The situation in Haiti : hearing before U.S. Cong., Hse.Com. on Intl.Rela., Subcom. West. Hem., One Hundred Eighth Congr...

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The situation in Haiti : hearing before U.S. Cong., Hse.Com. on Intl.Rela., Subcom. West. Hem., One Hundred Eighth Congress, second session, March 3, 2004.
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U.S. Cong., Hse.Com. on Intl.Rela.

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THE SITUATION IN HAITI

COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY

3 5005 01049 800Z


HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
LAW LIBRARY


MARCH 3, 2004


AUG 1 9 2004


Serial No. 108-93 U.S. DEPOSITORY
COPY

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations








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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman


JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,
Vice Chairman
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida


TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California
ADAM SMITH, Washington
BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
CHRIS BELL, Texas


THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel
R. OBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director


SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
RON PAUL, Texas WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JERRY WELLER, Illinois GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa Samoa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CALEB MCCARRY, Subcommittee Staff Director
JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Professional Staff Member
TED BRENNAN, Professional Staff Member
JEAN CARROLL, Staff Associate









J -, .(I / *



(II)













CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES
The Honorable Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
W western H em isphere Affairs ......................................................... ................... 11
The Honorable Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and M igration ............................................................... 16
The Honorable Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator for Latin America
and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development .................. 18
Pierre-Marie Paquiot, President, State University of Haiti .............................. 69
Robert Maguire, Ph.D., Director of Programs in International Affairs, Trinity
C college ................................................................................................................... 72
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director, The Earth Institute at Columbia University ......... 80
The Honorable Timothy M. Carney, former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti ........... 82
The Honorable Orlando Marville, Former Head of the Election Observation
Mission of the Organization of American States (2000) ................................ 84
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Roger F. Noriega: Prepared statement ..................................... 14
The Honorable Arthur E. Dewey: Prepared statement ..................................... 18
The Honorable Adolfo A. Franco: Prepared statement ...................................... 21
Robert Maguire, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 74
APPENDIX
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York: Prepared statement ......................................................... 105
The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the
State of New York: Prepared statement ........................................................ 106
The Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California: Prepared state ent ................................................................... 107
Responses from the Honorable Roger F. Noriega to questions submitted for
the record by the Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ......................................... 108
Responses from the Honorable Arthur E. Dewey to questions submitted for
the record by the Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ......................................... 111
Responses from the Honorable Adolfo A. Franco to questions submitted for
the record by the Honorable Gregory W. Meeks ......................................... 113
Report on Haiti from the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2003, U.S. Department of State ............................. ....................................... 115
Report on Haiti from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
2003, U.S. Departm ent of State ............................. ....................................... 132
Letters from Haitian-Americans in support of the U.S. Administration ......... 136
Reverend Walter Fauntroy, former Delegate to the U.S. House of Representa-
tives from the District of Columbia: Prepared statement .............................. 144
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Fact Sheet on Humani-
tarian A assistance to H aiti .................................................................................. 148
Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues,
National Security and International Affairs Division, Government Account-
ing Office: Prepared statement submitted to the Committee on Inter-
national Relations on September 19, 2000 ..................................................... 149
Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the International
Civilian Support Mission in Haiti dated November 9, 2000 ......................... 164
Resolution 1529 (2004) of the United Nations Security Council adopted at
its 4919th meeting on February 29, 2004 .......................................................... 172




IV
Page
Excerpts from "Island of Disenchantment," by Charles Lane, printed in the
September 29, 1997 issue of The New Republic .......................................... 175











THE SITUATION IN HAITI


WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2004
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m. in Room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cass Ballenger (Chair-
man of the Subcommittee) Presiding.
Mr. BALLENGER. First of all, let me apologize to the people who
sat and waited. It really was not 45 minutes; it was only about 40
minutes.
Before we get started, I want to ask unanimous consent that all
Members of Congress in attendance today be permitted to join the
Members of the Subcommittee up here on the dais. Without objec-
tion, it is so ordered. Okay, thank you.
I wish to announce some of the ground rules upon which both
Ranking Member Mr. Menendez and I have agreed. First, Members
of the Subcommittee will be allowed to offer an opening statement.
Second, all Members of the House will be allowed to insert their
written statements into the record. Third, all Members, time per-
mitting, will be given 5 minutes to ask questions of the witnesses,
and I would like to say to those of you who are here, we are going
to be pretty strict on that 5 minutes, or we will be here all day.
Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent to allow all nonmembers of
the Subcommittee to speak when they are recognized by the Chair
to question witnesses.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Alternating by party, priority will be given first to the Members
of the Subcommittee; then, as time permits, to the Members of the
full International Relations Committee; and, finally, to Members
who do not serve on the International Relations Committee.
Fourth, in the interest of time, I am going to be pretty strict on
the clock so that each Member will have the best chance of being
able to say something.
Before I begin with my opening statement, I wish to remind ev-
eryone that this hearing will be lively and emotional, since we all
want a full debate, and I also ask that everyone remain cordial and
respectful throughout, if possible, and we have an obligation to up-
hold the dignity of our offices and this Subcommittee. While we
may disagree on some issues, we remain obligated to work together
to discuss the important issues which face our Nation and those of
Haiti. In my considered opinion, we can and must work together
in good faith to meet the challenges that we now face.
(1)






And now, my opening statement.
This afternoon we will examine the situation in Haiti. This situa-
tion in Haiti is, as has been for some time, extremely challenging.
The needs of the Haitian people for democracy, jobs, education, and
health care, and for basic necessities such as food and clean water
are as great as they have ever been. One can lay out terrible statis-
tics, but they cannot even begin to describe the situation of Haiti's
impoverished citizens.
The efforts of the some of the world's most experienced diplomats
to resolve the political stalemate in Haiti all ended in frustration.
The Deputy Secretary General of the Organization of American
States made 20 trips to Haiti to try to work out a solution. Presi-
dent Aristide resigned and left Haiti. Presidents in other countries,
including our own, have resigned for the good of the people.
Let me be clear. I fully support the steps taken by the Bush Ad-
ministration to give the people of Haiti a chance to build a better
future. Our government has acted with the backing of other gov-
ernments, particularly France and Canada, and has secured the
unanimous vote in the United Nations Council for a resolution that
supports actions to help Haiti.
There is something else I would like to say. There have been ac-
cusations that officials of the U.S. Government have committed a
felony punishable by death, and that is kidnapping. The head of
the Steele Foundation, which was responsible for President
Aristide's security, told me, personally, that if U.S. forces or any
other forces had tried to kidnap or otherwise harm President
Aristide, his men had orders to resist and were authorized to do
so with lethal force, if necessary. The accusation that President
Aristide was kidnapped is clearly false.
It is my hope that the hearing can support an initiative that I
agreed with several Members to come together on a bipartisan
basis to see how we can help Haiti. I have personally committed
to deliver humanitarian assistance to Haiti with private funds as
soon as the situation there permits.
There is a new provisional President in place in accordance with
the Haitian Constitution. American Marines are now on the ground
in Haiti, and it is time to move forward to help the Haitian people.
With that, I yield to the Ranking Member.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our Members are well-informed and very passionate about the
issue, but they have every intention of pursuing both the truth as
well as their policy points of views, and I do not expect anything
less.
Today the Americas are watching. The people of our hemisphere
watched this Administration turn its back on democracy and walk
out on a democratically-elected President. They were watching in
Bolivia where massive protests forced President Sanchez de Lozada
to resign last October. They were watching in Argentina where
riots overturned numerous Presidents in 2001. They were watching
in Ecuador when a massive protest overturned a President in 2000.
But let us be clear that in Haiti, President Aristide was con-
fronting a violent, step-by-step takeover of his country by rebel
leaders and not simply protests in the street. They watched, and
they got the clear messages that this Administration sent: This Ad-






ministration will not stand up for a democratically-elected Head of
State they do not like, and this Administration will stand idly by
as rebels, thugs, and prisoners topple a democratically-elected gov-
ernment.
Now, we should watch out. That is an incredibly dangerous and
irresponsible message to send reverberating throughout this hemi-
sphere, particularly at a time when many democracies are tee-
tering on the verge of chaos, crisis, and conflict. Let us be clear:
We do not get to choose who gets elected in other countries. We
may like them. We may hate them. And certainly it is our responsi-
bility to question their policies and to shape our own policy toward
them. But it must be clear to the world and to all the countries in
the Americas that we respect and support democratically-elected
Heads of State, period. In fact, I have serious concerns myself
about President Aristide's policies and actions, but that cannot dic-
tate our support for democracy.
This Administration has tried to suggest that when a gang of
thugs was on the President's doorstep, that his only choice was ei-
ther nonintervention and subsequent death, or resignation. Imag-
ine if millions of Americans had stormed the White House after the
2000 elections. Would we have said that the President's only choice
was to leave office or face the mob? Absolutely not. We would rail
that that action would cause the beginning of the end of our Con-
stitution and our democracy.
As Andreas Oppenheimer said in his column in the Miami Her-
ald last Sunday, and I quote:
"These are dark days for the cause of democracy in Latin
America. The fact that a few rebels in Haiti could sway major
countries to demand the resignation of an elected President
should sound alarm bells throughout the hemisphere. It hap-
pens at a time when violent antigovernment groups are
spreading in several Latin American countries with politically
weak elected leaders, and where some elected governments
seem more tolerant of dictatorship than their predecessors."
And we must look clearly at what this Administration's policies
have wrought. Yesterday Guy Philippe declared himself military
chief, and Louis-Jodel Chamblain, a convicted killer and accused F-
squad leader, says he is now in command of operations. According
to today's Washington Post, rebel leader Guy Philippe declared on
Tuesday that he was in control of Haiti's security forces, and then
watches as followers looted a downtown museum to the roaring ap-
proval of thousands of supporters outside the National Palace. And
as violence escalated in Port-au-Prince, bodies laid at intersections
and downtown warehouses, and unclaimed at the morgue.
And so we say to the people of the Americas, at least in this
hearing, we in Congress are watching, too, and we will not abdicate
our responsibility to democracy in this hemisphere. That is why I
am here today, to ask serious questions about the Administration's
policy in Haiti. How could this Administration allow so-called rebel
leaders, known thugs and convicted murderers to violently take
over Haiti, piece by piece, city by city? How could the Administra-
tion turn a deaf ear to Aristide's call for help, while passively sup-






porting his resignation and strongly urging him to reconsider
whether his Presidency should continue?
There are, of course, the allegations of President Aristide him-
self. They need to be explored and responded to. We must also fully
understand the Administration's involvement with opposition
groups and whether violent nondemocratic groups received funding
or support. And the Administration must account for its decision
not to send peacekeepers in without a political solution when it
was obvious that there would be no political solution without those
peacekeepers.
Finally, as we turn to our witnesses, I remind them that the
words, actions, and deeds of this Administration in Haiti must be
judged not only for their impact in Haiti, but for their consequences
throughout this hemisphere. The Americas are watching, and so
are we, gentlemen, and we look forward to your testimony and the
answers to the questions that we pose to you.
Mr. BALLENGER. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to say, I hope your telephones are ringing the way
mine are. I have gotten 45 phone calls from Florida, and everybody
there, every phone call I have gotten so far, is in favor of what hap-
pened.
Next is Congressman Weller.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for con-
ducting this important hearing today and for the opportunity to
give my statement as a Member of this Subcommittee.
Mr. Chairman, in recent days the Congress and the American
people have heard plenty of rhetoric from supporters of President
Aristide regarding the situation in Haiti. I believe it is now time
to move away from political rhetoric and talk about the facts. I
think it is important to remember that every American, including
the President and every Member of Congress, sincerely wants to
help the people of Haiti.
We continue to hear outrage from some that Aristide is no longer
in power, and that the United States should have stepped in to let
him keep his or help him keep his power over the Haitian people.
We even hear unfounded accusations that the United States kid-
napped Aristide and his family and forced them out of the country.
But what are the facts that we have known about Aristide and his
government?
Fact number 1: Under Aristide, Haiti blatantly became a hub of
narcotics trafficking. Where is the outrage to the fact that Barry
McCaffrey, President Clinton's own drug czar, said with regard to
Aristide and his role in narcotrafficking that:
"It is hard to imagine that Aristide himself isn't taking part in
this enormously lucrative form of criminal activity. It makes
one wonder why Aristide became very quickly Haiti's wealthi-
est man."
What do we hear Aristide supporters saying about the fact that
the United States State Department International Narcotics Con-
trol Strategy Report for 2003 revealed that top officials under the
government of Aristide were directly involved in narcotics traf-
ficking? Where is the outrage that under Aristide's government,
aircraft filled with drugs have been allowed not only to land on






roads in Port-au-Prince, but have received assistance from Haitian
National Police officers in blocking traffic, offloading the drugs, and
ground transport?
And one of the most important assertions made by Aristide's sup-
porters is that this is a coup against democracy. Let us make sure
and get the facts on the record today about what kind of democracy
Haiti experienced under Aristide. The 2000 elections were note-
worthy not for their democratic nature, but for the fraud and vio-
lence that accompanied the elections. The Organization of Amer-
ican States Electoral Observation Mission condemned the 2000 leg-
islative election as rigged, and noted that 1.2 million ballots for
senatorial candidates were discarded.
Here are the facts on the presidential election. The November
2000 presidential election was held with no OAS observation, an il-
legally constituted commission, boycotts by the observation, and no
domestic observation. Less than 10 percent of eligible voters par-
ticipated in those national elections in Haiti. The Clinton Adminis-
tration refused to provide aid to support the elections, and, most
importantly, the United Nations saw right through Aristide's brand
of democracy. Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended that the
United Nations close its mission to help build democracy in Haiti,
saying U.N. efforts were useless considering the government's
questionable legitimacy and increasing isolation.
Let us be clear on the role of the Administration in trying to
solve Haiti's crisis. The Bush Administration was actively involved,
both independently and through the OAS and CARICOM nations,
in working to bring President Aristide back from the precipice he
placed himself and his country upon. Countless delegations from
the United States visited, counseled and urged Aristide to fix the
flawed elections that brought him to power and to renounce corrup-
tion, but nothing could dissuade Aristide from rejecting reform and
rejecting building public institutions. Aristide squandered the op-
portunity he had to lead Haiti in favor of personal gain.
Roger J. Daley, U.S. General Consul in Haiti from 1998 to 2002,
summed up democracy under Aristide:
"To support Aristide's continued tenure as President is to focus
on the shadow of democracy and not on its substance."
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am extremely concerned about the
harm that continued unsubstantiated allegations that Aristide was
kidnapped and forcibly removed from the country may do to our
armed services and diplomats currently in Haiti today. In fact, re-
cently, a senior United States diplomat in Haiti, a Latino-Amer-
ican, has been specifically targeted by name, putting both he and
his family at risk. They are already in a dangerous situation, and
irresponsible comments may not only serve to add gasoline to the
fire of mob violence in Haiti, but I respectfully urge everyone to
consider the safety of our Armed Forces before making statements
that may endanger their lives.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important hearing for our Western
Hemisphere, and I want to commend you for your leadership in ar-
ranging this hearing, and thank you for the opportunity to make
a brief statement.
Mr. BALLENGER. Now, Congressman Delahunt.






Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would have to re-
spectfully disagree with the last speaker in terms of his version of
the facts, but maybe we can illuminate that during the course of
the questions and answers. Let me just say up front, too, I am no
defender of President Aristide. I told him at a meeting that I con-
sidered him a profound disappointment, and I think at least two
members of the panel have heard me say that on other occasions.
But let us reflect where we are today. Haiti has been taken over
by assassins, drug dealers, thugs, and terrorists. Guy Philippe is a
former Police Chief who fled the country after allegedly planning
a coup. He is reportedly under investigation by U.S. authorities for
involvement in drug trafficking. His cohort, Mr. Chamblain, is a
convicted killer, the number 2 man of the death squad commonly
referred to as the FRAPH (Front for the Advancement and
Progress of Haiti), which brutalized Haiti during the junta years.
By the way, the leader and founder of FRAPH, Emmanuel Toto
Constant, a terrorist of the worst sort who is responsible for the
deaths of thousands, he is not part of this new junta yet because
he is in the United States, purportedly selling real estate in New
York City.
So now we hear that the leaders of this so-called democratic op-
position, including Evans Paul and Charles Baker, have been meet-
ing with Philippe and Chamblain. Joining them was the notorious
Dany Toussaint, well-known to anyone who is conversant with
Haiti. He is suspected of drug dealing and the murder of the coun-
try's most prominent journalist, and today our Ambassador appar-
ently had a meeting with Philippe.
Call it what you will, a coup, an alteration in the constitutional
order, a resignation, the fact is that this Administration did noth-
ing to save democracy in Haiti, and people who represent the very
worst in that society are in the process of taking it over. It is ob-
scene and a stain on our national honor. It goes against everything
that we in America embrace, and it did not have to happen. Haiti
did not have to be delivered into the hands of people who are, to
put it in terms familiar to many of us, pure evil.
The fact is that for the past 10 years, the Majority in this Con-
gress and the current Administration did nothing to nurture demo-
cratic institutions in Haiti. Instead, aid was blocked or not re-
quested for the police, for the judicial system, the human rights ob-
servers for election monitors. And remember, in September 2002,
an independent electoral council was accepted by Aristide, but it
could not function because the so-called Democratic Convergence
refused to name its representative to the council.
In late 2003, Aristide accepted a plan put forth by the Haitian
Bishops and supported by Secretary Powell in which he would have
shared power, but it was rejected by the opposition. And in Janu-
ary, the Caribbean community secured Aristide's agreement to a
coalition government and the disarmament of violent thugs, but the
opposition refused to negotiate unless Aristide resigned. At any of
these moments, the message from the Administration should have
been sent loud and clear that it was time for the opposition to put
the Haitian people above their petty desires and negotiate in good
faith. I see no evidence that that occurred.






Just a few days ago, Secretary Noriega said that some in Con-
gress are disappointed because the U.S. did not send in troops, and
I am using his quote, "to bail out Aristide." I reject that premise.
Our troops would not have been going into Haiti to bail out
Aristide; they would have been going in to protect the Haitian peo-
ple from some of the worst butchers and thugs in that nation's his-
tory.
Let me conclude that recent events portend a very bad sign for
the future of democracy and human rights in this hemisphere.
I yield back what time I may have left.
Mr. BALLENGER. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to thank you for holding this important hearing and allowing
all of us the opportunity to speak on an issue that is of vital impor-
tance, especially to my south Florida community, but, indeed, to
the international community in their efforts to support true demo-
cratic and political reform in Haiti. So I commend you for having
this hearing and for addressing your commitment to the current
situation and improvement in Haiti.
I would also like to welcome our witnesses today. Ambassador
Noriega has advised the President and Secretary Powell with a
true sense of professionalism and understanding of the region, and
we welcome him back to our neck of the woods, here in our Sub-
committee.
To Administrator Franco, I would like to thank him for his ongo-
ing efforts and commitment to the humanitarian situation in Haiti.
I know that you have been following it closely, and it is important
to note that this Administration's contributions have even exceeded
congressional funding.
Adolfo, I am thrilled to see that one of my former staffers, Jose
Fuentos, is sitting behind you and working with you and USAID
on these important issues. In concert with Assistant Secretary
Dewey, I am positive that your offices and the staff of all of these
fine gentlemen are working extremely hard to make the current
situation in Haiti less painful for the people of Haiti.
That is why we are here, Mr. Chairman, to discuss and learn
about the. current situation in Haiti and, more importantly, about
the future of Haiti and a future that we hope is a bright one and
a positive one.
The state of affairs in Haiti is changing and updated not only on
a daily basis, on an hourly basis, but indeed every minute it seems
to alter. Most recently the United Nations laid out its plan for
Haiti where Resolution 1529 called for a multinational interim
force to work with Haitian political forces and the international
community to restore a true, a lasting, and a transparent democ-
racy in Haiti. Additionally, CARICOM nations are working on the
CARICOM Action Plan. Under this plan, civil society, political op-
position, and the government each appoint one member to this
council.
Recent accounts, as we know, are troubling. Our own DEA
agents indicate that Haiti has been a major transit point for nar-
cotics into the United States. Statements by elusive narcotraf-
fickers are shedding light on Haiti's turning a blind eye to drug
trafficking. These drugs, which infest the streets and the play-






grounds of our neighborhoods, only bring tragedy to American fam-
ilies. So at all levels, the United States has taken a leadership role
in eliminating this danger and in working in tandem with our re-
gional and international allies to create a stable and working gov-
ernment for the people of Haiti, a government responsible to its
people and to the needs of the Haitian people.
With a population exceeding 7 million, we must come together to
help the people of Haiti overcome the transition it is currently ex-
periencing. The women and the children of Haiti sit in despair
awaiting assistance, be it military or humanitarian. But let us not
take our eyes off the target and remember that at the end of the
day, the children of Haiti are looking for international help, and
the United States will be there to help them.
Secretary Powell summarized our objective while addressing EU
ministers earlier this week, and I quote:
"And now we are there to give the Haitian people another
chance, and we will be working with Haitians to help Haitians
put in place a political system, and we will support it to the
best of our ability. I am pleased that the international commu-
nity has responded so quickly with a unanimous U.N. resolu-
tion."
Those are the Secretary's words.
So as I sit here today with my colleagues discussing the current
situation in Haiti, I cannot help but ponder upon the suffering of
a people and on the current situation of an island not too far from
Haiti, my homeland of Cuba. But I strongly encourage this Admin-
istration to work on promoting the security situation in Haiti, in
supporting an independent government that enjoys true popular
support and restores respect for the rule of law in Haiti.
The United States has been and probably always will be Haiti's
leading provider of economic aid. I encourage our colleagues here
today to continue their support for- the international financial
loans. Our country has been the shining beacon for freedom and
liberty for our Western Hemisphere neighbors. Haiti is currently in
a situation where assistance is warranted, and I call on my col-
leagues to make all efforts to bring stability and transparency to
a people who for so many years have longed for it.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to hear
from so many others.
Mr. BALLENGER. Now Congressman Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I, too, express my apprecia-
tion for this hearing to finally be held. I know that Chairman
Menendez as our Ranking Member has called repeatedly for a
hearing, and our colleague Barbara Lee on the International Rela-
tions Committee, not on this Subcommittee, has also done that,
and, of course, my voice. But I guess it took the situation that we
currently have in Haiti to talk about now what can we do, whereas
if we had a meeting before, perhaps some of these areas could have
been addressed before, and we could have prevented what hap-
pened.
It is always interesting to hear the people from the other side.
My colleague from Illinois talked about how tremendous this drug-
dealing state of Haiti has been. And I, you know, get amused be-




9

cause President Aristide asked the DEA to bring him more support.
He allowed the U.S. to have overflight responsibilities where our
aircraft could fly over and have surveillance over its country, could
use our Coast Guard at their ports, but we did not take advantage
of it. So the easy way to do it is to say, well, you know, he allowed
drug-dealing to happen. So we need to take a look, I guess, at Pan-
ama, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, all
of those places that we are spending tremendous amounts of funds
supporting in some instances the new leadership, while we still
have this tremendous thing. And so I really kind of question a per-
son to say there is drug-dealing going on. It is going on even in the
State of Illinois, and we do not, therefore, condemn the Governor
to say that he has turned his back.
So I would just like to say that, you know, you can have a self-
fulfilling prophecy. If you wait and wait and wait until the last
minute, there is no other option but to leave. And when the thugs
were coming down, town by town-and, as Mr. Delahunt men-
tioned, these are convicted killers: Chamblain, former sergeant, ac-
cused of killing businessmen and others; Philippe, who was actu-
ally convicted of killing Antoine Izmery and Guy Malary. These are
people our government evidently feels more comfortable in sitting
down with, negotiating with, because I guess that is what they are
going to do because those are the new people who will be in charge
of this government.
It makes no sense at all to take people who have been in the DR,
people who are in New York, the former FRAPH that stood on the
docks and turned the country of Harlem around. Do you remember
that? The same people now are in this new government. This is a
disgrace.
Then we have our great Colonel, David Berger-and I know that
he is concerned since there are so few Marines-said that, "I am
not a police officer, and I have no instructions to disarm." So as the
American Marines sit by, protecting U.S. properties, this band of
thugs and gangsters and killers simply can do whatever they want
to do.
If, in fact, we are going to do nothing, then we ought to leave and
just let the place go down like it is happening. How can we send
in people and just allow the killings to go on, to look the other way?
You would do better maybe with the Haitian Police Department.
They might at least try to apprehend the criminal.
So I think several weeks ago when the French made it pretty
clear that they were willing to go in with 4,000 Marines, but I sus-
pect that somehow they were discouraged-I was told by Secretary
of State Powell that it was a misinterpretation. They really did not
want to go in. However, they not only said they would go in, they
said they didn't necessarily need Americans to go in. They said
they would appreciate it if we would participate in the costs. I can
see one thing being blurred by interpretation, but not a specific
kind of a plan like that, that all of a sudden we find that it was
totally misinterpreted. We should allow countries that have some
goodwill toward a situation, that when they see right over wrong,
to do their thing and not necessarily say that is in our sphere of
influence, which I would suppose occurred.






So I am very-it is a sad day for democracy. This regime change
is who we want to see elected and who we do not. If we do not
agree with them, they are out. If we do, they are okay, regardless
to-it reminds me of the Cold War, the Mobutus that we created
for 30 years in Zaire. The people who rob and kill their own people
are those that we would rather negotiate with. It makes no sense.
It is a flawed policy. It is a dark day in our history.
I think that when a President-why not take him out and then
come up with that diplomatic solution that Secretary of State Colin
Powell was trying to negotiate? Why do we have to resign in order
for him to leave? He could have left the country and come back
once order was restored. But since he resigned, I guess then we can
deal with the country because a coup d'etat did not occur. He just
quit, retired, had enough, decided to resign and go somewhere else.
Therefore, legally, I guess, the international communities could
then deal with this coup d'etat, which even in the Africa Unions
say that if a country is taken over by military forces in Africa,
countries do not have diplomatic relations, and that country is iso-
lated and boycotted, and sanctions go out on that country. How-
ever, the convenient resignation of President Aristide, therefore,
precludes even the AU's, African Union, laws to preside.
So as you can tell, we are very-many of us are very frustrated.
We appreciated the President finally meeting with us last Wednes-
day, but we have seen nothing positive really come about. I would
hope that we would have a plan. I would hope that we would-if
we don't want to intervene with disarmament, why don't we let
someone else go in, those who may be willing to have disarmament
reintegration, so that the killings can stop right now? It is simply
a lawless place, and I believe that we can do better.
Mr. BALLENGER. Pursuant to the previous order, Members, other
Members, may submit their written testimony for the record. With-
out objection, so ordered.
Let me go to the first panel now. What I plan on doing is intro-
ducing all members of the panel first, and all will testify before any
questions will be asked.
First of all, Roger Noriega. Roger Noriega serves as Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.
He is a frequent visitor of this Subcommittee, and we always enjoy
having him here.
Second is Arthur Gene Dewey. Gene Dewey serves our Nation as
Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration. He is responsible for overseeing U.S. policies re-
garding the refugees and international migration. He is a graduate
of West Point and served two combat aviation tours in Vietnam. I
would like to thank him for coming.
Third is Adolfo Franco. Adolfo Franco is the Assistant Adminis-
trator for Latin America and the Caribbean of the U.S. Agency for
International Development. Mr. Franco previously served as a
counsel to the Majority on the International Relations Committee,
and it is a pleasure to see you again, Adolfo.
Let me please request of you if you could reduce your testimony
to 5 minutes, and we will enter your total statement for the record,
if that is satisfactory. And if that is okay, Secretary Noriega.





11
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMI-
SPHERE AFFAIRS
Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleas-
ure to appear before you and to have an opportunity to speak to
this Subcommittee today on the topic of Haiti.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, one chapter in the
history of Haiti has just come to a close, a very sad chapter, and
the Haitian people are preparing to write a new one. The resigna-
tion of President Aristide on February 29 marked the end of a proc-
ess that in its early days held out a bright promise to free Haiti
from the violence, authoritarianism, and confrontation that has
plagued that country since its independence 200 years ago. Sadly,
that hope remains unrealized today. While responsibility for this
failure resides largely with former President Aristide himself, the
task before the United States, working with the international com-
munity, is to help the people of Haiti break the cycle of political
misrule that has caused so much misery.
As we move ahead, it is important that we understand where the
problems lie. The Haitian people are not to blame for the country's
poverty and lack of development. Those of us who have Haitian
friends and colleagues know that they are an especially creative
and particularly industrious people. Those who have made the
United States their home are a blessing to our community and to
our economy. Rather, the absence of good governance, even the ab-
sence of the will to govern fairly and effectively, lies at the heart
of the problem.
President Aristide's legacy of frustrated hopes was caused as
much by what he did not do as by what he did do. At the end, even
his supporters in the international community realized that his
rule had undermined democracy and economic development in
Haiti, rather than strengthened it.
Let us be very clear. United States policy in Haiti and through-
out the Western Hemisphere, indeed throughout the world, is to
support and strengthen democratic institutions. On September 11,
2001, the United States joined the 33 other members of the Organi-
zation of American States, including Haiti, in signing the Inter-
American Democratic Charter. The creation of the Democratic
Charter owed much to the hemispheric concern against the under-
mining of democratic institutions by elected governments them-
selves. It acknowledges that the essential elements of representa-
tive democracy go well beyond merely holding elections, and that
governments have the obligation to promote and to defend demo-
cratic principles and institutions.
A commitment to constitutional democracy was what led this
government to demand that Jean-Bertrand Aristide be restored to
power after he was deposed by a military coup in 1991. By the fall
of 1994, the United States led a multinational force to restore
President Aristide to power, as a matter of fact. From the outset,
Mr. Aristide's supporters began committing systematic acts of vio-
lence that undermined the confidence of the Haitian people in our
international mission. Many Haitians began wondering whether we
were in Haiti to strengthen democracy or merely keep one indi-
vidual in power.






