Implementation and costs of U.S. policy in Haiti

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Implementation and costs of U.S. policy in Haiti hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, March 9, 1995
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S. HRG. 104-52
IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS OF U.S. POLICY
IN HAITI


WESTERN


HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEMISPHERE AND PEACE CORPS
AFFAIRS
OF THE


COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

MARCH 9, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



( CCOLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
<^^ LAW LiBRARY


U.S. DLPOSVC Y
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE COPY
89-189 CC WASHINGTON : 1995

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents., Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 2(402
ISBN 0-16-047272-5

















S75


COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
HANK BROWN, Colorado PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri
JAMES W. NANCE, Staff Director
EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Chief Counsel & Staff Director


SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND PEACE CORPS AFFAIRS
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia













CONTENTS


Page
Deutch, Hon. John M., Deputy Secretary of Defense ......................................... 12
Prepared state ent ..................................... ............................................... 14
Kirkpatrick, Hon. Jeane J., senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute ......... 35
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 38
Postal, Andrew, Chairman, Haiti Task Force, Caribbean/Latin American Ac-
tion ........................................................................................................................ 4 9
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 54
Talbott, Hon. Strobe, Deputy Secretary of State ................................................. 3
Prepare d state ent ......................................................................................... 6
Weinstein, Prof. Allen, president, the Center for Democracy ........................... 59
Prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 62

APPENDIX
Responses of Mr. Deutch to Questions Asked by Chairman Helms .................. 73
Responses of Mr. Talbott to Questions Asked by Chairman Helms ................. 75

(III)










IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS OF U.S.
POLICY IN HAITI


THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1995
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND
PEACE CORPS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Paul Coverdell
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coverdell, Helms, Pell, Dodd, and Kerry.
Senator COVERDELL. I call the hearing to order.
I would like to welcome Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and
Deputy Secretary Deutch to the hearing and to thank them for
their presence and willingness to be with us this morning.
Secretary Talbott, I know you just returned from the country in
question. The President will be going there shortly.
And I have accepted the invitation of President Aristide to visit
Haiti just after the first of April. I suspect that there will be sev-
eral other Senators in that delegation which will be traveling there
on approximately April 8.
In defining our foreign policy, which is something we have been
attempting since the "end of the cold war," there has been a lot of
gnashing of teeth as to exactly what that policy should be as we
approach the new century.
I believe that anyone's list of focus or targets should include the
Western Hemisphere and the U.S. relationships and interests with-
in this hemisphere.
This subcommittee will reference all of its work as related to the
general interests of the United States and the general welfare of
the Western Hemisphere. This morning's hearing will focus specifi-
cally on Haiti.
There should be no doubt in your minds that I have raised seri-
ous questions about the policies which this administration pursued
toward Haiti. The framework of my questions to the administration
relate to precedent:
How does this administration see the actions that were inaugu-
rated in Haiti and that are continuing to be implemented there as
establishing policy that relates to the long-term relationships in
this hemisphere?
Do you interpret what we did in Haiti as doctrine? Do you see
these policies as a statement to our neighbors in the hemisphere






as to what they might expect from us if circumstances of a similar
nature were to occur in other countries?
In the short term, there are a number of questions that need fur-
ther explanation. Obviously, the cost; how much? The exit; how
long?
The effect of the policy on the economy; do we see the investment
producing the economic results we want to see in this, the poorest
nation in the hemisphere?
And then to the broader question, which gets to your stated goal
for implementing the policy in the first place, the securing of a
democratic nation.
And then the issue regarding the establishment of a precedent
which comes back to the general premise that I outlined in the be-
ginning.
If we see an extended U.S. military and/or U.N. presence, how
near does that appear to becoming an occupation? And how do we
deal with that development as it affects the hemisphere's observa-
tions of our presence in Haiti?
And with that short opening and welcoming, I will turn to you,
Secretary Talbott, for your opening statement.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COVERDELL
Good Morning. I want to welcome Deputy Secretary Talbott, Deputy Secretary
Deutch and our other distinguished panelists to this year's first hearing of the West-
ern Hemisphere Subcommittee. The Subcommittee faces an active agenda this year,
and I'm honored to be working with such capable colleagues as we address the chal-
lenges and opportunities in the hemisphere.
ior forty years, U.S. national security policy was justifiably focused on the Soviet
Union and the defense of Europe. Today, U.S. national interests and national secu-
rity are being redefined around the world. During this period of uncertainty and re-
definition, it s crucial that the United States pay particular attention to the Ameri-
cas. Activities in this area of the world will have an immediate and direct impact
on the United States and the American people. Our aim should be to build a strong,
united hemispheric force for strategic and economic security to take us into the next
century. The United States must play a leading role in this process; continually
seeking to consolidate democracy, promote trade, and strengthen hemispheric insti-
tutions.
This subcommittee will play an active role in that process. In all of our delibera-
tions, hearings and activities, the subcommittee will seek to move these interests
forward in a manner that enhances the national security of the United States and
that of our hemispheric neighbors.
Therefore, it is logical that we look at U.S. policy in Haiti, both as a test of U.S.
resolve and hemispheric cohesiveness. Our actions immediately following the coup
and our actions following President Aristide's reinstatement provide a test case of
our capabilities and limitations as a hemispheric actor. What can we realistically
accomplish in Haiti and at what cost? How do our actions in Haiti support vital U.S.
national interests? What is the appropriate role of our neighbors and hemispheric
institutions, and how can we strengthen these institutions to ensure that the Ameri-
cas are better equipped to solve regional crisis such as that in Haiti?
Today, the subcommittee will explore all facets of U.S. policy in Haiti in the hopes
of answering these questions. As we proceed, I would ask our panelists to give spe-
cial emphasis to the following points: costs of the mission, progress toward real de-
mocracy, the effectiveness of U.S. economic assistance programs, and the security
situation. While significant progress has been made in each of these areas, the job
is not yet done. Restoring Aristide to the Presidential Palace did not and will not
restore democracy in Haiti. Six months, 21,000 troops and hundreds of millions of
dollars later, the future of democracy in Haiti remains uncertain.
About 5,600 U.S. troops patrol Haitian streets, keep looters from Haitian stores,
and provide security for Haiti's President and fledgling government. U.S. officials
constitute and train Haiti's interim police force. Hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars
feed tens of thousands of Haitians each day. Continued U.S. economic assistance are
the only hope of pulling the Haiti's economy out of abject poverty. While the United






