Legislative and municipal elections in Haiti

MISSING IMAGE

Material Information

Title:
Legislative and municipal elections in Haiti hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, July 12, 1995
Series Title:
S. hrg. ;
Physical Description:
1 online resource (iii, 101 p.) : ;
Language:
English
Creator:
United States -- Congress. -- Senate. -- Committee on Foreign Relations. -- Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs
Publisher:
U.S. G.P.O. :
For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office
Place of Publication:
Washington
Publication Date:

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Presidents -- Election -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Local elections -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Election monitoring -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Présidents -- Élection -- Haïti   ( ram )
Élections locales -- Haïti   ( ram )
Élections -- Observation -- Haïti   ( ram )
Politics and government -- Haiti -- 20th century   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Haiti -- United States   ( lcsh )
Politique et gouvernement -- Haïti -- 20e siècle   ( ram )
Relations extérieures -- États-Unis -- Haïti   ( ram )
Relations extérieures -- Haïti -- États-Unis   ( ram )
Genre:
federal government publication   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )

Notes

System Details:
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.

Record Information

Source Institution:
Columbia Law Library
Holding Location:
Columbia Law Library
Rights Management:
All applicable rights reserved by the source institution and holding location.
Resource Identifier:
oclc - 682100535
Classification:
lcc - KF26 .F697 1995a
ddc - 324.97294/073
System ID:
AA00001248:00001


This item is only available as the following downloads:


Full Text
















This volume was donated to LLMC
to enrich its on-line offerings and
for purposes of long-term preservation by

Columbia University Law Library




S. HRG. 104-205
,LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN HAITI


WESTERN


HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEMISPHERE AND PEACE CORPS
AFFAIRS
OF THE


COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION


JULY 12, 1995


Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations





,- -,, U N,' i ,! :' ; : ,' ".




U. S. DEPOSITORY
COPY.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE


92-305 CC


WASHINGTON : 1995


For sale by the U.S. Go vernment Printing Of ice
Superintendent of Document,, Congressional Sales OItice, Washington., DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-052017-7



























COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
HANK BROWN, Colorado PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri
JAMES W. NANCE, Staff Director
EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Chief Counsel & Staff Director


SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND PEACE CORPS AFFAIRS
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia

(II)












CONTENTS


JULY 12, 1995
Page
Dobbins, James F., Special Haiti Coordinator, Department of State ................ 51
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 55
Fischer, Jeffrey, International Foundation for Electoral Systems .................... 32
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 35
Goss, Porter J., U.S. Representative From Florida ............................................. 9
Prepared state ent .......................................................................................... 12
Graham, Robert, U.S. Senator From Florida ....................................................... 4
Hastings, Alcee L., U.S. Representative From Florida ....................................... 20
Prepare d state ent ........................................................................................ 21
McCain, John, U.S. Senator From Arizona ......................................................... 2
Prepared state ent ......................................................................................... 3
McColm, R. Bruce, International Republican Institute, Washington, DC .......... 23
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 27
McDougall, Gay, International Law Group, Washington, DC ........................... 39
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 42
Oberstar, James L., U.S. Representative From Minnesota ................................ 49
Payne, Donald M., U.S. Representative From New Jersey ................................ 16
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 18
Rangel, Charles B., U.S. Representative From New York ................................. 14
Prepare d state ent ........................................................................................ 15
Schneider, Mark, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Carib-
bean, Agency for International Development .................................................. 58
Prepare d state ent ........................................................................................ 60

APPENDIX
Responses of James Dobbins and Mark Schaeider to Questions Asked by
Senator H elm s .................................................................................................... 73
Responses of Mark Schneider to Questions Asked by Senator Coverdell ........... 83
Responses of Bruce McColm to Questions Asked by Senator Coverdell .......... 84
Responses of Gay McDougall to Questions Asked by Senator Coverdell .......... 87
Responses of Jeffrey Fischer to Questions Asked by Senator Coverdell ........... 87
Departure Statement of U.S. Presidential Delegation to Observe the Haiti
E election s ................................................................................................................ 90
News Releases From the International Republican Institute ........................... 92
Statem ent of Voices of H aiti ................................................................................. 99
Letter of Response From State Department to Senator Coverdell ................... 100
Letter to Senator Coverdell From Ambassador Jean Casimir .......................... 101

(III)











LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN
HAITI


WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1995
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND
PEACE CORPS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 10 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Coverdell, Pell, and Dodd.
Senator COVERDELL. The committee will come to order.
Let me take just a second, Senator, and describe that we are all
under fairly serious time constraints. We have essentially three
panels: congressional members, outside members, and the adminis-
tration.
To meet everybody's requirements, we will allow members to
take from 10 a.m. to 10:45 a.m., if it takes that much time. For the
outside panel, from 10:45 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. At 11:30 a.m. we will
promptly begin with the administration's spokespersons as I have
agreed.
Let me just say that I have just heard that the Haitian Govern-
ment has announced the results of the election in the last several
hours. At least at this point there is calm in Haiti. The situation
seems secure. I know we are all grateful for that.
There have been several questions raised about the last election.
The purpose of the hearing is to hear from those who observed that
election, with the idea that with run-off elections yet to be con-
ducted, and with Presidential elections scheduled for November,
that there will be findings from our hearing today that would con-
tribute to improvement over what occurred in the last election.
We are trying to define and discover how to effect improvements
over the process as we go forward. There is some suggestion that
the most recent election has a cloud over it. I think generally, and
the hearing may bring some clarification to it, there was chaos, but
it was a reasonably secure situation. Maybe this hearing will find
otherwise.
The main purpose is to contribute to the elections going forward.
With that, I would like to introduce my colleague, Senator John
McCain of Arizona, to begin the members' panel. Senator McCain.





STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, UNITED STATES
SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be
brief, given the time constraints and very frankly, since I was not
there, I think the details of this election will be provided by them.
I want to make a statement concerning the process.
Mr. Chairman, as you know the United States has made a rather
substantial contribution to the pursuit of peace and stability in
Haiti. It is important that the United States Congress have an ac-
curate estimate of that pursuit's progress.
The recent elections in Haiti do not define Haiti's destiny, but
the abuses and irregularities that rendered the election, in the
words of almost every observer, extremely chaotic, may if not cor-
rected in the next elections, ultimately crush whatever progress
Haiti has made toward enlightened self-government.
The grave problems that afflicted the elections are no longer seri-
ously disputed by anyone. While I do not claim that the fraud and
abuse so prevalent in the election were systematic or ultimately,
not correctable, to ignore those abuses is to do a profound disserv-
ice to the American taxpayer and to the people of Haiti.
I very strongly resent the initial attempt by some to blame the
chaos of the elections on the fictional partisanship of Republicans
observing the elections. It was in a classic Washington tradition to
shoot the messenger in response to the disappointment experienced
by some ardent admirers of President Aristide. It was unworthy of
them.
Mr. Chairman, I have the honor of serving as Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the International Republican Institute. IRI's
delegation to observe the Haitian election was ably lead by Rep-
resentative Porter Goss. IRI's honest and accurate assessment of
what occurred during those elections, which Mr. Goss and IRI's
president, Bruce McColm, will provide to the committee, rendered
a valuable service to the people of Haiti. Well after the election, a
consensus is now emerging that IRI's pre-election report and elec-
tion analysis was right on target. I noted with interest a recent
item in U.S. News and World Report that referred to the views of
another election observer who is a strong supporter of the Presi-
dent and the administration's policies in Haiti.
Mr. D. Jeffrey Hirschberg reportedly wrote in a letter to the
White House that the fraud and irregularities documented by IRI
were "substantially accurate, and not only as to scope, but also se-
verity." Mr. Hirschberg went on to observe that there exist credible
evidence to suggest that the election outcomes were managed and
that President Aristide did not remain neutral throughout the proc-
ess.
Mr. Chairman, these not partisan Republican views. They are
the views of an honest man who happens to be a very strong sup-
porter of the President. Rather than blame IRI observers for calling
them like they see them, I hope we will all listen to IRI's assess-
ment of what went wrong in Haiti and how those problems can be
corrected for the next elections there.
IRI has observed 48 elections from Nicaragua to Chile to Russia.
There has never been the slightest suggestion that an IRI election
delegation was anything other than honest, professional, and strict-






ly impartial. Our delegation to Haiti was thoroughly professional,
motivated by the highest democratic principles and steadfast in
their determination to do justice by the cause of freedom in Haiti.
I am very proud of Porter Goss, other delegates, and all of the
IRI staff who distinguish themselves by virtue of their honesty and
determination. Some have complained about IRI's release of our
pre-election assessment one day before the election. No one dis-
agrees with the contents of that assessment, but they seem to ob-
ject to the release of a pre-election assessment before the election.
It would seem self-evident as to why preelection reports are re-
leased in advance of elections, but critics have alleged that we did
so to unfairly influence reporting of the election. Again, that is un-
worthy of them. What those critics won't tell you is that IRI, like
its Democratic counterpart, the National Democratic Institute, has
released preelection reports before any number of elections we have
observed; Nicaragua and Russia to name the two most recent. Why
must we make an exception for Haiti?
The real injustice done by those who would shoot the messenger
instead of analyzing the message is their condescension to the peo-
ple of Haiti. As I said earlier in a floor statement, Mr. Chairman,
what they are really saying is that whatever standards we hold El
Salvador to, whatever standards we hold Nicaragua to, whatever
standards we hold Croatia to, whatever standards we hold Serbia
to, whatever standards we hold Albania to, whatever standards we
hold Azerbaijan to, whatever standards we hold Russia to, what-
ever standards to which we hold the countries where IRI observed
elections without controversy, we cannot expect Haiti to meet
them. That is unfair to the people of Haiti.
Instead of decrying the warnings of Congressman Porter Goss
and his fellow delegates, let us make good use of their accurate ob-
servations and important recommendations to make the next elec-
tions in Haiti something that may begin to justify the risk and ex-
penses that the United States has undertaken on behalf of democ-
racy in Haiti. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that the Committee is holding this
hearing. The United States has made a rather substantial contribution to the pur-
suit of peace and stability in Haiti, and it is important that the United States Con-
gress have an accurate estimate of that pursuit's progress.
The recent elections in Haiti do not define Haitis destiny. But the abuses and
irregularities that rendered the election-in the words of almost every observer-
extremely chaotic, may, if not corrected in the next elections, ultimately crush what-
ever progress Haiti has made toward enlightened self-government.
The grave problems that afflicted the election are no longer seriously disputed by
anyone. While I do not claim that the fraud and abuse so prevalent in the election
were systematic or ultimately uncorrectable, to ignore >hose abuses is to do a pro-
found disservice to the American taxpayer and to the people of Haiti.
I very strongly resent the initial attempt by some to blame the chaos of the elec-
tions on the fictional partisanship of Republicans observing the elections. It was--
in a classic Washington tradition-a shoot the messenger response to the dis-
appointment experienced by some ardent admirers of President Aristide, and it was
unworthy of them.
I have the honor of serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Inter-
national Republican Institute. IRI's delegation to observe the Haitian election was
ably led by Representative Porter Goss. IRI's honest and accurate assessment of
what occurred during those elections-which Mr. Goss and IRI President Bruce





McColm will provide to this Committee-rendered a valuable service to the people
of Haiti. Well after the election, a consensus is now emerging that IRI's pre-election
report and election analysis was right on target.
I noted with interest a recent item in U.S. News and World Report that referred
to the views of another election observer who is a strong supporter of the President
and the administration's policies in Haiti. Mr. D. Jeffrey Hirschberg reportedly
wrote in a letter to the White House that the fraud and irregularities documented
by IRI were "substantially accurate not only as to scope but also severity." Mr.
Hirschberg went on to observe that there exists "credible evidence to suggest that
the election outcomes were managed and that President Aristide did not remain
neutral throughout the process."
That is not a partisan Republican's views, Mr. Chairman. They are the views of
an honest man, who happens to be a strong supporter of President Clinton.
Rather than blame IRI observers for calling them like they see them, I hope we
will all listen to IRI assessment of what went wrong in Haiti and how those prob-
lems can be corrected for the next elections there.
IRI has observed 48 elections from Nicaragua to Chile to Russia. There has never
been the slightest suggestion that an IRI election delegation was anything other
than honest, professional and strictly impartial. Our delegation to Haiti was thor-
oughly professional, motivated by the highest democratic principles, and steadfast
in their determination to do justice by the cause of freedom in Haiti. I am very
proud of Porter Goss, the other delegates and all the IRI staff who distinguished
themselves by virtue of their honesty and determination.
Some have complained about IRI's release of our pre-election assessment one day
before the election. No one disagrees with the contents of that assessment, but they
seem to object to the release ot a "pre"-election assessment before the election. It
would seem self-evident why pre-election reports are released in advance of elec-
tions, but critics have alleged that we did so to unfairly influence reporting of the
election. Again, that is unworthy of them.
What those critics won't tell you is that IRI, like its Democrat counterpart, the
National Democratic Institute, has released pre-election reports before any number
of elections we have observed-in Nicaragua and Russia to name the two most re-
cent. Why must we make an exception for Haiti?
The real injustice done by those who would shoot the messenger instead of analyz-
ing the message is their condescension to the people of Haiti. As I said earlier in
a floor statement,, what they are really saying is that whatever standards we hold
El Salvador to; whatever standards we hold Nicaragua to; whatever standards we
hold Croatia to; whatever standards we hold Serbia to; whatever standards we hold
Albania to; whatever standards we hold Azerbaijan to; whatever standards we hold
Russia to; whatever standards to which we hold of the countries where IRI observed
elections without controversy, we cannot expect Haiti to meet them.
That is unfair to the people of Haiti. Instead of decrying the warnings of Porter
Goss and his fellow delegates, let us make good use of their accurate observations
and important recommendations, to make the next election in Haiti something that
may begin to justify the risk and expenses that the United States has undertaken
on behalf of democracy in Haiti.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator. We have been joined
by the distinguished Senator from Florida, Senator Graham. We
welcome your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GRAHAM, U. S. SENATOR FROM
FLORIDA
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
have some informal comments to make based on my experience as
an election observer in Haiti on June 25. I might start by a brief
factual statement of what I did and observed.
Our delegation, which was selected to represent the United
States, was one of several national and multinational observer
teams in Haiti on election day. It met commencing on the Friday
before the Sunday election. I joined the delegation at approximately
noon on Saturday and participated in a series of briefings on Hai-
tian election procedures, what had occurred up until the day prior





to the election, and various standards that we were to follow as
election observers.
I felt that our group was well-selected and well-prepared to carry
out its responsibility. I might say that this was the third election
which I had served as an election observer, having previously at-
tempted to serve in an election in Haiti in 1987 which was aborted
as a result of violence. Then I served in 1989 in the Panamanian
election which was aborted because General Noreaga canceled the
vote count.
My particular assignment on election day was two-fold. First, in
the morning I was an observer at the opening of the polls in Cite
Soleil, a large very low income suburb of Port-au-Prince. We par-
ticularly observed at precincts which ranged from day care centers
that had been pressed into service, as well as a marshal arts train-
ing center which was used. In both cases, my observation was that
the polling booths opened late; approximately an hour late in both
cases.
Second, there was a high level of public interest. There were
some 30 to 40 people in line as the polls opened. The people that
I talked to through a translator seemed to feel as if they had ade-
quate information as to how to cast their vote. That they were pre-
pared to vote and felt they were doing so in an informed basis.
They were uniformly orderly. There was no indication of scuffling
among the people who were waiting to vote. The poll workers
seemed to be very intent on carrying out their job and were aware
of the degree of scrutiny that they were receiving. That probably
contributed to some of the delay in opening the polls because of
their desire to be very meticulous in following all of the rules that
they had been given.
Subsequently, we moved from Cite Soleil to the city of Jacmel on
the south coast of the island where we observed both some quasi-
rural election precincts; one of which was held in a bakery, another
in a bar on the outskirts of town. We did observe one precinct
which was intended to open, which was not opened by 10 a.m. or
11 a.m. and I gathered did not open. I am going to come back and
discuss some of the reason for that occurring.
Then we visited a number of precincts in the city of Jacmel
which were held in a lottery sales office to a school. Again, there
were large numbers of people in line at each place prepared to vote.
There was no indication of any disturbance; certainly no intimida-
tion in Jacmel.
The UN Peacekeepers were visible in the street. At least one or
two of their pieces of equipment could be seen. They were not
called in to play any role in providing security into what was a pas-
sive situation at the polling booths. I left Haiti that even of Sun-
day, June 25, and was not present at the collection of the ballot
boxes or the subsequent counting of the ballots. So I cannot give
any personal statement as to what occurred during that phase of
the election.
My overall assessment was that the election was peaceful. It was
well-participated in. It was certainly free of the terror and intimi-
dation which had been so much a part of recent elections in Haiti.
It seemed to be a credible expression of the public opinion of the
people.





Now, let's talk about some of the problems. The context of this
election is that it was only the second democratic election that had
taken place in over a generation in Haiti; the first having taken
place in 1990. There was very limited experience of the people who
were participating in every phase, from those who were members
of the electoral commission, to those who were responsible for man-
ning the poles, as well as those who were voting in the democratic
process. Second, the environment was a difficult one, beginning
with the high level of illiteracy in the country which made normal
election procedures complex. The infrastructure, basic communica-
tions and transportation, are extremely difficult in Haiti. There-
fore, if there is a problem it is difficult to find out what the prob-
lem is and take responsive action.
A number of the difficulties of the election in my assessment
were the result of an effort to extend democracy beyond the capa-
bilities of those responsible for the election. Let me give two exam-
ples of that. The decision was made to first limit the number of
persons at precincts to 400 voters. That appeared to be a wise deci-
sion because it assured that there would not be a particular jam
or gridlock at any precinct. It was within the managerial capabili-
ties of the people who were there responsible for running the pre-
cinct.
The consequence of that decision is there were over 12,000 pre-
cincts. That, for instance, in my own State of Florida, that is three
times almost the number of precincts that we have in our state
with roughly twice the population of Haiti. So, they had a difficult
administrative job with that many precincts scattered across the
country.
Another decision was made to leave the registration rolls open
until very close to the election day. That meant that every time
they registered 400 people, they had to create another precinct.
That was what caused that precinct that I had commented on in
Jacmel not to open. It was one of those precincts that was created
late in the process as a result of persons who registered close to
the election day. They never were able to get together the mate-
rials to staff and support that precinct. Unfortunately, those people
who were assigned to that precinct were not able to vote.
Another example of the attempt to be very democratic which cre-
ated problems was the ballot itself. There were multiple ballots;
generally, a ballot for the Senate, a ballot for the House of Depu-
ties, a ballot for the local mayor, and a ballot for the local city
council. Most people voted on four separate sheets of paper and de-
posited them into four separate boxes.
In the case of the Senate ballots, they used color codes, insignias
of the political parties, pictures of the candidates, as well as the
name of the candidate in order to assure that the people would
have the maximum opportunity to identify who they wanted to vote
for and cast an enlightened ballot. That effort to provide so many
different means of identification created some of the problems in
terms of getting the ballots printed and to the place they were sup-
posed to be on a timely basis.
I cite those, not to say they were not problems, but they were
problems of good intentions of trying to operate in as open a demo-
cratic a way. I did not see any evidence that they were being ma-






nipulated in order to benefit a candidate or a political party. In
terms of recommendations for the future, I believe that this experi-
ence of June 25 needs to be used as an intensive lesson on how to
improve the process. I think it was a wise decision to defer the run-
off election from its original date in late to July to August 13 to
give more time for that process of assimilating lessons and being
able to apply them.
The critical test will come again at the end of the year when
there is a presidential election and where there will be a very
strong focus of world attention on the legitimacy with which the
next President is elected. I commend those from around the world
who rendered assistance to the Government of Haiti and the elec-
toral commission.
It is extremely important to the future of this country that it
have a credible government. That is the foundation upon which
Haiti's reentry into the community of nations will be predicated. It
is also a foundation upon which the international community and
private investors will see that Haiti is a stable, reliable country in
which to make the investments, which will be the key to the eco-
nomic growth and future prosperity of the country. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator. We have been joined
by our ranking member. Senator Dodd, I am trying to get our
member panel concluded by about 10:45 a.m., but I want to wel-
come you to make an opening statement. I understand Senator Pell
would like to make a statement.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
first of all thank you for holding these hearings. I think it is very,
very important. I am delighted to see such a strong participation
by our colleagues. I understand Senator McCain was here a mo-
ment ago and had to leave. I think this is tremendously worthwhile
that we have colleagues of our, particularly those from the House,
and people like Senator Graham of Florida who was there first-
hand and to be able to report to us exactly how this process has
unfolded over the last number of weeks.
I am anxious to hear as well from the International Republican
Institute on their observations. It is remarkable I would say, Mr.
Chairman, in many ways. While certainly the electoral process by
all accounts was not what one would anticipate in occurring in nec-
essarily one of our congressional districts or one of our states, but
I think Senator Graham has said and others, the fact that there
was any election at all-if you had predicted this or tried to predict
it a year or so ago, you would have been probably scoffed at for
even the suggestion that a country that had gone through what it
was going through would ever have a chance to participate as free-
ly as they did in the process that they did.
That occurred because President Clinton had the courage, despite
all of the opposition, including significant public opinion to the con-
trary, to go down and to offer an opportunity to this desperately
poor country to have a chance to get on its feet; the fact that Colin
Powell, President Carter, and Sam Nunn all participated in that,
creating this opportunity over significant opposition, and remark-
ably so, with such a small amount of loss of life. That was really
phenomenal.






I certainly don't argue that the election was anything but picture
perfect. I hope we won't lose sight of the fact as we talk about this
that there was virtually no chance of an election given the coup
that occurred in that country and the fact that there was little or
no hope.
We are looking at a nation, as we all know, that over 50-percent
of the population cannot read and write. It is the poorest country
in this hemisphere under desperate conditions. You can count the
free elections in Haiti, I was going to say in one hand, but probably
on one finger. It is really a great testimony to President Aristide,
in my view, and the people of Haiti that they have been as deter-
mined as they have to create an environment where democracy will
have a chance to thrive and to grow.
Mr. Chairman, I am anxious to hear again from our colleagues
here this morning. The Haitian officials have acknowledge their
mistakes, as Senator Graham has pointed out. Literally thousands,
thousands of candidates-I mean, probably in many ways if you
could roll the film back, and say why don't we just try it in a much
more simplified version to begin with. You are inviting the very
kind of situation that exist when you have that many candidates,
that many different ballots.
People are voting based on colors and symbols. People having to
literally have to remember just months ago what it was like to go
and vote where your life was in jeopardy if you did. Certainly all
of those gripping fears played a role as well. I have nothing but the
highest degree of admiration for President Aristide and for the peo-
ple of Haiti.
Despite the problems they witnessed in this election cycle, I
think they deserve our commendation, strong commendation, for
what they have achieved. They have a long way to go. Obviously,
it will take a lot of help and a lot of cooperation on the parts of
a lot of people. I know we need to focus on what did not go right,
but I hope in the process of doing that, we make it abundantly
clear from all of us regardless of party or political persuasion, re-
gardless of whether or not we agreed with President Clinton's deci-
sion in Haiti, whether you like President Aristide or not. That is
not our business to like or dislike heads of state in other countries.
Whether or not they are doing the job; whether or not they are
focusing on trying to provide a democratic opportunity for a people
and a country that have never, ever, ever, ever had it before. That
much is true. We all at least can agree on that. Again, I am anx-
ious to hear from our witnesses here. I thank you again, Mr. Chair-
man.
Senator COVERDELL. I thank the Senator. Senator Pell, you had
said you would like to make an opening statement.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much. Today, Haiti is one step
closer to having a functioning parliament and a viable local govern-
ment representative of the Haitian people. These are critical ele-
ments in the construction of a democratic system. The Haitian peo-
ple have struggled mightily to be able to get to this point. They de-
serve our assistance and support as they continue the difficult task
of fashioning a lasting democracy in that troubled country.
I think it is interesting too that Haiti has declared its independ-
ence, ahead of any other country in the Western Hemisphere, ex-






cept for the United States itself. I would ask that the balance of
my statement be inserted in the record.
Senator COVERDELL. It certainly will. There will be no objection
to that, Senator. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Pell follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL
REVIEW OF HAITIAN ELECTIONS
Today the subcommittee on Western Hemisphere will receive testimony on the
conduct and results of Haiti's June 25 elections. We will hear from Members of Con-
gress who have had a long and abiding interest in Haiti, from representatives of
non-governmental organizations who played a role in the election process, and from
Administration officials who closely monitored the rather chaotic election process.
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is a very important one because it will help us to
put into perspective not only the events of June 25-election day in Haiti, but the
entire electoral process leading up to the actual casting of ballots. Hopefully we will
gain some understanding of the complexities that confronted inexperienced election
authorities as they sought to hold elections across the country for more than 2,100
legislative, mayoral and local council offices.
Whatever flaws in that process, and no one denies that there were flaws, I believe
that by in large the Haitian people were able to freely exercise their right to choose
their local legislators and municipal officials. Whatever else one might conclude
about last month's election, one fact seems clear, it represents an important step
in the building of democracy in that country.
The Haitian government and Haitian electoral authorities have much to do in the
coming days and months to further strengthen their country's fragile democracy. I
applaud their decision to hold special elections in those municipalities where Hai-
tians were denied the opportunity to vote due to administrative or procedural prob-
lems.
Today, Haiti is one step closer to having a functioning parliament and viable local
governments that are truly representative of the Haitian people. These are critical
elements in the construction of a democratic system of governance. The Haitian peo-
ple have struggled mightily to be able to get to this point. They deserve our assist-
ance and support as they continue the very difficult task of fashioning a lasting de-
mocracy in that troubled country.
Senator COVERDELL. We will now move to the House members.
I am going to try to keep this as near on time as possible. I want
you all to air your views completely, but do try to be conscious of
the time if you would.
We will begin with Congressman Porter Goss who headed the
International Republican Institute observation team in Haiti. We
are anxious to hear your testimony. Congressman Goss.

STATEMENT OF HON. PORTER J. GOSS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM FLORIDA
Representative Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senators. I would like to submit my prepared statement for the
record if it is all right with you.
Senator Coverdell. It will be entered into the record.
Representative Goss. Perhaps I can save some time here for my
colleagues on that basis. I was in Haiti in 1990 as a presidential
observer with the Bush Administration and had a chance to see the
elections there. In my view, that was the high water mark of demo-
cratic elections in Haiti. It was a well-run operation in very dif-
ficult circumstances.
President Aristide was the properly elected President, even
though they never really had a formal count. I think it was a true
reflection of the people. I think that was a very great success story.





I went very much in mind with that experience and my previous
experience with Haiti, to these as the Chairman of the IRI and we
followed a very set procedure that was announced in IRI.
There were no surprises. First of all, we announced that we are
going to be following the procedure of the election. That we were
looking at the process. We were not there to draw conclusions. We
were not there involved with any party politics or anything like
that. We were there specifically to check up on the process because
we are very interested in the Democratic process obviously working
in Haiti. We all agree on that. Obviously I will put my hat on as
a Congressman and accountability to the U.S. taxpayers, we have
a very large investment in democracy in Haiti. I must say that in
the back of my mind was concern about how we were doing in that
investment with regard to the next elections they had in December
for the presidency which will of course be extremely critical.
We had a quality team in IRI. We had 20-some members of very
distinguished people; perhaps the most celebrated of the current
authorities on Haiti, Dr. Georges Fauriol was a member of our
team. He has a book, if anybody is interested in Haiti, really must
read. We were throughout the country in the nine departments. We
were there with a very strict set of procedural requirements that
we were trying to find out.
As I said, we were looking at process. We announced ahead of
time that we would be making three separate reports. The first re-
port would be on the pre-electoral process. The second would be on
the balloting day itself a process. The third would be on the ac-
counting process.
Others in IRI will testify to the balloting process because my ex-
perience in Haiti was to leave early Friday morning to get to Haiti,
spend the weekend there, go through some of the preparations,
some of the problems they were having with the parties and talk
to the various people involved in the preparation, and then observe
the balloting. I got to Port-au-Prince, up to St. Marc and back;
again out around in the countryside to a number of places, polling
stations in the city and in the rural areas, and in some of the other
cities, as I say.
Then I left Monday about noon before certainly the ballot count-
ing process had been completed. So, others will have to testify as
to that. In the process of this, as we announced, there would be
periodic updates before the election about what we were finding.
Many of the problems that Senator Graham has testified to that
are areas that need to be resolved are exactly the things that we
pointed out in our Saturday morning press conference about prob-
lems with process; failures in the system to do the things that
needed to be done to have a really true, widespread, good, thor-
oughly transparent, democratic election that did not disenfranchise
any candidate or any voter.
Unfortunately, the process failed the people of Haiti to some de-
gree. It appears that it is a larger degree as the Monday morning
quarterback goes on. We were criticized in IRI for perhaps being
a little too harsh. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me, I would
just like to read from a yesterday New York Times editorial. It
says, 'The first round, June 25, was marred by massive dis-
organization. Thousands of eligible voters were unable to cast bal-






lots. Some were left off lists and some polling places never even
opened. Ballots were handled sloppily." That is not the IRI speak-
ing. The IRI's conclusions that we spoke to in Haiti were no where
near that severe.
What has happened as we have gone through the process is we
have found out that some of our concerns about the process indeed
had very negative consequences. I need to point out that there were
some good things that happened too. Where I went on election day
was not preannounced. I got a chance to see some good things hap-
pening and some bad things happened.
We just walked in as observers. We got a chance to see the best
and the worst. It was a very, very mixed message that I got out
there on the polling day going from place-to-place. I would be very
happy to share with anybody who would like to see the sheets that
I got at the various polling places, either in Cite Soleil, or in St.
Marc, in Cabaret or in any of the various places that I went. It was
a different experience.
There were certain recurring problems that came out. I will go
into those very quickly in a moment. I think it is very important
to point out that there was some success in this election. There was
a great talk that the mood was better. It clearly was less tense
than it was 1990. That is a positive statement. It is also a great
credit to the U.N. and the U.S. Armed Forces that were there.
There is no question that the stability in the country and much of
the ease that was felt would not have been felt without those
troops being very, very much in evidence. One of the things we
found in virtually every polling station we went to, Mr. Chairman,
we asked the question of the president of the BIV, what are your
concerns?
Virtually in every one, whether the polling was going well or not
so well was, we are concerned about our security here. We were
promised somebody here and we do not have somebody armed in
a uniform standing outside of this polling place. Many of the BIV
presidents said to me, that is why we are having a very light turn-
out today.
As it turned out in the BIVs I went to, I did not count any turn-
out greater than 30-percent. I know there are some estimates that
the actual turnout was as high as 50-percent. We are never really
going to know because the registration lists in many cases have
disappeared or been destroyed and other problems like that.
It is going to be virtually impossible to verify the results of this
election because of the way the ballot boxes have been handled. We
can come up with a conclusion, but you are never going to get exact
statistics out of it. The other question is, should we have done bet-
ter with the millions of American taxpayers' dollars that were put
into this election to help the organization?
I lay this right smack at the doorstep of the CEP. That money
was not well-used. I think the biggest problem with the CEP was
either incompetence or lack of responsiveness or both. We heard
that across the country from the political parties. The political par-
ties in Haiti are actually the people who should make the judg-
ments about this election. They are the ones who are participating.
We are interested observers from foreign shores.






They participated and they have said, "this was not satisfactory."
The majority of the political parties have come up and said that
they were disappointed with the turnout. There was massive fraud.
Evans Paul said that, the Mayor of Port-au-Prince, as we know.
Twenty-three out of 27 political parties have said they want an an-
nulment either full or partially.
The Minister of Culture got up and said, "procedurally, this elec-
tion was a step backward." We have the leak of even Mr.
Hirschberg who was on the team saying, "you know, the Repub-
lican Institute was right. There are some very procedural problems
and we should not ignore them."
It is in that spirit to correct those problems that we have made
our reports and that we are here. We have indeed a great deal of
interest in having a friendly neighboring country. I will say, very
neighboring to Florida, which is where I live and where I rep-
resent. We have a great interest in seeing them flourish into a true
democracy.
We found there was insufficient public education; not adequate
training of the poll watchers; insufficient pay of the poll workers;
insufficient attention to the detail of the registration of the can-
didates, and other problems with ballot mistakes that we have
talked about. I would be very happy to expand on any of these de-
tails. I realize that others wish to testify. I certainly have taken my
share of the time.
I have also been subjected to, I think, some very, very unfair and
uninformed commentary about why I, as the chairman of the IRI,
put out a report such as we did. I will stand by our report, our re-
ports that we have put out so far. I assure you that we had quality
people there trying to do the right job. I would be very happy to
answer to any questions with regard to that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Congressman Goss follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN Goss
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for allowing me to testify before your committee today.
As you know, I was the Chairman of the International Republican Institute's Ob-
server Mission for the June 25 elections in Haiti. I would like to share some obser-
vations from that election mission and raise some of the concerns that I have as
a Member of the House of Representatives who has a direct responsibility to the
American taxpayers.
The mandate of the IRI observers mission was simple: to observe and document
the electoral process in Haiti. In so doing, we hoped to peel away some of the layers
of confusion and make what had become a very opaque process more transparent.
On June 25, IRI observer teams documented both the good and the bad in the
Haitian local and parliamentary elections process. In general, the IRI observer
teams were struck by the earnest efforts of Haitians across the country on election
day. Often in the most challenging of circumstances-without power, without mod-
ern means of transportation, without any real training-many Haitians still man-
aged to open the pofls for their communities.
The parties, despite a genuine lack of financing, worked with the private sector
to field party poll watchers. These efforts produced a relatively smooth process in
some areas, particularly the south. In towns like Jeremie and Jacmel, for example,
election day appeared to go well with most difficulties being overcome by the sheer
determination of the Haitians living there. This is good news and it deserves atten-
tion.
That having been said, an objective observer would have to conclude that there
were points where the process broke down. In and around Port-au-Prince, IRI ob-
servers witnessed the use of xeroxed ballot sheets, ballots being substituted for
those marked by the voters, and the deliberate alteration of voter tallying sheets.