Looking back, it is fair to say that had the international commu-
nity been more rigorous in holding President Aristide to his com-
mitments to respect human rights and the rule of law, his rule
might not have ended with his resignation and his self-imposed
exile 10 years later.
Killings of President Aristide's opponents began within months of
his return to power, but no persons were ever arrested or convicted
for these crimes. The undermining of the democratic process was
demonstrated by the highly flawed Parliamentary elections of July
1995, badly run local elections in April 1997, and the fraudulent
Parliamentary elections once again in May 2000. This series of far-
cical electoral exercises and the Haitian Government's unwilling-
ness to govern justly opened the door to the many subsequent acts
of political violence and the intimidation by President Aristide
against his opponents. Incidentally, his election at the end of No-
vember 2000 was pronounced by the international community as
not meeting international standards.
Since 1994, the United States has provided $850 million in as-
sistance to Haiti. However, our aid programs failed to produce sus-
tainable growth because of the corruption and the inaction of the
Haitian Government. An impressive investment of money and tech-
nical assistance to create a 5,000 Haitian national police force was
squandered as President Aristide deliberately politicized and un-
derfunded the organization. Instead, Aristide and his successors
undermined the rule of law by relying on criminal gangs and fail-
ing to confront narcotraffickers.
Mr. Delahunt has referred to Danny Toussaint as being one of
the thugs that is pretending to run Haiti today. Danny Toussaint
was an aide to President Aristide. He was a security aide to Presi-
dent Aristide. He was one of his principal advisers. He is a crea-
ture of President Aristide, and you are right, he is a very bad man.
You are wrong, though. He is not running Haiti.
Despite the justified frustration of the international community,
we never gave up on Haiti or the Haitian people. Our approach in
encouraging respect for constitutional processes and good govern-
ance of Haiti focused on working with our hemispheric partners
through the OAS and with the other friends of Haiti. In June 2001,
the OAS General Assembly approved Resolution 831 calling on the
Government of Haiti to take steps to create an environment condu-
cive to free and fair elections as a means of resolving the political
crisis created by the tainted, corrupted elections of 2000.
On December 17, 2001, only a few months later, the Government
of Haiti instead lashed out at its opponents with a series of brutal
attacks by pro-Aristide thugs on persons and property. This led to
the OAS Resolution 806, which called for the creation of an OAS
Special Mission to strengthen democracy in Haiti and for the
Aristide regime to take vigorous steps to restore a climate of secu-
rity.
When the Government of Haiti failed to comply with the terms
of Resolution 806, the OAS responded with another resolution, 822,
in September 2002. In this resolution, the Government of Haiti
again committed itself to take a series of actions to promote a cli-
mate of security and confidence leading to free and fair elections
in 2003. I was Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council when Res-






solution 822 was approved, and the U.S. delegation did the heavy
lifting in negotiating that document. Resolution 822 is an impor-
tant resolution because it took the key step of calling for the nor-
malization of economic cooperation between the Government of
Haiti and the international and financial institutions as a means
of providing Haiti with further a incentive to develop its institu-
tions and promote sustainable development.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Secretary, if you could bring it to a close;
if I am going to be tough on everybody else, I guess I have to be
tough on you, too.
Mr. NORIEGA. Well, I guess I could stop right now if you do not
want to hear the rest of this.
Mr. BALLENGER. Well, I would love to hear it, but I just-could
you-
Mr. NORIEGA. Well, then, I will keep going.
In the face of the Haitian Government's noncompliance with the
terms of these resolutions, the Caribbean community, CARICOM,
and the OAS sent a high-level delegation, which included President
Bush's Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Affairs to Haiti in
March 2003. In September 2003, the United States facilitated the
OAS effort to send another special envoy to Haiti, Ambassador Ter-
ence Todman, to help broker a breakthrough in the political stale-
mate. While all of this was taking place, the United States donated
another $3.5 million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti to support
its work.
These determined efforts came to naught. Rather than taking
steps to build political consensus, reign in the rampant corruption
that robbed Haitians of their already meager resources, or promote
an atmosphere of security, Aristide continued to recruit and arm
gangs of thugs to be unleashed against his opponents.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Secretary, they are checking your statement
up here, and you have a couple more pages to go.
Mr. NORIEGA. Sure.
Mr. BALLENGER. If you don't mind, could you bring it to a close,
please, sir?
Mr. NORIEGA. Well, let me tell you what I need to tell you about
the future, sir.
I want to talk about several key points regarding United States
policy and how we go forward with our international partners to
help the Haitian people.
The United States has been and will continue to be a firm sup-
porter of democracy in Haiti. That is the cornerstone of our policy.
President Aristide's departure was never a demand by the United
States. We continuously worked with our international partners to
break through the political impasse and allow democracy to have
a chance. The United States has been and will almost certainly re-
main Haiti's leading provider of economic assistance. This aid was
never suspended or cut off, as some have claimed. Between 1995
and 2003, the United States provided $850 million in assistance.
Looking forward, our goal is to further stabilize the security situ-
ation and provide emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitians,
promote the formation of independent government that enjoys
broad popular support, and work with the government to restore
the rule of law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti,






while encouraging steps to improve the difficult economic condition
of the Haitian people.
The United States is not alone in this process. Under the terms
of the U.N. Security Council resolution, United States forces are on
the ground in Haiti, participating in a Multilateral Interim Force
to contribute to a secure and stable environment. And, Mr. Menen-
dez, the countries of the Americas are doing more than watching
what we are doing in Haiti, they are helping. And, quite frankly,
to compare them in any way to the way President Aristide has gov-
erned Haiti is, as a matter of fact, an insult to the Latin American
leaders.
As the Multinational Interim Force ends its mission, we will con-
tinue to support a U.N. stabilization force, and key countries in the
hemisphere are going to participate in that process and will build
up a Haitian national police. These are the people who will be pro-
tecting Haitians from killers.
President Bush has called for a break from the past in Haiti. In-
deed, there must be a break from the past if Haiti is to move for-
ward. That break will not come in the form of a new autocrat or
demagogue, but by unleashing the incredible potential of the Hai-
tian people in positive and productive directions. Nowhere is it
written that the Haitian people must be ruled by tyrants. They de-
serve leaders worthy of their trust and respect who favor the com-
mon good over personal gain.
Mr. Chairman, you are going to hear from Pierre-Marie Paquiot
in a few minutes. This is the legacy of President Aristide, the Di-
rector of the University of Haiti whose legs were pulverized by
Aristide's gangs when he dared to wander into the middle of a
demonstration in December 2003 and try to break up the violence,
beaten to where his legs were pulverized, and he has to go through
rehabilitation. This is the legacy of violence of President Aristide.
He is also part of the future, and you will be able to hear his mes-
sage, because that is the voice of the Haitian people.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear and to speak before this Subcommittee
today on the topic of Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members:
A chapter in the history of Haiti has just come to a close and the Haitian people
are preparing to write a new one. The resignation of President Aristide on February
29 marked the end of a process that in its early days held out a bright promise to
free Haiti from the violence, authoritarianism, and confrontation that has plagued
that country since its independence two hundred years ago. Sadly, that hope re-
mains unrealized. While responsibility for this failure resides largely with Aristide
himself, the task before the United States, working with the international commu-
nity, is to help the people of Haiti break the cycle of political misrule that has
caused so much misery.
As we move ahead, it is important that we understand where the problems lie.
The Haitian people are not to blame for the country's poverty and lack of develop-
ment. Rather, the absence of good governance, even the WILL to govern fairly and
effectively lies at the heart of the problem. Aristide's legacy of frustrated hope was
caused as much by what HE DID NOT DO as by the steps he took. At the end,
even his supporters in the international community realized that his rule had un-
dermined democracy and economic development in Haiti rather than strengthened
it.






Let's be very clear. U.S. policy in Haiti and throughout the Western Hemi-
sphere-indeed the world-is to support democracy and the strengthening of demo-
cratic institutions. On September 11, 2001, the United States joined the 33 other
members of the Organization of American States-including Haiti-in signing the
Inter-American Democratic Charter. The creation of the Democratic Charter owed
much to the hemispheric concern against the undermining of democratic institutions
by elected governments. It acknowledges that the essential elements of representa-
tive democracy go well beyond merely holding elections and that governments have
the obligation to promote and defend democratic principles and institutions.
The commitment to strengthening democracy has been the cornerstone of our pol-
icy in Haiti since the restoration of Aristide to power-by the international commu-
nity led by the United States-in 1994. This process was set back by the highly
flawed parliamentary elections of June 1995, badly run local elections in April 1997,
and fraudulent parliamentary elections once again in May 2000. This series of bogus
electoral exercises and the Haitian government's unwillingness to govern fairly
opened the door to many subsequent acts of political violence and intimidation by
Aristide against his opponents. Our approach in encouraging respect for constitu-
tional processes and good governance in Haiti focused on working with our hemi-
spheric partners through the OAS and with other friends of Haiti. In June 2001,
the OAS General Assembly approved Resolution 1831 calling on the Government of
Haiti to take steps to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections as
a means of resolving the political crisis created by the tainted elections of 2000.
On December 17, 2001, the Government of Haiti lashed out at its opponents with
a series of brutal attacks by pro-Aristide thugs on persons and property. This led
to OAS Resolution 806, which called for the creation of an OAS Special Mission to
Strengthen Democracy in Haiti and for the Aristide regime to take vigorous steps
to restore a climate of security.
When the Government of Haiti failed to comply with the terms of Resolution 806,
the OAS responded with another resolution-822-in September 2002. In this reso-
lution, the Government of Haiti again committed itself to take a series of actions
to promote a climate of security and confidence leading to free and fair elections in
2003. I was Chairman of the OAS Permanent Council when Resolution 822 was ap-
proved and the U.S. delegation did the heavy lifting in negotiating the document.
Resolution 822 took the key step of calling for the normalization of economic co-
operation between the GOH and the international financial institutions-as a
means of providing Haiti with further incentive to develop its institutions and pro-
mote sustainable development.
In the face of the Haitian Government's non-compliance with the terms of these
resolutions, the Caribbean Community-CARICOM-and the OAS sent a high-level
delegation, which included President Bush's Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, to Haiti in March 2003. In September 2003, the United States facilitated
the OAS effort to send another special envoy to Haiti, Ambassador Terence Todman,
to help broker a breakthrough in the political stalemate. While all this was taking
place, the United States donated $3.5M to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti to sup-
port its work. '
These impressive efforts came to naught. Rather than taking steps to build polit-
ical consensus, reign in the rampant corruption that robbed Haitians of their al-
ready meager resources, or promote an atmosphere of security, Aristide continued
to recruit and arm gangs of thugs to be unleashed against his opponents. In the
process, he undermined what little legitimate law enforcement capacity remained in
the already corrupted and weakened Haitian National Police. U.S. law enforcement
assistance was essentially limited to support of the Haitian Coast Guard, a rare and
largely autonomous police unit that continued to have professional and competent
leadership.
Further undermining the rule of law and the effectiveness of his government,
Aristide turned a blind eye to the rampant corruption and drug trafficking of those
within his circle of power.
It is no wonder, therefore, that when one of the largest pro-Aristide gangs turned
against him and rose in open rebellion in the city of Gonaives last month, the Gov-
ernment of Haiti had no effective, let alone legitimate means with which to respond.
The rapid collapse of Government authority throughout Haiti bore testimony not to
the strength of the thugs and gangs who sought to bring him down, but to Aristide's
own failures. By gutting respect for the rule of law and reverting to authoritarian
practices, he undermined his own legitimacy and demeaned the word "democracy."
Under these circumstances, Aristide agreed to what he had steadfastly rejected
before, a plan that would open the door to consensus government and a way forward
to resolve Haiti's political crisis. This was, of course, the CARICOM Prior Action
Plan, with its own Plan of Action and endorsement by the United States, France






and Canada. For Aristide, this change of heart came too late to save his govern-
ment. Nor did his eleventh-hour appeal for foreign military intervention garner sup-
port in the international community. No country, the United States included, was
inclined to send forces to sustain the failed political status quo in Haiti. In what
may eventually be considered his finest hour, Aristide decided to resign, initiating
a constitutional process that transferred power to the President of the Supreme
Court.
There are several key points that I wish to make regarding U.S. policy toward
Haiti-as we move forward with our international partners to help the Haitian peo-
ple:
1. the United States has been and will continue to be a firm supporter of de-
mocracy in Haiti. That is a cornerstone of our policy.
2. Aristide's departure was never a U.S. demand. We continuously worked with
our international partners to break through the political impasse and allow
democracy to have a chance. Even France, while calling on February 25 for
Aristide's ouster, remained supportive of our efforts to find a negotiated solu-
tion. While we were convinced that Aristide was a key obstacle in these ef-
forts, we sought to work with him up until the very end. These efforts were
conducted at the highest levels of the United States Government, with Sec-
retary Powell in the forefront.
3. The United States has been and will almost certainly remain Haiti's leading
provider of economic aid. This aid was never suspended or cut off, as some
have claimed. Between 1995 and 2003, the United States provided over $850
million in assistance to Haiti.
4. Our leadership at the OAS in negotiating Resolution 822 in September 2002
helped to open the door to normalized relations between Haiti and the IFIs
and since then IDB loans have begun to flow. We will continue to support
IFI loans to Haiti based on their technical merits.
Looking forward, our goal is first to stabilize the security situation and provide
emergency humanitarian assistance to Haitians, promote the formation of an inde-
pendent government that enjoys broad popular support, and work with that govern-
ment to restore the rule of law and other key democratic institutions in Haiti, while
encouraging steps to improve the difficult economic condition of the Haitian people.
The United States is not alone in this process. Under the terms of a UN Resolution
approved unanimously by the Security Council on February 29, U.S. forces are al-
ready in Haiti, participating in a Multilateral Interim Force to contribute to a se-
cure and stable environment. The key elements of the CARICOM prior action plan
are, as we speak, being carried out to name a new Prime Minister who will in turn
form a consensus government to lead Haiti forward. As the Multinational Interim
Force ends its mission, we will support the UN stabilization force called for by the
Security Council and will work with the UN and OAS to help the Haitian people
rebuild their institutions, starting with the Haitian National Police.
President Bush has called for a "break from the past" in Haiti. Indeed there
MUST be a break from the past if Haiti is to move forward. That break will not
come in the form of a new autocrat or demagogue but by unleashing the incredible
potential of the Haitian people in positive and productive directions. Nowhere is
there written that the Haitian people must be poor or ruled by tyrants. They de-
serve leaders worthy of their trust and respect, who favor the common good over
personal gain. The rule of law must be upheld. Those responsible for crimes and
abuses must be punished. Gangs and thugs cannot be allowed to hold sway. Support
from the United States and the international community can help-and they will
have it-but the long-term job of building Haitian democracy is up to the Haitians
themselves. They, above all people in our Hemisphere, deserve some success.
Mr. BALLENGER. Secretary Dewey. Witnesses are not supposed to
be regulated by the 5-minute rule, but I made that statement to
begin with, so I have to stick with it. Sorry about that.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ARTHUR E. DEWEY, ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REF-
UGEES, AND MIGRATION
Mr. DEWEY. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I, too,
appreciate this opportunity to discuss recent developments in Haiti
as they pertain to refugee and migration affairs.






I am thankful first that the number of Haitians taking to the sea
in overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels was not of the order of those
who had departed during previous migrations. Had there been a
mass migration by sea, we would almost certainly have seen people
drowned or otherwise lost at sea. We continue to encourage Hai-
tians not to take to sea.
During the course of the last week, the U.S. Coast Guard rescued
some 900 migrants at sea. Once aboard cutters, they were given
medical attention and food and cared for while awaiting repatri-
ation in coordination with the Haitian Coast Guard.
If at any time during the course of interdiction and repatriation
efforts a migrant in any way expresses or indicates a fear or con-
cern regarding returning to Haiti, that migrant is interviewed by
a trained Department of Homeland Security protection officer to
determine whether the migrant requires protection against repatri-
ation. During last week's repatriations, migrants who expressed
the fear of return were promptly transferred to a separate vessel
for protection screening.
Among those interdicted, only a handful expressed fear of return-
ing home. They were promptly transferred to a separate vessel.
They were not immediately returned to Haiti with the other mi-
grants. And after a thorough screening, these migrants were found
not to have a credible fear of persecution and were repatriated.
The U.S. Coast Guard effected these repatriations with superb
assistance from the Haitian Coast Guard and from U.S. Embassy
staff in Port-au-Prince, who were on the scene for as much of the
repatriation process as possible. My own bureau, the Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration at the State Department, is
now making emergency funds available to the Embassy to cover
food, transportation, and similar expenses to assist repatriated mi-
grants as they return to their homes.
We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, including the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of De-
fense, in this endeavor, as we have worked closely together
throughout the recent events in Haiti.
In addition to these efforts, we contacted the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner For Refugees well before the onset of
the crisis to discuss, among other issues, what could be done to as-
sist Caribbean countries like Jamaica, the Dominican Republic and
the Bahamas in the event of a large outflow from Haiti.
With our full support, UNHCR dispatched a team of specialists
to the Caribbean to draw up a comprehensive regional response to
any crisis that might emerge. They have provided guidance to Car-
ibbean governments throughout the crisis. Consideration of an
international appeal for assistance is now on hold pending new de-
velopments.
Our goal in this endeavor has been to mobilize the international
community through the High Commissioner For Refugees to ensure
that the United States, and the United States taxpayer, do not
bear sole responsibility for responding to this crisis, and that we
can count on our international partners to shoulder responsibility
as well. Application of international burden-sharing to rebuild
Haiti will also minimize motivations in the future for Haitians to
attempt to flee their homeland.







Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Dewey.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dewey follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ARTHUR E. DEWEY, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to dis-
cuss recent developments in Haiti as they pertain to migration and refugee affairs.
I am thankful, first, that the number of Haitians taking to the sea in over-
crowded, unseaworthy vessels was not of the order of those who departed during
previous migrations. Had there been a mass migration by sea, we would almost cer-
tainly have seen people drowned or otherwise lost at sea. We continue to encourage
Haitians not to take to sea.
During the course of the last week, the U. S. Coast Guard rescued some 900 mi-
grants at sea. Once aboard cutters they were given medical attention and food, and
cared for while awaiting repatriation in coordination with the Haitian Coast Guard.
If at any time during the course of interdiction and repatriation efforts a migrant
in any way expresses or indicates a fear or concern regarding return to Haiti, that
migrant is interviewed by a trained Department of Homeland Security protection of-
ficer to determine whether the migrant requires protection against repatriation.
During last week's repatriations, migrants who expressed a fear of return were
promptly transferred to a separate vessel for protection screening.
Among those interdicted, only several expressed fear of returning home. They
were promptly transferred to a separate vessel. They were not immediately returned
to Haiti with the other migrants. After thorough screening, these migrants were
found not to have a credible fear of persecution, and were repatriated.
The U. S. Coast Guard effected these repatriations with superb assistance from
the Haitian Coast Guard and from U.S. Embassy staff in Port-Au-Prince who were
on scene for as much of the repatriation process as possible. My own bureau, the
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, is now making emergency funds
available to the Embassy to cover food, transportation and similar expenses to assist
repatriated migrants return to their homes.
We are working closely with the Department of Homeland Security, including the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Defense in this endeavor, as we have
worked closely together throughout the recent events in Haiti.
In addition to these efforts, we contacted the office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) well before the onset of the crisis to discuss,
among other issues, what could be done to assist Caribbean countries like Jamaica,
the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas in the event of a large outflow from Haiti.
With our full support, UNHCR dispatched a team of specialists to the Caribbean
to draw up a comprehensive regional response to any crisis that might emerge. They
have provided guidance to Caribbean governments throughout the crisis. Consider-
ation of an international appeal for assistance is now on hold pending new develop-
ments.
Our goal in this endeavor has been to mobilize the international community
through UNHCR to ensure that the United States-and the United States tax-
payer-do not bear sole responsibility for responding to the crisis, and that we can
count on our international partners to shoulder responsibility as well.
Application of international burden sharing to rebuilding Haiti will also minimize
motivations in the future for Haitians to attempt to flee their homeland.
Mr. BALLENGER. Adolfo, it is your turn.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, AS-
SISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT
Mr. FRANCO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. It is always a pleasure to return home to the House
International Relations Committee, and today is a very timely
hearing, discussing the unfolding humanitarian situation in Haiti
and USAID's continuing efforts to assist the Haitian people to real-
ize their dream of peace, prosperity and democracy. I have sub-






mitted a complete statement for the record, and I ask that it be
made a part of the record.
Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection.
Mr. FRANCO. I used to be the guy who monitors those lights, so
if it goes yellow, just let me know, and I will wrap it up. I appre-
ciate it.
Although we might have differences of opinion, I know that
President Bush, this Congress, and the American people are all
fully committed to the well-being and prosperity of the Haitian peo-
ple. Just as Secretary Noriega has noted, the United States is and
has been the largest bilateral donor in Haiti, and this Administra-
tion will not shirk its responsibilities to the Haitian people.
With the situation regarding the humanitarian efforts at hand,
Mr. Chairman, since the conflict began in early February, there
has been some restriction of movement of commercial goods and re-
lief supplies, including food, fuel, and medical stocks. This has hin-
dered AID's ability to distribute food assistance to those popu-
lations it normally serves. Access and distribution remain our
major obstacle for both humanitarian deliveries and regular com-
mercial activity in the country. USAID is implementing with its
nongovernmental organizational partners, but has, however, re-
ported that the primary concern of humanitarian assistance is lack
of security, and this impedes the safe passage for the transpor-
tation and distribution of relief supplies, fuel, water, and food com-
modities.
However, Mr. Chairman, as I stated last week, I want to make
clear that based on the best information available to USAID, and
we are in constant communication with Port-au-Prince, we have
staff there and our partner organization, Haiti has enough food to
feed its population, although insecurity and disruptions in trans-
portation and distribution could potentially cause a deterioration in
the availability of food, particularly in urban areas.
Despite overall availability of food, however, it is true that cer-
tain pockets of particular need exist, and these are certain popu-
lations, particularly in the north, with the elderly and some or-
phanages that have reported to us difficulties in receiving food sup-
plies. I will travel to Haiti this weekend to personally assess the
situation on the ground with our staff and our partners in Port-au-
Prince.
To meet the needs of Haiti, Mr. Chairman, we have 20,000 met-
ric tons of food available in Louisiana for immediate transport to
Haiti if that would become necessary, and we have stocks of 11,000
metric tons of food. This is just USAID food in country. You may
have read that some of this food was looted in the unrest on Feb-
ruary 29, but I am very pleased to report to the Committee today
that the subsequent investigation by our personnel on the ground
reveals that most of our USAID emergency food supplies remain in-
tact and are under secure storage in Port-au-Prince.
I want to state, Mr. Chairman, that prior to this, we were
preplanning, and I reported this to the committee last week, if nec-
essary, drops throughout the country that were not using the Port-
au-Prince facility, use of helicopters, certainly any other means
that we would in a complex emergency to deliver food. So we have
been on top of this since well before February 18.






The interruption of basic health services in the north is a serious
concern, and due to hazardous and very difficult road conditions,
this represents a point of concern for us. We have sent a large
amount of medical supplies to Haiti in the last few days and pro-
vided a grant to the Pan American Health Organization for addi-
tional supplies. In addition, the International Committee of the
Red Cross has increased the number of staff to meet these short-
ages of medical personnel in clinics and hospitals, particularly in
Port-au-Prince.
Currently there are no reports of an outbreak of the six major
childhood vaccine-preventable diseases in the country. However, we
do have reports of increased cases of diarrhea and fever in the
towns of Gonaives, particularly due to the lack of water. According
to the Pan American Health Organization, there is a shortage of
tuberculosis, TB, drugs, and the disruption of TB programs in the
north of the country. We are working with Pan American Health
Organization currently, and we hope to bring the situation under
control as soon as possible, and I will report to the Committee on
the progress being made.
Again, Mr. Chairman, USAID is responding quickly to the poten-
tial for humanitarian crisis in Haiti. When Ambassador Foley de-
clared a disaster emergency on February 18, our Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance provided $50,000 to transport and distribute
emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits and 3 surgical
kits that serve 10,000 people each for the next 3 months. In addi-
tion, we provided $400,000 that I mentioned to the Pan American
Health Organization to purchase additional medical supplies imme-
diately and to conduct emergency relief activities in Haiti. They
have an extensive and very good network in the country.
On February 24, we deployed a three-person team to Port-au-
Prince, including a senior regional team adviser, a health officer,
and an information liaison officer with our partner organizations to
coordinate our humanitarian activities in the country. USAID has
also contracted several small aircraft to transport staff throughout
the country to conduct an assessment of the conditions, and I can
report to you that airplanes took off early this afternoon to conduct
those assessments. These planes also, in addition to the assess-
ments, carry cargo, including relief supplies, to remote areas as
needed.
Our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is currently awarding
a $400,000 grant to Catholic Relief Services for procurement of
what we call cash grants, and these are providing small cash so
people can buy food on the commercial markets, and this serves
particularly the most vulnerable populations, such as orphanages
and hospitals. We are also-our Embassy in Port-au-Prince is con-
ducting a security plan to address the protection of our staff and
our implementing partners as they transport goods and needed
services to people throughout the country. We work with CSR,
Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, CARE, and Save the Chil-
dren.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we have been, for some time, en-
gaged in Haiti, so we were well prepared for this potential emer-
gency. We have been monitoring the situation well before the dis-
turbances of February 18, and as Secretary Noriega has said, our







commitment and our resolve is to provide the necessary assistance
to the people of Haiti, and we will continue to do so. Thank you.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Franco.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Franco follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ADOLFO A. FRANCO, ASSISTANT ADMINIS-
TRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTER-
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before the
House Committee on International Relations to discuss with you the unfolding hu-
manitarian situation in Haiti and USAID's continuing assistance with helping the
Haitian people realize their dream of peace, prosperity and democracy. The central
focus of my remarks will be on what USAID is doing through our humanitarian as-
sistance programs to mitigate the effects of the social and political unrest on the
most vulnerable segments of Haiti's population.
FOOD SECURITY
The ongoing political turmoil and economic deterioration in Haiti have created the
potential for a humanitarian crisis, and have affected numerous aspects of develop-
ment such as food security, health and nutrition, and water and sanitation. While
sufficient food stocks are currently in-country and no immediate food crisis exists
at present, this could change quickly in coming weeks, especially in the north, due
to insecurity and disruptions in the transportation and distribution system. USAID
currently has in storage, more than 11,000 metric tons of P. L. 480 Title II food com-
modities. The bulk of these commodities are monetized and the proceeds are used
for delivering health care, education, and agricultural production services to Haiti's
most food-insecure population. The rest is used for direct food distribution to Haiti's
indigent populations and children's orphanages throughout the country. Most of the
food stocks are under secured storage in Port-au-Prince. The World Food Program
and European Union also have available for distribution, stocks of at least 5,000
metric tons, and 3,100 tons respectively.
HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM
The U.S. Government through USAID is Haiti's largest bilateral donor. In FY03,
USAID contributed $71 million. Through fiscal years 1995-2003, USAID provided
a total of $850 million in direct bilateral assistance. Prior to the outbreak of vio-
lence, USAID had planned $52 million in assistance in FY04 to programs ranging
from health, democracy and governance, education and economic growth. We are
currently analyzing additional assistance options. To ensure that quality service de-
livery continues to benefit those Haitians who are most in need, USAID assistance
is channeled principally through NGOs. USAID is also the lead donor in addressing
critical transnational issues such as HIV/AIDS and other debilitating infectious dis-
eases, a seriously degraded natural resource base, respect for human rights and the
rule of law, and trafficking in persons.
USAID uses food aid both to supplement its humanitarian program and as a truly
development tool. PL 480 Title II funds account for more than one-half of USAID/
Haiti's funding. This food-assisted program promotes improvements in household
food security, nutrition, and the welfare of women, children, and poor, marginal
farmers in six out of the nine districts of Haiti-affecting the lives of 640,000 poor
Haitians. Emergency response is also critical. Last year, over $3 million in emer-
gency assistance was provided to communities affected by drought and flooding.
CIVIL UNREST AND THE SAID PROGRAM
Civil unrest reached a peak in Port-au-Prince over the past week, and although
not as intense, lawlessness continues and the situation remains fluid following the
resignation of Aristide. There have been violent conflicts between opposition
protesters and government supporters, accompanied by widespread looting, and rob-
beries of civilians at roadblocks throughout the capital. On February 27-29, several
warehouses in Port-au-Prince were looted. Reports indicate that 800 metric tons of
European Union food commodities may have been taken. The manager of the food
storage facilities in Port-au-Prince where USG-funded stocks are located reported
that approximately five percent of the food stocks there have been looted. One of
four USAID-supported Cooperating Food Sponsors, Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
reported on March 1 that looters stole 30 pickup trucks from the CRS garage. In
Port-au-Prince, looters also stole medical supplies.






Increasing conflict since early February has severely restricted movement of com-
mercial goods and relief supplies, including food, fuel and medical supplies, creating
difficult conditions in some areas, and for those normally dependent on food assist-
ance. Access and distribution remain major obstacles for both humanitarian deliv-
eries and regular consumption. USAID and its implementing partners continue to
report that the primary humanitarian concerns at present stem from limited access,
security, and unsafe passage for transporting and distributing relief supplies, fuel,
water, and food commodities. There appears to be no massive shortages of food or
other essential commodities at this time as Haiti benefited from good harvests over
the last two agricultural seasons. However, an accurate assessment is difficult at
present due to lack of secure access to vulnerable areas throughout the country.
Food Availability: USAID's NGO development food aid partners and the U.N.
World Food Program (WFP) currently have approximately 15,000 metric tons (MT)
of food stocks in country. The European Union (EU) has 2,500 MT at a warehouse
and 600 MT at the port in Port-au-Prince. There is also an additional 2,000 MT
available from other donors. Thus the total amount of food assistance available from
all donors is approximately 20,000 MT.
Due to poverty and chronic malnutrition in Haiti, some segments of the Haitian
population are vulnerable to severe malnutrition. However, daily reports from
USAID's four partners in Haiti-CARE, Save the Children Foundation (SCF), World
Vision International (WVI), and CRS-indicate that none believe the situation re-
quires re-programming of planned food assistance. Region-specific reports from food
aid organizations are summarized as follows:
WVI does not anticipate a food crisis erupting in its targeted areas of Central
Plateau and Ile de la Gonave, even if distributions stop for a few months be-
cause of the strong coping mechanisms among the populations and .the good
December harvest. WVI is currently operating at 100 percent on Ile de la
Gonave.
CRS reported that food supplies for orphanages in Haiti are limited and some
orphanages may begin to run out of food early March. CRS is considering
using existing funds to purchase food on the local market for vulnerable or-
phanages.
On February 22, looters broke into a WFP warehouse in Cap-Haitien and
took 800 metric tons (MT) of food stocks, mainly vegetable oil and pulses. De-
spite the loss of food stocks, WFP estimates that it still has sufficient stocks
either in Haiti or en route to the country to provide assistance to 373,000 peo-
ple.
WFP reported that the shipment of 1,200 MT of rice scheduled to arrive at
the Cap-Haitien port is on hold until the security situation improves. Accord-
ing to WFP, a total of 268,000 people -are in need of food in the north and,
northeast, where prices have increased by 20 to 30 percent since early Feb-
ruary. However, the prices of these commodities have decreased after the Feb-
ruary 22 looting of the WFP warehouse in Cap-Haitien.
Fuel Availability: Fuel is vital not only for transport, but also for the continued
operation of facilities and equipment such as hospitals, bakeries, and freight moving
equipment at ports. Reports regarding fuel supplies in the capitol are conflicting.
According to the fuel companies, there is currently enough fuel in storage in Port-
au-Prince to supply the country, but the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are concerned that fuel shortages may lead to the
shutdown of the capitol's electrical plant and water treatment station. Further exac-
erbating the situation is the destruction of at least one fuel station in Port-au-Prince
during the civil unrest. CARE reported that there is a potable water crisis in
Gonaives due to a lack of fuel. Although CARE has food stocks in Port-au-Prince,
the organization lacks fuel for transportation, particularly for food distributions in
the north.
Medical Supplies: A major humanitarian concern at present is the interruption of
basic health services, particularly in the north. The ability to purchase and trans-
port drugs and fuel to health facilities nationwide has been disrupted in major popu-
lation centers due to the sporadic access to banks and insecure travel on the roads.
The ICRC has been organizing regular convoys to both Gonaives and Cap-Haitien
in cooperation with the Haitian Red Cross, and ICRC medical teams have also been
stationed at facilities in these cities.
It is not clear at this time how many medical facilities have been affected by the
recent unrest. Reports from the Hospital Communaute Haitienne in the capitol indi-
cate that there is an increase in the number of trauma patients at the hospital and
care is hindered by fuel shortages for generator power and lack of surgical and med-






ical kits. Negotiations for a planned expansion of ICRC operations in the Canape
Vert Hospital in Port-au-Prince ended without agreement and ICRC has reported
that there are no doctors remaining at Canape Vert following the withdrawal of
ICRC staff. Similar disruptions of supplies are occurring in Gonaives and other
areas.
Currently there are no reports of an outbreak of the six major childhood vaccine-
preventable diseases. However, increased cases of diarrhea and fever have been re-
ported in the town of Gonaives due to a lack of potable water. The Expanded Pro-
gram on Immunization (EPI) has sentinel sites in Haiti, of which 30 percent to 40
percent are still functional and operating.
A Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) epidemiologist recently arrived in
Haiti to reactivate the health surveillance system, as Haiti lacks adequate surveil-
lance data from health facilities throughout the country. PAHO will monitor data
on measles outbreaks, polio, diphtheria, typhoid, and violence, as well as acute mal-
nutrition. According to PAHO, there is a shortage of tuberculosis (TB) drugs and
a disruption of TB programs in the north. Medicins Sans Frontieres-Belgium is re-
questing TB drugs from PAHO.
Displaced Populations: USAID and its NGO partners continue to report very lim-
ited displacement and no "sites" with concentrations of internally displaced persons
(IDPs). According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA), numbers of IDPs cannot be accurately assessed at present. However,
UNOCHA notes that significant numbers of residents are moving from insecure cit-
ies to other areas or returning to their places of birth in the mountains. Movements
have also been reported from rural areas to main cities. According to a well-known
and trusted source, he has never been aware of the existence of IDPs in Haiti.
On February 23, the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) indicated
that the Dominican Republic does not have structures in place to manage a migra-
tory wave of refugees. The GODR also noted that Dominican authorities have rein-
forced the border with Haiti along critical points. On February 24, the GODR sent
1,200 additional troops to patrol its border with Haiti. The GODR has declined to
state the total number of troops along the 225-mile border. According to the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 400 Haitians have fled to the DR,
Jamaica, and Cuba since early February 2004.
U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO HAITI'S POLITICAL CRISIS
* On February 18, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti James B. Foley issued a disaster dec-
laration due to the ongoing complex emergency in Haiti. As an initial response
to the situation, OFDA has provided $50,000 through USAID/Haiti to support the
transport and distribution of emergency relief supplies, including 12 medical kits
and three surgical kits, valued at approximately $87,000. Each medical kit is
equipped to serve 10,000 people for approximately three months. On February 26,
the medical kits arrived in Port-au-Prince. In addition, OFDA approved $400,000
in funding for PAHO to purchase additional medical supplies and to conduct
emergency relief activities in Haiti.
* On February 24, OFDA deployed a three-person team to Port-au-Prince, including
a Senior Regional Advisor as Team Leader, a Health Officer, and an Information
Officer.
* OFDA has contracted with Airserve for two to three aircraft to move relief per-
sonnel and light cargo around Haiti if required in the coming days and weeks.
* USAID/Food For Peace has significant amounts of additional food stocks which
can be transported to Haiti by sea for food assistance within 7-14 days if needed
* OFDA is currently awarding grants in the amount of $400,000 to CRS for local
procurement and emergency cash grants to institutions serving vulnerable popu-
lations such as orphanages and hospitals.
* The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince is currently developing a security asset plan
that will address protection of people and USG buildings, transport of goods and
people, and security of NGO partners, such as CRS, WVI, CARE, and Save the
Children. A top priority of the security asset plan is to secure and protect the air-
port and port in the capital.
* There are approximately 15,000 MT of USG-procured food commodities imme-
diately available for distribution in Haiti. USAID will continue to work with other
members of the donor community to mobilize the additional resources required for
the Haiti post-conflict effort.