Nation's will assume peacekeeping duties on March 31st, 2,500 U.S. troops will re-
main to ensure basic order. In short, the United States has assumed almost total
responsibility for Haiti's future, raising the question where do we go from here?
First, I believe we need to get a firm handle on the total costs of our policy, and
how long these costs will continue. Between economic assistance, costs associated
with the Multinational Force, and our 30% share of the United Nations operation,
the costs of this policy are mounting. I have seen some reports that the United
States has spent $1.3 billion over the last two years on Haiti. If this is true, that's
quite an investment, an investment that must be justified considering the other
needs in the hemisphere.
Second, are we meeting our own goals? President Clinton stated that the principle
goal of our Haiti policy was to "restore democracy and stability to Haiti." While we
would all acknowledge that bringing democracy to Haiti will be a slow process, re-
spect for opposition parties and democratic institutions must be present. Today, no
Parliament functions in Haiti. There are no checks and balances on Presidential
power. Elections to seat a new Parliament originally scheduled for last December
have continually slipped. In addition, troubling reports of political intimidation con-
tinue, and many political parties feel disenfranchised from the process. It seems to
me the heavy lifting still needs to be done on this score.
Third, is U.S. economic assistance being used fairly and wisely? The best way to
consolidate democracy in Haiti is to provide Haitians with jobs. Unfortunately, ob-
servers say that the economic situation in Haiti is not much improved since the oc-
cupation, with only about 5,000 new jobs having been created. I would be interested
to know what specific steps are being taken to jumpstart the private sector, where
I understand up to 80,000 jobs could be created by U.S. and Haitian companies
waiting to resume operations.
Finally, what is the security situation on the ground in Haiti? With the transition
to the United Nations expected in three weeks, fear for personal security remains
high among Haitians. Even after the United Nation's leaves in March of 1996, secu-
rity will be of paramount concern. A professional police force loyal to the constitution
is necessary to establish a lasting, secure environment in Haiti. Thus, I was dis-
turbed to hear that up to 1,700 recruits were hired onto the police force without
going through the U.S. vetting process. While I understand that situation has been
resolved, it is part of an unsettling pattern that could lead once again to fear and
repression in Haiti.
Recently, I joined Senators Mack and Lieberman in sending a letter to President
Aristide addressing many of these concerns. In his response, President Aristide has
invited me to come to Haiti and see for myself the situation on the ground. I'd like
to take this opportunity to accept the President's invitation, and I look forward to
seeing him in the near future.
I thank you all for coming this morning, and I look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. STROBE TALBOTT, DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF STATE
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Your opening state-
ment and opening questions have guaranteed us a good discussion
today.
Deputy Secretary Deutch and I are here to talk about a specific
case of American engagement in the world. And as you have made
clear, we are also here to talk about the costs of American engage-
ment in the world as a whole.
There are always such costs. And sometimes they come in the
saddest, hardest to bear form, which is the loss of life suffered by
our citizens who work abroad in the service of their country and
the bereavement of their families.
We paid such a price, Mr. Chairman, this week in Karachi where
two of our colleagues were killed and a third wounded in a terrorist
attack that sickens and outrages us all.
We at the State Department feel this loss deeply, and I wanted
to use this occasion, Mr. Chairman, to assure you that the U.S.
Government will use every means at its disposal to bring those re-
sponsible to justice.