13

In fact, the observer teams reported the chronic lack of ballot security at all levels
of the electoral apparatus. In some areas, like Limbe, the ballots were destroyed
when the communal electoral office was burned down.
It is clear that voters and candidates alike were, in many areas, disenfranchised
by pre-election failings and election day snafus. In most areas of Haiti, the registra-
tion period was cut-off not by a deadline, but by lack of materials. In addition, can-
didates faced mass confusion about whether or not they were on the official list.
They had their answers on election day when it became clear that there were can-
didates in many areas of the country who had simply been excluded from the bal-
lots. In other areas, candidates found their symbols and/or pictures incorrectly rep-
resented or even missing from the ballots-a significant problem in a country where
the vast majority of the population is illiterate.
On election day, violent incidents closed many voting stations around the Haitian
countryside. For example, our teams reported this in Port-au-Prince, Limbe, Port de
Paix, Don Don, Ferrier, Jean Rabel, Carrefour, and Cite Soleil. Further voting sta-
tions failed to open because the materials simply never arrived. In La Chapelle, for
example, this meant the election had to be postponed. Although an accurate esti-
mate is impossible, there were segments of the Haitian population excluded from
the voting day process.
The natural question is whether or not these problems are enough to require an
annulment of the elections. It is noteworthy that 23 of 27 parties that participated
in those elections have signed official communiques calling for the annulment. This
was done prior to any official announcement of results. In fact, as late as Saturday
four of the top five parties were calling for between 60 and 100% of the elections
to be redone. With this level of reservation among the parties, can Haiti get from
those elections a credible parliament and credible local government? Beyond June
25, can they move the process forward to a credible presidential election? That is
a decision only the Haitians themselves can or should make.
The Clinton administration doesn't seem to agree. U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Wil-
liam Swing, and his U.N. counterpart, Lakhdar Brahimi, have been convening and
reconvening meetings with the parties and the Haitian electoral council in an appar-
ent effort to build order into the chaos of June 25. If the reports are to be believed,
at the specific request of Ambassador Swing, the Haitian electoral council has de-
layed announcing results. Is the State Department crossing the line on interference
in the internal affairs of Haiti? Can the Embassy carry-out its efforts without legiti-
mizing what may have been a wholly unacceptable process when Haitians them-
selves weigh it against democratic standards and the spirit of the 1987 Haitian Con-
stitution? In the end, we have to ask, is this a Haitian process or isn't it?
As a Member of Congress, I am duty-bound to seek answers to a host of questions
regarding U.S. operations in Haiti. Who is in charge of the operations? When I need
a full accounting of the receipts or the rationale behind a given policy decision which
door do I knock on-the State Department? The National Security Council? The
Oval Office? The Embassy in Port-au-Prince? This is a question of transparency and
accountability.
On the cost question, precisely how much did the U.S. taxpayers spend on the
Haitian elections? Was that money spent where it was supposed to be spent? For
example, is the money made available for the surveillance units still in the accounts
since the CEP took the last minute decision to reject this mechanism agreed to by
the political parties? A disturbing action in terms of Haitian Democracy, for the
American taxpayers it has become a question of accounting for the dollars they sent
for those units.
The reports have varied but we know that at least $12 million U.S. taxpayer dol-
lars were sent to support the June 25 elections. After spending all of that money,
what have we left behind for the Haitians to build on for December's Presidential
election and, perhaps even more important, for a future election without the U.S.
and U.N. on the ground? Has anyone taken stock, for example, of the voter registra-
tion cards and records-cards some of our observers saw strewn around office floors,
destroyed, or hanging out of garbage cans after the June 25 elections-since they
are also to be used for the Presidential elections in December? Or, will registration
have to begin again? if so, who will pay for it this time?
There are more questions to be asked. However, I want to close by returning to
the larger question of what these elections were all about. I believe, at the most
basic level, they were about two things. First, they were about Haitians being free
to elect the local governmental structure and a new national parliament for their
country and being free to construct in those offices the checks and balances envi-
sioned and provided for in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.
Second, for the American people, this process was about when they can realisti-
cally expect the Clinton administration to bring their sons and daughters home from


92-305 0 95 2






the United Nations Mission in Haiti and whether or not all of their hard-earned tax
dollars, time, and effort have produced anything lasting in that small Caribbean na-
tion.
Mr. Chairman, I applaud your willingness to hold these hearings and thank you,
once again, for the opportunity to testify. I know that you and your subcommittee
will be asking the administration many questions about U.S. activities in Haiti in
the coming months. Like you, I eagerly await their responses.
Mr. Coverdell. Thank you, Congressman. Again, I apologize to all
of the panelists. We are operating under some time restraints. I ap-
preciate your efforts to get the essence of the report in as quickly
as possible. There will be an opportunity later to exchange further
information.
We have also been joined by Congressmen Rangel, Payne, and
Hastings. Being rather new here myself, I don't know that I know
the seniority. Congressman Rangel, everybody is pointing at you.
Congressman, we welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK
Representative RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I ask consent that my
written statement be introduced in the record so that I can be brief
and also to thank you and my friends, Senators Pell and Dodd, for
the way that you opened up these hearings to allow those of us in
the House to share our views with you.
Senator COVERDELL. Your statement will be entered into the
record, Congressman.
Representative RANGEL. Before the election, I had the oppor-
tunity to visit Haiti with President Clinton. As we got off of the air-
craft, as far as the eye could see were these faces of the multitudes
smiling and cheering President Clinton, the United States, singing
God Bless America in God knows what language. But it was such
an emotional experience and such a different experience.
As I travel around the world, those people who I thought should
thank us the most always found something critical that they had
to say about my country. I knew then that not only did the Presi-
dent do the right thing, but the Haitian people, notwithstanding
where we had been in the past were deeply appreciative in giving
them the opportunity to seek and achieve a democracy, certainly as
we know it.
When I think of all of the time that I have spent fighting my
country to get up to where we were, seeing how openly we sup-
ported a dictatorship that was there, and even after President
Aristide was elected for whatever reason, to find a band of mem-
bers of both Houses so dedicated to having this man removed after
he was duly elected; to read the reports that people in our govern-
ment prepared for the President and, of course, for members of the
Senate and the House that gave no evidence of the allegation that
the President was insane, that he was a murderer, he was corrupt,
that he had no support, that the military was the institution.
Then finally to see that these people, after all of that, said, hey,
that is where we were. Let's look forward to where we are going.
When Congressman Goss and his Republican Committee can evalu-
ate an election in a foreign country and come back and say that
they agree with the United Nations, they agree with the organiza-
tion of American States, they agree with every international team,






it does my heart good because it means that this goes a long way
in making certain that we are not giving any political analysis as
to what happened in that fragile democracy.
What we are saying is thank God they got the hang of it, but
more importantly that they got the opportunity. I gather from what
Congressman Goss says is that whatever things went wrong, we
should support correcting them. I invite him to come and take a
look at the politics in New York County, Cooke County and any
number of counties. His recommendations are ones that we badly
need that type of reform to make certain that polls open, that peo-
ple get the opportunity to vote, especially in communities where we
expect what that vote is going to be. These things we have to do
all over.
What I am saying is that what an opportunity to thank them for
this one step that they have made. What a great opportunity, not
for Haiti, but for China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and even
Castro to show, you make this step. We are not there to criticize
you for what you did not do.
What we are saying is that it took us 200 years to get to where
we are today. God knows we wish you had made that step earlier,
but we were an impediment. We are not reading from the same
page.
Congressman Goss, let me say that I was not invited to join with
that Republican group, but I certainly know that whatever it is, I
would like to be a part of it as we move forward to say that we
can improve the system any place, including our country. As long
as the response is positive, I am so proud to be an American, so
proud to be a member of Congress, and will be even more proud
when we can say that we do not have to oversight other democ-
racies and spend more time taking a look at the improvements that
can be made such as motor-voter and a variety of other things, of
course, in our own country.
Thank you so much, all of you, for the contributions that you
have made over the years, but especially in Haiti because I think
it sends an international signal that we say what we mean and we
mean what we say. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Congressman Rangel follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN CHARLES 1. RANGEL
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the oppor-
tunity to testify today regarding Haiti's recent parliamentary elections.
Haiti's elections were like democracy itself: they were messy, untidy, and difficult.
But I am pleased to report that the international community, observers from the
United States, the OAS and the U.N. All agree that it was a fair and valid election.
I have travelled to Haiti several times before the coup and several times during
the coup regime. Most recently I travelled there with President Clinton during the
transfer of forces to U.N. Command.
Before going any further, I want to offer my sincere congratulations to the Presi-
dent for the courage and leadership that he demonstrated in resolving this crisis
with minimum loss of life. He and I were witness to the adulation of the Haitian
people, not just for our President but for the American people whom he represented.
Indeed, I felt that any harsh memories that may have been held by anyone in
Haiti toward our nation were cleansed by the President's leadership and compassion
in the name of the American people.
Indeed, the restoration of the Aristide government has given Haiti another chance
to nurture the small seed of democracy which was planted with his election in 1990.
This, the first legitimate election since then must be placed in context.






I need not remind this panel that one year ago refugees were fleeing Haiti by the
thousands. Those unable to flee often ended up hogtied along the side of the road
with a bullet in the back of the head. The military dictators stripped the nation bare
and made no attempt to address the social and political needs of the Haitian people.
So let us not disparage and belittle Haiti's most recent accomplishment in the dif-
ficult process of democracy. She has come a long way. Even in this great Nation
of ours, it took more than 200 years for its darker citizens to gain the full right to
vote.
Mr. Chairman, if the vast body of international observers had ruled these elec-
tions invalid, I would be the first to urge their annulment because the interests of
neither Haiti nor the United States would be served by supporting an electoral
farce.
However, I do not attach the same weight to reports of logistical difficulties as
I do to reports of fraud and intimidation.
For those whose condemnation of the elections is a true reflection of a continued
opposition to president aristide-who had many enemies in this congress, and still
may-let us not play politics with the Haitian people's serious aspirations for de-
mocracy.
As long as the government and people of Haiti stay the course and continue along
a democratic path, we have a moral obligation to support those aspirations-not at-
tempt to tear it down.
We cannot apply schoolboy standards of democracy in a land of cruel hardship
and suffering. Instead let's help them rebuild economically, and lend constructive
criticism rather high-handed condemnation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Congressman. Now, Congress-
man Payne. I heard a beeper there. I do not know what you all are
up against.
Representative PAYNE. We have a vote, sir.
Senator COVERDELL. All right.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY
Representative PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me thank you for holding this hearing and also the opportunity to
testify. I will also shorten my version and ask that my statement
be submitted for the record.
Senator COVERDELL. We will be glad to put your statement in the
record Congressman.
Representative PAYNE. Let me say that I have been interested in
Haiti's struggle against dictatorships in its quest for democracy for
many years. I have made it a point to travel to that country repeat-
edly over the years in order to gauge and to monitor the progress
and frustration along the long road to democracy.
It has also been my view, Mr. Chairman, that my actually being
on the ground in Haiti and being in contact with the people of that
country would help me make informed and enlightened judgments
whenever U.S. Haiti policy was being deliberated in the U.S. Con-
gress.
Since I returned from Haiti, I have reviewed many press reports
on the elections. Although these reports have at times presented a
negative picture, replete with images of total disorder and complete
chaos, I must stress that this was not the case throughout the
country. In Cap Haitien, for example, which was one of the cities
to which I was posted as an observer, the situation was quite dif-
ferent. The process was orderly, and for the first time in Haitian
history, there was a complete lack of Haitian military presence at
the elections. Instead, Haiti's newly trained police, which we
trained, were in place and their obvious sense of decorum and dig-






nity contributed significantly to the overall atmosphere of order
and tranquility.
Mr. Chairman, I was last in Haiti as a member of the American
Inter-Organizational Observer Mission during the June 25 elec-
tions. Our mission, comprised of individuals with longstanding
commitments to the democratic ideals, collectively observed voting
at approximately poling sites throughout the various regions of the
country.
Election day in Haiti was a profoundly moving experience. As
someone who knew the Haiti of the Ton Ton Macoutes, the Haiti
of Fraph, and the Haiti of the attaches, the Haiti of the Chiefs de
Section, which is Section Chiefs-my French isn't that good.
As someone who knew Haiti when no one dared ventured out
after dark and fear was stamped on the faces of those who moved
by day, and someone who saw first hand and up close the coup
leaders' determination to rid Haiti of all vestiges of democracy, as
one who met with General Cedras-June 25 was a banner day for
Haiti, a banner day for the United States of America, and a banner
day for democrats around the world.
Seeing Haitian voters pressed against each other in sweltering
heat, focused on that time sacred democratic ritual of casting their
ballots, waiting sometimes for hours was a moving contrast to the
memories of Haitians fleeing the coup regime in leaking boats,
drowning at sea, eaten by sharks, being summarily repatriated to
a country then filled with dread. The Haitian people now know
that they have a stake in the future of their country.
It was obvious that there were administrative glitches that cer-
tainly were problems. In one case, we witnessed the frustration of
voters who could not get into the polling station because the key
was not any place to be found. Those who had been waiting in line
wanted to vote, demanded the right to vote, and interestingly
enough, they were not going to leave until they had the right to
vote.
Election officials had no other option but to depart from standard
operating procedures and broke the lock so the polling place was
opened. Now, I imagine that would be written up as a bad thing,
but they did what they felt they had to do. This is an example of
some of the unanticipated adjustments that had to be made in this
complicated election, which we have heard about. I will try to sum
it up.
In other instances, we observed polling stations that were very,
very tiny and very, very hot. Voters remained patient, steadfast,
and determined to vote. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I really
would have liked to have gone through this, but my colleague per-
haps might want to make the vote. I would just conclude that it
was as fair and free, under the circumstances, as it could be. Nine-
ty-two-percent of the people registered. We had a turnout approxi-
mated at 40 to 50 percent.
There were problems, but I think overall, a trip of a thousand
miles must begin with the first step. I think in 1990, they made
their first step with the election of President Aristide. I think the
second mile happened on June 25, 1995. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
[The prepared statement of Congressman Payne follows:]







PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for holding a hearing
on Haiti's recent elections, and for inviting me to testify before you today. I have
long been interested in Haiti's struggle against dictatorship and its quest for democ-
racy. And so, I have made it a point to travel to that country repeatedly over the
years in order to gauge and monitor the progress and frustrations along the road
to democracy. It has also been my view, Mr. Chairman, that my actually being on
the ground in Haiti and being in contact with the people of that country would help
me make informed, enlightened judgments whenever U.S. Haiti policy was being de-
liberated in the U.S. Congress.
Since I returned from Haiti, I have reviewed many press reports on the elections.
Although these reports have at times presented a negative picture, replete with im-
ages of total disorder, I must stress that this was not the case throughout the coun-
try. In Cap Hatien, for example, which was one of the cities to which I was posted
as an observer, the situation was quite different. The process was orderly, and for
the first time in Haitian history there was a complete lack of Haitian military pres-
ence during the elections. Instead, Haiti's newly trained police were in place and
their obvious sense of discipline and decorum contributed significantly to the overall
atmosphere of order and tranquility.
Mr. Chairman, I was last in Haiti as a member of the American Inter-Organiza-
tional Observer Mission during the June 25 elections, and our mission, comprised
of individuals with a longstanding commitment to the democratic ideal, we collec-
tively observed voting at approximately 100 polling stations throughout various re-
gions of the country. (Attached, for the record, is a copy of the statement we re-
reased upon our return).
Election day in Haiti was a profoundly moving experience. As someone who knew
the Haiti of the Ton Ton Macoutes, the Haiti of Fraph, the Haiti of the attaches,
and the Haiti of the Section Chiefs, as someone who knew Haiti when no-one dared
venture out after dark and fear was stamped on the faces of those who moved by
day as someone who saw first-hand and up close the coup leaders' determina-
tion to rid Haiti of all vestiges of democracy June 25 was a banner day for
Haiti, a banner day for the United States, and a banner day for democrats around
the world. Seeing Haitian voters pressed against each other in the sweltering heat,
focused on that time sacred democratic ritual of casting their ballots, waiting some-
times for hours was a moving contrast to the memory of Haitians fleeing the coup
regime in leaking boats, drowning at sea, being eaten by Sharks, being summarily
repatriated to a country then filled with dread. The Haitian people now know that
they have a stake in the future of their country.
It was obvious that there were administrative glitches that had not yet been
worked out. In one case, we witnessed the frustration of voters who could not get
into the polling station because the key was no where to be found. Those who had
been waiting in line wanted to vote, demanded the right to vote, were not going to
leave until they had voted. Electoral officials had no option but to depart from
standard operating procedures by breaking the lock on the polling station so that
voting could indeed proceed. This is one example of the type of unanticipated adjust-
ments that had to be made in one place or another in Haiti on June 25. In other
instances, we observed polling stations that were very tiny, and very hot. Yet the
voters remained patient and steadfast in their determination to vote because-as so
many of them said-their voting represented hope for a better future and assurance
that the dreaded army would not return.
Mr. Chairman, we now know that in a very small percentage of instances, some
polling stations never opened at all. However, the assessment of our observer mis-
sion, as well as that of many neutral observers, is that Haiti's June 25 elections
were characterized more by administrative shortcomings and infrastructural inad-
equacies than widespread fraud, strong-arm tactics, and intimidation.
Indeed, in an attempt to facilitate maximum participation in the elections, the
Provisional Electoral Council twice extended the deadline for voter registration-
first to May 30, 1995 then to June 3, 1995. In addition, once the administrative sna-
fus of June 25 became apparent, the Provisional Electoral Council quickly moved
to extend the 6 pm voting deadline to ensure that all polling stations were indeed
open for 12 hours. In addition, electoral officials also established clear criteria to de-
termine those areas in which elections would need to be held gain.
Mr. Chairman the Haiti's election workers labored for months to meet the June
25 date for the elections and over the past three weeks have been consumed with
the task of counting, recounting and certifying all ballots. And, as we speak, Haiti's
electoral officials are working with Haitian and UN Security forces to design a secu-
rity plan for the upcoming complementary, run-off, and presidential elections. In ad-





19

edition, and this is a very important point, the CEP is now in the process of orga-
nizing elections for Territorial Assemblies in order to form the Permanent Electoral
Council as mandated by Haiti's 1987 Constitution.
Hundreds of journalists from an over the world have been free to travel through-
out the Haiti during the run-up to elections, during the actual elections, and now,
during this post-election phase. In addition, some 1,441 observers representing 71
organizations were accredited as official election observers.
It was not always easy for the CEP to obtain the resources it needed, Mr. Chair-
man. Items as basic as vehicles and filing cabinets, for example, never quite mate-
rialized in the quantities needed and expected. Filing cabinets ordered in December
1994 arrived on June 23, 1995-two days before the elections. Another major chal-
lenge was the reviewing and screening of 12,000 candidates in approximately one
week within the complex procedure of Haiti's electoral law in an environment in
which some of the equipment delivered by international donors-such as comput-
ers-was extremely sophisticated and included complicated features which over-
charged the system and further slowed down productivity.
Regarding the accreditation of candidates, several candidates from across the po-
litical spectrum were indeed rejected for failing to meet the requirements of Haiti's
electoral law. However, Micheline Begin, the OAS Electoral Mission Associate Direc-
tor has ruled that there was not, as claimed by some, any political bias.
Mr. Chairman, on June 25 Haiti reached another important milestone along the
long difficult path to lasting democracy. There were flaws in the process to be sure,
but reasonable people should have expected that. These were, after all, the most
logistically complex elections in Haiti's history.
Even a trip of a thousand miles must begin with a single step. Haiti took its first
step towards democracy in 1990 with the election of President Aristide, and re-
mained steadfast on that journey on June 25, 1995.
Many people question why the United States should help Haiti. In addition to the
humanitarian reasons, there are historic reasons. We need to remind ourselves of
the sacrifices Haiti has made for us, starting back with our Revolutionary War in
1776. A battalion of French Haitian volunteers fought in the battle of Savannah.
In that battalion was a "company of color." One corporal by the name of Henri
Christophe helped to repel three charges from the British. Finally wounded, he re-
turned to Haiti where he became one of the famous leaders in Haiti's war of inde-
Fpendence from the French, which marked the turning point in Napoleon's prospects
for dominating the North American continent.
There were 200,000 slaves against 70,000 French citizens in Haiti at the time.
Napoleon sent his brother-in-law with 40,000 of his best troops to put down the re-
volt. The slave revolt lasted for many years, but in the end there were only 10,000
French soldiers left and Napoleon was forced to give up his expansion into North
America and sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States-a purchase made
with a "down payment of Haitian blood."
Just think, if it were not for the salve revolt in Haiti, and the blow that dealt
Napoleon, much of the United States might be French speaking country today.
The important point is that these elections were a good faith effort by the Govern-
ment and people of Haiti to move forward on the democratic front. And, as long as
there continues to be a positive movement and a dedication to democratic ideals,
Haiti deserves our continued friendship and support.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
American Inter-Organizational Observer Mission
The American Inter-Organizational Observer Mission visited Haiti on June 24
and 25 to monitor nationwide elections for municipal, departmental and legislative
seats. Our delegation was comprised of individuals with long-standing commitment
to the democratic ideal. Credentialed by the Haitian electoral commission (the CEP),
we collectively observed voting at approximately 100 polling stations.
Everywhere we traveled on election day we saw Haitians of all political persua-
sions working together to move the process of transition from military rule forward.
We congratulate the Haitian people for their continued dedication to the democratic
process and their remarkable patience in the face of continuing poverty.
The June 25 elections are a watershed for Haiti. These elections take place in a
human rights climate that is substantially more secure that in past election periods.
The elections also signal the beginning of the re-establishment of true civilian gov-
ernment at every level. This is a remarkable accomplishment in a country that was
stripped of its most basic civic institutions and democratic structures during the
brutal coup regime. In evaluating what we saw on election day, we are mindfulthat
Haiti started from scratch in undertaking its most complex elections ever.





20

During Haiti's parliamentary election in 1987, over 100 people were killed in the
run up to the election day and 34 people were killed on election day, some at polling
stations. On June 25, 1995, we observed no noteworthy security problems at polling
stations we visited. Also, for the first time in recent history, civilian police rather
than the Haitian military, were responsible for security.
We did observe a number of administrative problems, but concluded that none
were motivated by political considerations. Administrative problems included a late
start in opening the polling stations and confusion regarding operational procedures.
In the experience of this group, such administrative problems are to be expected in
a country such as Haiti with limited infrastructure and resources for an effort as
complex as this. The CEP showed flexibility in responding to these challenges. Vot-
ing was extended, in some places for an additional day, to ensure that voters would
have an opportunity to participate. By far the most serious administrative problem
was the omission of candidate names from the ballot. This led to a number of inci-
dents of disruption at polling stations. These omissions were brought to the atten-
tion of the CEP by international observers, who also discussed possible solutions.
We are confident that the ways and means will be found to adequately address this
deficiency.
At the polling stations we visited, Haitians displayed a high degree of confidence
in the process. Party representatives were present at every polling station we visited
and were playing a constructive role. Voters were patient despite long delays at
some stations, and administrative confusion.
We did not observe the counting phase and can offer no opinion about the conduct
of the vote count. Based on our past experience in other countries, this phase is the
most difficult and is the phase where most questions and complaints are raised.
The U.S. Government, the international community, and the Government and
people of Haiti deserve recognition and support for their efforts and accomplish-
ments in a country which one year ago in the midst of the most extreme social, po-
litical and economic crisis extant anywhere in the hemisphere.
OFFICIAL OBSERVERS
Danny Glover, Artist/Activist; William Lucy, International Secretary-Treasurer,
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees; Gay McDougall, Ex-
ecutive Director, International Human Rights Law Group; Maryse Mills, Deputy
President, TransAfrica Forum; Mwiza Muntbali, Information Specialist, TransAfrica
Forum; Charles Ogletree, Professor, Harvard Law School; Congressman Donald
Payne, Chairman, Congressional Black Caucus, U.S. House of Representatives; and
Randall Robinson, President, TransAfrica Forum.-
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Congressman. I understand you
all have about 10 minutes. I am going to go quickly to you, Con-
gressman Hastings.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA
Representative HASTINGS.. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I most re-
spectfully request unanimous consent that my full statement be
made a part of the record.
Senator Coverdell. Your statement will be entered into the
record.
Representative HASTINGS.. Thank you, Senator Coverdell. Espe-
cially let me thank Senator Dodd for extending the invitation for
me to have an opportunity to make a brief presentation, as well as
Senator Pell.
Like my colleagues, I will depart from my written statement, Mr.
Chairman, in the interest of brevity. I will give just a bit of back-
ground. In 1981, I was among five of the very first government offi-
cials who visited the site of one of the Haitian boats that had come
up on Florida shores.
I walked over the body of a nude, pregnant Haitian woman. I
have never forgotten that experience of people seeking freedom and
better opportunity trying to come to our shores. A year and a half






ago, Senator Graham who testified here earlier and myself visited
Haiti. We had dinner with the then-provisional Cabinet officials,
one of whom was Mr. Guy Malary, who was then the Justice Min-
ister.
Approximately a week later, Mr. Guy Malary was killed. Mine
and his conversation, and we were seat mates at dinner, we talked
about potential elections. He assured me that if our democracy
could be restored and if their country helped them that they would
hold elections that would be free.
I understand the criticism. It is replete in the record and will
continue to be. The record will show the kind of election that was
held was obviously flawed. How fast we forget that the election in
Baltimore and in Maryland was counted twice in a Gubernatorial
race.
I cited to my colleague in the House, Mr. Goss, about a city in
his district that has never had a straight election. I continue to re-
mind folk about our own flaws within our system. Last night Sen-
ator Graham and I were walking from a meeting in the Capitol
here to the Senate Hart building. He made a comment to me that
was very telling. That is, what did we expect, that they would hold
a Vermont-styled election in Haiti as the first election outing of
consequence?
Pretty obviously their infrastructure for elections is immature.
We all understand that. I would end and ask clear consideration
of my full remarks as I am sure the Senators will give it, by saying
what my mother says to me so often, "Give the prize to the one
who tries." Thank you all so much.
[The prepared statement of Congressman Hastings follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN ALCEE L. HASTINGS
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
before you today. I welcome the opportunity to share with you some of my views
regarding Haiti's recent elections.
I was unable to be in Haiti for the elections, Mr. Chairman, but I have studied
the reports issued by the various observer missions and it seems to me that the gen-
eral consensus at this time is that although there clearly were bureaucratic and
technical glitches on election day, the elections were a good indication of Haiti's
commitment to democracy.
The Organization of American States' June 25 report stated: "While recognizing
a number of inadequacies and administrative difficulties, we would not want to
overlook the more positive aspects of the process. As the day progressed it
became evident that the voting process had significantly improved electoral
officials were becoming more efficient and the overall atmosphere was increas-
ingly orderly and peaceful."
The U.S. Observer Mission concluded: "Despite repeated misunderstanding over
the actions of elected officials at all levels, the delegation saw little evidence of any
attempt to favor a single political party or of an organized attempt to intentionally
subvert the electoral machinery."
The American Inter-Organizational Observer Mission's report stated that they
"did observe a number of administrative problems, (they) concluded that none were
motivated by political considerations."
And the Washington Office on Haiti's Observer Mission concluded that: "In both
the 1990 and the 1995 elections, a significant proportion of [polling stations] mon-
itored suffered from logistical, administrative and technical problems which, while
serious by North American standards, did not violate the integrity of the electoral
process *"
The International Republican Institute, however, has stated that: "no reliable
counting of the June 25 balloting can occur as a result of the nationwide breakdown
of the electoral process. Post-election confusion now dwarfs pre-election problems.





22

There is a total absence of safeguards against fraud, tampering, disappearance and
destruction of election materials."
Mr. Chairman, I am however, skeptical about the IRI's assessment of the outcome
of the elections since they reported BEFORE the election (in their Pre-Electoral As-
sessment) that we could not expect Haiti's elections to pass international muster. If
they had an opinion on the outcome of the election before the election actually took
place, I must question the objectivity of their conclusions.
It is obvious that elections infrastructure in Haiti is still immature. But the peo-
ple of Haiti and their elected officials have proven that they are committed to de-
mocracy. It is my hope that the Provisional Electoral Council will find a way to en-
sure that the complementary elections are an improvement over the June 25 elec-
tions, the run-off elections an improvement over the complementary, and the Presi-
dential elections an improvement over them all.
The extension of the deadline for voter registration and the extension of voting
hours on election day were important indications of the electoral officials' deter-
mination that all Haitians must have the opportunity to participate in the electoral
process. In addition, the holding of complementary elections on July 22 shows that
Haiti's electoral officials understand that partial democracy is no democracy at all-
that every vote does indeed count.
Electoral officials' work with the United Nations Security Forces and Haiti's police
in matters of security should continue. The establishment of the Permanent Elec-
toral Council (CEP) must go forward. Improved coordination between international
agencies and Haiti's elected officials must be developed to facilitate the timely deliv-
ery of equipment and material for subsequent elections. Most importantly, the inter-
national non-governmental organizations must complete their civic and electoral of-
fice training responsibilities, since international donors have decided that Haiti's
electoral officials should not be funded to perform civic education and training ac-
tivities. And Haiti's electoral authorities must replace any officials who attempts to
obstruct the electoral process.
Mr. Chairman, in 1987, over 100 Haitians were killed in the run-up to elections,
and 34 were killed on elections day some at polling stations. Other elections have
had to be canceled due to terrible violence. This elections was free of that.
We are the world's leading democracy and its most powerful nation. We have a
choice. We can choose to stand by Haiti as long as it continues along a steadily
democratic path or we can choose to slam it into the ground at the slightest elec-
toral mistake and misstep.
After all, was it not in our own great nation that the City of Baltimore was count-
ed twice in the 1986 Maryland Senatorial race? Have we already forgotten recent,
bitter battles-replete with the most vile of charges-over Gubernatorial, Congres-
sional and Senatorial seats?
Mr. Chairman, a mere 6 months after the restoration of democracy, the IMF cer-
tified that the Government of Haiti had exceeded its performance criteria. In addi-
tion, the government is working with the International Finance Corporation to pri-
vatize 9 of Haiti's state-owned enterprises. In the 8 months since October 15, over
a half million Haitian children have been immunized against childhood diseases.
The macro-economic structure on which any lasting economic recovery in Haiti will
depend has been put in place. And most importantly, Haiti has just held the elec-
tions that naysayers said would never take place.
Mr. Chairman, Haiti's leaders have truly put forth their best efforts, and they de-
serve our support and encouragement, not our derision and skepticism. As my Moth-
er says, "Give the prize to the one who tries."
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate that.
I do appreciate everybody's attempt to cooperate with the time situ-
ation we are dealing with.
I am going to invite the outside panel to come forward. Mr.
McColm of the International Republican Institute; Mr. Fischer of
the International Foundation for Electoral Systems; and Ms.
McDougall, Executive Director of the International Law Group.
We will begin the panel with Mr. Bruce McColm of the Inter-
national Republican Institute.




23
TESTIMONY OF R. BRUCE McCOLM, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. McCOLM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have prepared formal
remarks. I hope they will be included in the record.
Senator COVERDELL. They certainly will be included in our
record.
Mr. MCCOLM. I am Bruce McColm, the president of the Inter-
national Republican Institute. IRI has sent, as Representative Goss
said, a 19-man observer team that spent June 25 through June 28
in the country of Haiti. IRI has been on the ground observing this
process since May 1st. We have a permanent staff on the ground
in Port-au-Prince of five people.
Prior to the election, we conducted several pre-assessment trips
using other people from our hemisphere actually; not North Ameri-
cans, but people who had been in transition elections to give us
some assessment of what was going on. On election day, we de-
ployed in all of the departments of Haiti.
Our team observed roughly 500 of the polling stations. But more
importantly, and certainly more importantly for this process, 50-
percent of the BECs, the next level of the election stations, and
100-percent at the regional level. More importantly, our observer
team stayed out in the field during the postelection count period,
which in Haiti is very, very important.
In fact, prior when we started having discussions with the ad-
ministration in December about these elections, one of the things
I brought up was because this was an intensely contested election
for local government, that it was very important to have a count.
The 1990 election, which IRI also observed and said was free and
fair despite some of the problems that were mentioned by the first
panel, was hailed as a model in Haitian history. The fact of the
matter is the major flaw in that process was there was no formal
count.
At least five of our observer members served on different Haitian
election observer missions in the past; whether it is the presi-
dential one in 1990, the aborted ones-I remember being evacuated
by plane in 1987. In all total, I observed all of those elections and
I have traveled to Haiti at least a dozen times in the last nine
years.
Let me say that the IRI believes that certainly one election does
not make or break a democracy. We realize it is going to be a long
process in Haiti. Let me underscore a few points and make this
sort of poignant situation. We believe that this would have rep-
resented another step, not a first step. People keep saying it is a
first step.
The first step was the approval of the 1987 Constitution. The
next step was the 1990 presidential elections. This was the third
step that would have at least solidified Haitian democracy.
It was well-known in advance of the restoration of the constitu-
tional order and President Aristide, that these elections would have
to be conducted rapidly to replace the outgoing parliament. The
international community and the agencies involved in that commu-
nity had been involved in past Haitian elections and knew the
problems of organization and mismanagement that had occurred
before.






