

1994


John Spanier


Major Department:


Political


This dissertation


Science


examines


relationship between the


structure


international


state


system


and


the


foreign


policy


objectives


state


governments.


Through


investigation


U.S.


development


assistance


policy,


this


study focuses on the ability of states to learn in response to


systemic changes.


Learning is conceptualized as the effective


reassessment


policy


goals


means


result


the


state's


policy


makers'


comprehension


external


change.


Policy


change


results


when


conditions


the


external


environment are


objectives and they


no longer compatible with


to reduce


the policy makers'


the distance between those


conditions


their


objectives.


Change


the


structure


the


system


signified


disruption


established


a a j^ I A -


- - a -


T -_-- -- --








appraisals of the external environment and if policies reflect

those objectives.


This study examines


U.S. development assistance policy in


order to


see


if U.S.


policy makers have changed the direction


of U.S.


foreign policy in response to ending of the Cold War.


The hypothetical


issue


is whether


light of the absence of


superpower


competition


U.S.


policy


makers


have


changed


the


rationale

transfers.


behind


Official


Development


Development


assistance


Assistance


been


(ODA)


integral


component


U.S.


foreign


policy.


The


changing


security


interests of


the U.S.


should be


reflected


in the patterns of


U.S.

study


ODA


commitments.


attempts


reveal


looking

whether


for

U.S.


policy

ODA c


changes,


commitmentss


this

are


statistically relative to humanitarian,


economic,


or security


profiles


regression


recipient


analyses


states.


confirm


Although


empirical


correlation


linkage


and


between


security


interests up to


1989


the statistical


evidence does


not support the hypothesized shift toward either humanitarian


economic


interests


after


Cold


War.


Recognizing


that


learning is a process that involves both external and internal


factors,


this study examines the current reformulation of U.S.


development


assistance


policy


suggests


that


those


processes mirror the larger dynamic of defining U.S.


interests


in the context of


an international


system in


transition.















CHAPTER 1


THE


INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM,


STATE


LEARNING,


AND FOREIGN POLICY


Politics among states are changing profoundly in the late


20th


Century


. The changes


tax the abilities of


statesmen and


analysts


to understand the conditions


they


face.


International


change,


conversely,


serves


impetus


for adaptation of state behavior.


Whether


leaders are able to


understand the changes they face is an important theoretical,


empirical,


practical


question.


Their


apprehension


changing


conditions


thus


important


given


the


political,


economic,


or social


costs


involved


when


they make


decisions


which affect their


citizens


those of


distant states


this


study


will


look


issue-area


U.S.


foreign policy--foreign


ass


istance--in order to


see


if policy


change


reflected


changing


systemic


conditions.


The


central


question


addressed


whether


U.S.


policy


makers


reassessed their


long-standing goals


in light of the profound


changes


that


occurred.


Our


concern


directly


connected


the


theoretical


issue


state


ability


learn


about


and adapt to its environment.


As politics in the international


system


passes


from


one


era


another,


issue


state


I I I


1 I I I I











successful


. Often


trial


error


leaders


determine


fitness of their goals and strategies.


Failure to learn can be


costly.


U.S.


foreign


assistance


endured


for more


than


four


decades,


every


pursuing


developing


analytical


problem


a diverse array


state


of goals concerning


international


in the study


of U.S.


almost


system.


foreign aid has been


inability


researchers


discriminate


between


the


periodic


redefinitions


U.S.


assistance


programs


and


long-term directions of


aid flows.


The objectives of American


foreign policy in the postwar era were distinct in relation to


U.S.


objectives in previous eras.


With the end of the Cold War


era


question


about


state


goals


foreign


aid


becomes


more


relevant.


Moreover,


with


transformation


the


international system,


states are presented with new challenges


that


require


actions


based


upon


new


definitions


problems


and solutions.


Foreign


policy


change


dependent


upon


conditions


both


internal


policy-making


processes


international


environment


which


responds


and


toward


which


directed.


study


examines


the


relationship


between


these


two environments


in order to determine whether


policy


reflects


close


interdependence


between


them.


State











Through


examination


foreign


policy


this


study


attempts


illustrate


how


factors


in both


the


internal


and


external


environments


can


affect


state's


abilities


recognize conditions, develop policies to respond to them,


effectively


implement


those


policies.


In this chapter we consider several


important questions.


First


we examine


state


system


some


prominent


characteristics that differentiate it from other phenomena in


societal


organization.


briefly


review


the


nature


the


state as an actor


in world politics and


consider the


linkage


of systemic context to the patterns of state behavior


. We then


assess


the connection between state


foreign policy goals and


state


learning.


define


parameters


state


behavior


that reflect learning, look

between choices and outcomes.


ng particularly at the connection

We compare some of the prominent


analytic

conceptior


approaches


goals


state 1

foreign


.earning

policy


and

deci


contrast


sion


their


making.


then conclude with some propositions about systemic influences


on state


learning.


This study

provocative. The


concerns


utility


issues


U.S.


that


are


foreign


timely


has


and

been


consistently


scrutinized


during


the


past


half-century


. With


the


transformation


international


system


some


the


b* h


-L 1










can


served


this


instrument.


common


knowledge,


states are not always quick to change course. Redirections are


not always for the better


(Hermann,


1990) .


But change is ever


present,


major


changes


the


international


environment


cannot be


ignored.


this


study


change and state


address


learning


issue


as they relate


international


to U.S.


aid policy,


acknowledging that there are normative and practical interests

involved in investigating the transfer of resources to nations


in need.


employing


statistical


methods and


explaining the


appropriate theoretical domains that relate to the analytical


question,


attempt


reinforce


applicability


scientific


investigations


foreign


policy


and


global


politics.


methodology


The


theoretical


employed


seek


scope


capture


the


the


study


dynamic


the


nature


interstate politics,


highlighting the interdependence between


theories


about


international


politics


and


theories


about


foreign policy.


The


International


System and


Foreign Policy Goals


introduction


Gulliver' s


Troubles,


the


Settinac


American


Foreign


Policy,


Hoffmann


(1968:


xvi)


succinctly recounted


the multiple


forces


that operate


S U, S. t -- aI


I


rB


I











domestic s
social inst
authority
never point


certain


society --whose


Aitutions,


ire


never


values,


experiences,


entirely


in one direction,


choice


maneuver .
international


defined
stakes,


with


leave


political
nd patterns


fixed


while


considerable


. and operates
system--that ha


arena


uncertain


(especially the major ones)


competiti


rules


and
of


coherent,
ruling out
margin for


milieu--the


repeatedly
on for mu


which


been


Itiple


players


hammer out by trial and


error, a
cleverly
rational


characterized


calculated,


are


moves


more


adaptations of means and


which,


like


wager


however
7s than


ends.


The


uncertainty


which


Hoffmann


refers


endemic


influence


the


international


system.


The


issues


state


learning


is bound by the


levels


of uncertainty that


permeate


international politics.


Politics is not a static enterprise at


level


human


interaction.


And


because


change


constant,


the desire


to achieve goals


is also conditioned by


the ability of actors to respond to change and in some fashion


overcome


Foreign


policy


goal


are


subject


internal


external


forces that Hoffmann describes.


The nature of goals


determined


nature


the


entity


expressing


and


pursuing


them.


Even


though


states


are


most


prominent


collectivities


acting


international


system,


their


objectives,


while primarily directed toward other states,


are


subj ect

system.


the


Moreover,


influences

even th


from


iough


variety


patterns


actors


interaction


the

are


__








6

international system are never free from the instability that


uncertainty


can


produce.


The


recent


dramatic


transformations


international


system


illustrate


tension


produced


change.


Certain


warnings


about


demise


the


postwar


international


order


appear


have


come


the


fore


(e.g.


Mearsheimer,


1990) .


Standard


Cold War reference points have


dissolved so that many states are adrift in their struggles to


gauge


their


vulnerabilities


strengths.


They


must


now


consider


other


issues


advocates


order


calculate


their relative positions in the system


(see for example, Nolan


and Perruci,


1993)


. The mutability of the international system


demonstrates that even though states may strive for continuity


in their external relations,


forces beyond their control often


determine


their probabilities


for success.


Moreover


, changes


in the


international


system also provoke questions about


relative


impacts


systemic


structure


and


nonstate


actors


(Wendt,


1987;


Keohane,


1984;


Waltz,


1979).


The Nature of


the State System


States


interact


with


other


states


actors


within


system that is defined by the types of actors that comprise it


and by the relationship each bears


to the others.


The nature


I










real


actions


environment.


relationships


Like


systems,


the


state


international


system


collection


elements


that


interact


according


certain


patterns of regularity


see


Maoz,


1990;


Spanier,


1987).


It is


the


observable


characteristics


states'


external


behavior


that set the system apart from the units themselves.


It is the


whole and not


the parts which


"state


system"


represents.


Much of the theoretical debate in international relations


revolves


around


limitations


systemic


theory


accounting for foreign policy behaviors across a wide spectrum


states.


systemic


1 Moreover,


analysis


structural


been


emphasis


criticized


recent


state-centric


perspective which diminishes the significance of other actors


the


system


(Keohane


Nye,


1977;


Mansbach


Vasquez,


1981).


But states still require special attention in analysis


given


that


their


characteristics,


resources,


and


level


control


over the human condition set them apart.


Waltz


(1979)


presented


the


most


elaborate


formulation


system


theory


which


encompassed


certain


elements


other


representations


but


which


deviated


from


previous


conceptual


constructs


emphasizing the structure of the system as the determinant of


state


action.


According


Waltz,


system


composed


a








8

both the interacting units and the structure within which they


interact.


Waltz


(1979:


acknowledged


that


states


are


not


the only international actors,


are defined not by


but he argued that


the actors which


"structures


flourish within them


but by the major ones.


" Structure refers to the arrangement of


the units


in the system


. States are differentiated according


their


capabilities.


"The


structure


the


system


changes


with


changes


distribution


capabilities


across


the


system's units.


And


changes


in structure change expectations


about


how


units


system will


behave


about


outcomes


their


interactions


will


produce"


(Waltz,


1979:


International


systems


are


hierarchic,


but


rather


anarchic.


States have no greater authority to constrain their


actions.


This


one


main


features


the


current


international system that separates the actions of states from


those


other


actors.


Without


overarching


authority


states are


left


to their resources


to ensure their survival.


Like


any


collectivity


, states'


chief


concern


their


self-preservation.


This attribute of the international system


means that states act in certain ways for reasons beyond their


control.


The parameters within which states act are controlled


by the structure of the international system.


As a "top-down"


approach,


international


politics


from this perspective means










which


capability


affecting


the


conduct


international


system.


life


Because


dispersed


structure


concentrated


within


arrangement,


the

the


ordering


, of


states


within


system,


follows


that


states


act differently


according to


the existing


arrangement


of capabilities within the international system.


A multipolar


structure


reflects


more


dispersed


arrangement


capabilities than does a bipolar one.


The latitude of decision


makers is constrained by the structure of the system.


They act


within


respond


particular


environmental


configuration.


While


environmental


level


systemic


theory


constraints


facing


of generalization which,


helps


statesmen,


even


though


appreciate


represents


its proponents do


not deny the significance of individual perception and choice,


cannot


answer


difficult


questions


about


decision


makers'


flexibility


choosing


implementing


foreign


policy.


Systemic

theories

foreign


theory

about

policy.


establishes

international

Moreover, s


conceptual


politics
.


systemic


and


theory


nexus between

theories about

reinforces the


critical


necessity


understanding


how


statesmen


perceive


systemic changes


how they


learn


to adapt


them.










politics,


is a struggle


for power


. Whatever the ultimate aims


of international politics,


power is always the immediate aim.


Although this contention has provided substantial


grounds for


debate


criticism,


illustrates


qualitative


difference between


international


concept


the objectives of


system and

sovereignty


states


the objectives of


as actors


in the


other actors.


development


The


modern


nation-states


provides


some


justification


Morgenthau's


blunt assertion.


As one of


principles under which states


engage


relations


with


one


another,


sovereignty


(Bodin,


1992)


refers to each nation-state's right to determine its own


obj ectives


and the means


for pursuing them.


Since each state


accorded


this


right,


absence


overarching


authority inhibits the resolution of conflicts of interests by


means


except


self-help.


Statesmen


have


traditionally


recognized


that


only


states


have


a right


use


force.


Along


with this attribute


states are different from other actors in


the


international


system


that


they


represent


fixed


territories


populations.


interest


preserving


their


territorial


integrity


their


populations'


welfare,


states'


decision


makers


engage


actions


that


are


often


competition with


other state actors.


Within


this


hypothetical


"state


war


there


are


S1 S a a










Rosenau's


(1990:


terms,


"sovereignty-bound actors


(who)


frequently


define


their


security


dilemmas


terms


their


autonomy as actors


in the state-centric world.