Turning to the issue in which you have asked us to appear before
you today, Dr. Deutch and I want to give you a progress report on
the U.S.-led 31 nation effort that has rescued a neighboring coun-
try from disaster, shored up stability in our region, and defended
our Nation's values and interest.
As you indicated, I returned from Haiti late last night after 2 in-
tensive days there, so I have a fresh, vivid sense of how Operation
Uphold Democracy is going. It is going well, Mr. Chairman. It has
lived up to its name.
It has restored to Haiti its legitimate government, established a
secure and stable environment, and is now preparing to pass the
baton to a U.N. force under a U.S. commander on March 31, when
President Clinton will be in Port-au-Prince for the ceremony.
Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led Multinational
Force on September 19, this committee, Mr. Chairman, might well
be holding a very different sort of hearing today, a hearing to sur-
vey the damage sustained and the damage to come as a result of
a crisis allowed to fester. Think for a moment where we would like-
ly be today had we not intervened in Haiti last September.
The dictators would still be in power, and their campaign of mur-
der and terror against the Haitian people would be continuing.
Tens of thousands of Haitians would be seeking refuge abroad.
They would pose a threat to America's borders and to regional
stability. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would still be diverting
massive resources on an open-ended, if not permanent, basis to
manage migrant interdiction and refuge processing along our own
coastline.
Instead, in Haiti today, people are building roads for commerce
rather than boats to flee terror. The flood of migrants from Haiti,
which hit a high of over 3,000 per day in July of last year, has vir-
tually stopped.
When our troops arrived in Haiti, there were an average of 10
to 15 serious incidents of organized political violence reported each
week. Today there are virtually none.
Over 3,000 members of the interim public security force, trained
and recruited by our Multinational Force, are now on the streets
of Haiti. They are acting as public servants, rather than as official
thugs.
Yesterday morning, I visited the extraordinarily impressive po-
lice academy, which will graduate its first class shortly and will
have put nearly 4,000 highly professional police into service by a
year from now.
Mr. Chairman, one measure of the security of the situation in
Haiti is the pace with which we are moving to turn the Multi-
national Forces' responsibilities over to the U.N.'s mission.
We are right on schedule. The U.N. force in Haiti will take over
at the end of this month. It will be commanded by an American of-
ficer, Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer, with whom I met Tuesday.
The U.N. force will total 6,000, of whom about 2,500 will be
Americans. The U.N. will assume the cost for the American and
international forces and the international police, costs the United
States has been paying up until now.
Mr. Chairman, from the beginning, our primary goal has been to
promote the process of democracy. There, too, we are on schedule.






We are working with the U.N. and the OAS to ensure that the
parliamentary elections scheduled for June 4 and the Presidential
elections at the end of the year are as open, free and fair as pos-
sible.
With this objective in mind, the responsibilities of the U.N. mis-
sion will end by February 1996 with the inauguration of President
Aristide's democratically elected successor.
However, we all know that no matter how successful the Haitian
people are at establishing a secure environment or building demo-
cratic institutions, stability will allude them without strong,
steady, broad-based economic growth.
That is why President Aristide has committed his government to
a far-reaching program of free market reform. That program in-
cludes the nearly total abolition of tariffs. It includes a reduction
of the civil service by up to 50 percent, a fiscally responsible budg-
et, and the privatization of state health enterprises.
For its part, the international community is doing its share by
funding programs that will help Haiti make the transition to de-
mocracy and a market economy. At a meeting in Paris, inter-
national donors have pledged $1.2 billion.
Non-American donors and lenders will provide over 75 percent of
these funds, which makes it, from an American standpoint, the
most successful instance of burden sharing in the history of the
hemisphere.
I was accompanied to Haiti by the Deputy Secretary of Com-
merce and by a delegation of 28 U.S. corporate executives. Our pur-
pose was first to give American companies an opportunity to assess
the emerging business opportunities in Haiti, and second, to give
the Haitian Government a chance to hear more about the steps
that they need to take to improve the climate for American invest-
ment there.
On both counts, the mission was a success, and it will help to en-
sure that Haiti continues to make progress in building a viable
market economy.
In light of the great progress that has been made and the hard
work ahead, we have asked the Senate to ratify the Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty with Haiti. That treaty would increase investor
confidence and make Haiti a more attractive place to do business.
Mr. Chairman, our intervention in Haiti made sense for reasons
of American self-interest. That includes our economic self-interest.
Of course the operation has been costly, but those costs must be
judged in context, and that means, among other things, against the
costs of inaction.
Since September 19, the U.S. Government has spent about $700
million on Operation Uphold Democracy, most of which are one-
time-only costs.
That is, instead of continuing to pay some $300 million a year
for the cost of nonintervention, which is to say primarily refugee
interdiction and processing, in Haiti we have made an investment
that protects our borders, that helps consolidate democracy in our
hemisphere and that will help Haiti become a good neighbor and
a stable partner in diplomacy and trade.
Our intervention also does justice to America's core values and
principles. The best defense of our Haiti policy is simple. We inter-