Second, we missed a great opportunity because this election was
conducted under the most auspicious security environment that
Haiti has or is likely to have in the near future. The international
community and the NGO's, whether it was the IRI, or NDI, or
IFES, or any of us had pointed out these problems all along.
Last, because the international community, all of us understand
the Haitian reality, it would not have taken much for the elections
to have been perceived as credible in the eyes of the international
community, but more importantly in the eyes of the Haitians them-
selves.
As we sit here, you know that there is a disparity between the
CEP and the Government of Haiti who, in their preliminary re-
sults, have announced pretty much 20-percent of the election would
have to be replayed. That is a modification of 10 to 15 from last
week. Twenty-six of the 27 political parties, however, are asking
now and meeting at this moment asking for an annulment of the
whole process.
We hope the mediation effort that is going on between the Unit-
ed States, the U.N. and the political parties will somehow resolve
what is a very polarizing situation right now on the ground. As we
said in Haiti, and I will say this here, and will say it-we are not
here or there to certify these elections, decertify these elections.
Only Haitians can do that.
We think the statements of the political parties in Haiti deserve
serious merit. I would argue now the data that they are submitting
about this election process far exceeds the quality and quantity of
our own election data. The conduct of this election does, however,
bring into question how soon a new round of elections should be
held or even if they can be held.
Let me say there are bright spots. It is not that we went down
there with a preconceived idea about this. Thousands of election
workers at the local level, and remember most of them have not
been paid yet, have contributed to the process. We were impressed
by the dignity of the Haitian voter trying to cast their ballots.
We are very impressed by actually the very surprising turnout
of political party poll-watchers because we had been informed a
couple of weeks before that there was no provision for this and that
political parties would probably not get out and observe the vote.
We have been also very impressed by the seriousness and sophis-
tication that the political parties have taken in analyzing the seri-
ous flaws in this process, and the type of discussion and debate
that is going on as we speak. It has been going on for the last 5
days.
We should be honest about this election process. The reason we
should is because we cannot repeat this later this year. If this proc-
ess were repeated later this year for the presidential election, we
believe it would be more polarizing than these elections and would
in all probability erode any small gains that we have made since
1987.
We believe an honest assessment of this process and some con-
structive recommendations might avoid this disaster. Let me just
summarize some of our results and do so in a snapshot section. We
were told that the disqualification of a few hundred candidates






from the ballot, Mr. Chairman, would not be that meaningful in
Haiti.
This is a shot of burning election ballots in a town called Jeremie
in the section right outside of Fort Liberte. Our observer team wit-
nessed this. The good news is that the arsonist was apprehended
and given over to the U.N. authorities. Around the country, we had
the burning down of BECs by followers of disqualified candidates
or people who did not make it on the ballots.
For instance, we had in Roseaux, the BEC was burned there. In
Limbe, a fight between the OPL led to the burning of that BEC.
In the next photograph, this is the Kenscoff this is a very pleasant
area outside of Port-au-Prince. Kenscoff area where this election
station which accommodates roughly about three BIVs was burned
down. This is the situation two days later. These are cast ballots.
These are tally sheets. These are all of the materials for the elec-
tion. They were left there without any type of organization.
In fact, there is a small party here, the UPAN party. We have
the burned ballot. This candidate probably will never receive this
vote.
Senator COVERDELL. Could you pass that ballot forward?
Mr. McColm. Sure.
Also, I should stress that we found, in 50-percent of the BECs
that we visited, registration cards that were filled out. We don't
know whether they are real or not real. If they are real, these peo-
ple cannot vote in the presidential elections. You have to have this
registration card to vote.
As you know Mr. Chairman, the CEP claimed there were a mil-
lion mission registration cards. We found stacks and stacks of these
all over the place without any supervision or guarding. This is a
very important point for the future elections in Haiti.
We also found tally sheets. We not only saw tally sheets being
changed, but there are others that were destroyed if one party was
ahead or the other. This is basically the collection of the ballots.
This is not a sensational picture. This is a fairly picture of ballots
being delivered to the next level of the election authorities; ballot
boxes unsealed. The importance about unsealed ballot boxes, we all
think about it in terms of security, but in a Haitian context, it is
something else.
You have a number. It identifies what polling station that box
came from. All of our observers observed that this was not observed
throughout Haiti. Therefore, when these boxes show up, nobody
knows from what voting station they are coming from. We do not
know whether these are cast ballots by voters or have been added
to.
This was a scene, and this is what is very important. There are
48 hours after the closing of the polls around the country, Mr.
Chairman, that all mayhem broke loose. These were beyond the is-
sues of development, mismanagement, disorganization.
This is the Delmas BEC outside of Port-au-Prince. Remember,
our observer team saw this an hour before they took the picture.
They didn't have a camera. These guys drive up with empty bal-
lots. There is a party identification on the right-hand pocket of this
man. On top of the car hoods, we saw them making up new tally
sheets in Port-au-Prince for the Delmas region and also casting and






making out the ballots, in this case, for the OPL party, and sub-
stituting them for other ballots that had been cast.
The time between the first observation of this until the photo it-
self was like two hours. In other words, this is a very nonchalant
group. The other photos of this whole process show that they were
fairly leisurely doing this.
This was the type of scene in the BECs and accounting proce-
dures. This isn't messiness or disorganization. Those black boxes
there are unmarked ballots. They are not sealed, they are not su-
pervised. I sympathize with this woman. Many of these electoral
workers-I see an electoral worker in the back-worked all day
and all night. When this happened, that was about the end of their
rope.
This is how our observer team saw, again, all over the country.
This is a counting center. This is actually operating somewhat nor-
mally. People are counting unsupervised, unobserved. I personally
saw somebody walk of the street, walk upstairs, just walk into a
room, actually count a series of ballots, put down on the list a num-
ber, and walk out. I have no idea whether that was an election
worker. I have no idea whether he had just taken a break and was
finishing what he was doing.
This was the type of scene that we saw constantly. Then they
cleaned this up. The big issue, I think, that we all have to come
to grips with is what percentage of this election will be able to be
ratified? There is massive destruction of the election materials.
This is a very organized situation. This is in the basement of the
Port-au-Prince-there are three levels to this basement. Only on
day three, about our sixth trip, did we find the other two. All of
that with the tally sheets, the registration sheets, cards, the cast
ballots, that all is thrown out into dumpsters.
The sort of last demonstration of what happened in the post-
election day process, this is in a truck depot where you have the
situation where all of this stuff is just put into dumpsters. They are
on the ground. This was taken by our observer team who called me
up to come down an hour later. People talked about inefficiency,
but an hour later I went down and the Haitian woman sort of su-
pervising all of this told me very proudly that the garbage trucks
had come and taken it all away. So, it was very clean.
In other words, there is efficiency when there is a desire for effi-
ciency. Let me just say that, that chaos that we have seen does
raise questions about whether this election meets minimal accept-
able standards. Again, we will rely on the political parties of Haiti
to make that decision.
I think we can all say that is a direct consequence of the CEP's
own pre-electoral problems and lack of training of electoral work-
ers, lack of civic education. We would suggest in the future, Mr.
Chairman, that there should be a total reconstruction of that CEP
so there is a broader representation of the political spectrum in
Haiti. There has got to be more extensive training of poll watchers.
I was there a week before the election and they had not even start-
ed training poll watchers.
If it were not for IFES, there would not have been even a general
manual out in the field on training. I also believe that, just senti-
mentally, I think you ought to pay your electoral workers. What






happened was in Cite Soleil, we would go to places where 60-per-
cent of the tables did not open up because people were basically on
strike. They had not been paid with the funds given to the CEP.
Of course, there has got to be a better way to qualify candidates.
The major parties all maintain that the candidates thrown off of
their lists were very competitive. In the field we saw actually some
of those candidates that clearly were disgruntled and people actu-
ally sat down and did not vote.
In St. Marc's, for instance, they had a very vigorous local cam-
paign for the magistrate's office with five major parties. Candidates
went through the night campaigning and then Saturday night they
only found out on Saturday night that none of them, none of them
appeared on the ballot. You should have seen the lack of turnout
in that town. It just was a "poof." This happened throughout the
country.
So, let me just conclude saying that all of us realize there is no
alternative but democracy for Haiti. I remember for the OAS
Human Rights Commission being in jails and interviewing victims
of the military regime. No Republican or Democrat can benefit if
this process is forwarded, stalled, or stopped. But let's openly recog-
nize what a fiasco this election was. This was an election of which
the international community is fully engaged. The Haitian military
was not appearing and it did not work. We have to help the Hai-
tian people overcome this.
There was not one stage of the process which could be independ-
ently verified. That is very crucial for all of us. This was a process
that at each stage, confidence could have been rebuilt by the gov-
ernment, the CEP, and others. But at each stage, it was corroded
and eroded.
I would say that when you have an election like this, unfortu-
nately the winners take office. Their creditability is diminished.
The new institutions of local government and parliament take of-
fice and that institution will lack some creditability. That is too
bad. That was the emphasis of that 1987 Constitution.
More importantly, I think voters will gain a very sanicle distrust
of the electoral process. Mr. Chairman, I would submit that is not
what we want in a country desperate for national reconciliation.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McColm follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. BRUCE MCCOLM
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Inter-
national Republican Institute (IRI) about the findings of our observer mission to the
June 25th Haiti elections.
The International Republican Institute (IRI) was established in 1984 as one of the
core institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). We have a distin-
guished board of directors that includes Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and
Jeane Kirkpatrick. Our chairman is your colleague, Senator John McCain. IRI cur-
rently has a range of democracy-building programs in almost three dozen countries.
Since February 1986, when we monitored the Philippines elections, IRI has con-
ducted 48 election observation missions around the world. In the last two years, our
observer missions have included El Salvador, the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Rus-
sia, Macedonia, Slovenia and, along with our colleagues at the National Democratic
Institute (NDI), the Mexican elections.
IRI has been involved in efforts to further Haiti's democracy since 1986, except
for the period between President Aristide's ouster by coup and his return to the is-
land. In 1990, we fielded an observer mission for Haiti's December national elections







and another for the January 20, 1991 runoffs. IRI observed of that election: "The
will of the people was declared. Haitians went to the polls in record numbers on
December 16, determined to exercise the right of franchise which had eluded them
for so long. Their presidential candidate of overwhelming choice was Father Jean
Bertrand Aristide, a liberation theologue known for his social activism."
Our sole goal in Haiti, as in other nations around the world, is to strengthen
democratic institutions and processes. We were therefore heartened that the valu-
able experience gained in the 1990 elections would be supplemented in 1995 by the
technical assistance and material resources of the United States, the United Nations
and the OAS. In May of this year, we established a field office to embark on an
election monitoring program requested and funded by the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development. According to our mandate from AID, IRI was to "sponsor reg-
ular assessment missions to collect data on the entire election process prior to elec-
tion day," and to sponsor an observer mission to the June 25th national elections
in Haiti "to observe the counting and election processes."
It is important to stress that IRI was not in Haiti to certify the elections. Only
the Haitian people themselves and their political representatives have the right to
determine the legitimacy of the process. We were there to assess the election envi-
ronment and the administrative process from the campaign period through the elec-
tion count. As we have all learned, the events of an election day itself are an essen-
tial part of a democratic process, but they are only a part.
Our mission in Haiti followed our normal methodology in assessing an electoral
process. We sent assessment teams to all parts of the country to observe and evalu-
ate the pre-electoral environment. We deployed teams to eight of nine departments
of Haiti prior to election day to observe both the immediate preparations for the
vote and then the actual voting itself. They remained for two days to observe the
ballot collection and vote count. Since then, we have deployed small teams to follow
up on election-day findings and to evaluate the post-election events throughout the
country. Last, we will be issuing a series of recommendations for improving the elec-
toral process so that the December elections can avoid many of the serious problems
we observed.
Six weeks prior to the election, IRI began issuing a series of "Election Alerts" that
highlighted the problems in the pre-electoral process. These observations were
shared personally by IRI with the responsible authorities in the weeks leading up
to the election. Our five "alerts" detailed the problems that ultimately led to the
election day chaos reported by IRI and the U.S. media. These included:
a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) chosen outside of the constitutional
requirements and that excluded a range of promised political representation;
the CEPs inability to implement an orderly registration process and its
own statements declaring one million registration cards were missing. We re-
peatedly noted the CEP's registration problems, beginning with our May 24th
"Alert," issued more than a month before the election;
the prolonged and, in many cases, arbitrary CEP process of qualifying can-
didates for the ballot, a problem we repeatedly noted beginning with our May
24th "Alert," issued more than a month before the elections;
the CEP's failure to adequately train Haiti's 45,000 electoral workers on
election procedures, especially election day procedures and ballot security. IRI
first noted this problem in our June 5 "Alert," issued more than three weeks
before the election.
IRI's "Election Alerts" were always faxed immediately to the Haitian Government,
the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince, the All) Mission, the United Nations and OAS
missions and more than thirty media outlets in Haiti. The same reports were faxed
in Washington to the State Department and appropriate AID officials. IRI also re-
peatedly detailed our concerns about the election in person to both the State Depart-
ment and AID in both Port au Prince and Washington. Finally, on May 31st, more
than three weeks before the elections, IRI's in-country program leader personally
briefed the Administrator of AID about the pre-election problems.
It's worth noting that the scale of the problems found by IRI was confirmed by
United Nations and OAS officials in private briefings throughout the process. These
problems, which went far beyond the inherent difficulties caused by under develop-
ment, such as the lack of a transportation and communications infrastructure, and
beyond isolated problems in localized areas, were well within the power of elections
officials to solve. The consequences of these problems quickly became apparent in
the chaos of election day.
Before I describe our election day observations, I want to first pay tribute to the
Haitian people. These elections were important for Haitians, who have been striving
to establish a democracy since the 1987 adoption of the Constitution. The elections






were not an end in themselves, but a step in a process toward establishing a democ-
racy. For the Haitian people, a credible election would have been a step toward in-
stitutionalizing a democratic process, and would have lent credibility to the govern-
ment responsible for charting Haiti's future.
Haitians demonstrated their will to vote, many walking many hours and standing
in the heat to cast their ballots. Election workers, most of them unpaid and un-
trained by the central authorities, showed up before dawn and sometimes stayed
until the following dawn without food and water to try to fulfill their duty. Thou-
sands of Haitians were frustrated by an inability to participate in their country's
political process because of election day violence or the lack of voting materials. For
many Haitians-voter and candidate-June 25 was a wasted day. The tragedy is
that their dedication to democracy was not matched by those responsible for the
conduct of this election.
The international community also showed its commitment to supporting the rees-
tablishment of the constitutional order by investing enormous resources to support
this election process with the hopes that democracy can finally flourish in Haiti.
During the election day, our delegates sent in reports from Les Cayes to Fort
Liberte and monitored approximately 500 BIVs, the local polling places, more than
50 percent of Haiti's BECs, the local election headquarters, and all of Haiti's BEDs,
the regional election headquarters. This enabled IRI to have a comprehensive view
of the election day and post-election period. Let me proceed geographically so you
can get an idea of just how widespread the problems and irregularities were.
First, in the Northwest, in Port de Paix and surrounding areas:
-in Port de Paix, the CEP failed to deliver sufficient ballots to the BIVs and
left two candidates for deputy off the ballot. The followers of one Mr. De La
France, who was left off the ballot, ransacked three voting stations, affecting
1,200 Haitians;
-in Jean Rabel, Deputy Candidate Henri Desanour was left off the ballot and
his followers prevented the distribution of election materials to 124 voting sta-
tions, affecting about 42,000 voters. Voting for that area was effectively shut
down;
-in Bassin Bleu, four voting stations were destroyed and the president of the
BEC fled to his house, which crowds ransacked;
-in Nicola, a crowd forced the BEC President to hand over the keys to the
building whereupon the mob destroyed the tally sheets.
In the department of the North, our team deployed to Cap Haitien found the fol-
lowing:
-in Limbe, the BEC was burned down because of an apparent local war be-
tween factions of the OPL. Mr. Duly Brutus, the Panpra candidate for deputy,
was threatened; his house and car were attacked;
-in DonDon, the election was not held because of political demonstrations
and a failure by the CEP to deliver election materials. According to the United
Nations, the demonstration was organized by the local BEC president because
his friend was left off the ballot. This affected 18,000 voters.
Another IRI team deployed to Fort Liberte and the surrounding region:
-in Ferrier, IRI found a pile of ballots being burned with rubbish and dis-
carded corn cobs. Local police pursued and arrested the arsonist. Our team gave
the United Nations forces the ballot remnants;
-ballots were also reported burned in Perches, a town in the mountains;
-in Fort Liberte, our observers saw a man with wads of registration cards.
But election officials, who had not received any training by the CEP, told the
voters they didn't need to register to vote. These same workers threw out ballot
box seals, which our observers recovered from the trash of the Byaha hotel, the
OAS mission's headquarters;
-in Malfety, only five out of the 11 BIVs were open. The local citizens ar-
rested the head of the BEC and turned him over to the police for failure to do
his job;
-on the Dominican border, in Ouanaminthe, election officials feared for their
security and complained they had neither been paid nor received any food, as
promised by the CEP.
In the West, in the Artibonite region, IRI deployed another team to Gonaive and
the surrounding area and found that:
-in Grosse Morne, there was no voting at all. As many as 44,000 Haitians
were unable to vote;
-in Ennery, the voting was interrupted by noon and ballots were burned;
-in L'Estere, the BED vice president said that the CEP had delivered voting
materials to only seven out of 22 BIVs;


92-305 0 95 3





30

-in Gonaive, BEC officials were conducting vote counts for the local BIVs.
Our observer team saw vast amounts of unsecured and unused voting materials
and no records of the delivered ballot boxes;
-IRI was told by Gonaive BED officials that voting was suspended in the
nearby town of La Chappelle. Violence was apparently averted by an agreement
to hold balloting the following day;
-in the small towns of Goya and Mapou, our observers were told by opposi-
tion party members that their supporters were not allowed to cast ballots;
-but at the Gonaive BED, a local OPL coordinator told our observers of his
annoyance that OPL supporters couldn't vote because of registration problems.
At the BED, IRI was informed that 21 of 85 BIVs didn't open, including Petite
Riviera and Desdunes.
Another IRI team dispatched to the Central Plateau, the area around Hinche,
found the following:
-of 678 BIVs in the region, 75 or 12 percent didn't open because the CEP
had never sent election materials or they had arrived too late. There were some
30,000 people disenfranchised in the area. As one Haitian told the group in Cre-
ole, "You don't go to school without books";
-throughout the region, there was no system to receive ballots from the BIVs
and no supervised or observed counting;
-in Maissade, a fire partially destroyed the BEC the day after the election.
Opposition parties protested the changing of the BIV locations and claimed
their poll watchers were excluded from observing the count process at the BEC;
-in Thomassique, the CEP had failed to send enough materials to the BIVs
and the ALAH party declared it would not participate. The CEP ordered the
elections to go ahead and demonstrations broke out, causing the United Nations
to intervene. BEC workers fled and were reluctant to work election day. All BIV
materials had to be brought to the Mayor's office and then transported to
Hinche to be counted;
-in Thomonde, demonstrations by the political parties on Saturday threat-
ened to cancel the elections because the CEP had failed to send materials to
the BIVs. Eventually only 4,700 voted out of roughly 17,000;
-opposition candidates claimed that in Mirebalais OPL candidates arrived
and campaigned at BIVs in government cars;
-in Hinche itself, 20 percent of the BIVs did not open on election day. The
chaotic scene with ballots and the election materials we saw throughout Haiti
existed at the office of the BED President.
In the South, IRI observer teams observed a messy but relatively normal process
marred by incomplete registration lists, the failure to conduct elections for local of-
fices and the closing of a few dozen BIVs:
-at Moron, outside of Jeremie, the CEP failed to deliver ballots on time, and
election workers, untrained by the CEP, were thoroughly confused over closing
procedures once the materials had shown up. This was, however, one of the few
places in Haiti where some election workers had been paid;
-in Roseaux, a BEC was burned, resulting in the destruction of about 40 BIV
boxes and tally sheets;
-in Fort Rouge, Tourbeck and Carrefour, our observers witnessed consider-
able delays in opening but thought the process was among the best we observed;
-in Jeremie, an otherwise relatively smooth voting process was marred by
a party activist pulling a gun on election officials. He was arrested by American
troops;
-in Les Cayes, a PAIN Party stronghold, the CEP has left a number of PAIN
candidates off the ballot, and had mixed up other candidates' names and photos
on the ballots.
Finally, an IRI team observed the election in and around Port-au-Prince:
-in the Cite Soleil section of Port au Prince, of 11 BIVs at St.Ann's School,
only four were functioning. At only one of the four functioning BIVs could we
find a pollworker who had received CEP training;
-in Cabaret, voting was relatively normal;
-in St. Marc, the CEP had left five local candidates off the ballot, so much
of the population didn't vote. There were reports of violence during the previous
night;
-at Kenscoff, a BEC was burned to the ground. Seven full days later, our
team was able to recover burned ballots;
-our teams also spent quite a bit of time at the Port-au-Prince counting cen-
ters. All can only be described as anarchical. Specifically, we witnessed a lack
of security for votes, unauthorized people counting votes, changing and forging






of tally sheets, and the wanton destruction and disposal of voting materials, in-
cluding ballots.
Mr. Chairman, most if not all of the problems I've described are directly attrib-
utable to the pre-election failures of the CEP. Their inability to implement an or-
derly registration process, including, by their own admission, their apparent failure
to safeguard registration cards; the arbitrary, and prolonged decision-making proc-
ess on candidate qualification to appear on ballots; and the CEP'S failure to pay or
train the vast overwhelming majority of Haiti's 45,000 election workers resulted in
the chaos that we observed on election day. Coupled with the unusual formation of
the CEP, the organization's demonstrated inability to fulfill its mandate or the func-
tions normally executed by election commissions, contributed to a lack of confidence
in the legitimacy of the process-and, by extension, in its outcome.
I want to stress that these are preliminary findings. We still have staff in the field
following up on many issues raised during the election period. At the appropriate
time, IRI will release another report that details our election day findings and our
analysis of the post-election process.
I'd like to now outline some of our preliminary recommendations for future elec-
tions in Haiti, including some that were made before the June 25th balloting. As
I stated earlier, elections, including the one held on June 25th, are an essential
part, but only a part, of a country's democratic process.
1. A permanent electoral council should be created, to be headed by someone
widely perceived as a person of integrity, independence and prestige. The CEP
should also include representatives from important sectors of Haitian society, with
some political balance.
2. Chapter six of the electoral code should be eliminated. Eligibility to appear
as a candidate should be determined only by party certification or by petition for
independent candidates, and the fees for appearing on the ballot should be dramati-
cally reduced.
3. A sample ballot should be available to the parties and candidates a minimum
of 30 days prior to the election. This time period would allow for the opportunity
to confirm listings, spellings of names, and the appropriate party symbols.
4. BEC and BIV officials have to receive some training on their responsibilities,
and it should begin 2-3 weeks before election day. They should also be paid for at-
tending these sessions, and, as promised, should be paid in a timely manner for car-
rying out their responsibilities on election day.
5. Political pollwatchers should receive training in the electoral process and
their specific roles in verifying counting at the BIV and BEC levels.
6. Ballots should be safeguarded at BEC offices for at least 30 days past the
election to allow time for challenges and recounts if required. There must also be
a more systematic way by which election results and left over materials are trans-
ported, supervised and logged in at the BEC and BED levels.
7. More civic education is necessary for elections, especially since there has been
no open political debate in the country for over three years.
8. The electorate and the political parties need to feel there is adequate security
for the process. This could be done by a more thorough briefing of electoral workers
and the political parties by the international community about what is being done
to insure security.
9. Create a report form for all funds received and spent by the political parties
and individuals. Criminal penalties should be imposed for failure to comply. The
public should know the source of all funds, goods, and services. There should be
strict penalties against the misuse of state resources for a political campaign.
10. Political parties should have access to the state media and have affordable
time on the independent media.
11. The Political Surveillance Unit should be adequately financed and staffed so
that political parties might have confidence in the counting process.
12. Voter registration should be carried out year round, so that there is a more
accurate record of the voting population.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, IRI's sole goal in undertaking our Haiti
election observation mission was to further that country's democratic process. I ear-
nestly hope that those officials responsible for elections in Haiti examine our rec-
ommendations. We believe Haiti's December Presidential elections can still fulfill
the opportunity missed by the June 25 balloting.
That concludes my statement; I'd be pleased to answer any questions you might
have.






Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. McColm. I am going to turn
to you, Mr. Fischer, representing the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems. We welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY FISCHER, INTERNATIONAL
FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Mr. FISCHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I, too, have
submitted written comments for the record.
Senator COVERDELL. They will be inserted in the record.
Mr. FISCHER. Let me also take this opportunity to thank the sub-
committee for its interest in Haiti and its initiative to discuss the
circumstances of the June 25 election.
My name is Jeff Fischer. I am chief of staff at the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems or IFES as we are more com-
monly known. My own interest in Haitian electoral matters ex-
tends back to 1987. While an election commissioner in Kansas City,
Missouri, I was privileged to host two Haitian officials who were
there to observe a municipal primary in anticipation of their con-
stitutional referendum which was to be held the following March,
the next month.
From September to November, I made four trips to Haiti under
contract with the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment, USAID, consulting with USAID and the first Provisional
Election Council on the 1987 Haitian election effort. I was an ob-
server as well on the November 29 aborted election attempt.
In 1990, IFES received a $1.85 million grant from USAID to pro-
vide a broad range of technical assistance in the presidential, legis-
lative, and local elections which occurred that year. I served as the
field manager for IFES during that project.
A little bit of background about our organization. We are not as
well-known as IRI and some other groups. IFES is a private, non-
profit, nonpartisan organization which provides consultative and
technical support to election authorities in emerging, evolving, and
experienced democracies. We also provide civic education assistance
to electoral commissions and nonpartisan NGOs or nongovernment
organizations.
IFES was established in 1987 by political strategist, F. Clifton
White. Charles Manatt currently serves as our chairman. We have
worked in over 75 countries since our inception. For this particular
election cycle, the 1995 legislative and local elections, IFES was
provided grant monies from USAID to pursue basically two activi-
ties. There were two pools of money, if you will. One I will call the
training budget. The other I will call the ballot budget.
Funding for the training services amounted to about $231,000. It
is not clear in my written remarks, but I do want to state for the
record that, that total award was $300,000; $70,000 of which was
used in other activities. We conducted a four-person preelection as-
sessment in October of last year. We facilitated some meetings with
Haitian officials, State Department AID people back in October
when the elections were in their early discussions.
Specifically on the training front, however IFES, in the registra-
tion period, worked to develop training materials which were then
given to 15 core trainers, all of whom were under our supervision.
At that point in time, the process was turned over to the United






Nations Development Program, UNDP, which had a group of 400
field workers or volunteers who then worked in the field to train
the balance of the 9,000 voter registrars who were used.
On election day, IFES was to have a more focused and limited
role for the training requirements. However, we were compelled to
adopt a broader role. We worked, as Mr. McColm cited, to develop
a training manual which was widely distributed. However, the an-
ticipated 400 UNDP field workers did not manifest themselves in
this stage of the effort.
They were assigned other duties in civic education. Only ten
UNDP volunteers were made available to assist the efforts. IFES
was then compelled to hire 30 additional workers to work on the
departmental level or state level to accomplish the training task.
Under ballot procurement, IFES received an aware of just over
$2 million to organize the ballot procurement for this election. Bid
specifications were developed in cooperation with the election coun-
cil, the United Nations and USAID, all of whom signed off on the
specifications before they were submitted.
Thirteen solicitations were dispatched to both U.S. and Haitian
printing operations. Seven responses were received. On the basis of
capacity and price, the successful bidder was Sequoia Pacific from
Exeter, California. Sequoia brought its experience as the largest
manufacturer of official ballots in the United States to the process.
Last year alone, Sequoia produced over 100 million ballots for ju-
risdictions and over 25 states and the District of Columbia. How-
ever, once again, our task turned out to be a little bit different and
a little bit bigger than what we had originally envisioned. We were
informed by the United Nations and the Election Council that in
order to accomplish the procurement it was going to be necessary
for us to do a data entry project to basically set up all of the dif-
ferent ballot runs that were necessary.
We had 11,000 candidates. There were 800 different ballot runs.
There were 2,199 offices being sought. It was necessary to have a
function whereby all of this data was taken, entered into a com-
puter so that the printer could print the various runs. It was a
complex task. It also required scanning photographs and logos, po-
litical party logos.
We engaged the services of a local firm, a Haitian firm, called
MSP. They go by that acronym. They provided two shifts of data
entry operators, programmers, and supervisors. During the course
of the data entry work and the printing, there were 46 changes to
the ballot requested by the election council.
You can see that there were a lot of gyrations going on in putting
the ballot together, at least within our organization. However, de-
spite this fact, over 17 million ballots were printed and all ballot
orders were filled by election day.
IFES performed an internal analysis of the total cost of the
printing operation. The bid amounts and applicable change orders
were factored into the bids of the three top contenders. The spread
consistently demonstrated that the Sequoia Pacific option was ap-
proximately $460,000 under the second place contender and
$1,035,000 under the third place contender.
Much of these calculations were done using proprietary informa-
tion. If the committee is interested in our notes on this, we could






provide them under other circumstances, but not in open hearing.
We asked the AID mission in Haiti to review our procurement pro-
cedures. Mr. Ed Dragon, I have included his cable with the mate-
rials we have submitted to this subcommittee.
The legal counsel for USAID/Haiti states, "I read and re-read
each of the five bids." There were actually five that wound up being
considered, "and concluded that IFES' conduct of the ballot pro-
curement transaction (1) was accomplished in accordance with the
procurement provisions of the IFES Cooperative Agreement, (2)
conformed to sound business practices, (3) was free of any error."
[The cable referred to follows:]
To: Lawrence Crandall
From: Ed Dragon
Subject: Haiti Elections Support/IFES/Ballot Procurement
Date: Thursday, March 30, 1995
Following our meeting with Mr. Remy, President of the CEP, and with IFES rep-
resentatives, I reviewed and studies the IFES report on the Haiti ballot production
proposals. I read and re-read each of the five bids and concluded that IFES's con-
duct of the ballot procurement transactions (1) was accomplished in accordance with
the procurement provisions of the IFES Cooperative Agreement, (2) conformed to
sound business practices, and (3) was free of any error.
In particular, I note that IFES found that three firms, Sequoia, De La Rue, and
Deschamps, were rated close together on technical grounds and then determined
that each of the firms were capable of fulfilling the contract. This left only price to
be the determining factor and Sequoia was well below the other two bidders on
rice. In similar circumstances, the USG could not legally select a bidder other than
Sequoia.
The IFES determination was in conformance with A.I.D. price policies and tests
as set forth in Chapter 17 of Handbook 1, Sup. 2. As you know A.I.D. may finance
no more than a reasonable price for goods. For procurement through formal competi-
tive bidding procedures, the lowest responsive and responsible bid is accepted as
meaning the lowest available and reasonable price.
I am pleased to submit several recommendations for consider-
ation. We were not present in Haiti in an observer context. So, we
do not have those kinds of stories to share. I think we have some-
thing to contribute as far as technical insights are concerned.
For example, I think the election council should consider extend-
ing the number of days that balloting is available. This is not un-
common. In India, three days are allowed for voting. In South Afri-
ca, a recent example, Ms. McDougall will be able to speak to that,
four days were provided. Hungary has two days. Fiji has eight
days. The list goes on and on.
As a matter of fact, even in the United States, early voting which
is a form of multiday voting exists in Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Vir-
ginia, Iowa, and Nevada. So, being able to extend voting over more
than one day would give the election council more of an oppor-
tunity to fix things that are going wrong on election. Having a 12-
hour time period to do that has proven difficult in the past.
The election council should become a permanent body. Since
1987, and I think we are up to about CEP four or five now, but
it has been provisional in nature. In my opinion, this institutional
set up has created a tentative and arbitrary culture within the or-
ganization. The appointment of a permanent body should also be
coupled with the recruitment of a permanent staff so that you do






have a sense of professionalism growing within the bureaucracy
that is going to administer elections in the future.
The current election council should also look at the June 25 expe-
rience from a lessons learned standpoint. I think at times our rela-
tionship with them was problematic. I felt at times a lot of defen-
siveness, for whatever reason that, made our working relationship
difficult.
However, IFES has been involved in postelection conferences,
specifically recently in Uganda and Ethiopia, where key players
have gotten together and looked at what went wrong, what went
right, and come up with some solutions for future elections. Just
a couple of more points here and I will conclude my remarks.
The investment in security should be maintained. When security
problems take center stage, as they have in past elections, they
tend to consume huge resources and cause distractions in the proc-
ess to the administration of the election. To the extent that the vio-
lence was minimized, it did contribute positively to the election it-
self.
Finally, I think the election council needs to publish and dissemi-
nate rule books and laymen's guides on all aspects of the election
process. These would include voter registration, the act of voting,
how to file for office. These would be very useful guides for the elec-
torate to be able to have a better understanding of how the process
works. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fischer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFF FISCHER
Let me take this opportunity to thank the Subcommittee for its interest in Haiti
and its initiative today to discuss the circumstances of the June 25 legislative and
local elections. My name is Jeff Fischer and I am Chief of Staff at the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems or IFES. My own interest in the Haitian electoral
matters extends back to 1987. While an election commissioner in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, I was privileged to host two Haitian officials who were observing a municipal
primary in February of that year. These individuals held responsibilities in the up-
coming constitutional referendum the next month. From September to October of
that year I made four trips to Haiti and met with the election council members and
staff in a consultative role with IFES under a contract with the United States Agen-
cy for International Development (USAID). I was an election observer for the No-
vember 29, 1987 presidential, legislative, and local elections.
In 1990, IFES received funding to provide a major role in the presidential and
legislative elections scheduled for late that year. The scope of work for the 1990
election will be detailed in the next section. I served as the field manager for IFES
for the full-term of that project.
IFES' role in the 1995 legislative and local elections was more focused than 1990.
In this most recent election process, IFES was charged with developing materials
and training core instructors on the registration and election day process, and with
procurement of the ballots.
IFES is a private, non-profit, and non-partisan organization which provides con-
sultative and technical assistance to election authorities in emerging, evolving, and
experienced democracies. In fact, IFES is one of the few international organizations
which focuses on the field of election administration. IFES also provides civic edu-
cation assistance to electoral commissions as well as nonpartisan, nongovernmental
organizations engaged in the electoral process.
IFES was founded in 1987 by noted political strategist F. Clifton White. Charles
Manatt currently serves as Chairman. Since its inception, IFES has worked in over
75 countries. To support its technical and educational work, IFES has established
offices in Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Peru, Ghana, and the
West Bank.
IFES activities can be broadly divided into two categories: project implementation
and information resources. IFES conducts pre-election technical assessments; pro-
vides on-site technical assistance; performs election commodity procurement; orga-







nizes poll worker training programs; and develops voter/civic education campaigns.
The hub of IFES' information resources is the 1. Clifton White Resource Center, a
research library dedicated to documenting elections and democratic initiatives
worldwide. In addition, IFES organizes conferences and election official exchange
programs, and produces publications such as its quarterly magazine, "Elections
Today."
1990-1991 ELECTION CYCLE
In the 1990-91 election cycle, IFES played a multi-faceted role in the presidential
and legislative elections in partnership with the United Nations (UN) who provided
technical assistance. In July 1990, IFES was awarded a $1.85 million grant from
USAID/Haiti to provide technical assistance and election commodity procurement
for elections later that calendar year.
Specifically, IFES responsibilities were divided into four areas: (1) technical as-
sistance; (2) election worker training; (3) civic education; and (4) election commodity
procurement. Under the technical assistance provisions, IFES worked with the elec-
tion council and the UN on such areas as electoral law, forms design and control,
and logistics. For training support, IFES designed a program using a multiplier ef-
fect which began with 42 trainers who trained 260 members of communal offices
who then trained 739 communal delegates and 3,189 members of polling stations.
Posters, training guides, and ten instructional videos were additionally produced.
The civic education activities undertaken by IFES were voting-specific in nature,
that is, instructional on questions such as how to vote or where to vote. Examples
of the material developed in 1990 include three voter guides in Creole (Advice for
Voters on Election Day, Who Can Vote, Guide for Those Who Intend to Vote), posters,
flyers, and radio and television public service announcements on such topics as
voter registration instruction, the importance of the electoral card, and information
about polling stations. Election commodity procurement included: registration sup-
plies; computers; radios; and contingencies. Specifically, IFES developed and pro-
cured 3.9 million voter registration booklets (cards and forms) and the clerical sup-
plies and carrying cases for the registration kits. IFES procured a 48 terminal Data
General computer system with two printers for the entry and processing of the voter
registration list. IFES also retained a local programmer to develop the registration
software. IFES procured and installed a radio network providing a communications
link between 137 communal offices and nine departmental offices with the election
council's central offices through a combined HF and UHF radio system. In the Port-
au-Prince area, election council members and staff were equipped with hand-held
and mobile units. Contingency procurement included flashlights, facsimile machines,
signs, and clerical supplies. Supply transportation services were also purchased
under this budget.
Following the January 20, 1991 run-off election, IFES was requested by USAID/
Haiti to recover the capital equipment procurement with grant funds. These items
include the computer system, radio system, facsimile machine, and office furniture.
IFES has estimated that at least 95% of the equipment was recovered and placed
in USAID storage in Port-au-Prince.
The 1990-91 local, legislative, and presidential elections were observed by a vari-
ety of international groups including the UN, Organization of American States
(OAS), the Council of Freely Elected Heads of State, the Caribbean Community
(Caricom), CAPEL, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Insti-
tute, and official, country-based delegations from the United States, Canada,
France, and Venezuela. The election was widely regarded as free and fair; the will
of the Haitian people had been expressed in the balloting process.
1995 LEGISLATIVE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS
IFES performed activities under two separate agreements with USAID for the de-
livery of services in support of the 1995 local and legislative elections. These serv-
ices can be classified according to two categories: election worker training support
and ballot procurement. IFES played a specific role, one that was subordinate to the
UN. In its October grant agreement with USAID, the UN was funded as the lead
technical organization and charged with five areas of responsibility: (1) Elections
Technical Assistance; (2) Training of Election Staff and Election Workers; (3) Infor-
mation/Education/Communication and Popular Participation; (4) Procurement of
Elections Commodities; and (5) Budget Support to the Election Council.
ELECTION WORKER TRAINING
The funding for the training services project component was added by USAID/
Haiti to the IFES cooperative agreement with USAID/Global Programs. The amount







granted to IFES was $231,926. Prior to the training being conducted, IFES used
monies from this funding to facilitate the first meeting of Haitian/US election inter-
ests in September 1994. IFES also developed a widely-distributed briefing book for
that meeting, produced a paper in October providing recommendations on changes
to the Haitian election law, and financed a four-person pre-election technical assess-
ment in October 1994.
Several actions were undertaken by IFES for the training component. IFES devel-
oped training materials on administrative procedures identified by the key election
council staff, communal office staff, and other key individuals, approximately 1,700
in total. IFES also printed training materials on proper registration procedures in
conjunction with a registrar training plan which was designed by the election coun-
cil and IFES. Under this plan, IFES trained 15 core trainers. The United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) maintained responsibility for the subsequent grass-
roots training activities which facilitated the instruction of the 9,000 CEP registrars.
In May/June 1995, regarding the pollworker training component, IFES worked
with the Election Council to develop and produce 55,000 copies of a pollworkers
training manual. Following the model established in the registration process, train-
ing materials were developed and core trainers were trained. However, out of an an-
ticipated force of 400 UNDP field workers, only ten assisted in the grassroots
pollworker training. In early June, the UNDP informed IFES that the trainers
working in civic education pursuits were not available. IFES then hired 30 addi-
tional trainers who worked with the Departmental Election Offices (BEDs) to com-
plete the pollworker training program.
On June 15, the UN requested that IFES perform training for the counting of bal-
lots. While prepared to assist with computer equipment and programmer, IFES had
not previously been approached about performing the role of trainer in this case.
As stated in a June 16 memorandum from IFES to USAID/Haiti, "It must be under-
stood that in ten days time IFES cannot replace the 400-member strong UNDP
network *" IFES was able to deploy a consultant who developed a series of sup-
plementary training sheets on the counting process. Working with the Election
Council draft, the IFES consultant was able to clarify and expand upon the proce-
dures identified within seven days. Her materials were incorporated into the Elec-
tion Council's final output.
BALLOT PROCUREMENT
Under a second agreement directly with USAID/Haiti, IFES received $2,006,268.
The scope of work for the ballot procurement for the first and second rounds started
with the development of a bid list of printers capable of delivering services required
by the election calendar. Bid specifications were developed in cooperation with the
election council, the UN, and USAID. Each page of the specifications bore the ini-
tials of each of those organizations. Thirteen solicitations were dispatched and seven
responses were received. The successful bidder was Sequoia Pacific of Exeter, Cali-
fornia.
In addition to pricing consideration, Sequoia Pacific brought its experience as the
largest manufacturer of official ballots in the United States. last year, Sequoia pro-
duced over 100 million ballots for jurisdictions in over 25 states and the District of
Columbia. Under the original scope of work for IFES, the ballot procurement re-
sponsibilities began and ended with the printing component which included set-up,
packing, and shipping costs. However, the UN technical assistance unit and the
Election Council informed IFES on March 18, that IFES would also have the re-
sponsibility to perform the data entry services which grouped the candidate lists
into specific ballot runs by district. Logos or party symbols needed to be collected
and scanned. For senate and deputy candidates, photographs also had to be col-
lected by IFES. In total, over 11,000 candidates filed for 2,199 elective posts with
over 800 different ballot combinations to be printed. Four levels of offices were on
the ballot including the senate, deputy, municipality, and communal sections.
To accomplish this new database task, IFES was required to establish a 15 com-
puter network and develop the software to accommodate the responsibility. The
project plan to do so was submitted to the Haitian Election Council, the UN, and
USAID/Haiti on April 20, 1995. Coupled with this challenge, IFES was informed by
both the Haitian election council and the UN that no office space existed in their
facilities to house the data entry operation. It was necessary for IFES to rent office
space, hire security, and incur the costs of operating an office. Using a local data
processing firm named M.S.P., programmers, supervisory personnel, and 30 data
entry operators were hired to process the candidate list data provided by the elec-
tion council. Two shifts operated from May 1 to 13. The procedure was for data
entry personnel to receive a candidate file from the election council, input the data,
perform scanning of photographs and party logos if required, print the record for







