Policy toward Haiti following the withdrawal of U.N. forces


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Policy toward Haiti following the withdrawal of U.N. forces hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, first session, December 9, 1997
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HEARING 3 5005 00616 903


DECEMBER 9, 1997

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations


45-839 CC WASHINGTON : 1998

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
JAY KIM, California
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROY BLUNT, Missouri

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
PAT DANNER, Missouri
BRAD SHERMAN, California
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JIM DAVIS, Florida

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
CALEB McCARRY, Professional Staff Member
JOHN MACKEY, Investigative Counsel


The Honorable David Greenlee, Special Haiti Coordinator, Department of
S tate ...................................................................................................................... 5
Mr. James Milford, Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency ........... 8
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on
International Relations ............................................................................. 37
The Honorable Gary Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from New
Y ork ................................................................................................................ 39
The Honorable Joseph Kennedy II, a Representative in Congress from
M assachusetts ............................................................................................. 42
The Honorable David Greenlee .................................................................... 44
M r. Jam es M ilford .......................................................................................... 58
Additional material submitted for the record:
Letter to the Secretary of State from Congressmen Gallegly and Acker-
m an ............................................................... ............................................... 7 1
GAO Report, "Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean,"
submitted by Chairman Gilman ................................................................ 73
Letter of November 14, 1997, to Mr. William Cohen, Secretary of Defense,
from Chairman Gilman et al ................................................................. 74


Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. [presiding] The Committee will come to order.
We've called this hearing today to learn the Administration's
plans for Haiti following the November 30 withdrawal of our U.N.
forces. Haiti has been the Administration's most costly and time-
consuming foreign policy engagement in this hemisphere. A month
ago, Secretary of State Albright traveled to Port-au-Prince.
The Committee is disappointed and concerned that our State De-
partment chose not to provide a more senior witness for today's
hearing. While we look forward to hearing from Mr. Greenlee, I do
note that we have invited Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, a key
architect of the Administration's Haitian policy, to testify before us
on two occasions. I believe the historical perspective that Mr.
Talbott could provide, coupled with the testimony of Mr. Greenlee
and others, would assist our Committee in conducting the kind of
oversight that is required.
The Clinton Administration has so far invested some $2 billion
in Haiti. In 1994, after abandoning a promising initiative to end
the Haitian crisis through negotiations, our Administration com-
mitted 20,000 American troops to Haiti under the umbrella of the
United Nations. Last week, President Clinton decided to make an
open-ended commitment of U.S. troops in Haiti without any con-
gressional approval. The troops have an implicit security mission
and in extremis will constitute a tripwire for further military in-
A number of our Committee chairmen joined me in advising the
Administration, at a minimum, to secure an explicit invitation for
our troop presence from the Government of Haiti. President Preval
declined to extend such an invitation citing a resolution passed by
Haiti's Chamber of Deputies calling on foreign troops to leave. We
continue to believe that time is past due for our troops to come
home from Haiti.
Reversing the coup against former President Aristide and remov-
ing the Haitian army as the primary source of organized violence
against ordinary Haitians were historic accomplishments. A mas-
sive international donor effort to rescue Haiti from the hemi-

sphere's worst misery has been mobilized. A new civilian police
force was created from the ground up and projects are underway
to begin an overhaul of Haiti s corrupt and ineffective judiciary.
Now, after a little more than 3 years, the U.N. military mission
has ended. On December 4, The New York Times reported that the
departing U.N. troops, and I quote, "will be leaving behind a coun-
try nearly as poor, prostrate, and paralyzed as when they stepped
in to help."
Specifically, we hope that today's testimony will shed some light
on the following problems that were identified during a recent staff
delegation visit to Haiti:
First, the political crisis continues unresolved. In fact, President
Rene Preval and the Lavalas Political Organization have hardened
their positions since former National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake's November mission. There has been no movement toward
confirming a new Prime Minister.
Second, the crisis is blocking substantial international aid while
the Haitian economy languishes. The assembly firms that provided
many ordinary Haitians with jobs have not recovered from the em-
bargo. The Committee notes that while President Preval assures
the international community of his support for privatization and
foreign investment, domestically he has launched an economic pro-
gram that embraces import substitution and land reform.
Despite progress on privatizing the flour mill and cement plant,
privatizing the telephone company-which, incidentally, is being
misused by the Government of Haiti for expenditures such as lob-
bying the U.S. Government-the electric company, and port facili-
ties cannot succeed without consistent, strong, and public support
from President Preval.
Third, the dispute over the April 1997 elections still remains
deadlocked. Fraud, gross mismanagement, and a less than 6 per-
cent voter turnout-6 percent voter turnout-characterized those
elections. The international community and the Haitian Govern-
ment's failure to include representatives of opposition parties in the
elections risks the possible re-emergence of corrupt one-man, one-
party rule. The international community has failed to foster and
protect pluralism or even minimally acceptable electoral standards
in Haiti.
Fourth, a major drug crisis has developed in Haiti. President
Clinton has once again named Haiti as a major drug transit coun-
try. In its March certification report, the Administration stated,
and I quote, "Narcotics move relatively unimpeded through Haiti's
seaports, with some shipments transiting Haiti overland to the Do-
minican Republic for onward transport to the United States." The
State Department has additionally reported that, and I quote,
"Thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been smuggled over the
border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic". The Administra-
tion has noted that, and again I quote, "Most of those accused of
drug offenses are able to manipulate Haiti's weak and corrupt judi-
cial system and are released."
Now we've learned that the Haitian National Police-HNP-is
under siege from drug trafficking and related corruption. A number
of Haitian police officers have been found skimming drugs from
seized narcotics shipments. And in a distressing development, sen-

ior U.N. and U.S. officials stated that they would "not be surprised"
if former Haitian army officials, including key Aristide security
aides associated with the Lavalas Family Party, are involved with
drug trafficking.
Fifth, the politicization of the Haitian National Police continues
unabated. Former Presidential candidate, Leon Jeune was beaten
and arrested by the Haitian National Police for alleged crimes
against State security. HNP Director, General Pierre Denize, and
Secretary for State Security, Robert Manuel, who reports directly
to President Preval, participated in that arrest. Mr. Jeune is still
being held despite a judge's order that he be released.
Sixth, the security situation in Haiti is tenuous at best. Gangs
armed with automatic and other weapons continue to be seen in
Cite Soleil. There are numerous, overlapping, heavily armed gov-
ernment and private security forces. Furthermore, key Aristide se-
curity aides are arming Lavalas Family partisans and rival
Lavalas Political Organization partisans are also arming them-
Seventh, the Haitian National Police special investigative unit
has received little support from the Government of Haiti. Eddie
Arbrouet, who has been linked to politically motivated killings, is
still at large in Haiti. It is clear that the Haitian National Police
has the resources but lacks the political will to arrest Arbrouet.
And finally, on November 20, our U.S. Coast Guard intercepted
a Haitian freighter with more than 416 refugees headed for Flor-
ida. The Administration notes that this was an isolated incident.
However, it is a clear reminder of the consequences of failing to
help our neighbors in Haiti build democratic stability and jobs.
Today's hearing, hopefully, will focus on whether the Administra-
tion has a clear long-term plan for Haiti that addresses these very
hard questions facing our troubled neighbor. I welcome David
Greenlee, Special Haitian Coordinator for the State Department,
and James Milford, Deputy Administrator of our Drug Enforcement
You may proceed in reading or summarizing your prepared state-
ments, whichever you may deem appropriate.
First, however, I would like to recognize our Ranking Minority
Member, Mr. Hamilton, for any opening statement he may have.
Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the chairman. And, Mr. Chairman, I
want to thank you and commend you for calling this hearing. I
know a recess hearing is unusual in some respects, but I certainly
share your view that the situation in Haiti merits special attention
by this Committee.
I think Haiti has come a long way since we restored constitu-
tional order in 1994, but I think all of us would agree that it has
a very long way to go. And the question, I guess, is whether contin-
ued U.S. engagement is necessary in order to build the institutions
that Haiti never had and certainly needs in order to establish a de-
The chairman mentioned I think seven, or perhaps more, very
formidable problems. I found his statement to be unrelentingly neg-
ative with regard to Haiti, and there is much that is negative
there. But I do think it is important to recognize some of the suc-
cesses as well. I think the United States has created the context

for reform in Haiti. It swept away the junta; it restored constitu-
tional order; it focused attention on the need for international as-
sistance to Haiti. Before we intervened in 1994, we were rescuing
thousands of Haitians at sea on makeshift rafts. We were running
three refugee centers. We were feeding 1.3 million Haitians every
day. It was costing us millions of dollars-hundreds of millions of
Today, the oppressive military junta is gone. The army has been
abolished. Political violence, although certainly still a problem is
greatly reduced from 1991-1994 levels. The flow of refugees has
certainly diminished sharply.
We are now spending significantly less money in Haiti than we
were; and we're spending that money for the right things. We are
trying to support the development of democratic institutions and
move toward an open economic system instead of rescuing refugees.
Haiti now has its first ever civilian police force. That force's inspec-
tor general has dismissed or arrested 175 police agents for human
rights abuses, involvement in drug trafficking, and corruption; and
that's a far cry from the impunity that was enjoyed by violent offi-
cials in Haiti's past.
Haiti has begun to modernize its inefficient industry. That proc-
ess is painful. All of us would agree that it's been too slow, but at
least part of the delay is the result of an institution that is very
new to Haiti, and that is an independent multiparty Parliament.
I don't think we've succeeded in persuading Haiti's leaders to as-
sume responsibility for the country's future. And that may be the
biggest difficulty that we have at the moment.
The chairman is right to point to the political crisis that began
with the national elections last April and has paralyzed the Hai-
tian Government. There hasn't been any Prime Minister function-
ing since June. Haiti has failed to move forward on economic and
political reform and that blocks hundreds of millions of dollars in
international assistance for people who are as desperate as any
people in this world probably, and certainly in this hemisphere.
All that has been achieved in Haiti is still at risk unless its lead-
ers break very bad and very old political habits. Haiti's leaders
must set aside patronage- and personality-driven politics and build
a political culture that emphasizes institutions.
We all know that so very much needs to be done. Unemployment
is 70 to 80 percent-it's just an astounding figure. The economy
only grew 2 percent last year, even though a lot of money-billions
I think-was being put into the Haitian economy. The infrastruc-
ture is in ruins. Public officials are corrupt, still lining their pock-
ets with money that should be invested in the Haitian people.
There has been some improvement with the police, but the judicial
system is corrupt and ineffective.
Now, I think where we are at this point: First, the United Na-
tions made the right call to keep a 300-man international civilian
police force in Haiti. That force will help Haiti's police carry out
their mission to provide security. That move has fairly broad sup-
port in the Congress, although some opposition, too.
Second, I think President Clinton made the right call to keep the
U.S. Support Group in Haiti. We'll learn more about that in a few
minutes. As I understand it, our soldiers there are not assigned to

any security mission but their continued presence there sends a
message that the United States remains dedicated to helping free
institutions take root in Haiti, and that's a very important symbolic
presence, it seems to me. They're also getting some unique train-
ing. They're making some differences in the lives of ordinary Hai-
tians by building roads, and wells, and schools, and providing tons
of clothing, food, and supplies to these very desperate poor people.
Finally, let me just observe that I don't think we can save Haiti
from itself. Haitian leaders simply have to understand that the
international and the U.S. presence in Haiti can not long continue.
They are going to have to get their act together. They don't have
a lot of time to do it. They have to begin to assume responsibility
for governing the country. If they don't, Haiti is going to return to
the violence and the chaos that has marked much of its recent his-
to ur economic assistance for Haiti must be conditioned on the
achievement of that reform. We do no service to the people of Haiti
unless its leaders work to establish free markets and democratic
institutions. And the most important condition of our involvement
must be-an insistence, really-that they have fair and free elec-
tions. Our engagement in Haiti, together with a demonstrated com-
mitment by Haiti's own leaders to reform, is the only possible way,
I think, to sustain and build upon Haiti's genuine but so far very
fragile progress since 1994.
I thank the chairman again for the hearing. I look forward to it.
I welcome the witnesses as you did, Mr. Chairman. I thank them
for coming.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
We'll now proceed with the testimony of Ambassador Greenlee.
Ambassador Greenlee is now the Special Haiti Coordinator for the
Department of State. He has been a former representative to the
Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group earlier this year, and political
advisor to the Army Chief of Staff at the Pentagon. He has served
in Chile and Bolivia, and in many other important posts.
Mr. Greenlee, you may put in your entire statement, or you may
summarize it as you see fit. Please proceed.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before this Committee to discuss our efforts to promote sta-
bility, democracy, and economic growth in Haiti. I welcome this
Committee's interest in Haiti. It is an important matter which re-
quires our concerted efforts. I have submitted a more comprehen-
sive version of my comments for the record.
It is no exaggeration to state that Haiti must deal with chal-
lenges more numerous, complex, and deep-rooted than any other
nation in the Western Hemisphere. Within the hemisphere, Haiti
has the lowest annual per capital income and the highest child mor-
tality rate; the highest illiteracy rate and the lowest life expectancy
age. Haiti's fledgling democracy is a brave attempt to overcome
decades of despotism and dictatorship. Haiti's democratically elect-
ed leaders are struggling to reform, develop, and strengthen inher-
ited institutions which were abused and neglected for many years.

We must recognize that these challenges will persist for many
years to come.
We can all agree that the United States has clear, long-standing
interests in helping Haiti overcome these challenges. As a close
neighbor, we have a major stake in improving the social and eco-
nomic well being of Haiti to avoid mass migration that would be
destructive to Haitian society and costly to the United States. Hai-
ti's geographic location and poverty make it vulnerable to becoming
a major transit point for narcotics trafficking. Instability in Haiti
could become an example for those seeking non-democratic answers
in other countries.
I am convinced Members of Congress and the Administration
share common goals with respect to Haiti. Let me state what I be-
lieve those goals to be. We are seeking a stable, democratic govern-
ment which maintains public order while tolerating dissent and
disagreement. We are seeking a pluralistic political system that
uses public debate to strengthen government. We seek a country
where public security forces function with integrity, efficiency, and
respect for human rights, and can control the spread of inter-
national crime and narcotics trafficking. We seek an economy grow-
ing in a sustainable manner to help Haitians of all social strata
achieve higher income levels and a better future for their children.
We seek a Haiti that gives private initiative the space to make the
economy grow and provide employment for all who wish to work.
Finally, we wish to help Haiti recover its environment through
wise population policies and restoration projects. These are prac-
tical goals that advance our interest, but they will not be achieved
in a fortnight, or even in the 4 years of this Administration.
These goals and interests justify active, unyielding support for
Haitian democracy, stability, and economic development. More
progress toward these ends is needed, but much has been achieved.
Haitian democratic institutions are in place. The old tools of re-
pression have been dismantled. Haitians are working to resolve a
political crisis through negotiation rather than violence. Structural
economic reform legislation has been enacted and the first of sev-
eral planned privatizations of State-owned enterprises has oc-
Haiti's first civilian police force has been trained and fielded. The
Haitians have demonstrated a will to join us in efforts to combat
narco-trafficking. The Haitian National Police seized 6,000 pounds
of cocaine over the past 2 years and is rooting out corruption with-
in its ranks. Haiti has entered into a bilateral maritime
counternarcotics agreement with us. And while 67,140 Haitian mi-
grants were interdicted at sea during the 3 years of de facto rule,
about 4,200 migrants have been interdicted since the restoration of
democracy, and only 704 migrants have been interdicted in 1997.
This marked reduction in illegal migration represents a significant
savings to the American taxpayer.
Much hard work remains, it is very much in America's interest
to help the Haitian people realize their dream of a just, democratic
and prospering society; the type of society which attracts job-creat-
ing private investment and reduces migration pressures.
We should also work together with the international community
whenever possible. For example, about 41 Creole-speaking Haitian-