vened because it was in our national interest. We intervened after
every other alternative had been exhausted. And we intervened be-
cause it was the right thing to do.
We cannot say "mission accomplished," but we can say "so far,
so good."
Now we must see the job through, and that means until the com-
pletion of the U.N. mission 11 months from now.
Mr. Chairman, much of the credit for the results we have seen
so far goes to the American soldiers in Haiti, their officers, notably
Generals Shelton, Meade, and Fisher, and, I might say, their civil-
ian superiors in the Department of Defense.
With that in mind, I would like to turn the microphone over to
Deputy Secretary Deutch, who also has some opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Talbott follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. TALBO'WT
Mr. Chairman, Deputy Secretary Deutch and I welcome the chance to give you
a progress report on the U.S.-led, 31-nation effort that had rescued a neighboring
country from disaster, restored stability in our region, and defended our nation's
values and interests. Operation Uphold Democracy has fully lived up to its name.
It has peacefully ousted Haiti's brutal dictators restored its legitimate government,
established a secure and stable environment, and is now preparing to pass the
baton to a United Nations force under a U.S. Commander.
We cannot yet say "mission accomplished." We have another year of work ahead
of us. But we can say, "So far, so good." This mission, while still a work in progress,
is well on its way to being a success. 24 weeks after President Clinton sent our
troops to their country, Haitians are constructing roads to advance commerce and
build a civil society rather than boats to escape terror.
Let me briefly review how far we have come. It was nearly four years ago that
a military coup transformed Haiti's newborn democracy into a nightmare of repres-
sion. A violent regime took power, one that crushed its opponents and caused tens
of thousands of Haitians to flee from their shores toward ours. With the support of
that regime, paramilitary gangs assassinated opposition leaders and priests who
spoke out. Murder, mutilation, rape, and the kidnapping of children were not just
officially sanctioned-often officially perpetrated-crimes; they were instruments of
rule. They became common tools for dealing with citizens and families suspected of
supporting democracy. Meanwhile, the economy, long the weakest in the hemi-
sphere, plummeted deeper into ruin.
For three years, the United States and other countries around the world tried ev-
erything short of force to remove the coup leaders and restore Haiti's democrat-
ically-elected government. Persuasion, negotiation, mediation, condemnation, sanc-
tions-all to no avail. It wasn't until last September, when the coup leaders knew
that the President had ordered U.S. armed forces into action, that they agreed to
give up power peacefully.
Think for a moment where we would likely be today had we not acted:
-The dictators would still be in power, and their campaign of murder and terror
against the Haitian people would be continuing.
-Tens of thousands of Haitians would be seeking refuge abroad, posing a threat
to America's borders and to regional stability as well. The Bahamas and other
small island democracies in the Caribbean would be faced with the prospect of
being overwhelmed by a mounting flood of desperate humanity.
-The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard would still be diverting massive resources, on
an open-ended if not permanent basis, to manage migrant interdiction along our
own coastline. These are resources that would otherwise be available to reduce
the flow of illegal drugs, stop smuggling, protect our fisheries, and save lives
at sea. More generally, we would be faced with more years like 1994, when we
spent nearly $300 million to deal with Haitian migrants, sanctions enforcement,
and humanitarian relief. These were the costs of non-intervention, recurrent
costs for which-absent our willingness to use force-there was no end in sight.
-Furthermore, the enemies of democracy elsewhere in the region-coup-plotters
lurking in the shadows of other capitals in the hemisphere-would be more in-
clined to believe that they could act with impunity; that they, too, like the Hai-
tian coup leaders of 1991, could overthrow democratically elected governments.