IFES and the Election Council, and pass the file to proof readers. The time required
for the process on average was five minutes per file. Five to ten proof readers were
required to verify the information encoded on the database and classify the files for
transfer back to the Election Council. One file copy was kept at IFES and the origi-
nal returned to the election council. On a daily basis, IFES submitted database ma-
terial to the Election Council. Any errors detected by the Election Council were cor-
rected and incorporated by IFES in the data transmitted to the printer.
This information was transferred electronically to Sequoia Pacific to begin ballot
printing. Under the terms of their contract, the company had 30 days to complete
the order. In fact, it was completed in 17 days with 16 million ballots delivered for
shipment on June 15, 1995. A representative of the Haitian Election Council was
present at the plant to observe the printing process and give approval via signature
of all of the ballot runs. These signed ballot approvals are on file at the IFES/Wash-
ington office.
On June 16, the Election Council then determined that an additional 965 polling
stations would be required to accommodate the actual voting population. The impact
on ballot procurement was the need for an additional 1.6 million ballots to be print-
ed and shipped. These ballots were delivered on June 22, 1995. Additional changes
to the candidates lists led to seven reprints of batches of 84,000 to 300,000 ballots.
It should be noted that the Election Council requested approximately 50 changes to
the database between May 17 and June 14. All ballot orders were filled by election
da complaints have been publicly voiced by candidates that their names were left off
the ballot. IFES/Haiti maintains both a hard copy and electronic file of the can-
didate list information provided by the election council. As of this writing, no "miss-
ing" names have been forwarded to IFES from the UN or Election Council for inves-
tigation. However, our project staff has met with representatives of the OAS obser-
vation mission to discuss the candidates who complained to members of the observa-
tion mission about being left off the ballot. The OAS received this information from
six departments. A total of 34 complaints were recorded. Reasons for the omissions
varied. In some cases, filings occurred after the deadline closed; in others, the filings
were not executed properly. Some parties did not provide party logos to be included
on the ballot. And, in one case, the candidate did appear on the ballot. In six in-
stances, data entry errors were made.
Concerns have also been expressed about the political sensitivities surrounding
the issue of ballots being printed outside of the country holding the election. It is
not an unprecedented situation. IFES assisted with the printing of the ballots for
the 1992 election in Guyana. These ballots were printed in Miami, Florida. Out-of-
country ballot printing has also been conducted in Jamaica, Kenya, South Africa,
Malawi, Tanzania, and Angola. In most of these cases, they were printed in the
United Kingdom. The rationale behind out-of-country ballot printing generally in-
volves issues of printing capacity, neutrality in the process, and ballot security.
IFES has also performed an internal analyses on the total cost of the printing op-
eration. Bid amounts and applicable change orders were factored into the bids of
the top three contenders. The spread consistently demonstrated that the Sequoia
Pacific option was approximately $460,000 under the second place and $1,035,000
under the third place contender. Notes on these calculations can be made available
to the Subcommittee. Also enclosed with this package is a copy of a March 30, cable
from Mr. Ed Dragon, legal counsel for USAID/Haiti, who states "I read and re-read
each of the five bids and concluded that IFES' conduct of the ballot procurement
transaction (1) was accomplished in accordance with the procurement provisions of
the IFES Cooperative Agreement, (2) conformed to sound business practices, (3) was
free of any error."
RECOMMENDATIONS
IFES is pleased to submit several recommendations for consideration:
1. The Election Council should exercise its authority in extending the time
of voting to more than one day. This is the de facto situation. By allowing up
to three days for voting problems can be resolved before balloting officially ends.
The IFES databank shows over 20 countries which allow balloting for more
than one day. Examples of multi-day voting include India (3 days), South Africa
(4 days), Hungary (2 days), and Fiji (8 days). Early voting, a form of multi-day
balloting, is also practiced in the United States in Texas, Arizona, Colorado,
Virginia, Iowa, and Nevada.
2. The Election Council should become a permanent body. Since 1987, the
Election Council has been provisional in nature and this institutional set-up has
created a tentative and arbitrary culture within the organization. The appoint-
ment of a permanent body should be coupled with recruitment of a permanent






staff so that particular administrative skills can be developed and procedures
refined so that electoral events can become more routine in nature. President
Aristide and the new Parliament should be urged to take this action.
3. The current Election Council should be urged to look at the June 25 expe-
rience from a lessons-learned standpoint. IFES has employed the device of post-
election conferences of key players to review and improve the process. Such con-
ferences have been sponsored by IFES in Uganda and Ethiopia.
4. The investment in security for the election must be maintained. In 1987,
local printing plants were burned, the election council's Port-au-Prince office
was fire bombed, and homicides at polling stations shut down the electoral proc-
ess in the mid-morning hours. Aristide rallies were bombed and a coup d'etat
was attempted between the time he was elected in December of 1990 and Janu-
ary 1991 before Aristide was to be inaugurated. There was no serious violence
on election day, in part, because of the teaming arrangement of UN and Haitian
military as election policemen in open cooperation with the election council. Al-
though the June 25 election was not free of violence (2 killed, attacks reported,
polling stations burned) the level of violence was greatly diminished from pre-
vious years. In May, 65 people were reported killed in the Philippines; and in
India 12 people were killed in March during election-related violence. When se-
curity problems take center stage, they tend to consume huge resources and
cause distractions to the process which affect the administration of the election.
5. There is a need for voting-specific information to be disseminated. Observ-
ers have reported seeing confusion at the polls on basic questions such as how
to vote. Pollworker training must be strengthened and voter education must be
an integral part of training.
6. The Election Council should publish rule books and laymen's guides on all
aspects of the election process. These would include voter registration, the act
of voting, and how to file for office. Particularly in the areas of candidate dec-
larations, IFES observed a lack of clarity on the criteria for selection or rejec-
tion of candidates. However, it must be noted that no particular party appeared
to benefit or be penalized by the process in the end.
7. There should be better management of multi-national donor support to
build a long term electoral system. The depth of the problems will require con-
siderable funding for improvements to occur. Electoral institution-building may
not compete well when measured against other Haitian pressing problems in
health care, job creation, and the environment. But without a fully respected
electoral institution to begin the process, future Haitian leaders may govern
with their legitimacy clouded by election process problems.
But elections are also people-driven events and the Haitian people will determine
the course of their electoral system. Their level of interest in this election is a posi-
tive factor. An average of five candidates filed for each elective post to fill; and over
90% of those individual who could register, did, in fact, register. By capturing this
level of motivation and redirecting these energies into the elective process, I believe
that Haiti can build a responsive and respected election system.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Fischer. I appreciate your
assistance with regard to the time. We have all been operating
under this same pressure.
Ms. McDougall, we welcome you here representing the Inter-
national Law Group as its Executive Director. Thank you and we
welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF GAY McDOUGALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. McDOUGALL. Thank you very much. I participated in mon-
itoring the Haitian election of June 25 as part of a coalition of
American nongovernmental groups. The commission collectively ob-
served polling at approximately 100 polling stations.
Prior to the election day, I also visited Haiti for 2 days in May
to consult with the Electoral Council, the United Nations, the Or-
ganization of American States on electoral issues. My comments
here today are therefore based on my two visits to Haiti and my
experience as a member of the 16-member South African Independ-






ent Electoral Commission that organized and administered that
country's successful elections last year.
I would like to begin by reading a short passage.
At 2:00 p.m. on voting day, election monitors throughout the
country reported that 22.5-percent of the voting stations experi-
enced serious deficiencies. Most opened late. Some never received
a complete set of the required voting materials. Ballots and ballot
boxes were clearly in insufficient supply.
At most polls, thousands of people waited in line for hours to
vote. Presiding officers fearful of being swamped, prevailed on inex-
perienced warehousemen to issue excessive stocks of voting mate-
rials causing shortages for other voting stations. Some polling
places were running out of ink to mark the fingers for voters.
Hording of supplies resulted in what at the time seemed to be an
inexplicable disappearance of millions of ballots.
In haste, the electoral commission ordered the overnight printing
of nine million extra ballots. In the time available, it was not pos-
sible to include the customary safeguards against fraud. Where bal-
lot boxes ran short, presiding officers were urged to use postal bags
with an improvised method of sealing them.
The accounting process was chaotic. In many instances, presiding
officers failed to properly account for unused ballots, making rec-
onciliation impossible. It was also not possible to distinguish cases
where seals had been broken from cases where they had never
been affixed.
Many ballots were dumped at accounting stations. In one area,
voting officers threaten to hold the ballot boxes hostage because
they had not been paid. Following the election, there were numer-
ous allegations of irregularities, sabotage, and fraud.
The election described in this passage is not the June 25 Haitian
election. Rather, it is the April 1994 elections in South Africa that
are now widely acclaimed as the model for a successful transition
election. The parallels between conditions in South Africa and
Haiti are striking. In both countries, the election administrators
face the challenge of international expectations that they should
produce an election machinery that operates with first world effi-
ciency in conditions that are decidedly third world.
In the circumstances of developing countries, election administra-
tion is first and foremost a logistical feat of enormous proportions.
The available demographic data in both South Africa and Haiti
were clearly inadequate. In both countries, the majority of the vot-
ing and accounting officers had no prior electoral experience and
had insufficient training to follow instructions meticulously.
The inexperience of the electoral commissions themselves were
compounded by the complexities of the elections that they had to
administer. The Haitian election was far more complex than that
in South Africa with three or four ballots per voter, more than
11,000 candidates, each whose name had to appear on the ballot,
contesting over 2,000 offices.
One of the more serious problems that occurred was that the
names of a number of accredited candidates were omitted from the
ballots or appeared on the wrong ballot. In both countries, the elec-
toral administration was forced to work under severe time pres-
sure.






These were only a few of the circumstances that led to the many
administrative problems that plagued both elections; delayed open-
ings, insufficient quantities of voting materials, errors in registra-
tion lists, candidates names, the whole gamut.
Importantly, the administrative difficulties improved in Haiti as
the voting day proceeded. The Electoral Council has announced,
and did on voting day as well, measures to counteract some of the
more serious damage.
While there were serious flaws with the conduct of the election,
there were also achievements. The most remarkable of which was
the relative absence of intimidation and violence. In 1987, at the
elections in Haiti then, there were over 100 people who were killed;
34 of whom were killed on election day.
There is also no comparison to the widespread violence that oc-
curred during the run of the South African elections when thou-
sands of people were killed. There was a major campaign all over
the country that threatened to abort the whole process.
I go through a more detailed comparison of the two elections in
my written testimony which I will submit for the record.
Senator COVERDELL. It will be entered into the record.
Ms. McDOUGALL. In summary, I am saying that in comparison
with South Africa, Haiti's elections had equal or perhaps less seri-
ous problems on election day with the balloting process. With the
accounting process, I would say that they were equally difficult and
troubled processes.
Haiti's elections took place in an overall climate of peace and co-
operation in the run up to the election, while the preelection period
in South Africa, as I have said, was marred by serious acts of vio-
lence. Both populations responded to the adversities by dem-
onstrating a remarkable spirit of patience, tolerance, and commit-
ment to the process. Yet, the legitimacy and validity of Haiti's elec-
tions are being seriously questioned, while the international com-
munity unanimously endorsed South Africa's elections as substan-
tially free and fair and as a national triumph.
What accounts for the difference in perception? Clearly, there is
no simple answer to this question. Both elections were a part of
larger more complex political processes. I would cite here today two
possible factors. First, the Independent Electoral Commission in
South Africa was perceived to be a trustworthy custodian of the
electoral process.
Except for a handful of complaints about officials at a low level
in the administrative hierarchy, the impartiality of South Africa's
Electoral Commission was untarnished. Its independence of govern-
ment and of any political party was generally accepted. Therefore,
the shortcomings were not easily construed as deliberate acts of
subversion or party favoritism, but rather mistakes made in good
faith under difficult circumstances.
Because of the composition of Haiti's Electoral Council, because
it was not the result of a consensus process among the political
parties, and because some of its decisionmaking processes lacked
transparency, and I think particularly about the accreditation of
candidates.
It simply does not enjoy a similar widespread creditability. Sec-
ond, experience elsewhere in the world has demonstrated that the






political will of the electorate can overcome administratively flawed
elections. Absent political will, technically perfect elections can fail.
National and international public opinion unanimously wanted
the South African elections to succeed. Sentiments about the Hai-
tian elections appear to be more guarded. As Charles Manatt wrote
in a recent OPED article commenting on these Haitian elections,
"if the U.S. is to continue to wear the mantle of the leader of de-
mocracy, we have a duty to respond with more than derision to
budding democracies. We have a duty to offer active support and
compassion for the long haul."
I think there are a number of points that should be considered
over the coming weeks, as we assess in more detail and with more
data, the validity of the Haitian elections.
First, while the administrative failures created many opportuni-
ties for manipulation and fraud, are there indications that those
opportunities were in fact exploited on any significant scale?
The Electoral Council in Haiti will need to make public and in-
vestigate fully any allegations, challenges, or objections that are
submitted regarding the process.
Second, where irregularities and flawed administrative proce-
dures have resulted in disenfranchising voters or disadvantaging
parties or candidates, it is important for the Electoral Council to
fashion appropriate and fair remedies.
In addition to extending the hours for voting, which they did, the
Electoral Council has announced new complementary elections will
be held in certain areas where substantial problems occurred. This
proposal should be carefully examined for its potential to resolve
the grievances with the June 25 process.
Finally, third, the achievement of an electoral culture is a proc-
ess of development. The relevant question is whether this election
is a step forward toward democracy for Haiti or is it a step back-
ward? Does it serve a positive function in the development of a con-
stitutional order, or democratic institutions, or respect for human
rights?
In any event, the problems experienced in Haiti underline the re-
ality of democratic transitions in countries still awaiting economic
development and the need to keep expectations within reasonable
bounds.
In my view, Mr. Chairman, the people of Haiti deserve recogni-
tion and support for their efforts and accomplishments in a country
which just one year ago was in the midst of the most extreme so-
cial, political, and economic crisis anywhere in this hemisphere. In
spite of the deficiencies, I believe these elections are a step forward
for Haiti.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McDougall follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF Ms. GAY MCDOUGALL
My name is Ms. Gay McDougall, I am the Executive Director of the International
Human Rights Law Group, a human rights advocacy organization with its head-
quarters in Washington, DC. I participated in monitoring the Haitian elections of
June 25 as part of a coalition of American nongovernmental groups, the American
Inter-Organizational Observer mission. The Mission collectively observed polling of
approximately 100 polling stations. Prior to the polling day, I also visited Haiti for
a period of two days following the approval of eligibility of candidates by the Provi-
sional Electoral Council (CEP). During this visit, I met with the CEP, the United
Nations and the Organization of American States to discuss various electoral issues.






My comments are therefore based on my two visits to Haiti and my experience as
a member of the 16 member South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC)
that organized and administered that country's successful elections last year. I also
ran a one-year project to monitor Namibia's independence elections in 1989.
I would like to begin by reading a short passage:
At 2 p.m. on voting day, election monitors throughout the country re-
ported that 22.5% of the voting stations experienced serious deficiencies:
most opened late, some never received a complete set of the required voting
materials, ballots and ballot boxes were clearly in insufficient supply. At
most polls, thousands of people waited in lines for hours to vote. Presiding
officers, fearful of being swamped, prevailed on inexperienced warehouse-
men to issue excessive stocks of voting material, causing shortages for other
voting stations. Some contractors delivering ballots were hesitant to enter
poor black townships while others simply could not find their way to the
voting stations. Some polling places were running out of ink to mark the
fingers of voters. Hording of supplies resulted in what at the time seemed
to be an inexplicable disappearance of millions of ballots. In haste the Elec-
toral Commission ordered the overnight printing of 9 million extra ballots,
but in the time available it was not possible to include the customary safe-
guards against fraud; security paper and serial numbers on the ballots cor-
responding to numbered tear-off counterfoils. Where ballot boxes ran short,
presiding officers were urged to use postal bags with an improvised method
of sealing them in consultation with local party representatives.
The counting process was chaotic. In many instances presiding officers
failed either to seal ballot or properly account for unused ballots. It was
also not possible to distinguish cases where seals had been broken from
cases where they had never been affixed. Where ballot box capacity had
been exceeded, presiding officers delivered the cast ballots to the counting
stations in a variety of containers, often unsealed. Many ballots were just
dumped at the counting stations. In one area, voting officers threatened to
hold the ballot boxes hostage because they had not been paid. In some cases
reconciliation was not possible, and in contravention of the letter of the
Electoral Act, the Commission ordered counting to proceed even where rec-
onciliation could not be accomplished. Following the election there were nu-
merous allegations of irregularities, sabotage and fraud.
The election described in this passage is not the June 25 Haitian election; rather,
it is the April 1994 elections in South Africa, that are now widely acclaimed as a
model for successful "transition elections." The parallels between the conditions and
the difficulties in South Africa and Haiti were striking.
In both countries the election administrators faced the challenge of international
expectations that they should produce an election machinery that operates with first
world efficiency in conditions that are third world. In the circumstances of develop-
ing countries, election administration is first and foremost a logistical feat of enor-
mous proportions. For example, in Haiti, as in South Africa, the Electoral Council
had to identify buildings to be used as approximately 10,000 voting stations-in a
country where except for churches and a few homes of the elite, most buildings are
shacks. Most polling places had no telecommunications capability. Ballots and other
voting materials in sufficient quantities had to be delivered those 10,000 voting sta-
tions the morning of the election, over roads that are practically impassable even
in the center of Port-au-Prince.
The available demographic data in both South Africa and Haiti was clearly inad-
equate. Coupled with the absence of a voters roll in South Africa, that made the
task of supplying voting stations with adequate voting materials "guess work." In
Haiti, the problems were not as exaggerated because there was a voters' roll, how-
ever imperfect, and clear expectations about the number of voters to be serviced at
each polling site.
On both countries the majority of the voting and counting officers had no prior
electoral experience and had insufficient training to follow instructions meticulously.
And, the inexperience of both electoral commissions was compounded by the com-
plexities of the elections they had to administer. In South Africa we grappled with
the problems of running two elections in each of nine provinces; the election for the
national assembly and for nine provincial legislatures. There was approximately
1,000 positions to be filled using party lists and a system of proportional representa-
tion. While there was two ballots per voter, each ballot contained only the list of
parties with no names of individual candidates.
The Haitian election was far more complex with three and four ballots per voter,
more than 11,000 candidates, each of whose names were to appear on the ballots,






contesting for over 2,000 offices. One of the more serious problems that occurred
was that the names of a number of accredited candidates were omitted from the bal-
lots or appeared on the wrong ballot.
In both countries, electoral administrators were forced to work under severe time
pressure. As we stated in our final report as South Africa's IEC: "No electoral ad-
ministration should ever be called upon to plan or implement an election in a hurry.
Haste is the thief of administrative or financial efficiency."
These are only a few of the circumstances that led to many of the administrative
problems that plagued both elections: the delayed openings, the insufficient quan-
tities of voting materials, the errors in the registration lists, candidate names omit-
ted from ballots, ballot boxes improperly sealed and accounted for, and the chaos
at the counting stations.
Importantly, the administrative difficulties improved in Haiti as the voting day
proceeded, and the CEP announced measures to counteract some of the damage.
The Observer Mission of the Organization of American States reported:
As the day progressed and continuing into the evening, it became evident
that the conduct of the voting process had significantly improved. Reports
showed late in the day that electoral officials were becoming more efficient
in their tasks, the lines of people waiting to vote were diminishing and the
overall atmosphere was increasingly orderly and peaceful.
The CEP also extended the voting hours at troubled polling places to guarantee
that the polls were open and functioning the full 12 hours specified in the Electoral
Law.
While there were serious flaws with the conduct of the election, there were also
achievements, the most remarkable of which was the relative absence of intimida-
tion and violence. There were three deaths associated with the election period (it
has not been confirmed that all three were election-related). There was also several
violent disturbances, including the burning of one election office and several inci-
dents where ballots were burned. In the 1987 election, more than 100 people were
killed, 34 of whom were murdered on election day. There is also no comparison with
the level of wide-spread violence during the election period in South Africa. Thou-
sands of people were killed in the pre-electoral period. The voting day in South Afri-
ca started with a major bomb blast at Jan Smuts Airport; a bomb disarmed at one
voting station; hundreds of false bomb scares around the country; barricades and
a sentry tower were erected in one town; shots reportedly fired at polling stations;
and a militant white right wing extremist group was rumored to be mobilizing.
In summary, I am saying that in comparison with South Africa, Haiti's elections
had equal or perhaps less serious logistical and administrative problems on election
day, and equal problems during the counting phase. Haiti's elections took place in
an overall climate of peace and cooperation, while the pre-election period in South
Africa was marred by serious acts of violence and threats of more on election day.
Both populations responded to the adversities by demonstrating a remarkable spirit
of patience, tolerance and commitment to the process.
Yet, the legitimacy and validity of Haiti's elections are being seriously questioned,
while the international community unanimously endorsed South Africa's elections as
substantially free and fair and a national triumph. What accounts for the difference
in perception? Clearly there is no simple answer to this question. Both elections
were part of larger more complex political processes. But, I would cite two possible
factors.
First, the IEC in South Africa was perceived to be a trustworthy custodian of the
electoral process. Except for a handful of complaints about officials at a low level
in the administrative hierarchy, the impartiality of South Africa's IEC was
untarnished. Its independence of the government and of any political party was gen-
erally accepted. And therefore, the shortcomings were not easily construed as delib-
erate acts of subversion or party favoritism, rather than mistakes made in good
faith under difficulty circumstances.
Because the composition of Haiti's CEP was not the result of consensus among
the political parties, and because some of its decision making processes lacked
transparency (e.g., the accreditation of candidates), it does not enjoy widespread
credibility.
Second, experience elsewhere in the world has demonstrated that the political will
of the electorate can overcome administratively flawed elections; and absent political
will, technically perfect elections can fail. National and international public opinion
unanimously wanted the South African elections to succeed. Sentiments about the
Haitian elections appear to be more guarded.
As Charles Manatt wrote in a recent OP-ED article commenting on these Haitian
elections: "If the U.S. is to continue to wear the mantle of the leader of democracy,






we have a duty to respond with more than derision to budding democracies. We
have a duty to offer active support and compassion for the long haul."
I think there are a number of points that should be considered over the coming
weeks as we assess in more detail, and with more data, the validity of the Haitian
election:
1. While the administrative failures created many opportunities for manipu-
lation and fraud, are there indications that those opportunities were in fact ex-
ploited on any significant scale? To date, there has been no evidence of manifest
bias in the administration of the election or widespread fraud. The CEP will
need to make public and investigate fully any such allegations, challenges or
objections that are submitted.
2. Where irregularities and flawed administrative procedures have resulted
in disenfranchising voters or disadvantaging parties or candidates, it is impor-
tant for the CEP to fashion appropriate and fair remedies. In addition to ex-
tending the hours for voting, the CEP has announced that new "complemen-
tary" elections will be held in certain areas where substantial problems oc-
curred. This proposal should be carefully examined for its potential to resolve
the grievances with the June 25 process.
3. The achievement of an electoral culture is a process of development. The
relevant question is whether this election is a step toward democracy for Haiti
or is it a step backward. Does it serve a positive function in the development
of a constitutional order, democratic institutions or the respect for human
rights?
In any case, the problems experienced in Haiti underline the reality of democratic
transitions in countries still awaiting economic development, and the need to keep
expectations within reasonable bounds. In my view, the people of Haiti deserve rec-
ognition and support for their efforts and accomplishments in a country which just
one year ago was in the midst of the most extreme social, political and economic
crisis extant anywhere in the hemisphere. In spite of the deficiencies, I believe these
elections are a step forward for Haiti.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Ms. McDougall.
I have indicated that we would hear from Ambassador Dobbins
and Assistant Administrator Mark Schneider next. I am going to
therefore defer my questions. I invite Senator Dodd if you have
questions of this panel to please feel free to proceed.
Senator DODD. I do, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be very brief. I
appreciate the testimonies.
Let me begin, Mr. Chairman. I have always, in fact over the
years when the issue of funding came up for the National Endow-
ment for Democracy, NDI, and IRI have come up, I have not only
voted in favor of continuing to do so, but have taken an active role
in that.
I must say, Mr. Chairman, the display of putting up newspaper
headlines and so forth leads me very close to the conclusion that
I may be joining Senator Brown in calling for significant cuts or
the elimination. They are taxpayer expense, in my view, to engage
in sort of a political promotional activity of this kind gives legit-
imacy to the arguments that have been made in the past here.
I do not see the headlines there talking about ballots, not bullets
in the Miami Herald, or the piece in Time Magazine which basi-
cally said that this is election despite its flaws. Obvious ones,
which we are all painfully aware of, was a major positive step in
the right direction.
I am just disappointed, frankly, by a report that I think frank,
and it is my view. Everyone has got their own points of view they
can express. It is suspicious to me that when you go back to the
opposition, the character assassination on President Aristide when
he was in this country was incredible; the opposition to him, the
tremendous opposition which certainly was legitimate in many


92-305 0 95 4






quarters to us trying to restore President Aristide to his country
where he was rightfully elected.
Then sort of a drum beat of hostility preceding over the last
number of months. I note with great interest the report filed by
NRI on the elections in the People's Republic of China. This looks
like a report on elections in Arlington, Virginia, by comparison.
I look at the report done on Haiti the day before that election.
Again, we are talking about an election in China representing a
definite and a positive step forward; the nation's delegate move to-
ward democratic and participatory government; boast officials' were
frank, cooperative, interaction-I mean, this is in a country that
obliterated thousands of students in Tiananmen Square.
Then I read the report on Haiti the day before, and it is, again,
the last thing I am suggesting is there ought to be sort of a white
wash of what is going on. It was anything but appropriate and
proper and a tremendous number of shortcomings. Clearly, to issue
a report on the day before voting is to occur, I can't imagine that
anyone honestly thought that, that report was necessarily going to
change things. Had it been a report done a week or two prior to
that dealing with the process and procedures, then I could under-
stand some degree why it might have been raised.
A press conference done on the eve of an election just raises, peo-
ple like me, what was going on here? I mean, this is more than just
a political or an objective analysis. I mean, those of us who stood
up and supported IRI and supported the NDI have done so because
we have made the case that this helps us advance this process.
When I see stuff like this here, it just strikes me as going right
to the heart of what Senator Brown has talked about. Frankly,
when those votes come up again, I suspect he may win. Then we
may be looking at some of the last reports that were filed by these
organizations that are funded by taxpayer money, which are in-
volved in the kind of promotional activity that I am witnessing
here. I have always fought for you. I have serious doubts I will
again as a result of this. I am deeply disturbed by it.
Mr. McCOLM. Mr. Chairman, can I respond to some of this?
Senator COVERDELL. Yes.
Mr. McCoLM. First of all, about the China elections, I would like,
Mr. Chairman, to put these pieces in the record on those Chinese
elections. I think we are concerned about that.
Senator DODD. Is this not the report from the IRI that I was
thinking about?
Mr. McCoLM. Right. But I would like the newspaper coverage of
the reporters that have covered those elections.
Senator DODD. I mean from your report. This was your report
that I was reading.
Mr. McCOLM. Then that is right. That is the report. If you would
like for me to compare the two elections, I would be delighted to.
If there is a problem, Senator Dodd, in terms of why we said
even in our electoral report on Haiti was that there were a number
of aspects of those village elections, and particularly the ones that
we cited. This is at a time, you know, that Dr. Wu, a great man
is being held in China.
In fact, their registration was open and you had an appeal, yes.
You did not have that in Haiti. Could you have a prequalification






of candidates to run in these elections which no government official
could overrule? That was true. They overruled the Communist
Party who had these people on ban lists and people freely could do
that.
Did you ever campaign, and nobody has ever talked here about
the fact that this was a stealth campaign in Haiti. You know, peo-
ple can say they do not have resources. I heard this line all
throughout from people.
This is the way Haitians campaign. Having seen how Haitians
campaign, it was quite unique to me. There was a campaign in
those elections.
Senator DODD. Mr. McColm, I am not objecting to your criticism.
Do not misunderstand me. I think having legitimate criticisms
about an electoral process, I do not have any argument with that
point at all. My concern is holding a press conference on the eve
of that election which has little or no impact except to add possibly
to the chaos there. You could not possibly imagine you were going
to improve the situation.
Mr. McCoLM. Senator Dodd, we issued these. The report was a
compilation of reports that we issued since May.
Senator DODD. What was the purpose of doing that on the eve
of the election? What value could you have possibly contributed?
Mr. McCOLM. First of all, I think it is very important to set out
the framework by which the problems would occur.
Senator DODD. On the night before the election?
Mr. McCoLM. We do this all over the world.
Senator DODD. On the night before elections? Have you ever done
one before on the night before an election?
Mr. McCoLM. No, but that was a compilation of these reports
that we have issued all along.
Senator DODD. When do you normally issue those reports prior
to an election?
Mr. McCOLM. We issue it as timely as a factor as we can prior
to an election.
Senator DODD. Give some examples of what you mean.
Mr. McCoLM. Well, we can take Russia and South Africa. We did
one the week prior to an election.
Senator DODD. Earlier than that in some cases?
Mr. McCoLM. And in Haiti, yes, earlier than that. For instance,
in June, July, you know, all of the time in the two months prior
to the election in Haiti, we provided-
Senator DODD. In retrospect, do you think maybe holding that
press conference was a bad idea?
Mr. McCoLM. No, and I will tell you why. Our work cannot be
sustained by holding our tongues when a process is so flawed.
Senator DODD. No one was suggesting you should not have been
criticizing. On the eve of the election, was the timing of it poor?
Mr. McCoLM. The timing of it was not poor. I would submit to
you the timing of it was not poor. Why wasn't it poor? The United
Nations, the OAS, the U.S. Embassy, all of the NGO's confirmed
repeatedly, including the CEP, everything we had put in that re-
port.




