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)ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS AND POLITICAL
MURDERS IN HAITI: PART II


I'd


COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY
H E I JJ i' I rII H I rrl 'if 11
HEARING 3 5005 00520 273W
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS


SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 27, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations


COLLJ,;YD;JA UpN!VERSITY


*I I -

-' : I"


*


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1997


38-491 CC


For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-054255-3












COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman


WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South
Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
TOM CAMPBELL, California
JON FOX, Pennsylvania


LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.)
CHARLIE ROSE, North Carolina
PAT DANNER, Missouri
EARL HILLIARD, Alabama


RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Democratic Chief of Staff
ROGER NORIEGA, Professional Staff Member
TRACY E. HART, Staff Associate













CONTENTS


WITNESSES
Page
Hon. Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Diplomatic Security,
D epartm ent of State ............................................................................................ 22
Mr. Joseph G. Sullivan, Special Haiti Coordinator ......................................... 22
Hon. William Lacy Swing, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti ....................................... 25

APPENDIX
Opening statement of Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman ..................................... 59
Statement of Representative John Conyers ....................................... .......... 61
Statement of Representative Joseph Kennedy .................................................... 63
Statement of Representative Dan Burton ......................................... ........... 65
Statement of Joseph G. Sullivan .................................................................... 66
Statement of William Lacy Swing .................................................................. 70
Unclassified cables from the Department of State ........................................ 73
Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by the Department
of S tate ........................................................................................ .................... 8 1
Responses to additional questions submitted for the record by the Department
of D efen se ................................................................................... ..................... 86











ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS AND POLITICAL
MURDERS IN HAITI: PART II

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:44 a.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC, the Honor-
able Benjamin A. Gilman, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Chairman GILMAN. The Committee on International Relations
will come to order.
Two years ago this week, 20,000 American troops left their
homes for Haiti to restore constitutional order and to throw out a
regime that was murdering its political opponents.
Since then the Clinton administration has spent more than $2
billion to support a government that has tolerated thugs who mur-
der its political opponents.
I supported the resolution of the constitutional order in Haiti.
That support was betrayed by the Administration when it kept
Congress in the dark about political murders by the very govern-
ment we returned to power.
Many of those murders were committed in 1995, while our troops
were still in Haiti as peacekeepers. Our government has informa-
tion linking these killings to members of Haiti's Presidential Secu-
rity Unit, which was trained by our own government.
One of the most shocking murders was the March 28, 1995 shoot-
ing in broad daylight of Mirielle Bertin, a prominent opponent of
then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Two dozen FBI agents were deployed to Haiti to help investigate
that shooting, but by August 1995, our embassy had concluded that
the Aristide Government was stonewalling the FBI. Even as the
FBI was packing up to leave Haiti in frustration, an Administra-
tion official told our Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of this
committee on October 12th that the investigation was continuing.
And within a few days, the last FBI agent had left Haiti in frustra-
tion.
The Administration has been aware since early 1995 that death
squads were operating under the direction of top security aids to
President Aristide.
The Administration privately pressed Aristide to dismiss sus-
pected assassins in his security unit, but he refused to do so, al-
though some were dismissed by President Ren6 Preval after he
took office in February 1996. Their violence got out of hand just
last month.






But, despite some ten hearings and briefings before this commit-
tee on Haiti during 1995, the Administration failed to inform us
until January 1996 that it was aware of these death squads, which
began a year earlier.
After two leading opponents of President Preval were slain on
August 20 of this year, the Administration then rushed 46 armed
agents of our Diplomatic Security Service to Haiti to protect Presi-
dent Preval from his own U.S.-trained bodyguards and to oust
members of his palace guard who are linked to a series of recent
murders.
The Administration has claimed Haiti as a foreign policy success.
Yet, on the very weekend it was preparing to send cruise missiles
against Iraq, two top members of its foreign policy team-the Dep-
uty Secretary of State and the President's National Security Advi-
sor-were dispatched to Port-au-Prince to negotiate with President
Preval.
If Haiti is such the success that it claims to be, why then has
the Administration been so reluctant to provide our committee with
the information we have sought?
It is interesting that, while the Administration has declassified
some 5,847 documents pertaining to Guatemala, it has declassified
only 21 pertaining to Haiti. These documents that are here this
morning illustrate a stark double standard.
Moreover, the President has made an extraordinary use of his ex-
ecutive privilege to block a careful scrutiny of about 50 essential
documents by this committee.
And to those who may say that our investigation is just politics,
I would point out that our committee does have an important over-
sight responsibility to discharge on behalf of the American people.
As a National Security Council official said when releasing the
Guatemalan documents last May, and I quote, "We're going to let
the chips fall where they may. We just want to get to the facts."
In concluding, I would like to note that we tried hard to work
with the Administration over the past year to try to get to the bot-
tom of these troubling issues-issues that should not be minimized
because some say conditions were worse before U.S. troops landed
in Haiti.
Instead, what we should be asking, after our nation's vast invest-
ment in Haiti of over $2 billion, how many political killings are ac-
ceptable?
I, as well as many other of our colleagues, want a democratic
government in Haiti to work, and we have been trying to head in
that direction. We have long supported that goal. What we cannot
accept, nor can our committee accept, is this Administration telling
Congress less than the full story about the present situation in
Haiti.
I would much prefer to try to work with the Administration to
fix current shortcomings than to be told next year that we must
support the return of our U.S. troops to Haiti as the only means
of preventing the collapse of the government in Port-au-Prince.
I am pleased that we have with us this morning several of our
colleagues who have been involved in our work with regard to the
Haitian problem. We have with us Congressman Conyers of Michi-
gan; Congressman Tom Foglietta of Pennsylvania; and Congress-






man Joseph Kennedy of Massachusetts. We will proceed to take the
testimony of our members and we will start with Mr. Conyers.
[Chairman Gilman's statement appears in the appendix.]
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Gilman, and Ranking Mem-
ber Hamilton, members of the committee, good morning.
I am delighted to join you at these important hearings. I remem-
ber, Mr. Chairman, that you have been one concerned about Haiti
and its development for many years, long before you were in fact
chairman of this committee, and I know that that interest still con-
tinues. We discuss these matters from time to time, whenever we
can.
I too have that same concern that you do about the small impov-
erished country, perhaps the poorest in the Western Hemisphere.
And the Committee on the Judiciary has held hearings in connec-
tion with related matters of immigration, criminal justice, drug
running, and other matters that are particularly within the prov-
ince of the Committee on the Judiciary.
So I am happy merely to come here and join in these hearings,
keeping the hand of cooperation still extended, although it is true
we are descending into perhaps the most political season that oc-
curs every 4 years. I think that this hearing will be one that seeks
the truth, seeks to understand where we are and what the difficul-
ties are.
Now, may I just contribute a couple of items that have come to
my attention that may be of some usefulness in the course of this
hearing?
Last year, this country has been working very closely to rebuild
Haiti. We would not be here today if it was not for this country.
We would not be here today if it was not for the President of the
U.S.' decision to intervene in the terrible oppression that was going
on and that had driven out the first democratically elected Presi-
dent in the history of Haiti.
And so there has come about a great number of activities. The
first is the rebuilding of the country itself from scratch. Anybody
ever rebuild a country from scratch before, right from the ground
up? No infrastructure, no electricity, no water, no operating govern-
ment, a military coup had eliminated the government operations in
its entirety.
And so we had an enormous job. Our State Department, our De-
partment of Defense, our Department of Commerce have all
weighed in with other countries' help, of course, to help move this
country out of the incredible posture of destitution and poverty that
was suffering.
And so we have, I think, a right to be proud of what we are doing
there. I, for one, as the former chairman of the government over-
sight committee of the House, the Government Operations Commit-
tee, am concerned to make sure that these monies, these programs
we bring to Haiti are effectively and efficiently used. And I will join
you, Mr. Chairman, in making sure that that in fact happens.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.
Mr. CONYERS. The other matter that is critical is the financial
systems that are being built up in Haiti. The World Bank, the
other banking systems in the country, in the world, that have
joined in to financially lift this government forward are important.






And, then, finally, we have had a great deal of elimination of the
government agencies and private sector activities that were once
commonplace in the Caribbean, and in many other places in the
world, and we are now in a process trying to deal with that very
important consideration of privatizing, if you will, of many of the
government functions that we are working with. And so I join my
colleagues here at the table who have worked hard with all of us
on these matters, and your witnesses that are coming forward, and
I would pledge again my cooperation with you and every member
of this committee to see that we can move this country forward
with our help and support as effectively as we can.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you.
[The prepared statement of the Honorable John Conyers appears
in the appendix.]
Chairman GII AN. Thank you very much for your statement and
your willingness to cooperate. I know you have been in the fore-
front of this problem for a long period of time, and we are all very
much concerned with trying to improve the economy of Haiti so
that they can move forward.
Mr. Foglietta.
Mr. FOGLIETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to be here before this
committee today. I want to thank Ranking Member Hamilton and
other members of the committee for the interest you have shown
for the Republic of Haiti. I have been to Haiti so often lately that
some people have suggested that I should maybe think about mov-
ing there. I considered that suggestion until I found that it was
really coming from my friend, Dan Burton.
[Laughter.]
Mr. FOGLIETTA. So I thought maybe I had better stay here for
awhile.
Now, I was again in Haiti just 2 weeks ago for the fourth time
since the return of democracy and freedom to that country, just to
observe what is happening there, to observe what progress is being
made. I visited with President Preval, former President Aristide,
Commerce Minister Germain, and American Ambassador Swing. I
talked with people on the streets of Haiti, mothers, fathers, farm-
ers, shopkeepers. I spoke with business leaders, small business
leaders, big business leaders, and people who had been in the oppo-
sition parties in Haiti.
Without exception, every person I talked to talked about the
strides that they have been making toward democracy, and more
importantly, toward achieving and attempting to achieve some eco-
nomic stability.
The unemployment rate of that nation is over 60 percent. They
are trying to establish small businesses. They are trying to on the
streets just establish vendor systems. They are trying to work
through their economy to make their lives better. They talked
about the importance of Haiti's partnership with America.
They did not talk about violence. I saw no evidence of any vio-
lence occurring. I talked to President Preval. I talked to other
members of the community, of opposition party members, and they
again said they saw no evidence of any violence. I was assured by
everyone that I spoke to that, although there have been some prob-






lems, and there certainly have been some problems with some of
the members of the Security Force.
Let me just say parenthetically that my own city of Philadelphia,
some 39 members of our police force have been either taken from
the force or have been indicted for improprieties, things that oc-
curred within the police force in trying to enforce the laws in the
city of Philadelphia.
So certainly there have been some violations by certain members
of the Security Force, but I was assured by everyone that I spoke
to that stories of death squads sponsored by a political party or by
the government had no basis whatsoever in reality.
The leaders and the people of Haiti are thinking really basically
about one thing-about economics, and trying to bring their nation
back to life; trying to bring their nation back with business and op-
portunity. They are trying to make their lives better for the people
there. They are not thinking about revenge. They are not thinking
about retribution.
Thanks to President Clinton's policy toward Haiti each time I am
in Haiti I see a country and a people taking its next steps toward
democracy, and, more importantly, a democracy which has never
known before. I marvel at the commitment of these people to sur-
vive. They have survived dictatorships and oppression over the last
century, and yet each time I visit Haiti I see the hope in the eyes
of the people, the hope that is growing, because the people there
and their government is committed to achieving not only democ-
racy, but more importantly, economic progress.
Now, let us not fool ourselves. While Haiti has made some
strides, it still has a long, long way to go, and they need our help.
They need our assistance in rebuilding that nation. They need our
assistance in rebuilding the infrastructure.
As my colleague, Congressman Conyers stated, there is no water
system. To walk along the streets of Port-au-Prince and seeing chil-
dren trying to freshen themselves by playing in pools of sewer
water; by seeing young men trying to take a shower under a sewer
pipe. I mean, you know, you have to realize that this is not a na-
tion where people are concerned about killing one another. They
are concerned about getting jobs. They are concerned about estab-
lishing businesses. They are concerned about making their lives
better.
And we in this nation should be focusing on how we can further
assist them in their steps toward democracy and economic
progress. We should be helping them with real economic assistance
to make their lives better. I would hope that that would be the
kind of a hearing, with all due respect, that this committee should
be holding, and would be holding in the very near future.
With that, I would be happy to answer any questions that the
committee members have concerning conditions in Haiti that I
have seen in my visits there.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for
his insight and for his testimony.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very
much appreciate your willingness to take some testimony from me






this morning as well as the other Members of Congress who have
had a longtime interest in matters pertaining to the development
of Haiti.
I was very interested in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman,
with regard to this committee's continued concerns about the devel-
opment of democracy throughout Latin America, in particularly,
your citing Guatemala, and other countries in that region.
Just in the last couple of days I have had released to my office
from the Pentagon a very interesting document that maybe this
committee might take a look at with regard to the School of the
Americas, which has been noted now as having developed a torture
manual, where we were actually teaching these military represent-
atives from all over Latin America not just how to torture, but how
to kill, how to inject drugs into people that they wanted to have
talk. They have reference after reference about killing the entire
cell, about killing the parents of anyone that they wanted to have
come in and speak.
And I think that if you have that kind of interest in human
rights-I know you have expressed those interests in terms of Ire-
land and other countries in the past, Mr. Chairman, then I would
very much urge this committee to take a very hard look at that
document and what is actually taking place at the School of the
Americas that is funded by U.S. taxpayers.
Chairman GILMAN. If the gentleman would yield.
Mr. KENNEDY. I would be happy to.
Chairman GILMAN. Would you be kind enough to make that doc-
ument available to our committee? We certainly would be inter-
ested.
Mr. KENNEDY. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. KENNEDY. I will do that right after this committee.
In any event, we are here to discuss Haiti today, Mr. Chairman,
and February 7, 1996, the world witnessed the first democratic
transition of power in Haiti. President Preval succeeded President
Aristide after free and fair elections, and I am happy to say to this
committee that I am going to be welcoming President Aristide in
just a few hours to the city of Boston, and escorting him through-
out the State of Massachusetts, and looking forward to the recep-
tion that I know he will have in this country and in Massachusetts
later today.
As we know, democracy does not come easily. Our own history
teaches us that a heavy price must be paid to secure its blessings.
The people of Haiti understand this lesson too. It took Haiti almost
two centuries to achieve the democratic dream. During that time
the Haitian people suffered through a series of brutal dictatorships
whose lack of respect for basic human rights, and the principles of
freedom are well documented by this committee as well as other
bodies.
Now, there is no doubt that the will of the murderous dictators
in Haiti have been replaced by the will of the people expressed in
the elections throughout the country. The people of Haiti no longer
fear the late night knock on the door from members of a brutal re-
gime that ridicules the principles of human rights.






The Organization of American States, and the Department of
State, and Amnesty International agree that the human rights sit-
uation in Haiti has improved immeasurably, and President Preval
is continuing to take steps to improve this record. There have been
allegations by Republicans in the Congress that the Presidential
palace in Haiti can be linked to about 20 political killings that have
taken place in Haiti since President Aristide was restored to power.
However, I would like to point out that during the 3 years of the
coup regime, which this committee did not investigate, there were
over 3,000 political murders that took place.
President Preval has taken swift and decisive actions to deal
with the rogue elements within the Presidential Security Unit.
Over the course of the past year, he has dismissed members of the
Presidential Security Unit, and police and individuals allegedly in-
volved in human rights abuses. After the most recent incident on
August 20, Preval immediately dismissed suspect members of the
Presidential Security Unit and two dozen members of the State De-
partment's Diplomatic Security Force were dispatched to Haiti to
aid President Preval with security measures.
President Preval has also taken significant and dramatic meas-
ures to address the pressing economic issues in Haiti. Just last
night the Haitian senate passed landmark privatization legislation.
This bill, passed earlier by the low chamber of Parliament, will
soon be signed into law by President Preval. It contains the same
language that the IMF and the World Bank were urging Haiti to
adopt.
In addition, this week the Haitian Government successfully ad-
dressed the issue of civil service reform. With the privatization lan-
guage and the civil service reform approved, approximately $170
million worth of international assistance, $15 million from the
United States, will be released to Haiti, helping to build its econ-
omy and to grow economically in the future.
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt in my mind that the Haitian
economy will grow. Since President Preval took over Haiti, it has
been run as a cash economy, spending only revenues, not borrow-
ing money on the international market. Its austere fiscal and mon-
etary policies are indicative of the government's commitment to im-
proving its economy.
I had a brief conversation with Ambassador Swing, who I think
shows great faith in being here this morning, who tells me that as
a result of the imposition of sanctions on that country, the number
of jobs in the textile operations alone went from 35,000 jobs down
to zero, and that they have been able to build back up to over
19,000 jobs just in the last several months.
Haiti continues to face a number of significant challenges. In the
economic sector, it must start the process of privatization while ad-
dressing high unemployment and inflation. It must institutionalize
the Haitian National Police, and it must reform its judicial system.
President Preval has begun to address all of these issues. He has
clearly shown his intolerance for human rights violations with his
swift dismissal of rogue palace security guards. He will sign the
privatization bill into law, and his reform efforts will continue in
the judicial system.




8
I believe that the United States has a special duty to ensure that
this new and still fragile democracy is given the chance it deserves
to flourish, and I am proud that the United States has played a
major role in the success that we have witnessed so far in Haiti.
We should do nothing which threatens to roll back the gains of the
last few years.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[Representative Kennedy's statement appears in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy. I want to thank
our colleagues for taking the time to express their thoughts with
regard to the future of Haiti and where we should be going, and
we welcome your working with the committee as we try to address
these problems.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Would it meet your pleasure if any of us, pending our schedules,
would be able to join the members?
Chairman GILMAN. We would welcome having you. You are wel-
come to come and join us up here.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much.
Chairman GILMAN. I know a number of our members have some
opening statements. To save some time, we will get right into
those.
Our ranking minority member, Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I think all of us recognize that Haiti is an important subject, and
I want to commend you for the oversight you have given to this
issue. Haiti, of course, is a very fragile democracy and events have
to be very carefully followed there.
I do want to raise three concerns I have about this particular
hearing.
First, I am concerned about the chairman's recent statements
about the Administration policy on Haiti. The chairman has said
this morning and in previous instances that there has been an ef-
fort on the part of the Administration to conceal, to provide less
than the full story, failure to inform with respect to the murders
that have occurred there, and the political killings.
I respect my friend, the chairman, of course, but I really do not
believe that the Administration has tried to conceal any murders.
Indeed, I do not think there is any way to conceal them. They are,
of course, regrettable events. They happened in broad daylight, and
they have been reported by the newspapers for nearly 2 years.
It is my impression that the Administration has pressed the Hai-
tian Government to investigate these murders, and to bring the
perpetrators to justice. We all know the inadequacy of the legal
system in Haiti today.
Last year the Administration dispatched the FBI to help inves-
tigate the murders, and last month it was the Administration that
went to President Preval with information about the political mur-
ders that took place.
I do not find here any pattern of concealment. I do not find any
effort to conceal these activities, or these atrocities. To the extent
that justice has not occurred in Haiti, it cannot, it seems to me,
fairly be put on the Administration's door step. And I simply do not






understand the charges of Administration concealment and cover-
ups when it seems to me the facts do not indicate that.
Second, let me comment on the question of the subpoenas. I am
concerned that the chairman suggested last week that the Adminis-
tration was hiding documents that would expose this coverup, and
a number of statements were made to that effect.
Let me say I find no basis in fact for that statement. The Admin-
istration has provided access to over 1,000 documents. The commit-
tee staff has examined them. To the best of my knowledge, they
have found no evidence of coverup of political killings.
The remaining disagreement, and the reason, as I understand it,
for the chairman's subpoena concerns the terms of access to the re-
maining documents which number fewer than 50. As I understand
it, the only question outstanding between the committee and the
Administration is whether access to the most sensitive internal de-
liberative Presidential documents will be given to staff, as the
chairman prefers, or will be restricted to members with two staff
members present, which is the White House position.
In other words, the difference really is whether the most sen-
sitive documents will be given to staff or to staff and members.
Now, it is my understanding that Chairman Combest, in the In-
telligence Committee, and Chairman Hyde, in the Judiciary Com-
mittee, have been able to work out similar document requests with
the White House on a mutually acceptable basis, and I would hope
that this committee will still be able to achieve that.
The chairman, of course, is right that it is important to have ac-
cess to these documents to the fullest extent possible, and I hope
that we can find a way to reach an agreement with the White
House. Had an agreement been reached, the committee would al-
ready have gained access to all of the information in the docu-
ments.
I want to know what is in those documents, just as the chairman
does, but the route chosen by the committee, the subpoena route,
makes it less likely we are going to get that information. What we
are likely to get is a long partisan battle and a long court fight.
Finally, the third point is that I know that the decision to inter-
vene in Haiti now some 2 years ago was a controversial decision.
There were legitimate differences of opinion about that decision,
but once the intervention occurred it seems to me that it is in the
interest of all Americans and of this committee to try to make the
policy work. It is not in the interest of this country that the policy
fail.
I think we have to acknowledge, as our witnesses here have done
this morning, and I thank them for it because they have done it
in a very effective way, that a lot of progress has been made in
Haiti. Haiti has held democratic elections for Parliament and for
President. A corrupt regime has been removed. The flow of des-
perate people toward Florida has been stopped. A freely elected
President Preval has been chosen, and he has launched upon a
path of reform.
Political violence, which is the subject of this hearing, is down
significantly, very significantly. We will hear about that in a few
moments. Some two dozen political murders in the last 2 years






compared, I believe, with several thousand killings under the mili-
tary regime.
Under legislation recently passed by the Haitian Parliament, pri-
vatization of the economy is set to begin. In short then, democracy
is being given a chance in Haiti, in a place where there was none.
None of us want Haiti to revert to conditions that existed before
the intervention, but sometimes I wonder whether we want U.S.
policy to succeed. This committee has blocked millions of dollars in
funds designated for police training and held up funds for economic
assistance. From my perspective, these funds are desperately need-
ed to help build the institutions of democracy in Haiti.
I think we are spending too much time in search of coverups that
do not exist and too little time in pursuit of constructive answers
to Haiti's problems, which all of us acknowledge are all too real.
Our responsibility here is to try to make this policy succeed, and
I hope this and subsequent efforts and hearings will be on that
basis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.
And I just would like to note, your summary of the situation with
regard to the documents is quite accurate with one exception, and
the Administration was going to brief us on the documents, and not
allow either Mr. Hamilton or myself to personally review the docu-
ments. We took issue with that, and would just have a briefing. In
my discussions with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
who is also concerned that it was just a briefing that we are going
to get by the White House with regard to the documents without
the opportunity to personally review.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Your Honor. I have a prepared state-
ment that I will submit for the record.
Chairman GIIMAN. The statement will be made part of the
record.
[Representative Burton's statement appears in the appendix.]
Mr. BURTON. I believe that the Administration is trying to obfus-
cate and cover up part of the issues. We had a hearing before my
subcommittee, at which Mr. Hamilton was not in attendance,
where Ambassador Dobbins lied to us about the knowledge he had
regarding the assassination of Ms. Bertin. We had an FBI witness,
a Department of Defense witness, and Mr. Dobbins there at the
hearing. We asked all of them questions.
It was indicated very clearly that Mr. Dobbins knew that there
was going to be an attempt on Ms. Bertin's life. He did not tell her
and e did not tell the family. The U.S. Embassy in Haiti knew
about it, and they kept it from the U.S. Congress, but they did not
keep it from the Administration. They were talking to people at the
State Department about it. But there was a deliberate attempt to
not only keep it from the Congress, but to mislead the Congress,
and they deliberately lied to us about it.
And let me just read to you a few things. The documents that
we have seen which we want released show a concerted effort to
downplay the problem. For example, as I said, in October the State
Department's Haiti coordinator, James Dobbins, did not tell our
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, under direct question-