-And finally, the United States and the international community would have failed
to fulfill our commitments in the face of a coup that President Bush described
as an extraordinary threat to our national security; that Secretary of State
Baker said should not stand; and that President Clinton, the United Nations
and the Organization of American States declared unacceptable.
Had it not been for the deployment of the U.S.-led Multinational Force on Septem-
ber 13, your Committee, Mr. Chairman, might well be holding a very different sort
of hearing today-a hearing to survey the damage sustained, and the damage to
come, as a result of a crisis allowed to fester.
There was, of course, widespread controversy over our Administration's decision
to use force in Haiti. We understood the concern and the skepticism. So did the
President. As Commander in Chief, he considers no responsibility more serious than
the one he assumes when he sends the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces
into harm's way.
Thanks in the first instance to the superb performance of American soldiers, their
officers, and Generals Shelton, Meade, and Fisher, Operation Uphold Democracy
has set a new standard for the degree of peace and civic order that has been kept
in a peace-keeping operation.
From the moment the armed services began planning, they demonstrated an ex-
traordinary capacity to adapt to change, to identify and understand the problems,
and to solve them effectively. When the Haitian military dictators agreed to step
down, within minutes we were able to recall our assault forces, and within hours
they had shifted to a deployment posture suitable for intervention in a permissive
environment. In the months that have passed, our military's accomplishments-
which have ranged from quelling initial outbreaks of Haitian-on-Haitian violence to
disarming the paramilitary gangs to, literally, turning the lights back on in Haitian
cities-have been truly outstanding.
From the beginning of the operation, President Clinton instructed the military
commanders on the ground that their first responsibility was to safeguard our men
and women in uniform. In the five months since our troops entered Haiti, we have
lost one brave American soldier in the line of duty: Special Forces Sergeant Gregory
Cardott, who was shot when he went to investigate a disturbance that arose from
an isolated crime at a toll-collection point.
Mr. Chairman, while we pay tribute to the American soldiers serving in Haiti, we
must also remember that Operation Uphold Democracy is a truly multinational ef-
fort, with participation from 30 other nations. In this regard, I particularly want
to say a few words about the contributions of the 11 nations of the Caribbean Com-
munity. Haiti's CARICOM neighbors took an international leadership role by calling
for forceful action to remove the coup leaders, and each of these 11 states has
matched its words with deeds, by contributing soldiers or police, or both, to the mul-
tinational force.
Mr. Chairman, the success to date of Operation Uphold Democracy has also been
due to the lessons that we have learned from previous experiences in peacekeeping
and other missions. From U.S. operations in Grenada and Panama, we learned the
importance of inter-service cooperation, joint and inter-agency planning and oper-
ational flexibility. In Operation Uphold Democracy, the lifting of a U.S. Army divi-
sion from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier took the concept of joint operations to a new
level.
Mr. Chairman, just as our military forces are strengthened by the integration of
sea, land and air power, so too is the force of our diplomacy increased by the inte-
gration of unilateral with coalition and more broadly multilateral approaches. From
the Gulf War, we learned how American leadership in multilateral force can spur
the actions of others, reduce our burdens, and enhance our effectiveness. UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 940 authorizing "all necessary means," the Multinational
Force, and the handoff to the United Nations Mission are all conscious adaptations
of the Desert Storm experience.
Mr. Chairman, credit for the current success of Operation Uphold Democracy is
also due to President Aristide, Prime Minister Smarck Michel, members of the Hai-
tian parliament, Mayor Evans Paul of Port-au-Prince, and other democratic leaders
of Haiti. And, of course, credit is due to the Haitian people themselves. Remember,
Mr. Chairman, some of the fears and warnings that were in the air at the time
when this mission began: some said that President Aristide would choose vengeance
over reconciliation; that Haitians would fight, rob and slaughter each other in a
frenzy of lawlessness; and that efforts to rebuild Haiti's democracy and economy
would never get off the ground.
Instead, in overwhelming numbers, the Haitian people have heeded President
Aristide's consistent call for reconciliation. They are joining together to begin build-
ing a new society. They have shown immense resilience, courage-and, I might add,







restraint-in the face of enormous challenges. Moreover, they have also shown a
gratifying and richly deserved degree of appreciation for our troops. All across the
country, from Port-de-Paix to Les Cayes, our soldiers are now greeted each day by
signs bearing three simple words: "Thank you, America."
So Deputy Secretary Deutch and I come before you with a sense of confidence and
optimism. But we also come with our eyes open to the magnitude of the challenge
that remains-for us and for the international community in the coming months,
and, more importantly, for the Haitian people themselves in the coming years and
decades. Before the coup of September 1991, Haiti was, as I mentioned, the poorest
country in the hemisphere; it may take until the end of this decade for its people
to work their way back even to that level.
A devastated economy is only part of the legacy with which Haiti must cope. This
is a country still struggling to banish the ghosts of its past. Its people must learn
new habits and new ways of working together as they try to overcome a long history
of social polarization, political instability and institutionalized brutality. As Presi-
dent Aristide so frequently and memorably puts it, Haitians will have to work hard
simply to move "from misery to poverty with dignity."
But we must also place Haiti's problems in the context of the extraordinary
progress that its people have made in just five months. All that we've given to the
Haitian people is an opportunity-an opportunity for them to resume the hard work
of sustaining their democratic institutions and building a viable market economy.
But having been given a second chance-after four long, lost years-the Haitian
people are making the most of that opportunity.
Today, thanks to Operation UpholdDemocracy, the Haitian people live in an envi-
ronment that is-in relative terms-safe, secure and free of political violence. They
have made progress in breathing life back into democratic institutions. And they
have begun to jump start their dead economy, by initiating free market reforms, and
by seeking the investments they need for long-term growth.
Let me examine each of these topics-security, democracy, and economics-in
turn.
When the United States sent its troops to Haiti, our mission was to restore the
legitimate government, and to create a secure and stable environment in which it
could function. Thanks to the Haitian people's desire to end the violence that has
plagued their nation and the cooperation of our allies in the multinational force, we
have been largely successful.
A few statistics illustrate this point. When our troops arrived in Haiti, there were
an average of 10 to 15 serious incidents of organized political violence reported each
week. Those have virtually disappeared. Incidents of criminal violence remain at a
very low level as well: in Port-au-Prince there are now an average of 18 violent
crimes being reported each week-a figure far below those of other cities in the
hemisphere with similar-size populations.
The multinational force has recovered nearly 33,000 weapons, through buybacks,
by seizing caches, and by setting up roadblocks. There is no doubt that some weap-
ons are still in circulation. But the multinational force made the right decision not
to go door to door to try to find every gun. That was not our mission, and it would
have been impossible-and indeed illegal under the Haitian constitution, which pro-
tects gun ownership within the home. Our goals were to create a generally secure
environment in which the democratic government could take hold and to establish
new civilian-controlled professional security forces as the first line of protection for
the Haitian people.
In this, we have made good progress. In the three months following the interven-
tion, over 3,000 recruits for the Haitian Interim Public Security Force received tran-
sition training at a facility provided by the government of Haiti, funded by the De-
partment of State, managed by the Department of Justice, and supported by the
U.S. military. Over 900 Haitian migrants received comparable training at the camps
in Guantanamo. These interim security forces are now on the streets of Haiti-in-
creasingly responsive to the civilian authorities and acting as public servants, rather
than as official thugs.
These interim security forces are monitored and assisted by more than 600 Inter-
national Police Monitors, or IPMs, spread throughout the country. These IPMs are
police officers, provided by more than 20 countries on 6 continents, under the lead-
ership of former New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly. They are protagonists
in one of the great success stories in the annals of international peacekeeping. Re-
cruited, trained, and deployed in less than six weeks, the distinctive IPM "yellow
hats" have restored the confidence of the Haitian people that police exist to serve
and protect society, not to brutalize it.
In organizing the Interim Public Security Force we have worked with the govern-
ment of Haiti to remove individuals involved in serious human rights abuses, or