48

No one had ever publicly said this. I mean, here all of us were
raising these issues months ahead of this election. Everybody said,
"Oh, this will help to accomplish"-
Senator DODD. What did you hope to accomplish by holding a
press conference the night before?
Mr. McCOLM. I think in a lot of ways the accomplishment was
to give a framework by which you might understand what you are
about to see.
Senator DODD. Did it have something to do with those headlines
that you wanted to put up on your billboard here?
Mr. McCoLM. No.
Senator DODD. Why didn't you include the Miami Herald as a
part of your titles?
Mr. McCoLM. Well, we would have included at least one of the
Miami Heralds. There are several Miami Herald coverage.
Senator DODD. Do you know the headline I am talking about?
Mr. McCOLM. What I am trying to say, Senator, is that every-
thing that we pointed out in the preelection, and we are not proud
of that. I would like to have been proven totally wrong. As the dis-
tinguished lady said, people can overcome these flawed processes.
People really can. Unfortunately, there are serious problems that
came out of this election.
Senator DODD. No one has argued with that.
Mr. McCoLM. Senator, I would argue that a lot of people would
not have raised any of these issues if we had not raised them.
Senator DODD. I think they did. The European Community did.
The OAS did. Certainly, Ms. McDougall has and everyone else that
was down there. You are not unique in that regard. You are unique
in this regard, in that you have decided that this thing is so fun-
damentally flawed it ought to be scrapped.
Mr. McCoLM. Well, we said you could overcome it. We told the
Presidential Delegation, you could overcome this, but these flaws
were so difficult.
Senator COVERDELL. I am going to conclude this. As I said, in
deference to the constraints of time and my commitments, I am
going to refrain my questions. I am going to issue written questions
to each of you. The context of those questions will be related to my
opening statement which is, how do we evaluate what occurred and
make it be a contribution to what is yet to come?
Senator, the Miami Herald has said two things. I am sure you
have alluded to something that is complimentary. He could have
put that on his chart, confusion abounds in Haiti vote.
I intend to still support IRI and NDI.
Mr. McCoLM. We appreciate it.
Senator COVERDELL. We are going to have controversial moments
and differences of opinion. The competition of ideas helps every-
body. There are some real problems here that need discussion. I be-
lieve all of these panelists have made very fine statements which
will contribute to the work we have yet before us. I will submit my
questions to you in writing.
Congressman Oberstar, you have arrived. We are about to move
to the administration panel. They have welcomed you, if you would
like to make a statement.






STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAR, U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE FROM MINNESOTA
Representative OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for permitting
me to testify in a sense out of sequence.
Senator COVERDELL. We are glad to have you here.
Representative OBERSTAR. I regret not being here earlier. We
had several recorded votes on the Committee on Public Works in
which I serve and could not avoid those votes.
I have had a longer association with Haiti than probably any-
body, not only currently serving in either the House or the Senate,
or anyone in the administration. I started in Haiti in 1959 as a
teacher of English to Haitian military personnel, to American mili-
tary personnel, French, and later Creole.
I lived there for 3V2 years. During that time I traveled the entire
country. I got to know people from all lines of existence in Haiti,
all economic strata, all parts of the country with one modest little
exception. I never got to Mulsanicula in the northwest.
The Haitian military personnel to whom I taught English, and
I underscore English only, not civics or government, later became
the leaders in the post-Duvalier era. People with whom I could
meet, talk, work, and who were students in my class. Several of
them later led the governing council.
I worked very diligently with the Reagan administration, and
later the Bush administration to bring about free elections in Haiti,
honest elections. We thought there was a great possibility in 1987
that there really would be an open election. They were sabotaged
by the right wing with the cover provided by the army.
During my time in Haiti, I did witness one, and only one, elec-
tion in that entire period of time. It was to elect Papa Doc Duvalier
President for life and to abolish the senate and elect a unicameral
legislature. That election was very simple for people. It was or-
derly, organized, structured. There was no violence. There was no
trouble at all. I asked the landlord person for the house where I
was living to tell me about the election.
I went to some of the polling places. I saw people lined up. He
came back. He said there was no problem at all to vote. In fact,
they made it very simple for us. The ballots were already filled out.
In fact, there were some extra ones so I brought some home for
you. Of course, there they were. Everything was checked out. All
you had to do was put your finger stamp on it and that was it.
It was neat, clean, orderly. Duvalier was elected for life. It was
not an election. In 1987, people stood in line waiting to vote. They
were machine gunned and brutally killed as they waited to vote in
what was to be the first post Duvalier era election. I have to under-
score the unique situation in Haiti.
The university was closed for over 30 years. The law school was
closed for over 30 years. The judiciary was emaciated. A very dear
friend of mine who was chief justice of the Haitian Supreme Court,
who had served a term in the World Court at the Hague, was ma-
chine gunned to death, his wife, grandson, their home burned down
because he dared to act in a judicial manner.
When it came time to write a constitution, how do you do that
without people schooled in the law? How do you do that without
a judiciary? How do you have elections without people trained, ex-






perienced doing elections? We have problems with elections here in
this country. This is the country in which there had never been
honest, free elections.
I went to meet with the Electoral Council in 1987. It was just
2 weeks after we had celebrated the 200th anniversary of the Great
Compromise in our Constitution at Philadelphia. Members, one
from each state, went to reenact the agreement on the first Article
of the Constitution that created the House and the Senate.
For the members of the Haitian Electoral Council, eight of them,
their meeting place had been machine gunned. Some of their
homes had been set a fire. Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams
asked if I would go and meet with the group and encourage them
to stay on track, keep writing this electoral law, which I did.
I told them in Philadelphia I had stepped across the threshold
200 years back into history. But here in Haiti, I am stepping 200
years ahead into history. You are the framers of the new Haiti. You
must not give up. You must persist with writing this electoral law.
Despite observers and despite efforts by the international com-
munity-predecessors of the attache group brutally machine
gunned people standing in line waiting to vote. The elections were
canceled.
There was an attempt in January of 1988 to have an election. Of
course, it was totally fraudulent. The army organized it. It was
neat and orderly. There was no disruption. Then came the election
of 1990. My colleague, Mr. Goss and I were members of the Presi-
dential Observer Team organized by President Bush to observe the
election.
That election came out very well. It took the entire international
community, the Carter Center, the Organization of American
States, intensive efforts by the international community, by the
United States together to work with every step of the electoral
process.
The head of the Haitian Armed Forces at the time was General
Abraham. He had been a second lieutenant in one of my English
courses. I talked with him prior to the election. I did television
interviews by satellite with Haitian news media about these elec-
tions and how important it was that they should be honest, fair,
and free. The day after the election I saw General Abraham and
I said, [witness speaking in French]. "Crayon de Dieu pa gain
gamee" It was an old Haitian expression. 'The pencil of God has
no eraser." God cannot erase what the people wrote yesterday and
neither can you and the army. He looked at me and he said, you
know our people. You know our country. We won't try. We will live
with this election and they did.
Aristide tried to rule, but then of course the army chased him
out. Now the army has been dismantled. The difference in the elec-
tion that just took place and all other elections prior to 1990 is that
in this case the government wanted an honest result. They tried
to have an honest result. They worked hard to the best of their
ability. But one election does not a democracy make. One election
does not a republic make.
We are looking at Haiti with white gloves under a microscope.
We are subjecting them to a standard that few countries can meet.
There were mistakes made. There were probably even some ill-will






actions. I frankly did not expect that election to happen as well as
it did. I thought that the Ton Ton Macoutes, the Fraph forces, and
the cashiered-out army personnel would actually use guns and dis-
rupt the elections.
It did not happen. That was a major plus. Those who committed
fraud and other illegal acts should be brought to justice by the Hai-
tian Government. Perhaps in retrospect, in the international com-
munity and the United States should have taken over those elec-
tions too as they did in 1990 and made sure that they were run.
How long can you run elections for a people? You cannot do it
in every case. Haiti will learn from this. They already are learning.
Perhaps the best thing would be for President Aristide to order a
cancellation of the elections and do it again. I do not know that.
They need to fix what went wrong. We all need to learn from this
experience to go the next step to the next election.
Aristide himself has said, the test of a democracy is not the first
election, but the second election. He is speaking of the election for
president. We need to learn from this experience to go to the next
step. For that next election, learn from what went wrong.
This election was much more complicated than the one of 1990
in terms of numbers of ballots, numbers of people on those ballots,
and the difficulty of just simply the organization of the election.
You are conducting an election in a country where most of the peo-
ple are illiterate or they have had only one experience with an elec-
tion. Where the complexity of conducting this election far exceeds
their capacity. Where most of the talent of the country is overseas.
They have left.
They were either chased out or on their own left Haiti during the
Duvalier era. We are saying, we are holding them to a standard
that perhaps some parts of the United States could not meet. The
point is they have crossed a Rubicon. They have gone to a point
of being committed to honest free elections. They want them to
happen. They need the infrastructure support to make it happen.
We should find ways that we can be a part of that process. That,
I think, is the lesson to be learned from these elections.
Senator COVERDELL. Congressman, thank you very much. I ap-
preciate your testimony and the brevity as well.
I am going to ask Ambassador Dobbins if he would please come
forward on behalf of the administration, along with Assistant Ad-
ministrator, Mark Schneider.
Ambassador Dobbins is coordinator of the Haiti Working Group.
I assured you that you would be testifying by 11:30 a.m. I guess
by Washington standards and congressional testimony, we are rea-
sonably close. I appreciate your patience. We welcome your testi-
mony, Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF JAMES F. DOBBINS, SPECIAL HAITI
COORDINATOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. DOBBINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me, in
the interest of time, just quote some excerpts from a longer testi-
mony which, with your permission, I will submit for the record.
Senator COVERDELL. It will be entered into the record.
Mr. DOBBINS. On Sunday, June 25, Haiti held electoral contests
for nearly 2,200 offices, the results of which will provide that coun-






try for the first time in its history, with a system of independent,
democratic, and local government.
Balloting was almost uniformly peaceful. Most contests took
place without serious incident. In many cases, however, the process
was in the words of one observer, free, fair, and fouled up. In a
smaller number of races, serious irregularities occurred which in
some cases will reruns to correct.
Problems included the following: a couple of dozen candidates,
perhaps, out of about 10,000 found their names left off the ballot.
Something over 150 candidates had earlier been disqualified for
failure to meet various requirements of the Haitian electoral law.
This proportion of disqualified candidates is about the same as
in the 1990 election, but communications between the Haitian elec-
toral authorities and the political parties as to the reasons for
these disqualifications were inadequate, creating from the opening
of the campaign an atmosphere of distrust.
In scattered districts across Haiti, some polling stations did not
open because they received insufficient balloting materials. An ear-
lier decision to extend voter registration was in some measure re-
sponsible for this. On the other hand, that decision also allowed
more than an additional million voters to register, thus greatly in-
creasing participation in both this and the upcoming presidential
election.
Inadequate physical facilities and untrained personnel created
substantial confusion in both balloting and vote count procedures.
Reports of these and other irregularities have been numerous. On
the other hand, international observers saw few examples of elec-
toral fraud and found no evidence of any large scale or systematic
efforts to subvert the electoral process or to skew the results.
It is not surprising that freely electing over 2,000 local and na-
tional officials in the poorest, least-educated, most politically and
socially polarized nation of the western hemisphere, a country al-
most without roads, electricity, administrators, or democratic tradi-
tion should prove so daunting a task.
On June 26, Bryan Atwood, USAID Administrator, head of the
Presidential Observer Delegation sent by President Clinton, de-
tailed the problems with the preceding day's balloting encountered
by his monitoring teams. Bryan called the previous day's voting, "a
step in the building of democracy in Haiti," but he then noted that,
"the process was affected by irregularities and administrative flaws
that need to be addressed for the second round and the future." He
went on to cite a number of those flaws.
Since June 26, U.S. officials have been working intensely with
the Haitian electoral authorities, Haitian major political authorities
and other members of the international community to identify and
help put in place appropriate remedies. This remedial action
should, in our judgment, include rerunning of some races, improve
training and support for local electoral officials, and strengthen
procedures for holding and counting the vote.
Based on the discussions we have held to date, we are hopeful
that such steps will be undertaken. That the most serious irreg-
ularities of the June 25 vote will be corrected and that the second
round of balloting to be held in the next few weeks will mark a fur-
ther advance in the consolidation of Haitian democratic processes.






The U.S. Government's contribution to these elections is part of
a broader program of support for restoration and consolidation of
democracy in Haiti. The United States is working with France and
Canada to train a new professional civilian police force which will
replace the U.N. Peacekeeping Troops who are currently helping to
maintain security in Haiti. Second, a presidential ballot is to be
held at the end of this year. Next February, a successor to Presi-
dent Aristide will take office. By then, nearly 6,000 new civilian po-
lice will have been deployed.
The international peacekeeping force will be withdrawn. Its task
completed. We intend to take each of these hurdles on schedule. In
this connection, it is sometimes asked whether the costs of support-
ing democracy in Haiti are commensurate with the benefits. Let me
briefly respond to this point. $2 billion is sometimes cited as the
cost of our effort in Haiti for fiscal year 1994 and 1995. In fact, the
actual figure is smaller amounting to under $1.2 billion as of
March 31 when the U.S.-led multinational force completed its task.
That figure itself aggregates the expenses of two distinct phases of
policy.
The first $400 million of this total was in fact spent before the
intervention on September 19. This $400 million was the cost not
of restoring democracy, but rather of coping with tyranny. It was
spent on interdicting migrants, sheltering refugees, providing hu-
manitarian aide to a destitute population, and enforcing an inter-
national embargo.
From September 19, 1994, to March 31, 1995, the cost of the
United States of all of its activities in Haiti, civil as well as mili-
tary, was about $700 million. Certainly this figure represented an
increase over the earlier period spending. But unlike the $400 mil-
lion, which we had expended over the previous months coping with
the consequences of tyranny, this $700 million over 6 months rep-
resented a one-time cost, not an endlessly recurring drain on the
U.S. Treasury.
Since the March 31 departure of the multinational force, U.S.
Government costs in Haiti have dropped dramatically; falling al-
ready to near the month-to-month level of pre-September 1994, i.e.,
before the intervention. The U.N. is now picking up most of the
military costs to which the U.S. contributes less than one-third and
from which we will be reimbursed for our military contribution.
Other donors have begun picking up most of our civil costs. Next
year, U.S. spending in Haiti will drop even further. Supporting de-
mocracy has thus already proven more cost effective in dealing
with the consequences of tyranny. It is certainly a better invest-
ment; one to which we can attract other investors. A year ago, the
United States was left to deal largely unaided with the humani-
tarian and refugee crisis in Haiti.
Today, other countries and institutions are contributing two-
thirds of the cost of the peacekeeping presence and three-fourths
of the cost of economic assistance. This is leveraged leadership; the
best example of genuine burdensharing in hemispheric history. Our
successful effort to multilateralize the restoration of Haitian de-
mocracy has also promoted the emergency of Haiti from nearly two
centuries of isolation, prejudice, and neglect.






More than 50 other nations, through their participation in Oper-
ation Uphold Democracy and its U.N. successor, have now sent
their soldiers, their police, and their civilian administrators to
serve in Haiti. For the first time in its history, Haiti is moving to-
ward meaningful participation in the Caribbean, the hemispheric,
and the global community.
The location of one of the poorest, least educated, most under-
developed countries in the world only an over night's boat ride from
our shores inevitably poses a certain burden on the United States.
Either we help Haitians to deal with their problem at home, or we
will find ourselves compelled to deal with them elsewhere as they
seek to make their way on their make-shift vessels to our shores
and thohe of neighboring states.
If Haiti represents a challenge for the United States, it also rep-
resents an opportunity. As we seek to evaluate Haiti's progress to-
ward sustainable democracy, we naturally look for standards of
comparison. If Haiti's recent electoral performance cannot be fairly
measured against that of California, say, or Switzerland, how does
it compare with El Salvador, Nicaragua, or South Africa?
Even such comparisons are not entirely balanced however. Hai-
ti's $340 annual per capital income does not put it in the class with
Africa's richest country, but rather with some of its poorest. Haiti's
30 percent literacy rate is far below that of even its least developed
Caribbean or Central American neighbors. In fact, few nations at
Haiti's level of economic development have ever advanced so far to-
ward sustainable democracy.
As democracy takes root in Haiti, therefore, this fact will put
paid forever to the notion that freedom is a luxury which only rich
societies can afford. In forming an international coalition to restore
and consolidate democracy in Haiti, thus, the United States has
not just found a way to enlist other nations in addressing a prob-
lem near and important to us, but we have also seized an oppor-
tunity to send a message of successful support for democracy which
will reverberate around the world.
No one is more committed to the goal of sustainable democracy
than those Haitian men and women who stood patiently and peace-
fully in the heat and the sun two weeks ago waiting to cast their
ballot. They knew what they were voting for. They were voting for
an end to tyranny. That were voting that the Macoutes and the at-
taches never come back.
They were voting that the democracy they had gained in 1990
never again be stolen from them. The mechanisms needed to trans-
late these aspirations into a duly constituted and freely elected gov-
ernment must be strengthened if such a system of government is
to endure.
This is why the French, the Canadian, the Argentine, the Ven-
ezuelan, and the American Ambassadors joined with the U.N. and
OAS representatives in Port-au-Prince in recent days to urge coop-
erative measures upon the Haitian political parties and electoral
authorities to address deficiencies in the balloting process.
This is why the administration, the Congress, the U.N., the OAS,
the IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank, and other donor
countries have all repeatedly linked their assistance to Haiti to the
restoration and consolidation of democracy.






This is why all of us are working now to help assure that the
soon to be held second round of local and legislative elections will
be more effectively administered than the first. That the presi-
dential election scheduled for the end of this year will achieve a
still yet higher standard.
Despite its flaws, the June 25 ballot in Haiti represents an im-
portant milestone in that country's progress toward sustainable de-
mocracy.
Our task at this point is three-fold. First, to encourage the people
of Haiti to remain committed to the electoral process. Second, to
encourage Haiti's electoral authorities to improve that process.
Third, to encourage Haiti's political parties, whether they be losers
or winners, this time around to stay in the process.
Today's hearings and subsequent congressional debate can con-
tribute importantly to all three of these objectives.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dobbins follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES F. DOBBINS
On Sunday, June 25 Haiti held electoral contests for nearly 2,200 offices, the re-
sult of which will provide that country, for the first time in its history, with a sys-
tem of independent and democratic local government. Every Mayor and county
counselor in the country was to be chosen, as well as all members of the lower house
of Parliament and two-thirds of the Senate. Balloting was almost uniformly peace-
ful. Most contests took place without serious incident. In many cases, however, the
process was, in the words of one observer, "free, fair, and fouled up." In a smaller
number of races, serious irregularities occurred which in some cases will require re-
runs to correct.
Problems included the following:
-A couple of dozen candidates, out of about 10,000, found their names left
off the ballot. About 150 candidates had earlier been disqualified for failure to
meet various requirements of the Haitian electoral law. Communications be-
tween the Haitian electoral authorities and the political parties as to the rea-
sons for these disqualifications were inadequate, creating from the opening of
the campaign an atmosphere of distrust.
-In scattered districts across Haiti, some polling stations did not open be-
cause they received insufficient balloting materials. An earlier Haitian decision
to extend voter registration beyond the original April 30 cutoff date was, in
part, responsible for this problem. On the other hand that decision also allowed
more than a million additional voters to register, thus greatly increasing partici-
pation in this and the upcoming Presidential election.
-Inadequate physical facilities and untrained personnel created substantial
confusion in both the balloting and the vote count procedures.
Reports of these and other irregularities have been numerous. On the other hand,
international observers saw few examples of electoral fraud, and found no evidence
of any large scale or systematic effort to subvert the electoral process, or skew the
results.
We and other international observers will withhold final judgment until the re-
sults of this election-including any reruns, and the second round for undecided
races-are complete. It is fair to say, however, that observer teams from France,
Canada, and the European Union have so far assessed the situation in much the
same manner as have we. The OAS, which has fielded the largest observer team,
with personnel from fifty different countries, will issue a detailed interim report on
the first round's voting in the near future.
It is not surprising that freely electing over two thousand local and national offi-
cials in the poorest, least educated, most politically and socially polarized nation in
the Western Hemisphere-a country almost without roads, electricity, administra-
tors, or democratic tradition-should prove so daunting a task.
Extensive measures were taken by the Haitian election authorities to promote
broad participation of candidates, parties and voters. Well over three million voters
were registered, a better than 90% figure, which many more established democ-
racies would envy. Sixteen million ballots were printed, carrying the party and in
many cases the personal symbols for each of over 10,000 candidates, and in the case
of Parliamentary contests, the actual photographs of over 800 individuals. Few elec-






toral systems, anywhere in the world, go to such lengths to facilitate voting for those
who cannot read, and to assure independent candidates and small parties an equal
place on the ballot. The complexity of this ambitious attempt at inclusivity itself be-
came the source of complaint.
Ten thousand polling places were set up, in a country largely devoid of infrastruc-
ture. Forty thousand poll workers were hired, in a country where literacy is the ex-
ception. All this was done over a brief period, with no existing electoral structure
on which to build. The scope of these preparations challenged the Haitian electoral
authorities, and in some cases overwhelmed them.
On June 26, Brian Atwood, USAID Administrator, head of the Presidential Ob-
server Delegation sent by President Clinton, and himself a veteran election ob-
server, made a public statement on behalf of that Delegation, detailing the problems
with the preceding day's balloting encountered by his monitoring teams. Brian
called the previous day's voting "a step in the building of democracy in Haiti," but
he then noted that "the process was affected by irregularities and administrative
flaws that need to be addressed for the second round and the future." He went on
to cite a number of those flaws.
Since June 26 U.S. officials have been working intensely with the Haitian elec-
toral authorities, Haitian major political parties, and other members of the inter-
national community to identify and help put in place appropriate remedies.
This remedial action should, in our judgment, include rerunning of some races,
improved training and support for local electoral officials, and strengthened proce-
dures for holding and counting the vote. Based on the discussions we have held to
date, we are hopeful that such steps will be undertaken, that the most serious irreg-
ularities of the June 25 vote will be corrected, and that the second round of ballot-
ing, to be held in the next few weeks, will mark a further advance in the consolida-
tion of Haitian democratic processes.
The United States has supported the conduct of these elections in a variety of
ways. First, the United States joined with over 30 other nations in providing troops
and police for the international peacekeeping presence which maintained a secure
environment throughout the electoral campaign. Second, the U.S. Government con-
tributed to a UN-managed international fund to help finance the costs of balloting,
and provided direct assistance, for instance in transporting the ballots from the
printer in California to Haiti. Third, the United States joined France, Canada, the
uropean Union and the OAS in sending observers to monitor the process. Fourth,
U.S. officials have worked with all of Haiti's major democratic parties, including
those who opposed the American led intervention, to encourage their active partici-
pation in the electoral contest. In order to help promote such broad electoral partici-
pation the Administration encouraged and funded both the International Republican
Institute and the National Democratic Institute to establish a presence in Haiti
throughout the electoral period.
In 1990 Haiti financed 60% of the cost of that year's elections from its own re-
sources. This year the Haitian Government contributed less than 5% of the direct
cost of holding this election. Neither the Haitian Government, nor the international
community wanted to wait until the slow resumption of Haiti's own revenue collec-
tion would permit it to fund the two national ballots scheduled for this year. All
of us realize, however, and the Haitian Government most of all, that this heavy de-
pendence on the international community for the conduct of elections is an undesir-
able aberration, not to be repeated in future years.
The U.S. Government contribution to these elections is part of a broader program
of support for restoration and consolidation of democracy in Haiti. The United
States is working with France and Canada to train a new professional civilian police
force, which will replace the UN peacekeeping troops who are currently helping to
maintain security in Haiti. A second, Presidential ballot is to be held at the end of
this year. Next February, a successor to President Aristide will take office. By then,
nearly six thousand new civilian police will have been deployed. The international
peacekeeping force will be withdrawn, its task completed. We intend to take each
of these hurdles on schedule.
In this connection, it is sometimes asked whether the costs of supporting democ-
racy in Haiti are commensurate with the benefits. Let me briefly respond to this
question.
Two billion dollars is sometimes cited as the cost of our efforts in Haiti for fiscal
1994 and 1995. In fact, the actual figure is smaller, amounting to under $1.2 billion
as of March 31, when the U.S.-led Multinational Force completed its task, and that
figure itself aggregates the expenses of two distinct phases of policy. The first four
hundred million of this total was, in fact, spent before the intervention of September
19, 1994. This $400 million was the cost, not of restoring democracy, but rather of
coping with tyranny, for it was spent on interdicting migrants, sheltering refugees,






providing humanitarian aid to a destitute population, and enforcing an international
embargo.
From September 19, 1994, to the departure of the U.S.-led Multinational Force
on March 31, 1995, the cost to the United States of all its activities in Haiti, civil
as well as military, was about $700 million dollars. Certainly this figure represented
an increase over the earlier period's spending, but unlike the $400 million which
we had expended over the previous months coping with the consequences of tyr-
anny, this $700 million over 6 months represented a one time cost, not an endlessly
recurrent drain on our Treasury.
Since the March 31 departure of the Multinational Force, U.S. Government costs
in Haiti have dropped dramatically, falling already to near the month-to-month level
of pre-September 1994, i.e. before the intervention. The UN is now picking up most
of the military costs, to which the U.S. contributes less than one-third, and from
which we will be reimbursed for our military contribution. Other donors have begun
picking up most of the civil costs. Next year U.S. spending in Haiti will drop even
further.
Supporting democracy has thus already proven more cost effective than dealing
with the consequences of tyranny. It is certainly a better investment, one to which
we can attract other investors.
A year ago the United States was left to deal largely unaided with the humani-
tarian and refugee crisis in Haiti. Today other countries and institutions are con-
tributing two-thirds of the costs of a peacekeeping presence, and three-fourths of the
costs of economic assistance. This is leveraged leadership, the best example of genu-
ine burdensharing in hemispheric history.
Our successful effort to multilateralize the restoration of Haitian democracy has
also promoted the emergence of Haiti from nearly two centuries of isolation, preju-
dice and neglect. More than fifty other nations, through their participation in Oper-
ation Uphold Democracy and its UN successor, have now sent their soldiers, their
police, and their civilian administrators to serve in Haiti. For the first time in its
history Haiti is moving toward meaningful participation in the Caribbean, the Hem-
ispheric, and the global community. This tremendously encouraging development
was symbolized by the over 300 OAS observers present for Haiti s June 25 ballot,
and by the gathering of 34 hemispheric Foreign Ministers who held the annual OAS
General Assembly outside Port au Prince three weeks earlier.
The location of one of the poorest, least educated, most underdeveloped countries
in the world only an overnight's boat ride from our shores inevitably imposes a cer-
tain burden upon the United States. Either we help Haitians to deal with their
problem at home, or we will find ourselves compelled to deal with them elsewhere,
as they seek to make their way, on their makeshift vessels, to our shores and those
of other neighboring states. But if Haiti represents a challenge for the United
States, it also represents an opportunity.
As we seek to evaluate Haiti's progress toward sustainable democracy, we natu-
rally look for standards of comparison. If Haiti's recent electoral performance cannot
be fairly measured against that of California, say, or Switzerland, how does it com-
pare with El Salvador, Nicaragua, or South Africa? Even such comparisons are not
entirely balanced, however. Haiti's $340 annual per capital income does not put it
in a class with Africa's richest country, but with some of its poorest. Haiti's 30%
literacy rate is far below that of even its least developed Caribbean or Central
American neighbors. In fact, few nations at Haiti's level of economic development
have ever advanced so far toward sustainable democracy.
As democracy takes root in Haiti, therefore, this fact will put paid forever to the
notion that freedom is a luxury which only rich societies can afford. In forming an
international coalition to restore and consolidate democracy in Haiti, thus, the Unit-
ed States has not just found a way to enlist other nations in addressing a problem
near and important to us; we have also seized an opportunity to send a message
of successful support for democracy which will reverberate around the world.
No one is more committed to the goal of sustainable democracy than those Hai-
tian men and women who stood patiently and peacefully in the heat and the sun
two weeks ago, waiting to cast their ballot. They knew what they were votin, for.
They were voting for an end to tyranny. They were voting that the "macoutes' and
the "attaches" never come back. They were voting that the democracy they had
gained in 1990 never again be stolen from them.
The mechanisms needed to translate these aspirations into a duly constituted and
freely elected government must be strengthened if such a system of government is
to endure. This is why the French, Canadian, Argentine, Venezuelan and American
Ambassadors joined with UN and OAS representatives in Port au Prince in recent
days to urge cooperative measures upon the Haitian political parties and electoral
authorities to address deficiencies in the balloting process. This is why the Adminis-






tration, the Congress, the UN, the OAS, the IMF, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and other donor countries have all repeatedly linked their assistance to Haiti
to the restoration and continued consolidation of democracy. This is why all of us
are working now to help assure that the soon to be held second round of local and
legislative elections will be more effectively administered than the first, and that the
Presidential elections scheduled for the end of the year will achieve a still higher
standard.
Despite its flaws, the June 25 ballot in Haiti represents an important milestone
in that country's progress toward sustainable democracy. Our task at this point is
threefold; to encourage the people of Haiti to remain committed to the electoral
process, to encourage Haiti's electoral authorities to improve that process, and to en-
courage Haiti's political parties-whether they be losers or winners this time
around-to stay in that process. Today's hearings, and subsequent Congressional de-
bate can contribute importantly to all three of these objectives.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Ambassador. Assistant Adminis-
trator Schneider.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK SCHNEIDER, ASSISTANT ADMINIS-
TRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, AGEN-
CY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also will excerpt
from the testimony.
Mr. Chairman, the first round of parliamentary and local govern-
ment elections held in Haiti on June 25 represented an important
step forward in Haiti's progress toward an enduring democratic
order.
I think it is important to emphasize that the bulk of the voters
of Haiti voted in the most peaceful election in the country's history.
The vast majority were able to vote for the parties and the can-
didates of their choice and to have those votes counted.
Three years after a military coup and barely nine months after
the restoration of President Aristide's government, it is somewhat
remarkable that the election occurred at all. That achievement is
even more impressive given its complexity; more than 10,000 can-
didates, 2,200 offices at stake, inexperience of the electoral institu-
tions, and the limited time available for civic education and train-
ing of poll workers.
Know that you have seen these complex election ballots as well,
which help explain the difficulties of that election. It is also clear
from all observers that in a minority of communities-some 7 of
133 communes-as a result of a series of procedural and logistical
snafus, the election voting was canceled.
At a scattered number of other sites, voting was significantly dis-
organized and accounting impaired. To the credit of the Haitian
people, since that election day political parties, electoral institu-
tions, and the government-with the help of the international com-
munity, particularly the U.N. and the OAS-have been engaging in
dialog and fact-finding, not violence, to determine where elections
will have to be rerun.
It has been indicated that perhaps some 15 percent of those com-
munities will have to rerun elections in the next several weeks. It
is also important to emphasize that despite all of the difficulties,
3.4 million Haitians are registered to vote, some 92 percent of the
estimated eligible population.
Let me add as well that this is the first time in Haiti's history
that a code of conduct among the parties was agreed to. It was the




59

first time ever that Haitian citizens were able to exercise their
democratic right to vote without fear or intimidation from an op-
pressive military and its network of brutal section chiefs.
One must not forget the images in 1987 of the horror of 34 citi-
zens killed and countless more wounded while attempting to vote.
I was pleased to participate in the Presidential Delegation led by
USAID Administrator Brian Atwood to observe the elections along
with other public and private sector representatives. I know you
have received the statement that the delegation issued.
The substance of that statement is replicated by virtually all of
the other observer delegations. There were 30 international mon-
itoring organizations, including more than 584 individual observ-
ers. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I will just give you one personal ac-
count of what I saw during those days to indicate both the difficul-
ties and the way the people tended to resolve them.
In the northeast part of the country, about an hour and a half
or so outside of Cap Haitien, 16 of the 19 polling places had
opened, but the ballots for the remaining three did not arrive. By
mid-afternoon, those three polling places had not opened. So, the
local parties and the local officials took some of the unused ballots
from the other 16 and then were able to open up those remaining
three voting places. They began to vote late in the day with the
promise of staying open beyond the 6 o'clock hour in order to try
and complete the voting.
Clearly, the election was affected by numerous administrative
and procedural flaws. However, I think it is important to empha-
size that our delegation, the European Union's delegation, the Or-
ganization of American States, and the United Nations found no
credible evidence of a systematic bias, or any concerted attempts by
the government or anyone else to subvert the election for any par-
tisan purpose.
Problems were attributed to inexperience and administrative
weaknesses. As has been indicated, during these past several
months the government of Haiti took on an enormously ambitious
agenda of economic and political reform-pursuing a program of
economic restructuring and privatization, establishing a national
civilian police force, demobilizing the military and the former po-
lice, and establishing a new justice system while consistently pro-
moting political reconciliation.
One of its key objectives and one of our fundamental concerns
was the reconstitution of the institutions of governance. Parliamen-
tary and local government elections are a fundamental step toward
that objective. USAID has contributed some $11.7 million toward
the funding of these elections. The bulk of those funds cover costs
related to the first round, completion of the rerun, and the run-off
election.
We submitted detailed reports to the committee from all of the
organizations that have received funding under this program. The
bulk of this, as you know, went to the United Nations Electoral As-
sistance Unit to provide technical assistance in the process of con-
ducting the election.
IFES, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems also
received some $2 million to procure the ballots and the registration
cards and assist with civic and voter education. NDI received fund-






ing to provide training, political party poll watchers, and to assist
party development.
IRI received funding to assess the process and election day activi-
ties. The American Institute for Free Labor Development also as-
sisted in registration and get out the vote activities.
We were not alone in our support. The European Union, Japan,
Mexico, France, Canada, and the UNDP also participated in pro-
viding financial support and technical assistance in this process.
Mr. Chairman, we all understand that we have to learn from the
first round and help Haiti move forward in the next rounds and
particularly in the presidential election. The U.S. Government will
work together with our counterparts to address many of the prob-
lems that we encountered during the first round in areas such as
facilitating greater political dialog, early training of poll workers,
activating the parties's surveillance units as agreed to but not im-
plemented, and strengthening administrative and management
procedures for the electoral authorities.
IFES mentioned the desirability of calling together the groups
that have participated and attempting to go over the lessons
learned and how to help the Haitians resolve them. We began that
process in Port-au-Prince over the past several weeks and will be
continuing that.
Finally, just let me conclude with the official delegation's state-
ment when we left Haiti: "The Haitian people have demonstrated
that they have earned the respect associated with participating in
the individual act of casting a ballot. For our part, we will continue
to work with the government and people of Haiti in supporting the
strengthening of democratic institutions in this country." Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER
I. INTRODUCTION
The first round of parliamentary and local government elections held in Haiti on
June 25 represented an important step forward in Haiti's progress toward an endur-
ing democratic order. The bulk of the voters of Haiti voted in the most peaceful elec-
tion in the country's history. And, the vast majority were able to vote for the parties
and the candidates of their choice and to have those votes counted.
Three years after a military coup and barely nine months after the restoration
of President Aristide's government, it is somewhat remarkable that the election oc-
curred at all. That achievement is even more impressive given its complexity with
more than 10,000 candidates and some 2,200 offices, the inexperience of the elec-
toral institutions and the limited time available for civic education and training of
poll workers.
Nevertheless, it also is clear from all observers that in a minority of communities,
seven of 133 communes, as a result of a series of procedural and logistical snafus,
voting was canceled. In a scattered number of other sites, voting was significantly
disorganized and the counting impaired. It is to the credit of the Haitian people that
since that election day, the parties, the electoral institutions, and the government,
with the help of the international community-particularly the UN and the OAS-
have been engaging in dialogue and fact-finding, not violence, to determine where
elections will have to be rerun.
About 3.4 million Haitians, or 92 percent of the eligible population, registered to
vote. Despite Haiti's long history of political violence, the political campaign was re-
markably peaceful.
Let me just add that this was the first time in Haiti's history where a code of
conduct among the parties was agreed to. And it was the first time ever that Hai-
tian citizens were able to exercise their democratic right to vote without fear or in-
timidation from a repressive military and its network of brutal section chiefs. One






must not forget the images of 1987 and the horror of 34 citizens killed and countless
more wounded while attempting to vote.
I was pleased to have participated in the Presidential Delegation, led by USAID
Administrator Brian Atwood, which observed the elections along with other public
and private sector representatives. You previously have received the statement
which the delegation issued, the substance of which is replicated by virtually all of
the other observer delegations. There were 30 international monitoring organiza-
tions including more than 584 individual observers. Let me just quote from the final
statement of the U.S. delegation: "Despite the problems associated with the pre-elec-
tion period and observed on election day, the Haitian people voted freely and seem-
ingly without fear. Haiti is now one step closer to establishing a functional par-
liament and viable local government. It is our firm belief that further steps to cor-
rect the identified problems will encourage a perception of fairness about this proc-
ess, despite the inevitable difficulties of conducting an election in Haiti."
Let me also note that the European Union made the following comment: "The Eu-
ropean Union takes note that the peaceful running of the electoral campaign and
of the voting has clearly demonstrated the desire of the population to express itself
freely and in a responsible manner." They expressed their 'satisfaction" on the elec-
tion but the hope that "the administrative and logistical deficiencies which were ob-
served on the 25th of June will be corrected" in subsequent elections.
Finally, the OAS monitoring mission, which had the benefit of the nationwide cov-
erage of the Civilian International Mission's human rights observations throughout
the campaign, and its own more than 300 observers during the period of the elec-
tion, also noted in its post-election report two days following the balloting: "As the
day progressed, and continuing into the evening, it became evident that the conduct
of the voting process had significantly improved. Reports showed late in the day
that electoral officials were becoming more efficient in their tasks, the lines of peo-
ple waiting to vote were diminishing and the overall atmosphere was increasingly
orderly and peaceful."
Let me just give two personal accounts of voting in Haiti. I traveled to Cap Hai-
tien. There we found several urban polling places where they had opened at 6 am,
had 5 different party observers, and a relatively patient crowd waiting in line to
vote. Around the block, we found a polling place at 10 am where they were sched-
uled to vote inside a clinic. The door was padlocked and they had been trying to
find an appropriate outdoor site for four hours with one or more objections.
Throughout this period, despite tempers being rather hot, the new Haitian Civil-
ian Police, together with Pakistani UNMIH forces and UN Civilian Police monitors,
had maintained both order and security. Finally, somehow, the padlock gave way,
the booths were set up, the people began voting and there, as elsewhere around the
country where voting started late, the tables were going to continue operating be-
yond 6 pm.
In Acul du Nord, where I also visited, 16 of 19 polling places had opened. But
ballots for the remaining three were far fewer than the 400 per site needed. By mid-
afternoon, with all parties and local officials agreeing, a portion of unused ballots
from the nearby voting sites were gathered up so that voting could begin in the re-
maining three sites.
It also was in the same Department where three municipalities did not vote and
where elections are among those scheduled for re-running. In those instances, it ap-
peared that the absence of approved candidates from the ballot and inadequate
numbers of ballots were the fundamental issues that produced anger, confusion and
ultimately prevented elections from being held in those communities.
It was by no means a perfect election. There were significant organizational and
implementation foul-ups in a widely scattered set of voting sites. But, according to
the OAS observer mission, more than 50% of the 3.4 million registered voters had
gone to the polls.
The election was affected by administrative and procedural flaws in a number of
areas. However, the U.S. delegation, the European Union, the Organization of
American States and the United Nations found no credible evidence of systematic
bias or concerted attempts by the government to subvert the election process. The
problems in the election can be attributed to inexperience and administrative weak-
nesses, rather than any deliberately effort to manipulate the democratic process.
The Government of Haiti and the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) have ac-
knowledged these problems and are taking steps to address them. In the relative
few areas where these problems prevented voters from expressing their preference,
the CEP and political parties have been discussing where new elections should be
held. We will continue to assist the people of Haiti, the political parties and the Pro-
visional Electoral Council, in addressing the problems identified in the first round.