" Moreover,


the


linkage


between


military


power


international


influence,


while subject to criti

has been a feature of


qualifications


interstate politics


(see Baldwin,

. And finally,


1979),

while


some


states


leaders


are


satisfied


with


the


existing


international


distribution


power


, others


are


not


(see


Wolfers,


1962)


just


international


system


subject


change,


states


are


also


subject


changing


qualitative


relations.


The importance of increasing interdependence among


states across


important


issue-areas has been presented as an


indication


changing


status


states


among


international


actors.


Traditional


conceptions


of state power


have


been


questioned


propositions


critical


conventional


images


national


security


have been put


forth


responses


interdependence


problems


(see Keohane and Nye,


economic


1977;


ecological


Klare and Thomas,


1994).


Questions


have


been


raised


about


universal


applicability


state-centri


assumptions


involving


the


prerogatives of states


in the international system.


Following


in the footsteps of the North-South political debate of recent


. -- 4


1 -


*


Jk *










example,


been


asked


whether


LDCs


dependent


upon


assistance


from


developed


states


possess


indigenous


orientations or are so "penetrated" by the donor that many of


the


causal


factors


policy


determination


ultimately


originate


donor


(Moon,


1985).


There


research


that


suggests,


however


, the


presence


seemingly


incompatible


goals


among


Third


World


leaders


who


attempt


change


the


rules


the


system


simultaneously


engage


"anarchical


society"


(Bull,


1977)


with a


"vested


interest


preservation


predictable


norms


state


behavior"


(Ayoob,


1989:


. Finally,


it has been argued


(Goldgeier and


McFaul


, 1992:


479)


that


states


are


less


unitary


than


past,


"effects


international


anarchy


are


less


pronounced than in earlier periods.


" The changing condition is


not globa

to norms


however


regarding


. While

acceptab


the amount


of order and adherence


international


behavior between


core states is rising, "in many parts of the developing world,

power and wealth are still linked in ways recognizable to the


realists,


the security


dilemma


paramount.


The


conceptual


definition


the


state


subject


debate.


The


increasing


importance


trans-national


sub-national


actors


international


system


called


into


question


notion


sovereignty


and


made


I











argue


"the


relative


irrelevance


sovereignty


" States


are


constrained


these


diverse


internal


external


factors


that


differ


according


both


the


issues


involved


and


the


relative conditions of the states suggesting that some states


are


"more


'sovereign'


than


others"


(Mansbach


al.,


1976:


20-22).


states are


still


powerful


collectivities,


and


many states the actions of their policy-makers can affect the


shape


and


content


interaction


among


people


international


system.


Therefore,


imperative


that


continue


search


answers


questions


about


their


behavior.


The ability of


sovereign leaders to


learn and adapt


remains vital


their efforts


to ensure


political


stability


economic development.


Systemic Context and State


Behavior


The


seems


relationship


almost


between


tautological.


States


state


system


behave


and


certain


states


ways


because


system


driven


imperatives.


And


system


exists in its current form because of the imperatives of state


behavior and the nature of the states themselves.


But the crux


of the the seeming paradox lies not in the characteristics of


either


the


state


international


system,


but


dissociation of


either analytic level


from the other


. Neither










interaction in the world.


state entities,


In trying to analyze behavior among


the connection between one level of conceptual


generalization and another level is less a problem of valid or


invalid


representations


reality


than


one


logical


connections


based


useful


conceptions


relational


phenomena.


core


conception


realism


we have


seen,


is that


states


are


primary


actors


world


politics.


The


underlying


assertion


structural


realism


builds


this


conception and posits that given the nature of the environment


in which states


interact,


certain patterns of behavior can be


expected.

structure


The

and


link


state


structural


behavior


realism


lies


between


the


system


rationality


assumption it inherited from its classical realist antecedent


which
will


enables
respond


theorist


to predict


incentives


and


that


leaders


constraints


imposed by
analysis of
acceptance o
precondition
world. To b


their


environments


constraints,
the status


sensible


from


quo,


should


attempts


self-reflective,


human


But,
implying


seen


change
action


the
must


take


place


within which


with
it


understanding


occurs.


(Keohane,


of
1983


context


: 509-511)


The


importance


systemic


context


stems


from


probabilities that certain actions will serve the needs of the


state


while


others


may


not.


States


operate


some


bilateral


vacuum


devoid


other


influences.


Changes


the


I










environment


may


mollify


effects


states'


competitive


self-help orientation.


deny


dynamics of


the


goal


importance


setting and decis


individual

ion making,


action


however,


is to


reify the state. Structural realists correctly understand that


their


analytic


framework


intended


dismiss


importance


choice


policy


making.


The


connection


that


system-level explanations have with other levels of explaining


state


behavior


spelling


the


field


interaction


across those levels


. The characteristics of the state,


such as


sovereignty,


self-help


orientation


security-driven


caution,


are


features


entities


that


exist


within


particular


arrangement


among


them.


even


though


some


theorists


criticize


use


state


concept


subject


matter


(Alger,


1985;


Mansbach


Vasquez,


1981),


conceptual representation of levels of interaction its utility

is connected to the differentiation that must be accounted for


across specific political


domains.


Ultimately


, the specifics of


action


in pursuit


of state


goals


are


subject


calculations


states


decision


makers.


Foreign policy is purposive and can at least partially


explained


objectives


decision


makers


(Brady,


Wendt


(1992:
.* r t S


394-395)


argues


that


structure


does


not


S I-


-_ I- -










1982a).


Surveying the contextual landscape in order to narrow


the


probabilities of


state


behavior


is productive only


if we


continually


keep


mind


that


"There


can


'state


behavior'


except as the term is used to describe the combined


behavior


individual


human


beings


organized


into


state"


(Wolfers,


1962:


The significance of individual action lies


relation


to the corporate


entities


serves.


Systems


are


maintained


altered


the


actions


individuals.


Conversely,


order to comprehend


reciprocal


influences


of different


levels


interaction


more


fully,


we must


also


bear


mind


that


"there


individual


apart


from


the


network of


systems


in which


he or


is embedded"


(Rosenau,


1990:


117)


State Goals and State


Learning


Analysis


state


behavior


under


circumstance


complicated


enterprise


(see


example,


Snyder,


Bruck,


Sapin,


1962).


Variable factors related to the characteristics


the


state


variable


factors


related


environments


outside of the state must be considered and arranged according


their


logical


causal


connections.


Asking


questions


about


the


ability


such


strong


and


influential


actor


United


States


learn


adapt,


modify


views


and


- S a


~










alms


that


particular


policy


area


are.


Second,


also


necessary to determine who acts on behalf of whom.


Third,


conditions


external


environment


before


after


initiation,


modification,


or retention of policies have to be


accurately examined


in order to


see


if the actions taken have


the intended effect. Finally,


system-level influences on state


behavior,


decision


makers'


abilities


embrace


realistic goals and make productive choices,


must be accounted


for.


While the


first and third


issues above are more directly


concerned


with


nexus


goals


outcomes,


these


issues


foreign


are


related


assistance,


puzzle


with


long


state


history


learning.


and


Thus,


discernible


motives,


serves as


broader


a hospitable


theoretical


issue area


empirical


investigating


question


whether


states


learn.


Learning


involves


recognition


change


productive responses


International


relations


are


dynamic


exchanges


between


states and other actors across state boundaries.


Although all


international


exchanges


are


really


relations


between


individuals


groups


individuals,


the


bases


their


interactions


according


vary


what


according


entities


the


their


issues


actions


involved


serve.


and


Change


conditions external


to the state can cause individuals acting


t I -


_ I










the


internal


environment


followed


actions


intended


impact


external


condition


some


manner


. The


degree


impact resulting from internal modifications is dependent upon

many factors inside the internal policy process and outside of


that


process


directed


external


both


environments


environment.


order


Attention must


understand


dynamics


policy


change.


Treating


state


actor


presupposes that the actions taken on its behalf are products

of internal deliberations about the external conditions which


face


state.


policy


change


ultimately


consists


decisions


made


individuals


alter


some


way


the


relative


position


state


external


environment.


And


individuals


must


recognize


changes


the


external


environment before


they


can


productively modify the


policies


state


toward


that


environment.


When


speaking


state


learning


process,


important


consider


that


process


the


locus


deliberation

policy-making


dynamics.


larger

External


configuration


factors


foreign


influence behavior,


but the behavior of


individuals acting on behalf


of the state


are not necessarily automatic


rationally calculated responses


external


stimuli.


While


states


are


often


portrayed


unitary


actors


international


politics


(e.g.


Morgenthau,


-1 I - A -


1








19

Although it is very difficult to disentangle personal motives


from individuals


' actions,


even when the actions are taken on


behalf


some


larger


collectivity,


looking


states


unitary


actors


suggests


there


must


logical


and


empirical


means


accounting


states'


behaviors


opposed


behaviors of


individuals


or groups.


The system within which


states coexist separates,


at least conceptually


, their


levels


interaction


(and


often


stakes


involved)


from those of


nonstate


entiti


es.


3 When


analyze


the


behavior


states


we need to


identify what goals and preferences motivate them.


This may prove difficult


in that goals and preferences,


while


they


may


stable


over


time,


are


necessarily


clearly


perceivable across all issue areas.


See


e.g.,


Keohane,


1983.)


importance


of goals


preferences


among


them


lies


close


heart


issue


state


learning


international


change.


Choice and Outcomes


Whether


casual


"states


learn"


manner.


is not a


much


question


states


have


to be asked in


impressive


record of survival


in the anarchical


international system,


Shelling
Micromotives a]


(1978:


discu


Macrobehavior.


sses
He


a parellel point
maintains that n


in his
people's


behavior or choice cannot always be summed up or extrapolated











seems apparent that states'


leaders in fact do learn about the


condition

However,


affecting


survival


them


minimum


the ir

standard


international


success


system.

in world


politics.


States


have


more


goals


than


merely


surviving. 4


Moreover,


no state is successful all of the time in pursuit of


every goal.

The linkage between international change and learning is


really


only


recognizable


when


policy


change


examined.


Robert


Legvold


(1991:


714-7


put


, "Learning


only


counts


it makes a difference to policy.


Outcomes by themselves


cannot reveal


whether or not


learning


occurred.


Outcomes


must


logically


connected


to goals


which


are


dependent


factors in the two environments mentioned above. This study is

concerned with choices and the resulting outcomes. While it is


not directly concerned with the micromotives that accumulated


some


aggregation


resulted


policy


choices,


concerned


with


how


choices


reflected


policy


aims.


Choice


involves, among other things,


internal processes, however, and


after determining whether policy change reflects some positive


4 Wol
classic E
difficulty
states' fo
for a coal


argued


means o


fers (
)iscord


1962:
and


68-69)


makes


this


Collaboration.


of distinguishing
reign policies, he s1
as highly valued as


that


providing


nation
its


between


bates,


point


In
goals


his


discussing


and


means


now
the
in


"Even when a nation aims


national


seeking


Citizens


independence,


such


with


it can


independence


benefits


other


than


1


J


c











adjustment


the external


conditions,


evaluating the choice


process


then


operates.


forces


The


look


crucial


problem


how


which


learning


must


process


initially


resolved is whether one can actually determine what goals


are


being


pursued


state


policies.6


Goals


are


important


components of memory


"establishing the relevance and salience


pieces


information


range


acceptable


alternatives"


(Brady,


1982b:


28) .


order


evaluate


outcomes


have


specify


what


outcomes


are


desired.


evaluating


distance


between


goals


outcomes,


taking exogenous environmental


factors


into account,


the next


step


essentially


decomposition


learning


process


itself.


Foreign


policy


goals


pursued


states


are


variable.


States


are


single-purpose


organizations.


not


case


that


just


because


states


desire


broad


range


ends,


which


can


only


attained


through


interactions


with


other


states,


these


desires


will


automatically


converted


into


foreign policy objectives.


"They will become goals only if the


Hermann


(1980:


30-32)


discusses


problems


identifying
According t


parsimoniously


foreign p
Hermann,


explain


,olicy


goals


knowing


foreign policy


actor's


behavior


goals


evaluate


analysis.


helps


one


performance.


Problems arise in trying to determine a complex collectivity's


goals as if it
preferences and


were


goals.


individual


Inferring s


with


itate goals


1 single set of
from observable










decision


reached


that


some


national


effort


involving


sacrifices,


or the risk of sacrifices


is to be made for their


realization"


(Wolfers,


1962:


It is up to this point that


system-level


theory


instructive


the


direction


policies states will choose.


The choices, however


, are related


what


states


desire


their


relations


with


others.


They


involve


decisions


about


incurring


costs


pursuit


those


desires.


But decision making


is a process of which the act of


choice


is a


part


(see


Maoz,


1990) .


States


pursue


objectives


that


serve


them


some


way.


costs


that


the


state


willing to pay and the risks it


is willing to take in order to


achieve


them


are


related


importance


attached


objectives.


Moreover


, because determining


costs and expected


outcomes


involves


searching,


evaluating,


revising


information,


options and goal


choices are not temporally or


substantively


disconnected.