American law enforcement officers will participate in the 300-per-
son U.N. Civilian Police Mission in Haiti-MIPONUH. MIPONUH
will continue the important work of previous U.N. peacekeeping
missions in mentoring and professionalizing the Haitian National
Police as it continues to make progress toward the goal of self-suffi-
ciency. MIPONUH is strictly a civilian police mission and dem-
onstrates a further reduction in the size and scope of the U.N. pres-
ence in Haiti.
Since April 1995, DOD's U.S. Support Group in Haiti has de-
ployed engineering, medical, and other units for training purposes
on a bilateral basis, providing humanitarian, civic assistance to the
citizens and institutions of Haiti. The Support Group's presence
symbolizes our commitment to Haitian democracy and undertakes
projects which directly benefit Haitians of all ages and walks of
life. For example, engineering units have completed renovation of
16 schools and have drilled 20 public wells. The group's medical
units have provided basic health care to over 100,000 Haitian citi-
zens. These activities provide valuable field experience and train-
ing to DOD personnel and are of lasting benefit to the people of
As an example of the kind of engineering activities that are
planned, the Support Group will help the Haitian Government con-
struct a maritime facility for the Haitian Coast Guard in Jacmel
on Haiti's southern coast. Consisting of a pier and a barracks-office
building, this would be the Haitian Coast Guard's first major facil-
ity outside of Port-au-Prince and would greatly enhance its narcot-
ics interdiction capacity. It is within the context of such engage-
ment that the President determined that the current U.S. military
posture in Haiti is appropriate and should continue for the time
President Preval and Haitian political leaders are working to-
ward a resolution of the political impasse which has beset Haiti
since June. We have urged all parties to act in the national interest
and to resolve their differences promptly so Haiti can continue to
move forward. We do not yet know if their efforts will yield success.
The impasse has its roots in the April 6 elections for nine Senate
seats in which international observers noted irregularities. Presi-
dent Preval has put forth a formula which takes into account key
areas of concern, but which has not yet achieved the degree of
broad spectrum backing that may be necessary.
As frustrating as the length of the political stalemate might
seem, we must not lose sight of our goal: a democratic, stable, and
prospering Haiti. Given their history, the process of political nego-
tiation is novel for Haitians. They're learning how to engage on
contentious issues in a peaceful, non-violent manner. They are
using words, not guns or knives. This is a marked departure from
the Haiti of old in which the edicts of despots like Duvalier or
Cedras were swiftly carried out with brutality and violence.
Haiti will continue to need the help of the United States and the
international community. Without such help, Haiti's fragile demo-
cratic institutions could fall prey to predatory, anti-democratic
forces that will have adverse consequences for American interests.
The result could be instability, brutality, a flotilla of rickety vessels

packed with freedom-seeking migrants, and a flood of narcotics
transshipments bound for our country.
The Administration is pleased to broaden opportunities to con-
sult with Congress on how best to advance our shared goals of a
stable, democratic, and prospering Haiti. I look forward to respond-
ing to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milford appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
Now, we'll proceed with the testimony of Mr. Milford from the
DEA. Mr. Milford is Special Agent in charge of the Miami Field Di-
vision, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Acting Deputy Ad-
ministrator, Washington DEA. He has served in many capacities in
the DEA since June 1971.
Mr. Milford, we're pleased to have you with us. I might also note
that Mr. Milford is the recipient of the Presidential 1996 award for
meritorious executive performance in the Senior Executive Service.
We welcome you to our Committee, Mr. Milford. You may submit
your full testimony, or you may summarize, whichever you see ap-
Mr. MILFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it's a pleasure to
appear before you and the Committee today. I have my full written
text that I'd like to submit for the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
Mr. MILFORD. And I have some comments that I would like to
make before any questions you have.
Chairman GILMAN. Please. Feel free.
Mr. MILFORD. First of all, I'd like to thank you and the other
Members for your continuing support of DEA operations both do-
mestically and internationally. It has been a true pleasure to work
with you and I think that we have made a significant difference as
a result of the support from all the Members on this Committee.
I believe it's important to look at the Caribbean itself and what
has happened. As you know, Mr. Chairman, in the early 1980's the
Bahamas and some of the areas around the Bahamas became an
important transshipment point for cocaine coming into the United
States. Over the last several years, we have seen Mexico become
the preeminent location of cocaine moving into the United States
with south Florida and the Caribbean taking a secondary role.
With the fall of the hierarchy of the former Cali cartel, the Cali
traffickers have really bifurcated their operations and moved to
more individual sort of trafficking activities. That has lead many
of the Cali traffickers and the traffickers from the North Valle del
Cauca in Colombia to look for new avenues to really move their co-
caine from Colombia through sometimes the Central American area
and into the United States via the Caribbean. Much of that is hap-
pening, as we all know, through Haiti and the island of Hispaniola
which also accommodates the Dominican Republic.
What we have tried to do, and what we have done with a coordi-
nated law enforcement effort, is develop a coordinated Caribbean
initiative between DEA, the Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service,

and the FBI to look at many different areas throughout the Carib-
bean which are important to us, and that includes Haiti.
Haiti itself over the past several years has seen a tremendous in-
crease in the amount of cocaine coming into that island. The island
really experiences cocaine coming in by air drops via small planes.
We see it by commercial cargo coming in through primarily in
transiting Venezuela and Panama, and we also see it through
coastal freighters that come up from the source countries, primarily
of Colombia, stopping off in Panama and Venezuela, and then mov-
ing into Haiti.
Most of the drugs, and primarily what we are talking about is
cocaine, is coming into Haiti, coming into some of their ports, their
outlying ports-Cape Haitian, Jacmel, St. Mark and some of the
outlying areas. It is warehoused in those areas and then moved
across through primarily border posts or the border between the
Dominican Republic and Haiti. They are moved into the Dominican
Republic by a combination of Haitian traffickers and by the Domin-
ican Republic traffickers themselves.
As we well know, and as you know, many of these border oper-
ations and these border crossings are unmanned, or poorly manned
at best. And for those other traffickers that want to move drugs
from, let's say one side of the island over into the Dominican Re-
public, the use of the small canoes or the motorized canoes called
yolas and also more coastal-type freighters are also used to move
in the drugs. At that point, because of the large commercial ship-
ping operations that really are located in the Dominican Republic,
a lot of the cocaine is moved out into the United States via com-
mercial cargo.
We have also seen a tremendous increase with the use of Haitian
and Dominican traffickers with Puerto Rico. As we know, Puerto
Rico has become an important entrance point for traffic of cocaine.
Moving a little bit to what our problem is: and what we have and
what we see in Haiti has been for many years just a total lack of
infrastructure and organization in the law enforcement arena in
Haiti, much as we have seen in all other areas of the Haitian Gov-
ernment itself. There has been, you know, a total free-fall as far
as any type of organizational structure. In recent times, and as a
result of initiatives by the U.S. Government, the State Department,
and many other organizations, there has been established and con-
tinues to be established, a police force and the structure of a police
force within the Haitian National Police and the Judicial Police.
And more importantly, as far as narcotics is concerned, most re-
cently, in February 1997, the counter-narcotics unit was developed.
Now, I must say that this is just a fledgling organization. It has
22 members at the present time, plus its director. This is an orga-
nization that brought people in who were for the most part, totally
inexperienced not only in drug law enforcement, but law enforce-
ment in general. Since October and over a period of time, we in law
enforcement-we in the U.S. Government, we in DEA as a part of
this-have worked in a training operation that we are trying. And
we are hopefully developing an infrastructure that can be sort of
the basis-the foundation-for working into a structured sort of po-
lice drug enforcement organization that we all know and we all rely
on. That training, as far as DEA is concerned, started in October.

We hope to complete that in January 1998. And then, hopefully, we
can move from that point.
This is going to be a long process. It's not going to happen over-
night. But, I think it's important to point out that we have this and
that we are hopeful that it will move along.
The DEA office in Port-au-Prince which is in the U.S. embassy,
as we all know, has a complement of three people at the present
time. We have two people at that location, and hopefully, we can
get a third in the country in the near future.
With all that in mind, and assuming that we can develop a struc-
ture and an infrastructure of drug law enforcement, we also have
to look at the prosecutions in the prosecutors' offices which have
been less than credible. It is a process that needs to be reformed.
It is a reform that is absolutely critical to the overall structure of
making a difference in Haiti. And also, as you have mentioned, we
have to look at the judicial system. And the judicial system has to
be supported and enhanced to have any thought of any effective-
ness there.
That is basically the comments that I have. I would be more than
happy to answer any questions that you or any of the Committee
Members have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Milford appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Milford.
Ambassador Swing stated he wouldn't be surprised if key
Aristide aides were engaged in drug trafficking. There are other re-
ports to that effect which should be investigated and I'm going to
ask Ambassador Greenlee, why wouldn't Ambassador Swing be
surprised. Is the Administration concerned about Mr. Aristide's
close association with people who may well be narcotics traffickers?
And what steps are we taking to look into all of that?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think what we have to do is follow trails of evi-
dence wherever they might lead. And what Ambassador Swing was
saying in effect was that he wouldn't be surprised if they led in one
direction or another. I think Mr. Milford has described very effec-
tively the security environment in Haiti and the still nascent abili-
ties of the Judicial Police and the Haitian National Police to de-
velop evidence. I think we should not leap to the conclusion be-
cause there are allegations or rumors to the effect that people close
to Mr. Aristide or close to some other political figure might be in-
volved in narcotics that those allegations are in fact true.
Chairman GILMAN. So are we pursuing then that review to see
how many are involved or to what extent that involvement goes up
the ladder?
Mr. GREENLEE. We certainly work closely with the Haitian Na-
tional Police to press them to pursue every lead consistent with ef-
fective law enforcement practice. The DEA office is just being set
up. I hope that when it's fully staffed that contingent, working to-
gether with the new antidrug contingent in the Haitian National
Police, will begin to make some effective inroads.
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Greenlee, for the past 2 years
Haiti has been listed as a major drug trafficking transit country,
and how do we explain Haiti's transformation into a major plat-
form for drug transshipments to our country and Europe during a

period in which both the United Nations and United States had
major military administrations in that country?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Gilman, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about
a country where everything needs to be done at once; a country the
size of Maryland whose armed forces were dismantled after Octo-
ber 1994 and had no security apparatus at all. A new security force
had to be trained from scratch. Many things are being addressed
at one time.
There are vast expanses of the Haitian coastline that are still not
adequately patrolled. I think it's understandable that such an envi-
ronment would be an attractive place for drug traffickers, particu-
larly as more effective law enforcement techniques are brought to
bear on other traditional routes.
So, I'm not surprised if there is an increase in trafficking through
Haiti. I don't really know the statistics on that, some of it I think
is pretty anecdotal. But, it does not surprise me at all that Haiti
would be seen by traffickers as an attractive place to try to initiate
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Greenlee, since we've made
known our intent to maintain U.S. troop presence, what's going to
be the specific mission now of our U.S. troops there?
Mr. GREENLEE. The specific mission now is the same mission as
has been the mission since March 1996. The mission is to conduct
training exercises specifically in the areas of medical and engineer-
ing projects, and to conduct such exercises in a manner beneficial
to the United States and the Haitian people.
Chairman GILMAN. Can you tell us under what circumstances
rules of engagement would be changed or permitted to evolve?
What scenarios have been in discussion in the Administration?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think any discussion of changes of rules of en-
gagement is highly hypothetical. The discussions that I've been in-
volved in, and I think I have been involved in all of them, relate
to the mission that I have described and only that mission. The
U.S. Armed Forces and the Support Group in Haiti do not have a
security mission. The security mission is the responsibility of the
Haitian National Police.
Chairman GILMAN. And, Mr. Milford, how critical are the Domin-
ican Republic drug dealers to the success of drug trafficking in the
New York City area? I understand they are one of the largest traf-
ficking groups today.
Mr. MILFORD. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, as you well know, the
Dominicans have had a foothold beginning in the early 1980's with
low-level drug trafficking in the Washington Heights area of New
York City. Over time they developed a very close relationship with
the Colombians and subsequently developed their own coordinated
effort through the Dominican Republic and moved not only cocaine
but also heroin.
Chairman GILMAN. So by getting the drug supplies into Haiti
and going across the land into the Dominican Republic we're really
fostering that kind of distribution ring, are we not?
Mr. MILFORD. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I've said in my testimony,
what we have is the Haitian traffickers and the Colombians bring-
ing drugs across the Haiti-Dominican Republic border into the Do-
minican Republic. We have air drops around the Dominican Repub-

lic and Haiti and the drugs are then moved into Puerto Rico and
the continental United States by the Dominican traffickers and the
primary destination of those drugs, at least for the Dominicans, is
New York City.
Chairman GILMAN. Is it true that a number of the former Hai-
tian military officials that were heavily involved with narcotics
trafficking in the past left their posts and are now heavily engaged
in taking up their old trade moving drugs from Colombia through
Haiti? Is there some evidence to that extent?
Mr. MILFORD. Mr. Gilman, I'd like to explore that in maybe a
closed session with you.
Chairman GILMAN. Alright.
I've extended my time. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much.
Mr. Greenlee, you said the U.S. Support Group has no security
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. So if the-
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, may I qualify that? I would qualify it
to the extent that it has the mission of securing itself. It is respon-
sible for its own protection.
Mr. HAMILTON. Alright, so if the U.N. Civilian Police Mission or
the Haitian police got into trouble and were being attacked, the
U.S. Support Group would not lift a finger to help them.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct. In fact, we worked very hard to
ensure that the civilian police mission had its own organic security.
Three hundred CIVPOL members will be deployed to Haiti, 140 of
that number will be dedicated to the protection of the operational
Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that. But the U.S. Support Group
would not take any action to secure the nation-
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. -or of a police nature.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now you heard the chairman a moment ago call
for the troops to come home-the U.S. troops. What would happen
under that circumstance; if we said, OK, come on home?
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, I think the point has been made that the
U.S. Support Group symbolizes our support for Haitian democracy
and economic development. The point was also made in a letter
that I've just seen that was sent by Mr. Gallegly and Mr. Acker-
man to the Secretary of State, that in effect says that the U.S. mili-
tary forces in Haiti constitute an important factor of stability.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I'm interested in what you think, and what
the Administration thinks. We pull them out, what happens?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think if we pull them out at a time when the
international military is leaving, and I think if we do that, we send
a very bad signal. We send a signal that we are going out with the
rest of the international community.
Mr. HAMILTON. OK. We send a bad signal; what happens?
Mr. GREENLEE. It may be that nothing will happen. It may be
that the situation in Haiti will not change in any way. On the
other hand, it may be that when elements that have not been iden-
tified at this point see that the United States is pulling out of Haiti

and no longer maintaining the visible commitment that it had in
the past, that they will begin to probe and test the Haitian Na-
tional Police in ways that will be difficult for the Haitian National
Police to handle.
Mr. HAMILTON. You seem to be saying the situation is only mar-
ginally or a little better if they stay there; if they pull out, no big
deal. I mean, I don't get any sense that you think this is a highly
important mission of the U.S. Support Group.
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it is highly important because it symbol-
izes our commitment. I think it is highly important because it pro-
vides good training for the United States and great benefits to
Haiti. It's part of a bigger picture of the commitment of the World
Bank, the IDB, and the United Nations.
Mr. HAMILTON. And if they are in fact pulled out, what happens?
I'm still not clear as to what you think happens.
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it's not in the U.S. interest to pull them
out. If we were to pull them out, I don't think we would be further-
ing our interests in supporting Haitian national democracy.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now let me ask you a little bit about the political
leaders. T have supported what the Administration has tried to do
in Haiti, and I recognize the problems involved, and I understand
that many of the criticisms the Chairman has made have a lot of
validity to them. I must say to you, I have been enormously dis-
appointed in the Haitian political leadership. And I want your
frank appraisal here: President Preval and Mr. Aristide, is Mr.
Aristide at this point helpful or unhelpful?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Aristide is pursuing his political interests
Mr. HAMILTON. That's not what I'm asking. Is he helpful or
unhelpful? Is he causing problems for us at this point?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think it is unrealistic to talk about the political
context in Haiti in terms of whether someone pursuing his political
interest is causing problems or not causing problems.
Mr. HAMILTON. I'm talking about not the Haitian national inter-
est, I'm talking about the American national interest. From an
American national interest standpoint, is Mr. Aristide at this point
being helpful or unhelpful?
Mr. GREENLEE. I think we'll know more about that when the-
Mr. HAMILTON. You don't know at this point?
Mr. GREENLEE. No; I think the political situation is ripening and
I don't think it has reached the point where the parties are ready
to compromise in a significant way.
Mr. HAMILTON. Are you pleased with Mr. Aristide's political lead-
ership in Haiti today? He's the most popular politician there.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Aristide is not the President of Haiti, he's a
Mr. HAMILTON. I understand what he is not. Are you pleased
with his leadership?
Mr. GREENLEE. I am neither pleased nor displeased.
Mr. HAMILTON. You're not displeased with it. You think he is
doing OK?
Mr. GREENLEE. I don't think it is a matter for me to be pleased
or displeased about; or the Administration.

45-839 0 98 2

Mr. HAMILTON. You mean when the American national interest
is strong, when we're putting hundreds of millions of dollars into
that country-billions, perhaps, as the Chairman said-we can just
stand back and not make an evaluation of political leaders. I'm not
asking you to make an evaluation from Haiti's standpoint; I'm ask-
ing you to make an evaluation of Mr. Aristide's conduct from the
American national interest. Is he helping us or is he not?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Hamilton, I would be able to answer this bet-
ter if I were sure I knew what aspect of Mr. Aristide's conduct you
are referring to.
Mr. HAMILTON. In general, I'm asking you.
Mr. GREENLEE. In a general way, we would like to see the Hai-
tian leadership in all areas be more flexible and more constructive
in reaching a solution to the political impasse and in moving for-
ward on economic development in ways that are consistent with
the undertakings that Haiti made in 1994.
Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you are unwilling to make any judgment
about him; I guess there are reasons for that. How about President
Preval. He started out pretty well, but it seems to me in the last
few months we've not had any real leadership from him either.
You see my frustration here? You're coming up here asking us
to appropriate a lot of money for Haiti; you're asking us to do a lot
of things to be supportive. I want to try to support that. I think
it is a worthy objective. But my goodness, we can't do it unless the
Haitian leadership steps forward. I am enormously disappointed
with the Haitian leadership. I don't think anybody is stepping for-
ward and moving that country in the direction that you say we
want to go-stable government, pluralistic system, market econ-
omy, and all the rest. I just don't see any leadership moving for-
ward there. I don't know the reasons for that. I don't know enough
about Haitian politics to know. But I am frustrated by that leader-
ship. And you can't expect the Congress of the United States to
continue to pour money into Haiti and do a lot of other things if
the indigenous leadership doesn't step forward.
And what worries me about your testimony this afternoon is you
don't show any frustration with that leadership. I'm frustrated by
it. I don't think they're performing very well. And I think we have
a right to see on their part more effective political leadership. You
don't convey that to me.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Hamilton, I share your frustration with the
situation, and let me say that any number of high-level Adminis-
tration officials, congressional delegations, Ambassador Swing al-
most daily convey exactly the frustration you've expressed.
We want to see the Haitian leaders find ways to compromise; we
want to see them make the democratic process work.
What I was trying to do in my comments to you earlier was
frame the political problem in the context of a Haitian history of
no experience with democratic processes, no experience with com-
promise and understanding how compromise is achieved. But in a
general way, yes, we are enormously frustrated. That's why we've
been trying to on many, many occasions urge compromise. That's
why your comments are going to be useful for us to send right back
to the Haitian leadership, because we agree with them.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, despite my comments, I appreciate the ef-
forts being made to try and get this thing on the right course. But,
I want to say to you and to the Haitian leadership that they have
a window of opportunity that is quite extraordinary for that coun-
try. They have got a lot of international support out here; a lot of
people wanting to help, including the United States; a lot of good
people working on the problem. And they simply have to get their
act together and begin to assume responsibility to govern Haiti.
And if those leaders-and I've mentioned two or three of them-
are not prepared to do that, then Haiti is going to slip back into
violence and chaos like they have had in most of their history. I
just hope those leaders can understand the extraordinary oppor-
tunity they have right now. And if they blow it, there is going to
be untold misery for the people of Haiti for a long, long time to
come. If they seize the opportunity that is now available to them,
they can begin to turn around that country that has had a long
tragic history.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to turn a little bit more to the U.S. leadership. Pursuing
further some of the comments of the distinguished Ranking Mem-
ber. But, as I understand it at this time we have no formal request
for the Government of Haiti to have troops there. Is that correct?
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, we've been in a dialog with President
Preval and the Government of Haiti. We go over the projects we've
been doing with them. There is a status of forces agreement which
is in place and that is a formal agreement.
Mr. LEACH. But we have no formal written request from the gov-
ernment? Is that true?
Mr. GREENLEE. We have no formal written request but we've dis-
Mr. LEACH. Let me go on about this for a second. I mean, in one
sense, people in Congress that have appraised Haiti have in a
sense had an ambivalent attitude. That is, everyone who looks at
Haiti, their heart goes out and wants to give the benefit of the
doubt to anything that will help Haiti, including things that are a
little expensive for the United States; i.e., intervention. On the
other hand, there is a great deal of doubt that any other country
can cause another country to pull itself up. And the historical
American terms are that you have to do things for yourself. And
there has not been an immense demonstration of that in Haiti.
And so from an intellectual and philosophical point of view, the
U.S. Department of State has just testified to the U.S. Congress
that we have a multi-billion dollar operation in a foreign State for
the purpose of training. It has testified to the U.S. Congress that
it is necessary to maintain a training exercise because of support
for democracy and economic development in another country.
Now the obvious intellectual question one has: that rationaliza-
tion can apply to many, many countries in the world for which we
have no troops present, nor should we. I mean, what we are now
looking at from a rationalization point of view is a government that
has made no request formally for troop presence; we're maintaining
that presence for training, with no security purpose; and then we're