Ultimately the key issue is whether, at the conclusion of the run-off process next
month, the Haitian people will believe that these elections were credible.

II. U.S. ASSISTANCE AND ITS RESULTS
During the past several months, the Government of Haiti took on an enormously
ambitious agenda of economic and political reforms. For example, it has pursued a
program of economic restructuring and privatization, establishment of a national ci-
vilian police force, demobilization of the military and former police, establishment
of a new justice system, at the same time, it has consistently promoted political rec-
onciliation.
One of its key objectives and one of the fundamental concerns of the United States
was the reconstitution of the institutions of governance in Haiti. The parliamentary
and local government elections are a fundamental step toward that objective. We
have worked closely with the CEP, UN agencies and other donors to support the
electoral process.
USAID has contributed some $11.7 million to the funding of the elections in Haiti.
The bulk of those funds will cover costs related to the first round, and to the comple-
tion of both the re-run and the run-off elections.
United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit (UN/EAU).-Most of our assistance was
provided to the UN/EAU, which has extensive experience in providing technical as-
sistance for elections in the developing world. The UN/EAU received $8.1 million to
support the planning and implementation of the elections. They established a per-
manent elections office in Port-au-Prince with a senior advisor, six staff and eight
volunteers.
The UN/EAU assisted the CEP in drafting the Electoral Law, the development
of an electoral operations plans and electoral calendar. Working with IFES, they de-
veloped a pollworker training program in coordination with an ongoing civic edu-
cation program administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
Some 45,000 poll voters were trained, although, very late in the process. The UN/
EAU also provided technical and material assistance to the CEP and is coordinating
donors' assistance for the elections. This included a nationwide radio system and
computers for CEP operations valued at $490,000.
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES).-IFES received about $2
million to procure ballots and registration cards for the elections, assist with civic
and voter education and provide logistics and other necessary election material.
IFES has provided a local staff person to work with the UN and CEP to obtain can-
didate lists and ballot specifics, and coordinate with the Canadians who will provide
the voting kits. IFES also received a $300,000 grant to provide training to
pollworkers. This training-of-trainers program uses civic education animators of the
ongoing UNDP civic education project. In addition, IFES has trained CEP officials
in election administration and procedures.
National Democratic Institute (NDI).-NDI has received a $651,000 grant since
early this year to provide training to political party pollwatchers and to assist civic
organizations and political parties organize a series of candidate and party forums.
sixteen political parties participated in NDI's first meeting for political party lead-
ers, held in Port-au-Prince on February 6, in which the parties were able to discuss
their concerns directly with the CEP. This was the beginning of a continuing dia-
logue between the CEP and political parties. As a part of their civic education ef-
forts, NDI sponsored four political party debates in different parts of the country,
with the last held on June 13.
International Republican Institute (IRI).-IRI fielded a five-person team to oversee
and assess the international election observation effort. As part of their $425,000
grant, they also sent a team of twenty-five international observers in coordination
with the OAS during the period immediately before and after June 25. This was
preceded by four smaller assessment team visits.
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD).-AIFLD received
$300,000 to assist labor unions in get out the vote and poll watching activities.
Their conferences and work with labor unions helped to explain the voter registra-
tion process and deserves some credit for the great success in registering about 90
percent of eligible voters.

HI. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
The United States was not alone in this effort. The European Community (EU)
contributed $2.5 million for election commodities. Japan has pledged a $500,000 con-
tribution to the UN elections Trust Fund and has also offered $150,000 to repair
Radio Nationale. Mexico offered to provide technical expertise for vote counting and
tabulation, and France has also pledged $1 million assistance. UNDP provided






$350,000 for a civic education program. Voting kits at the polling stations valued
at about $1.5 million were provided by Canada.
OAS.-The role of the OAS has been particularly valuable. During the period
since the return of President Aristide, the OAS has continued the work of the Inter-
national Civil Mission (ICM) to monitor Haiti's human rights situation. The ICM
was an important presence during the registration period. With the advent of the
elections, the OAS expanded its role to include more than 300 election observers
from 55 different countries, deployed in 12 regional teams throughout the nine de-
partments and covering most of the 133 communes in the country. According to OAS
reports, these observers were able to move independently in virtually all of the com-
munal or county level electoral offices (BEC), actually visiting some 30% of the
10,000 polling sites. During the final counting they were present first at all the
BECs and then later at the Departmental Electoral Off ices (BED).
IV. IMPROVING TIlE PROCESS
Problems arose in the following areas: candidate registration; printing of ballots;
timely payment of electoral employees; conduct of vote and security of ballots during
tabulation process. These problems were experienced in a relatively few areas and
did not systematically favor one side or the other. The conclusion of virtually all
international observers is that the difficulties were more a matter of inexperience,
poor training and weak administration, rather than a deliberate and organized ef-
fort by one side to subvert the electoral process.
The USG will work, together with Haitian and other donor counterparts, to ad-
dress many of the problems encountered during the first found in areas such as fa-
cilitating greater political dialogue, early training of pollworkers, activating the
party surveillance unit, and strengthening administrative and management proce-
dures.
V. CONCLUSION
A functioning, credible parliament is essential to Haiti's evolution toward a stable
and democratic democracy. The election on June 25, despite their problems, were
a significant step forward. We believe, along with many other observers, that this
is a major achievement. It is essential that we stay the course and continue our as-
sistance in order to solidify and strengthen this achievement and help the Haitian
people realize the full promise of a democratic society.
Let me just conclude by citing our official delegation statement: "The Haitian peo-
ple have demonstrated that they have earned the respect associated with participat-
ing in the individual act of casting a ballot. For our part, we will continue to work
with the government and people of Haiti in supporting the strengthening of demo-
cratic institutions in this country."
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I have several
questions that I would like to pose to you. Again, I do not think
you were here when I began, but I said several times that the ef-
fort here is to consolidate the critiques and to assimilate those into
the process as we go forward. Tensions are running a little high
here. I am going to break this into two parts.
I assume by now you have assembled from the various parties,
the various reports of electoral breakdowns, including IRI's report.
In the U.S. News and World Report it indicates that Jeffrey
Hirschberg has essentially written a letter to the President, to the
administration suggesting that the problems raised by IRI and oth-
ers were legitimate. Is this an accurate portrayal? Has such a let-
ter been received by you?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do not think I should be commenting on cor-
respondence between a private citizen, Mr. Hirschberg who, I am
certain, is available to the committee, if you wanted to speak to
him, and the President.
I think that nobody disputes that many, indeed most, of the
problems raised by IRI were legitimate problems that require at-
tention. I think you will probably get today the OAS report. They
have by far the largest observer group that has been there by far






the longest. So, they are going to do I think a quite thorough job.
I think you will see that they raise many of the same problems. In
fact, if you look at Brian Atwood's statement, on the day he left
Haiti, you will find it mentions almost every problem that the IRI
report raised. The question is, what conclusions do you draw from
that and how do you assess the overall impact of the election in
terms of progress toward democracy in Haiti.
Senator COVERDELL. Well, in the report, and I have not read
IRI's report completely, but the suggestion by Mr. McColm here
sounded as though it was in keeping with what I had said pre-
viously. I did not hear a rejection of the overall election process,
but rather substantial difficulties that needed considerable atten-
tion as the process goes forward. It seems to me that we are get-
ting a consensus about that.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that is right. Clearly our statements
have differences of emphasis. There were cases where specific prob-
lems arose. We might attribute different motivations or different
causes to them. I think there is a strong consensus among nearly
all of the observers that the elections were marred by administra-
tive oversights and problems, but that there was no evidence of an
organized or large scale effort to take advantage of those to skew
the elections toward any particular result.
If the process is to maintain validity and build a sound system
of elected government, it is going to have to be significantly im-
proved.
Senator COVERDELL. This brings me to the second thrust of my
question. I have been sort of surprised that so little has been said
about the U.N. Election Trust Fund and UNDP which received $8.1
million of the $14 million we have invested in the election. So, they
obviously have broad responsibilities with regard to preparation
and the conduct of the election.
Mr. Fischer from the International Foundation for Electoral Sys-
tems is the only individual who really referred to this institutional
device. He suggested that they were to have had 400 personnel in
the process of training and that turned into 10. That is a signifi-
cant modification.
I am a little surprised. The folks seem to be defending the elec-
tion on the fact that Haiti is a very poor country that has been
without law for 30 years, and lacks infrastructure. That is not the
case with UNDP.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. The distinction, I think, has to be made between
the UNDP and the United Nations Electoral Unit. The United Na-
tions Electoral Unit was essentially the manager of that electoral
fund that you mentioned, the trust fund. They were the ones utiliz-
ing those resources to help finance the actual conduct of the elec-
tions through the Provisional Electoral Council.
The UNDP had provided a separate program, civic education.
The initial understanding was that the same people who were pro-
viding for civic education would do the training that IFES was
talking about. Obviously, there was a disagreement over the re-
sponsibilities there. In the end, IFES had to come forward and pro-
vide the trainers themselves.
Senator COVERDELL. I guess the point I am making, Mr. Schnei-
der, is this. There has been very little said about the international






apparatus that bore a considerable responsibility for the conduct of
the elections or even failed in its focus on the Haitian people them-
selves. We have invested a lot of money in the apparatus.
When you have the technical know-how and when we knew we
had to train people-you couldn't miss that we had to train people
for this unusual election-there seems to be a shortfall on what we
got from the people that do know what they are doing.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think that in most of the instances the propos-
als that have been set forth as to what needed to be done are from
the U.N. Technical Assistance Unit. Frequently, the decisions that
came from the Council came very late. As a result, as was indi-
cated earlier, training for the 45,000 poll workers did take place,
but it took place only in the several days just before the election.
Why? Because they were not named until very late, even though
that had clearly been part of the calendar that the U.N. Technical
Assistance Unit had provided to the Council much earlier. It was
that delay in naming them that resulted then in the delay in the
training. Some of the problems obviously resulted from that delay.
Mr. DOBBINS. Mr. Chairman, let me just add that first of all, I
think you will find a little more material on this subject in the
written testimony that both Mark and I have submitted.
Both Mark and I worked closely with the U.N. officials who are
helping to support this election. I think we both, and other U.S. of-
ficials, felt that they were professional. They were committed and
that their decisions were being adequately discussed with us as the
largest single contributor, as with other contributing countries.
While there may well have been individual cases where we might
have argued that something should have been done quicker or
sooner, I think we believe their contribution was a sound one. They
came up against the same realities of a Haiti and a Haitian admin-
istrative structure which simply could only accept and use so much
help.
I think the fact that Haiti was so dependent on international as-
sistance for this election-in its last election it funded 60 percent
of the election, in this election it funded under 5 percent-was be-
cause they simply have not recovered the revenues as a result of
the coup and the embargo which would allow them to fund an elec-
tion.
So, either it was funded for them or it was postponed. Nobody
wanted to postpone it. That itself imposed certain burdens in the
sense that every large expenditure had to be approved by the do-
nating country and the U.N. through each of their bookkeeping and
oversight procedures as well as Haiti's.
So, another layer of bureaucracy was imposed on a system that
already was not moving as rapidly as it should. I think that as
Haiti develops its capacity to fund its own elections at least in
bulk, which it should do fairly rapidly, this will to some degree im-
prove the responsiveness of this structure.
Senator COVERDELL. Ambassador Dobbins, would you comment
on the Provisional Electoral Council? Mr. Fischer, before you ar-
rived, said it should be a permanent body with permanent staff. I
saw a lot of heads out there nodding.
In conducting the candidate registration and campaign process
and given the ability of the Council to deny candidates a place on






the ballot, the Council's conduct seems rather bothersome in the
context of a traditional democratic process. What is your general
observation?
Mr. DOBBINS. First of all, we certainly agree that Haiti ought to,
as rapidly as possible, set up a permanent electoral system and a
permanent council. The Constitution requires that the first step in
that is that local assemblies put forward a list of candidates from
which the Parliament, the President, and the Supreme Court
would each choose three. So, you have to have local assemblies.
You cannot have local assemblies until you have had this election
and then some further processes to form those assemblies. There-
fore, it is not clear at this time whether it is possible to move rap-
idly enough to compose a permanent Electoral Council based on the
criteria in the Constitution in time to hold the presidential elec-
tions by the end of this year.
I think that is an open question. If it can be done, obviously it
is optimal. It is desirable. It was also highly desirable that those
presidential elections occur on schedule. In terms of the current
Electoral Commission and its performance with respect to the re-
view and candidacies, it had requirements imposed on it by the
electoral law which it was instrumental in writing, but which is
modeled on the electoral law from previous years, including 1990.
It sets up a number of criteria for candidates. Some of the cri-
teria are fairly hard to meet in a country like Haiti where docu-
mentation is difficult to get; certificate of property ownership; cer-
tificate of birth, that sort of thing in a society that is illiterate and
poorly administered. Those are not always easy to come by; par-
ticularly when you have 22,000 candidates who have to submit
them.
The requirements were stated in law. The council had to adhere
to them. The number of candidates-disqualified was not in excess
of 1990; about 3 percent is my understanding. The process by
which explanations were given as to why they were-
Senator COVERDELL. On radio rather than in writing?
Mr. DOBBINS. It was never adequately explained, the basis upon
which each disqualification occurred. Once the first list was en-
tered the parties protested. To its credit, the Council then began
to adjust and make concessions. That, itself, complicated things be-
cause then there were four different lists with different names on
them.
One was never sure whether one's name had been put back on
the list. Indeed, some of the people on election day who were pro-
testing were people who had been taken off three weeks ago. They
thought they were back on. They never discovered that they had
not been put back on. So, it was a very poor process and was large-
ly responsible for the poor relations which developed between the
Electoral Council and the parties.
We would certainly strongly counsel the Electoral Council, and
any Electoral Council in the future, to regularize that process, and
in particular improve their communications.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. The only additional point I would make in re-
gard to that rejection and putting candidates back on, the list goes
right across the range of political parties. There is no one party






that benefited. Those rejected and restored come from across the
board.
Senator COVERDELL. I do want to get the breakdown, if I can, of
the $8.1 million. You mentioned that the candidate lists were de-
layed which comes back to the Council, which I think is at the
heart of many of the problems that occurred.
A lot of attention needs to be directed at that Council in terms
of Haitian responsibility for these problems. Why would the nam-
ing of candidates delay the training? Why wouldn't we have pro-
ceeded with electoral training? How did the Council deal with the
process of getting ready for the logistics of the election?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. To some degree it related to expanding the num-
ber of voting places. As you know, in the last several weeks they
increased by several thousand the number of actual polling tables.
As a result of changing the locations, you had to then reidentify
the people who were going to work the tables. That was a part of
the problem. As to why they did not train workers for tables that
were set from the beginning, I cannot answer.
Senator COVERDELL. It seems to me that that is at the heart of
it. Do you know the answer as to why the 400 UNDP trainers be-
came 10?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. No, but we can provide that information.
Senator COVERDELL. That, as I said, is very significant.
Mr. DOBBINS. The delay in naming was not a delay in naming
candidates. It was a delay in naming poll workers. They had to
hire 40,000 workers in a country where literacy is the exception.
Senator COVERDELL. Do you accept the fact that some significant
percentage were never paid?
Mr. DOBBINS. The Government of Haiti almost never pays any-
body on time. So, the fact that they were not paid strikes me as
absolutely normal unfortunately. I mean, they do not pay their po-
lice. They do not pay their officials on time. They did not used to
pay them at all. Now, they pay them and usually within a few
weeks of when the money is due. So, this is progress.
In terms of somebody who has just been hired for one week, it
is not much good to tell them that you will probably get your
money 3 weeks after this job is over. They wanted it while they
were still working, while they had some leverage. So, I understand
the tension. But Ialso do not attribute anything to it except a level
of efficiency which extends across the spectrum.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Just as an example, when I was in Cap Haitien
the day of the voting, I did ask that question at every one of the
different BIV's that I visited. The checks had gotten to the Cap
Haitien departmental site on Friday, but they could not cash them
at the banks. So, the election workers were not able to receive the
money until the day after the election.
Senator COVERDELL. You were about to be relieved of this re-
sponsibility, but Senator Dodd has returned. So, he has his just op-
portunity to pose questions.
Senator DODD. I apologize. I had a group of 4-H students from
Connecticut that were down. I had to go and see them. I apologize
to the witnesses and to the administration.
I had a chance to go over the testimony. I did not get a chance
to compliment our two previous witnesses, Mr. Fischer and Ms.






McDougall. I was very impressed with your testimony. I thought
you did an excellent job. To compare the South African elections
which most heralded, with all of its shortcomings.
I think your point about there being a determination to try and
promote the growth of democracy in that country and what I per-
ceive, and I admit it. Maybe I am the only person in the world who
thinks this. It is just too coincidental for me and my taste to all
of a sudden see something that looks to me like a determined effort
to try and paint a different impression about a different election,
albeit one with a load of problems.
I am impressed with what the administration has done here.
Mark, Mr. Ambassador, and the people have done good work. While
it has not been a popular issue, not a whole lot of votes I suppose
as some would think, as sticking to your guns as the administra-
tion has on Haiti.
As I mentioned earlier, to take the tremendous chance of giving
this small country an opportunity to achieve what it never would
have otherwise have. There would have been no election, absolutely
no election worth its weight had it not been for the fact that the
administration took the chance to see that President Aristide re-
turned to his country, in my view, and the fact that you have made
it a priority.
I think it is always difficult to prove a negative, but with the
boat people showing up, and what Congressman Hastings talked
about in terms of seeing bodies washed ashore on the beaches of
Florida, and the human tragedy associated, there has been none of
that. Have there been any exodus out of Haiti?
Mr. DOBBINS. A few dozen every couple of months. There are
more coming out of the Dominican Republic at the moment.
Senator DODD. But nothing that compares obviously to what oc-
curred before.
Mr. DOBBINS. No.
Senator DODD. Again, those scenes no longer which we have to
witness I think are no small measure due to the efforts that you
have made. Tell me just quickly and you may have already ad-
dressed the chairman's questions on this. If you have, then I will
pick up on it.
On this next cycle now of elections, a lot of these already legiti-
mate criticisms that have been raised. Are they going to be ad-
dressed in your opinion?
Mr. DOBBINS. I believe so, Senator. They made some partial an-
nouncements in Haiti late yesterday and early this morning.
Senator DODD. I saw that.
Mr. DOBBINS. In 21 out of the I think 133 localities, there are ei-
ther going to be partial or full reruns. That is 18 percent of the lo-
calities in other words that will rerun the election, which is a fairly
significant number.
In addition, they have committed to other steps, including financ-
ing a party monitoring unit so that these party workers who show
up to act as poll watchers can receive some remuneration which
should help the parties maintain their interest in the process and
commitment to it, and better training, and better administrative
processes, more rigorous vote count procedures.






There are a series of steps that they have agreed to. Of course,
we will have to work with them to ensure that these are all imple-
mented.
Senator DODD. Last, the issue that Senator Bob Graham raised
earlier this morning, and that was the evidence of corruption, the
kind of political corruption that we have seen in the past. Grant
it, all sorts of difficulties here and there, but on the notion of politi-
cal corruption for lack of a better description, to what extent was
that evidenced in this election cycle?
Mr. DOBBINS. Well, as I have said, there were relatively few alle-
gations of specific instances of fraud, despite the opportunities for
it which were clearly evident in the irregularities that occurred. I
believe none of the international observers have really found any
evidence of systematic fraud or systematic effort to skew the re-
sults of the election.
I also think that there has been no evidence or even allegations
of diversion of government funding for parties and purposes.
Senator DODD. Mark, any comment on that?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. No. That is correct. I just saw a copy of the re-
port by the OAS which, as you know, had monitors there. During
the process, there were some 120 monitoring human rights and,
subsequently, 300 around the country monitoring election proce-
dures. They have been there throughout this period at the 133 first
BEC sites, the communal sites, and then at the departmental sites.
They concluded the same: no systematic evidence of fraud. I
think it is impressive to note that their general conclusion was, to
quote, that, "by far the largest majority of the electors who voted
went to the voting places in total security without fear and intimi-
dation and voted freely for the candidates and parties of their
choice."
Senator DODD. Who is that from?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is the Organization of American States.
They had the largest monitoring operation during the months be-
fore the elections.
Senator DODD. Right.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. They have been there ever since.
Senator DODD. How about the European Community? They had
a delegation as well; didn't they?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. They did. Again, they had a similar general con-
clusion about the elections, despite the administrative problems
that have been described their report states, 'The European Union
expressed the satisfaction and accomplishment of the election of
June 25 which constitutes an important step on the path of democ-
racy. The European Union which has given its support to the orga-
nization of these elections expresses its hope that the admin-
istrative and logistical deficiencies which were observed will be cor-
rected in the case of the second round and for the presidential elec-
tions later this year."
Senator DODD. Thank you very much. Again, I thank both of you
for your efforts. Obviously, we have got to stay involved on this
issue if we are going to see any real progress here. I commend you
for the work you have done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator. We have been joined
by the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I call





on him now, the Senator from North Carolina for any statement or
questions.
The CHAIRMAN. I will not take long. I think Henry VIII said to
Anne Boleyn that I will not keep you long.
Senator COVERDELL. That is a warning to both of you. You know
what happened to Anne Boleyn.
The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for not being here; a couple of ques-
tions. Has there been an investigation into the assassination of the
congressional candidate, the mayoral candidate, you know the two
I am talking about?
Mr. DOBBINS. The OAS human rights monitors are looking into
that separately from the Haitian authorities. There will be normal
police investigations which are not terribly adequate at the mo-
ment because of the inadequacies of the Haitian police force which
we are doing our best to correct.
In addition, the OAS has a group of monitors who in addition to
doing electoral monitoring also monitor situations such as that.
They are looking into it and will issue a report.
The CHAIRMAN. What do you know about what they have found
or decided thus far? Is there really an investigation going on?
Mr. DOBBINS. I will try to get you more details as to whether
any-has been developed.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. From the initial reports, in one instance they
were not sure if it was politically related. They were continuing to
do further investigation.
In the other, the Minister of Justice has asked to have an addi-
tional investigation take place. There are no conclusions that I
have seen.
The CHAIRMAN. When shall we have some information on it? I
think it is important.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think we will try and get that information for
you, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. By when?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. We will send down a cable to the mission and
ask for the information.
The CHAIRMAN. There have been attacks on several other con-
gressional and senatorial candidates; have there not? Are they
being investigated as well?
Mr. DOBBINS. All allegations of serious violence are going to be
investigated. The OAS report on the election which I think was
going to be issued today will contain some summary information on
levels of political violence and some rather brief comments on
whether or not they seem to be politically motivated.
They may cite one or two of these cases and provide what infor-
mation they have at this stage. I think that the general assessment
of most observers is that in comparison, not only with previous
Haitian elections, but with elections in a lot of other countries in
transition, this was a remarkably peaceful process. I might also say
that the violence that did occur seems to be fairly evenly distrib-
uted across the political spectrum.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean both parties?
Mr. DOBBINS. I mean that parties that supported President
Aristide suffered; at least a proportional number of incidents as
parties that oppose him.






The CHAIRMAN. Anyway, let me have the information that you
are able to acquire. I would like your judgment as to whether an
adequate effort is being made properly to investigate these things.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Please report on the aftermath of the killing of Jean-Charles Henock,
a candidate for the lower house of the Haitian Parliament from the town of Anse
d'Hainault. Has an investigation been launched into the killing by the International
Civilian Mission? What is the progress of that investigation? What about the re-
ported attack on a Senatorial candidate? What is being done generally by Haitian
and international authorities to investigate attacks against candidates?
Answer. The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission (ICM) and Haitian authori-
ties are still investigating the June 27 killing of Henock, whose body was found by
his family inside their house with a single gunshot wound to the head. No arrests
have been made to date.
Although a violent attack on a Senatorial candidate may have been reported, our
Embassy is unable to confirm that an attack against any such candidate has in fact
taken place either during the election campaign, on voting day, or in the weeks
since. A rally on behalf of Renaud Bernardin, an adviser to President Aristide and
Lavalas Senatorial candidate, was disrupted by an unruly crowd in Cap-Haitien on
May 31. Initial press reports to the contrary, Bernardin was unharmed.
The Haitian police (both the interim police and the newly deployed Haitian Na-
tional Police, depending on which has jurisdiction for the locality), with assistance
from UN civilian police, investigate reported attacks against candidates. In many
cases, the ICM has launched independent investigations either on its own initiative
or in response to specific complaints.
Incidents of violence and intimidation have occurred only sporadically since plan-
ning for these elections began. In this regard, the OAS Electoral Observer Missions
"Report on the June 25 Elections," dated July 12, describes a "general environment
of calm and non-violence throughout the electoral period."
The CHAIRMAN. Specifically, has there been an investigation into
the attack on Congressman Duly Brutus? You know his house and
his automobile were stoned. There were so many death threats that
he went into hiding. I do not know whether he is still in hiding or
not. Is he, or do you know?
Mr. DOBBINS. I do not know. All I know about that incident was
that there was apparently a previous incident at the voting cite in
that town. That tensions were raised. A demonstration occurred in
or near former Deputy Brutus' home. He took refuge at the police
station, which was fortunately manned by people who had grad-
uated only ten days earlier from our police academy.
They apparently protected him very professionally, using the
techniques that they had been taught in this academy. He was per-
fectly safe as a result. Beyond that, I do not have further details.
I will try to get any that we have.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Following the burning of voting materials in Limbe on June 23, Duly
Brutus, a candidate for the lower house of Parliament, was attacked in his home
there by a mob. What has happened to Mr. Brutus since?
Answer. The June 23 fire in Thimbe's electoral office necessitated the postpone-
ment of voting in that highly polarized town. On June 25, a group of demonstrators
who claimed that Duly Brutus was responsible for setting the fire gathered outside
Brutus' home, pelting it with rocks. This caused Brutus to take refuge in the Limbe
police station, newly staffed by the Haitian National Police (HNP), and the HNP
proceeded to disperse the crowd. Thereafter, the situation in Limbe calmed and Bru-
tus was able to circulate both there and in Port-au-Prince, where he has been active
on behalf of the PANPRA party in discussions related to the upcoming partial and
runoff elections.
On July 6, a Justice of the Peace in Limbe was arrested for alleged involvement
in the fire. The HNP Commissioner in the Northern Department was also arrested
and subsequently dismissed in connection with the case. As part of the ongoing in-
vestigation into the fire, Haitian authorities decided to call Duly Brutus in for ques-






tioning related to unspecified "subversive intrigues and arson." On July 15, based
on an arrest warrant issued by a Port-au-Prince prosecutor July 6, Brutus was
taken into custody by Haitian police. Questioning was supposed to have begun on
July 17 but was suspended due to the prosecutor's absence (he was attending a
training course in the U.S.), and Brutus was released, at least temporarily. Given
Brutus availability for questioning in Port-au-Prince, we regarded his arrest as un-
necessary and unhelpful and so informed the relevant Haitian authorities.
Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince, acting out of concern for Brutus' welfare, made
a number of efforts on his behalf during the period he was detained. Ambassador
Swing interceded with the Haitian President and Prime Minister; an Embassy offi-
cer visited Brutus while he was in custody; and Embassy officers were present at
the July 17 proceedings which culminated in Brutus' release. At this point, we do
not have information about why the prosecutor decided it was necessary to question
Brutus. (We assume the arrest warrant concerned the events in Limbe, but it fails
to say so expressly.)
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, did you or Senator Dodd cover
the Reuters report about the suspicious outage of power down
there?
Senator COVERDELL. No, that has not been covered, Senator, so,
it would be appropriate for you to address it.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you about that. Maybe you can give
me a written answer to that as well, if you do not have full knowl-
edge of it.
On July 11, Reuters reported and there have been first-hand ac-
counts as well, I understand, that the election results were delayed
4 hours due to a power outage which Reuters described as "mys-
terious," considering that it occurred-only-at the Provisional
Electoral Council's offices.
According to this report, witnesses have said that even the street
lights outside of that building were working, that the power inside
of the building mysteriously went off. Therefore, the results were
delayed. The election results there were delayed until I think it
was 1:30 a.m. Has there been any explanation of that, that you
know about?
Mr. DOBBINS. I have seen the event reported. In Haiti, it is usu-
ally a cause for comment when there is power, rather than when
there is not. The circumstances here may have been unique as the
reporter suggests. I have heard no suggestion that there was any-
thing at cause here other than a mechanical failure of the sort that
occurs rather frequently in Haiti. Let me again, find out whether
there is any further information to substantiate that report.
[The information referred to follows:]
Question. Reuter reports that on July 11 journalists in Port-au-Prince were kept
waiting more than four hours for the announcement of election results, due to a
"mysterious power outage experienced only at the Provisional Electoral Council
(CEP)." What caused this power outage? Do you consider the claim that only the
CEP was affected to be suspicious?
Answer. Power outages occur frequently in Port-au-Prince. Neither our Embassy
nor the UN has seen evidence of anything suspicious in the power outage at the
CEP on July 11. Similar outages occurred in the capital on the night of June 25,
when the first round of elections was held. Many of the polling stations received
their electricity via connections to streetlights which work only erratically.
The CHAIRMAN. I have a couple of other questions, but I will sub-
mit these in writing. I would appreciate a response in writing as
quickly as possible. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator COVERDELL. All right, gentlemen. Thank you very much
for the patience in waiting the additional 30 minutes. Thank you
for your testimony.




73
We will include in the hearing record the statements of the presi-
dential election observers and the IRI election observers, and the
State Department letter of July 11.
Gentlemen and Ladies, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the hearing was adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to the call of the Chair.]