Often


state


faces


dilemma


contrasting


goals


that


compete


interest


government.


order


explain how some goals


receive greater


attention than others


have


construct


look


some


patterns


ordering


hierarch


choices

v that


and


attempt


reflects


value


trade-offs


among


goals.


Choices


are


culminations


factors


that affect the selection of options


in response to problems.










learning


particular


capability


goals


recognize


changing


the


milieu


importance


international


politics.


Furthermore,


changes


the


external


milieu


may


render


established value


priorities


less


relevant.


Learning,


therefore,


is also a process whereby values are reassessed and


priorities


adjusted


meet


changing


demands


external milieu


(Breslauer


, 1991a).


Changes in beliefs prompt


changes


behavior


(see


Levy


, 1994).


"Learning


provides


yardstick of


shifting


belief"


(Legvold,


1991:


715)


The disposition of


state goals


is significant because we


are interested in whether behavior reflects state learning.


foreign policy is purposive behavior,


then state actions must


reflect


decisions


that


address


objectives


problems


even


when conditions are in a state of flux or uncertainty.


Because


states


must


order


ensure


their


own


welfare,


the


burden


responsibility


compels


them


decide.


Moreover,


their


own


prior


decisions


actions


affect


their


calculations


they


move


forward


their


pursuit


objectives.

previous b4


Faced


beliefs


with

about


unfamiliar


what


challenges


worth


that


pursuing


undermine


what


achievable,


states


have


to solve


these


"cognitive dilemmas.


Whether


when


states


can


overcome


these


dilemmas


empirical


question


that


this


research


will


assist










so that


they tend


true


sense,


to respond


states,


to challenges


like


in habitual


international


ways.


system


which


they


are


parts,


are


reproduced


the


patterns


habitual


interaction


micro


level


7 But


since


states


are


capable


learning


, habits


are


not


unbreakable.


Individuals and collectivities possess a readiness to learn as


part


their


"habit


pool.


" "It


may


require


stimuli


scale of powerful


trauma such


as a Pearl


Harbor or a


crisis


over


missiles


Cuba--but


some


point


even


most


habitual


actor


least


minimally


open


reorientation"


(Rosenau,


1986:


864) .


In order for states to alter their goal


priorities or develop new goals,


circumstances must change to


the extent that the beliefs,


experiences,


and memories of the


state fail


to serve the needs of the habit-driven behavior for


which


they


evolved.


stated


earlier


, policy


change


does


not


necessarily


mean that the state leaders have learned about the conditions


external


environment.


Likewise,


international


change


does


necessarily


mean


that


state


will


reorient


outlook toward that environment in order to accomplish certain


habit


Rosenau
in world


(1986:


868)


politics.


discusses
Although h


the


crucial


contends


function of


that


while


speak of macro stuctures or macro


using


"shorthand


labels


institutions,


very


complex


we are really
nd elaborate


interaction


patterns


micro


level,


" he


also


contends


_










goals.


The important element in identifying state learning in


foreign


policy


is the


observable


behavior


that


results


from


state


response


international


international


change


must


change.


logically


The


and


behavior


purposively


related


. Behavior must 1)


demonstrate the state's recognition


external


change


conclusion


that


positions


certain issues are not productive.


It must also 2) demonstrate


more


compatible


assessment


external


conditions


the state's relation to them.


And it 3)


must be more effective


in achieving


state goals.


Tetlock


(1991)


cautions


against


seeing


learning


reflected by only one of these three conditions.


In his view,


straightforward


reward-punishment


conception


state


learning


insuffi


cient


because


neglects


decision


process and it does not provide any


insight about how complex


external conditions affect the nature of the state's actions.


Likewise,


he maintains that seeing state learning as feedback


induced


makers'


changes


outlooks


structure


may


or content


fulfill


decision


conditions


sufficiency


. While


these


types


of changes might


increase


likelihood


that


state


can


achieve


certain


goals


more realistic ones,


they cannot guarantee success.


The three


conditions


are


interrelated.


Because


behavior


not










reflecting


failure


reassessing


state's


position


with a


different definition


its objectives.


Therefore,


order


determine


learning,


three


whether


conditions


state


need


behavior


to be


reflects


operative


state


so that


the outcomes cannot


simply be


attributable


to happenstance.


Policy


learning


performance

necessary


conceptual


because


gives


sequence


the


state


empirical


referent


connect


intelligence


with


policy


change.


What


Tetlock


(1991:


calls


"learning


in the efficiency sense of


the


term,


occurs


"whenever


policy


makers


have


learned


match means


Learning


and

this


ends


sense


more

comes


efficient


two


and


distinct


effective

ct forms.


ways."

Policy


makers


can


find


better


ways


achieving


their


original


goals,


they


can


redefine


their


goals


upon


realizing


the


inherent


conflicts


among


their


original


goals.


first


form,


learning can be thought of


as tactical


(Legvold


, 1991)


simple


learning


Nye,


1987)


only


focuses


controlling means.


In its complex form,


learning involves the


rethinking of basic concepts which Legvold


(1991:


701)


defines


"the


conscious


intellectual


formulations


explaining


the


phenomena


that


give


foreign


policy


tasks.


interest


more


effectively matching means


and


ends,


goals and not


tactics


that are changed.










adjusted


policy


instruments.


are


concerned


instead


with


what


Maoz


(1990)


calls


"substantive


aspects"


decision-making


processes.


What


qualitative


changes


are


reflected


policy


changes?


What


logic


employed


the


decision


process?


How


are


goals


identified


and


how


are


conflicting


goals


treated?


what


extent


does


implementation reflect the essence of the decision? Questions


such


these


are


heart


Etheridge's


(1985)


investigation


Government s


Learn?


defines


government


learning


"changes


intelligence


and


effectiveness.


And


Bres


lauer


Tetlock


(1991)


draw


conceptual


distinction between


"learning that"


"learning


how.


" They


acknowledge


that


definition


learning


debatable among foreign policy analysts.


"In part this derives


from the inherent tension between the everyday use of the term


learning


as engendering


'greater realism


' (learning that)


'greater


skill


(learning


how) ,


varied


uses


term


specialized


psychological,


organizational,


political


science


literature"


(Breslauer


1991b:


825).


The


simple distinction illustrates the difference between beliefs


Etheridge


intelligence
recognizing


using


(1985:
three


different


operating in the world;


66) CC
criteria:


insider
"(1)


elements


growth
process


growth of
f realism,


ses


actually


growth of intellectual integration


in which these different elements and processes are integrated










and


behaviors.


highlights


significance


evaluating performance


as the consequence of


changed beliefs


goals.


The


state's


decis


makers


may


learn


that


their


previous


policies


were


successful


achieving


their


intended goals.


Or by the experience of trial


and


error,


state's decision makers may come to a better understanding of


the problems that face them


However


, as Breslauer and Tetlock


assert (1991 :13),


"[G]reater realism along certain dimensions


of belief may often be a necessary condition,


not a sufficient condition,


but is certainly


for improved performance (learning


how) .


The


empirical


determinant


state


learning,


therefore,


is policy change-induced outcome.


Identifying this


determinant


requires


description


goals


which


policy performance should be evaluated,


evidence that changes


in belief prompted the enactment of changed policies,


and then


an evaluation of


the effectiveness


those


policies.


Systemic


Effects


and State


Learn in


States operate within


system


. When


looking


at foreign


policy


decision


making,


cannot


conceive


the


system


just a separate exogenous factor merely supplying


inputs into










the process.


10 The


foreign policy making process


is contained


within


system.


The


system


surrounds


that


process.


influence is apparent before,


during,


of deliberative choice making.


and after the processes


not only the


individual


actions


states


which


states


respond,


also


overall


changing


nonchanging)


systemic


conditions


which


influence state action.


Structural


realism,


or neorealism,


perhaps


paradigmatic


closest


international


outlook


past


relations


twenty


has


years.


come


stated


above,


with


its conception


of systemic


structure,


neorealism


attempts to explain how the behavior of states


is affected by


the variations in the international system's structure.


In its


portrayal


international


political


system


as a


whole,


neorealism describes structural and unit levels simultaneously


distinct and connected.


"International structure emerges from


the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking


certain actions


while


propelling them toward


others"


(Waltz,


1992:


29) .


However,


research


in this tradition


(e.g.,


Waltz,


1979;


Krasner,


1978;


Gilpin,


1981)


too


often


assumes


rationality


in order to make


inferences


about


state behavior


based


upon


knowledge


structure


international


system.


one


assumptions


that


abstracts


from


practice,


it is useful to


distinguish


between










simplifies


much


complications


world


politics.


Moreover


, Waltz, structural realism


s most outspoken defender,


maintained


that


theory


inevitably


concerns


some


interaction


dynamics


leaves


others


aside.


Waltz


(1979:


122)


states,


example,


that


the


balance-of-power


theory


upon


which


argued


his


overall


theory


international


politics


"makes


assumptions about the interests and motives of states,


rather


than explaining them.


Critics


structural


realism


argue


that


because


neglects


individual


state


ability


outside


structural


constraints


even


bring


about


structural


transformation,


structuralism


fails


account


enabling


character


the system.


is a


static perspective


that


does


give


attention


dynamic


nature


interstate


politics


see


Mendelson,


1993) .


Structural


theory


too deterministic


(Wendt,


1987).


even


Waltz


contended


that his


theory of


international politics was not a theory of


foreign policy


. His contention is that by first understanding


the contexts within which


foreign


policies are operative can


we begin to understand the motives and policies of states. And


Waltz


(1979:


122-123)


further


states:


"What


explain are the constraints that confine all states.


perception of


does


The clear


constraints provides many clues to the expected


reaction
those re


states,


actions.


They


depen


itself
d not


the
only


theory


cannot


explain


i international


e v w










while


the


system


provides


opportunities


imposes


costs


voluntarism.


Goals


that


stretch


beyond


logic


structural constraints will be costly to pursue, and achieving


those goals may


lie beyond


the ability


state


(see


example,


Perruci,


1991).


System-level


theory


, therefore,


begins


the


process


explaining


state


goals.


themselves


, propositions


this


level


cannot


tell


what


states


will


choose


pursue


specifically in every circumstance.


For an investigation of a


particular policy area such


as U.S.


foreign aid,


system level


analysis


may


lead


answers


about


the


need


certain


actions without necessarily


leading us to the specifics about


them.


Furthermore,


observing


patterns


of behavior we


may


find


state


goals


are


compatible


with


logical


implications


system


level


analysis.


Waltz


(1979:


107)


maintained,


"Structures


cause


actions


have


consequences


they


were


not


intended


have.


" Because


this


dilemma,


states often cannot achieve


their original


ends


adjusting


their strategies.


State-Centric Considerations of


State


Learning


This


study


will


treat


state


actor


with


critical, qualified recognition that decisions taken on behalf


_II I










being


policy


might


"round-off"


analysis,


many


provides


rough


simple


edges


base


from


foreign


which


inquire


about


utility


policies


enacted


behalf


that


being.


simplifying


reality


purposes


inquiry,


giving


state


"qualities


being"


also


enables


difficult


questions


without


necessarily


losing


sight


forest


the


trees.


Before


can


explore


various


arboreous


specimens


our


landscape


must


locate


survey


our


forest.


That


say,


beginning


from


simple


reduction


reality


can


move


toward a more secure investigation of the complex relationship


of foreign

The


policy


issue of


decision-making and policy ou

foreign assistance objectives


tcomes.

is derivable


from


placement


within


greater


purposes


United


States


foreign


policy.


concern


this


research


with


the


goals


American


foreign


policy


directs


examine


how


state goals


are determined.


From the


previous discussion,


assume


that


structural


requirements


international


system place constraints on what is both probable and possible


in a state's external aspirations


. For explaining the actions


of states,


the dominant outlook


since the end of World War


has


been


state-centric


approach.


What


Morgenthau


(1967)


labeled


"political


realism"


broadly


defined


school


_










and


the weighing


of alternatives.


The more recent structural


reformulation of realism acknowledges that states are not the


only


international


actors.


Again,


however,


Waltz


argues,


international


system


comprised


many


species


actors,


but its structure is based on the relationships of the


most dominant ones.


stated


previously


, knowing


the


context


international


politics


provides


only


portion


necessary information for explaining foreign policy goals and


actions


states


(see


also


Keohane


, 1984).


Morgenthau's


(1967


: 9)


classic statement


of realist


theory understood the


"inevitable" gap between rational


policy as it actually is.


foreign policy and "foreign


In the classical realist position,


states can be treated as unitary actors that weigh alternative


courses


uncertainty


action

and


"although

without 2


doing


necessarily


under c

having


conditions


sufficient


information


about


alternatives


resources


(time


otherwise)


to conduct a full review of all possible courses of


action"


(Keohane,


1983:


508)


statist


image


foreign


policy,


such


that


described by Krasner


(1978)


, represents state goals as related


the


condition


whol


nation


individuate


portions of


Ultimately the


objectives


themselves


have to










multiple private interests.