11
ing, that the FBI had discovered a link between the killings and
ties to the Aristide key advisors.
Ms. Bertin could have been saved. All they had to do was tell her
family. Instead, she was in downtown Port-au-Prince and assassins
came up on both sides of her car and killed her. She never knew
about the plot. Her family never knew about it. But we knew about
it in advance. And do you know who we told? We did not tell Ms.
Bertin or her family. We told the Aristide Government, and we be-
lieve that they were involved in killing Ms. Bertin.
Ambassador Dobbins at one point actually counsels Secretary
Talbott to describe these killings, which he knew to be politically
motivated, as revenge motivated, and having nothing to do with
current Haitian politics. That was a deliberate lie, and he knew it
when he appeared before my subcommittee.
The many briefings and testimony on the elections in Haiti did
not mention that we had information that hit squads were
targeting political opponents of the Haitian Government. State-
ments to the media tended to deny this pattern of political killings.
On August 7, a White House spokesman said flatly, and I quote,
"I am not aware of any evidence to corroborate the claim that some
80 political murders have been perpetrated against anti-Aristide
individuals."
What Mr. McCurry was not told, or did not say, was that about
two dozen murders, a series of assassinations committed by our cli-
ent government was no less troubling. Why didn't the Administra-
tion spokesman just acknowledge the problem instead of down-
playing or muddling the issue?
It is true that several media reports merged last fall on this hit
squad phenomenon, but it is important to note that the Adminis-
tration officials pointedly and publicly challenged the accuracy of
these reports. They literally tried to mislead and cover it up.
The declassified documents that we have even show that they
knew these murders were politically motivated, but explicitly plot-
ted to call them something else-"revenge motivated", and "not re-
lated to current Haitian politics".
In an August 7, 1995 column by Robert Novak, far from acknowl-
edging this problem, Ambassador Swing said, and I quote, "The
only political killing anybody talks about is the Bertin murder, but
even that has not been proved. There has been no proof of a politi-
cal murder. Even if you counted one or two of them as a political
murder, the number is very small."
According to documents the committee staff has received, by the
time Ambassador Swing was making that statement he was pri-
vately telling his superiors in Washington about for two dozen
killings, a political motive was considered likely. So it is unfair for
these same people who are systematically discrediting these media
reports to turn around and say that this committee should have
known about this problem by reading the newspapers. When we
have a State Department, we should not have to count on Bob
Novak or other columnists for straight answers.
I am chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, and I
have had people from the State Department before the subcommit-
tee and questioned them. And I can tell you that anybody who sat
in on those hearings and does not think that we were lied to just






was not paying attention. We were. I believe there was a deliberate
attempt to cover up, and I find that very, very troubling.
I think that since we represent the people of the United States
of America, we deserve for the Administration to come clean and
be truthful with us. But when they lie to us-I wish I had had Mr.
Dobbins under oath at the time, e would have been in contempt
of Congress.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON. Yes.
Mr. GEJDENSON. He does not have to be under oath. It is a fel-
ony, I think, under the present House rules. If you can prove he
was lying to you, then you have every legal right to pursue that.
Mr. BURTON. No, if I might reclaim my time, let me just say to
my local friend that there is an IG investigation going on right now
on that very subject, and we are going to continue to see that it
is pursued. The bottom line is that I believe that Mr. Hamilton is
in error. I believe there has been a deliberate attempt to try to
cover this up. It is true that there are fewer political killings in
Haiti now than before. There were a couple thousand. Now there
are only 25 or 30. But we helped get rid of the other government,
and now we have put in one that is killing fewer. Nevertheless,
there is political motivation behind a lot of them.
And let me say this. I find it troubling that the new President
of the country has people trained by our State Department, and his
security guards possibly implicated in political assassinations, and
now he is so unsure of his own security that we had to send 40
people to Haiti trained by the State Department and private con-
tractors to protect the President in his own country.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON. I do not have time right now. I see that I am just
about out of time, Mr. Kennedy. I would like to comment on some-
thing you said, too. I think since Mr. Hamilton had a little extra
time, I will comment on that.
There are troubling things that have been doing on, and I think
this committee is justified in really pursuing this diligently.
Let me say one more thing, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kennedy in his
statement talked about the security guards. U.S.-trained palace
guards are suspected in two August 1996 political murders. Admin-
istration officials have information implicating members of the
President Preval palace guard unit in the August 20, 1996 political
murders and widespread harassment of government opponents.
Members of President Aristide's handpicked palace guards, who
were trained by the Department of State in 1994 and 1995, have
been implicated in political murders in 1995 and 1996.
Mr. KENNEDY. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON. The U.S. Government has provided over $5.5 mil-
lion in support of this unit since 1994, and that, again, is a trou-
bling situation.
Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to discuss this with my col-
leagues when I have some more time. I am not avoiding it. I am
just out of time.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.






Through the years I have become genuinely fond of Mr. Burton.
[Laughter.]
Mr. BURTON. But.
Mr. GEJDENSON. But the irresponsible use of language here
today in charges against the Administration is unconscionable.
This Administration has had, as any Administration, successes and
failures in foreign policy. Haiti is clearly a success, as is the former
Yugoslavian situation, especially when compared to the policy of
the previous Administration.
So what we have here is we are back to the Walker-Nussell
memo. The Walker-Nussell memo told the committees controlled by
the Republicans to use their resources to take the attack on Presi-
dent Clinton for political advantage.
Now, it is clear to me that the effort here will not succeed.
Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEJDENSON. I will not yield.
Chairman GILMAN. This investigation was started long before the
Nussell-Walker memo.
Mr. GEJDENSON. I will not yield, Mr. Chairman.
The committee continues its assault on the Administration's suc-
cesses in, I think, the unrealistic hope that somehow this will take
away from the President truly remarkable successes where he had
shown incredible leadership, and at times he almost singlehandedly
led in this area.
There was not broad support in the Congress for putting troops
in Haiti. Everybody in this room knows the danger politically and
to our military when you put them in harm's way. One hand gre-
nade in a tent and the American Congress and public would have
demanded the removal of our troops in Haiti long before they had
a chance to establish peace.
But the President took the risk because he knew how important
it was to the United States, to Haiti in this hemisphere.
Now, we are going to go through another one of these hearings
where we try to take what is clearly one of the greatest achieve-
ments in the Western Hemisphere in recent times, a government
that since the 1800's had not seen a democratic change of office
holders, having a free and fair election with a change of govern-
ment through the electoral process, not through assassination, not
through military coup, but through the electoral process.
Is the Government of Haiti perfect today? I would venture to say
that no one in the Administration would make that argument. But
it does not take a genius in political science to figure out that we
have come an astounding distance from the days of death squads
and the Tonton Macoutes walking around machine-gunning people
by the thousand, as Mr. Burton points out, a time when hundreds
and thousands of Haitians risked their lives to get to the United
States, to a point where there is some hope in this very poor coun-
try in this hemisphere.
Now, I think we ought to make every effort, no matter how few
the killings are, to find those who are involved in the killings, hold
them responsible and take them to trial. But that is not what this
hearing is all about. This hearing is about trying to deny the re-
ality of what has happened in Haiti, that led by a courageous
President we have made incredible progress, and the Administra-


38-491 97 2






tion is ready and willing to give the chairman and the ranking
member all the information they have, well beyond what any pre-
vious Administration would provide to Congress.
This Administration has stated clearly that of all the documents
this committee has demanded, only 47 have Presidential privilege.
The courts have, I think, in the past sustained Presidents when ex-
ercising this privilege, and they could exercise it completely saying
those are privileged documents, and we will not tell the Congress
any of their content.
But, no, this Administration has gone further. They have said
they will take the ranking member, Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Gil-
man, and they will brief them on these documents. It seems to me
that before the chairman can come here and criticize the Adminis-
tration for its failure to be forthcoming, he at least ought to give
the Administration the time to brief them.
Then if they are unsatisfied in the quality of information or the
quantity of information, or even then if they have a hunch that
there is more there, they might be able to make additional argu-
ments. But to come here today having had the Administration give
this committee 99 point probably 9 percent of the documents they
requested, and offer to even brief them on the remaining 47 docu-
ments, and then to try to continue to use inflammatory language
that Mr. Burton used, I think, again, was highly irresponsible, and
I am sure if we had time he would not mean some of the things
he said.
Mr. BURTON. I meant everything I said.
Mr. GEJDENSON. I am not yielding any of my time.
Mr. BURTON. I meant everything I said.
Mr. GEJDENSON. But the sad business of today is that we are in
political season and the attack seems to be unending. The reality
is so far the policy in Haiti has been a tremendous success. No one
has argued it is perfect. The Administration is willing to come for-
ward with the documents, but politics apparently prevents the
chairman of the committee from accepting that offer.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I am correct, I think this is the seventh hearing of this full
committee on Haiti, and, of course, not counting the hearings of the
Intelligence Committee, the-
Chairman GILMAN. If the gentleman will yield, this is the third
hearing on Haiti.
Mr. Payne. Well, there have been seven according to my knowl-
edge. Maybe a couple of them were Mr.-
Chairman GILMAN. I am referring to the full committee, Mr.
Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. OK, only three, a total of seven.
But let me tell you that there have been 34 Administration offi-
cials who testified 147 times to discuss Haiti, very, very important.
If we took the dollar amount and added up what these officials
could have been doing somewhere else, we probably would come up
with an enormous sum.






After 2 years of this inquiry, this committee has still yet not
found a pattern of persistent human rights violations, or any
thread running through the hearings.
I think we have forgotten that in 1990 Haiti experienced a coup
d'etat, 16,000 boat people headed to the shores of the United
States, hundreds were drowned or eaten by sharks, heading toward
the U.S. shore, 4,000 people were murdered from 1991 to 1994,
U.S. troops arrived there and we heard many of your colleagues
said not one ounce of American blood should be shed there, and
thank God, there was not once ounce of American blood shed there.
But now we today are kind of looking at two isolated cases. We
are going over it again. I think we should dedicate some of the time
to the real problems of Haiti. You know, I would like to submit a
copy of a report for the record that deals with the fact that 60 per-
cent of the 7 million people there are jobless. President Preval can-
not pay street sweepers or nurses to take care of the sick, and the
civil servants are going without pay. As a result, yes, people are
disgruntled and upset.
Yet, we are still debating this question of two killings. I have not
heard the committee bring up Emanuel Constant from FRAP who
was trained and paid for by our CIA, the same CIA that Mr. Ken-
nedy talked about having a manual of torture.
But let me tell you something else that we have been able to find
out about our CIA, that they have a comic style "Manuel de
Combate Polo Liberta". Now, translated, it means "Freedom and
Liberty". But what that was something prepared by the CIA to be
distributed in Nicaragua, which taught people how to disrupt eco-
nomic activity and so forth. But in our recent meetings with CIA
Director Neutch, we want to take a look at this manual because we
believe that in it was possibly some plan on how crack cocaine
should be distributed in the black communities, as we heard re-
cently about the alleged cooperation between the CIA and the
whole question of crack cocaine.
So, we have a lot of very serious situations going on in this coun-
try and around the world, and we are spending all of our time here
talking about two people.
And no one here would say that things are all going right. Haiti
has many, many problems. I have been there many times myself,
and I have seen the problems also. But much of what we hear-
as a matter of fact, it is kind of ironic, and will conclude here, this
being the last day of the 104th Congress, hopefully, here we are
dealing with an issue that is of some importance. But if it were up
to me, if I were the chairman of this committee, I would not be
spending the time here today talking about this case of Haiti when
our allies in the Middle East, where I am reading the first page
of the New York Times, 39 Palestinians killed yesterday, 11 Israe-
lis in the Gaza Strip that have died with new violence erupting, to
me this is important. These are our allies, Egypt and Israel, this
is where we are spending close to $6 billion annually on foreign
aid, and I think that it is certainly well spent, where we have seen
the possibility of the David Accords and the whole peace process
falling apart before us. It's like Nero fiddling while Rome burnt.
We are here talking about two people that we think may have had
a political assassination when this day, in my opinion, should be






spent on seeing how we can bring out interests in the Middle East,
our friends in Israel, the Palestinian people together to see how we
can work out some solution to this very serious problem.
So I just think that this hearing is misdirected, the time is mis-
used, and I think that this is an opportunity that we are missing
by trying to make some political hay as we leave here.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Thank
you, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Moran.
Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While I thank you for giving me the microphone, I do not think
you are going to be particularly pleased with what I have to say
because believe very strongly that this hearing today is not a con-
structive attempt to address Haiti's problems. It is one last parting
political shot at the President and his State Department before this
Congress is concluded.
In fact, of all the abuses of power that have occurred since the
Gingrich Congress has taken over the committee structure, this
committee has been one of the most abusive and least constructive.
We have nothing of consequence to show for the last 2 years. This
committee has used its bully pulpit to bully Administration wit-
nesses time and time again. Of all the crises and concerns around
the world the President has had to address them with virtually no
support from the Republicans on this committee.
In fact, Democrats, and even moderate Republicans, that are pro-
fessionals in foreign policy can seem to do no right from the point
of view of this committee. Even world leaders that are working for
peace and prosperity in these countries are invariably unacceptable
to many of the members of this committee. The only people that
seem to escape criticism are right wing dictators and bigots around
the world.
With regard to Haiti, it did not seem to bother the Republican
majority when thousands of people were being slaughtered and
tens of thousands of people were flooding into Florida. All we could
do was criticize.
The fact is that the Haitian policy has been a success. It has
been an unmitigated success. We have democracy in Haiti today.
We do not have any flood of refugees. We have some people who
in fact have been suspended from President Preval's security force.
He did not hire them. They may or may not have been involved in
assassinations. But it is being addressed, and the State Depart-
ment witnesses are going to tell us how they have responded in a
constructive fashion.
Mr. Payne is absolutely right, there are so many more important
issues that we need to be addressing. And today the Middle East
is the most important. And what are we doing here? We are having
a hearing so that we can take one last parting political shot at an
administration that is probably the most underrated administra-
tion in terms of its foreign policy successes of any in the last sev-
eral years.
So I am disappointed that with all of the things that we could
be doing, we are spending our time on this.
And with that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement.






Mr. Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, my frustration level exceeds any that I have had
since I have been here in Congress, and I regret very much that
my colleague, Mr. Burton, is not in the room because a few of my
comments may be directed to him specifically.
I think Dan is beyond the point of irresponsibility as a policy-
maker when he issues spurious nonfactual, irresponsible, specula-
tive directives, and calls people unabashedly liars without their
having been any underpinning to go on that other than his useless
determination.
I am frightened by that not only as it pertains to Haiti, but as
it pertains to this government. What we do here-somebody answer
for me, please, at some point what would be gained by covering up
murder? And what I heard Dan Burton say is that the Clinton ad-
ministration, if not indeed Bill Clinton and persons who are func-
tionaries, actually participated in covering up a murder. That is a
damn crime.
Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. HASTINGS. No, I will not yield.
Mr. BURTON. Well, you were referring to me and you are saying
that I am in error.
Mr. HASTINGS. Excuse me.
Mr. BURTON. I am not in error.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I will not yield.
Mr. BURTON. Well, then I will speak later, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HASTINGS. That is a crime in and of itself. And if you have
proof of that, you owe it to this country and to all of us to come
forward with that information, and not come in here with that kind
of speculative offer.
Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?
We think we have that proof.
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, if I may be permitted to continue.
Mr. Chairman, you said that we wasted $2 billion in Haiti since
the return of President Aristide. I want to-
Chairman GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
That is not a statement made by the Chair. I said we invested
$2 billion-
Mr. HASTINGS. I gather that you-
Chairman GILMAN [continuing]. And several millions since then.
Mr. HASTINGS. I gather that yielding is something that is deter-
mined when one wishes to speak. I do not yield.
You spoke in terms of the amount of money spent, Mr. Chair-
man. I want to remind you that a major portion of those expendi-
tures vis-a-vis the crisis in Haiti pertained to the interdiction of al-
most 100,000 Haitians fleeing the region's most brutal military dic-
tatorship. And the testimony that we will hear in a few minutes,
and we are probably better advised, or to hear from Ambassador
Swing and Mr. Boswell and Mr. Sullivan, who have a giant amount
of information more than all of us on this committee combined with
reference to these matters.
But in that testimony what you will hear is that $400 million
alone in 1994 was spent in emigrant outflow, and that in the last






3 months I can attest to it, I live in Florida, of the amount of refu-
gees that have come in in emigrant outflow has been zero.
Let me make it very clear here. If I understand the chairman,
we here discharging our oversight responsibilities, which I do not
take lightly, and I respect the chairman and know that he does not.
But obviously this is not something that is going to lead to the fur-
thering of legislation, and it puzzles me.
I think the thing we should be addressing, and I would alert Mr.
Sullivan when he gets ready to testify, that in calling for this hear-
ing and issuing his subpoena, Chairman Gilman on September 19
leveled a series of serious charges about the Clinton administra-
tion, and raised a number of questions.
I would like to go through those when we get an opportunity and
ask the Administration to respond. For example, Chairman Gilman
stated, "The American people have the right to know whether U.S.
officials have tried to conceal some two dozen murders in the hope
of sparing President Clinton political embarrassment. Regrettably,
the cooperation necessary to meet its oversight in this area simply
has not been forthcoming."
I want to know from Mr. Sullivan can he give us a sense of the
cooperation that has been ongoing in this investigation, how many
requests have been from the Congress for documents related to
Haiti? Is it correct that the Haiti Working Group at the State De-
partment had to acquire the services of additional staff just to re-
spond to the document inquiries from the Congress? Do you have
any idea how many hours the working group has dedicated to ful-
filling these requests just over the last year? How many of these
requests were bipartisan? How many were from the majority? How
many were from the minority? How many requests were submitted
by this Committee? What is the status of these requests? How
many documents have been made available to Congress so far?
How many documents have not been made available? What is the
Administration's position on the documents that have not been
made available? And among all these requests, did the Administra-
tion ever decide to withhold responsive documents from Congress
to make them completely unavailable for review or briefing?
I want to make it very clear today to Dan Burton and Ben Gil-
man I am just as good a politician as either one of them. This is
pure unadulterated political posturing and senseless and shame-
less.
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a point of
personal privilege.
Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman is granted a statement of per-
sonal privilege.
Mr. BURTON. I said that Mr. Dobbins lied to my subcommittee.
I stand by that statement. I will now prove that he lied to my sub-
committee, since the gentleman from Florida implied that I was
stretching the truth and trying to make politically motivated state-
ments.
Now, let me read to you the record, my colleague from Florida,
and I hope you will pay particular attention. On October 12 at a
hearing before my subcommittee these are the questions and an-
swers put to Mr. Dobbins:






"Thank you very much. Let me ask you a couple of questions.
You mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, that the FBI was assisting in in-
vestigating some of these alleged political assassinations, including
the killing of Ms. Mirielle Bertin."
Mr. Dobbins said, "Yes."
I said, "She was gunned down in the middle of Port-au-Prince on
the main street as I understand."
Mr. Dobbins said, "Right."
I said, "Because of a traffic jam. Have they found anything about
that yet?"
Mr. Dobbins, and listen to this, "The FBI has not briefed me, or
as far as I know, anyone else from the Administration on their
findings. They are still conducting their investigation, and as far as
I know have not come to a conclusion."
Now, on January 4, 1996, 3 months later, I spoke to the FBI rep-
resentative who was down there, who said, "We met regularly in
Port-au-Prince with representatives of the Embassy, the U.S. mili-
tary, and other relevant U.S. agencies in order to obtain assistance
and advice, and generally to apprise them of the course of our in-
vestigations. The discussion included investigative strategies, prob-
lems experienced, and certain investigative information developed
on the murders."
And what Mr. Dobbins said, 'The FBI has not briefed me," yet
he was in on those briefings.
So he lied to this committee, and there is no doubt about it.
Mr. PAYNE. Would the gentleman yield on that? Mr. Burton, will
you yield?
Mr. BURTON. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. PAYNE. You indicated that Mr. Dobbins said that he was not
briefed. I thought, and I sat here and listened to him, and he said
that the FBI said that there was no conclusion. Your question was
did you conclude that there was some kind of complicity, there was
some kind of involvement-
Mr. BURTON. If I might be-
Mr. PAYNE. No, I am telling you. And he said that I was being
briefed-
Mr. BURTON. One more time let us read the record. Let us read
the record.
Mr. PAYNE. All right, let us read the record.
Mr. BURTON. The record said, "The FBI has not briefed me or
anyone else in the Administration on their findings." The FBI says
3 months later-
Mr. PAYNE. What about-yes, that is my question.
Mr. BURTON. They did brief him.
Mr. PAYNE. What are the findings? The findings you conclude? I
am not a lawyer, but when you have findings that is what happens
when you come to a conclusion. And he made it clear that they
were being briefed, they talked about it, but there were no conclu-
sive findings. When you find them, then you go to indict.
Tell me where the findings are. The FBI never gave him any
findings. They are still investigating.
Mr. BURTON. Well, let me read the rest of it. I will read some
more to you.