saying it would be a bad signal to depart. And if we get ourselves
trapped in that kind of rationalization which is either intellectually
uncompelling or fraudulently misleading that there are other rea-
sons we are there, we get in a pickle in terms of foreign policy in
I am really increasingly on the side as one who's never been a
great particular critic of our policy and almost wanting, in balance,
to give support to the Administration, increasingly doubtful that
this kind of rationalization is sufficient. And I would just ask you,
can you frame your reason for committing American troops in a
larger parameter? We've dealt abstractly many times with mis-
sions-why we send troops around the world in difficult situa-
tions-and training is not necessarily a very compelling one when
the situation is difficult.
Mr. GREENLEE. I appreciate your comments and your question.
In the first place I'd like to say that although we have continuous
deployment in Haiti, in fact such training missions are not unique
to Haiti as a country in the Western Hemisphere. There are other
such deployments for periods--discrete periods, for example of 4
months-basically the same size in countries like Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Saint Lucia, Jamaica, for example. And there have been
such deployments in other countries in Latin America. So the fact
that we are conducting medical training and engineering training
is not particular to Haiti. It's just sort of the way we do it that's
particular to Haiti.
Mr. LEACH. And the length of time we do it.
Mr. GREENLEE. And the length of time, right. But 4 months is
not a short time to deploy in other areas and other contexts where
we haven't had the same experience that we've had with Haiti. And
we have to remember where we were in October 1994; the geo-
graphical proximity to Haiti; the particular conditions of Haiti as
by far the poorest country in the hemisphere and where we have
a particular commitment in other areas to try to help that country
develop so that it can become self-sustaining. So it seems to me
that what we are doing on the military side is consistent with what
we are doing in other areas and is complimentary to those other
I've said that our commitment, our presence, in Haiti symbolizes
our commitment to Haitian democracy. I did not put out there on
my own that it was a factor of stability, but I noted that it was
said in another place. I think that that is also the case, though,
that there are intangible benefits to a U.S. presence that are not
strictly related to its mission but simply as an example of our com-
mitment to ensure that our interests are recognized as well as Hai-
tian interests.
Mr. LEACH. Well, I appreciate that, but not very much. The in-
tangible American national interest is hard to find a very compel-
ling precept.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, I don't understand that because I think
the interests are very tangible.
Mr. LEACH. What I'm trying to say is: you represent the U.S. De-
partment of State as the articulator of American foreign policy, and
as such you have expressed that we have an intangible American
national interest. Well, if you are going to suggest that, I would

like to suggest that you have to bring tangibility to the intangible.
What do you mean?
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry.
Mr. LEACH. You've expressed nothing about meaning. You've not
said we're going to have peace in the world because of it; you've not
said that you're defending American jobs; you've not said you're de-
fending anything. But maybe you can list 40 things, I don't know;
it's quite possible. But, for someone to stand up and say, I defend
the commitment of American troops to another country because of
the intangible American national interest, I say to you that that is
not a very compelling concept. You've got to tell me what that na-
tional interest that you are defending is and how vital it is.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, sir. We're going down the wrong path.
I don't think I said intangible interests, I think I said tangible in-
terests. I think we have tangible interests in Haiti.
Mr. LEACH. Well, then list them.
Mr. GREENLEE. In 1994, we had approximately 30,000 seaborne
Haitians coming toward our shores. The interdiction of those sea-
borne Haitians cost us about $400 million. We put some of them
in Guantanamo, that cost about $1 million a day. Our foreign pol-
icy for months was tied up with trying to relocate these Haitians
in other countries. Our Atlantic fleet was tied up with trying to
find the Haitians on the sea, rescue them, put them aboard, put
them in to Guantanamo. That cost us millions of dollars and was
very, very disruptive to the United States. I think that preventing
that kind of thing from happening again is a tangible interest.
Mr. LEACH. Thank you. You've said something.
Mr. GREENLEE. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leach.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for deferring.
Mr. LEACH. Excuse me, would the gentleman yield for a few sec-
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I gladly yield.
Mr. LEACH. I have a unanimous consent request I was requested
to make and didn't, to put a letter in the record from the distin-
guished chairman and Ranking Member of the Western Hemi-
sphere Subcommittee. Would the Chair allow that?
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Mr. LEACH. And I apologize to the gentleman.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, may I make a similar request?
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. I ask unanimous consent to have a statement by
Representative Joseph P. Kennedy made a part of the record.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection. And at the same time I'd
like to introduce a portion of a report for the record entitled, "Up-
date on U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean, Eastern Pacific,"
page 6, which reads, "In addition, the Department of State has re-
ported that thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been smuggled
over the border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic whose
army has had little success in stopping the flow of drugs." And I
offer that for the record without objection.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Greenlee, I'm sure I, more than anyone in this hear-
ing, can appreciate the circumstances and the reason for the Com-
mittee's hearing this afternoon concerning Haiti. I am also sure of
your recollection 3 years ago when there was such a tremendous
groundswell in support, not only by many of the leaders from the
Congress but as well as from the Administration, and for the rea-
son why eventually we sent a very highly decorated delegation to
Haiti hopefully to bring some sense of decency and honor to this
country and the Caribbean.
And of course, you know, former President Carter, Colin Powell,
and several others in a very dramatic fashion were able to work
out some sense of solution to the crisis that was at hand in the
Caribbean. And I think this probably is one of the reasons why our
distinguished Members of the Committee are trying to raise the
question: what exactly is our national policy toward Haiti? Is it be-
cause of near presence that might have some real security prob-
lems with our own national security, or is it because it will cause
some political crisis into our own Nation? It seems to me that this
is what we are trying to raise at issue with the Administration and
with yourself.
And I just wanted to ask you too, you mention in your statement
that sometime in July the President will then reevaluate the situa-
tion in Haiti and he will then make a decision. And I want to ask:
if he does make a decision, what conditions will it be based upon.
Has the Administration formulated any set of conditions or prior-
ities that say by July if this doesn't happen in Haiti, I, as President
of the United States, this is what I'm going to do? Has the Admin-
istration formulated that sense of policy?
Mr. GREENLEE. Let me say first of all that our clear national in-
terests with respect to Haiti certainly are driven in significant part
by the geography of Haiti, its proximity to the southern coast of the
United States; and the experience of what happened when there
was a brutal, repressive regime and Haitians fled Haiti in huge
numbers and we were not, on humanitarian grounds, able to put
them back into Haiti. So that very clearly drives our national inter-
We have also an interest in seeing the poorest country in our
hemisphere develop and get on its feet and become self-sustaining.
After all, we don't want to live in a world where there are countries
that are not viable, and not able to trade with us, and that are in-
herently unstable. And that's particularly the case in our own
hemisphere. So we have an interest there.
As regards the U.S. Support Group presence, there will be an
evaluation of that presence, you said, in July. I think that that's
about the time that that will happen. The criteria, I'm not sure
that I can answer that precisely because we are talking about a
mission that is a training mission.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Ambassador I'm sorry, my time is run-
ning out on me. This is the problem: it has been 3 years now-and
I'm a little surprised myself to say that after 3 years we have not
formulated a more definite set of criteria which, come July, says

this is what we are going to do. And I think this is the frustration
that we are going through now here as a Committee.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, I didn't want to leave the impression
that there are no criteria.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. OK. Alright, please.
Mr. GREENLEE. What I was trying to say was that we are talking
about a training mission with projects that are mutually beneficial
and if it's determined that those projects are no longer mutually
beneficial, then we should leave.
As regards the reason that the U.S. Support Group is in Haiti
and the reason that the U.S. military has been in Haiti, well, there
has been a change in the reason. Because the first mission was
quite different from the mission we have now. Also there has been
a dramatic decrease in numbers over time. We started out with
over 20,000 troops in Haiti, and we have drawn down to now be-
tween 400 and 500. That's the size of a training mission; that is
not a security mission. And as I pointed out earlier, there are such
training missions in other parts of the hemisphere. That's the kind
of thing that we can sustain if we find it to be in our interest and
in the interest of Haiti.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, Mr. Ambassador, I'm sorry to say that
you say that you have classified this policy as a training mission.
I don't look at it as a training mission. I look at it as a more broad
and a very powerful sense of presence. And I wanted to ask you
by the same token, the contradiction to our whole policy in the Car-
ibbean is that 90 miles away you have a Marxist Government that
is not very democratic, and I make reference to Cuba. And why
haven't we done the same in the Cuban situation? I want to leave
that for further discussion.
But here is another problem I have. A couple of months ago we
had the Prime Minister of Cambodia duly elected. He came to
Washington and met with the Congress pleading with America that
democracy is at a crisis now in Cambodia. Should we apply the
same standard that we're doing with Haiti to the crisis that we're
now confronted with in Cambodia? Even though we may not be in
the Caribbean, there is the same set of problems underlying the
fact that here is a country that has the same similar situations
that we find in Haiti, and they are asking us to help because de-
mocracy is at a risk right now. Should we apply the same prin-
ciples to Cambodia?
Mr. GREENLEE. You're going to take me quickly away from my
portfolio, and I don't want to go there. I think principles are prin-
ciples, and principles remain constant. But, Haiti is Haiti; Cam-
bodia is Cambodia. Haiti is an hour and half plane ride from
Miami; Cambodia is farther away. I don't want to speak about
Cambodia. I'd like to keep the focus on Haiti.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Five hours away from Guam, I know.
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry. I want to keep the focus on Haiti, and
I cannot speak to the other issue.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I understand. Mr. Chairman-
Mr. GREENLEE. Did you have another question though about
our-you said that it wasn't simply a training mission, the U.S.
troops in Haiti provide a presence. And I very much agree with

that and I think that presence is understood in the framework of
our commitments in broad terms to Haiti.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I would say that you would agree then, that
symbolism sometimes is our best foreign policy sometimes.
Mr. GREENLEE. Symbolism backed by commitment, I would say.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes; and we have the commitment.
Mr. Milford, what is the approximate cash value of the drug traf-
fic coming out of the Caribbean to the United States? Do you have
any sense?
Mr. MILFORD. The sense is billions, sir.
Mr. MILFORD. Billions.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And you mentioned Puerto Rico as a major
trafficking market. We have U.S. Customs presence there. Any es-
timates of the amount of drugs coming out of Puerto Rico directly
to the United States?
Mr. MILFORD. Again, the situation with Puerto Rico, I think as
you well know, once drugs get into Puerto Rico, there is no customs
check coming back out, or a customs check in the United States.
So, that is where the traffickers have utilized Puerto Rico really as
a very lucrative transshipment point. They've also used a lot of the
ports, including the airport, in co-opting a lot of the airport employ-
ees and so on. We have a very vigorous ongoing operation with U.S.
Customs and with the other law enforcement organizations-U.S.
law enforcement organizations-in Puerto Rico in an initiative that
looks at Puerto Rico and the entire Caribbean, including, of course,
the island of Hispaniola.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. May I ask Mr. Greenlee, Mr. Chairman, one
more question if I may?
What exactly is Mr. Aristide's position toward the United States
at this point in time?
Mr. GREENLEE. I don't know exactly.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Is he pro-American?
Mr. GREENLEE. I don't know exactly what his position is. I have
always had trouble with describing foreign leaders as being pro-
American or pro-something else. I image he's pro-Haitian and pro
the interests he sees in his political agenda. I know that he feels
very warmly toward the United States and appreciative for our ef-
forts in October 1994. I think it is fair to say though that he is a
Haitian with Haitian interests.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and I want to say
that I associate myself entirely with the statements made by the
Ranking Democratic Member of this Committee. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Goss.
But before Mr. Goss proceeds, I would like to make part of the
record a letter in which Mr. Goss and I joined together with our
colleagues, Gerald Solomon, Bill McCollum, Dennis Hastert, Henry
Hyde, Chris Cox, and Bill Young where we asked the Secretary of
Defense to spell out the specifics of our further mission in Haiti.
This was dated November 14, 1997, and I don't believe we've re-
ceived any response yet. And we noted in there that our troops and
navy should not be used as a tripwire, and under no circumstances
should they stay without an unequivocal invitation to remain from

the Government of Haiti. And I hope that our good ambassador will
help us get a response to all of that.
Mr. Goss.
And I ask that this be made part of the record, without objection.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to return
to my home Committee today.
I have a number of questions. Going on the basis of some that
have started, however, to try and wrap up some loose ends. I have
a DOD report which I think several of us have seen that said Oper-
ation Fairwinds staffing in Haiti, as of November 1997, broke down
as follows: 20 percent headquarters staff, 64 percent security per-
sonnel, 14 percent engineering, and 2 percent other functions. I'm
curious, if that is accurate information, and we have double-
checked with DOD, how you could characterize the mission as an
engineer and medical training mission? And if indeed you are going
to stick to the fact that it is an engineer and training mission, how
is it that the tangible results response that you gave to Mr. Leach
would still be effective today? Will these people who are there,
these medical trainers and engineer trainees who are military, in
fact be able to stop any flow of refugees coming out of Haiti? And
if the answer is yes, how do you explain the recent ship of 417 peo-
ple? And if the answer is there was no ship of 417 people, my next
question is, are we watching the refugee situation carefully? And
if we are watching it carefully, how do you explain that a shipload
of 417 Haitians almost got all the way to the United States without
being detected?
Mr. GREENLEE. You've asked a lot of questions.
Mr. Goss. I have.
Mr. GREENLEE. Let me start with the first one. I remember that
at the discussion, I believe it was about a month ago or so, maybe
more, with Sandy Berger and others, you put the piece of paper on
the table-
Mr. Goss. Indeed.
Mr. GREENLEE. -that had the relationship of the number of se-
curity personnel in Fairwinds to engineers and so forth. I was al-
ways sort of surprised by your doing that because I understood that
that piece of paper was a snapshot and that at any given time
there could be a relatively large number of troops in one area or
a relatively small number. And I did ask about that and I under-
stood that at that particular time that the snapshot was taken,
there were two security companies at one time-one was coming in
and the other was leaving. So, that skewed the numbers.
Also, I'm not certain, I think that you drew a comparison in that
other meeting between the number of engineering elements in I
think July, as opposed to the relatively fewer engineering elements
in November.
Mr. Goss. It was no snapshot. It was actually a spectrum, and
it was a pattern that was shifting away from engineering into secu-
rity. That is why I put the piece of paper on the table; because over
an extended period of time it showed a change in pattern and pol-
icy which I suspected might have something to do with the fact