CONCLUSION
USAID is closely monitoring the humanitarian impact of the current political cri-
sis in Haiti. With the presence of international forces in Haiti, we expect the secu-
rity situation to improve significantly. This will facilitate the delivery of humani-
tarian assistance. USAID/Haiti and OFDA personnel will continue to assess the un-
folding humanitarian situation, and develop appropriate responses for the Haitian
post-conflict period. USAID is working closely with other agencies and implementing
partners to develop a post-conflict program strategy that will ensure the continued
provision of emergency relief and improved basic services, and generate productive
employment over the immediate, short- and medium-term. In addition, USAID is
working with other donors to jointly identify long-term priorities in Haiti.
Mr. BALLENGER. I yield myself 5 minutes, and yield my time to
the gentleman from Indiana Mr. Burton, who has to leave early.
Mr. BURTON. Well, I want to thank the Chairman for yielding to
me. I was the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemi-
sphere in 1995 and 1996, and I had a chance to go to Haiti on a
couple of occasions. I think Mr. Noriega was with the Foreign Af-
fairs Committee at that time. I would like to just go through a few
points that we found that we thought was very important.
First of all, regarding the murders and the horrible atrocities
that were taking place down there, in 1995, one of the leading op-
ponents of Mr. Aristide was Mariel Burtan. She was surrounded
and shot to death at Port-au-Prince right on the main street in
broad daylight, and we questioned the FBI-Mr. Dobbins was be-
fore the Committee-about whether or not Aristide was involved,
and Mr. Dobbins lied to the Committee. And we subsequently fol-
lowed up, and we found out that there was no question that Mr.
Aristide had to know and be involved in the murder of Ms. Burtan.
In about that time period, when Mr. Aristide was coming back
into power, we had clips of Mr. Aristide giving speeches, and they
were translated, and in his speeches he was talking about the
value of putting a tire around people's necks that didn't agree with
him, filling them with gasoline, and burning them to death.
There is a real democrat kind of fellow for you-democratic per-
son.
In 1994 Mr. Aristide, according to a drug cartel informant, re-
ceived a sackful of money in order to let the drug cartel move drugs
through Haiti. And the State Department has reported that high
officials all the way up to the top of the government are involved
in drug trafficking. According to the State Department's 2003 Inter-
national Narcotics Control Strategy Report, it is a major trans-
shipment point for narcotics.
On February 25, 2004, one of Haiti's most flamboyant drug traf-
fickers told a Miami Federal Court under oath that he couldn't
thrive in Haiti without paying millions of bribes to his close friend,
the President, Mr. Aristide. So he was involved in drug trafficking
according to testimony in Federal Court.
On February 26 of 2004, Barry McCaffrey, as has been stated
earlier, who was the drug czar under President Clinton, said it was
hard to imagine that Aristide himself wasn't taking part in drug
trafficking.
The human rights records I think are legion. After the election-
I want to talk about the election that took place. Everybody talks
about it being so democratic. The Lavalas Party conducted the
counting of the ballots. They said Aristide received 91 percent of






the vote and there was a turnout of 61V2 percent. But according
to reports from others who were there from the international com-
munity, the turnout was about 10 percent, and it was flagrant
voter fraud.
In fact on November 29, 2000, after Aristide was reelected, U.N.
Secretary Kofi Annan recommended that the U.N. Close its mission
to help build democracy in Haiti, saying U.N. Efforts were useless,
considering the government's questionable legitimacy and increas-
ing isolation.
Now, regarding human rights-and this is something that really
bothers me. In the government-in our government's June 1, 2003
Trafficking in Persons Report, the Haitian Government does not
fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of
human trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.
And the reports said Haiti is a source country for trafficking of
children for forced labor and sexual exploitation. And between 90
and 300,000 poor rural children age 4 to 14 serve as unpaid domes-
tic laborers in slave-like conditions.
This is the kind of government that was going on under Aristide
in Haiti. He was a brutal dictator who had no problem of putting
tires around people's necks and burning them to death.
The gentleman who is going to testify later was beaten and had
his legs broken down there. They were allowing children to go into
slave labor. He was a major source point for drug trafficking and
was taking money from drug traffickers in the millions of dollars,
and this is the kind of person we were supposed to go in there and
defend and protect?
If we hadn't gone in there, and if Aristide had stayed, I believe
he would be dead today because I think the people there would
have killed him. I think the rebels would have taken the capital
and he would have been killed. So, Mr. Aristide is alive today be-
cause he chose to leave when he did. As far as this kidnapping
charge is concerned, anybody that knows, knows that America does
not work that way
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Let me first, Mr. Noriega, tell you that I don't appreciate your
insolent mischaracterization of my remarks. Either you did not lis-
ten to them, or you in fact purposely mischaracterized them. Either
way I resent it, and I don't intend to take it.
I have a series of questions and I would like the first two to give
me a yes or no answer. Did the Government of the United States
formally recognize President Aristide as the duly elected President
of Haiti, yes or no?
Mr. NORIEGA. I don't think it is that simple. We treated him as
a constitutional President.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Menendez. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
I don't think it is that simple. We regarded Aristide as a constitutional President.
Aristide was elected, but he did not govern democratically and the presidential elec-
tion of November 2000 did not truly reflect the will of the Haitian people. Opposi-
tion parties did not participate in that election, nor was it observed or supported
by the international community, which estimated voter turnout at 5-15 percent.
This happened because Aristide and his ruling party refused to reconsider the re-






sults of the legislative elections in May 2000, after international observers uncov-
ered fraudulent vote tabulation.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Did our Ambassador present credentials to
President Aristide?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Did the United States seek to invoke the Demo-
cratic charter that you talked about at the OAS as it related to
Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. We didn't and neither did the Republic of Haiti.
Aristide did not use the self-help mechanism-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Menendez. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We didn't, and neither did the Republic of Haiti. Aristide did not use the self-help
mechanisms that were available to his country under the Charter. This was Haiti's
decision to make, not that of the United States or other OAS member states. Haiti
did consent to OAS action in Haiti, such as the establishment of the OAS Special
Mission in Resolution 806, but only after the Permanent Council called upon it to
do so.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I asked you for a yes or no, and it is no.
Mr. NORIEGA. Sometimes these issues are a little more com-
plicated.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I fully understand that, but there are some ques-
tions that can be answered yes or no so you don't eat up all of my
time. The reality is the United States, the Democratic charter that
you referred to inferentially in your statement to try to paint the
brush, the United States did not pursue that Democratic charter at
the OAS as it related to Haiti.
Mr. NORIEGA. None of the 34 countries-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Menendez. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
None of the 34 member countries of the OAS did. Aristide's government could
have invoked the Charter directly in any number of ways to restore democracy, but
it chose not to do so. The Aristide government did co-operate with OAS initiatives,
such as creation of the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti, but
only after the OAS Permanent Council asked it to do so. One last comment the
implication that the United States did not support efforts to settle Haiti's political
crisis democratically and peacefully is entirely false. The Administration fully sup-
ported OAS efforts, both financially and diplomatically, while at the same time pur-
suing vigorous diplomacy directly with Aristide and the opposition to achieve a polit-
ical settlement.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I didn't ask you about the 34 countries, I asked
you about the United States, Mr. Secretary. And if you want to
play games with us here-
Mr. NORIEGA. No, sir, I am telling you that none of them did.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me ask you this. On February 13, Secretary
Powell said "the Administration was not seeking Mr. Aristide's res-
ignation." On February 17, Secretary Powell went even further and
said, "we cannot buy into a proposition that says the elected Presi-
dent must be forced out of office by thugs."
And yet that is exactly what the Administration did when, on
February 26, 9 days later, Secretary Powell suggested Mr. Aristide
"examine the situation that he is in and make a careful consider-
ation of how best to serve the Haitian people at this time and sub-
sequently suggest that he leave." So all of those statements, includ-






ing your own, Mr. Noriega, on October 21 of this past year, before
this very Subcommittee where you said "as it relates to Haiti, vio-
lence has no place in settling political dispute in a democracy."
Well, if violence has no place in such a set of circumstances, if
I tell the thugs that are at the presidential gate that we won't go
in until there is a political solution, and the inherent fact in that
statement is that you can go ahead and pursue violent overthrow
because I am not going to send anybody in until you have a polit-
ical solution, that ultimately encourages that type of action. And it
is that type of action, whether it exists in Haiti or whether it exists
in other countries in this hemisphere, that I was referring to.
So how is it that this Administration says that violence has no
place in settling political disputes, that we cannot buy into a propo-
sition that says an elected President will be forced out of office by
thugs; that we, in fact are not seeking that resignation especially
under those set of circumstances, and then we allow those who
would by violent effort overthrow a government?
Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Con-
gressman Menendez.
And if I can give you more than a yes or no to that question, it
is extraordinarily important to bear in mind that we do not have
an obligation to put American lives at risk to save every govern-
ment that may ask us for help, whether it is democratically-elected
or not. We do not have an obligation to do that. We have to make
decisions about where we will put American lives at risk.
In the case of Haiti, I think it was a difficult decision, but we
made the right one. The erratic, irresponsible behavior of President
Aristide in the last 48 hours demonstrated that he was not a reli-
able person or reliable interlocutor. That does not mean by any
means that we support the violent overthrow of that man. How-
ever, it did mean that he was not a sustainable political solution.
Mr. MENENDEZ. In the 20 seconds that I have left, I will simply
say that we made a very clear message. Yes, we don't have to send
troops each and every time, but we sent a very clear message: You
can go ahead and pursue your violent activity because, unless there
is a political solution, we don't seek to intervene either ourselves
or through any international effort.
And that is a risk for democracy in this hemisphere.
Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Weller.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary and
Mr. Secretary and Mr. Administrator, and I thank all of you for
participating today.
And we have heard some terms such as thugs, killers, and narco-
traffickers being used in comments before this Committee today,
but they also describe the government of President Aristide. And
I would note that over the last several years, the Bush Administra-
tion has bent over backwards, time after time, to help the people
of Haiti; in particular, where President Bush waived other consid-
erations to continue providing aid and assistance to Haiti.
And let me give you an example of where that is. There is prob-
ably no greater threat to democracy than the corruption that comes
from narcotrafficking as well as the threat to our own Nation's se-
curity. According to the State Department in March 2004, serious
allegations persisted that high-level government and police officials






were involved in drug trafficking. And in 2001, 2002, and 2003, the
Bush Administration said Haiti was not certified as having fully co-
operated, or had failed demonstrably to comply with the United
States drug control efforts.
All 3 years, President Bush determined however that it was in
the national interest in the United States to continue providing aid
to Haiti despite its lack of effort and counternarcotics, but also ex-
pressed concern regarding the human rights record of the Aristide
administration. and, it appears, which human rights were of no con-
cern to President Aristide. In fact, it appears that President
Aristide instigated violence against his political opponents.
In June 2001, Mr. Aristide announced a zero tolerance policy on
crime which many Haitians interpreted as an imitation vigilante
justice. That December, the pro-Aristide organization called Sleep
in the Woods, took matter into its own hands and hacked to death
radio journalist Brignol Lindnor in the town of Petit Goave.
Lindnor had done radio broadcasts critical of Mr. Aristide.
Little more than a month ago, Mr. Aristide pardoned 42 violent
criminals, commuting the sentences of 66 others, provided amnesty
to an additional 90 accused whose cases were still under investiga-
tion. So it is wondering whose side some of the thugs were on.
We talk about the election, Mr. Secretary, and of course, you
know, it appears in many cases that the elections of Mr. Aristide
were very, very tainted. It is often cited, his reelection in November
2000 is proof that he was a freely elected democratic leader. How-
ever, international observers, not just American observers, refused
to observe this election. The head of the Provisional Electoral
Council Leon Manus fled Haiti because he was threatened by
Aristide for failing to endorse fraudulent election results. And after
Manus fled, the ruling Lavalas Party installed a one-party electoral
council and held the November 2000 presidential elections. The
Clinton Administration even refused to provide support of any kind
for that election process.
Public disenchantment with the sham election process was ex-
pressed by a voter turnout estimated less than 10 percent of eligi-
ble voters by foreign diplomats and journalists. The question is:
Can this really be termed a free and fair election?
One of our senior United States diplomats who was in Haiti dur-
ing the November 2000 presidential election stated that there was
more enthusiasm and participation in the elections that gave
Charles Taylor the presidency of Liberia, and who the United
States Government told last year to step down when civil war
reached Monrovia. And did anyone seriously advocate sending U.S.
troops to prop up Charles Taylor's regime? That is an ironic ques-
tion here, because some of those who called for the removal of
Charles Taylor are those who say that we should have sent troops
in to keep President Aristide in. And when you had greater election
participation in Liberia for Charles Taylor than you did in Haiti,
you wonder about the legitimacy of the Haitian elections.
So the question is: Why is Charles Taylor out, good; versus
Aristide out, bad? What is the difference when Liberia had a great-
er level of participation in the election?
I guess, Mr. Secretary, the question I have for you is did we treat
Charles Taylor in Liberia any differently than we treated Aristide,







or have we treated Aristide any differently than we did Charles
Taylor and Liberia in similar circumstances?
Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Congressman. The decisions
we made regarding President Aristide for the last several years
have been tied to support for a diplomatic negotiated solution to
get Haiti back on a democratic course. I explained during my testi-
mony that we did not achieve that objective, but we tried.
We didn't achieve that objective because of the lack of political
will by President Aristide, in part. The fact that other political ac-
tors in Haiti didn't want to participate and didn't have confidence
in President Aristide's ability to keep his promises was also an-
other problem. But for example, when we asked for steps to im-
prove the security climate, we asked that a new police chief be ap-
pointed. He was appointed and within a couple of days, showed up
in the U.S. Embassy seeking political asylum.
Mr. BALLENGER. I hate to cut you off. It is our mistake up here.
Generally speaking, we don't cut our witness' time off, but my big
mouth got us in trouble. So I apologize for the difficulty. If you
need a second, 10, 15 seconds, go ahead, without objection.
Mr. NORIEGA. In the last few weeks we saw the Haitian National
Police without arms, but had reports that the government was dis-
tributing arms to its gangs. We saw most of the looting and vio-
lence against persons and property in Haiti and Port-au-Prince
committed by those gangs of President Aristide. We saw these
gangs attack their own Coast Guard installation, which was clearly
intended to prevent the United States from being able to return
migrants, so it would provoke perhaps a migrant crisis.
We saw that President Aristide in those final days was not a reli-
able person and he would not be part of a sustainable political solu-
tion. We were prepared to send some forces in to support a sustain-
able process that kept Aristide in power, but we were not prepared
to put American lives on the line merely to do that.
MR. BALLENGER. Thank you. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Why didn't you use your influence with the opposition, Mr.
Noriega, to get them to agree to the various accommodations that
Aristide made? Be really brief about it; I don't want a long answer
now.
Mr. NORIEGA. We made a strong effort to do that. We spent 4
hours a couple of Saturdays ago trying to convince them to do that.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But it didn't work.
Are you currently supporting the government, as it exists now,
of Prime Minister Neptune.
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, sir. Prime Minister Neptune is the head of the
government until a new government is formed.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And what plans do you have for the formation
of a new government?
Mr. NORIEGA. There is a Tripartite Commission which will in-
clude a representative of the Lavalas Party, a representative of the
international community, and a representative of the Democratic
Platform.
Mr. DELAHUNT. That is the only answer. It is sufficient for me.
Mr. NORIEGA. It is not the answer, sir.






[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Delahunt. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
It is not the answer, sir. That is, it is not the only answer. The new government
is being formed in accordance with the CARICOM plan. Under that plan, the Tri-
partite Commission appoints a seven-member Council of Eminent Persons. That
Council nominates a new Prime Minister, and Interim President Alexandre appoints
the Prime Minister, who then chooses a cabinet. We are giving our full support to
this transition process. A permanent government will be formed after elections are
held.
Mr. DELAHUNT. It is sufficient for me, Mr. Noriega. I am asking
the question, so I would ask you to desist.
What are our plans as far as Toto Constant is concerned? Are we
going to allow him to stay in this country?
Mr. NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman and Congressman, I don't know
much about his situation. I will tell you that I asked several weeks
ago, when this recent violence happened, that U.S. law enforce-
ment be notified because we didn't want this individual to show up
in Haiti.
Mr. DELAHUNT. The answer is you don't know much about it.
Mr. NORIEGA. I don't know particularly.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Your information would be the same as mine,
that the former head of the FRAPH, who is responsible for thou-
sands of deaths during the period from 1991 to 1994, is currently
here in New York City and is free? Is that your information?
Mr. NORIEGA. I think he came here about 6 years ago.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Delahunt. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
I think he came here about 10 years ago. In 1995, the Department of State re-
voked his visa and an Immigration judge issued a deportation order. In late 1995,
Constant sued the U.S. Government seeking damages. In 1996, that suit was set-
tled. In 1997, an assessment was done evaluating the threat to Constant if he were
returned to Haiti. Based on that assessment, reviewed by various U.S. Government
agencies, Constant was not returned to Haiti. In 1998, Constant tried to reopen his
asylum case, but an Immigration judge denied the motion. Constant appealed, and
the Board of Immigration appeals upheld the denial in September 2003. At the mo-
ment, I do not believe there are any pending appeals or other legal impediments
to Constant's removal. The Departments of State and Homeland Security are evalu-
ating whether Constant can be deported now, in light of current country conditions.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I want to point out because you make references
to international support and maybe this is a statement that has
been rescinded, but CARICOM, through the Prime Minister of Ja-
maica, recently issued this statement:
President Aristide has submitted his resignation as the President
of Haiti and left the country for an undisclosed destination. We are
bound to question whether his resignation was truly voluntary, as
it comes after the capture of sections of Haiti by armed insurgents
and the failure of the international community to provide the req-
uisite support despite the appeals of CARICOM. The removal of
President Aristide in these circumstances sets a dangerous prece-
dent for democratically-elected governments anywhere and every-
where, as it promotes the removal of duly elected persons from of-
fice by the power of rebel forces.
It was a statement that has been issued by CARICOM. Is that
accurate?






Mr. NORIEGA. That was a statement they issued a few days ago,
and they are meeting today and we hope we can encourage them
to be part of the solution.
Mr. DELAHUNT. In terms of the fraudulent elections that we
talked about, and you alluded to the OAS report. Let me read the
report as I have it before me. And I happened to be a volunteer,
an election observer, and unfortunately there was no one other
than some Members on the Democratic side of this Committee and
staffers and no one from our colleagues on the other side. So I was
there, Mr. Noriega.
"Election day proceedings on May 21 represented the high
point of the electoral process. An estimated 60 percent of reg-
istered voters went to the polls. Very few incidents of violence
were reported. Haitian National Police responded efficiently
and professionally to situations that could have deteriorated
into violence. While voters had to wait in long lines, especially
at the beginning of the day, they were eventually able to cast
their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most voters
were able to find their polling with relative ease."
This is really about the tabulation. Let us really understand
what the fraudulent elections are all about so the American people
understand them. The elections themselves were relatively well
done, given the situation in Haiti at the time. It was about whether
a certain runoff of 7 Senate seats would occur. Is that a fair state-
ment?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, it is an accurate statement.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. You indicate in your written testi-
mony:
"Under the circumstances, Aristide agreed to what he had
steadfastly rejected before, a plan that would open the door to
consensus government."
You are referring to the CARICOM plan.
Was I under a misunderstanding that Secretary Powell endorsed
a plan put forth by the Catholic Bishops of Haiti that Aristide
agreed to?
Mr. NORIEGA. We were promoting-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Delahunt. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We were promoting the CARICOM plan. The Secretary endorsed CARICOM's plan
on February 13, after his meeting with CARICOM foreign ministers, Canadian For-
eign Minister Bill Graham, and OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria. There were
two Bishops plans-one was withdrawn in November 2003 and the other was never
presented because the CARICOM plan evolved at the same time. To the best of my
knowledge, the Secretary did not endorse any plan put forward by the Bishops, al-
though he and other Administration officials were urging the parties to settle their
political differences throughout this period of time. Aristide agreed to the CARICOM
plan.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Answer my question. Did Aristide agree and the
opposition reject the plan that was put forward by the Catholic
Bishops of Haiti where he would share power?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.





Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and thank you, gentle-
men. I wanted to ask questions related to refugees and migration
as well as to the level of U.S. and international aid.
When I first got elected to Congress, I had the high honor of rep-
resenting the area in Miami known as little Haiti, and I was able
to establish great communication with the leaders and the common
folk in that community and have found them to be hardworking,
law-abiding, a wonderful addition to the fabric that makes up our
south Florida communities. And it breaks my heart to see our-the
U.S. policy being one that repatriates individuals to a very difficult
condition in their homeland, and that is why some of us have been
advocating for TPS status for Haitian nationals living in the
United States, Temporary Protected Status, so they are not set
back to a country that by all accounts, wherever-whether you are
pro-Aristide or anti-Aristide, all of us can agree it is a tumultuous
situation of civil strife, no respect for the rule of law. We don't
know when true democratic elections will take place. We are not
sure who the leader is, although we have a constitutional leader
there and it breaks our hearts to see continued divisions of fami-
lies.
I wanted to ask you about if there would be any change in the
United States policy toward either repatriation and/or conferring
TPS status to Haitian nationals who are otherwise very law-abid-
ing, wonderful citizens of our community.
And my second question has to do with the level of U.S. and
international aid. How much military aid do you see forthcoming
in the coming weeks, in the coming months; how much humani-
tarian aid; what will be the level of the international aid with
CARICOM or the U.N.; how will it be supervised; who will be there
to make sure the distribution is done in the correct way and will
not be stolen by whoever happens to consider himself or herself the
chief of the town?
So I am concerned about the free" flow supervision of humani-
tarian aid so that it does get to the people themselves.
Mr. NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I will answer the first
part on the security component and the current security mission,
and I will ask Mr. Dewey and Mr. Franco to address the specific
points you raised.
The security presence that we have on the ground is primarily
United States and French forces. The Chileans are arriving very
soon, and other countries will be joining. This is part of the initial
phase of the Multinational Interim Force to establish a certain
amount of order so we can have a constitutional succession and
begin to reestablish the institutions of government, starting with
the Haitian National Police and the formulation of a civilian gov-
ernment.
The initial troop presence will be on the order of 3,000 or more
soldiers in the follow-on mission under another U.N. Mandate and
a more traditional peacekeeping-type operation which contemplates
the presence of several thousand.
We have had a good number of countries in the Hemisphere indi-
cating their willingness to participate in that follow-on mission,
and it will carry out its work as U.N. Missions generally do for






these peacekeeping missions. I will ask Mr. Dewey to address the
migration issue.
Mr. DEWEY. We understand your concern on that issue and it is
fortunate also we are concerned in watching that issue of Tem-
porary Protected Status very closely. The Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security makes the determination on Tem-
porary Protected Status in consultation with the State Department.
We are also checking people that we feel can give us good advice
and input in terms of our advising DHS. We talked to the Office
of the High Commissioners for Refugees, for example. And there is
concurrence now at this point that it is not time to recommend that
status, and the reason is because the situation is just too fluid. It
varies day by day and I think you can appreciate that. But we are
not relenting our vigilance in watching it.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
Once again for Mr. Weller, I want to make a couple things clear,
and he seems to be an expert on Liberia. We did not call for the
removal of Charles Taylor, for your information.
Secondly, when you compare President Aristide to Charles Tay-
lor, for your information, there was a special court in Sierra Leone
that was sponsored by the United Nations that indicted Charles
Taylor. So I want you to get some of your information correct.
Let me just say-let me ask you, Mr. Noriega, as you know, the
CIA paid and protected the FRAPH-squad people in the old days.
And I would like to know what you know about Guy Philippe. Mr.
Philippe was trained by the United States military in Ecuador. Do
you know anything about that?
Mr. NORIEGA. No.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Payne. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
No. The U.S. has never trained Philippe in Ecuador, or any other country.
Mr. PAYNE. Let me say, do you have any knowledge of why-the
DR, the Dominican Republic, they haven't been having any outside
problems with foreign countries in quite awhile, right?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, sir.
Mr. PAYNE. They weren't invaded by Iraq, right?
Mr. NORIEGA. Right.
Mr. PAYNE. Let me ask you another question. Why would, then,
the U.S. ship 35,000 weapons, 20,000 guns that were sold to the
DR recently? Do you have any idea why there would be so much
weaponry-and I am asking the question because, as you know, the
rebels have a lot of U.S.-made weapons. I think they have a lot of
M-16s, M-60s. They have rocket-propelled launchers. And we
know that 20,000 weapons were sent by the U.S. to the DR. I don't
know the date. But you don't know anything about it. You honestly
don't know anything about-you are in charge of Latin America
and you don't know about these 35,000.
Mr. NORIEGA. No.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Payne. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]






No. Your information is inaccurate. The U.S. has agreed to sell reconditioned M-
16s to the Dominican Republic, but has not delivered any of them. The last U.S.
Government arms sale to the Dominican Republic took place in 1991, when we sold
side arms to the Dominican military.
Mr. PAYNE. And never heard of any training in Ecuador, Mr.
Noriega?
Mr. NORIEGA. I heard the accusation and I heard the reference,
and I don't know that it is true.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Payne. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
I heard the accusation and I heard the reference, and I don't know if it is true.
I believe Philippe attended the Ecuadoran Army Academy for about one year in the
1990s as part of a bilateral exchange program between Haiti and Ecuador. As I un-
derstand it, the United States was not involved in any way in that exchange pro-
gram, and did not at any time provide support or training for Philippe.
Mr. PAYNE. Let me ask you, when you worked as the chief aide
to Jesse Helms, at that time there were allegations that President
Aristide was mentally unbalanced. Do you remember your report
on that?
Mr. NORIEGA. I was working here for Ben Gilman at the time.
Mr. PAYNE. Did you work for Jesse Helms?
Mr. NORIEGA. I sure did. I am proud to have worked for Jesse
Helms for 4 years.
Mr. PAYNE. And you weren't proud to work for Ben Gilman? I
know Ben Gilman. Let me-
Mr. NORIEGA. Let the record show, I love Ben Gilman.
Mr. PAYNE. Well, I am just saying that you said you were proud
to work for Ben Gilman but evidently not so proud-I mean of
Jesse Helms, not so proud of Ben Gilman.
Will the Haitian military be reactivated?
Mr. NORIEGA. That is a decision that will have to be dealt with
by the next elected government of Haiti.
Mr. PAYNE. And under their Constitution, I thought that the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court took over the government.
Mr. NORIEGA. He is the new President now. He is the Head of
State.
Mr. PAYNE. He will be the Head of State until the next elections?
Mr. NORIEGA. Until there is a new election.
Mr. PAYNE. The question about the fact that Mr. Aristide-as
you may recall, we asked for intervention into sending the troops
into Haiti, the same way for Mr. Weller's information. We asked for
United States troops to also be sent to Liberia; same thing as we
did for Haiti. We didn't do either one. We sent them after the Nige-
rians went in Liberia, but did not send anything in until Mr.
Aristide left.
But could you explain the resignation as well as you know it?
Mr. NORIEGA. President Aristide resigned. I don't know if I have
a copy of the letter here or-one of my people probably does have
a copy of the letter. All I have is a translation of it. I have seen
the actual letter. He submitted his resignation on the evening of
the 29th, I believe.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Payne. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]






President Aristide resigned. I don't know if I have a copy of the letter here or-
one of my people probably does have a copy of the letter. All I have is a translation
of it. I have seen the actual letter. He submitted his resignation on the evening of
the 29th, I believe. The resignation letter itself is revealing. Aristide wrote that if
his resignation could prevent a bloodbath, then he agreed to leave in the hope that
there would be life and not death. Aristide knew full well that if he tried to remain
as president, many people would die in the impending clash between his armed par-
tisans and the advancing insurgents. At no time did the U.S. force this conclusion
on Aristide or even suggest it. The evening before Aristide left, he passed a message
to Ambassador Foley through his private security guards, asking what the U.S.
thought would be in the best interest of the Haitian people-staying or resigning.
After consulting with Secretary Powell, the Ambassador replied to Aristide: You
have to decide what is best for Haiti. Hours after this, Aristide told the Embassy
that he was ready to go that night. The U.S. helped Aristide get to the airport and
arranged air transportation out of the country for him, his wife, and his private se-
curity detail.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Foley.
Mr. FOLEY. Let me first extend to Mr. Noriega my personal ap-
preciation for going down to Haiti and attempting to negotiate a
settlement to the crisis. You went in the middle of turmoil. You did
so at some risk and peril to your own life, and I want to applaud
you on behalf of Congress, or at least this Member of Congress, for
endeavoring to seek a peaceful settlement to the crisis. Congress-
man Wexler and I have neighboring districts and we have a news-
paper, The Palm Beach Post, the most liberal probably of any news-
paper in Florida. They have never printed a kind word about Presi-
dent Bush or his brother, Governor Bush.
Let me read you today's editorial:
"A Delusional Aristide. Jean-Bertrand Aristide can accuse
the United States of many things, but depriving him of an op-
portunity to bring democracy to Haiti isn't one of them. The
United States, in conjunction with France and the Organiza-
tion of American States, helped Mr. Aristide to leave the coun-
try. Though his destination wasn't clear when the plane took
off, the action protected Mr. Aristide and his family. It might
have prevented a blood bath.
"His departure decreased the chance that armed criminals
masquerading as rebels will take control and increased the
chance that an international effort can move Haiti toward
democratic elections."
Now, that is by an observer, The Palm Beach Post.
I hear a lot of things about a gentleman being kidnapped, spir-
ited away in the middle of the night, and we will have plenty of
time to ferret those issues out. But there is one thing for certain:
Haiti needs our help. And this Administration has stepped up to
the plate.
Now I can read testimony, Randall Robinson and I were on CNN
the other day and he is making wild accusations about this kidnap-
ping. Mr. Robinson's wife was paid some $300,000 by the Haiti
Government to represent them in matters of public relations. This
is what he said about President Clinton:
"Civil rights lobbyist Randall Robinson said he opposed
President Clinton because he had exhausted all patience with
President Clinton's failed, insensitive, and ultimately racist
policy in Haiti."