Nordlinger


(1981)


has also argued


that


even


democracy


state


can


formulate


objectives


implement


policies when


preferences diverge


from the


demands


societal


groups.


states


are


only


logical


constructs


that


differentiating


state


behavior


from


behavior of other actors is a


simplifying procedure.


Krasner's


definition


state


central


decision


making


institutions


roles


identifies


loci


where


the


prerogatives


of state action,


state goal


setting,


and policy


choice occur


. And although Krasner is more concerned with the


domestic constraints which states must contend with,


the issue


state


learning


more


directly


connected


imperatives of state actions as they relate to the actions of

other states.


The state


s decision makers operate within the system of


states.


Learning


requires


that


they


remain


cognizant


behaviors of other states.


Their goals and strategies are not


only


conditioned


prestige,


they


their


are


desires


conditioned


security,


well


welfare,


desires


actions of other states.


The ability of state decision makers


implement


policies


are


also


conditioned


their


capabilities as state administrators,


the resources available,


and


their


organizational


efficiency.


Beyond


these


internal


A


I





_










evident


state's


leaders


can


realize


their


external


environments and


overcome


impediments


to policy.


PsVchological/Coqnitive ADDroaches


to Learning


Approaches


emphasizing


psychological


cognitive


influences


proximity


decision-making


actions


processes


outcomes.


beyond


Instead,


assessing


these


perspectives


look


how


policy


makers


think


about


international


try to


politics


identify any


. Among


idiosyncratic


other things,


these approaches


characteristics of


foreign


policy


elites


ultimately


disclose


processes


which


guide

posits


their

that


choices.

"analysis


Decision-making


actor's


analysis

behavior


this


involves


vein

the


separation of


internal


from situational


components"


(Jervis,


1976:


48) .


Goals and the means


for achieving them are related


the


perceptual


predispositions


individuals


influences


individual


behavior


organizational


choice.


Unlike


rationality-based


calculus


neorealist


framework,


psychological


cognitive


approaches


not


explain


state


goals


the


basis


"objective"


external


conditions.


These


related


perspectives


look


instead


the


subjective


perceptions


decision-makers


they


define


conditions and constrain their choices as to what actions are










Cognitive


approaches


are


more


directly


concerned


then


with


what


enhances


constrains


changes


beliefs.


Less


attention


directed


question


whether


changes


the content or structure of beliefs enables an individual


collectivity)


to better understand his environment.


It may be


that


decision


makers


are


only


employing


more


elaborate


justifications


for poli


cies


they


support or


intend


to pursue


(Tetlock,


1991:


32-35


Cognitive/psychological


approaches


deal


less with


learning


"efficiency"


sense.


According


the Tetlock


(1991:


, learning from this perspective is


most a necessary,


not a sufficient,


condition for


learning in


the


efficiency


sense.


mere


fact


that


one


adjusts


one's


tactics,


strategies,


or goals does not


imply that on is doing


so wisely.


The dividing line between these broad approaches


is more


than


distinction


between


explanations


changes


state


behavior


either


based


upon


changes


attributes


system


changes


internal


attributes


actors.


maj or


difference


between


these


differing


perspectives


involves their conceptualizations of state goals


. In one sense


the difference


lies


in seeing goals as


limited


(or enhanced)


external


characteristics


conditions


limited


of individuals and


enhanced)


organizations.


Perception










external


conditions


assumed


neorealist


perspective


problematic


psychological/cognitive


approaches


. The


rationality assumption


of structural


realism


means that decision makers must be


"able to articulate their


goals and values and establish priorities and preferences for


these

the


goals"


(Maoz,


'rules


possible


1990:

game"


probable


152). System-level

thereby delimiting


state


objectives.


factors


what


Relying


define


both


instead


on the interrelation of


leaders'


personal


characteristics to


suggest


probable


parameters


goal


preference


setting,


the psychological approaches clarify state goals on the basis


leaders'


personal


responding


orientations


external


environment


general


(Hermann,


ways


1980).


However


, whether goals are delimited by external factors or by


internal

between


perceptions


these


different


interactions,


perspectives


the

that


common

foreign


thread

policy


goals


change


are


directed


results


when


toward


external


conditions


that


environment.


environment


Policy


are


compatible with the desires of the state's decision makers and


they


to reduce


the distance between


those conditions and


their desires.


Their actions may be designed to either change


the external conditions or to change their expectations about


4 *


q-B










how


cope


with


that


environment


(e.g.,


Hermann,


1990).


Learning is evident


if policy change accomplishes either end


Overview to the Analysis of U


Development Assistance Policv


Learning in foreign policy cannot be assumed. Even though


policies


change,


those


changes


may


the


results


deliberative revaluations of policy objectives or reflections


more


realistic


appraisal


conditions


the


international


environment.


following


chapters we will


discuss


the development


application


of U.S.


development-


assistance


policy


with


objective


seeing


how


this


particular policy


decision makers


area


reflects


in response


the changing perspectives of


to external


changes.


Having


defined


state


learning


processes


wherein


foreign-policy


decision


makers


understand


international


changes,


redefine objectives and priorities


in light of those


changes,


develop


coherent


policies


based


upon


those


redefined


objectives,


examining


formulation


and


implementation of U.


assistance policy allows us to monitor


policy


area


that


connected


integrally


the


broader


bases


U.S.


foreign


policy.


Approaches


development


assistance cut across traditional


issue domains.


Development


assistance serves political, economic, and strategic purposes.










international


change


policy


change


will


examined


empirically


through


analysis


interests


driving


foreign assistance


policy.


Recent transitions in the international system call into


question the long-standing bases for policy


. They suggest that


changes


the


definition


U.S.


objectives


are


needed.


Issues


that


were


indirectly


connected


U.S.


security


calculations


during


Cold


War


are


increasingly


important


considerations directly involved in the interest calculations


of U.S.


security policy.


Our


focus on


learning


directs us


look at the connections between traditional and nontraditional


security


considerations


order


determine


whether


assistance


priorities.


applied


policy


U.S. f

means


reflects


foreignn

for s


shift


assistance


supporting


U.S.


foreign


consistently


security


policy


been


interests.


However


, in the context of a bipolar international system U.S.


security was defined in military-strategic terms. Our analysis


will look at the changed international context


, the absence of


bipolarity


overarching


imperative


superpower


competition


see


U.S.


security


rationales


related


humanitarian crises and economic interests are involved in the


formulation


of U.S.


development assistance.















CHAPTER


U.S


. FOREIGN


POLICY


AND


DEVELOPMENT


ASSISTANCE


The


use


economic


means


achieve


political


ends


unique


the


modern


international


politics


(see


ska,


1960;


Knorr,


1975)


. Since


Second


World


War,


United


States


, however


, has


provided


economic,


technical,


military


assistance


vas


t majority


states


. The


scope


magnitude


ass


stance


distingui


shes


U.S


foreign


aid


policy


from


aid


relationships


among


other


states.


While


humanitarian


esire


ass


others


in need


certainly


been


part


overall


rational


behind


foreign

factors


ass


instance


driving


strategic


police


U.S.


nature.


police


Foreign


United

have


ass


stance


States,


been


has


political


been


maj or

L and


used


promote


the


interests


U.S.


an international


system


that dramatically


discussed


changed

the p


as a result


previous


of the


chapter


Second

those


World

goals


War.

are


dependent


upon


conditions


both


international


environment


and


internal


policy making


environment


of the


state.


The


larger


development


realm


U.S.


. foreign


foreign


assis


tance


policy


within


, and


the










international


environment and


the choices pursued


to address


those changes.


this


chapter


will


examine


conditions


that


prompted shifts in U.S.


foreign policy in the postwar era.


will


give


particular attention


the systemic


influences on


U.S.


foreign policy goals.


Looking at the patterns of choices


made by the U.


dynamics of


U.S.


government,


foreign


(and global)


we will


policy making


history


briefly reconstruct


this dramatic period of


. The progression of policies across


the Cold War decades evinced patterns of behavior with marked


continuities amidst constant


change.


their maintenance of


policy


means


objectives


U.S.


and


decision


their


makers


manipulation


sought


constant


balance


policy


means


ends in a mutable environment.


Enduring influences


in tension


with


emerging


issues


characterized


postwar


period.


Moreover,


with the present demise of


the old systemic order


both means and ends are uncertain


as a coherent new order has


not


emerged.


probe


these


historical


developments,


will


review


the


context


which


U.S.


foreign-assistance


programs were conceived


implemented.


System Structure,


and U.S


Patterns


. Foreign


of Continuity.
Policy


Before World War


most U.S.


presidents


"had faced one










imperatives.


U.S.


power was unsurpassed


but U.S.


leaders were


challenged by a determined and powerful ideological adversary.


The


growing


hostility


the


Soviet


Union


and


the


recent


memory


the


turmoil


1930s


together managed


to help


shape a


course away


from


isolationism,


creating two dominant


foreign policy aims: keeping peace and stopping Communism.


transition away from traditional


The


foreign policy perspectives


did not


come


immediately


or eas


ily.


U.S.


foreign policy


historically has been represented as


a pattern of swings between isolationism and interventionism.


Prior


World


War


hallmark


of U.S.


policy


abroad


had


been


noninvolvement


European


conflicts.


Only


when


aroused did the U.S.


venture into the power politics arena and


afterwards


retreated


behind


natural


geographic


barriers.


This


tendency


avoid


involvement


political


struggles abroad has been attributed to a particular kind


American


nationalism.


Hoffmann


(1978:


example,


suggests


that


Americans


tend


see


their


experience


unique.


The


belief


national


character


the


United


States


was


such


that


American


"mission


model


democracy" was served alternatively by remaining "the lone and


shining


guardian


certain


values


traditions,


[and]


times their missionary.


" The defining essence of U.


. foreign


- .


1


i


* -, -










The change


the disposition


of U.S.


leaders


following


war


important


because


came


define


enduring


trans format ion


American


purpose.


The


change


was


significantly a structurally


induced phenomenon.


The bipolar


character


the


postwar


state


system


"compelled


United


States


foresake


isolationism


once


for


all"


(Spanier,


1987


: 152).


Faced with this structural


condition,


U.S


. policy


makers espoused and worked


toward


a consistent set


of goals.


The patterns of behavior across the decades after World War II


reveal


remarkable


constancy


foreign


policy


goals.


constancy


U.S.


foreign


policy


postwar


era


was


remarkable


vastly


only


different


because


from


U.S.


in which


acted


had


within


acted


system


previously,


also


because


sought


achieve


consistent


goals


system that was changing rapidly


constantly


Furthermore


, Krasner (1978)


argued that the broad foreign


policy


alms


America's


postwar


leadership


consistently


reflected different preferences than those of prewar decision


makers.


According to


Krasner


(1978:


15),


With the exception of the administration of Woodrow


Wilson,


period before


the Second World War was


one


which


American


actions


can


best


understood


terms


interests,


that


aims


that


had


American
enhancing


some


identifiable


society as
strategic


whole.


material


These


security


benefit


included


both


furthering


economic well being.










ideological


goals"


was


result


dramatic


change


the


United


States'


global


power


status.


Fundamentally,


the


resources

pursue anr


the


IAmerican


international


disposal


image


should


system


U.S.


what

be.


leaders


peaceful


This


allowed


and


vision


them


prosperous

essentially


mirrored


American


values


expectations


derived


from


America's national experience.


A belief


in Lockean liberalism


and in a democratic and non-revolutionary developmental course


characterized


the


U.S.


approach.


pursuit


objectives


anchored to these beliefs,


American leaders looked outward to


the


structuring


the


international


system


and


developed


goals


"directly


related


tothe


basic


political


structures


foreign regimes"


(Krasner,


1978:


When


looking


at patterns


policy


that


have


persisted


several


decades,


need


what


factors


(both


internal and external)


were responsible for that consistency.


historical


nature


generalizations


direction


generalizations


decision


cannot


, patterns

foreign


account


motivations


behind


reveal


policy.


every


them.


the

But


foreign


What


overall

these


policy


offered by


generalization is the ability to discriminate between what is


lasting


and


what


transitory.


Therefore


the


patterns


continuity


U.S.


foreign


policy may


conceal


variations


16) .










globalism,


was reflected in the record of U.S.


sponsorship of


and


support


the


United


Nations


development


and


implementation


Marshall


Plan


subsequent


foreign-assistance


programs.


U.S.


activism


pursuing


expanding liberal


trade regime,


and U.S.


construction of NATO


and other regional alliance arrangements were also expressions


of U.S.


leaders'


drives to remain


involved and


influential


world politics


(Destler


, Gelb,


and Lake,


1984)


. Throughout the


postwar


period


however


, a concomitant


consistency


U.S.


policies


was


derived


from


unavoidable


circumstances


limited


resources


available


pursue


foreign


policy


objectives.