that the U.N. mission was coming to an end and we were beefing
up the security forces to try and cover it.
Mr. GREENLEE. My understanding is, and I stand to be corrected
by DOD if the information I got from DOD isn't correct, but my un-
derstanding is that there were two rifle companies at one time, and
one was coming in and the other was leaving in the November sta-
That said, it would not be surprising that if with the drawdown
of international military, the responsible military commanders
were to decide to increase security personnel relative to their other
personnel, but that would be their decision. I don't know that that's
the case now. I understand there is a total of 408 as of today at
Fairwinds. I don't know the relative mix, but it's possible that the
security components could go up, it's possible that later they could
go down. But, I don't think that particular piece of paper that I
saw the other day established a clear trend.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Ambassador, this is in no way an ad hominem re-
mark: I honestly have trouble knowing which piece of paper to be-
lieve from the Administration on the subject of Haiti. It is very dif-
ficult to grasp the policy here.
I think you got a very straightforward question on the subject of
President Aristide: is he helpful or not? I believe that Mr. Hamilton
had a fair question. We have a lot of money invested in Mr.
Aristide and his representation of democracy. I have had some peo-
ple characterize his role to me as sabotaging the elections of April
6. It has been said that the only nation who observed those elec-
tions that said those elections passed as free, fair, democratic, or
even close to it, was the United States of America. Everybody
else-everybody else-said those elections were a fraud, a sham, or
worse. It is very hard for me to understand, since it was Mr.
Aristide who caused the problem with those elections, and his fam-
ily party, that we could not draw the conclusion that Mr. Aristide
has not been helpful to our efforts and our tax payer support which
we have extended to provide democracy to Haiti. I think it is a
clear cut answer. I don't understand why you are afraid to say it.
Tell me why my conclusion is wrong.
Mr. GREENLEE. The April 6 elections were flawed. They were
clearly flawed.
Mr. Goss. Is that official policy now?
Mr. GREENLEE. The April 6 elections were flawed.
Mr. Goss. Is that the U.S. position?
Mr. GREENLEE. The U.S. position is that the elections were
flawed but they should be reviewed in a Haitian context. There is
a process that provides for review of the April 6 elections in place.
We will have to see with what degree of integrity it goes forward.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired; can I finish this
You know as well as I do that the key in the elections was not
who won the elections as much as it was to get the elections satis-
factorily completed so we could get on with the appointment of the
electoral council which has been the critical-the pivot stone, the
key stone-of free, fair, democratic election possibility in the future
in Haiti. You know that that was forestalled by what happened in

the political scenery before, during, and after those April elections
as well as I do. That's a fact. It's done; it's over.
It seems to me that by frustrating the installation of the CEP-
that democratic observers could agree was fairly there-and could
therefore monitor future elections, that former-President Aristide
has systematically and deliberately forestalled the opportunity for
fair, free elections in Haiti in the future. Now that to me is a huge
setback for our democratic efforts. I am sorry to say that because
nobody wants to see democracy come to Haiti more than I. I've
been watching for 35 years, and I guess the question remains: can
we save the Haitians from themselves? So far the answer does not
seem to be encouraging. But I'd like your response on the Aristide
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, let me back up though. You were talking
about the CEP, the provisional electoral council. There is a process
in play now where significant numbers of the CEP will be replaced.
That process has not been fully accepted by the OPL. We'll have
to see how it goes. There is still room for negotiation and perhaps
an outcome that will be broadly acceptable and that we can sup-
port. That's one thing.
Mr. Goss. It's not just the CEP, as you are well aware. It's all
the way out into the grassroots, into the mayoralties, to use a jux-
taposition that doesn't exactly fit-the local elections, as it were.
Mr. GREENLEE. The local elections produce assemblies that would
in turn produce a permanent electoral council. I think that's what
you are talking about. Again, that hasn't happened yet, and cer-
tainly a large part of the political crisis right now revolves around
the shape of that Committee.
Mr. Goss. And that was Mr. Aristide's primary engineering, to
the best of my knowledge; was that that was upset by the actions
he took. Is that incorrect?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Aristide certainly has his interests. The OPL
has its interests. The OPL was concerned about the conduct of the
CEP that it accepted in the previous elections.
Mr. Goss. Are his interests, in your view, the interests of his
party, himself, Haiti, democracy, or something else that I haven't
Mr. GREENLEE. Certainly his party; certainly himself; possibly
Haiti. Democracy is a much bigger issue because democracy is a
field on which players contend, and he's contending on that field.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your generosity.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goss, the distinguished
chairman of our Intelligence Committee.
Mr. William Delahunt, who recently was part of a task force to
Haiti. Congressman Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
I appreciate the invitation, the opportunity to participate. As you
indicated, I've been to Haiti several times with Members of the Ju-
diciary Committee and have formed some of my own opinions.
I intended to explore with Mr. Greenlee some of the political
questions in terms of what's the best approach toward this govern-
ment, including for Members of Congress, to assist in terms of
breaking that political impasse. But, I 'm going to devote my time,
I think, to Mr. Milford because this is my first introduction to the

issue of the flow of drugs, particularly as it relates to Haiti. You
talked about Puerto Rico. I take it the problem has increased in
terms of the flow of drugs in and out of Puerto Rico. Is that a fair
Mr. MILFORD. It's not only Puerto Rico, but the entire Caribbean,
and particularly the eastern Caribbean.
Mr. DELAHUNT. OK. And I think the point I want to get to, is
that while we single out and talk about Haiti in terms of an in-
creased level of the flow of drugs, this is true of the entire eastern
Caribbean. It's not peculiar to Haiti. Is that, again, a fair state-
Mr. MILFORD. Well, I think, just to try to answer your question,
I think Haiti, with the lack of a structure-an organizational struc-
ture-with the police force and political structure for a period of
time has invited more corruption, and frankly more traffickers, to
penetrate their borders.
Mr. DELAHUNT. How would you compare it to the increase in the
Dominican Republic, for example?
Mr. MILFORD. The Dominican Republic has also had an increase,
but I think you-
Mr. DELAHUNT. In the same proportion as-
Mr. MILFORD. I think you'd have to put them together since they
really share the same island. A lot of the trafficking which the Do-
minican Republic sees-or a lot of the cocaine coming in-actually
does come from the Haiti side and enters the island on the Haiti
side and then is moved over via land.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And exits via the Dominican Republic.
Mr. MILFORD. Absolutely.
Mr. DELAHUNT. But in comparing those two island nations, there
is not a great disparity in terms of the increase that the DEA has
Mr. MILFORD. Well, again, you have to look at it, as far as the
Dominican traffic, it is really permeating all the Caribbean in the
Dominican Republic, Dominican Republic waters, Haiti to some ex-
tent, and just as important, Puerto Rico and into the United
States. It's a little different situation as far as the structure, for ex-
ample, with the police force in the Dominican Republic-
Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me interrupt and just ask you this question:
when the Cedras regime was in place, what kind of relationship did
the DEA have with the coup leaders at that point in time?
Mr. MILFORD. We had less than any type of-
Mr. DELAHUNT. So you had no formal relations.
Mr. MILFORD. We had an office there. And, at times, because of
the total political and social unrest, it was a difficult place to work
in. And with the political structure.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, let me again ask you to make the compari-
son between now and then in terms of the response, of the Preval
Government and the response of the Haitian National Police. Have
you seen an improvement?
Mr. MILFORD. Yes. What we've seen in where we are today; we've
seen a will by many of the Haitian officials to try, at least at the
police level, to try and change and develop an organizational struc-

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you would say that with the advent of democ-
racy at least there has been an awakening in the willingness of the
government to respond to the flow of drugs in and out of Haiti.
Mr. MILFORD. Well, I would look at it in terms of the police itself,
rather than get involved in the political structure.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And there has been an improvement?
Mr. MILFORD. There seems to be a will for improvement. We are
hopeful that that will-
Mr. DELAHUNT. And has there been cooperation from the Haitian
coast guard that didn't exist heretofore?
Mr. MILFORD. Well, I think the coast guard which Haiti has is,
as you well know, very limited.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.
Mr. MILFORD. But they are cooperating with our coast guard, and
moving forward.
Mr. DELAHUNT. And they are cooperating.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.
And back to Ambassador Greenlee, because I see myself running
out of time here. I share the frustration that everyone else does
and that I know that you do also about the political impasse. But
you made reference to the fact, I think, in response to Mr. Hamil-
ton, that the political situation is ripening. Can you amplify that
and clarify that?
Mr. GREENLEE. Yes. Several weeks ago, President Preval
launched a political process which has a number of elements. But
the primary element is that he appointed a Presidential commis-
sion to review the results of the April 6 elections and to determine
what should be done about those elections in recommendations that
will be made public. That commission-a three person commis-
sion-has begun work.
President Preval also determined that six of nine members of the
provisional electoral council that presided over those elections could
e replaced and that those positions could be filled with persons
drawn from a list of people submitted by what's called civil soci-
ety-by non-political groups-and that two of those persons would
be selected by the Presidency, two by the Parliament, and two by
the judiciary. And that part of his proposal, his initiative, has not
been completed but it's in play.
Now, originally there were indications that the OPL-the other
major Lavalas party which is in dispute with the Aristide-based
party and which is the party that has objected most vocally to the
April 6 elections-originally that party appeared to go along with
elements of the Preval plan, but since then, it has objected to the
way the plan is being implemented. President Preval, at the same
time as launching his plan, selected a candidate for Prime Min-
ister. That person, Herve Denis, is now being considered by the
Parliament. For him to become Prime Minister would require the
ratification of both houses. Now the Chamber of Deputies will take
up his candidacy and vote on it within the coming days. It's unclear
whether the Chamber will ratify his candidacy; perhaps it won't.
If it were to ratify his candidacy, the candidacy would then go to
the Senate where the OPL has enough strength to block even a
quorum to consider it.

The OPL is in a position to urge a further refinement of Presi-
dent Preval's initiative. President Preval is in a position to insist
that his initiative go forward according to the agreement he
thought he had. As the Prime Ministeriaf process goes forward, it
intersects with the concerns over the April 6 elections. It's possible
that there could be room for flexibility on both sides. It's also pos-
sible that the Denis nomination will collapse entirely. It's possible
that President Preval will go forward with his commission and his
initiative without reference to the concerns of the OPL.
So, there are a lot of things that are possible, but there are some
X factors and we simply have to wait and see how they bear on the
Mr. DELAHUNT. May I just have one more question?
Chairman GILMAN. If you would. Time is running on us, please,
go ahead.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one; and this is a question for Mr. Milford.
Earlier there was a statement ascribed to Ambassador Swing, that
he wouldn't be surprised if key aides to President Aristide were in-
volved in drug trafficking. Do you as the deputy in charge of that
particular area of the world, do you have any evidence whatso-
ever-or solid intelligence as opposed to rumors-that any close as-
sociates of Mr. Aristide are involved in drug trafficking?
Mr. MILFORD. Congressman, I would prefer to get back to you at
the appropriate time and discuss it at that moment.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Congressman Delahunt.
Mr. Hamilton, do you have any further questions?
Mr. HAMILTON. One comment: is there some question now as to
whether *-the central bank president will be renominated, Mr.
Mr. GREENLEE. I understand that Mr. Delatour's term was to
have expired December 5. I don't think he's been renamed and I
don't know the status of this and I can check and get back to you.
Mr. HAMILTON. The Haitian Government has demonstrated ad-
mirable fiscal restraint, austerity. He, I think, deserves some credit
for that, and we would favor his renomination, would we not?
Mr. GREENLEE. He has been a fiscally conservative, responsible
central bank president from everything I have heard. And I don't
know whether it's my position here to say that we favor this or
favor that, but I think we appreciate what he's done and would be
very comfortable with him continuing to do it.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Mica, thank you for joining us. Mr. Mica.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I'm not a Member of this Committee, but I'm a Mem-
ber of the Oversight Committee and the Subcommittee on National
Security and International Affairs overseeing DOD and the Depart-
ment of State. I have the privilege of working with the Chairman
who does a fantastic job, and the Ranking Member, on a number
of international issues.
I take particular interest in Haiti, having in the private sector
represented a Florida group that was trying to help them start
their economy. And I was involved in that effort before the govern-
ment fell.

I took the position when I got elected to Congress, very strongly
opposed to the embargo which dealt an incredible blow to that frag-
ile economy. I have visited there on a number of occasions over
time and followed up with the visit of congressional committees to
see the status of the situation there. It truly is one of the absolute
scandals and shames of this entire hemisphere what we have al-
lowed to happen in Haiti.
I have some questions about economic development because you
can do all you want to do and put in all the institutional programs
and train all the police and security and institution-building pro-
grams, but where are we on assisting business and investment?
One of the problems we have, of course, is when you did the embar-
go, we had 60 to 80 thousand jobs that were supporting a million
Haitians, and it completely disrupted those job opportunities. Very
few folks returned that I know of, the last count I had. We had
some young AID official who had no clue as to how to get business
restarted there. What has happened to those who had investments
there? Are they there? What are we doing to build business? Maybe
you can tell me. Because that's the only thing that's going to get
these folks back on their feet.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Mica, I very much appreciate your question.
I think it's the key question in this session.
Haiti must one day become self-sustaining. It can't become self-
sustaining without economic development. Generally speaking, eco-
nomic development can only occur if there is both public and pri-
vate investment. There are problems in both areas. A significant
amount of public investment is being hung up because the Par-
liament has not been able to pass needed legislation that would
permit the disbursement of-
Mr. MICA. So with all we've done, they haven't proceeded. What
about private?
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, they are-
Mr. MICA. The privates won't come into Haiti until this is in
Mr. GREENLEE. If I could keep going with this thought: there is
needed tariff reform and needed legislation so that they can accept
concessional loans that would permit the disbursement of money
into the economy which would really provide a stimulus for further
kinds of investment. That's one problem and it's wrapped up with
the political impasse. That's only one problem.
Private sector investment: there is a little bit of good news in
that there has been one privatization so far and another one is in
the works. The transaction for the flour mill has been completed.
We would expect that that flour mill could be operational within
9 or 10 months and that would provide some jobs and demonstrate
it's possible to invest in Haiti and ultimately, we hope, turn a prof-
There is a cement plant that will be privatized shortly. The bids
are in. Unfortunately, without a functioning government-without
a Prime Minister in office-there is no one to sign the award. So
that's a problem and a great concern.
Let me mention another thing that is a concern to us. There is
a cellular license pending. The elements in the agreement are in
place. For reasons that are not altogether clear, the government

has not completed that transaction. We think the completion of
that cellular license agreement would send a very important signal
to future foreign investors and we think that that's a very impor-
tant test case.
On the light industrial complex, the assembly sector: there used
to be perhaps as many as 100,000 jobs before the period of de facto
government-before, in fact, the first period of democracy when
conditions were a little bit different in the hemisphere. During the
period of the embargo and the de facto government, a lot of those
people pulled up stakes and left and few of them have returned.
A sector that once had 100,000, and then during the de facto period
I think went down considerably more, has now built up to only 16
or 17 thousand.
There are things that we can do to make investment in that sec-
tor more attractive. They really are mostly in the area of helping
Haiti with its infrastructure of roads and so forth. We are, frankly,
constrained by existing legislation from directly lobbying U.S. firms
to set up business overseas. That's something that the business
sector can do for itself, by itself; the Haitians can do it; but there
is an impediment as to what we can do directly.
There is another factor, and again, here's perhaps a role for the
Congress. NAFTA has greatly, I think, helped the United States
and helped the countries in NAFTA, and it certainly has helped
Mexico. It has not been so kind to Haiti. It would be good if there
were some kind of NAFTA parity or legislative initiative for Haiti
that would enable Haiti to compete more equally with some of the
bigger industrial platforms, like Mexico.
Mr. MICA. Well, you know, you've confirmed my worst suspicions.
The last time I was there we had 100,000 jobs-previously I said
80,000, but 100,000-that did really support over a million people
with viable income from legitimate sources. The last I saw, we had
2,500 feeding stations and the biggest program was picking up
trash or public employment. It sounded like just a total wrong di-
And what concerns me is I'm hearing again that we haven't done
anything. I mean, if you put me out of business, I would be con-
cerned about it. And we put, through the embargo, a lot of Amer-
ican firms and other firms out of business and that denied these
people jobs. That's why I was against the embargo. It hurt the
poorest of the poor and it put these folks out. As a business person,
I won't take my money and go to a country where I get put out of
business and I don't get compensated. So we shafted our people; we
ruined their economy. It's still not put back in place. There was no
plan when I got there with AID or anyone. We had absolutely nov-
ices to business-not a clue. And I sat with the Ambassador and
discussed this and they still haven't done a damn thing about it,
and this burns me more.
The other thing, too, is putting in the infrastructure. You don't
have to be a genius to look at the place to put a road from the air-
port to the port. Is there a road from the airport to the port?
Mr. GREENLEE. There is a road that goes right through a densely
populated slum.
Mr. MICA. Well, the last time I was there they were building a
road in front of Aristide's house and not that.