9

narcotics trafficking. All senior officers of the Haitian army have been released from
active duty. More than 2,400 former soldiers have been enrolled in a program of
counseling and job training funded by USAID, and run by the International Office
of Migration. The government of Haiti is continuing to pay these soldiers' salaries
as they go through the retraining process.
We have made it clear to the government of Haiti that the decision whether to
retain a military is theirs to make. For our part, we are ready to work with Haitian
government officials to make sure that the process of demobilization, however far
it may go, takes place in an orderly, responsible and equitable fashion, consistent
with President Aristide's emphasis on reconciliation.
Mr. Chairman, candidates for a permanent civilian police force are now being re-
cruited and trained by our Justice Department, in cooperation with French, Nor-
wegian and Canadian police, at the new National Police Academy in Camp
d'Application, Port-au-Prince. All trainees are entering the Academy on the basis of
merit-their performance in the entrance exams-rather than personal or political
affiliation. We regard these entrance exams as a crucial filter in breaking the cycle
of personal and political security forces that have dominated Haiti's history.
The first class of Civilian Haitian Police entered in January and will graduate in
May. About 350 graduates will be deployed each month, building up to a force of
at least 4,000 that will replace the Interim Public Security Force. This new, account-
able, professional, apolitical police force will be a dramatic improvement over the
violent, corrupt security forces of the past.
For all these reasons, life in Haiti is generally secure today. The simple activities
of everyday life-street vendors plying their wares, children going to school, and
families attending church services-have come alive again. Thousands of men,
women and children who were in hiding or in exile-from members of Parliament
to mayors to clergy to entrepreneurs-have resumed normal lives. The flood of refu-
gees from Haiti-which hit a high of over 3,000 per day in July of last year-has
virtually stopped. Since September 19, the Coast Guard has helped more than
13,000 Haitians-including all but a few hundred at Guantanamo-to return home.
Another measure of the security of the situation in Haiti is the pace with which
we are moving to turn the Multinational Force's responsibilities over to the United
Nations Mission. We are right on schedule. On January 20, the MNF Commander,
Major General Meade, and the member states of the multinational force reported
to the UN Security Council that "a secure and stable environment" had been estab-
lished. On January 30, the Security Council passed Resolution 975 authorizing the
U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to build up to a force of 6,000 troops and 900 police,
and to take over from the Multinational Force by no later than March 31. The proc-
ess of transition has already begun, and will accelerate as we approach the end of
the month.
The United Nations Mission is enabling us to continue the draw down of Amer-
ican forces in Haiti. U.S. forces reached a peak of 21,000 in early October. Together
with their colleagues from the multinational force, they established 27 bases and
made their presence felt in each of the 133 districts of Haiti. As the situation began
to stabilize in November, we started to withdraw our troops. Today there are about
5,800 American soldiers in Haiti. That number will be cut by more than half when
the UN Mission takes up its full responsibilities.
The United Nations forces in Haiti will be commanded by an American, Major
General Joseph Kinzcr, and include about 2,500 American troops. Two-thirds of the
forces that will comprise the UN Mission will carry over from the Multinational
Force, and are already on the ground in Haiti, including the Bangladeshis, the Nep-
alese contingent, and the CARlCOM battalion. The contingents from Pakistan and
India will arrive later this month. I should add that the United Nations will assume
the costs for the American and international forces and the international police,
costs that the United States has largely been paying up until now. This means that
the U.S. share of the UNMIH costs will be just over 30% until October 1, and only
25% thereafter. As Secretary Christopher noted in a broader context, when testify-
ing before your Committee in January, "this is a sensible bargain I know the Amer-
ican people support."
Our success at helping the Haitian people create a secure environment has also
helped Haitians to strengthen their fragile political institutions. Let me turn now
to that subject.
President Aristide has set the tone of tolerance and reconciliation for his entire
country. He returned to Haiti with one of the largest democratic mandates of any
political leader in the Western hemisphere. Yet from the beginning, he has reached
out beyond his own enormous constituency. Through his cabinet and other appoint-
ments, President Aristide is building bridges to all sectors of society, from the elite
families to the residents of the slums of Cite de Soleil.