"There are limits to the extent that even the most


powerful nation can project its influence beyond its borders"


(Ambrose,


1971:


Means and


Ends:


.S a i


Foreign Policy


Understanding


the


connection


between


policy


goals


and


policy


means


important


because


interrelationship


between means and ends reflects the ability of the government


to develop


achievable


objectives


face


uncertainty


and


change.


Ideally,


outcomes


are


logically


causally


connected


to objectives


means.


the


distance


between


outcomes


and


objectives


conditioned


the


capacity


U.S.


UT S.


Foreign Aid


I









46
means of policy have to be suited to the context within which


they

around


exist.

dthe


The i

logical


issue


connect


government

.on between


learning

internal


centered


response


external


change.


Therefore,


will


review


relationship


between U.S.


foreign policy,


its broad aims,


and U.S.


foreign


assistance policy


The Cold War and the Truman


postwar period.


Doctrine


After


accompanied


Second


victory


World


over


War,


Axis


optimism


swiftly


which


declined.


American


leaders


, the


utility


of wartime


allegiance


fell


the postwar order failed to emerge along the lines of American

preferences and expectations. American leaders felt threatened


by the expansive moves of the Soviet Union.


The Soviet armies


had liberated much of Eastern Europe as they moved the German


armies


back.


Soviet


Premier Stalin was very much a


political


and


military


opportunist


attempted


project


Soviet


power


into


these


areas.


Moscow's


unilateral


political


settlement


Soviet


occupied


Europe


ran


counter


the


expectations of the


Western members


"Grand Alliance.


President


Truman


remained


hopeful


about


Eastern


Europe,


but


reality


massive


Soviet


presence


control


over


political


fortunes


there


made


bargaining


with


the


r^ .1










Potsdam


the


Soviet


leader


"considered


transformation


the


political


picture


Eastern


Europe


closed


issue"


(McWilliams and Piotrowsky,


1990:


Truman acceded


the Soviet position


in Eastern Europe


because there was little he could have done to change it.


The


pessimism


which many


took


away


from


Potsdam


reflected


their


realization of the asymmetrical positions of the three allies


in postwar

reflected


Europe.


this


Secretary


pessimism


State


James


acknowledging


Byrnes


that


was


unfortunate for the Soviet Union to have emerged


from the war


with as much


power as


it wielded


Moreover


he expressed the


fear that the vast differences in the ideologies of the United


States and the Soviet Union precluded any


long-term program of


cooperation between


them


(Woods


and Jones,


1991).


From the American point of view,


the international system


was


developing


into


contradistinctive


political


orders.


The hope of


a united


international


order guided by the major


powers dissipated


. The United Nations could not become a forum


constructing


new


order


without


the


cooperative


and


compatible energies of


two dominant


global


powers.


Each


side


was


wary


other


motives.


The


strategy


containment


which


greatly


influenced


U.S.


postwar


foreign


policy developed after


American


officials concluded


that the


38)










which


the


United


States


leadership


should


meet


challenges


containing


Soviet


power


bipolar


international


served


system.


important


now


ways


famous


"long telegram"


clarion


policy


1946


change.


Kennan


continuous


counsel


helped


resolve


the


cognitive


crisis


caused


war'


accommodation


ideological


incompatibilities


adjusted


perceptions


objective


conditions.


He voiced an important perspective which stressed


the


limitations


in pursuing


containment strategies


. American


opposition


based


Soviet


expansionism


particularistt


conception of American


security


rather


communism


than


interests:


had


universalist


what was


required


was not to remake the world in the image of the United States,


but


simply


preserve


diversity


against


attempts


remake


in the


image of


others


"(Gaddis,


1982:


56).


One


the


important


consequences


the


embracing


containment,


however


, was its seemingly global application as


policy.


Beginning


with


Truman


continuing


through


every


subsequent administration


the question of


American


interests


Kennan's lasting


influence on policy makers began with


his


ominous


February


1946


"long


telegram"


evaluating


motivations


among


officials


Sovie
and


leadership.


helped


was


crystallize


widely c
official


circulated
thinking


about Soviet intentions. Kennan's telegram had great influence


"because


provided


way


fuse


concerns


about


~










troubled U.S.


officials


in their attempts to reconcile policy


means to ends.


In the years immediately following World War II


patterns


behavior


developed


which


shaped


subsequent


decisions


and


goals.


Recognizing


the


condition


the


international


system,


American


leaders accepted


the goals of


containment.


implementation required


creative statecraft


and


political


acumen


order


successfully


stabilize


international conditions and build necessary domestic support.

The official expression of this shift in American purpose


and


policy


came


from


President


Truman


his


address


before


Congress on March


1947


. The


Truman


Doctrine set


the


tone


and direction of U.S. policy and shaped the course of American

policy for decades to come. Developed as a response to crises


Greece


and


Turkey,


Truman's


speech


presented


those


circumstances


parts


much


broader


dilemma


the


international system. Cognizant of the domestic impediments to


dramatic


shift


American


policy,


Truman


portrayed


the


problem as a global


one with direct security implications for


the United States.


He outlined an approach


necessity of involving U.S.


resources abroad


that stressed


As Truman (1956:


106)


later stated,


he believed that his speech was in fact the


turning


point


America's


foreign


policy


, declaring


"that


wherever aggression,


direct or


indirect,


threatens the peace,








50

be to extend assistance to "victims of aggression" everywhere.


The speech outlined the central premises of the Cold War.


His


message


related


the


world


situation


terms


global


ideological


conflict,


with


democracies


facing


"totalitarian


regimes


imposed


upon


free


peoples.


part


general


overhaul


official


U.S.


positions,


the


Truman


Doctrine


recognized

Containment


the existence

was defined


global


strategic


bipolar


uses


competition.


American


resources to counter conditions


that presented


opportunities


Soviet


intrusion.


The


basic


pattern


of American


postwar


foreign


policy was set


forth


President


Truman's


speech.


One prominent point in Truman's speech which shaped


many


subsequent


policy


choices


was


the


emphasis


that


U.S.


assistance should be given primarily


the


form of


economic


financial


aid


. Rather


than


making


new


direction


U.S. p

Truman


)olicy


solely


Doctrine


relat<


military re

ed American


sponse


uncertainty,


interests


economic


conditions of


other states.


The Truman administration agrued


that


subversion


succeeded


best


situations


of poverty


and


unrest


(Truman,


1956;


Crabb,


1982).


The most important ramifications of Truman's speech were


the tran

purposes


isitions


U.S.


attitudes


policy.


of policy


Truman


Doctrine


makers


about


signalled


the

the


1


1 _









51
The demobilization of American armed forces after World War II


presaged


return


isolationism.


Many


Americans


believed


that with the creation of the United Nations the United States


could


use


resolve


"troublesome


international


questions.. .thereby relieving the United States of any further


direct responsibility"


(Crabb,


1982


: 112)


The Truman Doctrine


struck a blow against such expectations by declaring that the


United States would assume leadership


in the troubled postwar


system.


In presenting the


problem


facing the


"free


world"


one


where


forces


external


threatened


internal


security,


the


Truman


Doctrine


laid


U.S.


strategy


defensive terms.


According to


its advocates,


the U.S.


was not


concerned


with


pursuing


adventuristic


policies


designed


create


an American hegemony


over weaker


states.


Rather,


proclaimed


goal


doctrine


was


assist


independent


nations


within


the


Soviet


orbit


idea


clearly


keeping with


principle


of self-detemination and with


precepts


contained


United


Nations


Charter


(Crabb,


1982).


The


Truman


Doctrine's


lasting


influence


American


policy was evident across


subsequent


administrations as each


sought


counter


Soviet


power


international


system.


The


problem of matching


objectives


with


resources


repeatedly


1










communist


threat


was


global


scope.


The


document's


main


thrust


was


that


U.S.


strategy


could


not


discount


importance


areas


perimeter.


In a marked


departure


from


strongpointt"


defense


strategy


proposed


Kennan,


NSC-68


stated that


any substantial
the domination


possibility


the Kremlin
assembled .


further expansion of the area under


Kremlin


that


with
. and


coalition
greater


would


adequate
strength


context


raise


confron


could


polarization of power a defeat of free institutions


anywhere is a defeat everywhere.
1982: 91}


(Quoted in Gaddis,


portraying


balance


power


global


terms,


NSC-68


made all interests vital


. The invasion of South Korea by North


Korean


armed


forces


June


1950


appeared


validate


conclusions


of NSC-68.


A major concern of the Eisenhower administration was the


ability


the


U.S.


government


keep


commitments


line


with


resources.


Eisenhower


believed


that


defensive


prescriptions


Truman


Doctrine


made


containment


reflexive


policy which allowed


Soviet


Union to determine


where and when


it would


challenge


U.S.


interest.


Putting


every


fire


that


broke


international


system would


stretch the limited resources of the United States.


Therefore,


Eisenhower developed an

did not delimit the vital


'asymmetrical"


response strategy.


interests of the U.S.


~~_as_ Kennn ha


the


present


as Kennan had











as to its nature"


(Gaddis


1982:


151)


. Although


Eisenhower


course


deviated


from


"symmetrical"


prescriptions


NSC-68


planning

formation


followed


toward

of NATO


the

post

1949


design


ure

was


NSC-


military


already


moving


American


containment.


an attempt


The


to install


militar-

Truman


technical


component


Doctrine


assistance


barrier


defensive


to halt


Soviet


strategy


Soviet


usinc


expansion


expansion.

g economic


was


The

and


upstaged


design


use


military


assistance


and


alignments


accompli


same


goal.


During


Eisenhower


tenure


this


approach


was


complemented


series


regional


defense


pacts


between


the


United


States


country


Central


and


East


Asia


designed


inhibit


further


aggression


to keep


the


U.S.S.R.


China


behind


cordon


non-communi


alli


es.


President Kennedy


s "New


Frontier"


revert


ed to the spirit


of NSC-68


maintaining


that


was


necessary


to expand


means


available


power.


periphery


Like


was


to impede ur

Eisenhower,


expanding


acceptable

Kennedy


. Kennedy more


C


shifts


faced

clearlyy


the


system


understood


Balance

whose

od that


threats


to the


periphery


could


be adequate


addressed


military


arrangements


alone.


was


ess


concerned


about


solvency


than


was


with


expanding


range


available










Eisenhower


terms,


Kennedy


Kennedy


saw


questioned


balance


asymmetry


power


grounds


global


that


provided


insufficient


means


respond


varieties


challenge.

regarding


His

less


administration

defense-orient


incorporated

:ed resources


Truman's


precepts


maintain


balance.


Along


with


military


assistance,


assistance


economic planning,


technical


assistance


provision of


capital


were


designed


help


LDCs


withstand


pressures


revolutionary


change without embracing the communist


path.


The


globalism


containment


forth


Truman


Doctrine came


military


and


under


severe


involvement


certainly


attack with


Vietnam.


With


aftermath


the extended American

the conduct of the war


U.S.


public


leaders


questioned


whether


U.S.


should


bear


global


responsibilities


opposing


Soviet


inspired


changes


the


world.


American


commitments


appeared


have


outreached


American


resources.


The


enduring


consensus,


which


supported


containment


globalist


form,


dissolved.


The


applicability of the Truman Doctrine in world vastly different


from


the


postwar world


was


questioned


. The


Nixon,


Ford,


Carter


administrations


attempted


define


limits


American


purpose


while


maintaining


resolve


initiated


the Truman Doctrine.










For Nixon,


detente represented


a way


of maintaining the


balance of power without


overreaching the means available


so.


Nixon


successors


recognized


how


much


the


international


system


had


changed


since


Truman


professed


American


containment goals.


Under Nixon,


according to Gaddis


(1984:


361) ,


detente


was


abandonment


containment,


but rather "an imaginative effort to accommodate that strategy


existing


realities,


maintain


that


calculated


relationship of ends and means that any strategy must have in


order to succeed


" President Carter


, like presidents Nixon and


Ford before him,


sought to restore a balance between resources


and national


commitments.


Unlike his


immediate


predecessors,


however


Carter


sought


construct


domestic


consensus


support his policies.


His emphasis on human rights


was used,


part,


restore


public's


trust


government.


Carter's approach to containment stalled in the face of events

that resurrected sentiments close to pre-Vietnam perspectives.


Thus,


while


his


vision


more


cooperative


"global


community" was not totally set aside, Soviet adventuresomeness


in the Third World and its 1979


invasion of Afghanistan forced


Carter


conclude


that


Soviet


threat


was


predominant


(Melanson,


1991)


Every administration since Truman confronted the dilemma










power


first


and


foremost


international


system.


The


legacy of the Truman Doctrine endured primarily because of the


inability


the


actors


international


system


transform


the


structure


that


system.


Neither


the


United


States nor the Soviet


Union


faced


any third


equal


adversary.


The


relative


positions


many


other


states


rose


during


the


three


decades


Cold


War,


but


none


displaced


challenged


two poles of


political


and military power.