The Corps of Engineers, when I was down there, said it would
take just a few million dollars to redo their port and open their
port. Has that been done?
Mr. GREENLEE. The port is undergoing a study for privatization.
Mr. MICA. A study. OK, well, I just get so frustrated by this.
Energy? You cannot operate any economy unless you have en-
ergy. I was taking down, as the government fell, people from Flor-
ida who are retired from Florida Power and other power generation
folks to try to get their energy started. When you have power 4
hours on and 4 hours off, it's not going to attract a whole lot of
business or create a stable economy. Where are we with power?
Mr. GREENLEE. Power is a problem. One of the problems is that
there are an awful lot of people who are tapping into the public
utilities and getting power for free.
Mr. MICA. Do we have them up and running? No? Are we helping
them? The last time I was there I asked the question and I never
got an answer. And I think our money was going to have Canadi-
ans put in Canadian equipment rather than U.S. equipment. And
when you put in Canadian generating equipment, then you put in
Canadian switching equipment, and you put in Canadian power
lines and transformers. And then you put in Canadian boxes-what
do you call them-on everybody's, because they don't know how to
bill people or even a billing system to have an electric meter on
these houses. So, we use our money-and I think we're into this
about $3 billion, Mr. Chairman-
Chairman GILMAN. Over $2 billion to date.
Mr. MICA. OK. Well you could take those folks, divide that by $5
million and probably divide by the number of families-that's a
million families, something like that. We could put them on a
boat-a cruise boat-and probably sail them around the world for
5 years and still have money left over to buy them a condo in south
Florida for what we've spent in this place.
And this is what I'm hearing. I'm so glad I came because it con-
firms again my worst suspicions. But we need some folks with
some business sense to get down there. And if we can't put pres-
sure after what we've done for that country, there is absolutely
something wrong.
And then most disturbing is, I go down to south Florida and I
find out here we're training police-we've spent money on training
police and forces, and setting up judicial systems, and everything-
and I go to south Florida and do a report for my Subcommittee and
find out one of the major transit zones now is Haiti. Here we put
all this money in building their judicial and law enforcement infra-
structure and it is contributing now to transshipment through Ja-
maica, through the Colombian connection, through the South
American connections, one of the great stop-over points for the Ja-
maican canoes that are filled either with cocaine, heroin, mari-
uana, whatever the drug of the day is, and that Haiti is the major
launching point.
So, Mr. Chairman, I have had it.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica, for the cogent points
that you have raised today.
Mr. MICA. And I hope your Committee, too, will pursue this. You
know, we get slapped in the face. We did everything for Aristide,

45-839 0 98 3

and one of the first things he did was turn around and recognize
Cuba as a favor to us. And we know that some of those folks are
even involved in this trafficking and illegal activity.
But, I'm really concerned about this, Mr. Chairman. This is a
human tragedy of the greatest proportions. These are wonderful
people. If you have ever been with the Haitians, these are fine
human beings and they are willing to work.
I could get into micro-enterprise, what we're doing in that re-
gard. There industrious; they will work; and they have been dealt
a terrible deck of cards by the United States, and I just think this
is a tragedy. I thank you for allowing me--
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica. And we will continue
our oversight on Haiti, and see what we can do to improve things.
Just one or two questions and we will then conclude. Ambassador
Greenlee, does the Administration accept the Haitian Electoral
Council's announcement that the Lavalas family Senate can-
didates, Celistin and Medard Joseph were elected in the first round
of the election? The Electoral Council fraudulently said Celistin
and Joseph were elected to the Senate and then they-
Mr. GREENLEE. Celistin and Feuille, I think.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Mr. GREENLEE. Not Medard.
Chairman GILMAN. The United Nations cut off additional aid in
protest to the way that election was held and Ambassador Swing
said this was water under the bridge. Does the Administration sup-
port the Electoral Council's declaration?
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Chairman, the President has launched an
initiative that provides for a review of the April 6 elections by a
three-person commission. We want to see how that commission op-
erates and whether integrity can be restored and transparency can
be restored.
Chairman GILMAN. Is the commission doing something substan-
Mr. GREENLEE. It's begun work. The returns are not in, and I
think what Ambassador Swing was saying was that the April 6
elections have occurred. We need to find out if there is a way to
make some necessary corrections. We have not stated what those
corrections should be.
Chairman GILMAN. The OAS proposed an initiative to bring a
broad spectrum of parties back into the election process. Has the
Administration done anything to support that?
Mr. GREENLEE. We certainly want to see a broadly inclusive
process. The six non-Lavalas parties elected not to compete in the
April 6 elections. There are elections scheduled again for November
1998. We hope they will compete in those. And let me just say also
that I think it's very important that we try to have some kind of
bipartisan initiative maybe through NDI or IRI to try to create as
large an electoral space as possible so that all who want to compete
can compete and feel that they're able to do so fairly.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, election reform will be very significant
in the future of Haiti and we hope that you'll keep pressure on and
move in that direction.
Mr. Milford, thank you very much for your insight with regard
to the narcotics problems. Does DEA have anyone in the Haitian

security services today that you can rely on and trust in working
on the narcotics problems?
Mr. MILFORD. I think from time to time and all through this
process we've had several people we've worked with, much like in
most countries that we work in. What we need to see is a move to-
ward an organizational structure, as I mentioned before. But, to
answer your question today, yes, there are people. We have faith
in them; we're moving forward with the training program; and we
hope to make a difference in the near future.
Chairman GILMAN. We wish you a lot of success. Tell us, how are
the Colombians moving all that heroin into New York? Are they
using any mules through Haiti, or any process through Haiti?
Mr. MILFORD. There have been from time to time, Haiti has been
used as a transshipment point through the airport.
Chairman GILMAN. For heroin?
Mr. MILFORD. For heroin, much as cocaine, the same thing. The
Colombians are using Puerto Rico, Haiti, anywhere they can get.
Final destination, as you well know, is normally New York City
where the heroin is then distributed throughout the Northeast.
Chairman GILMAN. Is the Preval Administration helping you at
all in your efforts with regard to drugs?
Mr. MILFORD. At this point, I believe yes, sir. We just need to
see continued successes and develop that structure and organiza-
tion that we can actually make a difference.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss, do you have any further questions?
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, I had one area I wanted to ask about
very briefly.
Chairman GILMAN. Please, go ahead.
Mr. Goss. We all have a great investment in stability there and
by my count, discussing today, we are going to have 500 troops
there indefinitely. We're going have 300 CIVPOL there for a time
to be determined, I guess months-4 months-something like that.
Mr. GREENLEE. It's a 1-year mandate.
Mr. Goss. One year; for 1 year. And then we're going to have
this Argentine mercenary backup team that has been negotiated,
or whatever it is.
Mr. GREENLEE. No, that's not correct.
Mr. Goss. Well, explain to me what it is. I have read a re-
Mr. GREENLEE. It's not a mercenary team, it's a contingent of Ar-
gentine national police which is an assessed part of the CIVPOL
operation. They are CIVPOL. But they're organic-
Mr. Goss. I have them as a military-based swat team to back up
CIVPOL. But it's military and I understand it was because-
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm sorry, military?
Mr. Goss. It's a military-based swat team. I don't know that
means to-
Mr. GREENLEE. If I had prepared your talking point, it wouldn't
have read that way.
Mr. Goss. That's the question. Anyway, there is going to be an
Argentine swat team, or something like that there.
Mr. GREENLEE. Right.
Mr. Goss. And this is for stability.

Mr. GREENLEE. No, sir; this is not for stability. This is to protect
CIVPOL if CIVPOL needs to be protected.
Mr. Goss. Force protection then?
Mr. GREENLEE. It's in effect, force protection for CIVPOL. It is
CIVPOL, and it's for CIVPOL. It's not for intervening in Haitian
national security matters.
Mr. Goss. Got ya. I understand the point. The question, then,
would be: are we correct in the information we have that, in fact,
the U.S. Government is going to be paying the freight for these
Mr. GREENLEE. No, that's not correct.
Mr. Goss. We have some kind of an arrangement that induces
them to come here to do this?
Mr. GREENLEE. No, that's not correct. They're part of an as-
Mr. Goss. The Argentines, out of their own-they just decided
they needed to come to protect CIVPOL?
Mr. GREENLEE. No, sir, it's part of an assessed U.N. mission.
Mr. Goss. The Argentines, as a member of the United Na-
Mr. GREENLEE. The Argentines are a member of the United Na-
Mr. Goss. And therefore, they are contributing through the Unit-
ed Nations of their own volition?
Mr. GREENLEE. The Argentines are receiving compensation from
the United Nations for their role in CIVPOL as the security compo-
nent, yes.
Mr. Goss. OK. So, the United Nations is footing the cost?
Mr. GREENLEE. Correct.
Mr. Goss. OK. That's very helpful. And the Argentines were
asked to do this by the United Nations?
Mr. GREENLEE. We asked the Argentines bilaterally. The United
Nations asked both the Argentines, and I believe the Pakistanis,
and ultimately decided on the Argentines.
Mr. Goss. That's curious. The Pakistanis have been there until
the 30th.
Mr. GREENLEE. Well, it's complicated. The Pakistanis that they
were asking would have been Pakistani National Police.
Mr. Goss. I see. Different Pakistanis.
Mr. GREENLEE. But there are Pakistani military in place, in fact
now, because we need some kind of bridge for the security of the
CIVPOL between the departing military and the in-coming police
security team which isn't in place yet.
Mr. Goss. OK Thank you, that's helpful. The final point of this:
I understood that this is costing us about $2 million a month at
a time when Southcom is facing a $5 million shortfall for similar
training missions in Latin America. Is that not accurate, or is that
Mr. GREENLEE. I understand the incremental costs to the Sup-
port Group are about $2 million a month.
Mr. Goss. I know the shortfall exists, I'm familiar with that. So,
what we basically are doing is we are focusing on then, as a prior-
ity matter, these training dollars on Haiti. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. GREENLEE. I think it is a fair statement that we have a pri-
ority for supporting Haiti.
Mr. Goss. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goss.
Ambassador Greenlee, how much have we spent in Haiti since
we tried to restore the Aristide Government?
Mr. GREENLEE. I've looked at different figures trying to break it
Chairman GILMAN. Just an approximation.
Mr. GREENLEE. I think a global figure of $2 billion is probably
Chairman GILMAN. What is it?
Mr. GREENLEE. A global figure of about $2 billion is probably
about accurate.
Chairman GILMAN. Two billion?
Mr. GREENLEE. A little bit less, but about $2 billion.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, may I? Will you yield to me?
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss. Yes.
Mr. Goss. Thank you. Let me ask, because I'm still a little bit
puzzled. In that cost, we've had some debate about what's in that
2 billion and what isn't in that $2 billion. I understand, for in-
stance, that we've got Presidential security units down there; and
we have personnel; and we have an advisory unit; and they have
a Presidential security unit. And I have been told that some monies
are paying for the elected President, who would be Preval, and yet
there is some kind of a security force that is protecting Aristide.
And I have never really been able to figure out whether we're pay-
ing for that or somebody else is paying for that. And that's in the
$2 billion, or that's something extra? Can you help us?
Mr. GREENLEE. We are providing assistance to Haiti in many
forms and some of that assistance is fungible. Some of it was pro-
vided in the form of balance-of-payments support, for example. And
I'm not sure which pot money has been pulled out of, or it might
have been revenues from the Government of Haiti for certain secu-
rity contingents. It is correct that there is a Presidential security
unit and that unit provides protection both to President Preval and
to former-President Aristide.
Mr. Goss. I am told that part of that is that there are some em-
ployees-this is a privately based firm, in part-and that there are
some hires as well. And my real concern about that is, not so much
the cost-although I am concerned that we're using taxpayers'
money, whether it's fungible or not to do that-but what I'm really
concerned about is these people, I understand, are authorized to
use deadly force for security for these people. And my concern is
if we have passive people of our own down there-granted we do
have force protection-that we might be looking at the extraor-
dinary situation where we have people who are authorized to use
deadly force on behalf of the people they are protecting in some
type of a conflict or standoff with our own security protection peo-
ple-our own security force protection.
Mr. GREENLEE. Mr. Goss, it's a very complicated picture. I
thought when you were talking about Presidential security you
were talking about the Haitian PSU. We're talking about the U.S.

contract, about the MVM contract-U.S. personnel who are train-
ing, but also working with, Presidential security unit.
Mr. Goss. Right.
Mr. GREENLEE. That's right. We initially paid for that contract.
It has since been picked up by the Haitian Government. And I
think it's correct that they have rules of engagement that permit
them to use lethal force.
Mr. Goss. That's my understanding. Again, I'm quoting the Am-
bassador, and reading his answers. And, candidly, I wasn't satis-
fied with about 58 percent of his answers, and I'm going to pursue
that. But there were many puzzles, and that was one of them about
exactly who was doing what now in terms of protecting whom. Is
it fair to say, money may be fungible, that some of the support
we're giving for Presidential protection or VIP protection may in
fact be being used to protect not only Preval but other VIPs includ-
ing Aristide?
Mr. GREENLEE. I'm not exactly sure of the role of those six advi-
sors with respect to President Aristide, but there is a provision for
the Presidential Security Unit, the Haitian National Police, to pro-
vide such protection. In the past, at one point, the United Nations
was providing protection, but they withdrew that.
Mr. Goss. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goss.
Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I'll be very brief. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On the $2 billion that we're talking about, that global $2 billion
also includes the cost of picking up refugees, housing those refu-
gees, feeding those refugees. So, I think it's very important to un-
erstand that I would presume a significant percentage of that $2
billion went to the tragedy that befell that island nation as a result
of the coup, not subsequently in terms of our efforts to nurture de-
mocracy. Is that accurate?
Mr. GREENLEE. Yes, sir; thank you for that.
Mr. Goss. Will the gentleman yield on that?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I'll be happy to yield.
Mr. GREENLEE. Thank you for that perspective.
I understand that during 1994, approximately $400 million was
spent on picking up Haitian boat people, housing them on Guanta-
namo, and so forth.
Mr. Goss. Will the gentleman yield?
The gentleman may not be aware that much of the reason that
those people left Haiti is that they were economic refugees. And the
reason they left is because the situation was so miserable, as my
friend Mr. Mica from Florida has pointed out, because of the em-
bargo. What we did was we created a policy that had a hook in it
that made these people come out of the country. And so the respon-
sibility of all of this is part of the result of the Administration's pol-
icy. And, yes, whether it's the $2 billion that went to relocate those,
the reason those folks came-and I think the numbers were better
than 95 percent-they were economic refugees. We had testimony
today that some were returned to Guantanamo for "humanitarian
reasons". I would agree, humanitarian in its broadest sense. But
you cannot ignore the fact that most of these people were not being

politically persecuted in the traditional political persecution sense.
Obviously a bad dictatorship is persecution by definition.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Mica, for the last question.
Mr. MICA. Just a point, Mr. Chairman. What concerns me, I
think within the last month we've had another boat with 400 or
500 that was turned back.
Chairman GILMAN. Yes, we mentioned that earlier.
Mr. MICA. Yes. I mean, we have the potential for this starting
all over again because of the economic situation, because of the fail-
ure of our programs to get these people back on their feet. It's a
serious situation, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
And I want to thank our witnesses. And I want to leave the
record open for 1 week for Members to submit questions to our wit-
Thank you, and the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned subject to
the call of the Chair.]



House International- .

Relations Committee

Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman

DATE: December 9, 1997 FOR RELEASE: Immediate
Contact: Jerry Lipson, Communications Director (202)225-5021

Opening Statement of Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman
Hearing on Policy Towards Haiti Following the Withdrawal of U.N. Forces
Tuesday, December 9, 1997

The purpose of today's hearing is to learn the Administration's plans for Haiti following the
November 30 withdrawal of United Nations forces. Haiti has been the Administration's most costly and
time consuming foreign policy engagement in this hemisphere. A month ago, the Secretary of State
herself traveled to Port-au-Prince.

Our Committee is disappointed and concerned that the State Department chose not to provide a
more senior witness for this hearing. While we look forward to hearing from Mr. Greenlee, I note that we
have twice invited Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, a key architect of the Administration's Haiti policy,
to testify. The historical perspective Mr. Talbott could provide, coupled with the testimony of Mr.
Greenlee and others would assist our committee in conducting the kind of oversight that is required.

The Clinton Administration has so far invested some $2 billion in Haiti. In 1994, after abandoning
a promising initiative to end the Haitian crisis through negotiations, the Administration committed
20,000 American troops to Haiti under the umbrella of the United Nations. Last week, President Clinton
announced an open-ended commitment of U.S. troops in Haiti. The troops have an imuplicit bcculity
mission and, in extremes, will constitute a "tripwire" for further military involvement.

A number of Committee Chairmen joined me in advising the Administration to, at a minimum,
secure an explicit invitation for our troop presence from the Government of Haiti. President Preval
declined to extend such an invitation, citing a resolution passed by Haiti's Chamber of Deputies that
called on foreign troops to leave. We continue to believe that the time is past due for our troops to come
home from Haiti.

Reversing the coup against former President Aristide and removing the Haitian Army as the
primary source of organized violence against ordinary Haitians were historic accomplishments. A
massive international effort to rescue Haiti from the Hemisphere's worst misery has been mobilized. A
new civilian police force was created from the ground up and projects are underway to begin an overhaul
of Haiti's corrupt and ineffective judiciary.

Now, after a little more than three years, the UN military mission has ended. On December 4, The
New York Times reported that the departing U.N. Troops "will be leaving behind a country nearly as
poor, prostrate and paralyzed as when they stepped in to help." Hopefully, today's testimony will shed
light on the following problems that were identified during recent staff delegation visit to Haiti:

First, the political crisis continues unresolved. In fact, President Rene Preval and the Lavalas
Political Organization have hardened their positions since former National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake's November mission. There has been no movement towards confirming a new prime minister.

Second. the crisis is blocking substantial international aid while the Haitian economy languishes.
The assembly firms that provided many ordinary Haitians with jobs have not recovered from the
embargo. The Committee notes that while President Preval assures the international community of his
support for privatization and foreign investment, domestically he has launched an economic program
that embraces import substitution and land reform.




Despite progress on privatizing the flour mill and cement plant, privatizing the telephone
company-which is being misused by the Government of Haiti for expenditures such as lobbying the U.S.
government-the Electric Company and the port facilities cannot succeed without consistent, strong and
public support from President Preval.

Third, the dispute over the April 1997 elections remains deadlocked. Fraud, gross
mismanagement and a less than six percent voter turn out characterized these elections. The
international community and Haitian government's failure to include representatives of opposition
parties in the elections risks the re-emergence of corrupt one-man, one-party rule. The international
community has failed to foster and protect pluralism or even minimally acceptable electoral standards in

Fourth, a major drug crisis has developed in Haiti. President Clinton has once again named Haiti
as a major orug transit country. In its March certification report, the Administration stated that
"narcotics move relatively unimpeded through Haiti's seaports, with some shipments transiting Haiti
overland to the Dominican Republic for onward transport to the U.S." The State Department has
additionally reported that "...thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been smuggled over the border
from Haiti into the Dominican Republic...." The Administration has noted that "Most of those accused
[of drug offenses] are able to manipulate Haiti's weak and corrupt judicial system and are released."

Now we have learned that The Haitian National Folice (HINP) is under siege from drug trafficking and
related corruption. A number of Haitian police officers have been found skimming drugs from seized
narcotics shipments. In a disturbing development, senior U.N. and U.S. officials stated that they would
"not be surprised" if former Haitian Army officials, including key Aristide security aides associated with
the Lavalas Family party, are involved with drug trafficking.