Now, here is Chairman Burton again, "So now they, the FBI in-
vestigators, really do not have any leads that you know of?"
Mr. Dobbins: "Oh, I don't think that's the case. I think they,
shortly after they began their investigation, there was one arrest
of somebody who they believed could have been implicated." That
person who was later identified by Mr. Dobbins as Big Claud
LeCroix remains in prison.
In this volunteer response, Mr. Dobbins set aside his excuse of
not being briefed by the FBI and referred only to the obscure
LeCroix arrest.
However, on this second opportunity during his October 12 testi-
mony, he again failed to mention the far more important details
that were pertinent to this question. Before his October 12 testi-
mony, Mr. Dobbins had to have been aware of the Haitian obsta-
cles to the FBI inquiry, the apparent political motivation of the
killings in which Aristide's aids were implicated, the FBI's frus-
trated attempts to interrogate over a dozen Haitian Government of-
ficials, and the links between several other killings identified by
the FBI.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Wynn.
Mr. WYNN. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my request. I would like
to yield to my colleague, Mr. Hastings, who I believe would like to
respond.
Mr. HASTINGS. I am still listening to Mr. Burton in an attempt
to understand what it is-
Chairman GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. HASTINGS. Yes, I yield.
Chairman GILMAN. We have several witnesses today. Mr. Burton
is not the subject of this testimony today. The time is running, and
these witnesses have limited time, and I would like to suggest that
we get on to the witnesses.
Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, I have to concur with the
settlement expressed by my colleagues today. This hearing is in
fact beneath the dignity of this committee. This is the third hearing
that we have had on this subject, none of which have focused on
the successes we have had in Haiti. All three are focusing on an
attempt to attack the Administration without any significant basis,
and having not come to any significant conclusion that I can ob-
serve after three hearings.
With all due respect to you, it is reported in the Washington Post
that you indicated that the Administration was involved in a bla-
tant abuse of power to cover up a massive foreign policy failure in
Haiti.
I have to say, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a fail-
ure in Haiti. Haiti is in fact a great success to this Administration,
which is why it appears that the Republicans are insistent upon at-
tacking it.
The fact of the matter is, No. 1, we have restored democracy to
Haiti; something that had not been accomplished in years.
Second, we ended the outflow of migration from Haiti, which was
costing U.S. citizens $400 million a year.
And, third, we dramatically reduced the political killings in Haiti
from some 300,000-excuse me-from 3,000 between 1991 and






1994 during the coup years to maybe 24, a half dozen or so, a cou-
ple dozen or so, at the present time.
So the fact of the matter is there has not been a massive foreign
policy failure. It has been a massive foreign policy success which
apparently is the reason why it is being attacked.
I said initially that this hearing was beneath this committee's
dignity because I concur with my colleague, Mr. Moran. We ought
to be talking about the situation in the Middle East rather than
nitpicking over the investigation of two palace guards in Haiti. The
palace guards have been suspended. The United States has in fact
sent additional assistance down to conduct an investigation, and
that is as it should be.
But there is no basis for, I think, anyone to conclude that this
ought to be the major issue on our foreign policy agenda today, and
that is why you heard from my colleagues. We believe that this
hearing is purely political and does not really serve the interest of
the country.
I, too, would like to hear from the witnesses because I think they
can further support the statements that we have made, that there
is no basis for this inquiry, there is no massive coverup, and the
situation in Haiti, far from being a foreign policy failure, represents
a real success for the Clinton administration.
I yield the balance of my time.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
If there are no further opening statements, let me say with re-
gard to our committee's oversight responsibilities that no member
has taken a more active interest over the years than I have in
helping Haitians to turn their country around. I led a bipartisan
mission there last spring, accompanied by Mr. Bereuter and others.
I think Mr. Payne was with us at that time, and we sent President
Clinton a 15-page report with constructive recommendations.
Administration officials have told us that our pressure on clean-
ing up the police force has actually helped them clean some of
those people out who were there appointed politically.
We have also tried to be evenhanded. I have pressed for U.S. aid
to the Truth Commission, which looked at abuses in the military.
I have raised serious concerns about killings by very poor Haitians
in Cit6 Soleil, who are probably among President Aristide's fiercest
supporters. We have insisted that the investigation of the murder
of a Lavalas parliamentarian, President Aristide's own cousin, be
treated as a priority.
Moreover, this is not just about Haiti. We cannot pretend to help
the Haitian people by turning a blind eye toward human rights
abuses there by deceiving our Congress here at home.
With regard to the Guatemala documents from the Reagan and
Bush eras, I co-signed a letter to President Clinton asking that
these documents be declassified and released to the public, and
that was signed by some of our colleagues who are here today. Our
committee's constitutional oversight duties are clear, and we will
do our job and let the chips fall where they may.
I am now going to ask our witnesses on the first panel if they
would be kind enough to take their seat at the witness table.
Mr. Conyers, you are welcome to join us up here with the com-
mittee members if you would like.






Ambassador Eric Boswell, and Mr. Joseph Sullivan and Ambas-
sador William Swing.
Ambassador Eric Boswell currently serves as the Assistant Sec-
retary for Diplomatic Security. He has had a long and distin-
guished career in our Foreign Service. He has held posts in man-
agement, counsellor affairs, and was the Executive Director for the
Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs.
Mr. Joseph Sullivan currently serves as a Special Coordinator for
Haiti. He assumed that position in August of this year. In the past,
Mr. Sullivan has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Central
American Affairs, and is our principal officer in Havana.
Ambassador William Swing currently serves as our ambassador
to Haiti. His diplomatic career began in 1963 with prior postings
as ambassador to Nigeria, to South Africa, to Liberia, and to The
Congo. William Swing has served as ambassador to Haiti since
1993, including 1 year grappling with the military dictatorship.
Gentlemen, we welcome you. You may submit into the record
your entire statement as you see fit or summarize it, whichever you
prefer.
If the witnesses would please rise so that we can administer the
oath.
Will the witnesses raise their right hand?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman GILMAN. We look forward to your testimony, and will
start with Ambassador Boswell's testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC J. BOSWELL, ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY OF STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I do not have a statement to make
at this time. I am pleased to be here and ready to answer your
questions and those of the rest of the committee.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOSEPH SULLIVAN, SPECIAL HAITI
COORDINATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. I would like to read a brief statement.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
this committee and to brief you on the recent actions we have
taken to assist President Preval reform and retrain elements of the
Presidential palace security guard. I would like to provide you an
overview of our actions and underlying policy, and then my col-
leagues and I will be pleased to respond to specific questions.
Haiti is a neighbor which for most of 200 years has not seen the
effective application of the rule of law nor the development of effec-
tive institutions of government. Just 2 years ago, prior to the U.S.-
led intervention, law enforcement and justice was virtually absent
in Haiti. There was no police force and the Haitian Army was
viewed as an enemy of the people. An uncontrolled outflow of thou-
sands of Haitian migrants in unsafe vessels fleeing to the United
States was underway. During the years of the de facto regime, over
58,000 Haitian migrants were interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard.






But Haiti has moved away from this dismal scenario. We have
seen concrete improvements. The uncontrolled flow of migrants,
which in fiscal year 1994 alone cost the U.S. Government about
$400 million, has ended and the illegal migrant flow was virtually
zero over the past 3 months.
President Aristide was restored to office. His elected successor,
President Preval, is courageously implementing the economic re-
form measures needed to put the economy back on track, to encour-
age private investment and gain the assistance of the international
financial institutions.
The Army has been disbanded and a new civilian Haitian Na-
tional Police has deployed 5,200 new officers selected in an open,
apolitical, rigorous, and competitive national process.
President Preval has taken steps to rid his government of indi-
viduals involved in or accused of human rights abuses, and he con-
tinues to focus on this issue. Despite these and other notable ad-
vances, challenges remain. The new security structure still lacks
experience and specialized technical training. The Haitian National
Police is making definite progress, but it is an institution that still
needs our help like the other institutions of the fledgling democ-
racy.
rThe problems of common crime and political violence aimed at
destabilizing the Preval Government have been recurrent chal-
lenges testing the national police. Yet, even in the face of these for-
midable problems, it is clear that the level of political violence in
Haiti had declined significantly. Human rights groups estimated
that some 3,000 political murders took place during the 1991
through 1994 Haitian coup period. By comparison, since September
1994, these same groups estimated that there have been about two
dozen execution-style killings in Haiti, in which a political motive
appears possible. Any murder is one too many, but there have been
clear improvements in a country with a long tradition of political
violence.
This improvement reflects the fact that the democratically elect-
ed governments have the support of the Haitian people and have
sought to end pervasive human rights abuses.
Recently, Port-au-Prince has experienced a threat to civil order
with attacks on government buildings, the murders of nine police-
men since March this year, and rumors of coup and assassination
plots, followed by the August 20 murders of opposition politicians
Antoine Leroy and Jacques Fleurival.
This increase in violence and indications that elements of the
Presidential Security Unit were involved in the Leroy/Fleurival
killings prompted President Preval to undertake a reorganization,
vetting and retraining of the Presidential Security Unit, and then
National Police Residential Guard.
In order to ensure that the security treat is confronted appro-
priately, the Haitian Government initiated a broad-based investiga-
tion into all recent incidents of violence. President Preval reiter-
ated his conviction that there is no place in palace security for
those linked to crime, corruption and the violation of human rights.
On August 30, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Deputy
Secretary Strobe Talbott, and other Administration officials trav-
eled to Haiti to discuss, among other issues, our concerns about re-






ports of official involvement in the August 20 murders, and the as-
sistance we might provide to help President Preval carry out the
vetting and reorganization of his palace security apparatus.
Based upon his decision to reorganize the Presidential Security
Unit, President Preval requested that the United States send a
temporary deployment of security specialists to assist him in carry-
ing out the reorganization and retraining of palace security. He an-
nounced publicly on September 17, that he had already suspended
the director and deputy director of the palace security unit pending
investigation of their possible involvement in the August 20 mur-
ders.
As you are aware, the U.S. Government provided assistance to
the Government of Haiti under Section 552(c)(2) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act. We have sent 20 Department of State and 12 Depart-
ment of Defense civilian security personnel to assist the eight con-
tract security personnel and two Diplomatic Security advisors al-
ready assigned to assist the palace security unit.
This augmented team of security personnel is assisting in provid-
ing security to President Preval, retraining palace security ele-
ments, and training new personnel that will be assigned to a pal-
ace as a review and vetting of the current Haitian palace security
agents is carried out.
Haiti still has many problems, and there still are problems in in-
stituting the rule of law and in assuring that the new security
forces do not violate their mandate. What is very important is that
when such violations occur, the Haitian Government be prepared
to deal with them.
When the OAS/U.N. Civilian Mission in Haiti issued its report
in July of this year and documented instances of human rights
abuses by HNP personnel, the police Inspector General undertook
an investigation, suspending a number of agents, recommending
dismissal of others, and preparing submission of several cases for
possible prosecution.
President Preval has unequivocally reiterated his determination
to make the rule of law a reality for the Haitian people. The estab-
lishment of Haiti's first civilian, professional police force, and the
determination to end the systematic violation of human rights typi-
cal of the former Haitian security services are significant advances
toward this goal.
President Preval is determined to ensure that these advances are
not undermined by criminal actions of any individuals in the secu-
rity force. He is taking steps to address that problem and we are
assisting in that effort.
The problems of inexperienced and inefficient police and judicial
systems and political violence are not unique to Haiti. They are en-
demic to countries making the transition from authoritarian to
democratic societies, and no country has had further to travel in
this regard than Haiti.
But Haitian authorities have moved to deal with these problems
with U.S. and international assistance. Haiti's police and security
establishment remain inexperienced and ill equipped, but are ad-
vancing in the gradual process toward becoming the effective insti-
tution required for a functioning democracy.






We firmly believe that it is in our national interest to support
President Preval as he continues to work to build Haitian democ-
racy and its institutions.
I want to note at the beginning of this testimony that I shall an-
swer questions as fully as I can in open session. In those instances
where classified information is involved, I would be pleased to go
into more detail in closed session.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan appears in the appen-
dix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you Mr. Sullivan.
Ambassador Swing.

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM LACY SWING,
UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO HAITI
Ambassador SWING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members, for
the honor of appearing before you today. I have long believed that,
as one confirmed by this body in accordance with Article I of the
Constitution, that I have a particular and specific responsibility to
you; to keep you informed; to answer your questions; and to ad-
dress your concerns. And I thank you for the opportunity to fulfill
part of this responsibility once again today.
I would also say that the active and continuing interest of this
committee in U.S.-Haiti policy is critical to its success. Therefore,
if you have a concern, clearly those of us in the field also have a
concern.
And it has been my experience in Haiti over these past 3 years
that we have shared your concerns. We have also tried to act to ad-
dress your concerns, and criticisms in every instance of which I am
aware.
Now, admittedly, some of these have no immediate or even short-
term solution, and our efforts may not always have borne the fruit
that either you or we would have liked or expected.
My remarks, although relatively brief, I must apologize for them
because they are somewhat philosophical in tone.
When I arrived in Haiti in 1993, I observed publicly that Haiti
had the weakest institutional, infrastructural, human resource and
organizational capacity of any country I had served in since leaving
Central Africa and Liberia a decade before.
So when we speak of Haiti today, we are not talking about a
country which is likely to become a Connecticut, or even a Costa
Rica, any time soon. Through decades of wrong-headed policies,
and what I term "domestic colonialism", that is, either a group, or
a family, or an institution such as the army, Haiti has simply fall-
en too far and too far behind to expect that any effort other than
a long-term policy can succeed in helping the Haitian people build
that durable democracy, the modern economy, and the better life
that they seek, these long-suffering, and incredibly patient, deserv-
ing people.
On the other hand, Haiti is not a Liberia, or Somalia-states
where the term has sometimes been applied of a "failed" state.
What the Haitian people through their determination have
done-with critical U.S. leadership in the international community,






including, I would add, this House-is to create their best prospect
in the past half-century to enjoy freedom, stability and justice.
As Americans, we know as well as anyone that democracy is a
process, not an event. Granted, that process is punctuated from
time to time by key events, such as elections or temporary crises
or setbacks such as are being examined today. It has been my good
fortune to have served in five consecutive countries undergoing
such watershed societal transformation. Some would contend that
my batting average is not very high, but I hope I will be excused
from that.
My abiding optimism about Haiti, in the face of seemingly insur-
mountable challenges, is based in part on my judgment that there
is in place in Haiti today a transition process which is credible,
transparent and increasingly irreversible.
While it is useful to take an analytical snapshot of Haiti, from
time to time as events such as the recent violence demands we do,
essentially the democratic transition process is dynamic, not static.
As such, Haiti's transition process resembles a movie film more
than a snapshot. Haiti is a work in progress.
Thus, while we can snap a photograph or even stop the film
briefly to examine a particular frame, it is in recalling the begin-
ning of the film and then allowing that film and that reel to con-
tinue that we can best put a particular event in perspective. Only
so can we accurately determine whether the trend line is positive
or not. I believe the trend line is positive, even though economic
progress may be slower than any of us would like, and there is vir-
tually a crisis every day. Haiti is a country in which the needs are
so great that it seems that no systems are go and everything is a
priority on any given day.
This is only to say that on the historical continuum of change,
Haiti is much earlier in its societal transformation than many
other countries undergoing the same, such as, for example, South
Africa.
The cycle of violence which erupted in mid-August, including the
broad daylight murder of two opposition politicians, is not unique
to Haiti among societies in transition from decades of autocracy to
democracy in which mistrust and stereotypes on all sides are slow
to die.
What is unique in this situation is that the Haitian Government
and our government actually did something about it. We quickly
recognized the threat that the situation posed to the transition
process, and we moved together quickly to fix it. I can imagine well
that we could be having hearings today on why we did not act, had
we not done so.
Finally, let me conclude simply by talking about Haiti as a long-
term, worthwhile investment.
It should be, as I am sure it is, a matter of great pride to all of
us as Americans that we now live in the most democratic region
on the globe, with 34 of the 35 countries in our hemisphere actively
embracing democracy. Haiti, happily, is part of that historic proc-
ess in which this committee is an important actor.
As fragile and weak as it is, Haiti's fledgling democracy-a coun-
try whose capital is closer to Florida than ours is-will continue to
need and deserve our full support. This assistance is being pro-






vided today at a much lower cost than at anytime in years. In fact,
our costs have continued to decline since our 23,000 troops entered
Haiti 2 years ago, and the 58,000 boat people who left in the 3
years between the coup and Aristide's return are now matched by
fewer than 3,000 who have left since that time, and the U.S. Coast
Guard, rather than having all its assets deployed in the Caribbean
to bring boat people back and help enforce the embargo, have now,
with the Haitian Coast Guard, captured more than 1,000 kilos of
cocaine in the last 3 weeks.
The Haitian Creole language, as many of you know, is rich in ex-
pressions, texture and, above all, proverbs which reflect folk wis-
dom. One of these is particularly pertinent for today's Haiti:
It goes as follows in English, "The Constitution is made of paper;
the bayonet of steel."
With our support, the Haitian people and their elected leaders
are rewriting that proverb to read:
'The Constitution is made of steel; the bayonet of paper."
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Swing appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ambassador Swing.
I would like to address a few questions to Ambassador Swing,
and Ambassador, I am going to ask, because of the shortage of
time, if you could just answer yes or no.
I would like to begin with the first question. It is fair to say, is
it not, that there is no doubt in your mind that members of Haiti's
Presidential Security Unit, which operates out of Haiti's Presi-
dential palace, were involved in the assassinations of two leaders
of Haiti's political opposition on August 25 of this year? Is that cor-
rect?
Ambassador SWING. I cannot give you a yes or no on that. I have
to at least say that we have evidence that there was involvement.
Chairman GILMAN. Is it also true that among those members of
the Presidential Security Unit, who were unquestionably linked to
the assassinations, that there is Joseph Moise, the head of the
unit? Is he a prime suspect?
Ambassador SWING. He has been suspended.
Chairman GILMAN. Is it not true that most members of the Presi-
dential Security Unit were handpicked by the former President of
Haiti, Mr. Aristide?
Ambassador SWING. Many members of the security unit were
picked. There was an initial cohort that was picked while the Presi-
dent was in exile in Washington. There was a subsequent cohort,
in January 1995, that we vetted and reviewed for criminality, cor-
ruption, and human rights violations, and gave other tests. The
first group was reviewed by us only for records of criminality.
Chairman GILMAN. Those members of the unit that were not se-
lected by President Aristide, were selected by the successor, Mr.
Preval; is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. By a successor, Mr. Preval?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Ambassador SWING. By his Administration, yes.






Chairman GILMAN. Is it not true that this unit was trained,
equipped and funded by our government after we did send 20,000
troops to Haiti in 1994, to restore Mr. Aristide to power?
Ambassador SWING. I would defer to my colleague, Ambassador
Boswell. But my recollection is that we began assisting the Hai-
tians in training a palace security unit along about the summer of
1993, in anticipation of President Aristide's return on October 30
of that year, and that relationship has continued, although in the
past year at a much reduced level.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, then, it is true that the unit was
trained, equipped and funded by our government; is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. It was largely trained by our government.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, Mr. Boswell, can you answer that?
Mr. BOSWELL. That is correct what Ambassador Swing said. The
initial cohort was trained by Diplomatic Security prior to Mr.
Aristide's return.
Chairman GILMAN. But we did fund the training and equipment?
Mr. BOSWELL. That is correct.
Chairman GILMAN. And, in fact, the government has spent a
total of $5.5 million in the 2 years since we occupied Haiti to train,
equip and run this very unit. Is that true, Mr. Boswell?
Mr. BOSWELL. I believe that is correct, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Is it true, Mr. Ambassador, that you were the
U.S. official who had the unpleasant task of informing the current
President, Mr. Preval, that members of his own security unit were
involved, or suspected to be involved in those murders?
Ambassador SWING. You are referring to the murders on August
20?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Ambassador SWING. Yes, and I informed the President, I believe,
on August 22.
Chairman GILMAN. Would it be fair to say that when you first
told President Preval about this, he was not enthusiastic about con-
ducting a purge of the Presidential Security Unit, finding some rea-
sons to avoid making an immediate commitment to remove the sus-
pected assassins; is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. That is not entirely the characterization I
would use, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, could you correct that statement then?
Ambassador SWING. I will correct it to say as follows: When I
went to him with it, I think he took it very seriously. We received
full cooperation from him. The only issue was how do you go about
such an elimination of people who may have been involved, and
that was the subsequent discussion.
Chairman GILMAN. Is it correct that one of the reasons that
President Preval was reluctant to act quickly is that he feared that
his life might be in danger if he tried to remove the death squad
members who belonged to his palace guard?
Ambassador SWING. I would not use the characterization "death
squad", sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Well-
Ambassador SWING. I think there was-
Chairman GILMAN [continuing]. Was he concerned?
Ambassador SWING [continuing]. A concern.