Waltz


(1979:


171)


maintained,


under


this


condition,


pattern of responding to moves that might upset the balance is


global


one


because


bipolar


world


there


are


peripheries.


U.S.


Foreign Assistance


Policy


Since


World War


Much


goals


foreign


policy


throughout


the


postwar


period


were


defined


during


years


immediately


following


World


War


means


achieving


those


objectives


were


developed


during


that


time


well.


Rather


than


directly


strategy


was


confronting


designed


Soviet


forestall


power,


soviet


containment


expansion


inserting American resources


in areas that were still


outside


Soviet


sphere.


The


Truman


Doctrine'


prescription


endured throughout the Cold War. Moreover,


the choices made in










foreign


assistance


programs


United


States


during


Cold War provided an enduring means


for pursuing


containment


whose


constancy


reflected


globalist


nature


the


objective.


Truman's


Marshall


Plan


Point


Four


Program


established


precedents


that


influenced


later


assistance


allocation decisions.


The


announcement


Marshall


Plan


came


directly


the heels of


the announcement


the Truman Doctrine.


design


the plan


for the cooperative


rehabilitation


of Europe


was


the most


ambitious and most expensive


foreign assistance


effort


which


the


United


States


developed.


implementation


was


far the


most


successful


program


the


the history


of U.S.


aid.


The Marshall


Plan served as the


foremost expression of the new policy of containment as it was


outlined


"economic


Truman


social


Doctrine.


political


sought


counter


deterioration"


Western


Europe,


the atmosphere which


Truman had stated


opened doors


for subversion.


The


success


Marshall


Plan


resulted


from


the


additive nature of

implementation of


factors


involved with


program.


the development and


"Nowhere else have conditions


been


appropriate


economic


approach


political


development"


(Packenham,


1973


34)


The


program


was










already


economically


developed.


economic


infrastructure


was


shambles


following


war,


but


the


skills


resources


necessary


resuming


productive


economies


were


still available.


And finally,


the European recipients and the


United States shared


fundamental


political


interests.


Containment was a strategy with long-term goals,


and the


initial


successes


first


dramatic


component


U.S.


officials to conclude that they had chosen a proper instrument


pursue


model


later


decisions,


Marshall


Plan


connected


economic


welfare


with


political


stability


Economic


intervention


enhanced


prospects


economic


development


and


political


stability.


With


stable


political systems and strong economies the threat of


internal


subversion


was


minimized.


The


European


Recovery


Program


was


evidence


keep


that


Communist


economic


parties


approach


from


could


coming


revive


power,


economies,


restore


stability


democracy


(Packenham,


1973)


Belief


that


economic


modernization


would


stimulate


political


changes


encouraged


U.S.


decision


makers


extend


the


principles


foreign assistance to other regions.


The goals of


assistance


were solidified by the


turnaround


Western


Europe.


In his 1949 inaugural address


, President Truman expanded


the


range


U.S.


assistance


strategy


including


broad


. .










states which were


left behind


the world


economy.


American


technical


know-how


was


abundant.


The


Point


Four


initiative


coincided with the processes of decolonization swelling in the


international


system.


Beyond


the explicitly defensive motive


of keeping these states from becoming part of the Soviet bloc,


Point Four was conceived


as a means of integrating those areas


more directly into the Western political


order.


According the


wording


emerged,


Act


Point Four was


International


justified


Development


on the grounds


which


national


security.


Like the Marshall


Plan before


, and like most of the


economic programs which followed,


Point Four was considered to


more


than


just


sound


economic


investment.


" Supplying


economic


and


technical


assistance


states


with


troubled


economies


provided


U.S.


with


opportunities


constructing a broader and more solid front against communist


gain


(Truman,


1956).


extension


methods


developed


the


Truman


administration


pursue


containment,


Point


Four


followed


consistent path of U.S.


response to the external


environment.


The Marshall Plan addressed the vulnerabilities in the core of


the bipolar system.


Having arrested Soviet encroachment there


with its substantial financial


effort,


American policy makers


looked


outside


Europe.


Developments


Third


World








60

provided through the Marshall Plan. Other circumstances, such


as the


Korean


War,


became


priorities


detracted


from


impetus established


in Truman's


inaugural


address.


However,


Point


Four


marked


the


beginning


official


policy


which


directed


U.S.


resources


non-European


states


economic


development.


also


represented


awareness


that


U.S.


competition


with


Soviet


Union


would


limited


Europe. Point Four also demonstrated the growing acceptance of

the particular means for engaging in that global competition.


The Korean War,


with its sustantiation of the principles


NSC-68,


transformed


foreign


assistance


from


technical


approach to one with a strong military supplement.


Even though


the American leaders wanted to promote democratic development


LDCs,


the


dominance


military


assistance


U.S.


programs


after


1950


meant


that


more


important


issue


was


whether


recipient


countries


could


stand


external


military


threats.


Foreign


assistance


began


subtle


technical initiative to bolster non-industrial regions against

the vicissitudes of economic development to promote "orderly"


political


change.


quickly


evolved


into


a program


more


direct military assistance whose aim was to keep allies strong


without draining their economic resources.


And it was evident


that military strength in those regions served to counter both











the


Third


World


demonstrated


belief


that


political


conditions


would


follow


economic


improvements.


This


tenet


persisted with varying degrees of


consequence


throughout


Cold War.


The Mutual Security


Act Period


(1951-1961)


The


concept


development


assistance


was


subverted


the military


emphasis that developed


after the


fall


of China


and


onset


Korean


War.


The


four


one


ratio


economic to military aid in 1949 was reversed by 1951 and even


the officially


stated


goal


the Marshall


Plan


from


1950 to


1952


changed from economic recovery to rearmament


(Packenham,


1973)


The


Mutual


Security


Act


1951


institutionalized


Truman's


"defense


conviction


support"


that


economic


because


was


assistance


the


constituted


foundation


militarization.


This


served


legislative


umbrella


under


which


foreign


economic


military


ass


instance


were


allocated over the next decade.


The activities of the Economic


Cooperation


Administration,


Technical


Cooperation


Administration, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program were


gathered

Security


under


legislative


Act


defense


authorization

orientation


the


Mutual


overshadowed


development


initiative


stemming


from


Marshall


Plan








62

reflected the organizational commitment of the U.S. government


to the


pursuit of


containment


through


foreign assistance.


The


resources


Mutual


Security


programs


the


1950s were primarily directed toward states on the peripheries


of the Soviet Union and


China.


"Forward defense"


countries


Turkey,


Pakistan,


Taiwan,


South


Korea


South


Vietnam


received the bulk of assistance primarily designed to support


their armed forces and supplement their economies.


three states accounted for over


The latter


40 percent of Mutual Security


aid commitments


(Gordon,


1979).


But the periphery states were


not


given


development


assistance


near


proportions


delivered to European states under the Marshall Plan.


Economic


assistance to the Third World did


increase substantially,


but


the


total


allocation


level


declined


assistance


Western


Europe


receded.


The


European


share


economic


assistance from 1949 to 195


1957 that annual average fell


averaged 86 percc

I to 25 percent.


. From 1953 to


And from 1958 to


1961 the average share of foreign economic assistance going to


Europe fell


to just 6 percent.


However


, whereas the total U.S.


economic

1949-1952


assistance


period,


averaged


only


$3.4


billion


averaged


annually

billion


the

the


1958-1961


period


(Packenham,


1973:


Just as continuities


existed in the rationales justifying


54)











funds


were


explicitly


"tied"


purchases


of U.S.


goods


and services.


The Mutual
notifying


of goods


aid


Security


Act


American


established procedures


enterprises


produced by them were


funds,


typically


that


uninformed


even


about


have an opportunity to bid.


Efforts by the Eisenhower


when


to be made


small


foreign


(Montgomery,


administration


purchases
from any


businessmen,


markets,


1962:


to extend


would
130)

financial


authorization for foreign assistance programs beyond one year


were


never


successful.


administration


consistently


submitted


"deliberately


inflated"


appropriation


requests


because


Congress


inevitably


approved


much


lower


amounts


(Montgomery,


1962)


. These


factors


inhibited the establishment


of long-term approaches


toward


economic


ass


instance


policies.


They


resulted


from


normal


executive-legislative


political


positioning and they revealed the lack of long-range planning


for utili


zing economic assistance


for political


advantage.


This


dilemma


characterized


assistance


policy


subsequent programs as well.


It involved a question of methods


rather than goals.


During the Mutual


Security Act period


search


productive


mix


principle


method


was


evident


reorganization


assistance


agencies.


The


Technical


Cooperation


Agency


(TCA)


Mutual


Security


Agency (MSA) merged into the Foreign Operations Administration


(FOA)


1953.


1954


this


aaencv


was


superseded


by the


*\ f










The administration's struggle


to find


a proper approach


to foreign assistance became more complicated when the Soviet

Union began to compete with the United States as an aid donor


to the Third World.3


was not


In this competition between donors,


just an instrument for supporting allies,


aid


but also "a


tool


with


which


bid


favor


nations


yet


committed"


(Gordon,


1979


counter


the


Soviet


American policy makers established such


programs as


Food


Peace


(P.L.


480).


U.S.


also


moved


away


from


the


military


assistance


emphasis


reinstated


more


developmental


focus


that


obj ectives,


although


still


rationalized in terms of U.S.


security interests,


were geared


more toward enabling


economic growth and


political


stability


in emerging Third World states.


This gradual shift back to the


original


emphasis


assistance


was


also


reaction


proliferation of newly


independent states


in the


1950s.


Most


were


not


interested


East-West


political


competition.


They were primarily concerned with getting their economies in


order


and stabilizing their national


development.


Critics


Eisenhower


administration's


military


emphasis argued the military and economic assistance should be


considered


separately.


1958


Democratic


members


Senate Committee on Foreign Relations expressed this sentiment










(Packenham,


1973:


influential


government-commissioned study


M.I.T.


Max Millikan and W.W. Rostow of


maintained that development aid should be allocated to


developing states in accordance with their abilities to use it


effectively.


Moreover,


Millikan and Rostow's


study


contended


that


stable


democratic


governments


would


follow


economic


development


promoted


through


U.S.


assistance


(Millikan


Rostow,


1957).


The


evolution


development


assistance


had


come


full


circle


since Truman's earlier


initiatives.


Conditions


in the


international system had pushed American strategies away from


the development focus of the Marshall Plan and Point Four


international conditions had brought them back.


But the system


had


continued


change.


Numerous


newly


independent


states


were entering the state system without professed allegiance to


either the U.S.


or the Soviet Union.


Their economies and their


political systems were fragile and uncertain.


Given the nature


of America's global


commitment to containment


, they could not


ignored.


The


Foreign Assistance Act


Period


(1961-Present)


Development assistance policy since 1961 has been marked


by a continued search for the


proper combination of principle











continuously


refocused


redefined


policy


makers


have


reconsidered


this


method


prospects.


The


tension


has


not been one between military


economic


assistance,


was


the


1950s,


much


been


one


between


the


proper approach to development assistance.


Part of the problem


stemmed


from


the


ever


changing


environment


toward


which


assistance was directed.


Part of the problem,


however,


stemmed


from


conceptual


ambiguities


that


drove


each


subsequent


definition


of the aid mandate.


The


Foreign


Assistance


1961


replaced


Mutual


Security


Act


and mandated


that


attention


should


be directed


toward long-range assistance goals not dissimilar to those of


the Marshall Plan.


As one of the Senators who urged Eisenhower


reassess


importance


economic


assistance,


Kennedy


believed


that


this


type


of aid would serve


U.S.


interests as


well


as military


aid.


Following the argument


of Millikan and


Rostow,


believed


development


LDCs


that


was


long-term


prerequisi


economic

te for


and

the


social

type of


international


community


necessary


self-interests


the


United


States.


The


Agency


International


Development


(AID)


that


absorbed


International


Cooperation


Administration


1961


was


guided


official


who


believed


that


economic


development


"required


modernization










Adjusting


more


generalized


development


approach


meant disseminating assistance


to a wide-range of


developing


states.


This


diffusion


confounded


attempts


formulate


criteria


allocating


aid.


The


political


goals


containment were not as apparent.

to annual congressional approval,


Appropriations were subject

and Congress was hesitant to


disburse


large


amounts


political


factors


did


warrant it.


Although Kennedy's Alliance for Progress to Latin


America


was


dramatic


shift


toward


new


perspective,


provided the administration with


important


lessons about


limits


promoting


democracy


through


economic


assistance.


While


aid


to most


Latin


American


states


doubled


four


year


period


following


the


1961


initiative,


succession


coups caused him to retreat to standard Cold War postures.


amount


most


recipients


fell


precipitously


the


following


five


years.


Latin


American


aid


reflected


the


changes


in aid policy globally in that assistance became less


diffuse.


was


once


more


concentrated


primarily


geopolitically important countries.


And whereas the amount of


economic assistance increased significantly in the first years


4 Only Guatemala and Haiti received less aid in the 1962-


period


compared


1957-61


years.