And it goes on about the President's flip-flop on Haiti, indifference,
sending in troops; no, maybe I won't.
So we can continue to have this political dialogue and see who
we can blame. I personally take the word of Secretary Colin Powell
over this man. He has had ample opportunity to help his people
with aid from this country and others. France, Canada, would not
invest one nickle or one body to save this man's failed presidency.
The State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report of 2003, 2002, and 2001 established that senior officials
throughout the Haitian Government, including the Haitian Na-
tional Police, presidential security unit, and Aristide's palace
guards, were actively involved in drug trafficking. These reports es-
tablished that light aircraft, landing with drug cargoes on Route 9
in Port-au-Prince, are actively helped by Haitian National Police
who block traffic and help with offloading the drugs and providing
ground transportation.
Let me read you another thing that is very important and I
would like you to comment on:
The 2003 State Department Human Rights Report for Haiti
confirms that there were credible reports of extrajudicial
killings by members of the Haitian National Police, municipal
national government officials, and civilian attaches associated
with the Haitian National Police. In 1994, the United States
used military force to restore Aristide to office. One of the com-
pelling reasons for using force to restore Aristide to office was
that the military regime was using civilian attaches to ter-
rorize the population, particularly Aristide supporters.
Aristide, it turns out, has been using civilian attaches to ter-
rorize the population, particularly his political opponents.
What does this use of attaches say about the Aristide's govern-
ment's commitment to the rule of law?
Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Congressman Foley, and I
will pass on to our staff the statements of gratitude for the work
they are doing to help Haiti. The report and the references to the
human rights violations are written by professionals at the State
Department, and they make a compelling point, which is, we do not
choose who runs various countries. We don't choose who we recog-
nize as constitutionally-elected leaders, but we do have an obliga-
tion to choose where we put American lives at risk. And in this
case, we made the decision based on what we know about Presi-
dent Aristide after years of trying, that it was not an effective, sus-
tainable, political solution to merely prop him up.
Mr. BALLENGER. Now for the other Members, we are going to call
on you. Since it is all going to be Democrats, we are going to call
on Members of the Committee by seniority and then finish up with
whoever is left. And you have my condolences, Charlie, as you may
be last.
Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Noriega, for
joining us.
This hearing has been intriguing, to say the least, with some of
the charges thrown around. And it just seems-I have been in-
volved in working on issues regarding Haiti for 3 or 4 years and
have just been amazed at how the Bush Administration has simply







set Aristide up for failure. The $154 million that Ms. Lee and many
in the Congressional Black Caucus, Mr. Wexler and others have
tried to spring loose the $154 million the Administration blocked
for water, for sewer, for health, for roads, for sanitation, for all the
things that would have made this regime a lot more successful sim-
ply wasn't available.
It is hard to look at this situation and think that the Bush Ad-
ministration really wanted the experiment of democracy in Haiti to
succeed.
But let me move to a question about the Constitution. I have
heard Mr. Noriega refer to the Constitution many times. President
Bush, I would like to quote, said on Sunday:
"The Constitution of Haiti is working. There is an interim
President, as per the Constitution, in place."
The White House described Aristide's exile as "peaceful, demo-
cratic, and constitutional." I don't think the President and, unfortu-
nately, the President or his Administration frankly took the time
to read the Constitution of Haiti, or they simply chose to ignore it.
I would like to read article 149 of the 1987 Constitution of Haiti:
"Should the Office of the President of the Republic become
vacant for any reason, the President of the Supreme Court of
the Republic or, in his absence, the Vice President of that
Court or, in his absence, the judge with the highest seniority,"
and so on by order of seniority,
"Shall be invested temporarily with the duties of the President
of the republic by the National Assembly, duly convened by the
Prime Minister. The election of a new President for a new 5-
year term shall be held at least 45 and no more than 90 days
after the vacancy occurs pursuant to the constitutional elec-
toral law."
The Administration's assertion that Haiti's Constitution is work-
ing simply doesn't mesh with the facts. In urging President
Aristide's resignation, without a legislature to ratify the interim
President, the Bush Administration played a role in subverting and
effectively nullifying the Constitution to which you consistently
point.
If the opposition had chosen to join in diplomatic solutions to the
crisis, democracy could have been preserved. Instead, the U.S.
stood by as a rebel minority forced him out of power.
Now, the Haiti Constitution calls for the election of a new Presi-
dent at least 45 and no more than 90 days after the vacancy oc-
curs. To the best of my knowledge, after urging President Aristide
to resign, the Bush Administration offered no insight and no plan
as to how this will be accomplished.
Please explain to me how the Constitution was followed as Presi-
dent Bush promised, and how it is possible to move forward con-
stitutionally without a legislature.
Mr. NORIEGA. Well, there is no Parliament because the Par-
liament's term expired because there were no elections held in a
timely fashion. We have-





38

[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Brown. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
Well, there is no Parliament because the Parliament's term expired because there
were no elections held in a timely fashion. We have had to deal with this political
reality in offering advice on how Haiti could reconstitute its government while re-
specting the 1987 constitution. When President Aristide resigned, Boniface
Alexandre, President of Haiti's Supreme Court, became Haiti's president under Arti-
cle 149 of the constitution. Under Haiti's Constitution, the Prime Minister is the
head of government. Article 165 of the constitution says that if the Prime Minister
resigns, the government remains in place until the appointment of a successor, in
order to transact current business. Article 165 does not specify how or when a suc-
cessor Prime Minister should be chosen, but a reasonable interpretation would re-
quire the President to choose a new Prime Minister from the majority party in Par-
liament, as stipulated in Article 137. But what does the constitution say about ap-
pointing a new Prime Minister if there is no Parliament? It is silent on this point.
Whatever the reasons were for Parliament's expiration, Haiti needed a government
after Yvon Neptune, Aristide's Prime Minister, resigned. Doing nothing, because the
constitution is silent, was not an option. Since the legislature did not exist, Haiti
used the provisions of the CARICOM action plan to provide a mechanism for the
appointment of a new Prime Minister. In my view, this does not make Haiti's tran-
sitional government unconstitutional. To the contrary, the transitional government
was formed with full respect for the constitution under the circumstances prevailing
at the time. And we need to recall that this is a transitional government, to be re-
placed when elections are held within a year or so.
Mr. BROWN. Because the opposition didn't block any elections
and the administration didn't force the opposition to move forward
and conduct those elections.
Mr. NORIEGA. We didn't force them to do it, but our ability to do
that would be limited. But the reason they didn't want to do it was
because they didn't trust the process. And every time they raised
their head in the political process-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Brown. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We didn't force them to do it, but our ability to make them do this would be very
limited. The reason the opposition didn't want to participate in elections was be-
cause they didn't trust the process. Every time they raised their head in the political
process, all they saw was President Aristide evading his commitments to the OAS
to create a secure climate for elections. Aristide partisans, at times armed and act-
ing with the complicity of the Haitian National Police, violently suppressed many
of the opposition's peaceful demonstrations. In December 2001, there was a con-
certed, nation-wide attack against the opposition. Many offices were torched and
some residences of opposition leaders as well. Going back to the May 2000 elections,
Aristide's government refused to fix fraudulent election results for the Senate, de-
spite an OAS finding that the vote results were tabulated in a fraudulent manner
and despite requests from opposition leaders, the U.S., and other members of the
international community. Little wonder, then, that opposition and civil society lead-
ers would not engage in an electoral process without good faith action from Aristide
to ensure their security-action that Aristide never took despite his many promises
that he would act.
Mr. BROWN. Whenever our policy as a government-whenever
there is an opposition that objects to an election, we say well, then,
that is okay not to have an election?
Mr. NORIEGA. That isn't what I am saying, and I don't have
much time to give an answer. The process is going to have to be
worked out by the new government, which will be a government
that is formed by a consensus, by a group of wise men that is being
formed by a Tripartite Commission that will advise on the appoint-
ment of a new Prime Minister. President Aristide's party will be






represented as well as other representatives of civil society and the
international community. They will form this new government, ap-
point a new Cabinet.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Brown. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
That isn't what I am saying and I don't have much time to give an answer. The
process is going to have to be worked out by the new government, which will be
a government that is formed by a consensus, by a group of wise men that is being
formed by a Tripartite Commission which will appoint a seven member Council of
Eminent Persons, which will in turn advise on the appointment of a new Prime
Minister. President Aristide's party will be represented as well as other representa-
tives of civil society and the international community. The Council of Eminent Per-
sons will advise on nominations for a new Prime Minister, President Alexandre will
appoint the new Prime Minister, who will appoint a new Cabinet. This is the proc-
ess for the formation of the transitional government, a process that follows provi-
sions of the Haitian constitution. This is the first step toward free and fair elections
that will put a new permanent government into power. The international commu-
nity, including the U.S., will be heavily involved in making sure that these elections
are conducted in a secure environment, so that all political parties, including Mr.
Aristide's party, can participate without fearing for their personal safety. Before
Aristide left, neither we nor anyone else could force the opposition to agree to elec-
tions when it was plain that Aristide would use violence and intimidation to retain
power. That is not democracy. Such an election would not be free, fair, or demo-
cratic.
Mr. BROWN. Is this in the Constitution that President Bush has
asserted that we are following?
Mr. NORIEGA. This is based on an international plan that was
posed to President Aristide, which he accepted, and we are trying
to follow that process to the best of our ability.
Mr. BROWN. The opposition didn't accept it.
Mr. NORIEGA. The opposition didn't accept it because they didn't
trust President Aristide, and we have heard a few reasons why. Re-
garding your statements that this Administration linked the deliv-
ery of assistance-or blocked the delivery of assistance is not accu-
rate. And your statement that we-well, I will stop.
Mr. BROWN. If your statement is about to be that if you didn't
block it, you can't count the number the phone calls that many of
us made to try to free up that money for roads and sewers and for
clean water, where their water is some of the worst drinking water
in the world.
Mr. BALLENGER. Your time is up. You are out of order, Mr.
Brown. Mr. Wexler, please proceed.
Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Noriega, I found the collective response to Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen's question with respect to the Temporary Protective Sta-
tus, with respect to many Haitians that are in the south Florida
community mostly, the response is an incredulous one. And I guess
it is sort of a twisted sense of reality where, on the one hand, you
take rightful point in introducing the gentleman who is sitting in
his wheelchair in the front row-and I am very happy that he is
here-as a personal example of the tragic circumstances that not
only himself but thousands of other Haitian people have found
themselves in, and understanding that Mr. Aristide no longer is
the President.
But on the one hand, we have sitting in the front row a gen-
tleman, who in your own language, had his legs crushed. And now,





for months, we have been deporting Haitians back to Haiti. We
continue to deport Haitians back to Haiti today. We have asked on
a bipartisan basis that through the turmoil, we just take a timeout.
We are told it is not ripe yet to take a timeout deporting people.
And apparently our boats that are circling Haiti don't have on
those boats people who can speak Creole, so that when we take
these people into custody, they can't even articulate, because no-
body on our side of the equation understands them, what fears
they may in fact have.
Well, the gentleman in the front row seems to be the personifica-
tion of the fears. So it seems to me on the one hand, you can't pa-
rade people. And I am thrilled with an enormous amount of respect
that this gentleman is here, but you can't have people sitting here
in the front row that had their lives ruined, and at the same time
say that we are continuing the current policy of sending Haitians
back so they too can have their lives ruined.
Which are we supposed to believe? Either there is a crisis or
there isn't. But we can't claim a crisis to justify our inaction or our
feelings toward the previous President and then continue to send
others back so they can get mauled like this gentleman in the first
row. Which is it?
Mr. NORIEGA. Now that President Aristide is no longer President
of Haiti, perhaps it is safe for this man to go back to Haiti.
Mr. WEXLER. Is that the policy? Is that the American policy now?
Mr. NORIEGA. On the other hand, if there are people, for exam-
ple, persons who are from the Aristide government who were to
come to the United States and have a credible fear of persecution,
that would be weighed today. We have to make decisions based on
individual cases. If there is a credible fear, then we have an obliga-
tion to run that fear to ground, to give them an opportunity to sub-
stantiate a political asylum claim. So that process does exist. It has
to be done on an individual basis.
Mr. WEXLER. What circumstances would need to occur in Haiti
in order for the State Department to recommend to the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security that Temporary Protective Status be
provided for Haitians? What hasn't occurred that needs to occur?
Mr. DEWEY. The conditions for Temporary Protective Status are
an acute situation and widespread violence throughout the country,
or a natural disaster, as has been the case for some of the countries
in Central America. It doesn't meet that test, and the Department
of Homeland Security makes that decision.
Mr. WEXLER. How many more Haitians will have to die in order
for the chaos to be great enough so we can grant a Temporary Pro-
tective Status? Is there a level that needs to be established that we
have to reach?
Mr. DEWEY. If we have evidence that Haitians are dying. There
have not been any that have been repatriated after the departure.
Mr. WEXLER. Do you recognize the dichotomy? On the one hand,
Mr. Noriega spends his entire testimony documenting all the trage-
dies that have occurred in Haiti. And up until 2 days ago that
same gentleman was in charge, and now we are saying there is no
documented problem.
Mr. NORIEGA. May I address that point very briefly? May I note
that in the days-






Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection.
Mr. NORIEGA. In the days before President Aristide's departure,
we had about 900 people that had taken to the seas. Since the days
of Aristide's departure, we have three intercepted on the seas. So
I think the situation may be improving and we hope it gets better
every day.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. I find it incredible. I look at today's news. I under-
stand that the United States is shifting its policy, where Staff Ser-
geant Timothy Edwards said that at airports, the Marines' mission
now is aimed to protect Haitians from reprisal attacks. I mean, it
is clear what is going on. We are shifting our policies now. This is
just in today's paper. I don't know whether you read it today. But
there are problems that we have to shift it because of the reprisals,
and they are talking about bodies laying in the street.
I watched CNN the other day. But they have had bodies just re-
cently that they were putting in and taking to the morgue. So peo-
ple are dying every day. I think that is well documented.
I wonder, is Venezuela next? I wonder, because we tried that
once and it didn't work, and maybe we ought to go back again be-
cause we believe in democracy. I wonder if Venezuela is next.
Let me ask you, I think that it is clear-and I wonder what is
the most important thing here. It is clear to me, and I think it is
clear to all, that you and the Administration for whatever the rea-
son, you don't like-didn't like Aristide. Now, I wonder what be-
comes more important. Is it an individual or an institution of gov-
ernment that is important in the lives of the people, the 8 million
people that happen to live in Haiti, the most important thing, the
saving of lives of Haitians?
Now if, in fact, you have a policy that is just based upon who you
like and dislike in regards to who heads the country, and you make
those decisions, then I wonder why we even went through the cha-
rade of saying that we agree with, first, the Bishops. When they
came together, they had an agreement and they wanted to sit down
and get both parties together so we can stop atrocities. Why would
we even say we agree with that? Why would we even say that we
agreed with the CARICOM agreement, if in fact we weren't serious
about trying to get two sides to the table to negotiate an agree-
ment?
We know an agreement cannot be had but one side. You need
two sides at the table. And if fact-why would we say we want a
diplomatic relationship? Based upon everything I heard here, you
are saying that your minds were made up before CARICOM and
you were saying you didn't want a diplomatic conclusion to this
problem. You just wanted to get rid of Aristide. That was the objec-
tive, not to preserve this democracy. The objective seems to me to
get rid of a Head of State.
You indicated in your testimony we don't put American lives at
risk to save a government. But by now, right now, by not trying
to save a government, we are going to put American lives at stake,
because we have rebels and criminals and hoods that are control-
ling the streets. And our own admission when we look at individ-
uals-and I am not a conspiracy theorist at all, but when, in fact,
you have these allegations, I think some of them have been fairly






well documented, and I will ask you that when you have allega-
tions that the CIA had been connected to the FRAPH, whose lead-
ers went through Aristide originally, and most recently over the
weekend, and the FRAPH death squad leader Toto Constant, who
not only lives in Queens, lives in my district and is causing heck
in my district as we speak, causing people-and we are separating
Haitians in the streets of New York and Brooklyn, Queens and
Brooklyn from each other, but Constant is there and he is going
to come back.
Then you have Guy Philippe, who is a leader of the current
movement, was trained by the United States military in Ecuador.
We have M-16s that were found and M-60s and rocket-propelled
grenade launchers in the hands of the rebels appear to be weapons
sent by the United States to the Dominican Republic, and now they
end up in Haiti. You have a situation, as I said, where the U.S.
did not really back the CARICOM peace plan at all, but they claim
they backed it after the Congressional Black Caucus-I would
ask-and I can go on and I could bring up allegation after allega-
tion, but I would like to know-and then you also have all sorts
of figures who are coming out of the woodwork to rule in Haiti-
Guy Philippe and I hear Baby Doc is coming back, Danny Tous-
saint.
What is our current plan for Haiti and will these people be al-
lowed to take office? There are criminals that have been released.
Prisons were broken into. The people that broke laws, people that
went to the DR, some people serving a life sentence, all is forgotten
about and these people can now come back, and are these going to
be the ones that are going to negotiate a peace agreement for a
democratic government in Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you, Congressman. Congressman, the
Bishops that you referred to, the Bishops' plan that you referred
to, was actually withdrawn by the Bishops. We tried to get them
to propose another plan, and Secretary Powell encouraged them to
propose another plan. But the Bishops' consensus was that Aristide
had to leave, and we were told they would not put forward a plan
that would leave Aristide in place.
With respect to the question of whether we like the man or not,
that isn't the issue. It isn't even the issue of whether we like what
he did when he was in office over a 10-year period. But we do have
to make some judgments about whether we want to put American
lives at risk merely to keep him in power for a little bit longer.
We were not asked and are not expected to put American lives
at risk to keep in power good men in Bolivia or in Argentina or in
Ecuador. And it is not merely a question of whether we like a per-
son; it is whether we think it is a sustainable, viable investment
for American foreign policy. It is a reasonable assessment that we
are obligated to make.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Meeks. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
Thank you, Congressman. Congressman, the Bishops that you referred to, the
Bishops' plan that you referred to, was actually withdrawn by the Bishops. We tried
to get them to propose another plan, and Secretary Powell encouraged them to pro-
pose another plan. But the Bishops' consensus was that Aristide had to leave, and






we were told that they would not put forward a plan that would leave Aristide in
place.
With respect to the question of whether we like the man or not, that isn't the
issue. It isn't even the issue of whether we like what he did when he was in office
over a 10-year period. But we do have to make some judgments about whether we
want to put American lives at risk merely to keep him in power a little bit longer.
We were not asked and are not expected to put American lives at risk to keep in
power good men in Bolivia or in Argentina or in Ecuador. And it is not merely a
question of whether we like a person; it is whether we think it is a sustainable, via-
ble investment for American foreign policy. It is a reasonable assessment that we
were obligated to make.
It is worth remembering that Haiti's political crisis had festered for more than
two years by the time the rebels began armed attacks in the north. Intervening with
troops in the middle of an armed insurgency caused by the unresolved political crisis
was not, in our judgment, a prudent policy. The armed insurgents opposing Aristide
would have viewed the intervention as supporting Aristide, substantially increasing
risk for American troops. When President Aristide resigned and left the country, it
became possible for troops to conduct stability operations without being in between
two armed factions.
Let me address some of the other questions you raise in your statement. You said
that we didn't like Aristide, that our minds were made up before the CARICOM
plan, that we did not want a diplomatic conclusion to the problem. The facts, I
think, show something far different. We were observers at the meetings where
CARICOM came up with its plan, and offered our advice and counsel when asked.
We knew what the plan involved from the very beginning, and were it favor of it.
The Secretary himself publicly endorsed the CARICOM plan on February 13. After
Aristide accepted the plan in Kingston, we engaged in intensive diplomacy to con-
vince opposition and civil society leaders to accept the CARICOM plan, including
that part of the plan that called for Aristide to serve out the remainder of his term.
So we did engage in diplomacy to achieve a political solution, and this settlement
included President Aristide remaining in office.
As I said earlier, the U.S. Government has delivered no M-16 rifles, or any of
the other weapons you mention, to the Dominican Republic. The last U.S. weapons
sale to the Dominican Republic was 1991, when we delivered side arms. I have also
testified that Guy Philippe's military training in Ecuador was not funded or spon-
sored by the U.S., but was part of a bilateral program between Haiti and Ecuador.
On our current plans for Haiti, the U.S. intends to support efforts to rebuild Hai-
ti's governmental institutions, including a professional, independent police force. We
will support free and fair elections as soon as the interim Haitian government deter-
mines it is practical to hold them. One of the guiding principles of our engagement
in Haiti is that political power will not be turned over to persons who have partici-
pated in political violence, including irregular armed groups.
Mr. BALLENGER. Again, sorry, Mr. Secretary. Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you and
the Ranking Member for this hearing. It is long overdue, but now
I understand why.
It is very clear to me, Mr. Noriega, that, first of all, we have been
involved in the process of destabilizing and undermining the gov-
ernment of Haiti over the last 3, 4 years. It is also very clear to
me that-and it is this Administration's policy that regime change
is a central component of its foreign policy and it manifests itself
in a variety of ways. It just so happens in Haiti, it was planned
in this way, working with the murderers and the thugs and those
paramilitary groups to achieve what you had planned from day
one, and that is a coup and overthrow of the government of Presi-
dent Aristide, the duly elected President of a black nation of 8 mil-
lion people, the poorest in the Western Hemisphere. I think your
testimony confirmed that for me.
Let me also indicate that it is very important for me to just ask
you about the safety and security of President and Mrs. Aristide,
because we have called the State Department just to ask them to
put us in touch with them, and it is my understanding there is no





United States Embassy in the Central African Republic. Or is there
a way to at least know what is transpiring? I want to make sure
from your point of view that you are ensuring their safety and their
well-being.
Next I would like to know just, really, Mr. Noriega, when did you
decide that Mr. Aristide had to go? And what did you do to make
sure that that happened? And I ask you that because I wrote to
Secretary Powell on February 12 and said in this letter-let me
just read one paragraph. I said-and this was February 12:
"I must say, Mr. Secretary, that our failure to support the
democratic process and help restore order looks like a covert
effort to overthrow a government. There is a violent coup d'etat
in the making, and it appears that the United States is aiding
and abetting an attempt to violently topple the Aristide gov-
ernment. With all due respect, this looks like regime change."
There were a series of questions I asked the Secretary of State.
He has not responded yet. Maybe you can.
Does the State Department support the democratically-elected
government of Haiti, and what tactical steps is our government
taking to support the democratic process?
Secondly, is our country supporting and sanctioning an over-
throw of the Aristide government by giving a wink and nod to the
opposition? And I said to the Secretary, there are reports that we
are covertly funding the opposition.
Thirdly, does the United States support the CARICOM proposal
and will we work through the OAS to broker a peaceful solution
and not an overthrow of the Aristide government?
Finally, I asked, is it true that Haitian opposition parties and
leaders have received USAID funding? Mr. Secretary, I think it is
very important that these questions be answered truthfully be-
cause many would like to believe the Secretary of State.
I know he said recently some of our statements are nonsense.
There have been reports that we are buying into conspiracy theo-
ries. But I also think it is very important to ask these questions,
given the facts that the Secretary of State made and the presen-
tation he made at the United Nations with regard to the weapons
of mass destruction, with regard to Iraq. It is important we know
the truth. And it is important to answer some of these questions
that we have been asking today, because certainly your testimony
to date begs the question, just when did we plan this and how did
we see this being executed? And I would like to hear from you on
that.
Mr. NORIEGA. Well, Congresswoman, on the safety and well-
being of President Aristide and his party, he is not the responsi-
bility of the United States Government. We facilitated his safe de-
parture from the country at his request. He is free to leave the
Central African Republic at any time.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Lee. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
Well, Congresswoman, on the safety and well-being of President Aristide and his
party, he is not the responsibility of the United States Government. We facilitated
his safe departure from the country at his request. He is free to leave the Central
African Republic at any time.






On your next question, we never decided that Aristide had to resign office-he de-
cided that himself when he realized that continuing in office would mean death and
suffering in the conflict between his armed partisans and the insurgents. And as
I responded a moment ago to Congressman Meeks, we supported the CARICOM
plan, which among other things called for President Aristide to remain in office for
the balance of his term.
While Aristide was in office, we acknowledged him as Haiti's elected president
and supported the democratic process by working with all parties to achieve a set-
tlement of the political crisis. This included urging Aristide on several occasions to
end his undemocratic suppression of legitimate political dissent and free press. We
also asked him to do something to create a climate of security for elections, as he
promised the OAS he would, but never did. We engaged in an intensive effort to
obtain the opposition's agreement to the CARICOM plan, which initially they did
not accept because it allowed Aristide to remain in office. -
Opposition parties and leaders in Haiti have never received direct funding from
USAID. Opposition parties and their leaders have participated in political party
training given by USAID grantees, the National Democratic Institute and the Inter-
national Republican Institute.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Secretary, let me just say my office was in touch
with the State Department throughout this process, and we were
told that President Aristide and Mrs. Aristide were going to a des-
tination of their choosing. We heard that President Aristide had no
idea where he was going until 20 minutes before they landed.
Mr. NORIEGA. That is accurate. He had chosen a destination
which decided it would not be able to accept him. We then had to
find a place that would accept him. We did, and the Central Afri-
can Republic has graciously accepted to do that.
They also now say that he is free to leave any time he wants,
and the public statements I have seen, I think that they would wel-
come his leaving whenever he wants.
Ms. LEE. And wouldn't we get a letter in response to the ques-
tions that we asked of the-
Mr. NORIEGA. I think you certainly are owed an answer, Con-
gresswoman.
Ms. LEE. And this was February 12, mind you, before the coup
took place.
Mr. BALLENGER. Okay. Could I request, just to assist you all, we
have quite a few more people, and let us be honest, I think they
are more interested in making a statement than asking questions.
But if you could record the questions that we do not have time to
answer, it would be greatly appreciated.
Sooner or later, the gentleman with the leg problem is supposed
to come up and, at the rate we are going, it may be midnight. So
let me ask the people that are going to ask questions, either make
your statement and don't ask questions, or ask questions and give
them time to answer.
So it is now.
Ms. WATSON. I am going to read you a statement and then would
you tell me if it is true.
"The United States State Department, which never nego-
tiates with terrorists, has sufficient cozy contact with the Hai-
tian rebels to convince them to delay their onslaught on Port-
au-Prince. Even after the rebels rejected terms of settlement
acceptable to President Aristide, in a matter of hours, the
State Department acceded to the rebel demands, which was
the removal of President Aristide."






Would you say that is a true statement, or would you say it is
not?
Mr. NORIEGA. That statement is false.
Ms. WATSON. All right.
Now, does the State Department deal with those who plan coup
d'etats or overthrow of legitimately elected democratic govern-
ments?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, we do not.
Ms. WATSON. What kind of conversation did you have with the
leaders or leader of the rebel groups?
Mr. NORIEGA. None.
Ms. WATSON. All right.
How, then, did you know they would not accept the proposal that
was offered and agreed to by President Aristide?
Mr. NORIEGA. The conversations we had were with the civilian
democratic opposition, representatives of political parties and civil
society, not with the so-called "rebel groups," which I would prefer
to refer to as "criminal gangs."
Ms. WATSON. Apparently, it is a criminal gang member, Philippe,
that has threatened other duly elected officials if they do not at-
tend a meeting. I understand less than 24 hours ago this statement
was made, and I understand this person has been responsible for
the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of Haitians in the past.
Mr. NORIEGA. I did not see the statement you are referring to,
ma'am, but we have communicated to the so-called "rebels," "crimi-
nal gangs," that they should lay down their arms and leave the
city.
Before they reached the city, we had public statements that said
that they would be held responsible, if they came into the city, for
the violence that ensued, and the international community would
hold them responsible for that. They said that they saw those
statements, among other things, on the Internet and said that they
were not coming into the city.
They immediately proceeded to come into the city. So they were
not responding to these public statements.
But as the international community is able to put more security
forces on the ground, these folks will have no choice but to respond
and to comply and to pull out of the city.
Ms. WATSON. Is it true or not true that our Ambassador, Ambas-
sador Foley, met with the rebel leader today?
Mr. NORIEGA. That is not true.
Ms. WATSON. He did not meet with him today?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, he did not.
Ms. WATSON. Maybe before?
Mr. NORIEGA. I don't think he has ever met the man.
Ms. WATSON. Okay. Maybe the Associated Press got it wrong. I
know they do get some things wrong. But it is in the Associated
Press today, and I will see that you get a copy:
"A day after declaring himself Haiti's new military chief,
rebel leader Guy Philippe met briefly with U.S. Ambassador
James Foley at the envoy's residence on Wednesday. Neither
side would comment about the content."