10

Immediately upon his return, President Aristide met with parliamentary leaders
from all sides of the political spectrum to set a common, cooperative agenda. On cru-
cial matters-such as appointing a supreme Court and drafting a new police law
and amnesty legislation-he has worked with the Haitian Parliament, not around
them. Thanks in large part to President Aristide's leadership, the Parliament
passed the first national budget that Haiti has had in five years. And he personally
helped Haiti's political factions to put aside their differences and move forward with
arrangements for the national elections. Thanks to those arrangements, Haitians
will be able to go to the polls on June 4 to elect the 83 members of the Chamber
of Deputies, 18 of 27 Senators and 2,100 local officials.
This is a record of which any executive and legislature could be proud-even in
a country less shattered, polarized, and traumatized than Haiti. But faced with high
expectations, Haiti's political leadership still confronts daunting challenges. When
President Aristide returned in October, the national treasury was virtually empty
and the government heavily in debt to foreign lenders. Aristide's cabinet ministers
took over ministries that the dictators had stripped of basic supplies-even plumb-
ing. There are few professionals below the ministerial level to implement decisions.
Haiti's judicial system, which was never strong to begin with and collapsed under
the Cedras regime, must be completely renovated.
The necessary reforms will not be accomplished overnight, or by any single person
or political party. That is one reason why, from the beginning, our primary goal has
been to promote the process of democracy. To that end, we are working with the
United Nations Elections Assistance Unit and the Organization of the American
States to ensure that the June legislative and local elections, as well as the Presi-
dential elections in late November, are open and fair. With this objective in mind,
the responsibilities of the UN Mission will end by February 1996, with the inau-
guration of President Aristide's democratically elected successor. Let me note that
the National Democratic Institute is currently actively engaged in preparing for the
upcoming elections, and we hope that the International Republican Institute will
also become involved,
We are also working closely with Haiti's new Minister of Justice, Jean Joseph
Exume, to rebuild Haiti's legal system. We have completed a comprehensive assess-
ment of judicial, court and penal facilities in the 9 provincial capitals and a short-
term training program for judges and prosecutors is already underway.
However, no matter how successful the Haitian people are at establishing a se-
cure environment or building democratic and legal institutions, stability will elude
them without strong, steady, broad-based economic growth. Haiti has a per capital
income of about $200 a year, making it one of the poorest countries in the world.
It also has one of the worst infrastructures of any country in the world, including
the most expensive, least efficient port in the western hemisphere. Its roads are al-
most non-existent, and it has among the world's fewest telephones per capital. Bring-
ing the economy to life will be Haiti's most difficult task.
President Aristide has risen to this challenge by committing his government to
a far-reaching program of free market reform, That program includes the nearly
total abolition of tariffs; a reduction of the civil service by up to 50%; a fiscally re-
sponsible budget; and the privatization of state-held enterprises. Other steps to-
wards a free market include the removal of most exchange controls, the moderniza-
tion of commercial law provisions, and a decentralization of many economic powers
of the central government. These reforms are far sighted, based on sound economics,
and deserving of support.
The international community is doing its share by providing aid and technical as-
sistance to help Haiti make the transition to democracy and a market economy. In
January, international donors and lenders met in Paris to review the progress that
has been made since President Aristide's return, and the general assessment of this
progress was so positive that the donors actually pledged $1.2 billion, nearly double
what had originally been proposed. It is anticipated that $900 million of that $1.2
billion will be available over the next 12-15 months.
I should note that the non-American donors and lenders have provided over 75%
of these funds, making this, from an American standpoint, the most successful in-
stance of burdensharing in the history of the hemisphere. In Haiti, we are dem-
onstrating that American leadership can leverage tremendous power and resources
on behalf of a common good.
Mr. Chairman, on Tuesday I accompanied a delegation of 28 corporate executives
to Port-au-Prince and Cap Hatien. The purpose of this two-day trip was, first, to
give American companies an opportunity to assess the emerging business opportuni-
ties in Haiti, and, second, to give the Haitian government a chance to hear more
about the steps they need to take to improve the climate for American investment.
One of the highlights of the trip was the first meeting of the U.S.-Haiti Business