Chairman GILMAN. Was he concerned about removal of these
people?
Ambassador SWING. I think he was concerned that this be done
in a proper and prudent manner in order that there be no risk of
danger or repercussion.
Chairman GILMAN. Danger to his own life; is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. Danger, I suppose, but I think basically that
there not be any violence connected with it.
Chairman GILMAN. Was it the judgment of our government that
President Preval might be killed by his own guards if he launched
a purge of the death squad members without taking proper pre-
cautions?
Is that a correct statement?
Ambassador SWING. I do not believe that we feared that his life
was at stake.
Chairman GILMAN. We had no fear of his own life being threat-
ened?
Ambassador SWING. I would make a distinction between a threat
and his actually being killed.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, was there a threat to his life?
Ambassador SWING. You are asking me for my personal judg-
ment on that?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Ambassador SWING. I think as long as you have people in a Pres-
idential Security Unit who have committed murders in the past,
there is always that possible threat.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, in order to treat that problem, did you
develop a plan that afforded President Preval protection from his
own guards?
Ambassador SWING. I developed a plan that basically was de-
signed to eliminate those elements that needed to be investigated
because they were either at the scene of the assassination or we
believed them to be otherwise involved, and at the same time to
provide additional protection.
Chairman GILMAN. For the President?
Ambassador SWING. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. By devising a plan to protect President
Preval, was it not enough to get him to agree to purge the Presi-
dential Security Unit, you then needed to bring high-level pressure
to bear on him in order to force him to recognize the gravity of the
situation; is that not correct?
Ambassador SWING. That is not the way, again, I would charac-
terize it. We had a high-level visit to discuss the situation with
him, and to offer him assistance.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, was the trip by Tony Lake, the Presi-
dent's National Security Advisor, and Strobe Talbott, the Deputy
Secretary of State, and their trip to Port-au-Prince on August 30,
not their intention to try to impress upon President Preval that he
had no alternative but to purge the death squad members from his
own personal security unit?
Ambassador SWING. The purpose of the visit to which I had just
referred in my earlier remark was to impress upon President
Preval the seriousness of having within the Presidential Security
Unit persons who may have been involved in the August 20 assas-






sinations, and to offer him assistance in suspending those elements
for the investigation.
Chairman GILMAN. Was the reason for these two high-level peo-
ple to come to Haiti because you were unable on your own to per-
suade President Preval that he had to remove death squad mem-
bers from the Presidential Security Unit?
Ambassador SWING. We had very good cooperation from Presi-
dent Preval throughout this. I had alerted Washington to the situa-
tion, and the response was to send the delegation, which was very
helpful at that time because I needed him to know that we could
in fact provide the assistance that he would require.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, were you able to convince President
Preval of the necessity to remove these people? Is that not why you
called on the Administration to send some high-level people to help
you?
Ambassador SWING. I believe that he understood exactly the situ-
ation, and was concerned to know how do you correct this. And
Washington's decision was it would be useful to send this delega-
tion there, and it proved to be so.
Chairman GILMAN. In your messages to the Administration, did
you request that high-level people come down to convince him?
Ambassador SWING. I requested high-level consideration of a
plan to help him, including the possibility of either a phone call or
a visit, as I remember.
Chairman GIIMAN. So then, finally, when the plan was put in
place, there are now 40 U.S. civilian personnel responsible for the
physical security of President Preval; is that correct, and is that
the President's status?
Ambassador SWING. The Presidential Security Unit is still in
charge of the President's security, with assistance from our unit,
who are also there primarily to train and professionalize a new
force, into which a large number of the current force will be
brought forward, and some additional persons, including an agreed
upon number, from the Haitian National Police.
Chairman GILMAN. Presumably these personnel will remain in
charge of President Preval's personal security unit until it is safe
to turn that responsibility over to someone else; is that the current
status?
Ambassador SWING. Our people are there for the several months
that it will take to complete the professional program of training
at the National Police Training Center.
Chairman GILMAN. Just one last question. You said you consid-
ered that President Preval might be threatened because of the peo-
ple in the PSU who had committed murders in the past.
When did you become aware that there were people who had
killed in the past?
Ambassador SWING. The ones on the August 20 murders, I be-
came aware of in about, I believe, about 48 hours after that when
I went to President Preval. I had also warned him earlier that
there may be elements in the other portion of the palace security,
which is the outer perimeter security, who may have been involved
in earlier killings, and that they should be expelled or suspended
until the investigation could be complete.





Chairman GILMAN. Did you express your concern about his own
safety?
Ambassador SWING. I did.
Chairman GILMAN. When did you do that?
Ambassador SWING. Mr. Chairman, I would have to get back to
you in writing on that.
Chairman GILMAN. Just approximately.
Ambassador SWING. It was in this year. It was several months
ago.
Chairman GILMAN. So that was before the August 20 killings?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, President Preval has pleased us, has he not, with his
overall performance?
Ambassador SWING. Yes, he has, very definitely. He has been
fully cooperative.
Mr. HAMILTON. He has been fully cooperative. He is committed
to carrying out the reforms in the economy and in the political sys-
tem of the country that we look upon with favor, is he not?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. So he is important in terms of our policy there,
right?
Ambassador SWING. Absolutely critical.
Mr. HAMILTON. And the result of this deployment of the Diplo-
matic Security agents, has been to make him safer; is that not cor-
rect?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Has he been able to purge that Presidential Secu-
rity Unit of any of the bad factors?
Ambassador SWING. I believe, sir, that the chief of the unit and
the deputy chief and a third person have thus far been removed.
Mr. HAMILTON. So you expect more to be removed?
Ambassador SWING. No, at this point.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now, I just want to get a sense of the level of
political violence, and put it into some context.
If you look at the years between 1991 and 1994, I have seen fig-
ures that political murders reached into the thousands; is that cor-
rect; over 2,000?
Ambassador SWING. The various estimates have been used. We
have generally used the estimate of 3,000.
Mr. HAMILTON. Three thousand.
And then how many since Aristide took over, which was in what,
October 1994?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct, sir, October 15.
I think the most recent figure we used was 26.
Mr. HAMILTON. So you have had this very dramatic decline in the
number of political killings since you have had Aristide and Preval
come into office, correct?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct.
Mr. HAMILTON. And with respect to the killings that took place
on August 20, have there been any other killings of that kind
under President Preval?





Mr. SULLIVAN. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. HAMILTON. None that you are aware of?
Ambassador SWING. Not of political opposition leaders that I am
aware of.
Mr. HAMILTON. Now, we became aware of possible political
killings, much fewer than before, occurring in Haiti following Presi-
dent Aristide's return.
Did the U.S. Government at any time direct U.S. intelligence or
information gathering away from these killings?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. Did the U.S. Government at any time direct in-
telligence or information gathering away from possible links to the
Presidential palace or persons close to President Aristide?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. HAMILTON. Aside from the normal protections afforded sen-
sitive intelligence information or diplomatic exchanges, did the Ad-
ministration decide to otherwise restrict the dissemination of such
information within the U.S. Government?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. HAMILTON. Was any of the information judged so politically
explosive within the United States that restrictions were applied to
its collection or dissemination?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Not that I am aware of, Mr. Hamilton. In the
most recent incidents, in fact, I think information has been very
widely disseminated, not only within the U.S. Government, but to
the Congress as well.
Mr. HAMILTON. All right.
Mr. SULLIVAN. I might add at this point to respond to an earlier
question as well, that there were indeed documents requested in
connection with this most recent killing, and all documents that we
have been able to locate have indeed been made available to staff
of this committee.
Mr. HAMILTON. All right. If I may return for just a moment to
President Preval's performance.
When he took over there were many who thought he was just
going to keep the palace warm until Aristide came back. But, in
fact, he has taken a lot of hard decisions, has he not, on the econ-
omy and even decisions that President Aristide was not willing to
make? Am I correct about that?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HAMILTON. And has he given in to pressures to relax, for ex-
ample, the strict controls the Central Bank has placed on taxation
and fiscal and monetary policy?
Ambassador SWING. No. In point of fact, just the opposite. They
are now living very much within their means with considerably dif-
ficult measures, including very high reserve requirements for
banks.
Mr. HAMILTON. So he has stayed on the path of economic reform
there?
Ambassador SWING. He stayed on the path, and he has just
achieved the passage of the privatization law in the Parliament
yesterday.





Mr. HAMILTON. U.S. spending on assistance to Haiti in fiscal
year 1996, as I understand it, was about $120 million. Does that
sound about right to you?
Ambassador SWING. I think that is about right.
Mr. HAMILTON. And we expect to spend about the same amount
in 1997?
Ambassador SWING. That much.
Mr. SULLIVAN. Approximately that much.
Mr. HAMILTON. And during the 3-year period of the coup regime,
we were spending almost the same amount of money, were we not,
on humanitarian assistance?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct. We were spending several
hundred million dollars a year, largely in the holding activities, in-
cluding feeding 700,000, eventually 1.3 million Haitians, a warm
meal a day. We were paying for running the refugee centers in
three cities in the country, and we had the entire Coast Guard fleet
in Miami tied up interdicting migrants.
Mr. HAMILTON. So it was an enormously expensive operation for
the United States. Today we are spending the same amount of
money, but today we are spending it in support of democracy and
a market economy, are we not?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct. We essentially are on a posi-
tive agenda now.
Mr. HAMILTON. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goss.
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased to hear that very rosy scenario. I guess I will have
to discount what I am reading in the press about how things are
actually going in Haiti. I have a number of areas I want to cover,
Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me.
I do want to talk about this question of President Preval and how
much his own man he really is. The testimony from Mr. Sullivan,
and I think corroborated by Ambassador Swing, was that he in-
vited us to come down.
Did he have any assistance in that decision to invite us down,
or did he just come to your office one morning and say "I need 40
DS people in here right now because I am going to weed out some
problems I have got."
Ambassador SWING. No, I would not characterize it as inviting us
down. I phoned the President and said that we had the thought of
bringing this high-level delegation down, and we wanted to arrange
to meet with him, and he was completely in agreement with us. We
asked to come.
Mr. Goss. So basically he did not invite us. We asked him for
an invitation; then he issued the invitation; then we responded to
it. Is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. Very much as we do with many senior dele-
gations, sir.
Mr. Goss. But that is in fact what happened?
Ambassador SWING. That is right.
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much.
I also wanted to get into this question about how fully coopera-
tive he has been.






Ambassador SWING. Could I just-I may have misled you on that
last question. Perhaps I misunderstood you and I apologize.
Mr. Goss. I would appreciate--
Ambassador SWING. Congressman Goss, were you asking about
an invitation for Mr. Lake and Mr. Talbott for us to come down,
or for us to bring the additional 30 agents down?
Mr. Goss. Both.
Ambassador SWING. In the first instance, we expressed a desire
to come down to meet with President Preval with that high-level
delegation with President Preval. And in the second instance, he
asked for the support.
Mr. Goss. Without any suggestion from us that the support
would be a good idea?
Ambassador SWING. We in the conversation said that we could
assist you in the situation to help you with the vetting process, to
identify those elements who should not remain for either involve-
ment in this or for other reasons, and to help you professionalize
and make a proper force out of it, and he accepted that.
Mr. Goss. So he accepted our guidance, and then took the action
that we had recommended to invite us down to provide the protec-
tion; is that correct?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Congressman, I would put it differently. I
think he realized that there were, in making any reorganization of
the palace security, there is an inherent potential problem, and we
discussed how to deal with that potential problem, and bringing ad-
ditional security agents down was viewed as something in the in-
terests of President Preval and something that we could provide as-
sistance in order to enable him to make the reorganization pos-
sible.
Mr. Goss. My reason for asking is that there seems to be confu-
sion on this. My understanding was that this was an idea that
started in Washington, not in Port-au-Prince, and did not start
with Haiti in their sovereign nation with their elected sovereign
leader. It started with the United States of America looking out for
its interests. And I am just trying to clear up any confusion.
Mr. SULLIVAN. If I recall correctly, he indicated his concern about
how to accomplish a reorganization and vetting and removal of any
individuals who might be linked to illegal activities, and how to do
that in a safe and secure manner. And we helped provide one way
in which that might be done, which he accepted and invited this
group to come.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, we are running out of time for a vote
which I do not want to miss, but I do want to pursue this line of
questioning.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, would you be willing to come back and
we will pursue this?
Mr. Goss. Yes, I would, if you would permit me.
Chairman GILMAN. All right, the committee will stand in recess.
There is a vote on, and we will, as soon as we return, continue if
the panelists will bear with us.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN. The committee will come to order.
We were in the midst of Mr. Porter's questioning. Please con-
tinue.






Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Swing, I had understood that you had created a
"plan" to assist the Preval Government in your role in Haiti and
observer on behalf of our national interests. I do believe that you
have done an extraordinarily good job in that role and I am happy
to say that publicly.
I also understand that the plan called for the removal of more
than the three "bad appples" we have talked about-that it in fact
predicted even more should be removed.
Ambassador SWING. Right.
Mr. Goss. And that this plan was to be put into effect. May I
ask when this plan was created by you? When it was shared with
President Preval? How far this plan has gone? And how far is it
going to go?
Ambassador SWING. Thank you, sir. That gives me a chance to
make an addition to what I had said earlier in order to give you
as complete an answer as possible.
There may well be other persons involved, sir, who would also be
suspended because of involvement in similar activities. Obviously,
in an open session I would rather not discuss the details, and I
would be happy to brief you privately afterwards.
The plan to which you refer, again, details of which I cannot dis-
cuss in open session, was-let me just back up the dates-would
have been written on the 25th of August, was simply an effort on
our part to suggest how such a process of vetting and review might
begin, and what the phases might be, and that is all in there.
Again, if you have not actually seen it, I can certainly brief you
orally on it after this session.
Mr. Goss. I thank you. I am not interested in names.
Ambassador SWING. But, as I say, I did not want to in any way
give the idea that the removals have occurred now, that that is all.
We must also keep in mind that we are talking about an ongoing
assessing. Excuse my emphasis on that. But we have been engaged
since 1993 in trying to help train a Presidential Security Unit.
That is a process continuing and the current phase is an inten-
sification of that. So a number of other people will not be brought
into the new force, not because of some unacceptable activity or be-
havior, but simply because they will not make the cut because they
will not meet the standards. That is a separate group.
Mr. Goss. Are all of the people, and, again, I am not talking
names, I am talking numbers here, gone? Because, as you know,
your plan suggested there were going to be more than three. Does
that mean that there are still some that in your view should not
be there?
Ambassador SWING. Not of which I am aware in the PSU.
Mr. Goss. Well, I am having trouble with that because-
Ambassador SWING. That is the close-in protection.
Mr. Goss. Yes. How about the residential guard?
Ambassador SWING. There may be.
Mr. Goss. So, in other words, we have got some people there that
you might still consider dangerous? I am not asking you to give
names, but I am asking whether or not you are satisfied that the
danger has been removed?






Ambassador SWING. Potentially dangerous in the sense of the ac-
tivities they had engaged in earlier, yes.
Mr. Goss. Well, I assume that is true-
Ambassador SWING. Yes.
Mr. Goss [continuing]. because otherwise I would be hard-
pressed to know why we sent 46 Personnel Security people down
there to provide protection.
Ambassador SWING. Right. There is one other point in order not
to give you an incomplete answer and this I should add that there
is the possibility that there are other persons in the current Presi-
dential Security Unit who may have been in the vicinity or actually
at the scene of the two assassinations.
Mr. Goss. Well, do we have any information or any suggestion
of capability about that?
Ambassador SWING. Yes, we do.
Again, I cannot cover it in this hearing but I would be happy to
brief you privately.
Mr. Goss. OK.
Ambassador SWING. So there would be other persons who would
have-and that would be the subject of the investigation as to
whether they were there by circumstance or actually involved.
Mr. Goss. In your opinion, is the actual trigger man in the
Leroy/Fleurival killings among those who have been purged?
Ambassador SWING. We do not know.
Who have been purged? We do not know. I do not know.
Mr. Goss. So the possibility then is that in the palace today, still
under U.S. supervision, we have some dangerous elements that in
fact may have been trained by us or not?
Ambassador SWING. We have some elements there who we be-
lieve to have been in the vicinity of or at the.scene of that particu-
lar crime.
Mr. Goss. I guess in criminal parlance that would make them an
accessory or a participant or something?
Ambassador SWING. Sir, I am not in any way trying to avoid the
question. I simply have to say that we will not know until an inves-
tigation is actually completed.
Mr. Goss. Well, Mr. Chairman-
Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Goss. Of course I would yield to Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. If they are suspected of being complicitous and
being at the scene of murders, and if we sent 46 people to Haiti
to protect the President, why are they still there?
Ambassador SWING. There is a plan that will see that they, in
fact, are suspended.
Mr. BURTON. I know, but why are they there now?
I mean, you would think if they were at the scene of a murder
and that the President's life is threatened, and we have sent people
to Haiti, and we could not even meet at the Presidential palace, we
met at the ambassador's residence, because we were worried about
security, you would think you would get them out of there right
away.
Why are they still there now?






Ambassador SWING. We are doing it according to the plan that
the Haitians and we have agreed on, according to their own plan
and phased activity.
Mr. BURTON. Well, if I might-
Ambassador SWING. It will happen, but I cannot help you beyond
that.
Mr. BURTON. If I might follow up, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. It seems to me there must be some fear or some concern
to get rid of these people if you think they were implicated or even
complicitous in a murder, yet you have not done so. You say you
have some plan.
If I had somebody that was there when a friend of mine was
murdered, and I was a law enforcement official and had control
over it, I certainly would not keep them there, especially if I
thought my life was threatened. So I do not understand the ration-
ale for them not being summarily removed.
Ambassador SWING. Congressman, there is, in indicating that
they were at or near the scene of the activity, we are not alleging
that they were the persons who actually did the deed.
Mr. BURTON. Then how come they are not suspended?
Ambassador SWING. They are not therefore in that sense nec-
essarily dangerous.
Mr. BURTON. Why are they not suspended pending an investiga-
tion? Suspend them with pay but have-
Ambassador SWING. This is exactly what we are trying now to ef-
fect in cooperation with the Haitian authorities.
Mr. BURTON. You are trying to-
Ambassador SWING. It is a process that will happen, as the oth-
ers have happened.
Mr. BURTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Goss. Reclaiming my time and understanding that my time
has probably expired, I heard what you said. You said it is a plan.
It is a process. You are trying to get them to do it. And from that
I take it that we have a continuum where basically we are leading
and trying to get the Haitians to follow in a direction that we think
is the right direction for Haiti to go.
Ambassador SWING. I would describe it as a cooperative action.
We have a very senior official of the Haitian Government who has
been appointed to coordinate this entire activity, and we are work-
ing with him very closely according to a plan that we have agreed
upon.
Mr. Goss. Was he your recommendation or was he-
Ambassador SWING. No, he was President Preval's personal se-
lection, and I might add, a very good selection.
Mr. Goss. I am delighted to hear that.
Mr. Chairman, I have used my time. Thank you. I hope we get
another go around.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gross.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
You know, I do not find anything so unusual where-whether we
were invited in or we decided to go down. I cannot even follow the
train of questioning. In practically every foreign affairs event we
are involved in we either suggest to our allies or use a heavy hand,






whether it is Turkey or Greece, and Cyprus, and Northern Ireland.
They did not come up with the Mitchell Plan. It was the United
States. It was the U.S.'s idea to suggest George Mitchell to get all
parties talking. The Bosnians, and the Croatians, and the Serbs did
not decide they wanted to go to Dayton and meet.
I do not understand what is so unusual about the United States
saying maybe we had better send some people down to see about
propping this up, or whether you are invited or not. I mean, this
whole thing is still-it still boggles my mind as to what, really is
going on.
The question, first, you have a brand new-you never had a po-
lice department ever. The army was the police. So in less than a
year you create an entire new police department, and palace
guards and all the rest. And you find that there are a couple of bad
apples in there, and everyone is shocked.
Like I said, we have got a hearing going on in New Jersey right
now, a 49-year-old cop shot a 40-year-old woman dead, boom. They
are going to have a hearing just to see what happened.
Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield on that?
Mr. PAYNE. Sure, go aright ahead.
Mr. BURTON. Are those policemen who are under suspicion there
in your city? Are they still on active duty or are they on temporary
leave?
Mr. PAYNE. Still on active duty.
Mr. BURTON. They have them on active duty while they are in
their investigation?
Mr. PAYNE. Active duty.
Mr. BURTON. Is that right?
Mr. PAYNE. Yes. That happens in most big cities.
Now, the next question, the State Department officials have tes-
tified that the Administration will not support a Haitian police
force that harbors in its ranks persons we believe to be implicated
in serious crimes.
Has there been any progress in this respect?
And without confirming or denying whether there are charges
against them, I would like to know where these following persons
stand in the Haitian Government's employment status, Pierre
Cherubin, Richard Solomon, Celestin, Danny Toussaint, and
Medard Joseph. These are people who have been accused or sus-
pected. Where do these people stand right now?
Ambassador SWING. None of them are any longer associated in
any fashion formally or otherwise with the current government of
President Preval.
Mr. PAYNE. And why are they no longer there?
Ambassador SWING. They were removed at the time because of
information we had of activities not consistent with their status.
Mr. PAYNE. On August 17, 19 persons from the MDN were ar-
rested, and could you just give me a little bit of your assessment?
Is the MDN popular in Haiti, in your opinion?
Ambassador SWING. The MDN as a political party, right of center
on the scale of the politics there, that has a certain membership,
I am not sure I can tell you what it is, and has a certain following,
and is a duly recognized political party.