Mr. NORIEGA. That is false. The meeting that I know Ambas-
sador Foley had was with Yvon Neptune, who was President
Aristide's Prime Minister, and with the interim President of Haiti,
Boniface Alexandre. As far as I know, Ambassador Foley has never
met with a guerrilla leader.
The leader of the U.S. military contingent met with Philippe
briefly this morning to tell him that he should lay down his arms.
Ms. WATSON. What did you just say? Repeat what you just said,
the last sentence.
Mr. NORIEGA. The head of the U.S. military contingent met with
Philippe this morning to tell him to lay down his arms and to leave
the city.
Ms. WATSON. Under whose authority? Was that under the Am-
bassador's authority?
Mr. NORIEGA. No. That man does not work for the Ambassador.
Ms. WATSON. Who directed?
Mr. NORIEGA. What he is doing, in the interest of the security
of U.S. forces, is to tell this man to leave the city to prevent any
sort of a confrontation. If he does not leave the city, he will have
to respond to the force of the international community; and that
was the simple message to him.
Ms. WATSON. Well, I would suggest strongly that the State De-
partment immediately contact the Associated Press to clarify this,
that is going out over e-mail.
Mr. BALLENGER. If I may, I have the latest quotation of 2:57 this
afternoon from the Associated Press, so it saves you the trouble of
finding out:
"Rebel leader Guy Philippe said Wednesday his forces laid
down their arms as United States Marines fanned out through
the capital, rifles at ready, to help restore some order amid
Haiti's bloody uprising."
And now-I mean, it is the same Associated Press that you
agreed was not too smart.
Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me just to finish
my question, and it probably is more like a statement.
I have listened for the last hour or so to an assault on a Presi-
dent that was duly elected in a democratic process.
Mr. BALLENGER. I hate to be impolite, but we did not let anybody
else have additional time.
Ms. WATSON. Well, you kind of took some of my time, but you
are the Chair, you can do that. But there is definitely a double
standard.
Mr. BALLENGER. Your time had already expired.
Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Rangel.
Mr. RANGEL. Thank you so much, and thank you, Mr. Noriega,
for sharing your views with us.
You had indicated that you would not deal with these rogues and
thugs that were part of the militia, and I guess the noncivilian part
of the opposition, but there did come a time where these rogues
and thugs were approaching the palace and that our government
thought that President Aristide was in danger of his life and his
family's.






Mr. NORIEGA. Pardon me, sir? I didn't hear the last part of that.
Mr. RANGEL. Did there come a time that the United States Gov-
ernment thought that these rogues, these thugs, these criminals
were approaching the palace and that President Aristide and his
family would be in danger?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes.
Mr. RANGEL. And as you said, that we did not think it was ap-
propriate to put our military in harm's way to shore up his safety?
Mr. NORIEGA. That was a decision we made.
Mr. RANGEL. Right. And so therefore we communicated that to
President Aristide that he could not depend on us to protect him
against these thugs, these criminals, and these rogues?
Mr. NORIEGA. That is essentially correct, yes. We told him
through public statements that we were not going to do that.
Mr. RANGEL. And as a result of this, President Aristide thought
that it was in his best interests and the best interests of the Hai-
tians for him to leave?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANGEL. And we facilitated that leaving?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, sir, we did.
Mr. RANGEL. And we did take him out of Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. At his request.
Mr. RANGEL. Yes. And he requested, because he was fearful for
his life and other Haitians that would die as a result of the infor-
mation we gave him, right?
Mr. NORIEGA. I think it wasn't necessarily just the information
we gave him, but I think-
Mr. RANGEL. Well, it encouraged him to leave, I would think.
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes. If you read his resignation letter, that is the
reason.
Mr. RANGEL. Well, I want to know, if someone leaves a country
that is elected, because he is fearful for his life, is that not a coup
d'etat?
Mr. NORIEGA. I don't think so, sir.
Mr. RANGEL. Well, that is what is explained in the dictionary.
How would you describe a coup d'etat?
Here is a man that is informed by the United States Government
that we cannot protect him, and the rebels and thugs and rogues
are going to come and they are going to kill him and his family and
Haitians would die. Do you want to leave? He says, "Yes." You
make him leave.
Why is that not a coup d'etat?
Mr. NORIEGA. We did not make him leave, sir.
Mr. RANGEL. I didn't say you made him leave. He asked to leave.
Mr. NORIEGA. At the very end you said, and "you make him
leave."
Mr. RANGEL. You helped him to leave, I meant to say. Forgive
me.
Mr. NORIEGA. At his request.
Mr. RANGEL. At his request. He begged you to help him to leave
to get out of there so he would not get killed, and his family, be-
cause he feared that these rebel forces that we informed him would
kill him and other Haitians, and he left. Now, why is that not a
coup d'etat?






Mr. NORIEGA. It isn't what I would regard as a traditional coup
d'etat.
Mr. RANGEL. Tell me the difference. When the man is running
for his life, here comes the military, they are armed, they are going
to kill them. We know it, we tell him that.
He says, please get me out of here. We get him out of there. Why
is that not a coup d'etat?
Mr. NORIEGA. He resigned, sir.
Mr. RANGEL. Now, did we ask him to resign?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, we didn't. We told him that if he needed to
leave-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
No, we didn't. We told him that if he needed to leave, we could facilitate his de-
parture.
Mr. RANGEL. Be very careful, Mr. Noriega, because it is reported.
Did we ask him to resign? Was that a condition of helping him to
leave the country?
Mr. NORIEGA. We told him that for us to be able to facilitate his
departure-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We told him that for us to be able to facilitate his departure that he had to decide
what was best for Haiti. If he decided to resign, we would work with him on a des-
tination. I do not consider that a condition for helping him to leave. Aristide and
his security advisors made their own assessment of his position.
Mr. RANGEL. Yes, of course. That is easy.
Mr. NORIEGA. We did not want to have a situation where we
were going to have to-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We did not want a situation where we were going to have to deal with the con-
sequences of a political vacuum. If Aristide had left Haiti with his status as presi-
dent unresolved, the street violence would have continued. Aristide understood
this-he said so in his resignation letter-I agree to leave if my resignation can pre-
vent a bloodbath.
Mr. RANGEL. You didn't want to have a situation, so you told him
that unless he resigned, we would not be able to facilitate his de-
parture.
Mr. NORIEGA. Because we wanted to have some sort of a sustain-
able political-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
Because we wanted to have some sort of a sustainable political framework after
Aristide's departure if he decided to leave, it was understood that he would resign
and show us his letter of resignation. Haiti's constitution provides for a succession
if the Office of the President becomes vacant for any reason. If Aristide had not re-
signed, the office would not be vacant even if he had left the country. His successor
could not have taken office, and there would have been a power vacuum that armed
insurgents could have exploited. Again, Aristide understood this-this is why he
submitted a resignation before leaving.






Mr. RANGEL. I didn't ask the reasons, Mr. Noriega. I am just ask-
ing you this.
Mr. BALLENGER. If I may say something, Charlie, you ought to
give him a chance to answer at least one question before you throw
another one at him.
Mr. RANGEL. But this is such a simple one here.
As a condition of assisting this man, saving his life, that of his
family, one of the conditions of helping him was that he resign; is
that not true?
Mr. NORIEGA. We did not want to have a situation where-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We did not want to have a situation where political chaos would ensue if Aristide
left the country without resigning. Aristide had to make this decision himself-he
could have stayed and the violence would have continued. If he decided to leave
without tendering a resignation, political turmoil and violence would also have con-
tinued. I believed that if we helped Aristide leave the country without seeing his
letter of resignation that we might be contributing to the uncertainty and turmoil
in the country and, ironically, that he might accuse us of taking him against his
will. Ambassador Foley and I have discussed this, and we agree that, in light of the
fact that Mrs. Aristide is an American citizen, and in order to attempt to avoid a
bloodbath, we would have been inclined to help Mr. Aristide depart Haiti even if
he refused to show us his letter of resignation.
Mr. RANGEL. Oh, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. WATERS. Make him answer.
Mr. NORIEGA. Well, if you listen to the answer, it might satisfy
you.
Mr. RANGEL. Now my time is going to expire. That is not fair.
If he had not signed that letter of resignation, would you have
helped him to leave the country?
Mr. NORIEGA. Probably, yes, in the final analysis.
Mr. RANGEL. But you told him-at that time, he was told that
he had to resign in order to leave the.country.
Mr. NORIEGA. I think in the humanitarian interests, particularly
since his wife is an American citizen, we would have been prepared
to take him-
Mr. RANGEL. But you told him that he had to resign if he wanted
to leave the country.
Mr. NORIEGA. We told him, because we wanted to have a sustain-
able solution where we could avoid bloodshed, where we could
be-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We told him that we wanted to have a sustainable solution where we could avoid
bloodshed, where we could be assured that violence would not continue. We did not
tell him he had to resign, but it was understood that he had decided to leave and
to resign. Both decisions were his to make and he made them.
Mr. RANGEL. And twice he was asked for that resignation, and
he would not have left unless he signed it; is that correct?
Mr. NORIEGA. We wanted to be able to have a basis for a sustain-
able political solution.
Mr. RANGEL. But you told him that unless he signed it, he could
not leave the country.







Mr. NORIEGA. We wanted to have a sustainable political solution,
and the only way to be able to achieve that-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
man Rangel. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We wanted to have a sustainable political solution, and the only way to be able
to achieve that, if Aristide chose to leave the country, was that his formal resigna-
tion be part of that solution.
Mr. RANGEL. And without that resignation, it would have been
a coup d'etat by anyone's standard.
Mr. BALLENGER. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. NORIEGA. We have a letter of resignation, sir.
Mr. RANGEL. You sure did, and I would have signed one too.
Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Waters.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you
for allowing those of us who are not Members of the Committee to
be here today. I want you to know that several of you, including
you, Mr. Chairman, have said that it is a fabrication that he was
forced out, that there was no coup d'etat, he was not kidnapped.
I talked to President Aristide this morning. He called me, and he
maintained that he was forced out, he was literally kidnapped, he
did not go of his own will, so I want to put that on the record.
Secondly, I want to put on the record that I have been to Haiti
three times since January 1, and I have met with the opposition,
that is, Mr. Apaid, Jr., and some of those from the committee of
184 and talked to many people about what was going on.
In addition to that, I was in Haiti a week ago this past Saturday
where you came and led the delegation of the international commu-
nity, where Mr. Aristide signed off on the CARICOM proposal. So
I want to put that on the record.
But I am very interested in some things that you have said, and
I do want yes or no answers. Don't take up my time.
I want to know, you have said that you have no responsibility to
protect a Head of State. Are you going to protect the new Chief
Justice that was just sworn in, who is now the Head of State of
Haiti, or not?
Mr. NORIEGA. We believe that he is part of this-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Waters. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
We believe that he is part of the interim government that will govern Haiti during
the political transition period, that is, before free and fair elections are held to put
a new permanent government in place. We have to make sure that the political
transition is effective and democratic, so yes, we will protect him.
Aristide was protected by a private security firm, paid for by the Haitian govern-
ment. He had security protection throughout all of the events preceding his resigna-
tion. His security detail went to the airport with him, and boarded the plane as
well.
President Alexandre does not have the advantage of a private security firm, which
the interim government cannot afford, and the Haitian National Police are incapa-
ble at this point. As the police force and Haiti's interim government become strong-
er, Haiti's domestic security forces will become responsible for protecting high-level
officials.
Ms. WATERS. Are you going to protect him or not, yes, or no.
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, we are, because he is part of a sustainable po-
litical solution.







Ms. WATERS. Did you refuse to protect Mr. Aristide, who was
then the Head of State? So you have a different standard for these
two; is that correct?
That is all I want to know, yes or no.
Mr. NORIEGA. These are very different men and very different po-
litical solutions.
Ms. WATERS. So, yes, for the chief justice; no, for Mr. Aristide.
So you don't have a policy that is consistent about having no re-
sponsibility to protect Head of State.
Mr. NORIEGA. That is not what I said the policy was, ma'am. You
are misstating what the policy was.
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Waters. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
That is not what I said the policy was, ma'am. You are misstating what the policy
was. Interim President Alexandre is a vital part of the transition to a democratic
Haiti through free and fair elections. For the transition to be successful, he has to
be protected from harm. Issues concerning protection for Aristide before his resigna-
tion were different. He had his own private security detail, paid for by the Haitian
government. President Alexandre does not have such protection, because the interim
government can't afford to pay for it and Haiti's domestic security forces are too
weak now. As a matter of policy, we protect President Alexandre because the future
of democracy in Haiti depends on it, and we can arrange this protection under the
umbrella of stability that the Multinational Interim Force provides. Before his res-
ignation, Aristide had his own personal protection, not to mention the pro-Aristide
armed gangs standing between him and the insurgents. We did not need to give
Aristide protection.
Ms. WATERS. Let's go on to the next question.
Mr. Noriega, people are assuming that you knew-
Mr. NORIEGA. You are misstating what the policy is.
Ms. WATERS [continuing]. That the so-called "rebels," who they
were. I just want some yes or no answers.
Did you know about the history of. Louis-Jodel Chamblain? Did
you know that he was the right hand of Emmanuel Constant, who
is now up in New York; and did you know that he had murdered
Mr. Antoine Izmery, along with thousands of other Haitians? Did
you know that before they reentered Haiti in this last coup d'etat
that took place? Did you know about him? Had you ever heard
about him and his history?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, I have.
Ms. WATERS. Have you ever met him?
Mr. NORIEGA. No.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know about Mr. Guy Philippe? Did you
know that he was a convicted drug dealer and that he attempted
a coup on President Aristide in 2002, and that he is responsible for
killing 26 members of Lavalas. Had you heard about him before he
entered Gonaives?
Mr. NORIEGA. I had heard of him, but not-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Waters. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
I had heard of him, but not of any specific allegations about the activities you
mention. We knew that Philippe was in the Dominican Republic. We also knew that
in 2003 armed groups were attacking government facilities in the central plateau
region, but we had no information connecting Philippe to these attacks.






Ms. WATERS. You knew about his history as a convicted drug
dealer?
Mr. NORIEGA. I did not know the details of that.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he had been a killer, that he
was accused of killing?
Mr. NORIEGA. I do not know any details that-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Waters. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
I do not know any details that would link Philippe to accusations of involvement
in killings. Of course, I know from the media that he was one of several leaders
of so-called rebel gangs that were involved in political violence, including killing. I
also am aware of accusations of his involvement in other forms of criminality.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he was in exile?
Mr. NORIEGA. I do not know the details.
Ms. WATERS. Do you know that he was in exile?
Mr. NORIEGA. I knew that he was in exile, yes.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he had returned and he was up
in Gonaives and Cap Haitien?
Mr. NORIEGA. I knew that he returned; I saw it on television.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know about Mr. Jean Tatoune and did you
know that he was a member of FRAPH, and did you know about
him before he came back into the country?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, I have never heard of him.
Ms. WATERS. Had you heard that he was involved in the mas-
sacre at Raboteau?
Mr. NORIEGA. I had heard of that incident.
Ms. WATERS. Had you met Mr. Guy Philippe before he returned
to Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, I have never met him.
Ms. WATERS. Did you ever met Mr. Emmanuel Constant?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, I have not.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know that he was the head of FRAPH?
Mr. NORIEGA. I have heard that.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know that Mr. Chamblain was his right
hand?
Mr. NORIEGA. I have heard that from you folks.
Ms. WATERS. Did you know that Mr. Constant was hired and
worked for the CIA?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, I don't know that.
Ms. WATERS. It was in the public domain. It was in the papers.
You never knew it? You never heard it?
You are not sworn in, but you are on record. Did you know that
Mr. Constant worked for the CIA?
Mr. NORIEGA. Ma'am, I am telling you, we don't generally com-
ment on these things, but I do not know that.
Ms. WATERS. You do not generally-you are qualifying your
statement.
Mr. NORIEGA. I am telling you that-
Ms. WATERS. What you are telling me is, you don't want to tell
me that you know.
Mr. NORIEGA. I am trying to tell you, but you won't give me an
opportunity.






[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Waters. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
I am trying to tell you, but you won't give me an opportunity. I am telling you
that I have no knowledge that Constant in fact worked for the CIA. I believe that
when he first came to the U.S., he claimed that he had worked for the CIA, but
that is all I know.
Ms. WATERS. Okay. I think I know enough.
Now, you knew that these thugs had returned and that they had
taken over Gonaives and Cap Haitien. Did you at any time publicly
denounce the thugs that you knew were thugs before they came in
and invaded Haiti? Did you ever denounce them?
Mr. NORIEGA. We said that these people should have no business
in the political process and they should lay down their arms.
Ms. WATERS. Did you ever attempt to make them lay down their
arms or to tell them that they were in exile, they were crooks and
criminals and that they should not be in that country?
Mr. NORIEGA. They shouldn't be in Haiti. We have told them
they should lay down their arms and go home. These violent folks
have no--
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Waters. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
They shouldn't be in Haiti. We have told them they should lay down their arms
and go home. One of our guiding principles for engagement in Haiti is that power
will not be turned over to those who have participated in political violence, including
irregular armed groups. Another principle is that Haitian citizens will be held ac-
countable for past crimes through the system of justice, not through revenge.
Ms. WATERS. But you did nothing to enforce it?
Mr. NORIEGA. We are doing that now, ma'am.
Ms. WATERS. Yes, after the fact. After the fact, the same crooks
and criminals and thugs and killers that you knew were in the
country, that you did nothing to intervene with, you are now, after
the fact, saying they should leave; is that right?
Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Mr. NORIEGA. Ma'am, I said-
Mr. BALLENGER. The gentlewoman's time has passed.
Pardon me, Mr. Secretary, but I am relieving you of having to
answer that question.
Mr. NORIEGA. That is all right. No problem.
Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. First of all, let me thank the Chairman and
particularly the Ranking Member for the effort they have made to
have this hearing, which happens to be particularly timely, but all
of the Members who worked so hard that are on this particular
Committee that really generated this meeting, all of the standing
Members that are there-Congressmen Payne and Meek, Barbara
Lee and Ms. Watson and others who are on the Committee-I
thank you very much, and I thank you for the courtesies of allow-
ing us to be here.
Mr. Noriega, this is not a personal inquiry, it is not personal
against you. I can tell you that there is a great deal of emotion be-
cause many of us have taken personally the bleeding in the streets,
the mutilating and the murdering that has been occurring. And, of






course, we take personally words such as a "rule by tyranny," and
we take personally the seemingly unceasing attack on an ex-priest
that through a great deal of his life has spent making efforts to the
extent of possibly a loss of life to preserve democracy.
To this very distinguished gentleman that is in the room let me,
first of all, acknowledge you and offer to you my deepest under-
standing, because those of us who lived through the era here in the
United, States as we still fight against racism and hostilities and
discrimination, are reminded of those who marched across the Ed-
mond Pettis Bridge and the dogs and hoses that came about, and
the fact that some of those who were marching were unfortunately
terribly injured.
If you would, accept our sympathies.
To Mr. Noriega, let me pose this series of questions to you: Have
you ever had a sense of fear of your life or the fear of your life and
that of your family members? Do you have any history of that or
any way that you could understand that by personal experience?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, yes, absolutely.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you have been in fear of your life?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Might you share with us?
Mr. NORIEGA. No.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You have been in fear of your life when and
where?
Mr. NORIEGA. That is none of your business, ma'am.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, let me say this. Since you are going to
be hostile, let me say this.
Mr. NORIEGA. No, no. It is a silly question.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. My business is to find out whether the Admin-
istration lied and whether or not you kidnapped and coerced Mr.
Aristide. So that is my business.
Mr. NORIEGA. Please ask me those questions, and I will answer
them.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I would imagine-excuse me. I am talking, not
you. Since you started off being rude, then let me be rude. In any
event, let me just say this.
My understanding of Mr. Aristide's position on that eve where he
was, if you will, thrown out of his own country, is that he was told
by American officials, maybe with the involvement of the CIA, that
his life was in jeopardy and that the security would be removed.
My question to you is whether or not you have any firsthand
knowledge of that activity.
My second point is-and you don't need to comment on this-I
am reminded of the attack on Chairman Karzai's, or President
Karzai's life in Afghanistan, reminded of the fact that we did not
ask him to leave his country, but we provided the necessary secu-
rity so that, thank God, his life was spared. He didn't have to make
that decision.
Do you have any firsthand knowledge of saying to President
Aristide that your security would be immediately removed?
Mr. NORIEGA. It is not true. As a matter of fact, there is an orga-
nization that, as a private contractor, has provided security for-






[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Jackson-Lee. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
It is not true. As a matter of fact, there is an organization that, as a private con-
tractor, has provided security for Aristide, paid for by the Government of Haiti. This
organization provided for Aristide's security throughout all of the events that led to
his resignation. A U.S. government security team consulted with his security detail
on the prevailing security conditions. We approved of that contact because we were
concerned about the security of U.S. citizens, including Mrs. Aristide and the Ameri-
cans who served in his private security detail. However, I am not aware of the de-
tails of these exchanges. After those conversations, Aristide contacted the Embassy,
through his private security firm, to ask what the U.S. Ambassador thought would
be best for Haiti. Our answer was that he, Aristide, had to make that judgment.
Aristide's private security personnel stayed with him after he made the decision to
resign, accompanied him to the airport, and boarded the aircraft with him for the
trip to the Central African Republic.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you have any knowledge of saying to him
that his security would be removed at that time.
Mr. NORIEGA. I am trying to answer the question. It is not true.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. If that is not true, then I assume that you
would welcome, as I have asked both the leaders of this House for
a full congressional investigation that would investigate the Ad-
ministration as to whether or not that is true. Would you welcome
that investigation?
Mr. NORIEGA. The Congress has an obligation to oversee-
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You would welcome that investigation, yes or
no.
Mr. NORIEGA. The Congress has an obligation to oversee the Ex-
ecutive Branch.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Is that yes or no? Is that yes or no? Is that
yes or no.
Mr. NORIEGA. We would cooperate with any-
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you would welcome that investigation,
yes or no?
Mr. NORIEGA. We will welcome-we will cooperate with any in-
quiry that the Congress deems appropriate.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much.
Let me proceed with my questions on another important aspect
that I am concerned about.
Is the United States a member of the U.N. Security Council?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. So as I understand it, by way of a report on
February 25, 2004, the U.N. News Service, the United Nations Se-
curity Council today deplored the Haitian opposition's rejection of
proposals from two regional organizations that could form the basis
for a peaceful compromise. And so you were-the United States
was a part of that offering of a compromise-
Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
just conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying this.
Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. CARICOM has been totally disrespected by
this Administration.
Mr. WELLER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you have violated the relationship with
the Caribbean-






Mr. WELLER. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And we will never be able to mend it, because
there is no way of providing the support that the United States
has.
Mr. WELLER. Mr. Chairman, regular order.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that we have
failed to be the kind of friend to Haiti that we should have been.
Mr. BALLENGER. Everybody else had to stop, so I am trying to
be fair to everybody.
Ms. Corrine Brown is next.
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. First, let me say that I hope
you received my letter of apology at our last meeting. I did not
mean anything personally to you, but I stand by what I said about
this Administration's policy, pertaining to the Haitian people, is
racist, and there is no way around it.
In our discussion, there was a lot of discussion about elections,
and of course, everybody knows that I take any discussion about
elections personally, because I experienced, I guess, the American-
style coup d'etat.
I heard you say something about not a traditional coup d'etat in
Haiti; well, we had not a traditional coup d'etat in Florida; in my
district alone, 227,000 votes were thrown out. And I personally
went to Haiti and monitored the election, and I can tell you it was
just as fair as the one that we had in Florida.
Now, my concern-and my concern was there about the Haitians
that have been turned back, how we have dual policies, we do not
let not one Haitian come into this country, we send them back into
the middle of this war that is going on, and we turn on the tele-
vision and we see people being slaughtered. So my concern still is
for the Haitian people. We have our military there, and I am grate-
ful that they are there, but they are standing by while people are
being slaughtered in the streets.
What are our plans for the Haitian people? In talking to other
leaders in the Caribbean countries, they are-they indicated that
the United States of America blocked us going in, intervening. We
stopped the other members of the international community from
going in and helping to stabilize this country.
Can you tell me what you know about that to be true, and what
are we going to do to help the hard-working Haitian people?
Now, I know it is a difference between them and Iraq, because
in Iraq they have oil, and in Haiti they have nothing but a his-
tory-and we just left Black History Month-they do have a history
of helping the United States.
Now, I want to know, what are we going to do to help those peo-
ple, my brothers and sisters, those children?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. I did receive
your letter, and I have never for a moment doubted that your con-
cern and engagement and interest and passion about the subject
was anything less than sincere and motivated by your interest in
the well-being of the Haitian people.
The United States did not block other countries from intervening.
There was some allusion that maybe we did this vis-a-vis France.
The suggestion was that, somehow, Secretary Powell was being de-






ceptive about that; and of course, that is not true. We did not block
them-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Corinne Brown. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much. I did receive your letter, and I have never for
a moment doubted that your concern and engagement and interest and passion
about the subject was anything less than sincere and motivated by your interest in
the well-being of the Haitian people.
The United States did not block other countries from intervening. There was some
allusion that maybe we did this vis-a-vis France. We did not block them or any
other country from intervening on a bilateral basis, but no country chose to inter-
vene before Aristide's resignation. This was for the same reasons I described for the
U.S. decision not to intervene. No country wanted to place troops and lives at risk
by putting them into the middle of an unresolved, armed conflict. Your question sug-
gests that perhaps we stopped the international community from going in to sta-
bilize Haiti. I think this may be a reference to the UN Security Council Resolution
that some Caribbean Community member states applied for on February 26. If so,
I would respectfully point out to you that the Security Council voted 15-0 not to
involve the UN at that point. In deciding not to intervene, the Security Council gave
the same reasons I have stated for not involving the U.S.-it did not want to put
a UN stabilization force in between two warring factions.
To answer your question about what we are doing to help the Haitian people, we
are doing a lot and will do much more. The U.S. has provided over $3 million in
emergency aid since mid-February, on top of the $55 million in regular assistance
budgeted for fiscal year 2004. We supported, and of course will continue to support,
re-engagement of the International Financial Institutions. Since last July, when the
Haitian government cleared its arrears to the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), it has approved loans totaling $398 million. The IDB has distributed $47 mil-
lion of this amount, all but $30 million of the rest are project loans that will pay
out over 5-10 years, thereby making a substantial contribution to Haiti's long-term
development. On a bilateral basis, the Administration expects an intensive engage-
ment in Haiti's reconstruction over the next several years to help restore the capac-
ity to govern, develop a professional and independent police force, promote economic
development, and support free and fair elections.
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Sir, it was not just France; we
talked to several different countries. I fear to call their names, be-
cause, you know, if we are not in lockstep with this Administration,
they take you out. So I am not going to call anybody's name, any
country's name, not me.
Mr. NORIEGA. I understand the discretion that you are showing
by not naming particular countries, but I can say that any country
that wanted to send police or troops was free to do so. Of course,
the United States would not be in a position to prevent any one of
the 150 countries in the world from contributing to Haiti.
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. My understanding, after talk-
ing to these various leaders, is that the United States of America,
under the Bush Administration, blocked the international commu-
nity from going in and stabilizing this country. I mean, they were
in the process of trying to do something.
My understanding on Sunday, and we went in on Saturday
night, in the heat of the night, in the middle of the night and took
out Aristide.
Mr. NORIEGA. Regarding the reference to blocking assistance, I
think I would be aware of any of that, and I do not have any-
there is no--
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Did we tell other countries?
Now, be careful. Did we tell other countries that we did not want
them to intervene?






Mr. NORIEGA. No, we did not do that. We did not do that. And
as far as-one final thing to the personal security thing that I
think Congresswoman Jackson-
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. You are going to have to an-
swer her question on her time.
Mr. NORIEGA. I am sorry. I thought-
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. I want to protect Aristide, but
I want to know about the Haitian people. They are being shot down
as we speak here today. What are we doing?
Mr. NORIEGA. We will gradually build up this presence, bring in
other countries that will provide security, get the Haitian National
Police stood up again, let them do their work in a professional way,
bring some resources in, some technical assistance, get them to
start doing that.
We will also have to look at the economic side, look at ways to
create jobs and investment.
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Christensen.
Ms. CORRINE BROWN OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Well, thank you.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have been in and out, so I am not sure what questions have
been asked and answered. But let me start with this.
For at least the past couple of years, Members of the Congres-
sional Black Caucus have been working to have the $145 or $150
million in development loans released to Haiti, and at every turn,
at every turn, it was pointed out to us that it was our country who
was blocking the release of those funds.
Would you not say that the inability or denying Haiti access as
the basis of development assistance to help develop their infra-
structure contributed to this? Would you not say that we were
complicit in the downfall of that government?
Mr. NORIEGA. Ma'am, the decision to link the delivery of that
international financial assistance to a political settlement was
made in late 2000. In September 2002, based on OAS Resolution
822, that I helped shepherd through the OAS Permanent Council,
we delinked that. So, quite frankly, this Administration undid
something that the previous Administration did by allowing that
aid to start to flow. The IDB lending began.
And I will ask Adolfo Franco to address that.
Mr. FRANCO. Yes, Congresswoman. In the first instance, loans
from the Inter-American Development Bank had to be made con-
sistent with the rules of that bank, and as you know, Haiti was in
arrears with that bank, and until the arrears were cleared and
Haiti was able to secure a bridge loan, consistent with the bank's
own rules, the United States could not do-it was not possible to
move forward on those loans.
However, I would tell you this. We are the largest bilateral donor
in Haiti. We provided $16 million more than the Congress re-
quested for Haiti last year.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Our contributions have been diminishing. In
addition to that, we had many, many meetings with representa-
tives of the IDB in Haiti and here, and we know that different ap-
proaches to dealing with that have been used in other countries,






and Haiti was never afforded the opportunity that other countries
similarly situated had.
Mr. FRANCO. As you know, Congresswoman, Haiti was able to se-
cure a bridge loan to clear its arrears, and I believe President
Iglesias was in Haiti in July.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. By that time, so much time had passed.
Ms. WATERS. Only $3 million of that money has been given to
Haiti. They say they cannot meet the conditions, even after they
made them do the bridge loan.
Mr. FRANCO. These are the Inter-American Development Bank's
conditions. These are not the conditions of the United States Gov-
ernment. These are the conditions set forth by the bank's own
rules.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. We were pretty much assured that if we
could get our country to agree, the IDB would be willing to restruc-
ture that loan in any possible way that had been used in other
countries. They outlined several ways for us to do it, but we could
not get our country to agree to it.
Mr. FRANCO. I have been personally in contact with the bank of-
ficials, both bank officials and the U.S. executive representative of
the bank, and that is not true.
What was difficult for Haiti, because of its arrears and because
of its difficult situation was to clear that issue before the loans
could move forward. Once that was cleared, the loans did move for-
ward.
In terms of the disbursement mechanisms, Congresswoman Wa-
ters, those are the bank's disbursement mechanisms. I do not be-
lieve anybody until today has suggested that we manipulated the
bank's rules, the first time I have heard it. I have never heard that
from my independent official at the bank or any executive director
at the bank.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Well, let me just. ask one other question, be-
cause what we have-our discussions differ from what we are hear-
ing here today; and forgive me if this question has been asked.
The U.S. was part of the development of the CARICOM proposal
and endorsed that proposal?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. What was the process whereby the U.S. Gov-
ernment decided to abandon that and to take unilateral action that
resulted in President Aristide's leaving?
Mr. NORIEGA. Each country made a decision for itself on what to
do after the CARICOM plan was not implemented. It was not im-
plemented because the opposition refused to accept and participate
in it.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Was CARICOM involved in your decision?
Mr. NORIEGA. They were aware of our decision. They all made
decisions for themselves not to intervene.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. But there was essentially an agreement, was
there not, by virtue of that proposal being essentially signed off on
by CARICOM-
Mr. NORIEGA. We did want to work together.
Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Did you break that agreement, and why?
Mr. NORIEGA. You are exactly right. We did want to work to-
gether. There was a consensus to try to work together, but coun-