Fifth, the politicization of the Haitian National Police continues unabated. Former presidential
candidate Leon Jeune, was beaten and arrested by the Haitian National Police for alleged crimes against
"state security." HNP Director General Pierre Denize and Secretary for State Security Robert Manuel,
w ho reports directly to President Preval, participated in this arrest. Mr. Jeune is still being held despite a
judge's order that he be released.

Sixth, the security situation in Haiti is tenuous, at best. Gangs armed with automatic and other
weapons continue to be seen in Cite Soleil. There are numerous, overlapping, heavily-armed government
and private security forces. Furthermore, key Aristide security aides are arming Lavalas Family
partisans and rival Lavalas Political Organization partisans are also arming themselves.

Seventh, the Haitian National Police's special investigative unit has received little support from
the Government of Haiti. Eddie Arbrouet, who has been linked to politically-motivated killings, is still at
large. It is clear that the Haitian National Police has the resources, but lacks the political will to arrest
Arbrouet. Finally, On November 20, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted a Haitian freighter with more
than 416 refugees headed for Florida. The Administration says this was an isolated incident. However, it
is a clear reminder of the consequences of failing to help our neighbors in Haiti build democratic stability
and jobs.

Today's hearing w ill focus on whether the Administration has a clear, long term plan for Haiti
that addresses the very hard questions facing this troubled neighbor of the United States. I welcome
David Greenlee, Special Haiti Coordinator for the State Department and James Milford, Deputy
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.


DECEMBER 9, 1997





















































Statement by Rep Joseph P. Kennedy II
for the Committee on International Relations Ilearing on Haiti
December 9, 1997

1 commend the members of the International Relations Committee for holding a hearing on this
important matter and for allowing me to submit testimony.

Haiti is a mixed bag of triumphs and failures. There ha.e been successes in Haiti: Raoul Cedras was
removed from power. swe have seen the first democratic transition in Haiti's history, and we stemmed
the flow of Haitian refugees (managing Haitian refugees cost U.S. taxpayers over $400 million in
1994). But many problems remain unsolved: a political stalemate paralyzes the Haitian government
and the economic picture remains bleak.

As we debate our response to the challenges in Haiti, I urge my fellow members of Congress to work
for constructive solutions. We must be careful that our actions do not reverse the progress that has
been made. Haiti should not be our political punching bag. Too often, members of Congress have
been willing to put Haiti's rehabilitation at risk in their drive to score political points against the
Administration. On the other side of the coin. we must be honest and realistic about America's
failures in Haiti.

We cannot let Haiti fall victim to our political disagreements in Congress, because the stakes are far
too high -- Haiti is enormously important to our national interest. Haiti is integral to the major U.S.
strategic objectives in the Caribbean Basin: economic stability, countemarcotics operations, and efforts
to stem illegal migration.

Our goals are to put Haiti on the path to stability, to reduce U.S. expenditures in Haiti, to reduce
Haiti's dependence on foreign economic assistance, and to turn Haiti's affairs over to the Haitian
people. To reach these goals. we must take the following actions:

Police training must continue. A number of successes have been logged in the training of the Haitian
National Police (HNP). The Haitian National Police Training Center has been running recruits through
an intensive 16-wveek program in law, police procedures, the use of non-lethal force, and human rights.
Three specialized units have been trained: crowd control, a rapid reaction force, and presidential

palace security. Major prisons have been refurbished and prison guards trained. The HNP has been
purged of over 100 unsuitable individuals.

But much work remains, and therefore, police training programs must be maintained. The end of the
peacekeeping mission is a critical turning point for Haiti. Security in Haiti will be dependent on the
ability of the indigenous police force to maintain order. And Haiti's streets are far from secure -- just
two weeks ago. two Boston residents fell victim to armed thugs in Port-au-Prince. There is a lack of
experience among HNP members, a lack of mid-level management talent, and vast equipment
shortages. Most significantly. it is uncertain whether the Haitian National Police, in their current
condition, are able to resist political manipulation without continued training.

We must re-double our efforts to bring about a resolution to the political stalemate. The political
impasse impedes privatization and economic progress. We must explore all options for persuading the
Haitian parliament to work together to tackle the challenges that sorely need to be addressed.

The U.S. must exert leadership on Haiti matters. That means building a coalition of allies at the
United Nations. Continued U.S. involvement in Haiti will help ensure that the United Nations remains
engaged. If the U.S. ends its bilateral programs and if the U.S. does not support multilateral training
programs in Haiti, there is little chance that U.N. operations will continue. Russia and China have
made it clear they want to end U.N. participation in Haiti, and without U.S. leadership, it is likely that
the U.N.'s scarce resources would be moved to other parts of the world.

Haiti is one of the clearest examples of how our foreign policy decisions can impact us directly at
home. If we turn our backs on Haiti, we could see drastic consequences for the U.S.: a tidal wave of
migrants, a flood of drugs on our shores, and the possibility that a new U.S. military operation will
have to be launched. If we make the wrong decisions during this pivotal time, we could undermine
the progress that has been made. The U.S. has a significant investment in rebuilding Haiti. Let us put
aside our political differences and work for constructive solutions to Haiti's problems.




DECEMBER 9, 1997

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this Committee to
discuss our efforts to promote stability, democracy and economic
growth in Haiti. I welcome the Committee's interest in Haiti. I
would like to set forth our goals in Haiti and establish some
common ground which I believe all of us share and then provide a
frank assessment of the progress Haiti is achieving in the context
of the challenges that remain. I will be pleased to respond to
your specific questions. f

Perhaps no other country in the Western Hemisphere grapples with
challenges as numerous, complex, and deep-rooted as those which
confront Haiti. With an annual per capital income of less than
$400, Haiti's economic, institutional and political development has
lagged behind most of its Caribbean neighbors. Less than 60
percent of the population receive primary health care and the
literacy rate is about 50 percent. The mortality rate for children
under 5 is more than double the regional average and life
expectancy is 57 years, the lowest in the hemisphere. Population
density is among the highest in the Hemisphere. Ongoing
environmental degradation destroys Haiti's remaining forest cover,
strips precious topsoil, and endangers water resources.

Pervasive poverty, repressicr. and ir t-;i.bility in Haiti have Jorg
been of concern to the United States. As a neighbor we have a
national interest in improving the social and economic well-being
of Haiti to avoid a mass migration that would be destructive to
Haiti and costly to the United States. Haiti's geographic location
and poverty make it vulnerable to becoming a major transit point
for narcotics trafficking. Instability in Haiti could become an
example for those seeking non-democratic answers in other
countries. For these reasons, this Administration like previous
Administrations of both parties supports the advancement of
democracy and economic development in Haiti.


I am convinced members of Congress and the Administration share
common goals with respect to Haiti. Let me state what I believe
those goals to be: We are seeking a stable, democratic government
which maintains public order while tolerating dissent and
disagreement. We are seeking a pluralistic political system that
uses public debate to strengthen government. We seek a country
where public security forces function with integrity, efficiency
and respect for human rights, and can control the spread of
international crime and narcotics trafficking. We seek an economy
growing in a sustainable manner to help Haitians of all social
strata achieve higher income levels and a better future for their
children. We seek a Haiti that gives private initiative the space
to make the economy grow and provide employment for all who wish to
work. Finally, we wish to help Haiti recover its environment
through wise population policies and restoration projects. These
are practical goals that advance our interests, but they will not
be achieved in a fortnight or even in the four years of this


The 1994 restoration of constitutional government created an
unprecedented opportunity to overcome the political and economic
legacy of Haiti's sad history. .As a result, Haiti achieved real
and measurable progress in many of the areas cited above. However,
the tasks that awaited the restored Haitian government were too
large to be completed in two or three years. Haitian President
Preval is setting forth appropriate national priorities:
strengthening fragile democratic institutions; building a credible
police and judiciary; privatizing state enterprises; and developing
agriculture and infrastructure. Preval has demonstrated a
commitment to moving Haiti forward, but much progress remains in
all of these areas. The legacy of the past is extremely heavy.

In 1996, a popularly-elected President peacefully succeeded another for
the first time in Haitian history. A vibrant, independent and popularly-
elected Parliament plays an increasingly important role, another first
for Haiti. Haitians of all walks of life enjoy unprecedented freedom of
association and expression. The Haitian media operate with freedom,
unhindered by governmental censorship or restraint. Over 200 radio
stations (all but one of which is privately operated) broadcast to an
audience estimated to comprise about three-quarters of the adult
population. All of this progress has a profound impact on the United
States. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, over 67,000 Haitian migrants
were interdicted at sea from FY92 FY94, the period of the de facto
regime: in 1994 alone, the U.S. spent $400 million dealing with 25,OC0
interdicted Haitian migrants. Since October 1994, about 4200 migrants
have been interdicted, a dramatic reduction in illegal migration from

Preval and Haitian political leaders are working toward a
resolution of the political impasse which has beset Haiti since
June. We have urged all parties to act in the national interest

4 -, -

and to resolve their differences prompt ly so Hfiiti can cr.tinue
to move forward. We do not yet know it theii efforts will yield
success. The impasse has its roots in the April 6 elections for
nine Senate seats in which international observers noted
irregularities. The Lavalas Political Organization (OPL,, the
largest party in parliament, disputed the election results and
threatened to boycott the run-off election round. The run-off
was postponed pending resolution of the dispute. In June,
Haiti's Prime Minister (an OPL member) resigned his position,
but remained in a caretaker basis until October 1997. President
Preval's first nominee was rejected by the Haitian Parliament,
and he has nominated another candidate. Confirmation of this
candidate is tied to resolution of the electoral dispute.

Preval has put forth a formula which takes into account key areas
of concern, but which has not achieved the degree of broad spectrum
backing that may be necessary. We do not support any faction or
individual since this is a Haitian internal matter. Ambassador
William Lacy Swing and his staff have worked tirelessly to urge all
parties to resolve their differences quickly so that Haiti can move
forward. In essence, we view the impasse as a growing pain of a
developing democracy.

However frustrating the length of the political stalemate might
seem, we must not lose sight of our goal: a democratic, stable and
prosperous Haiti. Given their history, the process of political
negotiation is novel for Haitians. They are learning how to engage
on contentious issues in a peaceful, non-violent manner. They are
using words, not guns or knives. This is a marked departure from
the Haiti of old in which the edicts of despots like Duvalier or
Cedras were carried out with brutality and violence.

A truly democratic government and viable party system require time and
patience. The US Government's task must be to help support democratic
forces in Haiti while they build and solidify institutions. There are



retrogressive forces in Haiti, as in other fledgling democracies, wh', see
advantage in autocracy, dictatorship and personal ruli;. The retrogrades
must not be allowed to reverse the hard-earned democratic gains achieved
by the Haitian people. As we have elsewhere in the hemisphere, the ',.S.
can play a key role by supporting the forces of democracy and economic


Like the Dominican Republic and other nearby Caribbean countries,
-Haiti is an attractive narcotics transshipment point. Haiti is on
the President's list of:major transit countries for narcotics
coming to the United States. 'While we have no credible evidence
that illegal narcotics are grown, processed or manufactured in
Haiti, there is evidence that Colombian traffickers have set up
operations in Haiti to transship Colombian narcotics to the U.S.
.Haiti was certified by President Clinton on February 28 as
cooperating with the United States on anti-narcotics matters.

Haiti's attractiveness as-a narcotics transit country derives from
its proximity to the U.S., its long unguarded coast, weak
governmental institutions and poverty, all-of which encourage
smuggling. Haiti's leaders are aware of the danger to the nation
posed by the power of the international narcotics organizations.
Since 1994, the Haitian government has made progress in combating
narcotrafficking. In 1996, the Haitian government established an
operational Coast Guard unit and selected and trained a
counternarcotics unit, which is slowly becoming operational. Both
of these units are part of the Haitian National Police. Again,
this is an area where our task is incomplete progress has been
(and will likely remain) slow, but we are determined to make



The Haitian Coast Guard seized 938 kilos of cocaine in 1996 in two
operations conducted with the U.S. Coast Guard. In part through
joint operations with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Haitians have
confiscated 2,179 kilograms of cocaine and 4.8 tons of marijuana in
the first nine months of this year. The scope for joint U.S. -
Haitian narcotics interdiction efforts is greatly enhanced by the
recent completion of a bilateral maritime counter-narcotics
agreement which enhances U.S. ability to pursue, stop and search
suspect vessels in Haitian waters. The agreement demonstrates a
common concern about the evils of international narco-trafficking,
and a shared commitment to working together on issues of mutual

The HNP counternarcotics unit received training (funded by the
Department of State) from the Department of Justice's ICITAP
training program in Haiti. The Department of State has also funded
$250,000 worth of equipment for the counternarcotics unit (two
armored Ford Explorers, pickup trucks, motorcycles and computers),
and is paying for the renovation of the HNP counternarcotics unit's
permanent headquarters at Port-au-Prince airport. The Haitian
government is active in bringing its legal framework up-to-date to
meet the narcotics threat. The Ministry of Justice has employed a
former Haitian Justice Minister specifically to draft money
laundering legislation, develop a national narcotics plan, and
address the problem of Haiti's existing but outdated
counternarcotics legislation

Nourishing Haiti's fledgling democracy is nowhere more important to U.-S.
interests than in the war on narcotics trafficking. A government
selected by voters from among competing parties will be held accountable
by voters who will demand honesty and transparency. If Haiti does not
succeed in reinforcing its democracy, our ability to work with the
Haitian government to fight narcotics trafficking and corruption will
suffer greatly.




Haiti's economy is recovering from several years of severe decline,
exacerbated by three years of international sanctions against the
Cedras regime. Real GDP fell by around 30 percent during the 1990-
1994 period and exports and imports dropped to a fraction of the
pre-sanction levels. Output grew 4.5 percent in 1995, but slowed
to 2.3 percent in 1996, and has registered 1.8 percent growth so
far in 1997 because the Preval Government had to adopt restrictive
monetary and fiscal policies for financial stabilization.
Inflation was reduced from 30 percent in 1995 to 17 percent in
1997, international reserves increased, the Gourd strengthened, and
the fiscal deficit virtually disappeared.

However, the Haitian economy has not reached the growth level
expected for 1996-97. Delayed disbursements of external budget
support caused by the political stalemate means that public sector
investment projects cannot be carried out. The delay in passing a
budget for the new fiscal year limits spending. Multilateral
development bank loans remain undisbursed pending parliamentary

In spite of having achieved a fragile stability, the economy is
stuck in neutral. Growing dissatisfaction with lack of progress in
the economy and deteriorating public support for economic reform
remain significant concerns. Nevertheless, considerable donor
resources have been mobilized and should begin to be disbursed in
the months ahead if the political stalemate is resolved and a
budget is passed.



Privatization is a bright spot. The Modernization Council (CMEP)
has established an ambitious plan for privatizing nine parastatals
by March 1998. In spite of substantial opposition, the Council is
determined to push ahead with the privatization program. The
privatization council concluded its first privatization on October
14 when U.S. investors Continental Grain and Seaboard along with a
Haitian financial institution, purchased 70 percent of Haiti's
flour mill for $9 million. The mill, which has been shut down
since 1992, should restart operations in mid-1998. The
privatization of Haiti's cement plant is near. Privatization of
seven other parastatals, including the seaport, airport, and
electricity company (which are now undergoing technical evaluation)
is scheduled for 1998. These privatizations will provide a key
signal to investors and boost currently weak business confidence.
There are many in'Haiti who oppose privatization: some out of .
misguided concern for state enterprise workers, others because they
benefit from the status quo of mismanaged or moribund state
enterprises. ,

A confluence of factors may allow higher growth in the first half
of 1998. Fiscal policy should be expansionary once a budget is
passed. This should put money in the pockets of government workers
and suppliers. In addition, the IDB and IBRD will disburse loans
for education, roads, and other infrastructure projects and the
Economic Recovery Credit loans. The immediate economic impact of
the.loans will provide some jobs, improve infrastructure and, most
importantly, show the public that the government is doing things to
improve the lives of ordinary citizens. The loans are conditioned,
however, on completion of certain prior acts.

Sustainable growth cannot be built on public spending; private
investment is necessary. A key economic signal to wary investors,
both Haitian and foreign, will be government leadership on
privatization and Haitian treatment of potential investors.


This will require conclusion of the Comr','el cellular phone con, ract
soon; respect for private property, and increasing the speed of
privatization. It appears that private interests within Haiti are
behind efforts to scuttle the Comcel agreement in order to protect
their own interests at the expense of the Haitian people.
Transparency in transactions of this nature is essential to
demonstrate to the international community that Haiti is ready for
the 21st century.


U.S. economic assistance to Haiti in FY 98 is $97 million --
consisting of $70 million in ESF and $27 million in PL 480 food
programs. This aid level is down slightly from the $101 million
level of FY 1997. U.S. bilateral assistance is targeted at three
inter-related strategic objectives -- strengthening and modernizing
democratic institutions, building a viable market economy, and
promoting healthier and better educated families. U.S. assistance
is part of a large multi-donor effort with total commitments of
about $2 billion in the 1995-1999 period.


Since April 1995, the Department of Defense has deployed engineering,
medical and other units to Haiti for training purposes on a bilateral
basis, providing humanitarian/civic assistance to the citizens and
institutions of Haiti. The U.S. Southern Command maintains a
headquarters (referred to as the U.S. Support Group Haiti) in Port-au-
Prince in support of these training missions.

Averaging between 400-500 personnel, the U.S. military presence
symbolizes our commitment to Haitian democracy and undertakes projects
which directly benefit Haitians of all ages and walks of life. For


example, engineering units have completed renovation of 16 schools and
have drilled 20 public wells. The Group's medical units have provided
basic health care to over 100,000 Haitian citizens. These activities
provide valuable field experience and training to DoD personnel and
are of lasting benefit to the people of Haiti on their path toward
democracy and economic development.