Mr. PAYNE. How long has it been in existence and who are some
of the key players of the MDN?
Ambassador SWING. Like most political parties in Haiti, it is a
relatively new party. The head of the party is a man named Hubert
de Ronceray, and one of the other leaders was Pastor Leroy, who
was just assassinated.
Mr. PAYNE. What has been their previous background? They
were supporters of Aristide?
Ambassador SWING. No, they basically opposed the return of
Aristide to Haiti.
Mr. PAYNE. What is the purpose of their organization? You say
it is a political group. Now, sometimes I get-they said FRAP was
political, and we found out the CIA paid FRAP to disrupt the gov-
ernment, maybe do a few killings here and there.
What is the MDN? Is the CIA involved in them? Do we know
whether the CIA has helped them like they did FRAP?
Ambassador SWING. Congressman, the persons actually arrested
at the MDN headquarters on August 17 were all former Haitian
army, Fad'h. There were about 19 of them at the time. They were
at MDN headquarters. That is where the arrest was made. It was
not MDN-arrested MDN people.
Mr. PAYNE. OK. So getting back to the question, I guess the dif-
ficulty in establishing a police unit when you have had no police
department, when the military were the police, I guess you are
going to get a couple of bad apples in there.
What is the current strength of the Haitian police, the unit na-
tionwide?
Ambassador SWING. We helped the Haitians to train and estab-
lish a police nationally of 5,200 officers.
Mr. PAYNE. What was the number that we were originally in-
tending? I thought it was about 7500.
Ambassador SWING. We originally had planned to train 7,000,
and that is part of the reason that we had to open up police train-
ing at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, because we did not have the
capacity on the campus at Frere, just outside Port-au-Prince. It be-
came clear along the way to President Aristide that that was prob-
ably more than his budget would support, which in point of fact
has happened. And so he agreed to a number of 5,000.
Mr. PAYNE. Well, I guess my time is up, and I will stop. I will
not take advantage of the opportunity as might have been done
previously.
But I just want to indicate that I think that President Preval is
really moving along with this whole question of privatization, deal-
ing with a new legislature that was trying to find its own level of
importance and strength and power. It was difficult, I guess, walk-
ing through with novice persons elected for the first time, and I
continually say that I think that in spite of a glitch here or two
that the progress is continuing.
I would like to commend you for hard work that you have done
there during some very difficult times, and I just, as I indicated be-
fore, seven hearings and close to 50 Administration witnesses here
on this one subject. You know, I have heard about beating to death
a dead horse, but there is probably nothing left to the horse, but






I guess we will have another hearing if we have time before the
elections. Thank you.
Chairman GIIMAN. The committee will stand in recess for 10
minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman GILMAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is a document, Mr. Swing, dated September 1, 1995.
Do you have that in front of you? Could somebody on the staff
see that he has a copy of that?
[The cables appear in the appendix.]
The first paragraph is the relevant paragraph there. Ambassador
Swing, this has been declassified as you know. This cable states
that the FBI investigation into the Bertin murder is at a standstill
because of a lack of Government of Haiti cooperation. Moreover, it
states that some of the persons implicated in political killings re-
main in their jobs.
Do you recall when you concluded and first reported to Washing-
ton your impression that the Haitian obstacles to the FBI inquiry
were merely designed to create political cover? Was that on or
about August 12, 1995?
Ambassador SWING. Could you just read that last sentence before
that? I did not quite understand.
Mr. BURTON. Sure. Do you recall when you concluded and first
reported to Washington your impression that Haitian obstacles to
the FBI inquiry were merely designed to create political cover, and
was that on or about August 12, 1995?
Ambassador SWING. Sir, I don't recall reporting that in those
terms. I recall it was about August 1995 that we were beginning
to realize that the FBI investigation was not proceeding as we had
hoped it would, and it was somewhere between then and October
11 when the special investigative unit was created that we went
to the government and said that we would urge them to create
their own investigative unit who could take over the investigation
upon the FBI's departure.
So somewhere roughly in that timeframe would have been when
we would have concluded that the investigation was not advancing.
Mr. BURTON. This cable that I gave to you, that was your cable.
You sent that cable?
Ambassador SWING. No, I understand.
Mr. BURTON. Yes.
Ambassador SWING. And I am not meaning in any way to be dis-
respectful. I sent a lot of cables, and I did not remember that lan-
guage. I have it in front of me now.
Mr. BURTON. But would you read the first sentence there, sir?
You can read it out loud if you would.
Ambassador SWING. "The FBI investigation of the Bertin assas-
sination is at a standstill due to lack of GOH cooperation. Individ-
uals around the President who were thought to be implicated in
execution-style killings continue to hold their official and quasi-offi-
cial positions."
Yes, sir.






Mr. BURTON. So you concluded then at some point at that time
or prior to that, that there were Haitian obstacles to the FBI in-
quiry that were merely designed to create political cover.
And did you come to that conclusion on or about August 12,
1995?
Ambassador SWING. I am sorry, I do not understand the ref-
erence to political cover. Is that in this cable somewhere?
I want to understand your question so I can answer it properly,
but I do not understand.
Mr. BURTON. Let me state it one more time.
Ambassador SWING. I understand what you are saying. I do not
understand the reference to political cover. Is that something I am
supposed to be saying?
Mr. BURTON. OK, was it ever your impression that the Haitian
Government was creating obstacles to the FBI inquiry? Was that
conveyed to the State Department on or about August 12, 1995?
Ambassador SWING. Yes.
Mr. BURTON. Thank you.
So when Ambassador Dobbins told me in October 1995 that the
FBI inquiry was ongoing, and at the same time the FBI was pack-
ing up to leave, what he said to me was not accurate, was it?
Ambassador SWING. What dates are we talking about? Again, I
am trying to go back into history here. Let me just try to-
Mr. BURTON. Let me give you the dates. I will give you the dates,
sir.
Mr. PAYNE. Would the gentleman yield?
You are asking him to say what Mr Dobbins-
Mr. BURTON. I did not yield.
Mr. PAYNE. I do not understand.
Mr. BURTON. Let me finish my line of questioning, then you-
Mr. PAYNE. It is bouncing back.
Mr. BURTON. Let me finish my-
Mr. PAYNE. It does not make sense.
Mr. BURTON. Well, I will make sense if you let me finish my line
of questioning.
Mr. PAYNE. Well, it will be the first time. Go ahead, Dan.
Mr. BURTON. I request the gentleman's words be taken down. I
mean, I do not make scurrilous remarks about you, Don, and I do
not expect you to do them to me.
I will withdraw that request.
The point I am trying to make is that when Ambassador Dobbins
appeared before us, in my opinion, and I think the record proves
it, he misled, at the very least, this committee. He said there was
an ongoing FBI investigation, and he knew at that time, I believe,
that the FBI was already packing up to leave, and he said it was
an ongoing FBI investigation. The FBI left on October 13, 1995.
And when he appeared before our committee it was October 13,
1995.
So I guess my question is, when Ambassador Dobbins told us
that, being in the position that he was in and working with you,
he must have known that the FBI was leaving and was packing up
because of frustration, and that there was not going to be an ongo-
ing FBI investigation?
Ambassador SWING. Let me respond as follows, if I may.






We did encounter obstacles along the way, and we tried to work
our way through them, and we brought down special delegations to
try to help us work through them. I had endless conversations on
this issue because I had been partly responsible for the FBI's com-
ing in to start with. In fact, we had the FBI on the ground within
less than 24 hours after Madam Bertin's assassination. I happen
to have been in the palace when she was killed, and I called Presi-
dent Aristide at home, and we spoke about it. And based on that
conversation I was able to go forward to make a very senior-level
request that we get the FBI down because we felt it was very im-
portant to get to the bottom of the killing.
Along the way there were problems that developed. But I contin-
ued to persist right up until the very end to try to keep the FBI
there, essentially because we felt that was our best hope given the
limited investigative capacity, virtually nonexistent at that time, of
the police locally to get this assassination solved, and get to the
bottom of it.
So I hope that is of some help. Despite obstacles and problems,
we felt it was important to continue the investigation. This is why
I continued to push to keep the FBI there, and we did in fact have
the FBI there up until about the 13th of August or thereafter-of
October, sorry, of October.
Mr. BURTON. On the day of Ambassador Dobbins' testimony, an
internal State Department memorandum prepared for Assistant
Secretary Alexander Watson had far less troubling-making cat-
egorical assertions about the FBI's Bertin inquiry under the sub-
heading "The Bertin case the Government of Haiti lobbyist blow
smoke. And I will quote that memorandum.
"Hogan and Hartson and Ross Robinson and Associates, U.S.-
based lobbyists for the GOH," Government of Haiti, "have released
a report entitled 'The Myth of Politically -Motivated Killings in
Haiti.' It gives full vent of spurious theories that the Bertin killing
last March was either drug-related or the work of right-wing ex-
tremists. The more compelling theory developed by FBI investiga-
tors pointing to involvement of certain DOH officials and policemen
which the DOH is undoubtedly privy to is bizarrely mischarac-
terized as stemming from an unsubstantiated claim."
So our government, according to this memo, did not agree that
this murder took place at the hands of a right-wing extremist or
drug-related, but it was stemming from some politically motivated
person or persons; is that correct?
Are you privy to that memo?
Ambassador SWING. I think I am reading it right here. This is
the one.
Mr. BURTON. Yes.
Ambassador SWING. Again, if we go back to the article that was
quoted earlier from a prominent Washington journalist that intro-
duced the figure of 80 killings, and in which I was quoted as saying
there is the Bertin case and there might be one or two others, what
I was saying, I was making no judgment about what the ultimate
outcome of these cases would be.
What I was saying, Congressman, was that based on the knowl-
edge we had to date we were not in a position to say were they
politically motivated or if they were drug-related or anything else





because at that point the FBI investigation was not complete, and
the Haitians did not have the capacity to carry it much further.
So I was simply leaving it open to see what the investigation
turned out. I probably did in that article refer to some political mo-
tivation on the Bertin killing.
Mr. BURTON. Well, my time is up. Let me just end by saying that
the information that we have from these memos would indicate
that our government including you and Ambassador Dobbins were
aware that these were probably politically motivated killings, and
Ambassador Dobbins, when he appeared before our subcommittee,
knew that her life was threatened and he had been told so by the
FBI and the military; is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.
The gentle lady from Florida, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to the witnesses here today. I am going to ask some
questions referring to the cables that we have been discussing.
The first embassy cable number 1190, just to make sure that you
have it there, cites a series of murders in February 1995, including
several of the first suspected political killings after we restored
President Aristide to power. And I had some questions about these
cables.
Have you reported to Washington that members of the palace
guard implicated in one or more of the February 1995 murders re-
flected in this cable were expected to be purged from the Presi-
dential Security Unit? And if so, how many members or former
members of the palace guard are implicated in any of these Feb-
ruary 1995 murders?
Ambassador SWING. I will be as specific as I can based on my
recollection as much as I am aware of. I believe, as I recall the fig-
ure, that there were about a dozen people removed over that period
of time from the President's return until recently. I believe that to
be the figure, but it is a recollection, and I have to check myself
and give you an answer afterwards.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. But referring to the purge in the past 3
weeks, have you reported to Washington that members of this pal-
ace guard were implicated?
Ambassador SWING. Yes.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. How many members or former members are
implicated in any of these murders?
Ambassador SWING. I think it would not be prudent in open ses-
sion to discuss that. I would be happy to brief you afterwards.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Sullivan or Ambassador Swing, either
one of you or both, when did you first become aware that a member
or members of the Haiti palace guard were implicated in any of
these February 1995 murders or any other murders?
Ambassador SWING. You are now talking about the 1995?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, the February 1995.
Ambassador SWING. I do not recall at this time. I am sorry.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And of the ones that were just recently
purged that would be in your memory within the past 3 weeks,
how many-when did you first become aware?





Ambassador SWING. Well, the only two, I believe, that we are
talking about today are the two political opposition figures who
were assassinated in the afternoon on August 20. And my recollec-
tion is that I knew within about 24 to-more likely 48 hours after
that occurred that there might be some involvement of the Presi-
dential Security Unit.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In February 3 at 9:50 in this cable, "Haitian
Army Warrant Officer Kebreau was shot five times in the head and
chest while drinking at the Zodiak Bar in Rue Martisan."
Do you have any information about them in the recent purge?
Ambassador SWING. About that particular murder, yes. That was
the first-
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Can you share-
Ambassador SWING. We should recall that of the 26 or so mur-
ders that are now being investigated by the Special Investigative
Unit from this period that, as I recall, was the first. It was on Feb-
ruary 3, 1995, as you accurately state, and it was about 5 weeks
before Madam Bertin was assassinated.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But were some of them expected to be
purged? Did you have that expectation, or did you-
Ambassador SWING. At that time, no.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. believe that that would be?
Ambassador SWING. At that time we did not know. And I do not
recall when I first knew that there might be some involvement
there.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And right now would you say that?
Ambassador SWING. Say what, ma'am?
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That you think that they were implicated in
these murders, and you expected them to be purged from that Pres-
idential Security Unit?
Ambassador SWING. I am not at liberty to discuss that in open
session.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So that would be a non-no? You are not say-
ing no to that?
Ambassador SWING. I am not saying no to it. I am not at liberty
to discuss it in an open session.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. On the second embassy cable, it is number
3679-3640 in some of the papers. That is dated May 1995. In this
cable you informed the State Department of the May 22, 1995 mur-
der of Michel Gonzales who was shot in the face and killed in front
of his teenage daughter, who is an American citizen.
Have you reported to Washington your expectation that the
members of the palace guard implicated in this murder would or
should be purged from the Presidential Security Unit?
We are talking about the September purges?
Ambassador SWING. Yes, I am. We have, I think, consistently
brought this to Washington's attention and have consistently made
the point with the legitimate government of Haiti, whether it was
under President Aristide or President Preval, that our own ability
to help them would not tolerate the continued presence of persons
in those security units who engaged in such activities.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman,
but just a last question.





When did you first become aware that a member of Haiti's palace
guard was suspected in the Gonzales murder?
Ambassador SWING. I am sorry. I do not recall.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But can you give us any kind of a figure, be-
fore September, right around that time? How much after the mur-
der took place did you become aware, and how did you become
aware?
Ambassador SWING. I am sorry. I would be delighted to answer
your question if I could. I simply do not recall. It is just a lack of
memory on this. I am sorry.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. For the record, if you could submit that for
us whenever you get a chance to recollect.
Why did we not go to President Aristide or the President to de-
mand justice-particularly when American citizens are made wid-
ows and orphans by the actions of the Presidential bodyguards?
Ambassador SWING. There is no case that I considered to be more
serious than that of the assassination of Michel Gonzales. His
widow, as you correctly noted, and his daughter, who was present
at the time of the assassination, are both American citizens.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But as important as it was, that person re-
mained in that position for over a year, 15 months. As important
as it was for the U.S. Government, it was important to keep this
person in this sensitive position for 15 months?
Ambassador SWING. Well, that has to do with your earlier ques-
tion was to when we knew about it, and that is what I do not recol-
lect, and I will have to go back to the records to find out.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could try to recollect for us for the
record.
Ambassador SWING. I will do that. It is not a question of recollec-
tion.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. This is very important.
Ambassador SWING. It is not a question of recollection, with all
due respect. It is a matter of my going back into the record because
I just do not know. I would have to look it up. I am sorry.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It just seems that if it is of such a priority
for the U.S. Government, and it would be so important, that it
would be one of the key items that one would remember, with all
due respect.
Thank you, Ambassador.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
Mr. Sanford.
Mr. SANFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Swing, most members of the Presidential Security
Unit were handpicked by, as we know, former President Aristide,
and this unit has continued to provide for his personal security
since he left office. That is my understanding, and that is cor-
rect-
Ambassador SWING. That is correct.
Mr. SANFORD [continuing]. based on your understanding?
Did you or any other U.S. officials at any time speak to President
Aristide about the problems in this unit?
Ambassador SWING. We have spoken to them on many occasions
over the period of his time in office.





Mr. SANFORD. Did you ask for his support or assistance in carry-
ing out the purge?
Ambassador SWING. We worked, I think, very closely over a long
period of time in seeing that a number of those persons were re-
moved from anything to do with the palace, and in fact that has
all been accomplished now. They have all left.
Mr. SANFORD. But that would be direct contact with President
Aristide in terms of actually carrying out the purge?
Ambassador SWING. That is correct.
Mr. SANFORD. Do we have any reason to believe that President
Aristide is upset about the purge that has taken place of his hand-
picked forces, that actually continue to, as I understand it, spend
a great amount of time-they are still spending time with Presi-
dent Aristide?
Have you heard anything along those lines?
Ambassador SWING. I do not know his reaction. He, as you know,
is in the States as of yesterday. I did not talk to him before he left
or have not talked to him since we came in with the augmented
security agents.
You correctly state, however, that he does receive Presidential se-
curity protection in his period now as a retired President.
Mr. SANFORD. Do we have any reason to believe that other mem-
bers of the President's-well, let me back up. Other members of the
Lavalas movement are upset about the purge?
Ambassador SWING. I have no reaction from them that I can re-
port to you.
Mr. SANFORD. None. Even just through the grape vine back in
Haiti?
Ambassador SWING. There has been a certain amount of public-
ity, some of it positive, some of it negative, in the local media, both
the written press as well as the radio. Some of both.
Mr. SANFORD. Conjecture? How much conjecture do you hear on
the radio?
Ambassador SWING. There is some criticism from the Lavalas
side that I am privy to that I have heard through the airwaves or
through the written press.
Mr. SANFORD. Regarding the assassinations and other criminal
activities involving members of the palace guard, have we at any
time come across any evidence linking President Aristide in any
way to these activities?
Ambassador SWING. Which activities are you referring to, Con-
gressman?
Mr. SANFORD. Well, in essence, basically any of the assassina-
tions.
Ambassador SWING. The answer is I do not have any evidence
linking him to any-
Mr. SANFORD. Other than the direct linkage to the guards that
still basically spend time with him.
Ambassador SWING. No, I have no evidence that would link him
to that.
Mr. SANFORD. Have we at any time come across any evidence
linking President Preval in any way to the assassinations or crimi-
nal activity?
Ambassador SWING. No, sir.






Mr. SANFORD. I am through with my questions.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman-I thank you for your
comments.
Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes, I just have a question about our aid. I under-
stand that there is an assistance package of about $28 million or
so that is being held up. Could you tell me that?
And also, I understand that some of our balance of payment and
privatization funds expire today; is that right? I mean, after today
there will be no more-that that particular line expires. Could you
bring me up to date on that?
Mr. SULLIVAN. If you do not mind, Mr. Congressman, we will
share this question, and I will talk a little bit about the programs
that have been notified to Congress, and then Ambassador Swing
will talk about their effects in Haiti.
There are probably three most critical elements that were noti-
fied to Congress. They are the $3.5 million for the administration
of justice, which is the program to improve the very poor judicial
system in Haiti, and particularly to help train prosecutors with in-
creasing involvement by the Department of Justice, and on this oc-
casion in the city of Port-au-Prince where they have not been fo-
cused in the past.
The second is the budget support which is, as you mentioned ear-
lier, I believe, a part of the package together with the IMF, and the
other international donors to provide budget support so that they
will be able to pay their teachers, their municipal workers, their
parliamentarians on time, and they look to that assistance, and
particularly after having passed the privatization bill, so that they
can live on a less austere and less difficult budget than they have
in the past and meet their international commitments.
And, third, there is an element of $800,000 which is for election
support, in order to prepare for territorial assembly elections which
are scheduled for this fall, and money needed to help carry out
those elections, which is, again, part of a package involving other
donors as well, in addition to the United States.
Mr. PAYNE. Right, the notification period just ended, not the
funds itself, right?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, in several cases, indeed the administration
of justice, my understanding is that the Department of Justice real-
ly only does have funds to carry on until the very first days of Octo-
ber unless the hold is lifted on these funds in order to be able to
go forward in training judges and prosecutors.
Mr. PAYNE. That was one of the arguments about upgrading the
police, but the judicial system lacking experienced judges, lacking
prosecutors, lacking investigators actually to investigate a crime
since the military was the law, and you did not need all that be-
cause they were judge, jury, executioner and all the rest.
How do we intend to move this country into the 21st century if
we are holding back our money to train judges?
I mean, it seems to me, and this is not for you to answer, but
you can answer that part, that there are people that are attempt-
ing, even with the Dole Amendment, I guess it has the right name,
it seems like there is an attempt to make this thing fail. I have






never seen more activity go toward making something that is
struggling to make it under very difficult situations with a very,
very violent history, trying to move into making it, saying we criti-
cize the fact that they do not have qualified judges or a good crimi-
nal justice system. So what do we do? We hold up the money to
reform the justice system. And they are going to browbeat some-
body about a day, was it April the 2nd or April the 1st, did you
know, do you not know how many are going to be implemented like
you are a mind reader.
Well, anyway, getting back to the question, where do we stand
on these funds? And second, are there any other countries that are
assisting in Haiti at the time, any of the friends of Haiti?
Ambassador SWING. There are, of course, a number of other
countries assisting, and we are working cooperatively with most of
them. On the police training, for example, both Canada and France
and the United Nations are involved. In the justice area, we have
a lot of support again from those, as well as from the UNDP.
Our project will have to come to a halt on October 3 without
those funds, however. We have trained approximately 400 of the
country's 500 judges, and we would like to complete that project be-
fore we move to the longer-term project, which is to take the new
judges who will be selected by the territorial assemblies, and who
will probably be much better qualified than the current judges, to
start a training cycle for them.
The difficulty is exactly as you state. We now have a police which
is becoming more efficient by the day in terms of its arrest capabil-
ity, but they are not moving them through the judicial system, so
the prisons which are already inadequate are becoming over-
crowded.
The prison at Port-au-Prince which was built to hold about 300,
actually today has more than 900 prisoners. This leads to all sorts
of conditions, including human rights conditions. It leads to greater
efforts to break out of prison, and that is replicated throughout the
country.
And you are correct in stating that our justice efforts are sadly
lagging behind the police efforts. We have $64 million over 5 years
for the police, and we have $18 million over 4 years for the justice
system. So we are trying to continue that program and to augment
it in the coming months. It is a real problem for us.
Mr. PAYNE. I have heard by trying to follow the history of Haiti,
that when there is a lack of confidence in the Justice Department
many times it seems like it creates a vigilante group or some peo-
ple who will say, well, if they catch them, they put them in jail,
they are never going to go to justice because we do not have judges,
we do not have prosecutors, and let us just take justice into our
own hands, and create a more volatile situation.
Is this an accurate assessment of perhaps the thinking of the av-
erage person, so they are locked up, they are put in prison, we do
not have a system, so maybe before they put them into prison let
me put out justice my own way?
Ambassador SWING. No, I think undoubtedly the current system
reinforces that tendency and trend which we have seen in Haiti be-
fore, and that again argues for trying to put the judicial reform on
to a fast track.