tries had to make a decision on whether they would commit their
own troops.
Mr. BALLENGER. Okay.
Congressman Porter Goss.
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for
having to leave, so I may have some questions that are repetitive.
But first of all, I would like to thank Mr. Noriega and the other
gentlemen at the table. I want to thank you for the very fine work
you have done in a very difficult situation.
I know you are very familiar with the situation in Haiti; you
have been working on it for years, trying to relieve the plight of
a country that is full of people that are burdened with medical
problems, food problems and, of course, leadership problems in
their struggle to get to democracy. That is well-known. It is not
just my opinion, it is certainly the opinion, apparently, of all of the
other countries that have been involved with trying to help Haiti
as well.
The efforts that you have made, I think, have led to results that
are probably the best that we can have. The amount of misinforma-
tion surrounding what is going on is extremely disturbing and, I
am afraid, may actually be leading to inciting some further violence
and some further bad happenings and actually, threatening the
lives of some of our Armed Forces there. So I would hope that any
discussion that we have, in public particularly, would be handled
in such a thoughtful, polite way, that it would be constructive to
a solution of the problem, rather than to inciting and emoting pas-
sions that are clearly out of place at this time.
My question is, first of all, is there any truth in the fact that Mr.
Aristide was kidnapped?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, sir. And you are correct to point out that the
statements that he was and the mentioning of the names of U.S.
Foreign Service Officers who were directly involved in helping that
man on television, and accusing them of helping kidnap and
strong-arm him, put the lives of those individual people on the
ground in Haiti in jeopardy, and it is extraordinarily irresponsible.
Mr. Goss. Thank you. I agree with you totally.
Secondly, with regard to the question of Mr. Aristide's freedom
to make his own choice, could you comment on whether the govern-
ment forced him to leave or whether he was given an opportunity
to make a decision?
Mr. NORIEGA. He had an opportunity to make a decision, and I
appreciate the opportunity to expand on the answer. There was
some reference earlier that the United States said we would pull
his security.
As a matter of fact, when this violence was beginning in earnest,
we got word that his private security company which was providing
his security wanted to augment their presence by adding additional
people. I made a point of telling people that would be involved in
the licensing of that request, if you get that, expedite it.
We, by all means, want to have the man's personal security
taken care of. We were not, however, in the final analysis, willing
to put American servicemen on the ground to be part of a political
process that would do no more than keep him in power in an un-
checked way outside the context of a political agreement where we






might actually be able to have a sustainable political process in
place. 4:
Mr. Goss. I congratulate you for arranging, under difficult cir-
cumstances, for the safe departure of Mr. Aristide.
Was there any involvement by the CIA in his departure that you
are aware of?
Mr. NORIEGA. I am not aware of any involvement.
Mr. Goss. I understand that you have not had the opportunity
to answer fully some of the questions that have been put to you.
Are there any of the questions that have been put to you that you
would like to further expand on?
Mr. NORIEGA. A couple of points.
Mr. Goss. Please, sir.
Mr. NORIEGA. On the disintegration of the Haitian institutions,
which we supposedly encouraged, we actually had $1 billion worth
of assistance going in there over the last 10 years, and it was
squandered because these institutions were undermined.
Take the specific example of HNP, the Haitian National Police.
They were undermined by underfunding by the Haitian govern-
ment, by politicization almost immediately, by the use of them to
carry out political murders. And finally Congress made the decision ,
to cut off assistance to the HNP because of narcotics corruption.
It was not a decision of the Executive Branch to do that, and I
believe it was done during the previous Administration. But Con-
gress decided that it could no longer invest in that institution, and
it is very important, because the gangs that Aristide used to govern
the situation-
Ms. WATERS. Regular order, Mr. Chairman. Regular order, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much.
Mr. NORIEGA. I am sorry.
Mr. BALLENGER. Jan Schakowsky.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
allowing those of us who care about Haiti, but are not on this Com-
mittee, to ask some questions.
Let me just first say it is obvious, Mr. Noriega, that you think
that the very distinguished Congressional Black Caucus, Members
of Congress who, in my view, have the most expertise and the most 4
interest in Haiti, not only for President Aristide, but for the people
of Haiti, who almost to a person disagree with you, are all wrong.
And it seems to me that that would justify a full and objective in-
vestigation of exactly what happened.
We need to understand, since there is such disagreement, every
dollar that was spent by the United States in Haiti over the last
while leading up to this, how the USAID dollars were spent or the
CIA dollars were spent; and we ought to examine carefully the in-
telligence.
You know, many Members in this Congress relied in the past on
intelligence that happened to be all wrong, and we need to look at
that carefully as well, the intelligence that you based your deci-
sions on.
I am very interested also in what happened that night. I was in
conversation with Mrs. Aristide in Haiti at about 6:30 p.m., and
there was absolutely no hint whatsoever that this was going to be






the night when they were leaving. So I was wondering if there is
a State Department memorandum or a written record or a plan
that involved the United States that we could have a copy of now,
if there were any communications that were written that we could
look at that would help to explain exactly what happened.
Mr. NORIEGA. Ma'am and Mr. Chairman, the Committee,
through its oversight responsibilities and powers, can request infor-
mation from the Administration and we will accommodate it in the
normal way.
Mr. BALLENGER. That is what I was hoping, that people would
submit questions, and I am sure you will be glad to answer them.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I will submit additional questions.
What time was the first conversation with President Aristide, is
one question I have about this? And was the letter of resignation
composed by, not just signed by, actually composed by President
Aristide?
Mr. NORIEGA. I do not know who composed the letter, but it was
not composed by us. I assume that he wrote it. It had his flare.
But the first conversation with him, I believe, was after 9 p.m.
We had received word through an emissary that he wanted to pose
some questions to us and that he-
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you saying, for the record here, that the
first contact was from Mr. Aristide to the Embassy or to U.S. rep-
resentatives to discuss his leaving?
Mr. NORIEGA. To discuss his departure. We had contacts with his
emissaries throughout all of this period of time.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. About leaving?
Mr. NORIEGA. No, no, no. It was about staying, as a matter of
fact.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Exactly. That was my sense at 6:30 p.m.
Mr. NORIEGA. That is right.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you saying, though, that he made the first
overture? This is important to get on the record.
Mr. NORIEGA. The first comments that clearly suggest that he
was considering leaving came from an emissary of his, who posed
some questions to us, to Ambassador Foley. The questions were-
[Chairman Ballenger asked that Assistant Secretary Noriega
provide an expanded response to the question posed by Congress-
woman Schakowsky. Mr. Noriega's response follows:]
The first comments that clearly suggested that Aristide was considering leaving
came from an emissary, who posed some questions to us, to Ambassador Foley. The
questions were-did the U.S. think it was in Haiti's best interest for Aristide to stay
or to go; would we protect his wealth and property; what would happen to his sup-
porters and key Cabinet ministers; and did he have a choice of destination. These
questions came to us through Aristide's private security personnel. So yes, Aristide
did make the first overture.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I have heard those, but you are saying that at
no time before that was there any suggestion from the U.S. Gov-
ernment in any way that he should resign and leave, and that we
would-we would help him leave?
Mr. NORIEGA. I am not aware of every conversation that took
place with a so-called U.S. Government official.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. When was the plane ordered?
Mr. NORIEGA. I think it was 'probably after 1 a.m. It would have
been after he indicated that he was interested.






Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. When he was on the plane, were they told that
they could not even raise the window shades?
Mr. NORIEGA. I am not aware that that is the case. I have heard
that allegation, but I have heard other allegations that are abso-
lutely inaccurate.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Was he told on the way to the Central African
Republic where he was going? In advance of what we heard was
about 20 minutes before they landed, did he know?
Mr. NORIEGA. I do not think so. I think he was told right before
the arrival.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Why would that be?
Mr. NORIEGA. I can answer the question if you-
Mr. BALLENGER. Go ahead.
Mr. NORIEGA. There were members of his security detail who
were armed. This is a very unusual "kidnapping" where you let the
man's bodyguards carry arms. Frankly, we were concerned that be-
cause they had weapons on the plane, that they might react, be-
cause he was not going to his desired location, but we were taking
him somewhere near there, because the desired location had turned
him down. They didn't want to accept him. I am sorry.
Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman Kirk.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Secretary, good to see you. When did French For-
eign Minister Dominique de Villepin withdraw support for Presi-
dent Aristide?
Mr. NORIEGA. It must have been about 4 or 5 days before his de-
parture. We did not follow suit as he clearly was out in front of us
on that.
Mr. KIRK. As I remember, the French Government was very pub-
lic about-after having been staunch supporters of President
Aristide, of saying that they felt that some sort of transition was
necessary for law and order and democratic growth in Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. I think they asked him to consider what was best
for the Haitian people.
Mr. KIRK. My understanding of the Secretary's working relation-
ship with the Foreign Minister of Development is-in many ways
has been reborn after some disagreements over Iraq.
Can you give me an assessment of how the French and United
States Governments now see this problem?
Mr. NORIEGA. They see it as a shared problem, that the inter-
national community shares responsibility to try to help the Haitian
people at this point. We are working together with them, putting
some force on the ground to help the Haitian people by tranquil-
izing the situation, providing a secure and stable environment so
this political succession to a new government can continue.
Mr. KIRK. Is there any significant difference between the French
and United States position on Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. Not really, sir.
Mr. KIRK. Let me take you back to September 18, 1994. Presi-
dent Clinton had asked President Carter and then private citizen
Colin Powell to go to Port-au-Prince and meet with General
Cedras. It is my understanding that that was a very tense meeting.
I was in a previous capacity; I was 'a lieutenant junior grade in the
Navy Command Center at the time, and I remember full well the






duty captain giving some very direct orders to private citizen Colin
Powell.
President Clinton had ordered the invasion of Haiti to put Presi-
dent Aristide back into power. The 82nd Airborne Division had
been launched out of Camp Lejeune, and when we told Colin Pow-
ell that United States forces were en route, we ordered him to
leave the Haitian military headquarters there.
In a very dramatic moment, Colin Powell said he was not leav-
ing, that he was going to stay there because he felt that he could
negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of the coup d'etat leaders and
bring President Aristide back to power peacefully. He describes ac-
tually being in the truck with General Cedras on the way to see
the then-nominal President with hand grenades rolling on the floor
as he thought he could bring a deal back.
I can tell you that it was with some personal bravery on Colin
Powell's part, because the order to take out the Haitian military
command had already been given by President Clinton. And in that
military rule that some idiot never gets the word, we were furi-
ously calling units telling them not to fire, because Colin Powell
was still on the premises.
To his great credit and personal bravery, he brought about a
peaceful settlement, and General Cedras left, and Americans en-
tered Haiti and reinstalled President Aristide into power without
a shot being fired, I think due to the personal bravery of Jimmy
Carter and Colin Powell.
Mr. NORIEGA. And Sam Nunn.
Mr. KIRK. Sorry, and Senator Sam Nunn, correct. So I want the
record to reflect the personal braveries.
I think it is a bit ironic to criticize Colin Powell, when he, prob-
ably more than anyone else, stared at General Cedras face-to-face,
backed him down; and what was an invasion ordered by President
Clinton then became a peaceful deployment of the international
community to restore order there.
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes, Congressman, and I think that is why it is
a source of great disappointment that 10 years later, the great in-
vestment of treasure and lives having been put on the line for
President Aristide came to naught, and we saw a leader who was
not able to lead effectively or honestly or justly and, unfortunately,
sowed the seeds of his own demise in this circumstance.
Mr. KIRK. It might be that we need to-without defending the ca-
reer of any Haitian politician, we need to defend the constitution
of Haiti.
Mr. BALLENGER. Congressman, we cut everybody else off. I would
like to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Meek and Mr. Conyers be
the last to ask questions so we can get to the next panel.
So without further ado, Mr. Meek.
Without objection.
Mr. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
President Paquiot, I want to welcome you to the U.S. Congress.
I am glad that you are here to share your testimony with me, and
my family and I prayed for your speedy recovery, even when the
incident took place.
Secretary Noriega, I must say that with as many Haitians that
are trying to receive temporary protective status or even safe ref-






uge in the United States, that you would bring the President here
to speak before this Committee to drive your point home is really-
in my opinion, really sad.
Mr. NORIEGA. I did not do that, sir. He is a witness at the next
panel.
Mr. MEEK. He got here somehow, okay?
Mr. BALLENGER. He was my witness.
Mr. MEEK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I apologize to Mr. Noriega.
Mr. NORIEGA. That is all right.
Mr. MEEK. But the bottom line is that we have Haitians-and
Secretary Dewey, I want to say the reason why it is down to three
now is because the Coast Guard-am I correct that they are in the
bay in Port-au-Prince right now? How close is the Coast Guard as
it relates to being off the coast of Haiti, our U.S. Coast Guard?
Mr. DEWEY. Our Coast Guard maintains a presence off the coast.
Mr. MEEK. So you can see it from the coast; is that correct?
Mr. DEWEY. I am not sure you can see it from the coast.
Mr. MEEK. Well, television accounts, large shots, you can see our
Coast Guard cutters there.
How many people have been repatriated?
Mr. DEWEY. Approximately 900.
Mr. MEEK. Approximately 900. I think when the President made
the statement, Mr. Chairman, that Haitians should stay in Haiti,
I think he really meant it, because if he did not put the force on
the ground, he definitely put the force in the water. When we are
there repatriating, Secretary Dewey, are they repatriated in port in
Port-au-Prince?
Mr. DEWEY. In the vicinity of Port-au-Prince, Congressman,
Killick Coast Guard Base.
Mr. MEEK. How does that happen? They just get off and they
walk on to the street and go home, I guess?.
Mr. DEWEY. That is essentially correct.
Mr. MEEK. Okay. The reason why, Mr. Chairman, that you do
not have Haitians taking to the sea is because they actually have
a bull's-eye on their backs when they get off at Port-au-Prince. So
if they are trying to escape persecution, they will definitely lose
their lives.
One other thing I want to add. As it relates to temporary protec-
tive status, I think it is very important that this Administration
understands-for the bloated bodies that are in the street in Haiti,
I do not know how many Haitians have to lose their lives.
Let's just talk about under normal circumstances, when Haitians
are interdicted at sea or even when they make it to the port and
shores of Miami. Our Homeland Security objects to their being re-
leased on probation or what have you, so I think this Administra-
tion has spoken to how it feels about Haitians.
Mr. Noriega, let me ask you, as it relates to the future of the
Haitian people-we have met before, in the past, not in this hear-
ing, but in other hearings. I am a Member of the Committee on
Armed Services and Homeland Security Committee. I will tell you
that I take great pride in our armed services and also for their
safety. I do not want to say that you personally want to put their
safety in jeopardy, but I must say the moves of the, Administration






setting the tone that is in Haiti right now, I think would make
things very difficult for a safe haven for our armed services.
Now, let me tell you this. In no way do I, nor should any other
Member of this Congress, feel that they are putting the lives of our
troops in jeopardy because we question the Executive Branch. I
just want to let you know that.
I take personal offense when I hear that if Members are.saying
things-and I do not call names, and I do not think we should call
names of people on the ground, but I would say this. For Members
of the Congress not to be able to speak freely about how they feel,
about the positions that the Executive Branch is taking, let alone
the rebel forces who went through Guy Philippe, whom you seem
to be very vaguely familiar with-this is him on the front page of
The New York Times, parading through the streets of Port-au-
Prince, thanks to the United States of America.
Here he is here, once again, The Washington Post, right here in
our capital city, on the front cover. Does it look like he is not in
charge? I want to tell you right now, he is very much in charge.
Let me ask you about the Prime Minister. Where is the Prime
Minister now of Haiti?
Mr. NORIEGA. I am not sure.
Mr. MEEK. Can he leave his office?
Mr. NORIEGA. I am not sure.
Mr. MEEK. Is he protected?
Mr. NORIEGA. Yes.
Mr. MEEK. Mr. Guy Philippe said he was going to arrest him?
Mr. NORIEGA. I heard something of that nature.
Mr. MEEK. Did he have a meeting yesterday at 4 p.m. and he
said any police chief who didn't show up that they would have to
answer personally to him?
Mr. NORIEGA. I didn't hear that, but I don't doubt your word on
this.
Mr. MEEK. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I think it is
important not only that this Committee continues to move forth
and get some of these questions answered, but this Committee defi-
nitely take the time out to go Haiti to find out exactly what is
going on and also aboard our Coast Guard cutters to make sure
there are translators that are there. Our meeting at the U.N. with
the Secretary General, he was concerned about our refugee policy
as it relates to giving people real interviews, not just some inter-
views. And that is the reason why, Mr. Secretary, you don't see a
mass migration away.
And that is the reason why we still continue to see executions
in Haiti. Mr. Noriega, I look forward to working with you to pro-
vide the very safety we need in Haiti
Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate your courtesy. Mr. Noriega-
Mr. BALLENGER. Can I ask a question? Can I say that you are
the last individual?
Mr. MENENDEZ. Can we call Mr. Conyers' name out?
Mr. BALLENGER. Is Mr. Conyers not here?






Mr. CUMMINGS. I just have a few questions. Mr. Noriega, you
know, I had an opportunity to talk to Secretary Powell on Satur-
day. And during those discussions, I was of the clear impression
that President Aristide was in good hands. Secretary Powell was
very clear that apparently there were 400 troops surrounding him.
And that there were-there was a private security agency and that
there was just absolutely no question about the fact that he was
safe. I know this question may have arisen before because I am cu-
rious since I was involved in this personally, you know, can you tell
me what happened that suddenly Sunday morning, he appar-
ently-things changed or did they?
Mr. NORIEGA. It is interesting to me, too. We believe that his per-
sonal security was more or less tended to.
Mr. CUMMINGS. What did you say?
Mr. NORIEGA. We believe that his personal security was tended
to. I think he was in good hands. There was perimeter security
around the palace. And there was close-in security by a profes-
sional security firm that has been with him for many years, maybe
5 or 6. And we were concerned in general that was there an acute
threat to him. There was some question as to how reliable some of
the people in the palace guard were, but we had an impression that
the some of the people around him were able to deal with any prob-
lems of that kind. But the impression was that there was not an
immediate, acute threat to him. That was my impression.
And I was rather surprised that he decided to leave. And up
until the last minute, up until the time he got on the plane, he
could have changed his mind, and I frankly expected him to change
his mind. That is why we didn't ask for a plane until the very, very
last minute-relatively in the last minute in the process, because
we wanted to have a real sense whether he was really interested
in leaving or not.
Mr. CUMMINGS. So I take it that you -were surprised when he
said that he was taken away pretty much against his will?
Mr. NORIEGA. I was very surprised. Well, actually when I
thought about it, it was not too much of a surprise that he would
do that. I guess I was shocked at the chutzpah, because there are
so many witnesses to all of this, including his personal guards who
now have said publicly he wasn't kidnapped. And I was dis-
appointed that that allegation was repeated so widely. But as far
as we were concerned, we were at his request, facilitating his safe
departure from the country.
Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things that Secretary Powell also
talked about was the difficulty that might come about. And by the
way, Secretary General of the U.N. also said the same thing that
there might be some difficulty in reestablishing a democracy here,
you know, getting it moving again because you have got the rebel
forces who are trying to take apart-you know, be a part of the
process. You have Aristide supporters who want to be part of the
process. And it seems as if things appear-you know, trying to pull
these forces, there are other forces coming together to be part of
the process. How do you see that working out?
Mr. NORIEGA. It is going to be difficult and we need to let the
Haitian people make these decisions for themselves. There is a
process for doing that. And little by little, I think we can establish






some kind of political order and strengthen the institution of the
government.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Secretary and all you fellows, those that
didn't have to answer all the questions, you have done a wonderful
job. I apologize for the length of time and without further ado, you
are free to go and we will call the next panel.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I assume that questions for this panel as well as
the next, written questions are still open because we have a series
of detailed questions that we want answers to.
Mr. BALLENGER. We would like to be able to get the full answers
that you never got to give.
Mr. NORIEGA. I had my shots.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, is there some way that you can en-
courage the answers to be given in a timely fashion? Some of us
are still waiting to have our letters responded to that we sent to
the State Department.
Mr. BALLENGER. He is more sympathetic to me than you, so I
will ask him to do that.
Ms. WATERS. I will tell him, get our answers returned that we
give to you.
Mr. NORIEGA. You deserve answers.
Ms. WATERS. And we are still waiting for some. I have sent you
some letters that have not been answered. So please get it back to
us, okay? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't mind asking.
Mr. BALLENGER. We have a bunch of people that have been wait-
ing a long time. And I am scared they are going to call on a vote,
so if we can get the tables changed. And I know we have a couple
members on this next panel that are very short on time and I am
surprised they are still here. You have my apologies. I tried to cut
it short.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, could I recommend that we have
a rolling, as we have done in the Full Committee, that some Mem-
bers go vote now and others come back so we can listen to these
witnesses in recognition of the time?
Mr. BALLENGER. That is a great idea. Mr. Paquiot, we are going
to keep going and we have two more people-he has to catch a
plane.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Could I ask you what the order of the witnesses
will be?
Mr. BALLENGER. The way we have it figured, Mr. Paquiot, Mr.
Maguire and then Mr. Sachs. And the names I did not call, let me
apologize to you, but those gentlemen had warned us ahead of time
that they had limited time.
Mr. BALLENGER. And Mr. Sachs, good luck. Mr. Paquiot.
STATEMENT OF PIERRE-MARIE PAQUIOT, PRESIDENT, STATE
UNIVERSITY OF HAITI
Mr. PAQUIOT. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee,
I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this
afternoon in order to share with you some of the bitter experiences
of the Haitian people in general and my suffering in particular.
Also, I appreciate the opportunity to engage with you in discussions
on Haiti's future. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like
to submit the statement for the record.






Mr. BALLENGER. Without objection, yes, sir.
Mr. PAQUIOT. First of all I would like to say I am not the voice
of any kind of political party in Haiti. I am not representing any
kind of opposition. I am just a citizen concerned by the situation
going on right now in Haiti and I would like to share with you
some of my thoughts.
Haiti entered the 21st century with a grim reality. Poverty is the
norm. Our people have inherited a vicious cycle that they are pro-
gressively less able to escape. Violence prevailed society and econ-
omy development eludes us. Tensions between the leaders of the
various opposition political parties in Family Lavalas are the re-
sults of the May, 2000 local and parliamentary elections. The ensu-
ing violence escalated to a point that all the gangs have been at-
tacking opposition leaders and others who dare challenge the sys-
tem. Journalists were subject to abuse in some senses and paid the
ultimate price of death by practicing their profession. It is from
this that I share my story.
The State University of Haiti is made up of 15 schools with ap-
proximately 800 faculty members and about 15,000 students. The
Haitian Constitution of 1987 grants independent status to the
State University of Haiti, although 100 persons come from the
State and the autonomy of the university has been the subject of
contention between the institutive body and the former President
of Haiti, Mr. Aristide. And indeed, President Aristide's attempts to
control the university over the past few years were met with strong
and sustained opposition from the university. When President
Aristide took office in February, 2001, I met with him to examine
the problems facing the university. And as a matter of fact, I have
to tell you that I was a very strong supporter of President Aristide.
And in fact, I was fired from the university during the coup d'e-
tat because of President Aristide. I submitted to the President a
document which contained a set of recommendations for addressing
the most crucial problems facing the nation. To this day, Mr.
Aristide neither acknowledged nor acted on any of the rec-
ommendations. Ultimately, the problems between President
Aristide and the university peaked on May 18, 2001, which is a
flag day in Haiti, and which is also celebrated in Haiti as univer-
sity day.
It was on this day that I, the President of the university deliv-
ered a speech to the Nation reminding the political parties, Presi-
dent Aristide's political party and also the opposition, the impor-
tance of our national motto, I'Union Fait La Force, which means
liberty, equality and brotherhood.
Apparently, Mr. Aristide did not approve of my speech in which
he was reminded of my offer to make the university facilities avail-
able as a neutral ground for his party and the various political
party leaders to discuss the contested local and parliamentary elec-
tion of May, 2000, the suggestion to which they had both initially
agreed to. And soon after the speech, all breaks of conflict broke
out in various schools inside the university. I don't have much
time, so I will skip some details to go forward. And I am going on
December 5. On December 5, 2003, a small group of students who
are demonstrating against President Aristide-as they have the
right to do it as any citizen, inside the school of human sciences,






while President Aristide's armed thugs attempted to enter the cam-
pus to subdue the protest.
When I heard this was taking place, I immediately ended a meet-
ing I was having with the Minister of Education of Mr. Aristide
and went to the School of Human Science in order to examine first-
hand the extent of damages to the university property and see how
best to facilitate the safe exit of students from the campus without
being harmed by Aristide's forces.
While I was inside talking with the students, a group of thugs
armed with guns, clubs and rocks invaded the campus shooting,
further destroying property and physically assaulting people, forc-
ing those they brutalized and say [speaking in native language],
which means "long live Aristide." I was beaten unmercifully and
suffered two broken knees. I am not here to lament on my situa-
tion. The point is I want to share with you the situation that is
going on in Haiti so that we can do something.
I don't have any hard feeling about President Aristide. As a mat-
ter of fact, I am very sad for President Aristide because he was
very popular in Haiti and now he is in exile and somehow he is
responsible for what happened to him. From there, I spent weeks
in hiding. And given the extent of the injuries I suffered, it was
doubtful whether I could ever walk again.
Mr. Chairman, I constantly consider myself lucky because I can
sit before you today to give you eye witness testimony. Many of my
fellow citizens will never see another day, whether they were
against Aristide or for Aristide, that is not the point. Lives have
been prematurely destroyed and ended during the struggle for free-
dom and freedom from fear. I can testify today in Washington, DC,
thanks to God and to the many friends and caring individuals who
contributed my safe departure from Haiti to get medical care here
in the United States. Officials of the International Foundation for
Electoral Assistance worked very hard in collaboration with part-
ners like the Haitian Resources Development Foundation, the Pub-
lic Diplomacy Office, and the consular section of the United States
Embassy in Port-au-Prince to ensure the timely, and safe exit from
Haiti for me and my family.
Since my arrival to the United States of America on January 9,
2004, I have received tremendous support from the New Orleans
medical and legal community and from the Haiti democracy
project. The events of December 5, 2003 triggered the ultimate
ground swell of opposition to President Aristide. People at least at
the university level and all people from all walks of life realized
then that the repression sponsored by Mr. Aristide or his govern-
ment had no limit and had no respect for any institution.
It became extremely clear that Mr. Aristide was the principal
source of problem and he did not have the legitimacy to be part of
the long-term solution to heal Haiti. After many years of political
turmoil due to the disputed election results, failed policies, mis-
management and human rights violations, Haiti and her friends in
the international community currently face a very crucial challenge
in developing an approach based on local leaders, national prior-
ities to address the many development and political problems the
countries has suffered. So I will-
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Paquiot, if you don't mind.






Mr. PAQUIOT. I will stop here, you know. What we need now in
Haiti is the strong support of the international community. Presi-
dent Aristide belongs to the past. We must look forward so that
nothing like that will ever again happen in Haiti.
Mr. BALLENGER. I don't know whether Mr. Sachs or Mr. Maguire.
Mr. Maguire, I think you were the first one and you were rec-
ommended a long time ago. I am not going to the House Floor to
vote so we can continue.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAGUIRE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF
PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TRINITY COLLEGE
Mr. MAGUIRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very grateful for
this opportunity to share my knowledge on Haiti with you. I have
been working on Haiti 25 years, 20 of them as a civil servant in
the same organization as Adolfo Franco. And what I see in Haiti
occurring now is what I would call deja vu all over again. And I
think this implies that if we are really going to understand Haiti,
we need to look at not what is just going on, but we have to look
backward. Secretary Powell said last week said he was dis-
appointed with President Aristide and I think we all have been.
There is much to be disappointed about.
And I would say we also need to be disappointed elsewhere. We
need to be disappointed with the opposition to Mr. Aristide, their
continuing intransigence, their failure to engage and even when
they had Mr. Aristide in a corner two Saturdays ago, their refusal
to engage with the CARICOM proposal does not merit them to be
called a Democratic opposition. They are an opposition. They have
still yet to earn the label "democratic."
They have been determined to broker their way into power. And
what we see today in Haiti is not a struggle over issues, ideas or
principles, it is a matter of a struggle over power. I think Secretary
Powell's disappointment should also be extended to those whose
policies and practices were enacted on his watch, policies and prac-
tices toward Haiti. I have outlined those in a paper here which I
will be glad to submit to you published in November called,
"United States Policy Toward Haiti, Engagement or Estrange-
ment."
I traced in here in much greater detail than I can now how our
policies have evolved in the last 5 years or so to be those that are
meant to isolate the Haitian government, to withhold resources
from it and to punish it. I would speak from experience, Mr. Chair-
man. I don't know if you recall this, but at one point I brought to
you in March, 2001, Mr. Neptune, who was, at the time, the Presi-
dent of the Senate, Mr. Leslie Voltaire, who was one of the min-
isters and Mr. Bazin, another minister. I had invited them to come
to Trinity college for a symposium so they could have their voices
heard in Washington.
Initially, however, I had invited the Prime Minister and First
Lady. I was told by intermediaries from our government, that this
would not be possible that I was trying to embarrass the adminis-
tration. And I felt this was a shame because we needed to have all
voices on the table. We need to listen. We do not engage the gov-
ernment of Haiti. We talked at them and criticized them. There
was this parallel presumptive policy I believe working over the past






several years working to strengthen the opposition and embolden
it and suggest through signals sent from Washington that that op-
position zero option of not engaging with the Aristide government
had the support from Washington.
I don't say this just myself. Our former Ambassador to Haiti,
Honorable Dean Curran said it in his address to the Haitian-Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce of July of last year when he was leav-
ing. I would like to quote what Ambassador Curran said. He said:
"There is incoherence in Haiti that has troubled me, the inco-
herence of the way Washington's views are interpreted here.
Those of you who know me who will realize that since I have
arrived here as President Clinton's Ambassador and then
President Bush's, I have always talked straight about U.S. pol-
icy and what might and might not be new policy directions.
But there were many in Washington and Haiti who preferred
not to listen to me, the President's representative, but to their
own friends in Washington."
The sirens of extremism on one hand or apologists on the other,
they don't hold official positions. I call them the "Chimeres" of
Washington. We had our Ambassador saying that, complaining and
being concerned that there were signals coming from Washington
that prohibited and emboldened the opposition and prohibited them
from being part of a political solution. I think we need to look deep-
ly into that because we have had a policy in my view that seem-
ingly has been driven by a deeply rooted and strongly held aversion
to one man, Jean-Bertrand Aristide and has seemed determined to
put Haiti at risk, either to emasculate Mr. Aristide politically or to
force him from office.
Mr. Aristide has many, many faults. I am not trying to defend
him, but I think our policies pushed Mr. Aristide and his govern-
ment more and more into a corner with predictable results. With
fewer and fewer resources, the government was left managing scar-
city. And in the Haitian political reality, managing scarcity means
managing power and managing power means managing the street
gangs. This is a long-held practice in Haiti. And I would say we are
seeing the same practice being enacted today.
I would characterize what happened over the past 3 years as the
gradual strangulation of the Haitian government with, ironically,
Mr. Aristide providing the rope. But we do really not really engage
him. We did not try to reinforce anything that he had done posi-
tive. And something in the last panel, there was a lot of discussion
about Mr. Aristide's involvement in drug trafficking. I think we
should note for the record that Mr. Aristide in 2003 turned over to
the U.S. DEA Haiti's two leading drug traffickers, Jacques Ketan
and another man named Jasmay Edijuan, and a number of smaller
drug traffickers. Would he have done that if he was as complacent
in drug trafficking as came out and was accused in the first panel?
I don't think so.
But in any case, the departure of Mr. Aristide has been achieved
and the phrase that comes to mind is that of victory. Those who
wanted his departure both in Haiti and beyond it has seen Haiti
descend into lawlessness, with gunmen and revenge and the set-
tling of scores, the kind of dechoukaj that has government officials