Thirteen


states


received less aid in the 1967-71 period than they received in


the 1962-66 years.


Total aid fell from $4.1 billion in 1962-66










the


Foreign


Assistance


Act


period,


subsequently


declined.


the wake of the


f


the Alliance for Progress


:ailure

, and


h


of development assistance


in the aftermath of the dismal


record of development and military assistance to Vietnam,


the


Nixon administration sought a further redefinition of the aid


methodology.


The


"New


Directions"


order


the


Foreign


Assistance Act of 1973 was designed to push emphasis away from

the traditional concerns with social infrastructural projects,


economic growth and industrialization.


Instead,


ass


instance was


targeted


poorest


developing


societies.


But


unlike


the


initial


response


development


shift


assistance


policy,


New


Directions


rhetoric


was


supported by


increased


funding.


The Nixon administration was


beset by security concerns that overshadowed the "basic needs"


philosophy it espoused for U.S.


development assistance to the


extent


that


some


argued


that


basic


needs


constituted


humanitarian


gloss


practices


that


would


have


existed


anyway"


(Wood,


1986:


196) .


geopolitical


reasons,


traditional


recipients


continued


receive


bulk


economic and military


assistance.


When Carter assumed the presidency, he argued for greater


restraint and morality


foreign


policy


. Human


rights was a










Agency


(ICDA)


and


charged


ensure


that


foreign


aid


policies toward LDCs


"passed a developmental litmus test" and


"bring


coherence


programs


present


multilateral


them


bilateral


comprehensive


assistance


budget


Congress


orientation


" (Wasserman,


nor


1983:


ICDA


Neither


initiative


human


were


rights


successfully


implemented.


pattern


consistent


with


his


predecessors,


Carter faced external conditions and internal constraints that


undermined his efforts on both counts.


ICDA never received the


bureaucratic


independence


required


to achieve


its mandate


free


development


from


immediate


foreign


policy


interests.


Human rights never fully surmounted the existing rationales of


development assistance.


Stohl, et al.


(1984)


concluded that in


Carter's foreign assistance policy human rights considerations


"were


subverted


perceptions


more


pressing


national


security concerns.


" Cold War considerations were more evident


allocation


decisions


that


translation


professed principle into policy,


the Carter administration was


not consistent


it allocation


of assistance.5


Comparisons


different


administrations


during


Foreign Assistance Act Period reveal a continuity of purpose.

Antipathy toward communism and fear of instability are "deeply


rooted" political


values in American society that constrained









70
Foreign Assistance Acts bely the patterns of application which


each


administration


exhibited


during


this


period.


Every


president


has


manipulated


principles


method


while


letting


the


principles


purpose


evolve


according


the


larger transformations of the international system.


President


Reagan


, however


, sought


to redefine


both


ends and means when


he occupied


Cold War


the presidency


The Reaqan


1981.


Doctrine


The Reagan administration was committed


"exorcising"


ghost


Vietnam


from


America's


foreign


policy


calculations.


By assuming unlimited resources for defense and


downplaying prospects


for negotiating with


the Soviet Union,


President Reagan attempted to reverse the perceived decline of


U.S.


power


relative


Soviet


Union's.


Containment


Soviet power and influence was unambiguously the top objective


among U.S.


goals.


Military power was


principle means


limiting Soviet expansion.


Reagan's


strategy was


premised


"starkly


bipolar view


geopolitics"


(Brown,


1983:


570).


Policy appeared to return to the containment strategies of the


immediate


postwar period.


Reagan


followed


pattern


of his


predecessors


reassessing


American


commitments


world.


Instead,


focused


on rebuilding the means to pursue










using American military


ass


distance to aid insurgent forces in


the


Third


World


Labeled


"Reagan


Doctrine,


was


Reagan's


attempt


make


containment


less


defensive


(see


Lagon,


1992).


While previous administrations had episodically


engaged


attempts


unseat


Soviet


supported


regimes


(for


example the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba)


pursued this course of


action as official


, none had actively

government policy.6


reversal


liberation


roles,


movements


U.S.


against


policy


Soviet


support


supported


national

regimes


resembled the Soviet Union's historical position of assisting


insurgencies against imperialist regimes


The policy committed


covert and overt American economic and military


ass


instance to


anti-communist movements in their struggles against communist


regimes.


Material support was given to Afghan rebel


fight against both Soviet armed


forces and


in their


the Soviet-backed


Kabul


government.


American


was


extended


opposition


groups


Cambodia


Angola.


And


most


notedly,


U.S.


assistance


was


delivered


to Nicaraguan


contras


their


attempts


bring


down


the


Sandanista


regime


(McCormick,


1992).

The ironic twist of the Reagan Doctrine's application of

the Truman Doctrine's prescriptions for containment reflected


how


different


were


circumstances


that


the


United


States











faced


the


1980s


compared


those


faced


the


1940s.


Reagan


sought


make


U.S.


policy


more


active


instead


reactive.


counter


His


Soviet


emphasis


was


gains


rebuilding


make


American


Soviets


power


recognize


the


costliness of their expansionism.


Reagan's desire to increase


American


But


power was


the United States


driven


in the


perception


1980s was


erosion.


the same dominant


power


had


been


the


1940s


1950s.


The


world


had


changed.


Although


U.S.


U.S.S.R.


were


still


the


relatively


superior


political


military


powers


the


international


system,


other


states


had


narrowed


the


gap.


Despite


continued


strategic


significance


their


bilateral


relationship,


other


issues


emerged


which


required


multilateral


solutions.


Premised


"hardheaded


realist"


conception


the


bipolar nature of the international system,


security replaced


development

allocations.


principle


From


this


criterion


perspective,


Reagan


assistance

considered


assistance

served se


funds


scurity


to be

ends.


fungible

His


that


economic


rej section


assistance

standard


economic/military


unwilling


(Lebovic,


separate


1988).


distinction

security


This conception of


suggested


from


that


development


interests


was


issues


resembled


the










the broader view of power relations


between


the U.S.


and the


Soviet


Union.


Development


only


mattered


affected


balance


power


alignment


the


system.


The


Reagan


administration made no pretense that the Economic Support Fund


(ESF)


, the


major portion


foreign


ass


instance


program,


adhered


to the development approach.


threat


subsided.


Soviet


Union


collapsed.


Foreign


continues.


Other


security


issues


remain.


The


Middle


East


draws


lion's


share


U.S.


security


assistance,


and


even


though


East-West


dimension


American


interests


Middle


East


longer


around,


U.S.


interests remain. A paradox of Reagan's calculated effort


redefine


interests


stark


manner


presents


itself


now


that


the


order


past.


Foreign


Assistance


Act


period,


premised


goals


containment


, has


not


ended


becuase no new


legislative mandate


replaced


the old.


The End


the Cold


War:


New World


Order


Whereas


results of


the Second


World War transformed


the characteristics of the international system,


establishing


bipolar


system


nation-states


that


revolved


around


the


competitive relations between the United States and the Soviet


Union,


the end of


the Cold War


produced a


system











such,


American


continuity


foreign policy


goals


which


since World War


characterized


now seems


to have


come


end.


Bipolarity


gone.


The


Soviet


Union


collapsed


. No other power


is capable of


challenging American


influence


military


might


way


the


Soviet


Union


did


during the Cold War.


international


system


is changing at


an unprecedented


pace.


Changes


the


international


system


occur


, however,


the midst of historical


continuities.


The absence of bipolar


competition


does


mean


absence


interstate


competition.


Among the new realities of the post-Cold War era


are patterns of


interaction inherent in the state system.


The


latent conflicts unleashed by the disintegration of the Soviet


system


are


evidence


that


Cold


War


does


ensure a


peaceful


future:


Many


of the basic generaliz


politics
the sense


remain unaltered


that


there


is n


nations of


: it is still a
o international


international


narchic


sovereign


that can make and


enforce


laws and agreements.


The


security dilemma remains as well,


with the problems


creates


states


who


would


like


cooperate


but


whose


specific
including
rivalries


security
causes
desires


hostile


perspectives


requirements
of conflict
for greater


not


still


prestige,


nationalisms,
incompatible


mesh.


Many


remain,
economic


divergent
standards of


legitimacy
ambitions.
aggression


, religious animosities,


To
and


put
spirals


more


and


territorial


generally,


insecurity


both


tension


can


still


disturb


peace.


(Jervis


1991-1992:


- S











the


post-Cold


War


international


system


are


more


pronounced


since the standard referents for gauging American security are


gone.


Indeed,


the


dilemma


facing


the


American


leaders


likened


that


"the


astonished


lottery winner,


" in


that


"the


U.S.


government,


morning


after


communism' s


sudden


collapse,


hardly


knows what


to do"


(Sorensen,


1990:


The choices facing American leaders are similar to those


which leaders faced throughout the Cold War


. Their efforts to


contribute


and


manage


new


world


order


must


reconcile


means to ends.


This task is complicated by the fact that there


as yet,


no clearly defined American


interest to


take


the


place of the goal of containment.


It is further complicated by


the increasing multipolarity that reflects a greater diversity


of interests now that the Soviet threat


is gone.


And finally,


task


matching


means


ends


complicated


because


"there


an emerging


'global


agenda


' of


new


and


old


issues


that


could


form


basis


new


international


priorities"


(Sewell,


1991:


36)


Problems


such


sustaining


economic growth in LDCs, eliminating poverty,


safeguarding the


environment,


promoting


open


political


systems


require


attention


from U.


policy makers.


Postponing any definition of


American


purpose while


international


system


this


"state


flux"


does


not










decisive


player"


wherever


leaders


choose


involve


(Krauthammer,


1991) .


Moreover,


absence


overt


military-security


concerns


Cold


War


merely


increases


salience


of other


issues


they


affect


the


security


the


United


States.


Concern


economic


independence


and


peaceful


enhancement


democracy,


Sorensen


(1990:


states,


are not as


"defense oriented or negative in nature as


containment


. nor as costly


in tax dollars,


nor as easy to


simplify


for political


purposes.


they


are equally global


scope .,


realities


(Sorensen,


postwar


1990:


bipolarity


Thus,


prompted


just


American


internationalism to protect American interests,


the exigencies


of unipolarityy" in the post-Cold War period suggest that this


continuity will


persist.


Political


Ramifications of U


. Foreign Aid


The debate over


foreign aid has consistently been waged


the both


the conceptual


political


levels.


At both


levels


proponents


have


argued


that


foreign


assistance


serves American foreign policy goals.


Despite its


long tenure


in the foreign policy repertoire of the United States,


foreign


assistance


continues


controversy


focus


conceptual


level,


debate


the


and


extension










in varying degrees


in public


attitudes about


the proper role


of the United States in global politics.

many Americans feel about U.S. relation


The ambivalence which


s with the rest of the


world does not completely subvert their opinions that the U.S.


should


active


global


affairs.


when


the


issue


foreign


assistance


considered,


often


isolationism


the


past


resurrects


itself


skepticism


which


many


express


(Graves,


1991)


. However,


the context in which foreign


aid


developed


diminished


strength


arguments


against


internationalism.


The consensus that persisted for two decades


testifies to the credibility of the perceptions of threat and

responsibility.


political


level,


debate


over


foreign


assistance


revolved


around


ulitity


the


perennial


tension


extended


between


available


application


means


assistance


suitable


did


not


ends.


remove


The


this


tension.


Debate


usually


centered


around


development


productive


intervention


strategies within acceptable


limits.


This


debate


illustrated


how


conceptual


dilemma


internationalism


versus


isolationism


was


connected


political


discourse


over means.


internationalism


was


accepted


principle


the


question


remained


how


American


commitments could be extended.


As the history of the Cold War











political


level


constant


contention


about


utility suggested that any


level of commitment was susceptible


to opposition,


regardless of the purposes.


Black's


(1968:


scanning


Congressional


Record


illustrated


timelessness of this aspect of political consideration.


As he


quoted:


the


road


to bankruptcy,


not


very


long


road at that


America


. They


short


are deliberately


Our


Uncle


flirtations has become the easy prey of


[Sam]


selling
in his


foreign and


domestic grafters,


vampires,


and gold diggers.


place


governing


ourselves,


place


looking after our own people,


we are now trying to


bribe and govern the world.

Black makes the pointed observation that these quotes were not


part


the


debate


over


assistance


1960s.


They


were


part of


the debates over the Marshall


Plan


1948


Point


Four


1950.


Research has shown


that


the apprehension


over


financial


"giveaways" was misplaced when it was based on the assumption


that


the


recipient


states


were


sole


beneficiaries


American largesse.


The humanitarian view of foreign assistance


was never predominant in practice


(Pincus,


1967;


Loehr et al.,


1976).


observation


that


"individuals


may


humane


and


disinterested


, but nations


are


not"


(Griffin and Enos,


1970:


314) ,


applies to the record of U.S.


foreign aid in the postwar


period.


a


First and


foremost


, foreign aid serves


the interests










Therefore,


political


conceptual


arguments


about


foreign assistance cannot be addressed singularly


. Throughout


the


postwar


period


constant


manipulation


foreign


assistance policy


focused primarily


on the policy


instrument


and its principles.