Mr. PAYNE. Just once again, I would like to say that I once again
commend you for the work that you have done and your Adminis-
tration during this very troubled time. I have never seen anybody
try to pull out of the jaws of victory or defeat, you know how that
thing goes. Something worked. We lost no lives. We restored de-
mocracy into the country. They are struggling to work it around.
We have been spending from ten o'clock to two o'clock here talking
about two murders in Haiti and how many people will be sus-
pended from the palace guard. And we have people firing at each
other with machine guns our friends in the Middle East. We had
4 hours to bring in our people from the Defense Department and
Foreign Assistance and folks that are dealing with this, maybe we
could have come up with some suggestions to deal with what I
think currently today in the world is one of the most critical prob-
lems that any of our allies are facing. But we spend 4 hours so far
dealing with this-and I know this, I am sure you would prefer to
be down in Haiti working there doing what you do best. But I
guess they subpoenaed you so you had to come up.
I would just like to say that you have my support. I think Presi-
dent Clinton has done an excellent job, not only in Haiti, but in
Northern Ireland, and North Vietnam, Cyprus, Iraq, and the whole
world, where we see a lessening of hostilities. Still, there are a lot
of tough places around, but, you know, this continued distrust to
make foreign policy statement of a success to become a failure,
when we did not lose one single, one single combatant out of
23,000, we do not even have that record where we have military
maneuvers. I think you have done a commendable job. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
We are not talking about two murders. We are talking about
murders by U.S.-trained personnel, the palace guards have killed
two dozen people since our intervention 2 years ago.
Mr. PAYNE. Well, that happened in Chile too.
Chairman GILMAN. I have not yielded.
Mr. PAYNE. It happened in Nicaragua.
Chairman GILMAN. I do not yield.
Mr. PAYNE. What is new about it?
Chairman GILMAN. I do not yield at this time!
Mr. PAYNE. All right. Well, I have got something-
Chairman GILMAN. We are here on an oversight review of what
our policy is and what the Haitian Government is doing with re-
gard to the trained personnel that we have in Haiti.
I might add that the ambassador is not subpoenaed. The ambas-
sador is here voluntarily.
Ambassador Swing, would I be correct in surmising from the fact
that we still have about 40 U.S. bodyguards in Haiti today that
President Preval's life could still be in danger, that we cannot
today withdraw those Americans without exposing him once again
to an unacceptable risk from his own bodyguards?
Ambassador SWING. I do not expect that when we withdraw our
42 Diplomatic Security people from DS, DOD and the contracting
agency, I do not expect that the President would be in any danger
from his Presidential Security Guard.






Chairman GILMAN. That is not the question I am asking you. If
you were to withdraw them today, would the President be in dan-
ger from his own bodyguards?
Ambassador SWING. I do not believe so. I think there is, again,
a primary focus of what we are in Haiti for is to carry out a thor-
ough review and vetting process, to train and to professionalize the
Presidential Security Unit to make sure there are no longer any
elements left within it which could in any way cause either risk of
danger or risk of embarrassment or credibility.
Chairman GILMAN. So there could be some risk yet among the
palace guards for the President? If we were to withdraw them
today, we would still have some risk there. Is that what you are
telling us?
Ambassador SWING. There will be no risk once we have finished
the review and vetting process, and so I would not-
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador-
Ambassador SWING. I would not want to
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador-
Ambassador SWING. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. Let me interrupt. That is not what I am ask-
ing.
I said if we were to withdraw our trainers and our U.S. body-
guards today, would the President be under any risk?
Ambassador SWING. Until we are satisfied that all of the ele-
ments have been suspended, who have engaged in such activities.
Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Boswell, have our Diplomatic Security personnel in the Pres-
idential palace in Haiti been instructed to regard the Haitian secu-
rity personnel still at the palace as a potential threat to President
Preval's life?
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, the role of the Presidential Secu-
rity Advisory Unit for-
Chairman GILMAN. Could you put the microphone a little closer
to you?
Mr. BOSWELL. Yes.
Chairman GILMAN. Could you just answer yes or no to my ques-
tion? Have our Diplomatic Security personnel at the palace been
instructed to regard the Haitian security personnel still at the pal-
ace as a potential threat to President Preval's life?
Mr. BOSWELL. The Diplomatic Security personnel at the palace
must-
Chairman GILMAN. Can't that question be answered yes or no?
Mr. BOSWELL. I do not think that is an easy question to answer
like that, Mr. Chairman.
I think the Diplomatic Security personnel have to look for danger
wherever they may find it around them, and I do not have any-
thing more specific than that to give you.
Let me add, Mr. Chairman, that the reason that we have 42 peo-
ple down there from a couple of agencies is to advise and train the
Presidential Security Unit. They are also there to protect each
other. They are also there in that number to make sure that they
are safe.






Chairman GILMAN. The American trainers who are there, the
U.S. bodyguards, do they consider the Haitian bodyguards as some
threat to the President?
Mr. BOSWELL. The trainers that are there are vetting the body-
guards for continued service in the Presidential Security Unit.
Chairman GILMAN. So there is some concern about some of them?
Mr. BOSWELL. There is some concern. There might be some con-
cern.
Chairman GILMAN. Ambassador Swing, have we sent any addi-
tional U.S. military personnel to Haiti in connection with the purge
of the Presidential palace or because of the deteriorating security
environment?
Ambassador SWING. No, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. There were some reports over the summer of
hastily scheduled U.S. military exercises in Haiti designed to help
shore up the government.
Can you assure us that these reports are untrue and that all of
our exercises there over the last 4 months have been scheduled
well in advance and that we do not perceive the need to intimidate
anyone in Haiti, or to protect anyone in Haiti?
Ambassador SWING. As far as I know, all of the exercises that,
as you correctly state, began in July are unrelated to the matter
for which we are assembled today; namely, the problems of the pal-
ace security guards and the assassinations.
As you know, we brought in the 82nd Airborne, about 165, in
July of this summer.
Chairman GILMAN. They were not related to any threat at that
time?
Ambassador SWING. They were there on a security training mis-
sion as we augmented our presence in the city. We started in July
to do a 7.5-mile road project that exposes our support group troops
more than they had heretofore been, and they came primarily for
that.
Now, clearly, with that many really top troops in the country,
that clearly augments the perception and the reality of security in
Haiti. And in that sense, yes, it does contribute to security, but the
primary focus was training.
Chairman GILMAN. When was that military expedition planned?
Ambassador SWING. The planning, I cannot tell you that. You
would have to ask DOD or USA COM at Norfolk. But the first con-
tingent arrived in July. The idea is-
Chairman GIIMAN. Was that planned in advance or was that a
hastily planned expedition?
Ambassador SWING. I do not know how much in advance it was
planned.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you have any information with regard to
any of the planning or the notice of arrival of that expeditionary
force?
Ambassador SWING. In the sense did I know about it beforehand,
yes. I was on hand to meet them.
Chairman GILMAN. How much beforehand?
Ambassador SWING. I knew well beforehand. Days before at
least, perhaps weeks before.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you ask for that force to come to Haiti?






Ambassador SWING. No, not specifically. I fully agreed with it,
and I fully support it.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you make any request, with regard to
that military force, to come to Haiti?
Ambassador SWING. I made a request later on. I made a request
that in light of this, that we try to schedule an additional deploy-
ment for September because there was not one in September. I
thought it was useful to do them on a monthly basis, and I had so
informed the government.
Chairman GILMAN. For what reasons were you making the re-
quests for those military expeditions?
Ambassador SWING. Because I thought it was useful in terms of
augmenting our own security posture for our own troops, and that
was basically the reason I did it.
Chairman GILMAN. Was there a threat to our own troops that
were down there?
Ambassador SWING. I do not believe it to be. Certainly not-it
was a threat that we felt that we could handle. And with the aug-
mentation of the additional 82nd and the 2nd Marine Expedition-
ary Force, we felt we were fully handling this. Because of the 500
troops there, there are more than 100 who are in the security area.
Chairman GILMAN. What sort of a threat did you perceive that
there could be without these troops?
Ambassador SWING. The normal threat you would have if you
were out working on projects in the city, or on a roadbed.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you include any threat to the Presidency
at the time you were asking for the military to come in?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. How much have we spent since the official
withdrawal of our forces from Haiti last April on the cost of mili-
tary exercises and other U.S. military deployments to Haiti?
Ambassador SWING. Sir, I will have to-I will have to get back
to you on that, or get the Defense Department to get you an an-
swer. I do not have an accurate figure.
Chairman GILMAN. Does Mr. Sullivan or-
Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I think we would have to consult with the De-
partment of Defense and get an answer to you.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you have any estimate of what we have
expended?
Ambassador SWING. I really do not, but we will be happy to get
that to you, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. All right. I am going to request that you sub-
mit it in writing for the record, and we will make it part of the
record.
Are there any additional deployments of U.S. forces contemplated
over the next few months? You said you wanted-
Ambassador SWING. Yes, sir.
Chairman GILMAN [continuing]. Some additional ones?
Ambassador SWING. As far as I know. There is, of course, not one
planned for September, but there is one in October, and according
to the schedule it should be the 82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg
again.
Chairman GILMAN. How many personnel are involved?





Ambassador SWING. It varies. The first deployment in July was
165. When the Marines came in August, it was about 65.
Chairman GILMAN. How many are you asking for in October?
Ambassador SWING. I never ask for them. I take what comes.
Chairman GILMAN. How many will be sent?
Ambassador SWING. I think we sort of agreed that they will vary
somewhere between about 50 and 175. It will usually be about that
number. They will stay 7 to 10 days normally.
Chairman GILMAN. Is that for security purposes?
Ambassador SWING. It is primarily to augment security training.
Yes, it is for security.
Chairman GILMAN. Did we ask the Canadian Government to de-
ploy additional military personnel to Haiti to assist in stabilizing
the situation during the purge of the Presidential Security Unit?
Ambassador SWING. Could I brief you afterwards on this?
Chairman GILMAN. Well, I think it would be very simple. Did we
ask them to assist us?
Ambassador SWING. I think this is the subject of confidential ex-
changes between our two governments, and I would prefer either
not to answer it either yes or no, but to brief you following the
hearing.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, let me ask you, were any Canadians de-
ployed to help with the Presidential problem?
Ambassador SWING. The Canadians, normally they have about
two platoons at the palace, about 40 people, and they augmented
their presence by 50 percent. So basically they have about 60 peo-
ple at the palace now for perimeter security.
Chairman GILMAN. The press seemed to report that the Canadi-
ans ringed around the entire Presidential palace; is that correct?
Ambassador SWING. That is not my perception. I have never seen
that, but it may have happened since I left.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, what was their duty at the Presidential
palace?
Ambassador SWING. Their duty primarily is to train what is
called the NPRG, the outer perimeter guards which are primarily
former FOD and Guantanimo migrant people.
Chairman GILMAN. I am sorry. I did not hear your response to
the last question?
Ambassador SWING. I said, sir, that the primary function accord-
ing to my information of the Canadian contingent of the U.N. force,
these are U.N. troops, is essentially to train and assist the NPRG,
which is the outer perimeter guards force for the palace.
Chairman GILMAN. Do you have any idea how many Canadian
personnel were involved in that?
Ambassador SWING. Generally they have had 40 U.N. personnel,
Canadians, and they have just added an additional 20.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, did any other governments
deploy additional military personnel to Haiti in connection with the
purge, or leave in place personnel who had been scheduled to ro-
tate out?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of.
Chairman GILMAN. We are on a roll call. The committee will
stand in recess for about 15 minutes.
[Recess.]





Chairman GILMAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Goss.
Mr. Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Swing, thank
you.
I am reading from a Los Angeles Times, September 25 article
that says, "'It was very heavy-handed,' one European diplomat
said, 'they told the Haitians this is what we know and this is what
we are going to do. It's spitting in the face of Haiti and saying you
are an occupied country, and you don't count.'" That is a story re-
ported about the foreign diplomatic community and Haiti observing
this latest arrival of U.S. security forces.
And then I notice the article goes on to say, "But U.S. Ambas-
sador William Swing and President Preval insist publicly that the
Haitian Government requested the U.S. agents to retrain the Presi-
dential Security Forces."
I submit that is a very important distinction because our mission
here is to deal with national security questions. It is not to deal
with domestic political questions. And I would suggest, if we got a
bona fide request from Haiti, that has to be weighed in the context
of a national security test.
If, on the other hand, the Administration had decided that they
want to impose upon Haiti some of these security personnel for
whatever reasons, however bona fide or not, it appears to me that
that is definitely getting into the sovereignty of another country.
And when you go ask what would be the motive for that, I think
you do get a suggestion, perhaps even a strong whiff, of domestic
politics.
But the question I have for you on that is, I think you have an-
swered the statement about whether you invited them or they in-
vited us, and even though your testimony and this newspaper arti-
cle are somewhat in conflict, I presume that your testimony today
has more credibility than this newspaper.
Ambassador SWING. I think it reflects on what constitutes a re-
quest and how did you arrive at it. And in a certain sense, it goes
right back to the question of whether President Preval asked for
the FBI, or whether we offered it and he accepted it. And I know
there has been room for some disagreement on that too.
All I can tell you is that when we spoke to President Preval
about the situation as we knew it on the ground, within the Presi-
dential Security Unit, and basically outlined what would need to be
done, we came to a mutual understanding that it would be in both
their interest and in our national interest to augment our security
presence at the palace.
Mr. Goss. Well, that is a very good point.
Ambassador SWING. Which is what we did.
Mr. Goss. That is a very good point because I have been looking
at some of the memorandum from, and maybe Ambassador Boswell
would comment on this, on the question of our capabilities with re-
gard to protection of our American personnel in Haiti overseas, in-
cluding Ambassador Swing. And I am astonished to find out that
as far back as November in 1995, and even subsequently in a letter
to Chairman Gilman from the Inspector General of the Department
of State dated September 25, that there is a shortage of these Dip-
lomatic Security officers. So much so that there has even been talk





about perhaps paring down on the Secretary's detail. That is an ex-
traordinary statement.
I have done some checking to see in all of the areas where there
are some serious security problems right now, in Sarajevo and Za-
greb, and Riyadh, that when I counted the number of DS people
there that we have been told are there, it totals 11. When I count
how many there are in Haiti, it is somewhere between 22 and 44,
however you characterize these people.
So my question is, are we putting at risk other areas and other
Americans and other American interests by this extraordinary com-
mitment of security personnel to a foreign President in his palace
in Haiti?
Mr. BOSWELL. Congressman, you are absolutely right that this
has been a very difficult year for the Diplomatic Security Service
in terms of the number of surges that we have had during the
course of the year that have required personnel. And it has become
difficult to respond to these requirements.
We were fortunate in the case of Haiti to be able to get some
help from other agencies. As you saw, there are 12 members com-
ing from the Department of Defense doing protective security in
Haiti.
Mr. Goss. Ambassador Boswell, I apologize for interrupting. The
bells have gone, and I think you have got my point, and you have
answered my question. It is tough. We are all on a short budget.
So the question will go and it is a judgment call on whether or not
this is a wise commitment of our assets.
I need to ask, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent to submit for
the record the unclassified Administration responses to questions
that we had about PSU training and U.S. assistance to them,
which I think are of interest to the committee.
And, finally, Mr. Chairman, I am disturbed by a report that I
have that has been brought to my attention that says that the Ad-
ministration chose former New York Police Commissioner Ray-
mond Kelly to head up the U.N. police effort in Haiti. He was not
hired in his personal capacity. Instead, I understand he was award-
ed a sole source $420,000 contract with the Investigative Group, In-
corporated, which has some interest and connection in the Depart-
ment of State.
I am going to submit this request for the record, and my request
is for whoever is the appropriate person on the panel, perhaps Mr.
Sullivan, could you provide us for the record a memorandum detail-
ing the process by which this contract was awarded for the IGI,
and how we happened to get to this somewhat extraordinary cir-
cumstance which does appear to have some elements, possible ele-
ments of nepotism in it, which is a concern to us.
Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the questions will be made
part of the record.
[Administration responses to questions regarding PSU training
appear in the appendix.]
Chairman GILMAN. I will ask our panelists if they will respond.
I have just a few questions. I know Mr. Conyers might have a
question. We are confronted with another roll call, but we will try
to wind up before the vote.





Again, I would like to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, were you at any
point concerned that rather than removing the suspected assassins
from the Presidential Security Unit, that President Preval might
try to cover up the involvement of his palace guards and death
squads?
Ambassador SWING. The question is would he remove them or
will he try to cover it up?
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Ambassador SWING. Of course, he will do everything possible--
Chairman GILMAN. No, I am asking at any point were you con-
cerned rather than removing them or any coverup?
Ambassador SWING. No.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you or any other official of our govern-
ment ever warn President Preval against trying to cover up the
death squad activities of some members of the Presidential Secu-
rity Unit?
Ambassador SWING. I had no reason to.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you or any other official of our govern-
ment ever warn other officials in the Haiti Government, besides
President Preval, against covering up the death squad activities of
the unit?
Ambassador SWING. I brought to the attention of those who need-
ed to know when there were elements in the Presidential guard
who needed to be suspended.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, that-
Ambassador SWING. And I think that is an answer to your ques-
tion.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, I do not think you are answering my
question.
Ambassador SWING. Would you ask it again, sir, and I will try
to be more-
Chairman GILMAN. Did you or any official of our government
ever warn other officials of the Haiti Government, besides Presi-
dent Preval, against covering up the death squad activities of the
Presidential Security Unit?
Ambassador SWING. Well, again, I am sorry, sir. I cannot accept
the characterization of death squads. I have never accepted it. So
it certainly makes it difficult to answer the question.
Chairman GILMAN. Well, covering up the assassination attempts.
Ambassador SWING. Did I warn them
Chairman GILMAN. Yes.
Ambassador SWING [continuing]. Against covering up?
Chairman GILMAN. Did you ever warn them about covering up?
Ambassador SWING. No. I told them that it was important that
those elements be dealt with, and the consequences of not doing
that would be serious in our ability to support PSU and other ele-
ments of security at the palace.
Chairman GILMAN. So you have never told any of them that they
should not be covering this up?
Ambassador SWING. I am trying to put it into more positive. I al-
ways talk to them about the importance of getting rid of these ele-
ments.
Chairman GILMAN. Did you ever ask any of your staff to pass
that wording on to the Haiti officials not to cover it up?





Ambassador SWING. I have always been able to tell them the con-
sequences of what a coverup would mean, if something did-
Chairman GILMAN. So you did discuss that with them?
Ambassador SWING. I do not recall ever using the term "cover-
up." I have said, in effect, that it is very important to do this in
its own right, for your own sake, and the difficulty will be if these
elements are not purged, it will have great implications for our own
ability to assist you.
Chairman GILMAN. To your knowledge, did any member of your
staff ever warn the Haitian officials about covering up the fact?
Ambassador SWING. Well, implicitly, yes; that the implication of
not getting to the bottom of these would have serious consequences
for our assistance program.
Chairman GILMAN. How about Joseph Moise, the former head of
the Presidential Security Unit, who has now been removed, where
is he today?
Ambassador SWING. I do not know physically where he is, but he
is outside of the palace.
Chairman GILMAN. Is he outside-
Ambassador SWING. He is no longer in the security unit.
Chairman GILMAN. Is he outside of Haiti?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of, although Millien,
his deputy, was recently in Boston before his suspension was an-
nounced.
Chairman GILMAN. Was Moise given what is known as a golden
parachute to remove himself from government?
Ambassador SWING. Not that I am aware of. I think he is simply
pending the investigation.
Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Conyers.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, first of all, Mr. Chairman, for allowing
me to raise a question or two here.
I would like to submit that this has been a useful hearing. There
have been obvious differences that members have come here with,
but I would like to commend the ambassador and the other two
witnesses for doing their level best to help make us understand a
little bit more what is going on. I think that everybody that has
participated in these hearings are indebted to you in that regard.
I have been looking at your prepared statement, Mr. Ambas-
sador, and I was struck by this sentence, "By comparisons, since
September 1994, these same groups estimate that there have been
about two dozen execution-style killings in Haiti in which a politi-
cal motive appears possible."
Well, for a country that has been in turmoil for as long as they
have, I may be optimistic, but that seems like a pretty low rate.
Is that figure going down or is there any movement or expla-
nation you can put beside this assessment that you made in your
statement?
Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Conyers, I am only aware of these two cases
since President Preval has taken office. We do think that the
Preval Government has taken a number of very positive actions to
remove people who had any possibility of association with such vio-
lent acts, and we think there is a positive message being sent when
people are dismissed who may have ben involved in such acts.





Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Conyers, I am going to suggest that all
of us who have additional questions submit them in writing and
ask that the witnesses respond in writing. We have 5 minutes left
to get to the floor on this vote.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your patience and for your
willingness to come to testify, and I know it was with a great deal
of hardship some of you are here.
[No additional questions were submitted to the witnesses.]
Ambassador Swing.
Ambassador SWING. Sir, I will be very brief. Could I ask you for
your indulgence to make a clarification?
Congressman Burton asked me a question. On further refection,
it is clear when I answered it that the question was not that clear
to me. It had to do with the question of what Ambassador Dobbins
and I knew, I think, on October 13, 1995, with respect to the depar-
ture of the FBI.
And I would like, if it is possible, to ask to review the question
to make sure I understood it, and review my answer.
Chairman GILMAN. You will have an opportunity to review the
testimony.
Ambassador SWING. I apologize for that but I am not sure I an-
swered it as I-
Chairman GILMAN. You can submit a clarification for the record.
Again, I want to thank everyone.
Ambassador SWING. Thank you, sir.
Chairman GILMAN. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned subject
to the call of the Chair.]