APPENDIX


RESPONSES OF JAMES DOBBINS AND MARK SCHNEIDER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY
SENATOR HELMS
Question. According to the July 11 letter from Assistant Secretary Wendy Sher-
man to Senator Coverdell, the U.S. Government provided some $13 million in sup-
port of the Haitian elections. Please provide a detailed breakdown of how USAID
direct funding was utilized by the United Nations Election Trust Fund, including
the amount spent on overhead by the UN and direct UN funding and technical as-
sistance provided by the UN to the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP)?
Does either the UN or USAID have an accounting from the CEP as to how any
funding provided by the U.S. was used by the CEP? If not, will the U.S. Embassy
or USAID Mission request an accounting from the CEP? Will the State Department
share this information with the Committee?
Answer. The CEP has provided an accounting for the first month of funds pro-
vided by the Trust Fund (January 1995). The UN expects the accounting for the
funds through April shortly, with the accounts for April to May to be provided be-
fore more Trust Fund monies are given to the CEP. The CEP has not received any
Trust Fund monies for the period beyond May 31 due to the delayed financial re-
porting. In addition, the USAID Mission has requested an audit of the CEP ac-
counts to be undertaken by the UN as soon as possible. Since USAID provides fund-
ing through the UN to the CEP, the UN's accounting and audit procedures are uti-
lized according to the terms of the grant.
(See attached UN budget)
(A) Receipts
Amount of Grant $8,100,000.00
Less 3 percent overhead (235,923.00)
Less Amount withheld by UNHQ (358,300.000)
Net Amount allocated to UNMIH $7,506,777.00

(B) Expenditures
Civilian Personnel Costs:
Local Staff Salaries $365.89
United Nations Volunteers 12,125.00
Other Official Travel of Staff 4,374.12
Local Travel of Staff 165.87
Transport Operations:
Rental of Vehicles 50,460.60
Maintenance of Vehicles 3,699.30
Vehicle Insurance 415.36
Petrol, Oil and lubricants: Purchased by CEP 1,266.67
Purchase of Vehicles: CARS, BUS, TRUCK 74,292.60
Purchase of Vehicles: Motocycles 222,790.40
Aviation Support 249,665.74
Communications:
Telephone-Long Distance 311.16
Pouches 36.71
Communications Equipment Purchased by CEP 118,682.13
(75)






Other Equipment:
Office Furniture: Purchased by UN 92,656.33
Office Furniture: Purchased by CEP 4,333.33
Office Equipment 49,965.27
Data Processing Equipment 107,214.70
Generators 104,804.70
Miscellaneous Equipment 26,631.10
Supplies and Services:
Miscellaneous Services 4,405.77
Stationery and Office Supplies: Purchased by UN 25,400.41
Stationery and Office Supplies: Purchased by CEP 3,500.00
Renovation work at CEP 16,448.14
Container Rental 6,200.00
Ballots 23,575.27
Registration cards 147,000.00
Election Support: Advanced to CEP for salaries of council mem-
bers, BED, BEC, registration staff, operation expenses and office
rental for BED and BEC
Feb 1995 66,666.67
April 1995 466,666.67
April 1995 466,666.67
May 1995 3,016,416.67
Freight and Related Costs:
Commercial Freight and Carrage 46.85
Total Expenditures $5,367,250.11
UNENCUMBERED BALANCE $2,136,526.89

Note.-The total cost for Vehicles is US $449,748.60. An amount of
US $375,426.00 was financed by the Japanese Grant.
Note.-The total cost for telecommunications is US $232.586.13. An
amount of US $113,874.00 was financed by the Japanese Grant.
Note.-The above advances to CEP will be identified as follows:
US$ GDE
Salaries (CEP) (4 weeks) $66,666.67 $1,000,000.00
Salaries: BED & BEC (Mar. Apr. May 95) 969,750.00 14,546,250.00
Salaries: Registration prior to budget 1,880,000.00 29,700,000.00
Operational expenses (Mar. Apr. May 95) 333,333.33 5,000,000.00
Rental BED & BEC (Mar. Apr. May 95) 666,666.67 10,000,000.00
Question. According to a June 16, 1995 USAID Fact Sheet titled "Haiti Elections,"
the UN Electoral Assistance Unit was responsible, amongst other programs, for de-
veloping a pollworker training program and in providing technical and material as-
sistance to the CEP in coordination with UNDP. Please provide details on the
pollworker training program, including how many pollworkers were trained, what
did the training consist of, where the pollworkers were deployed, the cost of the pro-
gram, whether any compensation was promised to the pollworkers, the amount or
type promised, and whether the compensation was provided.
Answer. In conjunction with the United Nations Technical Assistance Team (UN
TA), IFES trained 38 trainers who then each trained 220 pollworkers for a total of
8,360 trained pollworkers.
In conjunction with the CEP, IFES prepared a training manual which covered
procedures for voting day operations, secrecy of the vote and the count.
Training was decentralized and was done for pollworkers at the Communal Elec-
toral Office (BEC) level. At least three trainers went to each of the nine depart-
ments to help the BECs train the pollworkers in their areas.
Production of the IFES training manual cost $12,000. Total IFES training costs
were $232,000.
UNDP contribution for the joint training and other civic education activities was
$100,000.
Under an agreement between the European Union and the CEP, the EU funded
one day of training for the pollworkers and two days for voting/count. The salary
was 150 gourdes/person ($10 US). The EU funds were transferred to the CEP on
June 21 for this purpose.
The UN worked closely with the CEP to ensure payment to the pollworkers when
it became clear that the CEP had difficulty with paying people on a timely basis.
Pollworkers in the BED de L'Ouest complained that the pay was too low. The CEP's
official position on this was that the salary for the pollworkers was non-negotiable.





77

Question. According to the same June USAID Fact Sheet, $490,000 was provided
to the CEP for a nationwide radio system and computers, yet this program is not
mentioned in the July 11 letter from Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman to Sen-
ator Coverdell. Was such assistance provided to the CEPI If not, why not? If so, who
provided it: USAID, the UN, some other entity? What was the total cost? What was
the total amount of equipment provided? Is this equipment to be permanently re-
tained by the CEP and its successors?
Answer. USAID had computer and radio equipment in storage which were used
for the 1990 elections under a grant to IFES. In January 1995, in order to assist
the newly created CEP with its communication system with the BEDs and BECs,
USAID loaned the radio equipment to the CEP. In May, to assist the CEP with its
computer needs, USAID granted the 1990 computers to the CEP. At the same time,
it granted the radio equipment to the CEP.
USAID estimated the value of the equipment at $490,000. However, as this was
used equipment that had been in storage for 5 years, the actual value could be
much less.
The total amount of equipment provided was as follows: Radios: 129 HF radios,
18 portable and mobile radios, 1 repeater, 9 power supplies, 6 chargers, 116 solar
panels, 118 antennas, 1 power amplifier and 5 phone patches; Computers: 49 mon-
itors and keyboards, 1 portable computer, 2 pin printers, 1 UPS and 8 battery
packs.
The equipment was granted to the CEP for its use on elections. However the
grant letter conditioned the transfer of the property to the CEP upon the Provisional
Council transferring the equipment to the Permanent Council. If this transfer is not
done, then USAID may reclaim the property.
Question. How much USAID support went to civic education campaigns? What
was the extent of civic education efforts? Please provide a list, by BED and BEC,
of where civic education campaigns were carried out.
Answer. With USAID funds NDI held:
-two party forums in Port-au-Prince;
-four candidate forums; Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes, Gonaives, and Cap Hai-
tien.
With USAID funds AIFLD held:
-one multi-party rally in Port-au-Prince;
-three town meetings with candidates; Les Cayes, Port-au-Prince, and
Gonaives.
The approximate cost of these activities was $175,000.
All BEDs (Departmental Electoral Offices) and BECs (Communal Electoral Of-
fices) were involved in civic education. MIST (Military Information Support Team)
assisted the CEP with its civic education campaign by printing and distributing
250,000 posters to the BEDs and BECs. In addition, MIST broadcast 8,224 radio
spots and 103 minutes of video and handed out 75,000 handbills around the coun-
try.
Question. Please provide details of any direct USAID assistance provided to the
CEP not included in the first four questions above. If there was any other direct
U.S. assistance, has USAID received a full accounting from the CEP on the use of
this assistance?
Answer. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) received
$2.006 million to provide ballots for the parliamentary/local and presidential elec-
tions. USAID granted the funds for this activity directly to IFES.
The Department of Defense provided transportation of the ballots for the par-
liamentary/local elections from California, where they were printed, to Port-au-
Prince, on a non-reimbursable basis.
Question. There were reports that, in May, the CEP confirmed that one million
electoral registration cards were missing. CEP President Anselme Remy later
claimed that 60,000 had been found, but never explained what had happened to the
other cards. What is the official CEP explanation as to what happened to the cards?
Was the U.S. Embassy, the USAID mission, the CEP, and/or the Haitian Govern-
ment informed of the missing cards? When informed of the missing cards, what did
the CEP do with the information? Did the CEP follow-up and investigate? What is
the State Department's assessment as to the effect of the loss of the cards on the
June 25 elections?
Answer. The then CEP President, Mr. Remy, has offered several explanations as
to why he claimed the cards were missing. He told the Presidential Delegation on
June 24 that he was concerned that persons who wanted to thwart the electoral
process, by denying Haitian citizens the right to vote, might have taken the cards
so Haitians could not register. He said he made his statement and intentionally set





78

the figure so high, in order to demonstrate that the CEP was ready to counter even
a large scale diversion of registration cards, and thereby discourage any further evil
efforts.
The United Nations Technical Assistance Team (UN TA) believes the origin of the
claim that 1.2 million cards were missing was actually a mistake made by President
Remy who read the 120,000 difference between number of registered voters and
number of cards distributed to the BEDs (Departmental Electoral Offices) as 1.2
million missing cards.
The Embassy first learned of the missing voter registration cards when CEP
President Remy announced his claim on the radio. Mr. Remy repeated the claim of
the missing cards to USAID, to the international community and to the press, but
lowered the figure to 60,000 cards.
The information on the missing cards was generated by the CEP itself. When it
thought cards were missing, it requested a full accounting by all BEDs of the num-
ber of cards received, number of voters registered and stock of unused cards on
hand.
The OAS was not able to find any credible evidence that massive amounts of
cards were missing. We do not believe that Remy would still defend his claim at
the time that over a million cards were missing.
Had the cards been lost or stolen, this might have interfered with further reg-
istration but would not have resulted in fraudulent voting. The indelible ink used
after each person voted was designed as a safeguard against multiple voting. In the
event, registration was able to proceed without hindrance, ultimately reaching about
92% of re-eligible voters. Voting also occurred without any significant reports of at-
tempted multiple voting.
Question. The CEP failed to distribute voter materials in advance, with many
local polling stations receiving no election material packages or incomplete pack-
ages. What reasons did the CEP give for the delay or failure to distribute election
material packages? How did this impact the elections? What information did elec-
tion workers use if they did not have CEP-provided materials?
Answer. Nine thousand of the original polling sites (BIVs) received all their poll-
ing materials. Distribution of materials to corresponding BECs (Communal Level
Electoral Offices) began on June 20 and was completed on June 22. Materials were
then distributed to the BIVs. In some cases, such as in Port-au-Prince, deliveries
were not made until the morning of June 25 after the 6 a.m. starting time. The CEP
has admitted it did not plan its distribution properly. Adequate provision of ballots
and other voting materials was complicated by the CEPs decision to increase the
number of BIVs based on revised estimates of eligible voters. This occurred several
times during the registration period and even up to voting day, resulting in some
voting stations opening without materials.
The week before the elections an additional 2,000 polling sites were created and
ballot materials were ordered. Of the additional polling stations added, UN TA esti-
mates that approximately 600 did not receive complete sets of ballot materials.
Voting will be rerun in localities where this problem was particularly serious.
Question. According to a number of election observers, the secrecy of the ballots
was a concern: ballot box seals were not used and the set-up of local polling places
did not provide secrecy to voters. Who was responsible for setting up local polling
stations. Were voters accorded privacy while marking ballots? Were ballot box seals
utilized in all situations? What was the potential for manipulation given this appar-
ent lax security?
Answer. The BECs (Communal Level Electoral Offices) along with the DECs
(Communal Electoral Delegates) were responsible for hiring the BIV workers and
locating sites for the polling stations. The BIV workers were responsible for set-up
and functioning of their respective polling station.
Privacy was an issue in these elections. The voting kits, provided by Canada, con-
tained a cardboard screen to ensure privacy while voting. However, adequate facili-
ties were in short supply and some of the voting took place in a corner or other
semi-isolated spot, without the use of the screen or the screen placed on the floor.
The use of ballot box seals depended on the experience and training of the
iollworkers. The OAS estimates over 75% of the boxes may not have been sealed.
however, the potential for manipulation was low, given the presence of political
party and international observers. Overall the OAS believes that the failure to seal
all ballot boxes did not occasion serious instances of fraud or tampering.
Question. What was the process for transferring ballots from local polling stations
(BIVs) to the regional stations? What happened to ballots when they arrived at the
BEC? What security was in place to guarantee that there would be no manipulation
or alteration of the ballots? What was the chain of responsibility for reporting irreg-
ularities? Were there any sanctions for altering or destroying ballots? Was the po-






tential for this problem brought to the CEPs attention before election day? If so,
what was the CEP's reaction?
Answer. The BIVs were responsible for returning their tally sheets and ballot
boxes back to the BECs (Communal Electoral Offices) after completing their count.
They used various means of transportation; from carrying the boxes on foot, to using
donkeys, motorcycles and cars. By law the BIV officials were to be accompanied by
party pollwatchers during the count and the transfer of ballots to the BECs. In some
cases, and especially in Port-au-Prince, BIV officials transferred the ballots without
the company of party observers.
The BECs (Communal Electoral Offices) were a collection point for the ballot
boxes and tally sheets from their respective BIVs. They then transferred the ballots
to their corresponding BED (Departmental Electoral Office). This was done through
the use of CEP or UNMIH vehicles, including UNMIH helicopters. All ballot boxes
were returned to the BEDs by June 28.
In some cases, BIV personnel did carry ballot boxes to the BECs and BEDs to
proceed with the vote counting there, rather than following the established proce-
dures of counting at the polling sites and then proceeding to the BECs. This was
done for a variety of reasons: lack of electricity, lack of training, misunderstanding
of vote count procedures and concern for security.
In most cases, the political party pollworkers followed the ballot boxes back to the
BEDs and followed the consolidation of the count at the departmental level. Thu;
international observers (OAS) also obtained tally sheets from individual BIVs which
they are currently double checking with the results posted at the BED level.
The electoral system runs from BIV (polling station) to BEC (communal level) to
BED (departmental level) to CEP (Provisional Electoral Council). This is the chain
for reporting irregularities. In addition, UNMIH forces, CIVPOL and other inter-
national actors/observers, reported all irregularities to the OAS observation mission.
Chapter 10 of the electoral law specifies criminal penalties for altering or destroy-
ing ballots. Some of those who were implicated in the burning of ballots after the
count have been arrested, and investigations are ongoing.
The potential for ballot tampering was minimized by several mechanisms from
the printer's sealing of the boxes containing the ballots, to expedited delivery of bal-
lots to the BECs, to political party pollwatchers and other international observers
monitoring the process from start to finish. All of these activities were approved by
and/or done in conjunction with, the CEP.
Question. Of the more than 11,000 petitions filed with the CEP to register can-
didates, reports indicate that some 1,500 to 2,000 petitions were denied. Of those,
how many petitions were filed by Lavalas (OPL) candidates? What was the process
for approving/disapproving candidates? How were candidates notified about the CEP
decision? What fees were charged for filing a candidate petition with the CEP? How
much money was received by the CEP from fees? What was done with the money?
Answer. 11,380 candidates were on the ballots out of 11,625 candidates who a.p-
plied. Of the 245 rejected candidates 13 were Lavalas.
The electoral law specifies the qualifications for candidates. The CEP legal section
undertook a review of the candidate applications to ensure the documentation was
complete and that the candidate was eligible to run for office.
The CEP issued a press release and made an official announcement (in Creole)
in the local newspaper "Libete." The CEP also notified the electoral offices where
the applications were filed for public posting.
Candidate filing fees depended on the number and type of seat for which a par-
ticular party had standing candidates. The CEP did not receive any filing fees di-
rectly. The money, in the amount of 1,275,650 gourdes, went directly to a special
account for candidate fees at the Ministry of Finance National Tax Office. President
Aristide has offered to refund half of these fees to the political parties, in recognition
of their need to fund campaign expenses.
Question. In what other countries has USAID provided over $10 million specifi-
cally for election assistance?
Answer. In the time span of fiscal years 1991-1995, USAID has given electoral
assistance that exceeded $10 million to only one country, which was South Africa.
In 1990, $9 million was provided to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
for elections in Nicaragua.
Both of these countries had substantially more host country resources to fund
their electoral expenses than does Haiti at the present time.
Question. The State Department and USAID received warnings of difficulties in
the electoral process from several sources in the weeks before the elections. Also,
a number of Haitian political parties involved in the legislative and municipal elec-
toral process signed a letter to President Clinton on June 19, 1995, outlining prob-
lems in the process. Have the political parties received an answer to their letter?






What specific steps were taken by either the U.S. Embassy, the USAID Mission, or
the State Department to bring problems to the attention of the CEP? What was the
CEP's reaction? Did the CEP take steps to remedy the problems brought to its at-
tention?
Answer. In the weeks prior to the June 25 elections, Ambassador Swing and his
staff at Embassy Port-au-Prince, including the USAID mission there, spoke fre-
quently with the leadership of the CEP and with Haitian Government officials in-
cluding President Aristide about problems and potential problems in the electoral
process. Some of the specific concerns raised included reports of missing registration
cards, uncertainty in the list of approved candidates, the need for the Government
to contribute to the "party surveillance unit," the need for the CEP to hold more
meetings with the parties and candidates, the CEP's failure to pay and train elec-
tion workers adequately, and the absence of a CEP member at a pre-electoral brief-
ing organized by the OAS Electoral Observation Mission. The CEP took action to
remedy a number of these concerns, but not all were adequately addressed, as noted
in our response to several of the accompanying questions. In its "Report on the June
25 Elections" the OAS addresses several of these issues in some detail.
The White House has been unable to locate a letter dated June 19 from represent-
atives of various Haitian political parties addressed to President Clinton. We under-
stand that the authors of such a letter had originally intended to address it to the
President, but in the event decided to send it instead to UN Secretary General
Boutros Ghali, with copies sent to a number of hemispheric presidents.
Question. Shortly after the June 25 elections, 24 political parties demanded the
CEP's replacement and the annulment of the elections in areas where fraud report-
edly occurred. Also, a number of political parties have said that their candidates will
not participate in the run-offs because the CEP is not credible or reliable. Has the
State Department, the U.S. Embassy, or the USAID Mission consulted with these
political party leaders? What is the State Department's reaction to the demands of
these Haitian parties?
Answer. In the aftermath of the June 25 elections, Ambassador Swing and his
staff at Embassy Port-au-Prince have spoken frequently with leaders of representa-
tive parties, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), and the Haitian Government,
in order to encourage them to find common ground on measures to correct the prob-
lems which were evident on voting day. Along with diplomatic representatives of the
UN, Canada, France, Argentina and Venezuela, our Embassy hosted a number of
meetings which were intended to foster communication among these various Haitian
players.
The U.S. Government has listened carefully to the complaints and proposals of the
political parties, and discussed with them a number of measures which we believe
will correct the most serious deficiencies of the June 25 ballot, and ensure signifi-
cant improvement in the next round of balloting.
These measures include a reorganization of the CEP, encouragement to the CEP
to seek UN advice regarding additional areas in which rerun elections are appro-
priate, partial reimbursement of candidate registration fees; free media access for
candidates and parties; and improvements in election monitoring, training of elec-
tion workers; and civic education.
Question. Has there been an investigation into the assassinations of the FNCD
congressional candidate and the UPD mayoral candidate, as well as into the attacks
on several other congressional and Senatorial candidates? What is the result of
these investigations? Has anyone been apprehended? Specifically, has there been an
investigation into the attack on Congressman Duly Brutus?
Answer. The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission (ICM) and Haitian authori-
ties are still investigating the June 27 killing of FNCD parliamentary candidate
Jean-Charles Henock, whose body was found by his family inside their house with
a single gunshot wound to the head. No arrests have been made to date.
The Haitian authorities and the ICM also investigated the May 1995 shooting of
Matsen Cadet, a candidate of the UPD party, in Baraderes. Cadet was not killed
but suffered two gunshot wounds and was hospitalized for some days. Two men, one
the brother of an individual whos candidacy had been rejected by the Provisional
Electoral Council, were arrested in connection with the incident. One of them was
a member of a family which had threatened Cadet in the past.
Although a violent attack on a Senatorial candidate may have been reported, our
Embassy is unable to confirm that an attack against any such candidate has in fact
taken place either during the election campaign, on voting day, or in the weeks
since. A rally on behalf of Renaud Bernardin, an adviser to President Aristide and
Lavalas Senatorial candidate, was disrupted by an unruly crowd in Cap-Haitien on
May 31. Initial press reports to the contrary, Bernardin was unharmed.







Incidents of violence and intimidation have occurred only sporadically since plan-
ning for these elections began. In this regard, the OAS Electoral Observer Mission's
"Report on the June 25 Elections," dated July 12, describes a "general environment
of calm and non-violence throughout the electoral period."
The Haitian police (both the interim police and the newly deployed Haitian Na-
tional Police, depending on which has jurisdiction for the locality), with assistance
from UN civilian police, investigate reported attacks against candidates. In many
cases, the ICM has launched independent investigations either on its own initiative
or in response to specific complaints. We will provide copies of the results of these
inquiries as soon as they become available.
The June 23 fire in Limbe's electoral office necessitated the postponement of vot-
ing in that highly polarized town. On June 25, a group of demonstrators who alleg-
edly felt that Duly Brtus was responsible for setting the fire gathered outside Bru-
tus home, pelting it with rocks. Brutus took refuge in the Limbe police station,
newly staffed by the Haitian National Police (HNP), and the HNP proceeded to dis-
perse the crowd.
An investigation into the fire and related disturbances in Limbe is underway. At
this point, however, we lack specific information as to whether the attack on Duly
Brutus has itself been one subject of this investigation. On July 6, a Justice of the
Peace in Limbe was arrested for alleged involvement in the fire. The HNP Commis-
sioner in the Northern Department was also arrested and subsequently dismissed
reportedly in connection with the case. As part of the ongoing investigation, Haitian
authorities decided to call Duly Brutus in for questioning related to "subversive in-
trigues and arson." On July 15, based on a summons issued by a Port-au-Prince
prosecutor July 5, Brutus was taken into custody by Haitian police. Questioning
took place on July 17 but the substitute prosecutor (the prosecutor was attending
a training course in the U.S.) released Brutus due to a lack of supporting evidence
in the file. We have made clear to the Government of Haiti that, given Brutus avail-
ability for questioning, his arrest and incarceration was, in our view and that of
other international observers unnecessary, inappropriate and unhelpful.
Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince, acting out of concern for Brutus' welfare, made
a number of efforts on his behalf during the brief period he was detained. Ambas-
sador Swing interceded with the Haitian President and Prime Minister; an Embassy
officer visited Brutus while he was in custody; and Embassy officers were present
at the July 17 proceedings which culminated in Brutus' release.
Question. On June 13, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) sponsored a de-
bate with the five leading candidates: the debate lasted over three hours and a tape
of it was to be broadcast in its entirety by state television. According to NDI, only
15 minutes were broadcast and that the edited version favored the government can-
didate. Was the U.S. Embassy or the USAID Mission aware of this? If so, what was
done about this? What was the response of the Haitian officials) notified?
Answer. NDI issued a press release on June 20 on the misuse of their debate tape
which they immediately provided to USAID and the U.S. Embassy. USAID informed
Leslie Voltaire, President Aristide's Chief of Staff, and the Prime Minister, of this
situation on June 21 and followed up by forwarding a copy of NDI's press release
to him the same day.
The debate was rebroadcast in its entirety on June 23 to the satisfaction of all.
Question. Why weren't election results released until July 11? Is there any truth
to the story that the U.S. Ambassador asked that the release be delayed?
Answer. Election results started to come in from the BEDs on July 3 and 4. The
last results came in from the BED de L'Ouest (which includes Port-au-Prince) on
July 10. The CEP wanted to double check the figures from the BEDs to ensure their
accuracy and preferred to release the complete results rather than partial ones.
A number of the political parties thought that the results of the election should
be delayed until the differences with the CEP were resolved and then announce the
re-run elections at the same time as the results. The USG, the UN, OAS and several
other local embassies sought to facilitate the dialogue, and we encouraged the CEP
to consider reasonable political party proposals, including that of a brief delay in
the announcement of results of the June 25 balloting.
Question. What is the U.S. Embassy's estimate of the number of Haitians who
could not vote due to election day problems? How was this estimate arrived at?
Answer. There are no readily available means to estimate the number of those
who wished to vote but could not. Balloting will be rerun in those areas where this
problem was most serious. Such reruns are scheduled in about 20% of the voting
places in Haiti.
Question. Before being named to the CEP, what was Anselme Remy's relationship
with President Aristide and Lavalas?





82

Answer. Remy has said publicly that he is a supporter of Lavalas. We are not
aware of any close ties to the founding members or current leaders of the party. A
professor of ethnology, Remy was director of Haiti's National Archives during Presi-
dent Aristide's first months in office in 1991. From 1962 to 1986, Remy resided in
the United States.
Question. According to Haiti en Marche (July 12, 1995), Marc Romulus was a
founder of OPL. What was his relationship with UNDP? Did he have any role in
the UNDP's support to the Haitian electoral process?
Answer. During the 1980's Romulus became prominent as a leftist intellectual
and political activist opposed to Duvalier. More recently, he helped oversee prepara-
tions for the transfer of power to President Aristide in 1991. We are, however, un-
able to confirm that Romulus was a founder of OPL.
Until he died earlier this month, Romulus headed UNDP's civic education efforts
in Haiti. A part of that project covered activities related to the elections.
Question. Is it the State Department's assessment that the CEP decisions were
made in an informed and transparent manner?
Answer. While the CEP accomplished much in exceptionally difficult cir-
cumstances, its decision making was often opaque, sometimes arbitrary, and all too
often poorly communicated. The CEP's sometimes difficult relations with its inter-
national technical advisors, and its lack of adequate communication with the politi-
cal parties contributed to the problems experienced on June 25.
Question. Is it the State Department's assessment that international election ob-
servers receiving U.S. funding report accurate, timely information on the process to
the U.S. Embassy, USAID, and the CEP?
Answer. Yes, we believe the reports are accurate, timely and informative. These
reports detail the specific problems which occurred before, during and after the elec-
tions in specific localities, and provides a basis for assessing the validity of the proc-
ess to date.
Question. What safeguards do the U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in Haiti
have in place to strictly account for U.S. election support funds? What efforts were
taken to ensure that U.S. funds were not used to influence the outcome of the elec-
tions? Can State Department, USAID, the U.S. Embassy, and the USAID mission
assure the Committee that no USAID development assistance funds to or through
Haitian non-governmental organizations or government agencies (except those to
the CEP) were used in any way to influence the electoral process?
Answer. All U.S. funds provided to the CEP were given through the United Na-
tions Trust Fund which is following the accounting regulations of the United Na-
tions and which will entail a final audit at the end of the grant. However, at our
request the UN has initiated a rewiew of all CEP expenditures through the June
25 elections. The remaining U.S. funds were given to U.S. NGOs under grant or co-
operative agreements with USG standard provisions regarding accounting of grant
funds and audits.
No funds were given directly to any political party or interested faction. To the
best of our knowledge, no USAID funds were used to influence the outcome of the
elections.
USAID, through IOM (International Organization for Migration) and through
PIRED, a local NGO consortium, assists grass-roots community organizations to do
community projects. We used this network wherever possible to improve civic edu-
cation, including voting rights. To the best of our knowledge, none of these funds
was used to influence the outcome of the elections.
Question. What role did UNMIH play during the electoral process, generally, and
on elections specifically? Were any UNMIH forces and/or equipment used to provide
logistical support to the CEP or to the election process? Were UNMIH assets used
to transport election materials and/or ballots? Specifically, what UNMIH assets pro-
vided by the United States were used to transport ballots? What was the cost of
this?
Answer. From its inception, and in compliance with paragraph 10 of UN Security
Council Resolution 940 (1994), UNMIH has assisted the constitutional authorities
of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and
fair legislative elections. UNMIH military forces provided comprehensive assistance
to the electoral process, in particular planning and logistical assistance to the Provi-
sional Electoral Council (CEP). Due to the extended registration period and unavail-
ability of reliable registration figures, UNMIH was asked at the last minute to
produce a number of photocopied ballots. UNMIH also helped ensure the security
of electoral materials and personnel.
UNMIH assets were used to transport election material and ballots. Specifically,
U.S. vehicles assigned to UNMIH, including CH-47 helicopters, two landing craft
(utility) (LCU), and wheeled transport were used to move election material and bal-





83

lots. Costs attributed to ballot transportation can be determined for the helicopters
but are not readily available for the LCU's and vehicles, because the ballot move-
ment was in conjunction with regularly scheduled logistical movement.
Helicopter cost breakdown for supporting the electoral process (including ballot
transfer): CH-47 101.9 flight hours x $2282.62/hr = $293,738.98
Helicopter cost breakdown for ballot transportation alone: CH-47 61.2 flight hours
x $2282.62/hr = $139,696.34. The USG will be reimbursed for this cost by the UN.

RESPONSES OF MARK SCIINEIDER TO QUESTIONs ASKED BY SENATOR COVERDELL
Question. What U.N. agency was responsible for Haiti's elections and exactly what
technical roles did they play?
Answer. The United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit (UN EAU) was responsible
for supporting the Government of Haiti (GOH) in planning and implementing the
local and parliamentary elections. Working closely with other electoral authorities
from a permanent election office in Port-au-Prince, the UN EAU technical staff of
approximately 15 people helped the GOH surmount enormous obstacles.
The UN EAU assisted the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) with amending the
Electoral?Law used in 1990 to improve it for 1995. It prepared operational plans for
the electoral process and assisted in implementing the electoral calendar. The UN
EAU prepared the original budget for the CEP and helped find offices to house the
CEP. It also supported the design of the communications system.
In coordination with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
the UN EAU developed a pollworker training program to accompany an existing UN
Development Program (UNDP) civic education project. In addition, the UN EAU ad-
vised on the creation of the Monitoring Unit for political parties. Other technical as-
sistance included: preparation of the registration kits and delivery plans for the reg-
istration and polling phases; registering the candidate files coming into the CEP
from the BEDs and assisting with the transfer of the data to IFES for the creation
of the database for printing the ballots; and creating the operational plan for the
counting at the departmental level.
The UN also provided material assistance to the CEP and coordinated donor's as-
sistance for the elections.
Question. Please detail the problems encountered in the elections. How will these
problems be corrected in the future to avoid additional "ineffective" spending of U.S.
dollars?
Answer. In some communities, voting did not take place because logistical prob-
lems prevented the ballots from being delivered. Voting in these areas has been re-
scheduled.
In a number of cases, the polls opened late for a variety of administrative and
logistical reasons. The CEP authorized them to remain open beyond the planned
closing time in order to assure that the polls were open for a full twelve hours. In
some cases, pollworkers apparently delayed the voting because they had not re-
ceived their salary payments on time.
It was reported that 38 (out of a total of 11,000) candidates' names did not appear
on the ballots. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which
was responsible for producing the ballots, checked immediately after being informed
of these reports. They state that in only eight cases were the names of candidates
inadvertently left off the ballots.
The vote counting process was hampered by irregularities in a few areas, pri-
marily the BED d'Ouest in the Port-au-Prince area, due to a lack of security for bal-
lot boxes and confusion over counting procedures. In a number of cases, ballot boxes
were moved from locations without electricity to BECs because pollworkers could
not complete the count in the dark and felt that the ballots would be more secure
there.
There is no evidence of a systematic or pervasive effort to subvert the electoral
process in favor of one particular group. In most cases, these irregularities appear
to be the result of confusion or lack of knowledge about established procedures.
Flaws in the electoral process were an illustration of inexperience and administra-
tive weakness, not systematic fraud.
Steps are being taken by both the Government of Haiti and the Provisional Elec-
toral Council (CEP) to ensure that these problems are not repeated in future elec-
tions in Haiti. In addition, to improve the elections process both in the immediate
and longer term, the CEP will have to address a number of problems. Two of the
more controversial members of the CEP, including its President, Anselme Remy,
have been replaced. The CEP will now elect a new President, strengthen its tech-
nical staff, and complete preparations for the rerun and run-off elections, to be held








in August. Why have stressed how important it is that financial management is im-
proved, enabling workers to receive payments on time. We have made a number of
other suggestions for improvement, including that the CEP seek UN advice as to
whether additional localities should be identified for rerun elections. The inter-
national community is helping the CEP in these areas. IFES has already organized
a special training course for pollworkers in areas where partial elections will be
held, and will expand this to other areas of the country. This training will empha-
size procedures for counting and tabulating votes. IFES has also produced a revised
training manual that gives increased attention to these areas.
The United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit (UN EAU) and the United Nations
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) continue to provide technical and logistical support, as
well as playing a vital role as mediator between the CEP and political parties.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is supporting
an immediate rapid assessment of the election support program by the UN EAU Di-
rector and a USAID elections expert. USAID is also providing additional funding to
the National Democratic Institution (NDI) and the International Republican Insti-
tute (IRI) to help maintain their presence during the extended election period.
Chairman Gilman of the House International Relations committee has requested
a GAO program review of the election in Haiti, and USAID will be coordinating and
cooperating with them in this effort.
The OAS will maintain over one hundred election monitors in-country during the
period of the partial rerun and run-off elections. We will encourage international ob-
servers beyond the OAS to witness the vote count and tabulations, as well as the
elections.
Question. Considering the vast American expenditures in Haiti, why didn't the
United States play more of a role in managing the elections?
Answer. The credibility of these elections, both domestically and internationally,
depended upon their being managed, to the extent possible, by the appropriate Hai-
tian institutions, supported by the international community, including the UN and
the OAS. We therefore sought to keep the US role, important as it was, as unobtru-
sive as possible.
The Government of Haiti decided that the United Nations Electoral Assistance
Unit (UN/EAU) should be the central focal point for international assistance and
key source of expertise and technical assistance. This is a decision that we have sup-
ported. This Unit has extensive worldwide experience, considerable expertise and an
impressive record of successfully assisting with elections, particularly in the difficult
circumstances of the developing world. Throughout the election period, we have con-
sulted closely with the UN/EAU and will continue to do so in the future.