As an example of the kind of planned engineering activities, the
Support Group will help the Haitian government construct a maritime
facility for the Haitian Coast Guard in Jacmel on Haiti's southern
coast. Consisting of a pier and a barracks/office building, this
facility would be the Haitian Coast Guard's first major facility
outside of Port-au-Prince and would greatly enhance its narcotics
interdiction capacity.

The President has determined that the current U.S. military posture in
Haiti is appropriate and should continue for the time being.


Created in 1995, the 6,200 member Haitian National Police (HNP) is
an important guarantor of long-term stability and democratic
development and performs a difficult, dangerous public service in a
steadily-improving manner. But it is tough going. Notorious
criminals remain at large despite police efforts to arrest them.
Development of a police force with a new staff, new equipment, even
new uniforms, is a long-term task. We expect slow but steady -
progress. To measure our success we must ask ourselves two
questions first, is the force getting better? In the case of the
HNP, the answer must be a clear yes. Second, what is the
alternative? In the case of Haiti, the alternative was the large-
scale corruption, disorder, political disintegration, and human
rights abuse associated with the security apparatus of old. The
HNP will soon enter the fourth year of a five-year Department of
Justice International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance



Program (ICITAP) program. Since 199',, we have renovated a former
Haitian military base and opened the Haitian National Police
Training Center. We believe that the police training curriculum we
developed and introduced at the Training Center, which includes a
human rights component, is effective. With additional training
(emphasizing respect for human rights) and experience, instances of
HNP misconduct will likely diminish. The overall human rights
situation has improved dramatically since the restoration of
democracy in 1994. Prior to the formation of the HNP, thousands of
people were the victims of human rights abuses committed by Haitian
security forces. This is a thing of the past.

The task is not-complete. The HNP is a young, inexperienced force:
most of its officers are under the age of 30, and its most seasoned
officers have less than 2 years on-the-job. It works under
extremely difficult circumstances. The legacy of the past is a
constant reminder to HNP officers of the old, expedient way. The
successes of HNP leadership are achieved in the face of enormous
challenges. That there have at times been failures should come as
no surprise. That there have been imperfections should be

The HNP has also received training from the United Nations Civilian
Police training and mentoring missions. We have provided funding
for up to 50 Creole-speaking Haitian-American law enforcement
officers who participate in these mentoring activities. In
recognition that the HNP requires additional international police
assistance in order to build upon past achievements, the UN
Security Council recently approved an additional twelve-month UN
Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). MIPONUH is strictly a
civilian police mission UN peacekeeping troops affiliated with
the previous UN peacekeeping mission (UNTMIH) are in the process of
departing Haiti.



While the HNP has made progress, much work remains. The c'r.,.duct of
most HNP officers has been above reproach and in keeping with
principles of human rights, but a relatively small number of
officers have engaged in abuses, as recounted in our Human Pights
Report. We believe that those who abuse basic human rights should
be separated from the force and prosecuted in accordance with
Haitian law. The Haitian government has acted in the same spirit.
The Inspector General of the HNP has demonstrated independence and
firmness in taking disciplinary action against rogue officers. To
date, over 150 HNP personnel have been separated from their
previous positions. President Preval informs us that another ten
officials of other security entities have been removed from Haitian
government employment. In total, the HNP Inspector General has
referred cases of 32 former HNP officers to the prosecutor's
office, and we hope that the Haitian government will now prosecute
these individuals, the crucial next step in creating a lasting
atmosphere of personal accountability.

We remain concerned about the slow rate of progress made in the
investigation of murders of certain political figures. We continue
to urge at the highest levels that the GOH carry out thorough,
credible investigations of these crimes. In the Fleurival/Leroy
case, the government has taken a number of positive steps to
identify and bring the perpetrators to justice, but further
progress is imperative. We are implementing the DeWine Amendment
in the FY98 Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations bill to deny
U.S. visas to persons credibly alleged to have beeh involved in
acts of politically-motivated violence.

Progress achieved thus far in police development has not been
matched by progress in judicial development, the other key
component of a functioning criminal justice system. The Haitian
judiciary is dysfunctional and lacks popular respect. Many of
Haiti's current human rights problems are directly attributable



to its inadequate judicial system: ineffective and delayed
administration of justice leads to unreasonable pre-trial
detention, encourages vigilante acts among the volatile masses,
and tempts frustrated HNP officers into abusive conduct.

We have joined with a number of other partners to assist the
Haitian government in reforming its judicial and penal systems.
USAID in conjunction with the Department of Justice is
implementing an Administration of Justice Project to help improve
the competence of the criminal justice system. Through this
project, USAID and DOJ are providing judicial training; developing
and implementing a model parquet (prosecutor's offices) program in
seven jurisdictions across the country (to be expanded into 15
jurisdictions this year); strengthening case tracking, trial
preparation,-and oral advocacy by prosecutors; providing training
in the Courts of First Instance and Justice of the Peace courts;
and providing grants for legal.assistance in seven jurisdictions.

In addition, USAID has financed renovations at the National
Penitentiary, the Cap-Haitian prison and others throughout the
country. A special prison was established for women and juveniles
in Port-au-Prince to separate them from male prisoners held at the
National Penitentiary. Assistance in basic materials and equipment
was made to the first civilian Penal Administration. The USAID
program established a current register of prisoners nationwide and
a Haitian legal intern program which provides legal service to
indigent defendants to assure timely. A multi-donor effort to
address comprehensively the issues of prison rehabilitation and
management is now underway. While we are encouraged by the initial
results of these programs, we are aware of the formidable
challenges involved and realize that lasting success will take



The Haitian people and their elected leaders continue along the
road to a democratic civil society based upon the rule of law. Our
own history should demonstrate to us how difficult it is to achieve
a truly pluralistic democracy. Since October 1994, Haiti has taken
a number of important steps. It must now act decisively to
consolidate gains and increase democratic momentum. The people of
Haiti must make enormous sacrifices to bring their country into the
21't century with the rest of the Hemisphere. Haiti will continue
to need the help of the U.S. and the international community. It
is in the national interests of the U.S. to help Haiti achieve
stability, democracy and economic growth, just as we helped many of
Haiti's neighbors in the past. Without our continuing engagement,
Haiti's fragile democratic institutions could easily fall prey to
predatory, anti-democratic forces: the result could be instability,
brutality, a flotilla of rickety vessels packed with freedom-
seeking migrants, and a flood of narcotics transshipments from

By attempting to assist Haiti overcome its tragic legacy, we are
overcoming our own legacy in relation to Haiti. To the extent that
previous generations of Americans chose the expedient of
overlooking Haitian tyranny, our efforts today to assist Haiti are
further encumbered. Our present efforts are a worthwhile
investment in a peaceful, democratic and stable environment in the
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

The Administration is pleased to broaden opportunities to consult
with Congress on how best to advance our shared goals of a stable,
democratic, and prospering Haiti.


Remarks by

James S. Milford

Acting Deputy Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice

before the

House International Relations Committee


Drug Trafficking in the Caribbean:
The Role of Haiti

2172 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C.
December 9, 1997

NOTE: This is the prepared text and may not reflect changes in actual delivery


Statement of
James Milford
Acting Deputy Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
Before the House International Relations Committee
December 9, 1997

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to
appear today to discuss drug trafficking in the Caribbean and the role Haiti plays
in the transhipment of cocaine and heroin through the transit zone. First, I would
like to sincerely thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members for your continued
support of DEA and its programs, both internationally and on the homefront. You
have continually showed your support by traveling within the United States, and
to South America, and Asia, to see first hand the devastation caused by the poison
that flows from the drug producing and transit regions to the streets of our

The international drug syndicates operating throughout our hemisphere are
resourceful, adaptable and extremely powerful. These syndicates have an
unprecedented level of sophistication and they are far more organized and
influential than any organized crime enterprise preceding them. Traditional
organized crime, operating within the United States from the turn of the century to
the present time, simply cannot compare to the Colombian and Mexican
organizations operating in mainland U.S. and the Caribbean area today. Today's
international crime syndicates have at their disposal an arsenal of technology,
weapons and allies --- corrupted law enforcement and government officials ---
enabling them to dominate the illegal drug market in ways we never thought
possible. Today's drug syndicate leaders are able to oversee a multi-billion dollar
cocaine and heroin industry which affects every aspect of American life.

These drug lords, who mastermind transglobal organizations responsible for
all facets of the drug trade, are almost immune to conventional law enforcement
strategies. Any effective program must address the threat they pose in a
hemispheric approach, because they control the seamless continuum of the drug
trade from the jungles of South America, to the transshipment corridors in the
Caribbean and Central America, to the streets of almost every city and town in

America. Their army of workers is responsible for logistical support --
transporting the drugs, arranging for storage, renting a fleet of cars and cell phones
and faxes to ensure the smooth operations of the syndicates. All the business
decisions and the laundering of proceeds, are made from headquarters locations in
Colombia and Mexico far away from the streets of New York, Chicago, Orlando,
and even Haiti.

A History of Smuggling in the Caribbean

The Caribbean has long been a favorite smuggling route used by the Cali
and Medellin crime groups to smuggle thousands of tons of cocaine to the United
States. The narco-traffickers from Colombia seized control of the cocaine trade in
the late 1970's, virtually eliminating U.S. based entrepreneurs and independent
traffickers from the wholesale cocaine market. These individuals ruled the drug
trade with an iron fist, exponentially increasing their profit margins by controlling
the entire seamless continuum of the cocaine trade, from coca leaf production in
Peru, Bolivia and Colombia to cocaine HCL production in processing centers in
Colombia, to the wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the United

These traffickers established a labyrinth of smuggling routes throughout the
central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Bahama Island
chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling techniques to transfer their
cocaine to U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios included airdrops of 500-700
kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off the coast of Puerto Rico, mid-
ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000 kilograms, and the commercial
shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the port of Miami. The "Cornerstone"
case in Miami is an excellent example of the ingenuity of the sophisticated leaders
of the Cali crime syndicate and the volume of cocaine they were exporting to the
United States. In a period of a little over two years, the DEA and U.S. Customs
Service worked together to seize over 25 tons of cocaine in just six commercial
shipments of cement posts, broccoli and coffee.

The Emergence of New Trafficking Threats in the Western Hemisphere

With the increased pressure placed on the Cali groups' smuggling and
distribution operations in South Florida and the Caribbean, in the late 80's and

early 90's, they turned to established smuggling organizations in Mexico to move
cocaine to the United States. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes and the other major
traffickers quickly amassed fortunes from the profits of the sale of thousands of
kilograms of cocaine and systematically expanded their distribution networks.
This has changed the face of the drug trade in the United States and the organized
criminal groups from Colombia have lost their stranglehold on the U.S. wholesale

The ascension to power by the groups from Mexico has garnered them
enormous wealth and a demonstrative expansion in their spheres of influence.
Despite reports indicating the Orejuelas have ready access to both pay and cellular
phones in their prison cells, they are unable to exercise their former control over
their vast empire from jail. Consequently, their ability to function as the first
among all others has been seriously degraded. There are many groups in
Colombia and Mexico trying to fill the void left by the incarceration of the Cali
leadership. Without question, the organized crime families in Mexico, most
notably the Arellano-Felix brothers, Miguel Caro-Quintero and Jesus Amezcua-
Contreras, and, until his death in July 1997, Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, have
eclipsed the Colombian traffickers as the most dominant figures in the wholesale
cocaine trade in the U.S. today. The criminal groups from Mexico now control
virtually all cocaine sold in the Western half of the United States and, for the first
time, we are seeing a concerted effort on their part to expand into the lucrative
East Coast market.

However, Colombian traffickers still dominate the movement of cocaine
from the jungles of Bolivia and Peru to the large cocaine hydrochloride (HC1)
conversion factories in Southern Colombia and their fingerprints are on the vast
majority of cocaine sold in the United States today. It is likely that the remnants
of the Cali group, still directed by the Orejuelas, as well some Cali splinter groups,
such as the Grajales-Urdinolas, are still using their established connections with
the criminal groups in Mexico to smuggle cocaine to distribution groups in the
United States.

Splinter groups from the Cali syndicate and the new independent traffickers
from the Northern Valle del Cauca have risen to prominence and are responsible
for huge volumes of cocaine and heroin being shipped to the United States
through the Caribbean. Most of these new groups have returned to the traditional

smuggling routes in the Caribbean, including through Haiti, to transport their
cocaine and heroin to markets on the United States' populous East Coast.

Haiti: Drug trafficking Crossroads of the Caribbean

Haiti is strategically located in the central Caribbean, occupying the western
half of the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic. At
27,750 square kilometers, the country is slightly larger than the state of Maryland.
With the Caribbean to the south, and the open Atlantic Ocean to the north, Haiti is
in an ideal position to facilitate the movement of cocaine and heroin from
Colombia to the U.S. DEA is represented on the Island of Hispaniola by the Port-
Au-Prince Country office in Haiti and the Santo Domingo Country Office in the
Dominican Republic.

The island of Hispaniola is just under 430 miles from Colombia's most
northern point, and easily accessible by twin engine aircraft hauling payloads of
500 to 700 kilos of cocaine. While smuggling drugs by sea in commercial
shipments is more significant, ocean-going "go-fast" boats could make their
cocaine runs in the dead of night to the Southern Coast of Haiti, only having to
rendezvous with a refueling vessel on their return trip or carry extra fuel, to be
able to make the round trip in less than a day. The two countries on the island,
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, share similar coastal features, facilitating intra-
island boat traffic. Just as is the case with the Dominican Republic, Haiti presents
an ideal location for staging and transhipment of drugs.

Because Haiti shares an island with the Dominican Republic, Haiti enjoys a
special place in the drug trade. There is effectively no border control between the
two countries, allowing essentially unimpeded traffic back and forth. In addition,
here is no effective law enforcement or judicial system in the country, so there are
few legal impediments to drug trafficking..

A great amount of the South American drug traffic which is landed in Haiti
is transported across the porous border with the Dominican Republic, and then on
to Puerto Rico. Just 80 miles from the East Coast of Hispaniola, Puerto Rico is
easily accessible from Hispaniola by plane or boat. The key to the drug trade in
Puerto Rico is the island's U.S. Commonwealth status. Once a shipment of
cocaine, whether smuggled from Haiti or the Dominican Republic by maritime,

air, or commercial cargo, reaches Puerto Rico, it is unlikely to be subjected to
further United States Customs inspections en route to the continental U.S.

The juxtaposition of Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the lack of an
effective legal system in Haiti, combined with the current role Dominican
traffickers play in the heroin and cocaine trade, allows Haiti to become a key link
in the transportation chain. Today, cocaine and heroin traffickers from Colombia
have enlisted the aid of traffickers and smugglers from the Dominican Republic to
deliver their product to market and have placed an entire command and control
infrastructure in the Caribbean, including Haiti, to manage the movement of
cocaine throughout the Caribbean Corridor. Drugs smuggled into Haiti, by
several routes, are smuggled by Haitians either across the land border into the
Dominican Republic or in coastal trade along the northern coast of the island.
Once the heroin and cocaine reach the Dominican Republic, Dominican groups
take control over both smuggling the drugs into the U.S. and carrying out an
increasing percentage of wholesale and some retail distribution along the East

There has been a concerted effort on the part of Colombian groups to
franchise their smuggling and transportation operations to Puerto Rican and
Dominican groups in order to minimize their presence on the island chain. By
using this approach, they may forego some profits, but they gain the insulation
from U. S. justice that they desire. These actions by the Colombians have
effectively eliminated one to two levels of the Colombian cell system and forced
them to relinquish some profits and control. While the cell system is still
employed to provide security and compartmentalization, it no longer exists to the
extent that the Colombian traffickers exert complete control over the distribution
networks. These new traffickers, vying for Cali's former preeminence, understand
that direct control creates vulnerability for the criminal organizations' leadership
in both the United States and Colombia.

Trafficking Methods in Haiti and the Dominican Republic

There are three primary smuggling routes for cocaine through Haiti. The
first brings cocaine from Colombia into Haiti via general aviation conducting
airdrops at sea. The second route is from source countries, via Panama or
Venezuela, by commercial shipping. The third route is from source countries, via

Panama or Venezuela, in coastal vessels or fishing vessels.

The Haitian trafficking groups utilize wooden hulled boats with center
consoles as their vessel of choice for smuggling operations. These "yolas" are
low-profile, which enhances the traffickers' ability to avoid radar detection, and
have been retrofitted with plastic fuel tanks in order to extend their range. Boat
crews also rely on cellular telephone communications rather than high frequency
radios to further enhance their security measures. Slower-moving commercial
vessels are also advantageous because their larger cargo or passenger
compartments allow the traffickers the option of constructing well-hidden secret
compartments to store and transport their drugs.

In the past, the Dominicans' and Haitians' role in illegal drug activity was
limited to being "pick up crews" and couriers who assisted South American
smugglers in their drug ventures. Much of this has changed due to the evolution
of the Dominican and Haitian traffickers in the drug trade. This new breed of
trafficker functions as smuggler, transporter and, in the case of the Dominicans,
wholesaler in many cities on the East Coast.

Traffickers from the Dominican Republic have developed intricate
trafficking networks to distribute cocaine and heroin for the Colombians in the
lucrative New York market, as well as in cities all along the East Coast.
Dominican traffickers operate with efficiency, relying heavily on counter
surveillance, and operational security to ensure success. They use sophisticated
communications equipment, cloned cellular communications, alarm systems, and
police scanners to monitor the activity of law enforcement. They also rely heavily
on the ingenious construction of vehicle "traps or secret compartments to secure
their drug loads for transportation in passenger vehicles or trucks for
transportation to cities throughout the Northeast.