APPENDIX




September 27, 1996


Full Committee Opening Statement of
Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman on
Administration Action and Political Murders
in Haiti: Part II



Two years ago this week, 20,000 American troops left their homes for Haiti to restore
constitutional order and to throw out a regime that was murdering its political opponents.

Since then the Clinton Administration has spent more than $2 billion dollars to support
a government that has tolerated thugs who murder its political opponents.

I supported the restoration of the constitutional order in Haiti, but that support was
betrayed by this Administration when it kept Congress in the dark about political murders by
the very government we returned to power.

Many of these murders were committed in 1995, while U.S. troops were still in Haiti
as peacekeepers. Our government has information linking these killings to members of Haiti's
Presidential Security Unit, which was trained by our government.

One of the most shocking murders was the March 28th, 1995 shooting in broad
daylight of Mirielle Bertin, a prominent opponent of then President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Two dozen FBI agents were deployed to Haiti to help investigate the shooting, but by
August 1995, our Embassy had concluded that the Aristide government was stonewalling the
FBI.

Even as the FBI was packing up to leave Haiti in frustration, an Administration
official told our Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on October 12th that the investigation was
continuing. Within a few days, the last FBI agent had left Haiti in frustration.

The Administration has been aware since early 1995 that death-squads were operating
under the direction of top security aides to President Aristide.

The Administration privately pressed Aristide to dismiss suspected assassins in his
security unit, but he refused to do so. Although some were dismissed by President Rene
Preval after he took office in February 1996, their violence got out of hand last month.

But, despite some ten hearings and briefings before the Committee on Haiti during
1995, the Administration failed to inform us until January 1996 that it was aware of these
death-squads, which began a year earlier.





60


2


After two leading opponents of President Preval were slain on August 20th, the
Administration rushed 46 armed agents of our Diplomatic Security Service to Haiti to protect
Mr. Preval from his own U.S.-trained bodyguards and to oust members of his palace guard
who are linked to a series of recent murders.

The Administration has claimed Haiti as a foreign policy success. Yet, on the very
weekend it was preparing to send cruise missiles against Iraq, two top members of its foreign
policy team -- the Deputy Secretary of State and the President's National Security Advisor --
were dispatched to Port au Prince to negiotate with President Preval.

If Haiti is the success that it claims, then why has the Administration been so reluctant
to provide our Committee with the information we have sought?

It is interesting that, while the Administration has declassified 5,847 documents
pertaining to Guatemala, it has declassified only 21 pertaining to Haiti. You see these
documents here this morning, which illustrate a stark double standard.

Moreover, the President has made an extraordinary use of his executive privilege to
block a careful scrutiny of about 50 essential documents by our committee.

And, to those who may say that our investigation is mere politics, I would point out
that our Committee has an oversight responsibility to discharge on behalf of the American
people.

As a National Security Council official said when releasing those Guatemala documents
last May, "We're going to let the chips fall where they may. We just want to get to the facts."

In concluding, I would like to note that I have tried to work with the Administration
over this past year to get to the bottom of these troubling issues...issues that should not be
minimized because some say conditions were worse before U.S. troops landed in Haiti.

We must ask instead, after our nation's vast investment in Haiti, how many political
killings are acceptable?

I want a democratic government in Haiti to work. I have long supported that goal.
What I cannot accept, nor can our Committee accept, is this Administration telling Congress
less than the full story about the situation in Haiti.

I would much prefer to try to work with the administration to fix current shortcomings
than to be told next year that we must support the return of U.S. troops to Haiti as the only
means of preventing the collapse of the government in Port Au Prince.








STATEMENT OF REP. JOHN CONYERS
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HEARING ON HAITI
SEPTEMBER 26, 1996

I want to thank Chairman Gilman for holding these hearings and for generously offering to let me
make a statement.

Haiti's problems did not begin on August 20th this year with two murders, and they didn't begin
with the 1991 coup that overthrew its first democratically elected government. Haiti's troubles
probably began in 1517 with the importation of slaves. For centuries afterward, this tiny nation
suffered under the oppression of colonialism and the tyranny of fear. The United States has
played its own role in this painful history: thousands of Haitians were killed during one of the
Marine occupations from 1915 to 1920.

This hearing comes at the end of a long, hard road for Haiti. Haiti has earned its dignity, and it
deserves its democracy. No president has done more to help Haitians determine their own
peaceful destiny than Bill Clinton.

In the last year and a half, the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has trained 5200 police. These are rookie cops, but they
represent Haiti's transition from a repressive army to a civilian controlled police force.

A mere $3.5 million pending release from the Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees
will help establish new Administration of Justice (AOJ) programs. The programs will train needed
specialist such as prosecutors, detectives, judges, and especially anti-narcotic units.

The Haitian police made two large drug busts this month, one on a ship containing 83 kilos of
cocaine. In an even bigger bust on August 22, the new Haitian police teamed up with the US
Coast Guard to seize 348 kilos of cocaine. If the AOJ funds are held up, the next time these
drugs might make it onto our streets. A hold on aid would deprive Haiti's nascent judicial system
of resources needed to investigate not just the August 20 murders or these drug busts, but also
the murders of thousands of democracy supporters who were killed during the years of the coup.

The investigation into those thousands of murders will be greatly assisted by the return of
thousands of Haitian documents and photographs seized by US troops. The administration
announced this week that these materials, taken from the headquarters of the army and the
paramilitary group FRAPH, will be returned.

Democracy in Haiti has been under attack on many fronts. In fact, one source of instability may
be from within our own borders. The Department of the Treasury has informed me of several
recent cases of illegal arms shipments. One seizure of weapons yielded 260 guns and 14,900
rounds of ammunition. Another shipment in Miami included a load of pistols, shotguns, and
another 15,000 rounds of ammunition. Treasury noted that many of these weapons are the same
kind seized by US troops during the restoration of democracy.





62


I think it is no coincidence that these surreptitious shipments of arms have coincided with threats
to democracy. Shortly after former army officer Andre Pierre Armand announced that certain
political parties were stockpiling weapons to overthrow the government, he was assassinated in
cold blood. Where have all these guns been going?

Aristide once defined his task as moving his country from poverty to dignity. President Preval's
job is to move from hope to justice. I look forward to working with all of my colleagues here to
help achieve that.





63



STATEMENT OF REP. JOSEPH P. KENNEDY II
SEPTEMBER 27, 1996



Mr. Chairman,

On February 7th, 1996 the world witnessed the first
democratic transition of power in Haiti. President Preval
succeeded President Aristide after free and fair elections.

As we know democracy does not come easily. Our own history
teaches us that a heavy price must be paid to secure its
blessings.

The people of Haiti understand this lesson too. It took
Haiti almost two centuries to achieve the democratic dream.
During that time the Haitian people suffered through a series of
brutal dictatorships whose lack of respect for basic human rights
and the principles of freedom are well documented by this
committee and other bodies, Mr. Chairman.

Now there is no doubt that the will of murderous dictators
in Haiti has been replaced by the will of the people expressed in
elections throughout the country.

The people of Haiti no longer fear the late night knock on
the door from members of a brutal regime that ridicules
principles of human rights. The Organization of American States,
the Department of State, and Amnesty International agree that the
human rights situation in Haiti has improved immeasurably.

And President Preval is continuing to take steps to improve
this record. There have been allegations by the Republicans in
Congress that the Presidential Palace in Haiti can be linked to
about 20 political killings that have taken place in Haiti since
Aristide was restored to power. During the 3 years of the coup
regime, there were over 3000 political murders.

Preval has taken swift and decisive action to deal with the
rogue elements within the Presidential security unit. Over the
past year he has dismissed members of the Presidential security
unit and police individuals allegedly involved in human rights
abuses.

After the most recent incident on August 20th, Preval
immediately dismissed suspect members of the Presidential
security unit, and two dozen members of the State Department's
diplomatic security force were dispatched to Haiti to aid Preval
with security measures.

Preval has also taken significant and dramatic measures to
address pressing economic issues in Haiti. Just last night the





64


Haitian Senate passed a landmark privatization bill. This bill,
passed earlier by the lower chamber of parliament, will soon be
signed into law by President Preval. It contains the same
language the IMF and World Bank were urging Haiti to adopt.

In addition, this week the Haiti government successfully
addressed the issue of civil service reform. With the
privatization language and civil service reform approved,
approximately $170 million of international assistance -- $15
million from the United States -- will be released to Haiti,
helping its economy to build and grow.

Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt in my mind that the Haiti
economy will grow. Since Preval took over Haiti has run its
economy as a cash economy spending only revenues, not borrowing
money on the international market. Its austere fiscal and
monetary policies indicative of the government's commitment to
improving its economy.

Haiti continues to face a number of significant challenges.
In the economic sector, it must start the process of
privatization while addressing high unemployment and inflation.
It must institutionalize the Haitian national police. It must
reform its judicial system.

Preval has begun to address all of these issues. He has
clearly shown his intolerance for human rights violations with
his swift dismissal of rogue palace security guards. He will
sign the privatization bill into law. And his reforms efforts
will continue in the judicial system.

I believe that the United States has a special duty to
ensure that this new and still fragile democracy is given the
chance it deserves to flourish. I am proud that the U.S. has
played a major role in the success we have witnessed so far in
Haiti. We should do nothing which threatens to roll-back the
gains of the last few years.








STATEMENT OF REP. DAN BURTON

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Two years after the massive U.S. military operation in
Haiti, wc find ourselves still very deeply involved in the affairs of that country, with the outlook
for the success of democracy there very much uncertain.

As we move closer to our own presidential election, the Clinton administration is desperate to
put the best face possible on the situation in Haiti. This is not easy to do. We are witness to the
continuing violence, and the disturbing indications of the involvement of Haitian officials in
political murder.

It may be politically inconvenient, but decency and justice requires that we pay attention.
Despite $3 billion in U.S. spending on Haiti, once again we see a pattern of wrongdoing, of
violence, and of official cover-up. Now we are sending diplomatic security personnel to protect
President Preval because security agents that we trained turn out to have been involved in
political murder.

I met President Preval. I believe he is sincere and that he wants to do the right thing. But he is
submerged in a muck that he inherited, and that we helped to perpetuate.

A year ago, my subcommittee held a hearing on Haiti. The State Departement's Haiti
coordinator, Ambassador Dobbins sat in the witness chair and told members that he or the State
Department had no knowledge about the murder of Ms. Bertin and who might be involved. We
now know that this was completely untrue and that he was receiving regular briefings from the
F.B.I.
This pattern of deception must stop, and we are determined to see to it that it does. This, at least,
ought to be beyond politics.

Thank you.





66


STATEMENT OF
JOSEPH G. SULLIVAN
SPECIAL HAITI COORDINATOR
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 27, 1996



Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee to brief you on the recent actions we have taken to
assist President Preval reform and retrain elements of the
Presidential palace security unit. I would like to provide you
an overview of our actions and underlying policy, and then my
colleagues and I will be glad to respond to specific questions.

Haiti is a neighbor which for most of 200 years has not
seen the effective application of the rule of law nor the
development of effective institutions of government. Just two
years ago, prior to the U.S.-led intervention, law enforcement
and justice was virtually absent in Haiti. There was no police
force and the Haitian Army was viewed as an enemy of the
people. An uncontrolled outflow of thousands of Haitian
migrants in unsafe vessels fleeing to the United States was
under way. During the years of the de facto regime, over
58,000 Haitian migrants were interdicted by the U.S. Coast
Guard.

But Haiti has moved away from this dismal scenario. We
have seen concrete improvements. The uncontrolled outflow of
migrants, which in fiscal year 1994 alone cost the U.S.
Government about $400 million, has ended and the illegal
migrant flow was virtually zero over the past three months.
President Aristide was restored to office. His elected
successor, President Preval, is courageously implementing the
economic reform measures needed to put the economy back on
track, to encourage private investment and-gain the assistance
of the international financial institutions. The Army has been
disbanded and a new civilian Haitian National Police has
deployed 5,200 new officers selected in an open, apolitical,
rigorous and competitive national process. Five of nine
Department HNP Directors, senior management supervisors, have
received training and have assumed their duties. Seventy three
Commissaires, middle management supervisors, have completed
their training and are gradually and selectively being assigned
to the most critical posts to provide supervision to the HNP
officers. Another 63 Commissaires awaiting assignment or
completing training should be in the field in the next two
months.




67


-2-

President Preval has taken steps to rid his government of
individuals involved in or accused of human rights abuses, and
he continues to focus on this issue. Despite these and other
notable advances, challenges remain. The new security
structures still lack experience and specialized technical
training. The HNP is making definite progress, but it is an
institution that still needs our help, like the other
institutions of the fledgling Haitian democracy.

The problems of common crime and political violence aimed
at destabilizing the Preval government have been recurrent
challenges testing the HNP. Yet, even in the face of these
formidable problems, it is clear that the level of political
violence in Haiti has declined significantly. Human rights
groups estimated that some 3,000 political murders took place
during the 1991-1994 Haitian coup period. By comparison, since
September 1994, these same groups estimate that there have been
about two dozen execution-style killings in Haiti, in which a
political motive appears possible. Any murder is one too many,
but there have been clear improvements in a country with a long
tradition of political violence.

This improvement reflects the fact that the
democratically-elected governments have the support of the
Haitian people and have sought to end pervasive human rights
abuses.

Recently, Port au Prince has experienced a threat to civil
order with attacks on government buildings, the murders of nine
policemen since March, and rumors of coup and assassination
plots, followed by the August 20 murders of opposition
politicians Antoine Leroy and Jacques Fleurival. This spike
in violence and indications that elements of the Presidential
Security Unit were involved in the Leroy/Fleurival killings
prompted President Preval to undertake a reorganization,
vetting and retraining of the Presidential Security Unit and
the National Palace Residential Guard. In order to insure that
the security threat is confronted appropriately, the Haitian
Government initiated a broad-based investigation into all
recent incidents of violence. President Preval reiterated his
conviction that there was no place in palace security for those
linked to crime, corruption and the violation of human rights.

On August 30, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake,
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and other administration
officials traveled to Haiti to discuss, among other issues, our
concerns about reports of official involvement in the August 20
murders and assistance we might provide to help President
Preval carry out the vetting and re-organization of his palace
security apparatus. Based upon his decision to reorganize the





68


-3-

presidential security unit, President Preval requested that the
United States send a temporary deployment of security
specialists to assist him in carrying out the reorganization
and retraining of palace security. He announced publically on
September 17, that he had already suspended the Director and
Deputy Director of the palace security unit pending
investigation of their possible involvement in the August 20
murders.

As you are aware, the U.S. Government provided assistance
to the Government of Haiti under Section 552 (c) (2) of the
Foreign Assistance Act. We have sent 20 Department of State
and 12 Department of Defense civilian security personnel to
assist the eight contract security personnel and two DS
advisers already assigned to assist the Palace security unit.
This augmented team of security personnel is assisting in
providing security to President Preval, retraining palace
security elements and training new personnel that will be
assigned to the palace as a review and vetting of the current
Haitian palace security agents is carried out.

Haiti still has many problems and there still are problems
in instituting the rule of law and in assuring that the new
security forces do not violate their mandate. What is very
important is that when such violations occur, the Haitian
Government be prepared to deal with them.

When the OAS/UN Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) issued
its report in July of this year and documented instances of
human rights abuses by HNP personnel, the Police Inspector
General undertook an investigation, suspending a number of
agents, recommending dismissal of others and preparing
submission of several cases for possible prosecution.

President Preval has unequivocally reiterated his
determination to make the rule of law a reality for the Haitian
people. The establishment of Haiti's first civilian,
professional police force and the determination to end the
systematic violation of human rights typical of the former
Haitian security services are significant advances toward this
goal. President Preval is determined to ensure that these
advances are not undermined by criminal actions of any
individuals in the security force. He is taking steps to
address that problem and we are assisting in that effort.




69


-4-


The problems of inexperienced and inefficient police and
judicial systems and political violence are not unique to
Haiti. The are endemic to countries making the transition from
authoritarian to democratic societies, and no country has had
further to travel in this regard than Haiti. But, Haitian
authorities have moved to deal with these problems with U.S.
and international assistance. Haiti's police and security
establishment remain inexperienced and ill equipped, but are
advancing in the gradual process toward becoming the effective
institution required for a functioning democracy.

We firmly believe that it is in our national interest to
support President Preval as he continues work to build Haitian
democracy and its institutions.

I want to note at the beginning of this testimony that I
shall answer questions as fully as I can in open session. In
those instances where classified information is involved I
would be pleased to go into more detail in a closed session.








STATEMENT BY WILLIAM LACY SWING
BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SEPTEMBER 27. 1996

Haiti-A Shared Concern

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members, for the honor of
appearing before you today. (I have long believed that, as one
confirmed by this body in accordance with Article I of the
Constitution, I bear a particular and specific responsibility
to keep the Congress informed; to answer its questions; and to
address its concerns. I thank you for the opportunity to
fulfill this responsibility once more today.)

The active and continuing interest of this committee in
U.S.-Haiti policy is critical to its success. Therefore, if
you have a concern, then we in the field implementing our
policy also have a concern.

It has been my experience in Haiti that we have shared your
concerns. We have also acted to address your concerns and
criticisms in every instance I am aware of. Admittedly some of
these have no immediate or even short-term solutions and our
efforts may not always have borne the fruit you and we desired
or expected.

On arrival in Haiti in 1993, I observed that Haiti had the
weakest institutional, infrastructural, human resource and
organizational capacity of any country I had served in since
leaving Central Africa and Liberia a decade ago.

Haiti -- A Fallen but not Failed Society

When we speak of Haiti, we are not talking about a country
which is likely to become a Connecticut, or even a Costa Rica,
any time soon. Through decades of wrong-headed policies, and
what I term "domestic colonialism" -- by a group, a family, or
an institution such as the army -- Haiti has simply fallen too
far (and too far behind) to expect that any effort other than a
long-term policy can succeed in helping Haiti build a durable
democracy, a modern economy, and a better life for Haiti's
long-suffering, and incredibly patient, deserving people.

On the other hand, Haiti is not Liberia, or Somalia, or
Rwanda or Burundi, where we have come to speak of "failed"
societies.








-2-


What the Haitian people through their determination have
done -- with critical U.S. leadership in the international
community, including, I would add, this House -- is to create
their best prospect in the past half-century to enjoy freedom,
stability and justice.

Haiti -- A Credible, Irreversible Process

As Americans, we know as well as anyone that democracy is a
process, not an event. That process is of course marked by key
events such as elections or temporary crises such as are being
examined today. (It has been my good fortune, others might say
fate, to have served in five consecutive countries undergoing
watershed societal transition. I shall not name these, as you
would no doubt see that my batting average is not very high.)

My abiding optimism about Haiti, in the face of seemingly
insurmountable challenges which constitute a veritable defiance
of Haiti's own history, is based in part on my judgment that
there is in place in Haiti today a transition process which is
credible, transparent and increasingly irreversible.

While it's useful to take an analytical "snapshot" of
Haiti, from time to time as events such as the recent violence
demands that we do -- essentially the democratic transition
process is dynamic, not static. As such, Haiti's transition
process resembles a movie film more than a snapshot. Haiti is
a work in progress.

Thus, while we can snap a photograph or even stop the film
briefly to examine a particular frame, it is in recalling the
beginning of the film and then allowing the reel to continue to
roll that we can best put particular events in perspective.
Only so'can we accurately determine whether the trendline is
positive or not. I happen to believe the trendline is
positive, even though economic progress is slower than any of
us would like, and there is veritably a crisis a day. Haiti is
a country in which the needs are so great that it seems that no
systems are go and everything is a priority on any given day.

This is only to say that on the historical continuum of
change, Haiti is much earlier in its societal transition than
many other countries such as, e.g., South Africa.

The cycle of violence which erupted in mid-August,
including the broad daylight murder of two opposition
politicians, is not unique to Haiti among societies in
transition from decades of autocracy to democracy in which
mistrust and stereotypes on all sides are slow to die.








-3-


What is unique in this instance is that the Haitian
government and ours actually did something about it. We
quickly recognized the threat this situation posed to the
transition process, and we moved together quickly to fix it.
(We could be having hearings today on why we did not act, had
we not done so.)

Haiti -- A Long-Term. Worthwhile Investment

It should be, as I am sure it is, a matter of great pride
to all of us as Americans that we now live in the most
democratic region on the globe, with 34 of the 35 countries in
our hemisphere actively embracing democracy. Haiti, happily,
is part of that historic process in which this committee is an
important actor.

As fragile and weak as it is, Haiti's fledgling democracy
-- a country whose capital is closer to Miami than ours is --
will continue to need and deserve our support. This assistance
is being provided today at a much lower cost to the American
taxpayer than at any time in years, as our costs have continued
to decline since our troops entered Haiti two years ago.

The Haitian Creole language is rich in expressions, texture
and, above all, proverbs reflecting folk wisdom. One of these
is particularly pertinent for today's Haiti:

"The constitution is made of paper; the bayonet of steel."

With our support, the Haitian people and their elected
leaders are rewriting that proverb to read:

"The constitution is made of steel; the bayonet of paper."