running to the airport now under United States protection fleeing
the country, and the destruction of Haiti's infrastructure, the vir-
tual vulcanization of the country by gangs.
And I think we need to look at the issue of narco-trafficking
which, again, Haiti is essentially right now a narco-trafficking free
state. There is no order out there in the countryside because of
what has been going on. What can we do? I think we need to forge
a bipartisan approach toward Haiti. And I think what would help
us forge that approach is to first examine the issue of the Wash-
ington "Chimires" who are sending mixed messages to Haiti. And
I noticed in The Washington Post the other day that The Wash-
ington Post was suggesting in its editorial that one organization
that needs to be examined very carefully in this equation is the
International Republican Institute and its role with working with
the Haitian opposition. I suggest you need to look at that very care-
fully. I would also suggest-
Mr. BALLENGER. Could you sum it up, please?
Mr. MAGUIRE. We need to support in Haiti a policy of political
inclusion. All political actors in Haiti have been working toward ex-
clusion. It is the struggle for power. We need to get all the political
actors under the tent so all can have responsibility in the process.
This will not happen by having the Lavalas people chased out of
the country now by armed thugs, and it will not happen by having
an electoral process in Haiti where it is always winner take all. We
need to look for a solution in Haiti that can be a proportional rep-
resentation so that a small political party with 10 percent of the
votes gets 10 percent of the seats and 10 percent of the responsi-
bility to engage in the process. I will stop there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maguire follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT MAGUIRE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TRINITY. COLLEGE
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to speak before you and other members
of the subcommittee and the U.S. House of Representatives today. I am happy to
have this opportunity to share my insights and analysis on what is going on in
Haiti. I have followed Haiti and Haiti-US policy issues for 25 years. Over that time
I have come to know the country both from the 'bottom-up' through work at the
Inter-American Foundation, a U.S. government agency, where I held responsibility
for its grassroots development programs in Haiti, and from the 'top down' through
both work at the U.S. Department of State in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs and scholarly activities at Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, and Brown Univer-
sities. I continue my involvement with Haiti as the Director of the Trinity College
Haiti Program in Washington, DC. This program has been supported by the Ford
and the Rockefeller Foundations.
DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN
Since this is a time of year when many of us begin to turn our attention to base-
ball, allow me to open my remarks by citing a phrase made famous by one of the
sport's most colorful characters, Yogi Berra, who coined the expression "deja vu all
over again." What we are seeing today in Haiti is something akin to that expression.
And, as the expression implies, to understand the present we need to look back-
ward.
Today, in the streets of Port-au-Prince and in other cities and towns of Haiti, we
have been seeing the kind of murder and mayhem that characterized the country
between 1991 and 1994, following a violent coup d'etat carried out by Haiti's army,
leading to three years of brutal de facto military rule. Gunmen in fatigues roam the
streets, menacing citizens and waving their automatic weapons arrogantly. Bodies
mysteriously turn up at intersections in city streets, some of them face down with
hands bound and bullet holes in their backs. Rampaging mobs of civilians and erst-






while soldiers and members of paramilitary death squads attack public and private
property, looting, burning and destroying in a practice that Haitians call dechoukaj,
or uprooting.
Elected and appointed government officials, in fear of their lives, are either going
into hiding within Haiti or fleeing the country. In press reports released earlier
today, it is stated that U.S. Marines have become ambulant bodyguards for Haitian
officials rushing to the airport to save themselves. Also, we have begun to receive
reports of meetings between the armed thugs dressed up in military fatigues and
members of the unarmed opposition, and of tense confrontations between US mili-
tary officials and the thugs. And, finally, we have begun to receive reports that
cracks are already forming in the facade of unity among the armed and unarmed
opponents of the recently uprooted, elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, as
Haiti's next struggle for power begins in earnest.
Yes, Mr. Chairman, this is certainly a case of "deja vu all over again."
MULTIPLE DISAPPOINTMENTS
Last week, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated that he had been "dis-
appointed" with Haiti's now-deposed president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Secretary
Powell is correct in this statement, as there is no doubt that Mr. Aristide provided
much to be disappointed about. But I wonder if Mr. Powell is also disappointed in
Haiti's self-proclaimed democratic opposition, a group of political and economic lead-
ers who have also given us much to criticize and regret. The single-minded intran-
sigence of this largely ad hoc group toward achieving its one, unifying objective-
the removal of Mr. Aristide from office-has motivated it to behave rather
undemocratically. Its leaders have failed to engage in true democratic process as
measured by elections and by negotiated solutions to political problems. Instead,
they have acted with a veto from an empty chair from the negotiating table, repeat-
edly undermining or thwarting internationally-led attempts to find a solution to
Haiti's political crisis. Also, and particularly over the past two months, they have
practiced that deeply rooted Haitian political practice of giving a 'wink and a nod'
to violence in the street if you believe it furthers your political objectives.
I wonder, as well, if Mr. Powell was disappointed, or perhaps even outraged, by
the failure of the unarmed opposition to respond to the latest international urgings,
two weekends ago, when both he, via telephone, and his Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere, Mr. Roger Noriega, in person, pushed for this group to finally
agree to take its seat at the negotiating table-when the odds appeared highly fa-
vorable for it to achieve an objective of political inclusion. The CARICOM plan, a
solid recipe for achieving a negotiated, non-violent solution to Haiti's long lasting
and disastrous political crisis, supported not only by the United States, but by all
the hemisphere's democratic governments, was simply rejected out-of-hand by this
so-called democratic group.
This failure of US influence-perhaps we can say of US diplomacy-is doubly
shocking since the personalities who comprise this opposition have been widely per-
ceived as allies-even sycophants-of Washington. Among these personalities are in-
dividuals who have participated in an array of political strategy meetings organized
by the International Republican Institute using US government funds, and who
have repeatedly visited Washington over the past three years. And, at least one of
the highest profile leaders of this faction, Mr. Andre Apaid, is a US citizen.
As this veteran Haiti-watcher scans this political landscape, I get a strong sense
of Haitian deja vu all over again, as self-styled and unelected political leaders seek
the ways and means to broker their way into power. In their mind's eye, again tak-
ing a page from deeply rooted Haitian political practice, their means justify their
ends. And what are those ends? Allow me to state, Mr. Chairman, that what we
have been seeing in Haiti is not a political struggle of competing issues, ideas, and
principals. What we have been seeing in Haiti is nothing more than a struggle
among the political class and its allies, and the incumbent government to seize, and/
or to hold on to, power. Let us hope that the dust of confrontation and violence set-
tles in Haiti and that moderate, reasonable voices, with viable ideas, will emerge
from among those struggling for power and some true democratic credentials will
begin to be earned. Let us hope, also, that new, more democratic voices, less tainted
by participation in the tragic political confrontations of the past three years, will
come forth to relieve the country of its largely failed leadership on both sides of the
current political equation.
THE CONDUCT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
In terms of disappointment, Mr. Chairman and members of the sub-committee,
I also wonder whether this sense of Mr. Powell has extended to those who have been




76

largely responsible for the conduct of U.S. policy toward Haiti since January 2001.
As I have outlined in Trinity College Haiti Program Briefing Paper Number 8, US
Policy Toward Haiti: Engagement or Estrangement, published last November, over
the past ten years, US policy toward Haiti has evolved from one where our govern-
ment was constructively engaged with the government of Haiti in an attempt to
nurture democratic institutions and democratic practice in this country trying to
find its way out of 200 years of bad and mostly authoritarian governance, to a policy
that worked to isolate the Haitian government, withhold resources from it, punish
it, and push it into a corner.
Concurrently, as we constantly chastised that government, our efforts focused
more and more exclusively on working with Haiti's opposition groups. In following
this path, we sacrificed carefully constructed leverage and influence with Haitian
elected political actors, many of whom are already pre-disposed to be distrustful of
the United States as a dominant force in Haitian political reality that has not al-
ways made choices that have worked toward the benefit of Haiti's people.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit Briefing Paper Number 8 as a
part of my written testimony since it elaborates this analysis in much greater detail
than I have an opportunity to do in this testimony today.
Not all in Washington abandoned that leverage and influence we worked to
achieve over many years. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, that in March 2001, I es-
corted to your office several high Haitian government officials who had traveled to
Washington only a month after the inauguration of Mr. Aristide to his second term
in office to participate in a symposium on Haiti at Trinity College. Among them
were Mr. Yvon Neptune, who at that time was the President of Haiti's Senate, and
Mr. Leslie Voltaire, the then-and current-Minister for Haitians Living Overseas.
Also a part of the Haitian government delegation that visited you were two min-
isters who, even though members of the opposition, had accepted Mr. Aristide's invi-
tation to join his government's cabinet. One of these ministers was Mr. Marc Louis
Bazin, Mr. Aristide's principal opponent in the 1990 election who, subsequently,
briefly served as the Prime Minister of the 1991-1994 de facto military regime.
What better example could we have had of the potential for political reconciliation
in Haiti than Mr. Aristide and Mr. Bazin working together. Sadly, because Mr.
Bazin had rejected participation in the bitterly recidivistic opposition to Mr. Aristide
(at that time called the "Democratic Convergence"), his credentials as a member of
the opposition working within the Lavalas government were not accepted by
Aristide's opponents in Haiti and in Washington.
Much to your credit, Mr. Chairman, you were open to meeting these Haitian gov-
ernment officials and engaging them in constructive conversation. And they were
anxious to engage you. You even made an extra effort by taking time from your
busy schedule to travel up North Capital Street to Trinity's campus the next day
to listen to them speak at the symposium.
Sadly, Executive Branch officials reacted quite differently to this opportunity for
engagement and dialogue. Not only did ranking officials in Washington choose not
to engage these Haitian government officials, but, in the run-up to the symposium,
they urged me not to invite them to Washington, adding that this would embarrass
the new American administration. This, Mr. Chairman, is my own personal story
of a golden opportunity the Bush Administration lost to engage, to maintain/
strengthen influence and leverage in Haiti, and to assist Haiti emerge from its dark
political past. Surely, this is not the only time that administration officials refused
an opportunity like this.
Rather than taking advantage of this and similar opportunities, it seems to me
that our government was not only busy isolating Haiti's elected government, but,
through various intermediaries and political operatives in Washington, it was allow-
ing signals to travel to Port-au-Prince that emboldened the opposition and its "zero
option" policy of intransigence by suggesting that the opposition had Washington's
support.
THE CHIMERES OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
This is not my assessment alone. This concern that presumptive policy signals
were being sent to Port-au-Prince from Washington, and that those signals were
highly damaging to efforts to resolve what was, back then, a relatively reparable
political crisis, was shared by none other than the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti. In his
farewell address in Port-au-Prince last summer to HAMCHAM, the Haitian-Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce, the career diplomat who headed our embassy in Haiti,
the Honorable Brian Dean Curran, reflected on Haiti's long-standing political crisis
remarking:






"There is an incoherence (in Haiti) that has troubled me: the incoherence of
the way Washington's views are interpreted here. Those of you who know me
will realize that since I arrived here as President Clinton's Ambassador and
then President Bush's, I have always talked straight about US policy and what
might and might not be new policy directions. But there were many in Haiti
who preferred not to listen to me, the president's representative, but to their
own friends in Washington, sirens of extremism or revanchism on the one hand
or apologists on the other. They don't hold official positions. I call then the
chimeres of Washington."
And who, pray tell, might these irregular actors be? I would suggest, Mr. Chair-
man, that the committee takes steps to get to the bottom of this. It might begin
by heeding the supposition of the Washington Post that the International Repub-
lican Institute has played an important role in the 'wink and nod' messages from
Washington sent to the opposition. In its February 19th edition, the Post editorial-
ized: "In particular, it (the administration) has declined to exercise its considerable
leverage on the civilian opposition parties, some of which have been supported by
such U.S. groups as the International Republican Institute and which have rejected
any political solution short of Mr. Aristide's immediate resignation."
In sum, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that our policy-and practices-toward
Haiti in recent years have been driven, unfortunately, by a deeply rooted animosity
to one man-Jean-Bertrand Aristide-that has been held among a relatively small
but powerful group of actors in Washington. Policies rigorously enacted under the
auspices of this zealous group in order either to emasculate Mr. Aristide politically
or to force him out of office, as we are seeing right now, have put the citizens and
country of Haiti at grave risk, and have created potential spill over effects both in
the Caribbean and on to our shores.
To achieve the narrow political goal of getting Mr.Aristide, the chimeres of Wash-
ington have, in essence, enacted policies that have devastated Haiti. What better
example can one identify of the irresponsibility of being willing to throw out the
bathwater in order to get at the baby.
ACTS OF DESPERATION
As I reflect on the result of these policies of isolation, non-engagement, constant
criticism and punitive action I get the sense of the gradual strangulation of an elect-
ed government. As the noose around its neck tightened, it was pushed increasingly
toward ill-advised and desperate acts. The suspension of international assistance
was a particularly key element of strangulation. The government of Mr. Aristide,
like all governments in this tragically poor and resource-starved country, was deeply
dependent on external assistance in order to enact government programs. During
his inaugural address of February 7, 2001, Mr. Aristide took a quite unusual-per-
haps even unprecedented-step for a Haitian President when he outlined a series
of social welfare, infrastructure development and investment goals of his govern-
ment, suggesting that his term in office be judged according to his ability to meet
these goals. These plans were derived from the Lavalas Family party's "White
Paper" for Haiti, an unusual attempt-for Haitian political parties-to set forth a
platform that directed itself toward the country's multitude of social, economic and
environmental problems.
Sadly, following the virtual complete suspension of bilateral and multilateral aid
to his government as a result of the May 2000 election's eight flawed senatorial vote
counts and the Haitian government's bewildering failure to address this issue, few
resources were available to the government to work toward these goals. As Mr.
Aristide and his government were pushed more and more into a corner, predictable
results emerged. With fewer and fewer resources to manage, the government was
left to manage scarcity and, became increasingly desperate and corrupt. And, in
Haiti's political reality, managing scarcity means managing power, with equally pre-
dictable results. Mr. Aristide, presiding over a resource starved government under
constant assault from political opponents both in and beyond Haiti, took to the
streets, aligning his government with impoverished urban youth-the now infamous
chimeres of Haiti-who, by way of organized gangs, served as a means of managing
the maintenance of power.
Interviews with urban gang leaders over the past several months on various Na-
tional Public Radio (NPR) broadcasts have been quite revealing in this regard and
have underscored the enormous tragedy of both the government's strangulation and
its descent into the streets. Those interviewed have repeatedly suggested that they
would have preferred to have a legitimate government job as opposed to becoming
a member or leader of a street gang. Sadly, with no jobs available, the life of a
chimere presented itself as a viable option.






Mr. Chairman, when I was a boy growing up in the New Jersey suburbs in an
area that had just recently been farmland, I occasionally encountered a rabbit that
had found its way into my back yard that was enclosed with a chain link fence.
Sometimes, I attempted to catch the rabbit, gradually backing it into a corner of
the fence as what I perceived as the best strategy to capture it. I never did manage
to catch one of those elusive critters, but I recall vividly how the rabbits that I man-
aged to back into the corner of the fence became increasingly desperate as their ma-
neuvering space shrank. In fact, I recall vividly on one occasion how a panicked rab-
bit that I had edged into the corner acted with such desperation that bashed itself
against the fence, injuring itself in its attempts to elude my grasp. Aghast at the
blood streaming from the animal, I quickly backed away. This was the last time I
tried cornering a rabbit in order to capture it. It was not my goal to force self-in-
flicted damage.
I relate this story, Mr. Chairman, because I think of it when I reflect on what
has happened in Haiti over the past several years. As the government of Haiti was
increasingly backed into that corner, it acted more and more like that panicked rab-
bit of my youth, injuring itself in desperation. Ultimately, as its maneuvering space
shrank, the government, in its increasing desperation to escape the trap, inflicted
many wounds on itself. What a tragedy of huge proportions.
A PYRRHIC VICTORY
The departure of Mr. Aristide, at least for now, has been achieved. Those who
have sought it for quite some time are certainly rejoicing their political victory. But
their victory is proving to be a Pyrrhic one as Haiti descends deeper on the slippery
slope of lawlessness. Revenge killing and settling scores-in Port-au-Prince and else-
where in the country-have become the new ordre du jour. Prisons throughout the
country have been emptied. Secondary cities, towns and villages across the land
have become the domain of gang leaders establishing fiefdoms in what is now a bal-
kanized country. And, with the descent into lawlessness comes the probable scenario
of Haiti's emergence as a kind of narco-trafficking free state, as the countryside's
runways and ports fall within the domain of the local warlords, many of whom al-
ready have a history of involvement in drug trafficking.
The victory is Pyrrhic also, Mr. Chairman, because it was achieved through the
slow strangulation of Haiti's capacity to respond to the humanitarian, social and en-
vironmental challenges and crises before it. And, in recent weeks, we have seen in
particular a rash of significant damage to the country's already weak humanitarian
and development infrastructure, as roads and ports have been severely damaged
and destroyed, and public and private buildings looted and burned.
Perhaps the most Pyrrhic element of this victory, however, has been its achieve-
ment at the expense of the Haitian population's faith in democracy. This is illus-
trated most vividly by the enthusiastic welcome being given by some to the return
of the gunmen. While there should be no doubt that this welcome has been fueled
by a realistic sense of self-preservation by those who do not have the guns, by the
gratitude of those released from Haiti's jails and their families, and by former mili-
tary and paramilitary figures who have been waiting patiently for such an opening
to occur, this welcome is also fueled by another factor. Haiti's citizens are deeply
disappointed, indeed, disgusted, with the comportment of all of the country's polit-
ical leaders who, over the past decade, have been so intent on their own, personal
struggles to maintain or attain power that they have sacrificed their country. To
coin a phrase, they have been fiddling while Rome has been burning.
This disenchantment with democracy is an enormously tragic and dangerous de-
velopment. Haitians have harbored 'dreams of democracy' since the 1986 ouster of
the Duvalier dictatorship. Their dreams have repeatedly been turned into night-
mares. It is in everyone's interest in this room that we work together to deflect that
disenchantment and restore faith in the resolution of disputes through participation,
engagement, the peaceful mediation of differences, rule of law, and the rejection of
all forms of political intimidation, violence and recidivism.
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DEJA VU
I will leave to others the debate and the necessary investigation over the cir-
cumstances of Mr. Aristide's abrupt departure from Haiti last Sunday. Surely, the
removal-regardless of how it occurred-of a democratically-elected leader prior to
the completion of his term-is a set-back to Haiti's democratic process and a threat
to other nations in the hemisphere; indeed around the world. Regardless of whether
or not Mr. Aristide is restored to the presidency to complete his term of office ending
on February 7, 2006, however, there are several steps we can take, actions we can






support, and principles that can guide us that will contribute toward a sustained
resolution of Haiti's seemingly unending internal and external political warfare.
First, from a Washington and US perspective, we must forge a bi-partisan ap-
proach toward Haiti. Of course, this being Washington and ours being a democracy,
we will agree to disagree over certain specifics. But, even amid our disagreements,
we must be prepared to examine our role in Haiti's affairs in a more even-handed
manner that does not chose sides, stem from deeply rooted personal animosities, or
seek to profit from Haiti's misfortunes.
In this regard, it is of great necessity that the chimeres of Washington be removed
from any real or perceived role in the future of U.S. policy toward Haiti. We must
put an end to 'wink and nod' messages coming out of Washington. These messages-
and actions that reinforced them-have caused considerable damage not only to
Haiti, but also to the credibility of Washington's leadership on Haiti and around the
world. I would urge you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, to exam-
ine the roles of these chimeres, who, as the US Ambassador suggested, were aiding
and abetting Haiti's tragedies. Specifically, I would urge you to clarify the validity
of various allegations that have been leveled at the International Republican Insti-
tute for its role in exacerbating and reinforcing an atmosphere of political intran-
sigence and violence in Haiti. I would urge you, also, to explore alleged links among
Haiti's resurgent gunmen once based in the Dominican Republic and drug traf-
ficking, weapons smuggling, and money laundering.
Second, I would urge us support policies and practices that will reinforce the no-
tion of political inclusion in Haiti. Let us work-successfully this time-not to play
favorites, but rather work to get all the legitimate political actors under the political
tent. It is of vital importance that Haiti's once and future political actors all partici-
pate in the governance of their country and accept the responsibilities that come
along with it. To this end, the framework offered by the CARICOM plan is an excel-
lent place to start. Acts of dechoukaj aimed at members of the Aristide government
and the Lavalas party, and the urgent flight from the country of these political ac-
tors is not.
Third, and directly related to the need to have all legitimate political actors gain
inclusion in governance, we must support steps to put an end to Haiti's tried and
true political practices of 'winner takes all' and 'loser undermines the winner.' In
this regard, Haiti's electoral laws that prescribe a winner takes all approach toward
each and every elective office should be re-examined. In my view, Mr. Chairman,
this approach, particularly in a country that has had one dominant party competing
with many smaller ones, has only exacerbated polarization and confrontation. Some
form of proportional representation, perhaps in Haiti's Chamber of Deputies, would
help to ensure broader political participation. A party that captures, say, 10 percent
of the votes nationwide, could be awarded 10 percent of the seats in that parliamen-
tary body. This would both bring that element into the process and force upon it
the responsibilities of governance.
Fourth, there is an immediate need to move against the armed thugs and convicts
who have been freed from prison, and to re-establish some semblance of rule of law.
In this regard, Haiti's civilian-led police need immediate strengthening and support,
and its judicial system requires intense and long term support. The thugs must not
find their way into the police force. Putting this genie back into the bottle will be
a difficult, but necessary element not only to allow the country to move forward, but
to provide a needed push toward ending impunity. The return of the army and of
the FRAPH gunmen and criminals is in the best interests of only those particular
individuals, not of the Haiti, its citizens, and the international community.
Fifth, we need to be prepared to stick with Haiti over the long haul. Staying the
course will mean that our attention to Haiti can not be merely intense and short
term, as it was in 1994/95, and then leaving the country to its own devices, while
enacting partisan-driven policies in Washington that harmed gains that had been
made. If nation-building is an expression that gives some of you heartburn, think
of perhaps another approach-call it "nation-nurturing"-where we provide active
and sustained support to the non-governmental-and government-bodies in Haiti
that will develop the country and its required institutions. In other words, we do
not have to build Haiti, but we should have a long term commitment to all Haitians
to help them rebuild their own country.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Mr. Chairman, the tragic developments in Haiti, that are still unfolding, are to
some considerable extent the result of failed US policies and practices that have sac-
rificed the well-being of Haiti to achieve a narrow political goal-the removal of one
man from elected office. These policies and practices have not served Secretary Pow-






ell; they have not served President Bush; they have not served the United States
Congress, they have not served the American people, and they have surely not
served the long-suffering people of Haiti.
Again, I thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts and analysis with
you, and I stand ready to work with all of you to help improving the way the gov-
ernment of the United States relates to and works with its Caribbean neighbor.
Thank you.
Mr. BALLENGER. I recognize Congressman Rangel. You are a con-
stituent of Congressman Rangel's, I think, Mr. Sachs, are you not?
Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for giving me the honor
to introduce to you a friend, a constituent, an international scholar,
a professor at Harvard that is now at the great university of Co-
lumbia in my district, and that is Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, the Director
of the Earth Institute of Columbia University. We are sorry for the
delay, but I am pleased that you managed to stay. Thank you Dr.
Sachs and Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Sachs. All yours.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY D. SACHS, DIRECTOR, THE EARTH
INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Mr. SACHS. Thank you very much, Chairman. You asked a few
minutes ago why we would stay through such a long hearing.
There are two reasons: One is I would go anywhere where Con-
gressman Rangel is and I would follow him around the world be-
cause he is the most remarkable person, and I am so honored that
he is my representative in the Congress. But there is a second rea-
son, which is that I think I speak for many Americans that are
deeply frightened today. We are frightened partly for Haiti, but we
are truly frightened for America because we don't know what is
happening in this country.
What we hear doesn't add up. It reminds me when I am asked
to believe the Administration of Groucho Marx's old line, "what do
you believe me, or your own eyes." Doesn't meet the smell test
when I hear Mr. Noriega. And what I have heard directly, and I
am experienced probably as much as any person on this planet in
international development and in countries like Haiti and in Haiti,
what I hear about what is happening does not make sense, Mr.
Chairman. And so I come here to appeal to you, to Congressman
Menendez and to the rest of the panel to exercise Democratic over-
sight over the Executive Branch with urgency now.
I heard a lot of speeches. A lot of your colleagues seem to know
all the answers, but there are a lot of urgent questions you must
find answers to. And I don't believe that you are working hard
enough in the Congress yet to find out the answers to something
that is at a threat to American democracy.
Now I and others have been in touch closely with the people
around President Aristide, his wife. We have been in contact re-
peatedly. I have talked to his attorney. What you have been told
and what we have been told is flatly denied by President Aristide
and his wife. And I believe that rather than hearing congressmen
like Congressman Weller or like others say we believe, I think it
would be good to find out rather than just to believe. Where is Mr.
Aristide? How safe is he right now? I know as of this morning, they
fear for their safety. I know that as of this morning, they do not
believe they can communicate freely with the outside world.






Are you sure? I heard Mr. Noriega just say right now the U.S.
has no responsibility. This was a most shocking answer to me as
an American citizen after airlifting a President out of his country
and depositing him in the Central African Republic to be told by
the Assistant Secretary of State, it is not our responsibility is sim-
ply amazing. What is his current status? We heard so many con-
tradictions today. Mr. Aristide's departure was never a U.S. de-
mand. That was in the testimony but I heard Mr. Noriega flatly
contradicted himself. It was a demand. It had political reasons he
said, but yes, it was a demand. And I heard it directly as well from
Mr. Aristide's attorney that his client was not allowed on the air-
plane without giving the letter of resignation to Mr. Moreno in the
Embassy in Haiti.
Do you just believe it or do you exercise oversight to find out, Mr.
Chairman, because we need to know these things. Because in one
case, it is a resignation and in another case, it is a coup. We need
to understand these facts. What was said to Mr. Aristide about his
security? Congressman Cummings said that Secretary Powell as-
sured President Aristide-was assured of and assured Mr. Aristide
of his security as of Saturday afternoon. Mr. Aristide's attorney has
said that his client was told that the U.S. would not protect his
personal security or family security.
Mr. Noriega said early in the testimony, Mr. Chairman, said
early in the testimony that yes, we weren't going to protect him.
Said later in the testimony that no, he was not at any personal
risk, he was very surprised that he decided to leave under those
circumstances. What are you going to believe, me or your own
eyes? What about the withdrawal of U.S. support for CARICOM.
Curious, isn't it? The Caribbean leaders are absolutely aghast of
what we have done. One of them had the gumption to say so on
the record knowing that we can turn our governments it seems and
has a history of doing so. But he said at no time was CARICOM
action plan predicated on the unconstitutional removal of President
Aristide from office.
The removal of President Aristide in these circumstances sets a
dangerous precedent for democratically-elected governments. What
about U.S. links to the rebels? Please don't take these denials at
face value, Mr. Chairman, because history constantly shows the
CIA fingerprints after the fact. Let's find out what Guy Philippe
was doing when we talked to him, what Jodel Chamblain is doing
there as the head of the rebels. Let's ask not to hear that our De-
fense Department doesn't know how M-16s from the Dominican
Republic got in their hands. Maybe they were "sold." Maybe they
were given. Let's find out. It is absolutely alarming.
Then what was the support from congressionally voted funds to
the International Republican Institute going to an opposition that
blocked the CARICOM agreement? We are supporting the opposi-
tion. Is that right? We are giving millions of dollars to the opposi-
tion that Mr. Noriega went down to negotiate with them and got
a negative answer? Are you curious? I am curious as an American
and I am appealing to the Chairman of this Subcommittee to be
curious as well. It doesn't make sense. What do you believe, Mr.
Noriega or your own eyes? What about all of the love and care for






Haiti that we heard today? Now here's an area of some expertise
of mine-
Mr. BALLENGER. Could you summarize?
Mr. SACHS. I will summarize. I will summarize of why I am
frightened and why millions of Americans are frightened and why
we are looking to you for leadership. Now I came back from Haiti
in early 2001 and spoke to the leadership of the Inter-American
Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, and the Organization for American States. And they all told
me that the Bush Administration had put a complete freeze on all
multi-lateral assistance. I know something about that business cer-
tainly as much as anyone in this room. And I know what it means
for the United States to put a freeze on this aid. And then when
I hear people concerned about the children of Haiti where nearly
100 children die before their fifth birthday out of every thousand
that are born where we froze all aid for 3 years.
Mr. BALLENGER. Is this a summary?
Mr. SACHS. As Dr. Maguire said, we have strangled that country.
I would like some answers as an American citizen. I am grateful
for the chance to tell you how frightened we are for our own democ-
racy, Mr. Chairman. We do not know what our country is doing
and we appeal to you and your Committee to get real answers to
these questions. Thank you very much.
Mr. BALLENGER. If I may interrupt for a second in the fact that
I wondered myself about the safety of the President. And so the
Steele Foundation is an organization that has been providing-
taken care of his safety for years that are paid for by the Haitian
government. And I called the president of the Steele Foundation
and last night he told me for sure that there is no doubt in my
mind that they were completely protected by our men. And then he
said this morning he called me back and said I just wanted to
check it out, and I will tell you now I will swear on a stack of Bi-
bles that we had armed guards there at his request and we did
whatever he told us to do.
Mr. SACHS. Mr. Chairman, may I make a suggestion to you and
our colleagues. Please call President Aristide in the Central African
Republic. Please call President Aristide to find out for yourself
whether you are correct in that assessment because they feel at
risk of their lives.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call, since you
have said they are willing to swear on a stack of Bibles, I wouldn't
mind having them before the Committee to do so.
Mr. BALLENGER. Ambassador Tim Carney, career foreign service
officer at the Department of State, served as Ambassador to Haiti
during the Clinton Administration and we welcome you aboard,
and sorry for the long wait you had to go through.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. CARNEY,
FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO HAITI
Mr. CARNEY. I am delighted to be here. I am delighted to see be-
fore me some Members whom I welcomed into my residence in
Port-au-Prince and who welcomed me into their offices here in
Washington and repeatedly, I might add.






What do we have in Haiti? Well, we now have an opportunity for
the international community to support a political process there,
not a personality. It is essential that we provide resources for Hai-
tians to determine their future. Our first priority, sir, must be to
ensure security while former and still respected Haitian national
police elements reconstitute themselves. In this context of security
and a political process, I will associate myself with Mr. Payne in
underscoring that the most vital mandate for the interim inter-
national force and for the follow-on security entity is disarmament.
You put your finger on that, absolutely. In parallel with providing
security, we all must facilitate the political process that Haitian
parties themselves are embarked on in the framework of their Con-
stitution. I believe that at the outset, three interrelated crises must
receive Haitian attention and get the aid and advice of the inter-
national community. Those three crises are the rule of law, the
economy and the environment.
And specifically, Haiti needs institution building, especially those
institutions that ensure law and order, police, magistrates and the
courts. Second, Haiti has to have adequate laws and procedures for
economic stability and to foster development. Those must be in
place. They need, for example, to be able to have people establish
titles to their own property so they can put them up for collateral
for improvement. Foreign investors whose capital is important to
create jobs, must have the security of their investments in Haiti's
economy.
And third, the crumbling environment there needs urgent atten-
tion. Clean water is a particularly urgent need. That aquifer under
Haiti is already starting to salinate and of course got to stop cut-
ting down trees to make charcoal. Must have propane in their
homes so Haitians can cook. The most important reality for we in
the international community is an understanding that Haitian suc-
cess in bringing their nation into this 21st century with the stake
in the prosperity of our hemisphere is not a job for days or months,
it is one that is going to take years of imagination, discipline and
hard work.
My last thought, sir, is to congratulate France, Canada and the
United States for help bringing about the circumstances that can
realize these goals, the U.N. and its agencies, the international fi-
nancial institutions and most of all the hard work of Haitians are
the way forward. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you. Now Ambassador Marville. You
have extensive experience in Haiti and have served as an election
observer in 1997 and 1998. Ambassador Marville was named Sec-
retary General of the Organization of American States to head up
the Electoral Observation Mission for the legislative and municipal
and local government elections held in 2000. Recently participated
as a member of CARICOM mission to Haiti led by Prime Minister
James Mitchell of St. Vincent, and the Grenadines to review the
situation in Haiti. And I thank you for being here and would thank
you for staying as long as you have, sir.