RESPONSES OF BRUCE MCCOLM TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR COVERDELL
Question. What UN Agency was responsible for Haiti's elections and exactly what
technical roles did they play?
Answer. The United Nations Elections Assistance Unit ran its operations from
New York and Port-au-Prince. Their efforts were headed by Horacio Boneo in the
United States and Dong Nguyen in Haiti. They were responsible for technical assist-
ance to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). This included budgeting, registra-
tion of candidates, logistics, and distribution of election materials prior to election
day. IRI's relationship with the UN in this area was limited to information sharing.
Question. What are your recommendations regarding the problems that were en-
countered in the election? How will these problems be corrected in the future to
avoid additional "ineffective" spending of U.S. dollars?
Answer. IRI has conducted 47 election observation missions in over 30 countries
including the Philippines, Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Eastern and Central Eu-
rope, Haiti, Kenya, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, Mexico, and El Salvador. These
missions have cited an internationally recognized reputation for impartiality and
professionalism in the analysis of this fundamental democratic practice. The pur-
pose of these missions and the Haiti mission has been to evaluate the electoral proc-
ess, identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and make recommenda-
tions to improve the conduct of future elections.
The electoral process in Haiti requires significant changes. After undertaking an
extensive evaluation of the pro-electoral environment and the electoral process, IRI
makes the following recommendations to improve the administration, transparency
and confidence in future elections in Haiti:




85

Electoral Law:
1. A permanent electoral law needs to be drafted and passed by the Parliament.
The drafting committee should review other examples of electoral laws and be open
to input from the major political parties.
Election Administration Capability:
1. Create a representative permanent electoral council appointed in accordance
with the process outlined in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.
2. Recruit capable full-time staff for electoral council with a view towards creating
a cadre of professional staff with acquired expertise.
3. Replace all BED, BEC and BIV officials according to the procedures outlined
in the 1987 Haitian Constitution.
4. Formulate training programs for all CEP, BED, BEC and BIV officials that is
extensive and covers all aspects of the election law, voting procedures, counting pro-
cedures and dispute resolution. Training for officials should occur well in advance
of election day. Temporary workers hired for election day should be paid for attend-
ing training sessions. Training materials should be standardized, easily comprehen-
sible and readily available.
5. Salaries for these officials should be determined and delivered in a timely man-
ner.
6. Material that is bought for the election cycle needs to be safeguarded for use
in future elections. Plans need to be undertaken on how to acquire the supplies nec-
essary to begin to fill the vacuum the UN will leave.
Candidate Qualification and Registration:
1. Candidate qualification criteria should be simplified and registration proce-
dures should be streamlined. Qualification criteria should be limited to party certifi-
cation and by petition for independent candidates.
2. Lists of approved candidates should be posted on the day set by the CEP. Rea-
sons for rejections should be released simultaneously to allow equal access to the
appeal process.
3. Registration fees should be reduced and the sliding scale fee schedule should
be reviewed.
Voter Registration:
1. Voter registration should be carried out year round.
2. Voter registration card should be valid for all subsequent elections.
3. A permanent voter registry should be created with thorough audits conducted
prior to elections.
4. The system should be converted to a computerized system from a manual sys-
tem when the infrastructure in Haiti can support its maintenance.
5. The government of Haiti should conduct a new census.
Access To Media For Campaigning:
1. All political parties should have equal access to state media.
2. The independent media should make affordable airtime available to all parties.
If the media are unable to afford this effort, consideration should be given by the
government of Haiti to provide limited financial support for this purpose in an equal
manner to such media.
Campaign Financing:
1. Create a reporting mechanism for all funds received and spent by political par-
ties and individual candidates. This information should be made available to the
public. Criminal penalties should be imposed for failure to comply.
2. Strict penalties should be created and enforced against the misuse of state re-
sources for a political campaign.
Local Voting Places:
1. Voting places should, whenever possible, be the same as registration locations.
2. Lists of all voting sites should be posted at the BECs 2-3 weeks prior to the
election.
3. Lists of voters assigned to each voting site should be posted at the voting site
the required three days in advance of the election.
Safeguarding Election Materials:
1. A more systematic way by which elections results and materials are trans-
ported, supervised and logged in at the BEC and BED levels needs to be devised.
These steps should be included in all training programs for election officials and
party pollwatchers.





86

2. Ensure that ballot boxes, ballots and tally sheets can be easily matched. This
can be done through the use of pre-printed numbers for all materials.
3. Ballots should be securely maintained, in an orderly fashion, at the BEC offices
for at least 30 days after the election to permit challenges and recounts if necessary.
Pollwatchers:
1. Political party and independent candidate pollwatchers should receive training
in the electoral process and their specific roles at the BIV and during the counting
process at all levels. Specific attention should be paid as to specifically defining the
role of the pollwatchers in assisting illiterate voters.
2. In the electoral workers training seminars, the role, responsibilities, and rights
of pollwatchers need to be defined.
3. The political party surveillance unit should be adequately financed and be rep-
resentatively staffed. The unit should be operational well in advance of election day.
Transparency of the Counting Process:
Sample ballots need to be available in advance of the election for parties, can-
didates and the electorate to ensure correctness and enhance understanding.
2. Results of each BIV need to be available to the public, the political parties and
the candidates.
3. The methodology used by the CEP to calculate the winners of Senate races
needs to be clarified.
Appeal Process:
1. A clearly defined process needs to be established whereby candidates, parties
or individual voters register their complaints and receive explanation or redress.
This structure needs to outlined in the electoral law. The appropriate organ must
respond to complaints within a set reasonable timeframe and in writing.
Security:
1. A designated official must be present at all BIVs on election day to regulate
voter traffic and check voter cards.
2. The new Haitian police force needs to receive specific training on their role on
election day. Consideration should be given in the course design on how the police
force may play a facilitative role (i.e. directing citizens to vote locations) as well as
offer appropriate security.
Civic Education:
1. A serious civic education campaign needs to be undertaken by the CEP that
explains the purpose of the election, what offices are being elected, how and when
to register and how to vote. Included in this campaign should be voters' rights and
what constitutes valid and invalid votes.
2. Non-governmental efforts should be encouraged that support open political de-
bates and forums.
Question. Considering the vast American expenditures in Haiti, in your opinion,
why didn't the United States play more of a role in managing the elections?
Answer. The specific nature of IRI's mandate was to offer an objective analysis
of the pre-election environment and the electoral process itself; to document irreg-
ularities or acts of intimidation through the presence of international observers; to
assess the electoral process; and to strengthen regional perceptions that free and
open pluralistic processes are critical to national stability and peaceful resolutions
of civil conflicts. As a result of this specific nature, IRI does not have information
to answer this question without it being speculative.






RESPONSES OF GAY MCDOUGALL TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR COVERDELL
Question. What UN agency was responsible for Haiti's elections and exactly what
technical roles did they play?
Answer. Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) had sole responsibility for or-
ganizing and administering Haiti's election. The UN Elections Assistance Unit
worked daily with the CEP, assisting on all operational issues including:
setting up a budget;
coordinating international elections assistance;
logistical plans;
civic education;
security for elections; and
elections observation.
Question. What are your recommendations regarding the problems that were en-
countered in the elections? How will these problems be corrected in the future to
avoid additional "ineffective" spending of US dollars?
Answer. First, the CEP must be transformed into a permanent body with on-going
responsibility for the administration of elections, so that it will be able to build in-
house expertise in the required technical areas. Second, the political parties must
be made to feel a part of the entire process. They must be consulted at every point
in decision making, so that they develop a feeling of "ownership." The CEP should
establish a multi-party committee to consider the problems that arose in the June
25th elections and what steps should be taken to resolve the legitimate grievances
with that election. Third, the CEP must adopt mechanisms to ensure transparency
in all of its decision-making processes and operations. Finally, voting and counting
officers must receive sufficient training to permit them to conduct future elections
in accordance with official procedures.
Question. Considering the vast American expenditures in Haiti, in your opinion,
why didn't the US play more of a role in managing the elections?
Answer. It would have been inappropriate For the United States to have played
a direct role in managing the elections. Haiti must develop its own democratic insti-
tutions. The US can give assistance to that effort and can be financially supportive,
but it cannot and should not directly manage the process.

RESPONSES OF JEFFREY FISCHER TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR COVERDELL
Question. What UN Agency was responsible for Haiti's elections and exactly what
technical roles did they play?
Answer. The International Foundation for Electors Systems (IFES) was funded by
USAID to implement two projects related to election assistance in Haiti for the 1995
Haitian legislative and local elections: a candidate data base and ballots procure-
ment project (cooperative agreement #521-0254-A-00-5019-00) funded by USAID/
Haiti and a registrar and poll worker training project (cooperative agreement
#PDC-0023-A-00-1089-00) funded by USAID/Global. In this dual capacity, IFES
worked extensively with both the United Nations Secretariat's Election Assistance
Unit (UNEAU) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
The United Nations Election Assistance Unit, headed by Horacio Boneo in New
York and Dong Nguyen in Port-au-Prince, was responsible for technical assistance
to the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), which included logistics planning, budg-
eting, registration of candidates and distribution of elections materials. For the can-
didate data base and ballots procurement project, the Elections Assistance Team
provided an important liaison for IFES with the CEP. IFES' relationship with
UNDP was limited to the registrar and poll worker training project.
In November, 1994, IFES participated in a joint pre-clection technical assessment
(PETA) mission to Haiti with representatives of UNEAU and the Organization of
American States (OAS). In a follow-up meeting between UNEAU and IFES in New
York, a division of labor between the two organizations was determined as follows
(see attached memos from December 15 & 16, 1994):






1. IFES would be responsible for procurement of ballots, with assistance from
UNEAU for funding (this was changed later on, and USAID/Haiti funded the ballots
procurement project in its entirety);
2. IFES would be responsible for coordinating civic education (in the electoral con-
text) and training activities which would actually be carried out by the CEP. It was
also made clear that UNDP and other actors (including NDI) were planning their
own civic education activities;
3. UNEAU determined that there was no need for voter education activities be-
cause it was contended that people knew how to vote from the 1990 election, and
others were doing it.
In January, IFES fielded another mission to Haiti to further define its own areas
of assistance; at that point, meetings were held with UNEAU and UNDP. It was
agreed with Marc Romulus (now deceased) of the UNDP, and Marc Antoine Noel
of UNEAU, that UNDP would provide 400 trainers to the CEP/IFES training effort
(registrar training and poll worker training). In exchange, IFES would provide
training materials to the UNDP (see trip report from 29 January, and IFES Quar-
terly Report from October 1-December 31, 1994, attached). A final description of
IFES elections training assistance activities is given in the proposal approved by
USAID/Global, attached.
The agreement with UNDP outlining their involvement in providing registrar and
poll worker trainers (memo to Marc Romulus, January 25, 1995), is also attached,
as is a similar memo to Anselme Remy, then-president of the CEP, describing IFES
and UNDP collaboration. On the third page of the Remy memo, it is explained that
the exact structure of the training remained to be determined, as UNDP currently
had 350 trainers in the field who could be utilized.
Training for core trainers was held on March 13, 14 and 15. Difficulties occurred
because of lack of coordination within the CEP, but the training seminars were com-
pleted. At that point, the core trainers were to begin training "network" trainers
provided by UNDP in the field, who would in turn train CEP officials at the com-
mune level. Unfortunately, UNDP provided only 137 of the 400 trainers promised
"due to a certain misunderstanding on the part of the UNDP." Details are provided
in the registrar training report and the March, 1995 Quarterly report, attached.
Due to the difficulties IF ES had coordinating with UNDP for the registrar train-
ing, IFES began refining plans for the June 25 poll worker training in April. An
April 20th memo to USMD/Haiti indicates IFES' intent to utilize not only the 400
network trainers originally promised by UNDP, but also an additional 15 core train-
ers from UNDP to facilitate the training process from the beginning. UNDP was in
agreement with this plan. Unfortunately, as the June 25th election date approached,
a number of events caused the UNDP training apparatus to disintegrate. Mr. Marc
Romulus, the UNDP Director of Civic Education, became progressively sicker and
finally stopped working on the project; Mr. Paul Denis, Romulus' assistant, resigned
in order to run for Senate; Mme. Chancy, the UNDP official left to work on the
project after Romulus and Denis ended their involvement, was not familiar with the
project; and the UNDP trainers in the field were all involved in civic education pro-
grams-Mme. Chancy told IFES that they could not be pulled, as promised, to have
them work as poll worker network trainers.
After weeks of negotiation with UNDP about poll worker trainers, IFES was fi-
nally told by UNDP that the 400 network trainers would not, indeed, be available
to IFES because they were working on other projects; after repeated requests, they
were able to provide IFES with only 10 out of the 15 core trainers required. The
effect of the lack of network trainers was dramatically apparent on June 25, when
poll workers had no clear understanding of their role; fortunately, the IFES poll
worker manual, spelling out tasks and responsibilities and providing sample ballots
and forms with directions as to their use, were present at almost every polling sta-
tion and could be referred to throughout the day (manuals attached).
Question. What are your recommendations regarding the problems that were en-
countered in the election? How will these problems be corrected in the future to
avoid additional "ineffective" spending of U.S. dollars?






Answer. IFES was originally mandated to procure ballots and to facilitate training
for registrars and poll workers for the June 25, 1995 legislative and local elections
in Haiti. IFES went beyond its mandate in both cases: the ballots procurement
project was extended to include the creation and maintenance of a candidate data
ase, which consisted of over 11,000 candidate applications, and the training pro-
gram entailed recruitment and training of individuals outside of the original scope
of work. In fact, IFES was asked to provide a training module (including design and
publication of training materials and actual training sessions) for vote count proce-
dures to CEP officials ten days before the June 25 election. All of this was accom-
plished by IFES, but not without unanticipated costs. Costs were duplicated unnec-
essarily. For example, IFES was originally slated to share offices with the CEP and
UNEAU technical team. The CEP changed its mind suddenly, and at the last
minute IFES was forced to find separate office space. In another example, UNEAU
had worked with CEP to create a data base of candidate applications. When it was
decided that IFES would create and maintain the candidate data to transfer to the
printer in California, the CEP data was not made available to IFES and we worked
fmm scratch to create another data base. This was further complicated by the fact
that all files had to be copied and transferred manually from the CEP to the IFES
office; weeks after the project was scheduled to begin, UNEAU had not yet arranged
for photocopiers to be installed in the CEP to copy the appropriate files. These prob-
lems could have been avoided if IFES shared offices with CEP and UNEAU from
the beginning of the project.
IFES recommends adjustments to the process that may facilitate assistance ef-
forts in the future:
A more clearly defined relationship with other international organizations,
whose operating procedures and bureaucratic imperatives do not always parallel
those of IFES. If the relationship among CEP/UNEAU/IFES was made more
precise, the flow of information to the UNEAU/CEP and back to IFES may have
been less time consuming. If a different structure had been in place with
UNDP, perhaps there would not have been any difficulty in using UNDP train-
ers for registrar and poll worker training;
A comprehensive voter education/civic education/training program in the hands
of one organization, with subgranting capabilities to include resources from
other organizations (such as UNDP trainers). IFES has the capacity and the ex-
perience to carry out nationwide voter and civic education programs on such a
scale;
There is a need for voting-specific information to be disseminated. Observers
have reported seeing confusion at the polls on basic questions such as how to
vote, Poll worker training must be strengthened and voter education must be
an integral part of training.
There should be better management of multi-national donor support to build a
long term electoral system. The depth of the problems will require considerable
funding for improvements to occur. Electoral institution-building may not com-
pete well when measured against other Haitian pressing problems in health
care, job creation, and the environment. But without a fully-respected electoral
institution to begin the process, future Haitian leaders may govern with their
legitimacy clouded by election process problems.Question.
Question. Considering the vast American expenditures in Haiti, in your opinion,
why didn't the United States play more of a role in managing the elections?
Answer. The role of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in the
Haitian legislative and local elections was limited to ballots procurement and reg-
istrar and poll worker training; IFES was not involved at the policy level. As a
USAID grantee, any analysis IFES could offer in terms of U.S. policy decisions in
these Haitian elections would be mere speculation.




90

DEPARTURE STATEMENT OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO
OBSERVE THE HAITI ELECTIONS
Yesterday's elections represent a step in the building of democracy in Haiti. A
peaceful balloting process occurred in a country where violence has so often marked
past elections. This feat is truly impressive when one considers that but nine
months ago Haiti was under the yoke of a military dictatorship. However, the proc-
ess was affected by irregularities and administrative flaws that need to be ad-
dressed for the second round and the future.
Members of the presidential delegation visited five of Haiti's nine departments
and more than 300 polling sites. We observed a complicated balloting procedure, in-
volving elections for more than 2100 legislative, mayoral and local council offices.
Dedicated polling officials and pollwatchers representing 25 political parties sur-
mounted various obstacles in allowing the Haitian people, in most localities, to
choose their representatives.
Procedural and administrative problems before and on election day, nonetheless,
prevented citizens in several municipalities from expressing their voting pref-
erences. The failure to include the names of certain approved candidates on the bal-
lots contributed to the cancellation of elections in seven communities and created
disquiet in other areas. We also have received critical reports regarding the failure
to follow proper procedures during the initial counting phase, with most serious con-
sequences in the Department of the West, which covers the Port Au Prince area.
Despite repeated misunderstandings over the actions of election officials at all lev-
els, the delegation saw little evidence of any effort to favor a single political party
or of an organized attempt to intentionally subvert the electoral machinery. At
many points, the Provisional Electoral Council's actions and public statements
raised questions about the credibility of the process. The most significant of the
problems was the failure to explain the reasons candidates were rejected. Political
parties raised these and other concerns relating to the transparency of the elections
in their contacts with the delegation.
President Aristide and his government performed a positive role in repeating
often the theme of reconciliation. In meeting with some rejected candidates and in
a public statement on the eve of the elections, the President demonstrated his con-
cern over the controversies surrounding the process and underscored his desire to
be President of every Haitian citizen.
We wish to emphasize that this electoral process is far from over and thus a defin-
itive evaluation is premature. The counting of ballots and the adjudication of elec-
toral complaints are pending. There may even be a need to rerun elections in certain
jurisdictions. We will remain in close contact with other observer delegations, most
notably the Organization of American States, which has organized coverage of these
elections throughout the country.
A determined effort is required to remedy the most significant problems affecting
the electoral process before the next round of elections. Sincere consultations with
a broad range of political parties and transparent decisionmaking by the electoral
authorities should have occurred and are indispensable to strengthening Haiti's
democratic institutions. The government also should consider carefully the rec-
ommendations of the United Nations, various observer delegations and technical
election experts who have worked closely with their Haitian counterparts in assist-
ing the electoral process. In this context, we note the very positive role that the
United Nations Mission played in Haiti during the entire transition period.
Despite the problems associated with the pre-election period and observed on elec-
tion day, the Haitian people voted freely and seemingly without fear. Haiti is now
one step closer to establishing a functioning parliament and viable local govern-
ment.
It is our firm belief that further steps to correct the identified problems will en-
courage a perception of fairness about this process, despite the inevitable difficulties
of conducting an election in Haiti. The Haitian people have demonstrated that they
have earned the respect associated with participating in the individual act of casting
a ballot. For our part, we will continue to work with the government and people
of Haiti in supporting the strengthening of democratic institutions in this country.




91

United States Presidential Observer Delegation to Parliamentary and Local
Elections in Haiti

NAMES AND TITLES FOR DELEGATION
HEAD OF DELEGATION

Hon. Brian Atwood, Administrator, Agency for International Development
MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION

Hon. William Swing, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti
Hon. Bob Graham, United States Senator

Hon. Morton Hamperin, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Democracy, NSC

Mr. Dallas C. Brown, III, Office Director, National Security Council

Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America and
Caribbean, USAID

Dr. Arturo Arms Valenzuela, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs

Ms. Catharin Dalpino, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor

Ms. Norma J. Parker, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Agency for International
Development

Mr. Aaron Williams, Executive Secretary, Agency for International Development
Mr. Bill Millan, Counselor, Alternative Representative to the Organization of
American States

Mr. Larry Garber, Senior Policy Advisor, Bureau of Policy and Program
Coordination, Agency for International Development

Mr. Antonio Burgos, President, Tonio Burgu & Assoc.

Yvonne Brathwaite Burke, Supervisor, Los Angeles County

Bishop Frank C. Cummings, Eleventh Episcopal District, African Methodist
Episcopal Church

Mr. Jacques Despinosse, Despinosse Consultant Services

Mr. Jeffrey Hirschberg, Vice Chairman, Ernst & Young LLP

Hon. Arnette Hubbard, Commissioner, Board of Elections for the City of Chicago
ACCOMPANYING MEMBERS

Ms. Jennifer W. Curley, Protocol Escort Officer

Ms. Jacalyn M. Stein, Personal Assistant to the U.S. Agency for International
Development Administrator






NEWS RELEASES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN
INSTITUTE
Haiti Election Alert
(May 24, 1995)
The International Republican Institute (IRI) opened an office in Port-au-Prince,
Haiti, on May 15 to assess the pre-electoral climate for the June 25, 1995, legisla-
tive and municipal elections. This election will bring to office 99 new Senators and
Deputies of the Legislative Chamber and all 700 new municipal officials. IRI has
been accredited by the Haitian Election Council (CEP) as an independent election
observation organization. IRI will issue periodic updates on the election process
prior to June 25 and a more in-depth analysis immediately following election day.
Voter Registration
The voter registration period of March 26 thru April 30 has been extended to the
end of May. Many offices opened late and most exhausted their allotted number of
registrations by April 30. As of May 22, local registration offices had not received
any new registration materials for this extension. It is virtually impossible to deter-
mine how many voters have been unable to register.
Political Party Registration
Twenty-four parties registered candidates for the election. Three accredited politi-
cal parties chose not to participate in this election, and two parties' candidates, Gen-
eration 2004 and the Movement for National Reconstruction (MNR), were excluded
altogether from the official CEP list.
Candidate List Still Not Final
As of May 30, a final candidate list has not been issued. Following the publication
of a third supplemental list to the original list of May 17, 77 additional candidates
have been approved for national office. The numbers are as follows:
SENATE May 17 May 24
Candidates 180 180
Excluded 47 37
Approved 133 143 (an additional 10)
DEPUTY May 17 May 24
Candidates 865 865
Excluded 210 143
Approved 655 722 (an additional 67)
Of the 67 newly approved candidates for the office of deputy, 20 are from the
same political organization, the GMRN. The GMRN is a newly formed association
that split from the established MRN party, one of two political parties still being
excluded from the election by the CEP. The GMRN is not recognized by the MRN
nor by the Ministry of Justice as a political party.
The CEP has stated additional lists will be forthcoming. No additional candidate
numbers are available for the office of mayor. No list has been issued yet for other
municipal offices.
Electoral Calendar
As of May 31, the election calendar is approximately two and one-half weeks be-
hind. The May 13 date for release of the candidate list, which was to have triggered
the beginning of the campaign period, has slipped. Some candidates have begun
campaigning while others are awaiting official word from CEP that they may begin.
In addition, the time necessary for the printing of the ballots is being seriously com-
pressed.
(May 31, 1995)
The International Republican Institute maintains an office in Port-au-Prince as
the headquarters for its election observation mission. This is the second in a series
of election updates as reported by IRI staff in Haiti.
One Million Voter Registration Cards Missing
The Haitian Electoral Council (CEP) confirmed persistent rumors that one million
electoral registration cards are missing. The political parties have requested that
the registration numbers on the missing cards be released publicly. No official com-
ment nor action has been taken regarding this request.







Voter Registration Extended Again
The extension of the closing of voter registration from April 30 to May 30 has
been extended again to June 5. Registration materials for both extensions still have
not arrived at registration sites. It is unclear whether there are any materials avail-
able for distribution.
Candidate Shot at Political Meeting
On May 26, at 9:30 p.m., mayoral candidate Mr. Cadet Madsen was shot twice
during a political meeting in his hometown of Baraderes in the Grand Anse region.
The shooting occurred during a question-and-answer period at a political rally at the
national school. Mr. Madsen is the mayoral candidate for the town of Raraderes for
the Union des Patriotes Democrates (UPD) Party. Mr. Madsen was hospitalized and
no one has been arrested for the crime.
Candidate List Still Not Final
As of May 30, a final candidate list has not been issued. Following the publication
of a third supplemental list to the original list of May 17, 77 additional candidates
have been approved for national office. The numbers are as follows:
SENATE May 17 May 24
Candidates 180 180
Excluded 47 37
Approved 133 143 (an additional 10)
DEPUTY May 17 May 24
Candidates 865 865
Excluded 210 143
Approved 655 722 (an additional 67)
Of the 67 newly approved candidates for the office of deputy, 20 are from the
same political organization, the GMRN. The GMRN is a newly formed association
that split from the established MRN party, one of two political parties still being
excluded from the election by the CEP. The UMRN is not recognized by the MRN
nor by the Ministry of Justice as a political party.
The CEP has stated additional lists will be forthcoming. No additional candidate
numbers are available for the office of mayor. No list has been issued yet for other
municipal offices.
Electoral Calendar
As of May 31, the election calendar is approximately two and one-half weeks be-
hind. The May 13 date for release of the candidate list, which was to have triggered
the beginning of the campaign period, has slipped. Some candidates have begun
campaigning while others are awaiting official word from CEP that they may begin.
In addition, the time necessary for the printing of the ballots is being seriously com-
pressed.
(June 5, 1995)
The International Republican Institute maintains an office in Port-au-Prince as
the headquarters for its election observation mission. This is the third in a series
of election updates as reported by IRI staff in Haiti.
Final Candidate List Not Final
On May 31, Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) announced that the can-
didate list was final and all data had been sent for ballot production. However, on
June 3, the President of the CEP told a group of political party representatives that
the final candidate list of May 31 was incomplete. He announced that errors had
been found as the ballots were going to print. The CEP President stated that so ;e
candidates who had been approved did not appear on the ballot. The CEP stated
it will review candidate name omissions on a case-by-case basis. Political parties
still have not received copies of the May 31 list, nor have the local candidate lists
ever been released. It is unclear when the list will be final.
CEP Issues Communique Requiring Candidates to Pay Additional Fees
Candidates for national office of Senate and Deputy pay registration fees based
on the number of municipal candidates on their same party slates running for office
in their districts. The more candidates on local slates a party has, the less it pays.
The unreleased "final" candidate list of May 31, may exclude many local candidates,
which would affect registration fees for many national level candidates. The CEP
announced on May 31, at 11 pm. on the radio its decision to require all candidates







to pay any fees owed within 72 hours-or by June 3. As the political parties have
never received a list of approved local candidates, it is virtually impossible for them
to calculate the additional fees owed. Following protests by all political parties, the
CEP extended this deadline to June 8. However, many parties claim that it will be
impossible to pay additional fees. Indeed, political party representatives told the
CEP President on June 3 that as many as 75 percent of the parties would be forced
to withdraw if this provision is enforced. The CEP promised to seek a meeting
today, June 5, with the Prime Minister to determine if the Government could assist
in the payment or offer a legal way around this requirement.
Registration Cards Still Missing
Of the one million registration cards previously announced as missing, CEP Presi-
dent Remy announced that 60,000 had been recovered. No details were offered.
Political Parties Request Extension of Registration Period
At the June 3 meeting between political party representatives and the CEP, the
political parties requested an extension of the registration period. Most registration
ureaus have not had materials since April 30. Some materials were provided to
registration bureaus in Port-au-Prince late last week. In the bureaus that were
open, lines were very long and many ran out of the additional materials. The CEP
has not responded officially to the parties' request.
Political Parties Sign Accord on Election Surveillance Unit
A majority of the political parties participating in the upcoming elections signed
an agreement to establish an election surveillance unit. This unit would place se-
lected party representatives at all levels of the electoral process to oversee the proc-
ess. The parties would place three individuals at each of the nine department head-
quarters, three at each of the 135 communal level offices and one person at each
of the 9,000 voting places. This will require almost 9,500 persons. Full funding for
this initiative has not yet been found.
Procedures for Election Day and Counting Still Not Set
Instructions for the operation of election day and the counting process have not
been issued by the CEP. Training for all election officials regarding these two proc-
esses, therefore, has not begun.
Ministry of Justice and Interim Police Force Issue Warning
The Ministry of Justice and the Interim Police Force issued separate commu-
niques that warn citizens against participating in actions that could be considered
as hindering the electoral process. They state anyone participating in such actions
will be arrested and subject to the full penal code. This is stipulated in the electoral
law.
First Arrests
In Jacmel, 15 persons were arrested on May 31, for actions considered against the
electoral process. Most have been released for lack of evidence.
Candidate Threatened
On May 30, in Cap-Haitian, senate candidate Renaud Bernardin was the target
of a group of machete-bearing hecklers who interrupted a speech he was giving in
Pont St. Michel. The group began by heckling and progressed to rock throwing. The
audience shielded Mr. Bernardin from the group, called the Red Army, and rushed
him from the area. Mr. Bernardin represents a small party which is part of the po-
litical organization Lavalas.
(June 14, 1995)
The International Republican Institute maintains an office in Port-au-Prince as
the headquarters for its election observation mission. This is the fourth in a series
of election updates as reported by IRI staff in Haiti.
Candidate List Final
Although the final list of accepted candidates has yet to be released, the CEP re-
leased a final list of rejected candidates on June 7. The list contains 23 rejected can-
didates for Senate, 105 for Deputy, 12 for Mayor, and 7 for Communal Councils. The
announcement that accompanied the list stated that any candidates who did not
find their names on this list were authorized to campaign. Three additional political
parties are represented in the June 7 list that did not appear on any previous lists:
APP, PAKA-PALA and PSH. The numbers of rejected candidates have been con-
firmed by the CEP, but the numbers of approved candidates have not. The political






parties have now received a list of rejected candidates but not a list of approved can-
didates.
SENATE May 17 May 24 June 7
Candidates 180 180 180
Excluded 47 37 23
Approved 133 143 157
DEPUTY May 17 May 24 June 7
Candidates 865 865 865
Excluded 210 143 105
Approved 655 722 760
Candidate Registration
Petitions to register candidates were filed by party lists and by individuals. At the
end of candidate registration, 11,039 petitions had been filed. According to the CEP
election calendar, the official candidate list was to be released on May 13, after
which the campaign period would have opened. The CEP released a list of can-
didates for Senate, Chamber of Deputies, and mayors (no other offices) to Haiti
radio stations on May 18. As of May 22, no political parties had received a written
list from the CEP of their approved candidates. This made it very difficult for par-
ties to exercise their right to contest the list within 72 hours. All 24 recognized polit-
ical parties have registered formal complaints with the CEP regarding candidates
excluded from the list reported on Haiti radio. Two political parties, as mentioned
above, were completely excluded from the list. IRI has received numerous com-
plaints and documentation from parties and candidates regarding exclusion from
the list. IRI has requested explanations of these exclusions from the CEP. No an-
nouncement has been made regarding the opening of the campaign period.
The following numbers are taken from an official CEP list, titled Final List, dated
May 17. On May 22, the CEP stated that additional approvals may be forthcoming.
SENATE CANDIDATES .............................................. 180
CEP EXCLUDED ............................................................ 47
APPROVED .................................................................. 133
DEPUTY CANDIDATES ............................................. 865
CEP EXCLUDED ......................................................... 210
APPROVED .................................................................. 655
MAYOR CANDIDATES ............................................... 2,685
CEP EXCLUDED ......................................................... 2,022
APPROVE D .................................................................. 633

Election Officials
Election officials working at the local level have not been receiving regular sala-
ries; in fact, some have yet to receive their first paycheck. The CEP has been
queried about this issue and has committed to its rectification. Local officials that
work in the region that includes Port-au-Prince received their first salaries last
week.
(June 23, 1995)
The International Republican Institute maintains an office in Port-au-Prince as
the headquarters for its election observation mission. This is the fifth in a series
of election updates as reported by IRI from Haiti. Currently, IRI has a 25 person
delegation in Haiti monitoring the election activities.
Attack on Candidate Milot Gousse
RDNP Candidate for Senate for the Southeast Department (Jacmel) Milot Gousse
sustained an attack on June 19. Mr. Gousse was wounded and his driver was fatally
shot. Mr. Gousse has been a vocal critic of the current government.
National Democratic Institute (NDI) Lodges Formal Protest
On June 13, NDI sponsored a debate with leading candidates of five major par-
ties-OPL (LAVALAS), FNCD, KONAKOM, RDNP and PANPRA. The debate was
videotaped for national broadcast by the national state television station. When the
3V2 hour debate was aired, it had been condensed to 15 minutes despite prior agree-
ment for the debate to be aired in its entirety. The condensed version seriously al-
tered the tone and content of the debate and clearly favored the government party.






NDI lodged a protest complaints with the television station demanding it honor its
prior agreement. NDI also registered complaints with the election observation units
of the OAS and IRI. IRI will raise the issue with the CEP on the grounds of guaran-
teed free and equal access to media.
Counting Procedures To Be Decided Today
The Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) is said to be prepared to release
counting procedures and materials today, two days before the June 25 elections.
Representatives from the nine departments have been summoned to Port-au-Prince
to receive the materials. Each department then will be responsible for distributing
these materials to the 135 community level offices and over 10,000 voting stations.
Indelible Ink Demonstration Successful
The OAS held a public demonstration of the indelible ink to be used on election
day to mark voters' thumbs after voting. In the demonstration the ink proved to be
indelible. CEP President Remy previously had announced that CEP's members be-
lieved that the ink was faulty. Members of the CEP did not attend the demonstra-
tion.
Campaign Closes Today
The campaign period that has been compressed to little more than one week
closes today. As of June 23, there is still no approved candidates' list available.
One Million Voter Cards Still Missing
The CEP has not issued any more information on the whereabouts of the one mil-
lion voter cards it announced missing at the end of May. The CEP had speculated
that some of the election administration officials were hoarding the cards.
Election Officials Still Unpaid
Many local election officials have yet to receive payment from the CEP. The Unit-
ed Nations is attempting to facilitate payment today. In some areas, financial insti-
tutions are unable to cash the large checks from the CEP but in most areas, the
money simply has not arrived.

(June 24, 1995)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE PORTER GOSS DETAILS CHALLENGES TO SUNDAY'S ELECTIONS
Good morning ladies and gentlemen, I am Porter Goss, the leader of the Inter-
national Republican Institute s observer mission in Haiti. IRI has programs in over
30 countries around the world and has observed elections most recently in El Sal-
vador, Mexico, South Africa, and Russia.
Today we are releasing our findings of the pre-election environment and elections
administration. We would like to thank all the Haitian political parties, the inter-
national community and the electoral workers who have been helpful in assisting
the IRI staff in developing this report.
Importantance of the Elections
First, these elections are important for the Haitian people who have been striving
to establish a democracy since the Constitution of 1987. For them a credible election
which represents the will of the people would be a step to institutionalizing a demo-
cratic process. Second, these elections are important for the international commu-
nity which has supported consequently invested enormous resources to support this
election process with the hopes that democracy can be institutionalized in Haiti.
Third, in the United States, I want to make it clear, both Republicans and Demo-
crats, support the goal of helping democracy take root in Haiti.
Why This Mission
First, this mission by IRI is aimed at conducting an independent evaluation of
this electoral process with a view to providing constructive recommendation for its
improvement for the next elections. Second, this mission in part will examine
whether we, as the international community, have left anything behind in terms of
capacity building. In other words, will Haitians be better able in the next elections
to administer the vote and has the international community left the necessary tools
behind, such as a good registration list, so Haitians can build upon that foundation.
Third, with all the flaws and irregularities that exist in democratic transitions, will
this election produce a political system representative of the will of the people? Last-
ly, what about the process of the election itself? Was the process transparent and
understandable to the Haitian people? Was it administered on a non-partisan, im-
partial basis?