These criminal groups also provide a natural conduit for Colombian heroin
to the large addict population in New York and the Northeastern United States.
Approximately 63 percent of the heroin seized in the United States last year was
of South American origin. Abuse of high quality Colombian heroin, which can
easily be snorted or smoked rather than injected, the traditional method of
administration, has significantly increased over the last several years, and its use

has unfortunately become "fashionable" for many young people. The heroin trade
in Colombia is controlled by independent traffickers who harvest the poppy in the
mountainous areas of the Andes and produce heroin in small laboratories
throughout the area. They then employ an army of couriers who smuggle the
heroin into the United States via ingestion, body carriers, and increasingly, in
concealed compartments in luggage.

The Lure of the Bahamas

The Bahama Island chain, which lies northwest of the island of Hispaniola
and just northeast of Cuba, has been a center for smuggling of contraband for
centuries. During the heyday of the Medellin Cartel, Carlos Lehder bought an
entire island, Norman's Cay; where he flew planes laden with hundreds of kilos of
cocaine to stage for entry into the United States. The Bahamas remain a key to
drug trafficking from Haiti to the United States.

To counter the threat in the Northern Caribbean, including the Turks and
Caicos Islands, the United States government initiated Operation Bahamas and
Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) in 1982. A joint Bahamian, DEA, U.S. Customs,
U.S.Coast Guard and Department of Defense interdiction operation headquartered
in Nassau, Bahamas. OPBAT has had enormous success over the years, seizing
thousands of kilograms of cocaine and literally driving the transportation groups
working for the Cali syndicate out of the Northern Caribbean.

The threat we now face in the Northern Caribbean and Bahamas is
constantly changing, complicating the challenge to drug law enforcement in Haiti.
We are very concerned about the new containerized shipping port facility in
Freeport, Bahamas, which will function as a freight forwarding point for
containerized commercial cargo being sent to various ports in the United States
and Europe. The containers are not to be opened while in Freeport; however, this
is an opportunity ripe for opportunistic smuggling organizations, such as those on
the island of Hispaniola, to exploit.

While the greatest amount of cocaine is transported from Haiti to the
Dominican Republic for further shipment, some Haitian smuggling groups use
"go-fast" boats to smuggle drugs to the Bahamas.


The Toll of the Drug Trade in Haiti

As in most locations where the cocaine trade flourishes, competition for
control of the local market has resulted in an escalation of drug-related crime.
Tragically, as we have seen in Colombia, Mexico and the United States, violence
and corruption are attendant to the drug trade. Drug corruption is rampant, even in
the police and judicial system. A campaign against narcotics corruption, begun by
President Preval in 1996, has already led to the arrest of one judge for releasing an
alleged Dominican drug trafficker, and the release from duty of another judge
accused of improprieties in narcotics cases. Two police officers were removed in
1996, by the National Police Inspector General, because of drug-related problems.

Examples of corruption are widespread. A Colombian citizen, arrested at the
Port-Au-Prince Airport in connection with a shipment of 750 kilos of cocaine, was
released from custody under suspicious circumstances involving Haitian
governmental officials. In another incident, after large quantities of cocaine were
discovered by the Haitian National Police (HNP) at a routine traffic stop in Port-
Au-Prince. A senior governmental official ordered the police to release the
vehicle, the individuals involved, and the cocaine.

A Hemispheric Law Enforcement Response

The drug threat in Haiti is best approached from a broad perspective.
Successful cases against the leaders of international drug trafficking groups most
often originate from investigations being conducted in the United States. Through
what was originally designated our Southwest Border Initiative, but has become a
Hemispheric Strategy, DEA and our counterparts direct their resources against the
communications systems of the command and control functions of the organized
crime groups in both Colombia and Mexico and their henchmen throughout the
Caribbean and in the United States, who direct the distribution of cocaine and
heroin and the collection of profits from the drug sales. DEA's enforcement
operations in these efforts rely heavily on court-authorized electronic surveillance
or Title III interception orders. For example, the Miami Field Division had 97
court authorized wire taps to support investigations against organized crime
groups in 1996 and have employed 57 more as of July of this year. Almost all of
these intercepts were targeted at criminal groups smuggling cocaine and heroin


through the Caribbean basin, to include through Haiti.

With the assistance of our state and local partners domestically and our
counterparts in foreign governments, DEA works to build cases against, and
ultimately incarcerate, the leaders of these sophisticated criminal syndicates as
well as the underlings they send to other countries, including the United States, to
distribute their poison. Over time, this strategy serves to steadily degrade a
criminal organization's ability to conduct business, leaving it even more
vulnerable to law enforcement strategies.

A successful counterdrug strategy must incorporate an interdiction
component that is fed the critical intelligence necessary to be successful. The
vastness of the Caribbean Corridor combined with traffickers' use of sophisticated
compartments utilized in freighters, and the sheer volume and variety of
commercial cargo flowing through the Caribbean, make a meaningful interdiction
program almost completely dependent on quality intelligence. Our hemispheric
strategy relies upon court-ordered Title III interceptions that allow us to support
the agencies conducting interdiction with that quality intelligence.

In Haiti, the prospects for successful cooperative drug law enforcement are
not promising. Haiti's long history of economic and political instability, along
with rampant official corruption, have increased the inherent attractiveness of the
country as a crossroads of the drug trade. Haiti lacks a functioning judicial system
and a credible law enforcement element, making traffickers feel safe -- they
probably are, in fact, safe in their operations there. There were no successful
criminal prosecutions of narcotics cases in Haiti in 1996. Most traffickers are,
evidently, able to manipulate the weak and corrupt judicial system.

The Haitian judicial system is not up to the task and drug laws are
inadequate to support a viable law enforcement effort against drugs, even if there
were a healthy law enforcement element in Haiti. DEA's most serious obstacle in
Haiti is the lack of a law enforcement entity capable of conducting investigations
and making arrests and seizures that will stand up in court. Haiti has, regrettably,
made only the most tentative steps in the direction of viable drug laws or effective
law enforcement.

Haiti is nominally a signatory to the 1961 Single Convention, the 1972

Protocol, and the 1982 U.N. Convention. The domestic legislation which would
be required within Haiti to implement these international agreements is not yet in
place. The Constitutional bar against extradition of Haitian citizens presents an
unacceptable obstacle to cooperation on transnational drug cases. Finally, there
are no demand reduction programs in place. New narcotics laws are now being
developed, including asset seizure and forfeiture and money laundering statutes,
but are not yet in effect.

Only in 1996, did Haiti organize the HNP, and name its first Director, Mr.
Pierre Denize. The HNP has no demonstrated expertise or law enforcement skills.
The organization suffers from a lack of training and resources. The first chief of
counternarcotics, Mr. Francois Marie Sandy Charles Pierre, quickly resigned. A
second counterdrug chief, Mr. Patrick Chapoteau, also resigned. Neither of these
chiefs had a real counternarcotics unit to work with.

The Haitian Coast Guard, which, together with the police, would be
expected to play a major role in interdicting drug shipments in the waters around
Hispaniola, is not now able to operate on its own. It is operationally limited to the
GulfofGonave, and lacks sufficient training, personnel, and equipment. On the
bright side, in its first two months of operation, the Haitian Coast Guard had two
major cocaine seizures, amounting to over 900 kilograms.

There is, at present, an embryonic Counternarcotics Unit [CNU] within the
Judicial Police, which is headed by Mr. Pierre Fortin Jean-Dines. The CNU,
created with the urging of the U.S. government in February 1997, exists in name
only, and is entirely lacking in training, resources, and the support of either the
legal system or the Government of Haiti. The Counternarcotics unit has about 22
officers, including the chief, Mr. Smith Jean Payo. The unit members were
screened based on a interview, a basic Judicial Police examination, a background
investigation, and graduation from the Judicial Police Course.

The CNU has several major hurdles to overcome before becoming viable.
None of the officers, including the chief, have had law enforcement experience.
The Unit has temporary offices in a training center, and has no communications
equipment. The unit has no effective information/intelligence sharing capability.
The Director of the Judicial Police, Mr. Fortin, has stated that the unit cannot be
regarded as functional until it receives the needed equipment and the personnel

have been trained. The Government of Haiti has so far not provided the needed
resources, and has clearly demonstrated that counternarcotics initiatives are not a

The prospects for counter narcotics law enforcement in Haiti are not entirely
bleak. Steps are now being taken to create some semblance of a functioning
counterdrug unit. The DEA Country Office in Port-Au-Prince has a solid
working relationship with the key officials in the HNP, Judicial Police, and other
public safety officials in the Haitian Government. This relationship is a good
basis on which to build more effective cooperative drug law enforcement, the
centerpiece of which will be a functioning counternarcotics unit.

Responsibility for training the CNU lies with the International Criminal
Investigations Training Assistance Program [ICITAP] and with the Department of
State/INL. None of the needed start-up equipment has yet been delivered. An
ICITAP training plan is in place, but only initial training has taken place, starting
in May 1997. The Government of Canada has also provided basic police training
in conducting investigations, arrest techniques, judicial procedures, intelligence
collection, and analysis.

DEA began specialized training for the CNU in October 1997, with the goal
of initial operational readiness by January 1998. The first round of training took
place October 13-24, conducted by the DEA Office of International Training.
DEA will also have a Special Agent assigned to work full-time with the CNU as
an advisor during the transition from training to an operational force.

Once ready, the CNU will be targeted at dismantling criminal organizations
through investigations, arrests, and prosecution of international traffickers. The
CNU will, with the advice and assistance of DEA, collect intelligence regarding
trafficking organizations, target traffickers using Haiti as a transhipment point, and
concentrate investigations on organizations that transship through the country, the
Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico to the United States. In addition, DEA will
work with Haitian authorities to establish effective money laundering legislation
and to maintain a close relationship between the CNU, Haitian Coast Guard, and
U.S. counterparts.

Despite the vital role they play in investigations of international drug

trafficking organizations, there is no technical capability for court-authorized
electronic surveillance in Haiti. The antiquated communications infrastructure
there will not allow it. However, a joint DEA/FBI/US Customs Service group will
be used to identify key communications links between source country suppliers
and organizations operating in Haiti and throughout the Caribbean.


Proceeding on the basis of partnership with the Haitians, interagency
cooperation, and intelligence sharing, DEA will move forward to reduce the flow
of drug trafficking throughout the region. DEA's Caribbean Field Division has
created a Caribbean Mobile Response Group to provide additional investigative
and operational support in the region. OPBAT, referred to above, is being
replicated in the central Caribbean in Operation BLUE SKIES. For the first time,
it received the total support of the host nations, who provided overflight
clearances and enforcement personnel for the interdiction operations.

Thirty years ago many thought traditional organized crime could never be
subverted, but fortunately it is now a mere shadow of what it once was. Five years
ago nearly every one said that the Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela, and his
accomplices in Cali, were invincible. However, we see today that every one of the
criminals from the Cali Cartel are either in jail or dead. The law enforcement
systems I have described, which attack the command and control functions of
criminal syndicates, have been successful. Such an approach can be successful in
Haiti. Over time, trafficking organizations that rise to prominence in Haiti can be
reduced to ineffectiveness, provided we continue to have the assistance of foreign
law enforcement agencies, the ability to attack the communications system of
these organizations, and Haiti builds a law enforcement and criminal justice
capacity of its own.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, Mr. Chairman. I will be
happy to respond to any questions you or the members of the Committee may


WASHINGTON, DC 20515 .'.
?' S"- c1o -TEL EPHONE.(20-1 225-5021
..........~ December 8, 1997 "

Honorable Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State
The Department of State
2201 C Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Albright:

As Chairman and Ranking Democrat of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the
House International Relations Committee, we wanted to take this opportunity to express our
cautious agreement with the recent decision to continue a limited United States military presence
in Haiti during this immediate post-United Nations period.

We believe that during this post-U.N. time. a U.S. military presence will help contribute
to a much needed sense of stability in that country. As long as Haiti remains a low-threat
environment for our forces, a continued military mission in Haiti seems to make sense. A
continuing U.S. military mission which provides medical assistance and some public works and
infrastructure development does provide clear evidence that this nation wants to see democracy
and economic development succeed in Haiti.

However, we want to express our deep concern that this U.S. presence not be considered
an "open-ended" or indefinite commitment and that eventually, and sooner hopefully than later,
all U.S. military forces will be withdrawn from that nation. With the departure of the last of the
1.200 U.N. military troops from Haiti, any lack of a U.S. military exit strategy will eventually try
the patience of the Congress. We must also warn the Administration not to change the existing
humanitarian mission of the U.S. forces in Haiti to one of security and law enforcement in the
wake of the U.N. withdrawal. Such a change will meet strong resistance in the Congress and will
not be acceptable. We support the U.N. decision to retain a small civilian police cadre
(CIVPOL) in Haiti to continue to train the Haitian National Police (HNP) and we applaud the
governments of Pakistan and Argentina for agreeing to provide the manpower for this effort.
However, it must be made clear that the HNP/CIVPOL, not the U.S. military, are responsible for
providing security and law enforcement in Haiti.


Secretary Albright
page 2

More importantly, however, Haiti must move forward to resolve its political stalemate
and get on with the civil and economic reforms which will be the ultimate guarantor of political
stability. The Haitian government's current paralysis, has left the nation virtually leaderless for
the past several months and has cost the country millions of dollars in international financial
assistance. This stalemate now appears to have moved far beyond the normal growing pains of
an emerging democracy. Even here in our own Congress, inter-party disagreements are
eventually overcome when important national issues are at stake. In the current Haitian
parliament, it is becoming more difficult to understand where legitimate partisan political
disagreement ends and where individual self-preservation begins. We, therefore, call upon you
and the members of the international community to work more diligently in trying to persuade
the Haitian government to move beyond petty differences and consider the national good of Haiti
as its top priority.

Madame Secretary, we believe that for now the continuation of a modest U.S. military
mission in Haiti is a positive signal of our continued commitment to democracy in that nation.
But, our support cannot be without limit and the Haitian government must be convinced that
measurable progress must be made or they risk losing congressional and international support.

Thanking you in advance for your consideration, we are,


Elton Gallegly, Chairman G erman
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee ling Democrat




U.S. interagency estimates for the first 2 quarters of 1997 showed that
cocaine continued to be moved mostly by maritime conveyances and
Mexico was the principal destination. According to interagency estimates,
Mexico and Central America received 59 percent of the cocaine during this
penod. The Caribbean countries accounted for 30 percent of the flow, and
11 percent was shipped directly to the United States from source
countries. Also, U.S. law enforcement agencies noted some changes in
trafficking patterns in and around Puerto Rico. They attributed this change
to increased U.S. law enforcement efforts in this area.

According to the DEA Caribbean Field Division, the Eastern Caribbean
corridor remains a prolific drug-trafficking route! South American
traffickers continue to use the Bahamas and islands in the Leeward,
Windward, and Hispamola routes as staging and transshipment areas.
Cocaine loads originate in Colombia or Venezuela and are moved by air or
large motherships to smaller vessels in the Eastern Caribbean. The many
unguarded airstrips and coastlines of the Caribbean islands make it easy
for traffickers to refuel or store cocaine for further shipment directly to
the United States or through Puerto Rico.

A in to DEA, Puerto Rico is a popular gateway to the United States
andapnncipastaging destination for South American drug traffickers.
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica have also experienced
BrTeased drug-smuggling activity. For example, DEA has indicated that, in
the past, the role of Dominicans in the drug business was limited to
"pick-up crews" and couriers who assisted Puerto Rican smugglers. Today,
Dominicans have sophisticated drug-smuggling operations and use
advanced security systems and telephone communications to move and
sell cocaine in the Caribbean and the United States, according to DEA. Even
with heightened enforcement, offshore airdrops along the southern coast
of the Dominican Republic and in the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico
and the Dominican Republic continue. In addition theDepartmeeee f
State has reported that thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been
smuggled over the border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic, whose
army'Ri'iihd little success in stopping the flow .

Although the Eastern Caribbean remains a major route for illegal drug
trafficking, the larger quantities of cocaine pass through Mexico via the
Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean corridors. U.S. interagency
estimates show that, in 1996, 314 metric tons of cocaine reached Mexico
for eventual movement to the United States through the Eastern Pacific
and Western Caribbean channels. Of this amount, about 70 percent was


Conqrefs ot the Uniteb Stateo
Wlastgington, 3C 20515

November 14, 1997

The Honorable William Cohen
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMH) is scheduled to
conclude on November 30, 1997. It is our understanding that the U.S. Southern
Command is reviewing the security situation in Haiti and is preparing options for the
continued deployment of American forces under the Operation Fairwinds umbrella after
UNTMH's mandate expires. We further understand that the Administration has held
discussions with Haitian President Rene Preval regarding the continued deployment of
American forces for engineering, health and training missions. From April to September
1997, the Defense Department spent $13 million to support its operations in Haiti. As
more than three years have passed since the U.S. intervention in Haiti, there is no reason
why these engineering, health, and training missions cannot be implemented with
international development assistance.

When Operation Uphold Democracy was launched, the stated goal of the mission
was to "restore democracy" to Haiti. Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide was
restored to office; Aristide was able to complete his term of office and President Preval
succeeded him. In a November 6, 1997 meeting with interested Senators and Members,
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger asserted that the U.S. troops in Haiti were
assigned to purely humanitarian missions and had only a small security component.
When reviewing the November 4, 1997 Haiti force numbers from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, we note that Operation Fairwinds has been transformed from a humanitarian to a
security mission. We are most concerned that the primary purpose of the mission, the
rules of engagement, the nature of the specific threat, and the duration of the mission
have not been clearly defined by the Administration or by President Preval. As
important, neither President Preval nor the Haitian Parliament have officially requested
U.S. forces to remain in Haiti after November 30, 1997. Our troops in Haiti should not
be used as a "tripwire" and under no circumstances should they stay without an
unequivocal invitation to remain from the Government of Haiti.



Mr. Secretary, the U.S. military forces have done a superb job under difficult
conditions in Haiti since 1994. However, we believe that our soldiers' mission in Haiti is
completed. It is past time for them to come home.

7/- -// Sincerely,

-~~) ,,-