84
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ORLANDO MARVILLE,
FORMER HEAD OF THE ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (2000)
Mr. MARVILLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and through you, the
rest of the Committee. I stayed actually longer than you may have
imagined because I traveled all the way here this morning. I was
informed that I would have to testify before you sometime late last
night and what I have is handwritten. Interestingly, much of what
I want to say has been covered, but I will go through some of it
anyway. And I think the most fundamental point I want to make,
I want to make at the beginning.
Haiti is not only Haiti of now, it is also Haiti of the past. I think
we have to understand some things. What I have to say is probably
of no comfort to anyone. The truth is nonpartisan. And unlike
Haiti, it cannot be used as a political football. When I went to
Haiti, I went to Haiti with all the feelings of a man of the Carib-
bean with African ancestry who had great respect for a rag-tag
army that back in the early 1800s defeated what was supposed to
be the invincible army of Napoleon for its own independence.
The U.S.A. was already independent. But the U.S. independence
had no effect on the rest of the hemisphere. Haiti, on the other
hand, I must assure you, the revolt of the captives in Haiti resulted
in revolts in Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana, throughout the Carib-
bean. Additionally, the British were then forced to manumit slaves
by 1834. For the rest of the northern segment of the Americas,
there was absolute silence and shunning for 100 years the slave
holding powers of Europe and North America isolated Haiti. This
is the international community worked up to today. And I think we
have to understand what has been happening, what needs to hap-
pen.
I wanted to go through the process of.elections, which we con-
sider flawed not because of the shoestring democracy process that
occurred, but because of a tradition that had developed in Haiti
where the winner has to have everything. As a result of that, we
wrote a letter, a private confidence letter to the president of the
Republic and to the president of the electoral commission indi-
cating that, in fact, there had been a fraudulent attempt to change
the numbers rather than going back and pleading with them to
have the second round. Somebody within the electoral commission
leaked the letter to the press and everything went down. I was
called immediately before the letter was leaked by the president of
the Republic.
We had a lengthy conversation. I indicated that he had to bite
the bullet and he had to tell Mr. Aristide. He said, you know, a
man who has been robbed of 4 years of power, is difficult to talk
to. I said if you bite the bullet, I myself will be one of the first peo-
ple to go out and seek investments from the Caribbean and else-
where, which I considered an absolute necessity. The rest is his-
tory. A lot of it is sad. It is sad what I remember for instance that
at 6 a.m., I was in a polling booth in Petionville, Haiti. And people
were lined up as if there were food rations or something.
When the voting began, they pressed against the door and the
police were not able to keep absolute control. But in the midst of
this a very pregnant woman appeared and the crowd made way for






her. And then I went through it. Anyway, getting back to the point,
sir, we have had since then situations which have been not very
pleasant. First of all, we had a very small electoral observation
team. The fact that it was small was because a lot of the funding
that could have been provided from here was blocked by a single
Member of the Senate.
Additionally, when we came to update the Congress, we were
able to meet, I think two or three Members of the Democratic
party, but only the persons who provided information to the Repub-
licans. It seemed all the time that there was a question of who is
in, who is out and that is the political football. I know I don't have
a lot of time, so I will jump to the present because there are some
things that are absolutely necessary and a few points. The present
offers perhaps the final window of opportunity for the international
community and Haiti's brothers in CARICOM.
I notice my colleague, Ambassador Carney, permitted CARICOM
to come good, as they say. Haiti must not be made once more a po-
litical football. There is also no quick fix. Haiti needs food, medi-
cine, physicians, clean water and any number of efforts to bring
what is one of the hardest working and most talented populations
in the hemisphere to return to acceptable human levels. There-
after, not only will there be a great need for social infrastructure
improvement, but serious assistance must be offered in creating an
apolitical police force and an adequate justice system as well as
preparing for elections, which I believe may require 2 or more
years before they can be successfully conducted. Some of the mon-
ies suspended before should be used immediately for these pur-
poses.
Finally, with respect to the question of proper elections, the time
period I suggest is based first on my own experience where it is ex-
tremely important to have a proper and permanent electoral coun-
cil. It is extremely important to have all parties on board on this
issue. We cannot have the legal opposition saying no. We can't
have Lavalas saying no. The time taking to do a census in Haiti
would be considerable because it is a country where parts of it are
practically inaccessible and it takes time to get there. Additionally,
we need to be sure of proper paraphernalia, metal ballot boxes and
proper ballots, et cetera and also sufficient monies to support elec-
toral observation. Even after that, Mr. Chairman, we are going to
need a period of considerable assistance to allow the country to get
on its feet. And this is not something that can be done.
Mr. BALLENGER. Could you summarize?
Mr. MARVILLE. I am at the end practically. In a year or 2, it re-
quires the international community, by which I mean the North
American countries, Europe, Japan, Latin America and together,
they must work with CARICOM, which I think, in some ways, sym-
pathizes with, understands, misunderstands maybe, but is an im-
portant aspect of this whole process.
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, sir. Just a few questions. Ambas-
sador Carney, I have been to Haiti many times and I planted with
C.A.R.E. International-I planted 3 million trees. That was 20
years ago and I will bet you there is not a tree left. We put a hos-
pital in Leogane, and I understand it still exists there. A little old
lady came to visit me and she was not only the mayor of her town





in northern Haiti, but she was also a teacher. And she said could
you get us anything to help us out with? And I said what do you
need? And she said I need pencils and paper. It kind of shocked
me. Well, what I did is I got 800,000 sheets of 81/2 by 11 paper and
50,000 pencils because of my business connections, and we shipped
it.
And about a week or 10 days after I shipped it, the Salesian
order of the Catholic church called me up to say that we are ter-
ribly sorry to tell you, sir, but they burned her school down. Would
you mind if we gave her maybe a thousand pencils and 10,000
sheets of paper and kept the rest of it for the church? And I said
no, sir. That is one of the reasons that I seem very frustrated in
trying to do something positive about Haiti.
But one of the things that really kind of bugs me is with the
armed guards and the arms that have been there, what would you
recommend to control the gangs and how to disarm them? When
we sent our 20,000 troops in there and they refused to disarm, and
I think our troops cut loose with a couple of guns and killed maybe
five or six of them, and all of a sudden, they gave the guns over,
but it appears that the drug trade is reinforced, resupplied guns.
Do you have any suggestions as to a method of somehow disarming
the mobs that they have?
Mr. CARNEY. Let me first accept my colleagues' criticism and un-
reservedly add CARICOM to those who deserve congratulations.
Disarming, it has got to be done by appeals. But there is no doubt
in my mind that there is going to come a day when there is going
to have to be action that hopefully will not involve large-scale
shooting. But I think if we are going to do this right, we are going
to have to be willing to lock and load if the situation requires it.
Now in that context, I believe we should definitely have Haitian
police with us. And my understanding is that right now as we are
sitting here there is an effort going forward to call up those Haitian
national policemen who were either fired from the year 2000 on or
who quit in disgust who have a reputation that can return with re-
spect and professionalism to their duties.
Mr. BALLENGER. I hope-and I understand that of course some
of the police that stayed on, I guess were corrupted by the program
and so forth, and I don't know how you separated the situation, but
I understand your point. That is really the only base you have to
work with I think as far as law enforcement and law and order for
the country itself.
Mr. CARNEY. I know the Haitian Coast Guard has remained of
good reputation, but we are talking fewer than 100 men in that ele-
ment.
Mr. BALLENGER. Bob.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of the pan-
elists for their endurance and their participation, and I particularly
want to thank Dr. Maguire and Dr. Sachs, who we asked to be with
us. And I just want to make a brief comment before I ask a ques-
tion or two, and that is, it seems that this hearing, the whole
course of the majority is to discredit President Aristide, and I don't
particularly have the greatest affinity for President Aristide, but
that is not the issue. The issue is what is our policy as it relates
to supporting democratically-elected governments? What is our pol-






icy in terms of standing up, including for those who we may not
care for because we don't agree with their policies, but who were
democratically-elected, who this government recognized as the duly
democratically-elected entity.
It goes far beyond Haiti. It goes to the message that there is un-
rest in significant parts of this hemisphere. And if I were in some
countries like we have already seen, like Bolivia, Ecuador and
other places, I would say I understand how to get to my goal.
Let me create confrontation, maybe violent confrontation and
then ultimately a political solution where we say to the newly-
democratic entities step aside because when we send a message
that we don't intend to get involved unless there is a political solu-
tion, and ultimately that says to those who do not want a political
solution because they want a conclusion, not a political solution,
but a conclusion that brings them to power, then I think we have
gone down an incredibly dangerous path in this hemisphere. And
that is what I think today's hearing is largely about. Very impor-
tant to what is happening in Haiti, but this broad ability to wipe
it away so easily by seeking to discredit one individual is I believe
disingenuous.
Dr. Maguire, let me ask you, if I go ahead and I say to those who
are seeking violent overthrow that I won't do anything in terms of
either of my country or those of the international community until
there is a political solution, what do you think that that says to en-
tities, whether it be in Haiti or other groups in this hemisphere for
that fact or any part of the world?
Mr. MAGUIRE. I think it tells them they can act with impunity
and get away with it. And this is one of the tragedies of the sce-
nario that is unfolding right now where we have personalities with
known criminal records, known human rights violators, people who
orchestrated coup attempts in 2001, the attack on the palace that
was orchestrated by Mr. Guy Philippe. He tells them that rule of
law doesn't matter. He tells them that impunity is at large again
in Haiti. And you know, one of the things that frightens me consid-
erably is that we are seeing now through the press reports, through
the newspaper that Mr. Meek held up, we are seeing Mr. Philippe
kind of greeted as some kind of a folk hero. But let us step back
from that, and let us say that Mr. Philippe and his comrades over
the past 3 weeks have emptied every prison in Haiti, including the
penitentiary and those people surrounding them and giving them
a joyful welcome are certainly happy. They and their families are
happy that these people are out of jail and this includes people who
were tried and found guilty for the Raboteau massacre under a
wonderful judicial process that showed that the Haitian govern-
ment could do it. It was lauded everywhere in the hemisphere and
these people are back on the streets.
Mr. MENENDEZ. One final question, wouldn't some of the state-
ments I heard from the Assistant Secretary about all of the alleged
narcotic trafficking that it has been pointed out that President
Aristide did hand over to the United States major narcotic dealers,
what do we say then about Afghanistan where we are supporting
a government in which the there is more opium grown today in Af-
ghanistan than when we took over and we are actually looking the
other way on these warlords and what are they growing in Afghan-






istan, and yet we are strongly supporting President Karzai, who I
believe we should be supporting. But isn't there a duality of posi-
tion or a-
Mr. MAGUIRE. There is an incredible contradiction. I see the con-
tradictions throughout. I see them today where certain people have
indicated a concern about human rights violations that occurred in
1995, the murder of Madam Duoshay Bertrand. I hear people talk-
ing about the concern of the murder of Lingo Bringall. But I don't
hear people talking about the concern of the murder of other people
who don't happen to be affiliated with the opposition.
Mr. BALLENGER. Before Mr. Weller, let me first tell everybody
Mr. Paquiot missed his plane to stay here and testify, so I would
just like to thank you, sir, for the sacrifice you made there.
Now, Mr. Weller.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also, as a member
of this panel, want to thank those who are on the second panel for
your patience and being here this evening.
Mr. Paquiot in particular, thank you for sticking around. I recog-
nize it is a sacrifice for you to be here as well as to miss the flight,
stay an extra day, when I assume you want to be home with your
family at this time.
Mr. Paquiot, I really welcome your participation in this panel
today. All too often in many of these hearings, we have experts
from outside of countries such as Haiti telling us what should be
done in your country, and you are a distinguished leader as presi-
dent of a prestigious university, and your personal sacrifice as a
victim of Aristide's thugs is heart-breaking. My heart goes out to
you as well as my prayers for you and your family, as well as your
country and the people of your country, because every American
wants things to be better in Haiti for you and your people.
You are part of the solution, and looking to the future as one of
the respected leaders of Haiti, what would you recommend? What
do you foresee as the necessary steps to strengthen democracy in
Haiti, to make democracy work for the people of Haiti? What would
you recommend? I really appreciate your participation today.
Mr. PAQUIOT. I thank you for the opportunity you give me to an-
swer your question. I think we tend to focus too much on person-
ality, like Aristide, for instance. We have a lot of people like that
in the country. We had a lot of-the history of Haiti, we had a lot
of people who thought they were Messiahs, they were above every-
body. I heard lots of people here at the table talking about what
should be done in Haiti.
We have to address the very problem that we Haitians face. And
as a matter of fact, you know, I do not think that Haiti should be
like an issue in American policy, because I have been hearing a lot
of things this afternoon. The problem is not that. The problem is
the Haitian people who have been suffering for 200 years. Even
when Haiti was independent, it was not recognized as an inde-
pendent country, even by the United States. I think the United
States recognized Haiti for an independent country maybe 60 years
after Haiti was independent. So you have to understand a country
that was based, you know, on slavery, and it is quite "normal" that
you have those kinds of situations, because you must build things
on the economy, reinforcing the economy. It is a long-term process.






You must have institutions. That is the kind of thing that you do
not have in Haiti. When you do not have institutions, strong insti-
tutions, in a country, you tend to believe in personalities. And since
Duvalier left, we went through a whole process of disillusionment.
So I think that most of the things that should be done have al-
ready been said at this table. I heard people talk about that.
We have basic problems in Haiti like problems with electricity,
like problems with water, problems that you would not think that
a country in this century would have to face. So I think those are
the kinds of things that should be addressed and not necessarily
put the emphasis on somebody. And that is why me, and along
with a lot of Haitians who have been very disappointed by Mr.
Aristide, I thought it was going to do a lot of things. As a matter
of fact, at the university we do not even discuss about the issue of
whether it was or not, you know, being well-elected, because we
thought that he should have been given the chance to do some-
thing, and as a matter of fact, he failed in that.
So I think what we should do, what the international community
should do, is to address the real problem of the Haitian people,
that we need strong institutions, education, and things like that.
This will be a long process. So as far as I am concerned, I think
that is the kind of thing that we will have to do in Haiti if we want
that something like that will never happen again in this country.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Professor.
Quickly, using the remainder of my time, Ambassador Marville,
thank you for the leadership that Barbados has played, particularly
in CARICOM and in the Caribbean region. What role do you think
that CARICOM should play in helping Haiti in the immediate fu-
ture? What role do you see for CARICOM?
Mr. MARVILLE. CARICOM has any number of skills with respect
to elections. I come from a country which has had a tradition of
Parliament that dates back to 1639. Back in 19-I do not know
when, immediately after the fall of Duvalier, when Namphy be-
came a general, our then Prime Minister offered Namphy whatever
assistance he wanted in trying to put an elected government in
place. Namphy listened and then went off, and nothing happened.
CARICOM can do a lot of these things. There are several factors
at play here. We have populations in two or three countries which
already speak clearly, who, for instance, served as police and sol-
diers along with the U.S. forces in 1994, and they have been very
effective because they could reach people at the local level. We are
not from Haiti, but our connections with Haiti are real.
This is one of the things. I would suggest that whatever the
international community thinks it wants to do, CARICOM is a nec-
essary ally in that process.
Mr. WELLER. Thank you very much. Thank you for your time.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you.
I think your recommendations are excellent. I think now that
this Administration has accepted the concept of nation-building,
and I know, Ambassador, you have been involved in that process
recently, that underscores what I think I am hearing. There has to
be a permanent commitment, there has to be patience, and there
has to be appropriate resources.






My remarks at the beginning, and I think you corroborated an
observation that I made, when this Congress did not provide the
funding for those election monitors to the OAS, it was a point in
history that will be reviewed and examined as a turning point. Be-
cause I met you, Ambassador, I was one of those Democrats that
you referred to, large D Democrats. We were there. We observed
the election. There was a euphoria, until, of course, the interpreta-
tion was provided that a plurality was sufficient as opposed to a
majority to avoid a runoff. But the reality has been, consistently for
the past 10 years, we have turned our back on Haiti, and we have
not made that necessary commitment.
I would like to just bring one other-I think it was you, Mr.
Maguire, and maybe others-and let me direct this question to my
friend Ambassador Carney. The International Republican Institute,
I have had very serious concerns with the activities of that group
for some time now, not just in Haiti, but elsewhere. I have wit-
nessed their role in a variety of countries, and I think it is time
we reexamined all of the so-called democracy-building programs.
Are you aware, Ambassador, that-and maybe I am incorrect in
this statement-that the IRI is operating out of the Dominican Re-
public? Are you familiar with that?
Mr. CARNEY. No, sir. You will recall that I retired in early
2000-
Mr. DELAHUNT. You were fortunate then.
Mr. CARNEY [continuing]. And am not up to speed on that at all.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Either Mr. Sachs or Mr. Maguire or anybody
else.
Mr. MAGUIRE. I can tell you that I am fully aware that the IRI
has had meetings in Miami with the democratic opposition. In fact,
the date is etched in my mind because it was the day of the abort-
ed coup attempt in Venezuela. I think that was April 12, 2002, if
I am not mistaken. And at this time I. just happened to be in
Miami for a meeting that had been scheduled long before that of
Haitian diaspora organizations by the National Coalition of Haitian
Rights.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt you for a moment. Are you fa-
miliar with an individual by the name of Stanley Lucas?
Mr. MAGUIRE. I know Mr. Lucas. He is the IRI point person on
Haiti, and I was quite seized when, in Haiti in 2001 in January,
I saw in a video run on State television, a clip of Mr. Lucas drink-
ing champagne with Prosper Avril and the other generals after a
coup had been thrown. And I thought, well, you know, if I were
running the IRI, I certainly would not want a person with this kind
of a history and background running its programs in Haiti for me.
I also understand that Mr. Lucas has been asked by AID, as AID
has funded the IRI for these various meetings, that he-
Mr. DELAHUNT. The funding is no longer coming from the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy; is that what you are saying?
Mr. MAGUIRE. Well, what I understand is that AID was kind of
directed to fund the IRI.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Was kind of directed?
Mr. MAGUIRE. Yes.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Kind of directed. What do you mean by kind of
directed, Mr. Maguire?







Mr. MAGUIRE. Well, in my conversations in Haiti with various
people who know this much better than I do, AID was pretty much
mandated to support the IRI.
Mr. DELAHUNT. By Congress?
Mr. MAGUIRE. I do not believe so.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I think, Mr. Sachs, you make a very good
point, and I would recommend to the Chair that we take the time
over the course of the next 6 months or a year to really-you know,
we create commissions around here rather frequently. I really
think it is important for us to review the roles of the institutes, the
NDI, the NED.
Mr. Chairman, you know that we have had great success, at
least in a transitory way, bringing people of different perspectives
together to discuss democracy. I just fear that what we are doing
here is we are creating advocacy groups that are not working in the
best interests of the United States in nurturing democratic institu-
tions.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I could not agree more. I
think that the concept of NDI and IRI and the rest are good. I
think, though, it is rare that an institution has really taken on a
political binge like IRI. But I was there at the original election of
President Aristide when IRI had a report that was colorful. It was
all done; it was given on the night of the election, IRI's report on
the election. It had to be printed somewhere in the United States,
and it had to be printed before the election, because that was the
election evening. I was there, Mr. Goss was there, we were all ob-
servers.
The IRI has taken this Haiti question and made it a political
issue, and it is unfair, because I think that the concept of IRI and
the DRI, National Democratic Institute are good, but I think that
in Haiti and in Venezuela, the IRI has overstepped its boundaries.
As a matter of fact, the National Endowment for Democracy has
asked IRI to take a look at their new leadership who, as you know,
many of the IRI people ended up in the Bush Administration, as
they should. They are good card-carrying Republicans. And there is
a new group of IRI people who I do not think understand democ-
racy-building rather than taking part in politics.
So there is no question that IRI has had a political-as a matter
of fact, NDI was still working, and the IRI was asked to leave.
Once again, the CIA who had been in Haiti, as you know, forever
had Bazin winning the election and were embarrassed and shocked
that this guy Aristide won 70 percent of the election. Bazin, great
guy; beautiful French pictures in his house, very talented World
Banker. Aristide is running around out there having the people un-
derstand that he is trying to change their way of life. And so how
the CIA could have misread the fact that this is a popular move-
ment and the first election, to me it just shows how flawed our in-
telligence agency happens to be. It made no sense at all.
Just sort of in conclusion, the whole question of the impact that
Haiti has had on the United States, I think the Ambassador men-
tioned its importance. Haiti fought in the Battle of Savannah. We
had a celebration in the State Legislature in New Jersey because
they fought with the Colonies to take the British out of our inde-






pendence, the Battle of Savannah in particular. It was Haiti who,
when we defeated the French, caused the French to sell the Lou-
isiana Territories, which had to then open up the West so Lewis
and Clark could move on into the West, because France was broke
because they lost so much. And Haiti contributed as much as the
original Thirteen Colonies to France as the whole Thirteen Colo-
nies gave to Britain, and, therefore, France lost that and became
in need of funds and sold the Louisiana Territory.
Why do I say that? Because we have been involved; Haiti has
been an advocate for the United States, and, as a matter of fact,
the United States would not recognize Haiti because they did not
want to have a black diplomat when we had slavery.
We could go on and on with Haiti. Even as I conclude, the plant-
ing of trees that I really commend the Chairman for doing, the rea-
son that the erosion has happened so much was because in World
War II, our War Department asked Haiti to cut down its natural
habitat and try to grow rubber trees because we were cut off from
the Pacific region. There was a Haitian person who was-who
knew that they would not grow, but they continued to do it. Ero-
sion set in, it has never been turned back, and now this whole
question of that flawed policy, of Haiti attempting to help the
United States in World War II, somehow helped to create the prob-
lems that we are seeing there.
So there is an involvement of Haiti. As a matter of fact, Simon
Bolivar, who went and freed Latin America, lived in Haiti and
studied there.
Let me just conclude by saying it is unfortunate that we had this
policy. It is wrong that we have not recognized this Republic. I
hope that in the future we will have a decent policy as relates to
this country. They deserve better.
Since my time has not expired, Mr. Carney, let me ask you a
quick question, since the orange light is still on. I know you work
with the opposition, and I am glad you agree that disarmament
and the DDRR programs should go on. But can you tell me why
the opposition that you work with, with the business community,
why they refused the CARICOM proposal?
Mr. CARNEY. I can tell you what they told me. I am not sure I
can tell you the whole story.
The argument, and as a group of us initially put it to the opposi-
tion, was to accept the CARICOM proposal in a statement that
made no mention of Mr. Aristide at all. They found that impossible.
They said that in order to keep credibility with their base, and that
organization is rooted in civil society, something new in Haiti, in
my experience, that they simply could not refuse to mention Presi-
dent Aristide at all. An argument was then that they not make it
a precondition that he leave his office; rather, it be stated as a goal.
And the contention was even that would simply undermine them
to the point that the only results would be Guy Philippe's welcome
in Port-au-Prince as the liberator, which would effectively
marginalize them politically for Haiti's future.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Meeks.
Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I neglected to say last
time, thank you for conducting this hearing.






Let me ask first, Mr. Paquiot, simply, do you believe that Hai-
tians should receive asylum here in America? Do you believe that
Haitians should receive asylum as a result of the violence, et
cetera, that is going on in Haiti right now?
Mr. PAQUIOT. Well, I think that the dual policy consisting of hav-
ing a policy for Cubans and one for Haitians is not fair, because,
for instance, when a Cuban leaves Cuba right now, it is not for eco-
nomic reasons, it is because they have their friends, their family
in Miami, and they are, you know, comparing the lifestyle.
Mr. MEEKS. So you believe our policy should change?
Mr. PAQUIOT. I believe we should have the same standard for ev-
erybody.
Mr. MEEKS. Now, Ambassador Carney, let me ask you, in helping
with the opposition, et cetera, I am told, and you can correct me
if I am wrong, that your project brings some of the opposition mem-
bers to the United States and works with them in that way. And
I wanted to follow up just basically on the question that Mr. Payne
had initiated. So how long was your involvement? Did the negotia-
tions take place as to whether or not they should or should not ac-
cept the CARICOM agreement? Can you just tell me was there any
true engagement, and was there anything that could have hap-
pened that we could have had really at the negotiating table, and
whether or not, you know, the United States said anything to you
or to anybody at the front and said, hey, get these guys at the ne-
gotiating table so that we can try to have a diplomatic solution?
Mr. CARNEY. The event was essentially a long phone conversa-
tion that took place last Tuesday, I believe it was, Tuesday a week
ago. It was not done at the behest of the U.S. Administration or
of CARICOM; it was rather an initiative by three or four of us who
either lived in Haiti or have followed Haiti continuously for the
last, in some cases, 14 or 15 years. The interlocutors in Port-au-
Prince basically had already given a temporizing response to the
Department of State. There had been more time asked for before
a definitive response came through, and it was in those interstices
that we put a call through and tried to make some points that this
kind of a political process with firm international guarantees might
be the way forward.
Mr. MEEKS. Did they know that these expatriates and thugs and
criminals would soon be coming back in, and there would be vio-
lence that would take place very shortly?
Mr. CARNEY. If I recall, at the time the armed opposition led by
the men whose identities we have had adequately described were
quite close to Port-au-Prince; 25 miles comes to mind, subject to
correction.
Mr. MEEKS. Okay. Now, let me ask then, based upon the fact
that I think that we all agree who these individuals are, I was
wondering whether the Board of Haitian Democracy and whether
the opposition would agree and would push for the United Nations
and/or some international court to come in so that those individ-
uals who have been released from prison or who have been in-
volved in the prior atrocities in Haiti, that they now go back before
this body of justice so that, one, they could be reincarcerated, and
two, that they not be allowed to participate in any shape, form, or
fashion, whether it is in negotiations, or holding an office or any-






thing, to deal with part of any negotiation in dealing with the de-
mocracy or trying to establish a democracy again in Haiti.
Mr. CARNEY. I believe that idea has merit and ought to be put
into the political process in Port-au-Prince.
Mr. MEEKS. So I am just wondering, would the Board come out
with some kind of a definitive statement in that regard that you
would submit to our State Department as well as to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations saying that you would urge such a
tribunal to be put in place?
Mr. CARNEY. I will put it to the Board and argue its merits, but
I cannot speak for what the Board might do. I am just a member
of the Board, not the Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Ms. Lee.
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you again and
our Ranking Member for these hearings, and I also thank our pan-
elists for being here. I believe what we are hearing today and what
many of us know to be the case in terms of United States policy
toward Haiti, and especially in the last 3 years, does warrant a
fuller congressional investigation by the appropriate Committees,
perhaps this Committee, with the Intelligence Committees, with
Judiciary and all Committees that have some jurisdiction over our
role as it relates to Haiti.
I wanted to ask any of the panelists to give me some feedback.
Congressman Conyers and I are introducing a resolution to estab-
lish an independent commission to investigate these matters, and
I would like to hear from you what you think should be part of this
commission and the investigation, what questions should be asked
as we pursue this.
Let me just start by asking Dr. Sachs to respond, and then any
of the panelists could feel free to give me your ideas on that.
Mr. SACHS. Thank you very much.
First, I would like to say that we are just 3 days into what looks
like a coup, with the U.S. heavy involvement. So I think it is a
matter of real time, not just a matter of 6 months or a year or 2
years, but for this Committee to use its oversight powers right now
to understand what has happened in the last 5 or 6 days, to reach
President Aristide, to ensure his safety, to demand that the State
Department ensure his safety and his ability to speak freely to you
and to the whole-to Members of Congress that need to understand
what has happened, because you will not have a political solution
in the next few days or the next few weeks unless we understand
what actually has happened.
And the more I hear U.S. Government officials saying that we
have to look forward, not back, that is a recipe for disaster when
we are 3 days into a removal from office of a President on a U.S.-
chartered plane, taken to the Central African Republic, where the
man is not even in contact safely with the rest of the world.
So it is a little bit premature to start doing big theory before you
secure his physical safety and his ability to speak with you and
with the rest of the Congress, so that we understand, because there
is one interpretation which has a lot of, unfortunately, evidence be-
hind it, which was that this was a U.S.-led effort to remove him
from office against his will, and at the threat of imminent death
to his family.






Now, if that is the case, that is a quite remarkable conclusion.
We do not know yet whether that is the case, but the evidence
seems to point in that direction in many different ways. And it was
not flatly contradicted today, by the way, because what Secretary
Noriega said was that, yes, indeed, he was told that he had to re-
sign to get on that airplane. He said that. And that, of course, is
what President Aristide has told those that he has reached by
phone and told his attorney and others.
So we are in real time right now, with an extraordinarily dan-
gerous situation, a President carried away on a U.S.-chartered
plane, and we do not know where and what his physical status is,
and he does not want to be there, I know. He wants to be in a safe
place, not in the Central African Republic. And this Committee has
a responsibility, with all due respect, in its oversight, in my opin-
ion, to help ensure that that is the case.
Now, if we find the worst, and I think we may actually find the
worst, that has lots of implications about how to restore democracy.
And CARICOM leaders will have lots of views about that, because
as we have talked to them in recent days, they believe that there
is a grave threat to democracy as the way events have transpired
against their clear needs in the region, and Prime Minister Patter-
son was absolutely explicit about this.
So I want to urge that this is not a time, in my view, for theory
quite yet. This is a time for quick action, with the Committee tak-
ing a lead responsibility to ensure that the State Department gives
you answers about what was the U.S. role in the forcible removal
from office of a President in our hemisphere.
Mr. MAGUIRE. If I may add some comments, it is a trite phrase
now, but I think we need to connect some dots here. I think we
need to ask why was Guy Philippe not arrested in the Dominican
Republic when the Government of Haiti asked for him to be ar-
rested, and who was protecting him there? I think we need to ask
what kind of links there have been of the flow of drugs from Haiti
to the Dominican Republic, and how that has played into the fi-
nancing of various activities. And I think we have to ask why the
United States Ambassador had to intervene to keep a Haitian noto-
rious for drug trafficking from attending an IRI fundraiser in early
2003.
Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BALLENGER. Mr. Rangel.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, once again, thank you and the rest of
the Committee for calling these hearings.
Let me take advantage of the Ambassadors that are here and ask
them, what does coup d'etat mean as it relates to the American un-
derstanding of the-international understanding of that French
term, coup d'etat, Ambassador Carney? I am going to ask Ambas-
sador Marville as well, but since both of you are professional dip-
lomats, what does it mean to you?
Mr. CARNEY. A blow against the State, if you will, the forcible
seizure of power, and there are any number of ways to perpetrate
one. There was a book, in fact, done in the mid-1960s by Edward
Luttwak.
Mr. RANGEL. That is good for me.
Ambassador Marville.