73



p F


1.* 8 S'

0/12/96 112421 PRINIER: HG


PAGE CO Po3Rr 01190 01 ,F 3Z 1815352
ACTION ARA-Ol
INFO LOG-00 AID-01 AMAI-Ol CIAE-OC OEAE-00 OASY-00 ANH--01
DS-00 E-DL1 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 INSE-00 10-13
LAB-01 L-01 AOS-00 l-03 NSAE-IUO OIC-IZ OS-O
PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-OI scr-oo- SP-OO SR-03
S S-00 SS-00 ST-4u1 TPSi-00 T-00 USIE-OO P6b-Ou
DSCC-O1 SSA -O'0 PRFE-0l PR.C-O1 ORL-09 G-00 /039.
-- ------------- --A8A82 181536Z /38
P 19I27 F_9..5
FM A*EMBASSY PORT _A PRI 'CE
TU S..CSTATE A.ASHoD. PRIORITY 013a
INFG CDR *4F HAItI//JO//
CINCUSACOM NARF-"L VA o
iSC JASHOC '-
JCS 4ASHOC ;
SEC'EF *AS-'~C
SECTIu.W 01 OF 02 PIRT AU PRIP.CE 010 00 -0
OEPT. FOR S/Sr'. A utJ II5 --
ALSJ FOR ARP./HAITI WR S?.0. 12356: nOEL:AiDa 0
TAIS: P 'UV. P 'JV. lPS* HA S
SUhJECT: KILLIrlSG RAISE "'JSTIO:.S ABOUT A PATTERN CF
-- A;l-HtLITARY AN'J ANiTI-RIGHT-WI.' POLITICAL
VI.LECE: EN T EN Y5T CISCcR>I LE i
2 5 -
AGE 02 P'RT A Oll0 01 IF 02 II 1351
REF: PORT A'l RP.I.l\ 1150
1. -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMA.Y: FIVE RECENT KILLItjS ANO ANOTHER LAST .
OCTSIER HAVE RAISE) QUESTIONS ABOUT A TREND, TOUMAF ANTI-
MILITARY, 4% -RIG-4T-WIr.G POLITICAL VIOLENCE. WHILE
THRME OF TH" CASES WE-. LIKELY POLITICAL ASSASSINaTIO',S.
TPS OTFER iTHEA. PPPEAr TO BE THE RESULT OF LOCAL!
3ISJUTEcS. I-IF f-A^S.Y THE INTErNATIO4AL CIVILIAN
MISSION (IC) AND' THE MULTINATIOLJL FO0CE ARE SENSITIVE
TO THE POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF A TREND TOWARO UNCHECKED
POLITICAL VIlL.NCE, AdrC E WILL ?OZT HESITATE T10 RING --
THIS ISSUE TO ThE tTTEiTI~j OF THE GOH SHOULD APOITIO:.:AL
EVICEPCE I1OIICATE SUCH A TRtIU. END SU M RY
3. FOUR KILLINGS HG FAk IN THE -ONTH OF FEBRUARY
INVlLVING FRMEa MEMBsk5S UF THE HAITIAn ARMEO FORCES AND
A RIGHT-WING POLITICAL OPERAIIVE HAVE. AT FIRST GLANCE.
RAISED QUESTIONS ArBUT A TRE,.O TOWARD ANTI-MILITARY.
A;.TI-PIGHT-UI IG POLITICAL VIULEI, i. ALTHOUGH Two OF THE
KILLINGS HAVE TH' -ALLAPIKS OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATION'S,
INFO HATION C'UJRE:.ITLY AVAILABLE TI US AIC TO THE
riTECNATIONAL CIVILIAN FISSION DOOS NOT (REPEAT NOT)
SUGGEST A CL.AR PATE IN. s
IilfrIASSIFIED












CLASSIFIED



07/12/96 112421 PRINTER: HG
95 PORT AU PRINCE 1190

4. THE INCIDENTS:
(A) FEBRUARY 3 AT 9:50 P.M.
-- HAITIAN ARMY WARRANT OFFICER KEBREAU WAS SHOT FIVE
TIMES IN THE HEAD ENO CHEST HrLE MLfLtfPMIG AT THE ZODIAC


PAGE 03 PORT A 01190 01 OF 02 1815351
BAR IN RUE MARTISA'. AS A SERGEANT AT THN ANTI-GANG UNIT
IN 1991. KEFREAU ARRESTED THEN-LTC. PIERRE CHERUBIN AND
CONFISCATED HIS OFFICIAL VEHICLE. KEBREAU WAS CONTINUING
TO DRIVE CHERUBI-MS FORMER VEHICLE AT THE TINE OF HIS
1EATH. LOCAL RUROl. NOT BACKEDO Y HARO EVIDENCE.
SUGGESTS THAT KESREAU WAS KILLED IN RETALIATION FOR HIS
ARREST OF CHERJBIN.
(B) FEBRUARY 9 AT 12:30 P.M.
-- JEAN-ALBRU. TAYLOR, A RIGHT-WING POLITICAL ACTIVIST
FROM CITE SOLEIL WAS SHOT FIVE TIMES WHILE STOPPED AT THE
INTERSECTION OF RCUTCOE DELMAS AND OELMAS 29. A
CAUCASIAN MALE PULLED ALONGSIDE TAYLOR AND SHOT HIM DOWN
IN WHAT INTERNATIONAL POLICE MONITORS DESCRIBE AS A
*GANGLAND-STYLE SLAYING."
(C) FEBRUARY 11 AT 8:00 P.M.
-- AT LIMRBE SOUTH OF CAP HAITIEN. INTERIM PUBLIC
SECURITY FORCE MEMBER. LT. HENRI ANTOINE GARCIA, WAS
ATTACKED AND SHOT IN THE HEAD AT THE IPSF OFFICE. HIS
0ODY WAS LATER FOUND PARTIALLY BURIED AND EARNED FROM THE
NECK DOWN. A INVESTIGATION
HAS INDICATED THAT GARCIA WAS MURDERED BY DISGRUNTLED
FORMER AUXILIARY POLICE MEMBERS ANGERED BECAUSE THEY
FAILED TO WIN ENTRANCE TO THE NATIONAL POLICE
ACAOEMY/SCHO3L.
(0) FEBRUARY 15 AT 2:07 P.H.
-- LTC. SYLVESTE PAUL, A RETIRED ARMY OFFICER. WAS
STRUCK DOWN AND KILLED BY THREE MACHETE BLOWS TO HIS BACK
AND NECK 50 YARDS FROM HIS HOME IN CITE SOLEIL.


PAGE 04 PORT A 01u UQ OF 02 1815351
NEIGHBORS OESCRISE3 PAUL AS A FORMER MEMBER OF THE
PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATION FRAPH ANO NEIGHBORHOOD THJG WHO
OPENLY DISPLAYED PHOTOS OF PEOPLE HE HAD KILLED. THE
MOTIVE FOR PAUL'S KILLING APPARENTLY WAS REVENGE; NO
SUSPECTS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED.
5. IN DISCUSSING THESE CASES WITH

McNIAtuNtO TO US ANOTHER RECENT CASE WHICH IS
INVESTIGATING. LOUIS SIMON BAPTISTE. AN EMPLOYEE OF OR.
REGINALD BOULOS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTER FOR
DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH (A LOCAL NGO). WAS MURDERED ON
FEBRUARY I1. THREATS rAO BEEN MAUE AGAINST BAPTISTSC
LIFE BECAUSE OF HIS ASSOCIATION WITH OR. BOULOS. [i|i Il





75






07/12/96 112421 PRINTER: HG
95 PORT AU PRICE 1190
RELIEVES TH| KILLING WAS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND IS
SEEKING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
6. THE
6. THE EMBASSY IS ALSO AWARE OF A KILLING IN LATE
OCTO3ER OF THE SON OF A RETIRED UVALIEP.IST COLONEL DUSI
AT HIS FATHER'S RESTAURANT IN PTrIO'IVILLE. WE ARE TOLD
THAT COL. OUDI WAS ACTIVE IN RIGHT-WING CAUSES DURING THE
COUP YEARS AND THAT THE KILLING OF HIS SON WAS
POLITICALLY OIIVATE0.




























UVCL SSIFri D


PAGE 3














07/12/96 112421 PRINTER: HG
95 PORT AU PRINCE 1190


PAGE 01 PORT A 01190 02 OF 02 11H535Z
ACTION ARA-UL
INFO LOG-00 AI0-31 AMAO-01 CIAE-00 OEAE-00 OASY-00 ANHR-01
OS-00 EB-OL H-01 TEOE-00 INR-O0 INSE-00 10-13
LAB-Ol L-OL ADS-00 M-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-Ol
PA-Ol P-310 PRS-OL P-OL SCT-00 SP-00 SR-00
SSO-00 SS-00 STR-01 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 PMB-OO
OSCC-03 SSAH-00 PRME-CL PRMC-OL ORL-09 G-00 /039W
-------------- --AR45RS 1RLS36Z /38
P 181537Z FES 95
FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY O139
INFO COR MNF MHITt//JO//
CINCUSACOM NORFOLK VA
NSC WASHOC
JCS WASHDC
SECOEF WASHDO
SECTION 02 OF 12 PORT AU PRINCE 001190
OEPT. rOR 5/fHC AMH. 008BINS
ALSO FOR ARA/HAITI WORKING GROUP. AND DRL
E.O. 12356: OECL:OAOR
TAGS: PHUHM PGOV. 4UPS. HA
SUBJECT: KILLINGS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT A PATTERN OF
-- ANTI-MILITARY AND ATI-RIGHT-WING POLITICAL
- VIOLENCE: NO TREND YET DISCERNIBLE


.AGE 02' .JORT A 011Vu u ur 02 IktS35Z
HAS BEEN LINKETO THIS KILLING.
i. .LIptMEMI: THE KILLINGSS OF
AND WERE PR38ALY PQ.UTitAL ANAbtNAiUlUnb. IME
OEAlIS OF AND HAVE POLITICAL
OVERTONES t AvlartR 10 BE THE RESULT OF LOCAL DISPUTES.
THE EMBASSY AND THE MNF HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US AT THIS POINT IS INSUFFICIENT
TO ESTABLISH A TREOD OF ANTI-MILITARY. ANTI-RIGHT WING
POLITICAL VIOLENCE. SuT WE AND THE ICM ARE SENSITIVE TO
THIS POSSIbILITY AI4 WATCHING FOR A TREND. HE WILL NOT
HESITATE TO SPRING THIS ISSUE TO THE ATTENTION OF THE "
GOVERNMENT OF HAITI SHOULD ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE INDICATE
SUCH A TRENG.
SWING




UNmLASSIIE1


PACE 4




77









07/12/96 112352 PRIN ER: H
95 PORT AU PRINCE 3640

PAGE 01 PORT A 03640 23215OZ
ACTION OS-00
INFO LOG-00 AIO-00 ARA-OL CA-02 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DEAE-00
OASY-00 000E-00 OIGO-01 FBIE-00 H-01 IMMC-O1 TEDE-00
INR-00 INSE-00 ADS-00 NSAE-00 OCS-06 SS-00 ASOS-Ol
OSCC-00 SSAH-00 /013W
--------- -C8A391 232150Z /38
0 232150Z MAY 95
FM AMEMSASSY PORT AU PRINCE
TO SECSTATE WASHOC TMMEDIATE 2199 2
PORT AU PRINCE QQ360
FOR OS/OP/ARA, OS (AMB QUAINTON). ARA,
ARA/HWG AND S/SHC (AMB DOBBINS)
E.O. 12356. OECL: 5/23/2000
TAGS: ASEC, CASC. PINS, HA ,
SUBJECT: SHOOTING DEATH NEAR PRES. ARISTIOE'S PRIVATE
RESIDENCE.
1. (U) AT APPROXIMATELY 1730 HRS MR. MICHEL J.
GONZALES (OPOB 11/19/33, HAITI) WAS SHOT AND KILLED
WHILE ENROUTE TO HIS HOME, NEAR THE PRIVATE RESIDENCE
OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE. oj Ia
2. (U) THE RSO AND THE CHIEF OF CONS/ACS WERE !
NOTIFIED OF THE SHOOTING AT APPROXIMATELY 1840 HRS ANO [3
REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO THE SCENE. ~
UNMIH, UNCIVPOL, _

PAGE 02 PORT A 03640 232150Z
AND IPSF WERE ON THE SCENE WHEN THE EMBASSY OFFICERS
ARRIVED ANO HERE INITIATING THE INVESTIGATION. i
CANADIAN RCMP ELEMENTS OF CIVPOL WERE TAKING THE LEAD
FOR THE UN WITH SUPPORT OF CID AND MP ELEMENTS OF
HNMMIH.







THEIR HOUSE IS NEAR, TO THE REAR. OF THE
PERSONAL RESIDENCE OF PRES. ARISTIDE. ACCESS TO THE
GONZALES HOME REQUIRES ONE TO TURN AT THE CORNER OF THE
ARISTIDE PROPERTY ANO PROCEED ALONG THE EASTERN EDGE OF
THE PERIMETER. THE GONZALES HOME IS TWO HOUSES OVER.
TO THE NORTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL HOME.


U LC[SSFIED PAGE










UIJXI1kSIFIEO


q5 PORT AU ?P4ICc .64'1


jT/L2/V t1ItZ35


6. (U) WITH THE ASSISTANFCEL F THE EMBASSY. THE BODY
WAS MOVED TO THE UN'1IH FIELD MORGUE FOR THE NIGHT. THE
W[DOo 010 Nfo WANT THE BODY TAKEN TO THE MORGUE AT THE
UNIVERSITY HOS'STAL ANO IT CANNOT BE RELEASED TO A
PRIVATE FUNERAL HOM UNTIL AFTER THE IPSF REPORT HAS
BEEN FILED WITH THE COURT. UNCIVPGL AND CID ARE
COOPERATING I THE INITIAL INQUIRIES.
AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER
TAElL AA.E-Na.flA LEAOS.

PAGE 04 PURr A 03640 2321501
7. POST WILL REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THIS CASE. SWING



UICLASSFIED


PAGE


PRI.[Trm: H',









07/12/96 113315 PRINTER: HG
q5 PORT AU PRI.C'T *a

5ep q95




PA PLFZ


(2 KILLINGS TH -T I INVESTIGATION OF THE BERTIN
ASSASSINATION IS AT A STANDSTILL DUE TO
LACK OF GOH COOPERATION. INDIVIDUALS AROUND THE
PRESIDENT WH3 ARE THOUGHT TO BE IMPLICATED IN EXECUTION-
STYLE KILLINGS CONTINUE TO HOLD THEIR OFFICIAL AND QUASI-
OFFICIAL POSITIONS.
-- WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY EXECUTION-STYLE KILLINGS
DURING AUGUST. MOREOVER, A CLEAR RESULT OF THE FBI'S
WORK IS THAT THOSE DOING THE KILLING KNOM INVESTIGATORS
ARE UN TO THEM. MINISTER OF JUSTICE EXUME HAS AGREED TO
FIND AN INVESTIrAT3R/PROSECUTOR OPTION WHICH CAN BE
IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENT WITH HAITIAN LAW AND JUDICIAL
PRQCE URE.




F S,1J3i1ED


PAGE 2





80



United States Department of State A

Vahia o, D.C 20520
August 16. 199q



MfMORANDUM T TTHE OEPTY SECRETARY
Strobe:
Attached at Tab 1 is the Reuters story which followed on
Novak's piece, and put it in a useful perspective.
At Tab 2 is another positive Reuters story reporting l
specifically on deployment of the mNP. r I
At Tab 3 is our press guidance on the Novak article. I m
I suggest the line to take is:


prominent. Up to 20 cases might fall in this category,
although most would place the number lower. I
-None of these killings were linked to the elections, or to -
current Haitian politics.
After a brutal coup and three years of repression, in which
5,000 people were murdered, nearly everyone expected a much
;higher level of retributive violence. President Aristide's SJ
campaign of reconciliation and the very effective work of US
and UN forces have combined to forestall that eventuality.
-- We are nevertheless concerned about the retributive violence I s
which may be occurring. We are using every available means to .
Look into it. The UN and OAS are also doing so. Finally, we E
are building Haitian capacity' to investigate and deal with
crimes like these as fast as humanly possible. ---


? Do`0tins


Tab 1 Reuters story.
Tab 2 Reuters story.
Tab 3 Press guidance.




81


Question 1

Since the creation of the Presidential Security Unit (PSU),
what are the total amounts expended by the U.S. Government
(either directly or through contractors)? Please list
expenditures for each fiscal year since the establishment of
the PSU program as well as a functional breakdown of these
expenditures.

Answer

Funds expended and/or obligated from 10/4/94 through 11/30/96
for Protective Services, by functional breakdown:

FY 1995
*MVM Contract $3,863,547.59
-*PSAU expenses S 273,886.06
Subtotal, 1995 $4,137,433.65

FY 1995
MVM Contract $1,215,802.64
PSAU expenses S 104.770.93
Subtotal, 1996 $1,320,573.57



TOTAL: $5,458,007.22

Inventory Equipment ;67C,445.95


NOTE 1) Above does not include salaries for Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (DS) special agents assigned to
the DS Presidential Security Advisory Unit (PSAU) in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

NOTE 2) Above funds consist of AID's Economic
Support/Peacekeeping funds and Diplomatic and
Consular funds. Funds were provided on a
reimbursable basis -- thus far, approximately $2.1
million has been reimbursed by the Government of
Haiti.

NOTE 3) In late FY 1993, AID provided $347,000 (not included
above) for preliminary Haitian protective security
training for the Presidential Security Unit being
established to protect returning President Aristide.
This training was conducted by DS at the DS Training
Center in Virginia.


*MVM Protective Services (Contract)
**DS Presidential Security Advisory Unit (DS Special Agents)





82


QuesJt-ion 2 a

How many PSU personnel have been trained since the
establishment of the program?

Answer

During the period from August through November, 1993, the DS
Training Center trained 63 Haitian nationals in protective
security techniques. Since Aristide's return to power in 1994
DS has trained approximately 50 more. Of these, 85 are still
employed to protect President Preval, former President Aristide
and Mrs. Aristide.




83


Question 2b

In what disciplines have they received training?

Answer

The PSU personnel have received training in the general subject
matter of VIP Protective Security (PRS). The program was
designed for personnel responsible for the protection of
dignitaries. The course is appropriate for operational,
training, and staff personnel.

Course Descriotion

The course teaches techniques of providing security and safety
for dignitaries. The objective of the course is to provide
participants with a thorough understanding of all tactical
aspects of dignitary protection skills necessary to protect
national leaders/heads of state from assassination, armed
assault, and other types of terrorist or criminal attacks. At
the conclusion of the course the participants should be able to:
Develop pre-incident obser"ation and threat avoidance
skills.
* Describe the concepts of dignitary protection and conduct
protective planning.
* Describe the organization, duties and responsibilities of a
protective detail.
* Perform defensive tactics and arrest procedures.
* Plan, organize and conduct route analysis and selection'
and motorcade operations.
* Perform defensive driving maneuvers and various car drills.
* Conduct active and passive countersurveillance to identify
hostile surveillance.
* Conduct advance protective security surveys.
* Search persons, buildings, and vehicles for weapons and
bombs.
* Effectively use security posts and identifications systems.
* Perform basic first aid skills necessary to stabilize a
life-threatening injury.
* Serve as member of a protective detail for a threatened
principal.
* Plan, organize and operate as a member of a tactical
support team.
* Demonstrate proficiency in firearm use.




84


QUESTION 2c

What role did U.S. Government Personnel have in the selection
and training of the PSU recruits?

Answer

All prospective PSU agents were proposed by former President
Aristide or President Preval. They were vetted for at least
human rights violations through the embassy and some were
required to pass physical and medical tests at the request of
PSAU. See above for training.




85


Question 3

What role, if any, do United State Government personnel have in
the oversight of daily PSU operations and PSU senior staff?

Answer

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) currently has two
special agents assigned to the Presidential Security Advisory
Unit (PSAU) in Haiti. The senior DS agent serves as the PSAU
Chief and is responsible for supervising the second DS agent
and nine American citizen MVM contract security personnel, as
well as providing advice and coordinating training for the
Haitian PSU agents.









p OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000


-LICY
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Chairman, Committee on International Relations 2 2 JAN '997
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Gilman:

I am responding on behalf of Secretary Perry to your letter of January 8, 1997,
concerning cost data on periodic deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti as part of training
exercises. It our understanding that the question was posed to U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
William Swing during the committee's hearing held September 27, 1996.

Your letter notes that "according to the State Department, the Defense
Department was asked to generate this information soon after our September 27. 1996,
hearing, but this information has not been forthcoming." The Defense Department
regrets both the delay the committee has experienced in obtaining the needed data and
the misimpression it has acquired that such delay was the result of inaction by DoD. In
an effort to prevent such incidents from recurring, we have investigated our records and
learned the following:

SInexplicably, the committee's question was not referred to DoD by the State
Department until November 22, 1996, nearly two months after the hearing.
Assurances that the question was promptly referred to this department are simply
inaccurate.

Our response was provided to the Department of State on December 9, 1996, roughly
two weeks after having been received. We are at a loss to explain why the
information we provided was not then forwarded on to the committee.

In seeking to respond to the committee's question, we have learned that data are
not separately collected on Haiti operations. Moreover, cost data for the period in
question (April, 1996-Scptember. 1996) do not isolate prior operations, consequently data
may include adjustments or obligations for activities which occurred prior to April, 1996.
With those provisos in mind, we estimate that the increment cost of the periodic
deployments through September 30, 1996, to have been approximately $13 million.

A more detailed response, suitable for insertion in the hearing record, is provided in
the enclosure.

Sincerely,



John Merrill
Acting Director
Office of the cretary of Defense Haiti Task Force

Enclosure: a/s




87


Committee:
Hearing Date:
Subject: Haiti Costs
Insert (Page 127, Line 3024):

The information follows:

Since April, the Department has deployed engineering and medical units to Haiti for training
purposes, with some humanitarian assistance as a side result. In addition, the Army, as executive
agent, has maintained an office in Haiti in support of these training missions. With the end of the
contingency operations in Haiti, the Department has not maintained separate accounting and cost
data on these normal training activities. Therefore an exact value cannot be given in answer to
your question. Based on the best information available, the Military Components estimate the
incremental cost of these activities to be approximately $13 million through September 30, 1996.


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