Policy makers accepted the broader ends of


policy


varying


degrees


across


the


postwar


period.


Transformations


external


environment


modified


globalist thrust which developed in the wake of World War


the


condition


international


system,


despite


growing uncertainties and its expanding complexities,


endured


most


basic


level.


The


political


considerations


foreign assistance are representative of the dynamic processes


involved


foreign-policy


making.


External


continuity


and


change


force


decision


makers


develop


responses


while


internal


continuities


discontinuities


condition


methods and


principles employed.


Concluding


Remarks


U.S.


development-aid


policy


reflected


the


changing


systemic conditions throughout the postwar period. Development


assistance


evolved


part


broader


design


U.S.


external


policy as a new


order arose


from


the destruction of


World War


The


international system emerged from World War











foreign policy goals of the United States were


fundamentally


different from those of


its prewar


history


. The central


U.S.


foreign policy goals of containing Soviet power and influence


persisted


for over


forty years


even


though


international


system


changed.


Under


containment


"umbrella"


U.S.


development


assistance


reflected


systemic


transitions;


however,


containment


prevailed


because


the


international


system was defined by the dominant power relationship between


the U.S.


and the Soviet


Union.


The


periodic


redefinitions of


U.S.


development commitments represented reassessments of the


means


pursue


larger


ends


containment.


They


represented

occurring


the


reactions


underneath


U.S.


bipolar


leaders

structure


the

the


changes

postwar


world.


However,


this era has


passed.


Cold War


over.


The


basic


premise


behind


internationalism


U.S.


foreign


policy


gone.


wake


Cold


War,


U.S.


officials


interact


with


allies


former


adversaries


across


wide


range


issues


that


cannot


subsumed


under


the


general


policy


objectives


containment.


Habits


developed


over


the


course of


four decades are being subjected to the tensions of


change


. Change


level


systemic


structure


suggests


that policy perspectives require fundamental reassessments. If











development


assistance


policy


to reflect


altered


outlooks


which


systemic


transformation


suggest.


This


important


question


to which


we now


turn.














CHAPTER 3


RESEARCH DESIGN:


STATE LEARNING AND THE FOREIGN POLICY MODEL


OF U.S.


DEVELOPMENT


ASSISTANCE


Before


look


see


whether


the


United


States


government has learned from the recent and profound changes in


international


system,


we must


explain


the


importance


studying


foreign-assistance


policy.


foreign


aid


were


the


subject


our


investigation


own


merits,


significance


allocated


would


assistance


connected


the

the


programs


level

types


funding

programs


funded,


types


recipients


granted


assistance.


While these considerations are worthy of serious examination,


practical


significance


theoretical


importance


studying foreign-assistance policy are much broader in scope.


The question of


and


state


explanation.


occurring


learning


light


international


expands


the e

system


the domain of


lormous


inquiry


transformations


, the question


state


learning requires attention. The foreign-assistance issue-area


very


suitable


policy


domain


from


which


study


impact of


international


change on


foreign


policy behavior.


Despite the relatively small annual budgetary allocations


directed


toward


foreign


assistance


programs,


foreign aid










further


foreign


policy


interests


subject


controversy,


" the


U.S.


"has


interests


abroad


which


cannot be


secured


military


means


and


the


support


which


traditional


appropriate.


foreign


methods


diplomacy


Furthermore,


assistance


United


majority


are


only


States


developing


has


part


provided


states.


The


global


reach


this


foreign


policy


area


demonstrates


the


scope


practical


American

grounds,


interests

studying


in the international

American development


system.


assistance


enables


monitor


how


change


the


system


affects


approach


the


U.S.


government


relations


with


majority of states.


The transitions in foreign-aid policy over


the


last


several


decades


illustrate


how


U.S.


government


recognized


previous


chapter:


changing

r disclose


conditions.


how


The


shifts


narrative


emphasis


the


from


security


development


were


fashioned


largely


the


emergence of


new states whose


primary


concerns were centered


around


economic


issues.


Although


level


commitment


varied across


regions


over


several


U.S.


administrations,


foreign-assistance policy recognizably changed in response to


external


change.


On substantive grounds the issue of foreign assistance is

also important because the recent end of the Cold War suggests










With


ending


Cold


War,


contemporary


international


politics


are


becoming


more


centered


around


"low


politics"


issues


such


economic


development


stability,


environmental problems,


and health issues.


The "high politics"


concerns


military


security


have


been


removed


from


states policy considerations, but the clear-cut definitions of


security


factors


are


more


complicated


international


system

Foreign


reflects

economic


trend


toward


greater int

assistance


"low


:erdependence


clearly


politics"


among


more


priorities.


members.


connected


Added


with


these


factors,


the


U.S


and


other


donors


face


the


reality


resource constraints.


Ryan


(1990:


181)


suggests,


for example,


that


"American


developing


world


has


been


perhaps


seen as a luxury that the nation could afford when its economy


was


While


booming


donor


and


states


concept


reorient


their


budget


deficit


geopolitical


unknown.


rationales,


including their purposes


for supplying foreign aid


, they must


also


deal


with


domestic


limits


which


can


affect


their


abilities


fulfill


expand


their


foreign


assistance


obligations.


The


current


situation


international


system


presents an optimal opportunity for addressing the theoretical


question


state


learning


through


investigation










foreign-assistance policy


. The


longevity


the


U.S.


foreign


assistance programs gives


us a significant


record


from which


to study


change.


It provides


us with patterns


comparison


across time adequate in length to


assess


real shifts in policy


goals


and


strategies.


Since


foreign


aid


conceptually


connected


changes


broader


the


assistance


changes


principles


policy


American


American


can


foreign


evaluated


goals


policy,


parts


perspectives.


More


abstractly,


our


study


foreign


assistance


can


assist


providing empirical support for hypotheses about the abilities


of states to learn in the international system.


It can provide


additional


cog


structure


understanding


foreign-policy


behavior.


This


benefit,


derived


from


our


improved understanding of


foreign assistance as an instrument


of foreign policy,


can


further


our understanding


of foreign


policy


interrelationship with


global


politics.


Statement of Research Questions


Our


focus


state


learning,


therefore,


addressed


from


investigation


narrow


issue-area


foreign-assistance


environment.


policy


Again,


changing


utility


international


investigating


foreign-assistance policy in order to determine if governments










change


the


international


system


suggests


that


the


U.S.


needs


to continuously


reassess


foreign-policy


goals


instruments


order


more


ably


meet


basic


national


objectives


such


security


prosperity.


Because


foreign


aid serves multiple objectives,


and because of


perennial


inclusion


question


the


learning


strategies


can


American


investigated


statecraft,


examining


the

the


pattern


behavior


foreign


policy-making.


the


preceding


chapter


was


apparent


that


instrument


foreign


assistance


been


subjected


numerous


modifications in scope and composition.


But the designs behind


foreign assistance were


not redefined


the extent


that


components were.


With the end of the Cold War


, however


, the major goals of


foreign aid that sustained its political purposes and provided


it with political support have diminished


As Layne (1993:


states,


"The Cold War structure has been swept away.


American


policymakers must now think about international politics from


a wholly new analytical


framework


" To reiterate,


the end of


the Cold War,


the collapse of communism and the disintegration


of the Soviet Union,


stand collectively as a breakpoint in the


development of the international system.


These transformations


simultaneously


represent


portentous


shift


interstate








87

predictability of the Cold War are gone as are the threats to


global


survival


that


lingered


throughout


forty-odd


years


of superpower rivalry.


As perhaps


the only


global


power with


the


influence,


resources


presence


to construct


stable


new


order


, the


United


States


faces


external


imperatives


changing


foreign policy perspective.


Whether or not the United States responds to the changes


international


system


can


monitored


through


our


investigation


obligations.


the


The


patterns


breakpoint


foreign


assistance


reconfiguration


the


international


leaders

political


system

redirect


problems of


currently

attention


underway

toward


former Soviet


has

the


Union a


forced

economic

nd its f


U.S.

and


ormer


bloc client states.


This change


is only a redefinition of the


rationale


interest


these


states.


The


rationale


longer competition or insecurity.


Rather,


it is uncertainty as


prospects


states


into


productive


larger


order


market


reintegratior

t oriented


these


democratic


nations.


The pace of


change has


been swift,


but


the pace of


response has been less


so.


Learning reflects


an ability to


reassess


in the


face of


change


to better


cope


with


optimally


to manage


Since


foreign


longer


novel


approach


- a


I 1


1 _


II II










objectives and its development after World War II,


as an indicator of the ability of the U.S.


can be seen


government to learn


about


the


means


ends


policy


new


international


system.


the


wake


Cold


War,


foreign


policy


can


serve


as a gauge


American


leaders'


ability


respond


systemic change through a standard instrument of


statecra ft.


Whereas


foreign


may


initially


have


represented


conscious redefinition of American goals in light of systemic


change,


the


question


now


whether


face


recent systemic change


foreign-assistance


policy provides us


with some insight as to whether governments continue to learn.


The


current


conditions


international


system have


not


evinced a


pattern


to which


the U.S.


government has developed


new


thorough


conceptual


prism


viewing


American


security and diplomatic activities


(Sorensen,


1990) .


In part,


the absence of bipolarity multiplies the considerations which


American


officials


must


face.


new


emergent


configuration


state


relations


also


pushes


certain


issues


such


environment


economic


stability


toward


the


center of


American


concerns


in the


international


system.


The


ability of the government to adapt to and master new systemic


conditions


therefore


important


theoretical


problem


worthy


of serious study.











Research Desicn:


Analvz inQ


Relations Over Time


The objective of this study to determine if policy change

follows systemic change is addressed by employing an analysis


the


covariations


over


time


between


dependent


and


independent variables.


The eleven


years


under review provide


us with enough time-point observations to follow the patterns

of behavior before and after the systemic breakpointt" to see

if patterns of covariation change in response to the external


changes.


The purpose of a our approach is to determine whether


breakpointt"


subsequent


impact.


Pattern


differences before and after the breakpointt" would differ in


particular


manner


subsequent policy


external


decisions.


Like an


changes


interrupted


affect


time-series


design,


our


approach


follows


relations


across


time.


The


significance of particular variables


the period


can be monitored across


under review.


Chapter


discussed


different


theoretical


approaches toward state behavior


in the international system.


Our


discussion


included


varying


perspectives


about


systemic


influences on the foreign policies of


states.


It reviewed the


contrasting


conceptualizations


systemic


constraints


state


behavior.


particular,


discussion


Chapter


Interrupted


time-series


techniques


a -


are


sometimes











examined


the conceptual


connection between systemic contexts


and foreign policy choices.


From this discussion we proceeded


to examine


the theoretical


question of


state


learning


in the


international system and discuss the linkages between systemic


change


and


state


behavior.


examination


this


question


prompted us to


look at


issues of


choices and


outcomes


foreign p

analytical


olicy


decision-making.


approaches


state


reviewed


learning


the


with


various


particular


attention directed toward the issues of changing policy goals


in response to external


changes.


We contrasted the conceptual


definition


learning


productive


response


external


change


with


sys


temic,


state-centric,


and


organizational/individual


approaches


the


theoretical


question of


state learning


In Chapter


we reviewed the development of U.S.


foreign-


aid policy within the larger evolution of U.S.


postwar foreign


policy.


discussion


Chapter


provided


overview


the policy goals developed


response


to the transformation


international


system.


This discussion


illustrated how


the


United


States


was


capable


changing


basic


foreign


policy


objectives.


also


illustrated


how


the


U.S.


was


capable


developing


new


means


achieving


new


foreign


policy


goals.


The


underlying


thesis


Chapter


was


that










in the application and content of U.S.


foreign assistance did


not


indicate


assistance.


substantive


The


context


changes


foreign


goals


policy


choices


foreign

remained


stable.


We now turn to the third element of our analysis.


We will


test our hypothesis about the ability of the United States to


reassess


foreign


policy


goals


face


systemic


change.


Recognizing that the U


officials have demonstrated


this


capacity


the


past,


will


search


empirical


evidence


that


U.S


decision-makers


have


reoriented


their


approaches


foreign


policy


aftermath


the


recent


reconfiguation of the international system.


Although the Cold


War's


end


brought


about


changes


system


that


are


different from those engendered by the outcomes of the Second


World


War,


basic


outcome,


changed


structure


the


international


system,


just


profound.


will


test


our


hypothesis


executing


quantitative


analysis


U.S.


ODA


commitments


to each recipient


during


each


year of


our study.


Employing U


commitments


as our dependent


variable,


will


compare


attributes


and


variance


their


relative


significance


aid


the


recipients'


donor-recipient


relationships.


The statistical


analysis


will


proceed


three stages.