Development Council, which is bringing together business and government rep-
resentatives of both countries.
Yesterday, the U.S. Agency for International Development signed an agreement
with President Aristide to provide funding and technical assistance for Haiti's Presi-
dential Commission on Modernization and Economic Growth. This Commission will
work to identify specific regulatory changes and commercial law reforms that will
make it easier and more profitable to do business in Haiti.
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has announced that it is
prepared to provide $100 million in finance and political risk insurance to support
American private investment in Haiti. Yesterday, OPIC signed an agreement with
the First National Bank of Boston to create a lending facility that will make more
than $65 million in working capital and loans available. The Bank of Boston has
operated in Haiti for many years, and has already identified a number of promising
investment ventures.
To complement the OPIC-Bank of Boston facility, USAID announced yesterday
that it will provide an additional $12 million in credit, training and marketing as-
sistance to small businesses in Port-au-Price and Cap Haitien. To implement this
new initiative, USAID will be working closely with three local institutions-the Hai-
tian Development Foundation, the Haitian Credit and Savings Society, and the Hai-
tian Women's Assistance Fund. USAID will also continue to work with the Haitian
Development Foundation on the Provincial Enterprise Development project, which
is already in place with 1,100 loans outstanding.
In addition to these initiatives, we are organizing several sector-specific business
missions to bring U.S. business executives in direct contact with Haitian businesses
and government decision makers. These missions will concentrate on telecommuni-
cations, power generation, light manufacturing, and handicrafts. The telecommuni-
cations delegation will travel to Haiti on April 20-21, and the others will follow soon
thereafter.
Mr. Chairman, there is already evidence that the Haitian private sector is getting
on its feet: more than 35 manufacturing operations have restarted in Haiti since the
beginning of the year; exports of mangos and papayas have resumed; the construc-
tion industry is rebounding; and cruise ships are once again bringing tourists to Cap
Haitien.
In light of the great progress that has been made over the past five months, and
in light of the hard work ahead, we have asked the Senate to ratify the bilateral
investment treaty with Haiti that is now before it. That treaty would increase inves-
tor confidence and make Haiti a more attractive place to do business. It would en-
sure that funds from investment activities could be transferred freely; that Amer-
ican companies would have full protection against expropriation; and that the Hai-
tian government's investment approval decisions will be free of performance require-
ments.
Mr. Chairman, I mentioned earlier that our intervention in Haiti made sense for
reasons of American self-interest. That includes our economic self-interest. Of course
the operation has not been cost free. But those costs must be judged in context, and
that means, among other things, against the costs of inaction. Since September 19,
the U.S. government has spent about $700 million on Operation Uphold Democracy,
most of which are one-time-only-costs, instead of continuing to pay some $300 mil-
lion a year for the costs of non-intervention. This investment protects our borders,
has helped consolidate democracy in our hemisphere, and will help Haiti become a
good neighbor and stable partner in diplomacy and trade. But our intervention also
does justice to America's core values and principles as well.
The best defense of our Haiti policy is simple: we intervened because it was in
our national interest, we intervened after every other alternative had been ex-
hausted, and we intervened because it was the right thing to do.
The American intervention in Haiti has been successful thus far. Now, we must
see the job through, and that means until the completion of the United Nations mis-
sion 11 months from now. As I've already stressed, we cannot solve Haiti's basic
problems-the Haitian people must solve those themselves-but we can help. In-
deed, our help is essential: only we can lead a U.N. effort to maintain security in
Haiti until the Haitian government fields a professional police force of its own; and
only we can lead the international effort to help Haiti strengthen its democratic in-
stitutions and build its economy.
As Secretary Christopher has told the United Nations General Assembly, Haiti
now has an opportunity "to take its rightful place in the growing community of
democratic states; to work with the international community to solve the
transnational problems we all face; and to become an inspiration to other nations,
not an outcast." And American leadership in Operation Uphold Democracy has
shown that the United States is willing to stand up for its own interests and for







democracy in the hemisphere, and that our military is second to none, in creativity
and professionalism as well as in strength and courage. This is an effort of which
we, and you, can be proud. Thank you.
Senator COVERDELL. Secretary Deutch, before you begin, let me
say that on my previous visit to Haiti, which was just shortly after
the landing, I had an opportunity to meet with General Meade and
our personnel on the ground.
It was impressive to note the efficiency with which the U.S. pres-
ence was established in Haiti and the manner in which our mili-
tary personnel were conducting themselves.
And I was also encouraged by the reception that these personnel
were receiving from the indigenous population of Haiti itself. So at
least for the brief moment in which we had a chance to see our
military in action, it was an exemplary performance.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. DEUTCH, DEPUTY SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With your
permission, sir, I would like to submit my prepared statement for
the record and just briefly summarize some points, if that is-
Senator COVERDELL. That will be done.
Mr. DEUTCH. Let me begin by saying how pleased we are at the
tremendous progress and how pleased we are at the lack of opposi-
tion and by President Aristide's call for reconciliation throughout
our time in Haiti.
I do want to stress, sir, that Haiti remains a desperately poor
country that has a weak political tradition, and success here is still
to be completely realized.
The objectives we have of holding free and fair elections, restart-
ing an economy which on the best of circumstances is still in the
midst of the road of poverty, is going to be tough.
Therefore, for all of our success up till now, we cannot be assured
of total absence of problems here, and the security situation still
deserves the closest attention.
Therefore, I would like to echo the words of my colleague and
friend, Strobe Talbott, and say: "So far, so good."
What I would like to do is to spend a few moments very briefly
on the performance of the military in Haiti. And let me remind
you, sir, that that has occurred in two phases; first, a Multinational
Force phase, which is coming to an end here at the end of the
month, and a transition to a multilateral phase under the U.N.
mission in Haiti, so called UNMIH.
Our military operation in Haiti began on September 19, 1994. At
that time, we introduced over 20,000 men and women of our armed
forces into the island. Today, we are down to about 5,836 military
forces, U.S. military forces, in Haiti.
What have we accomplished during this period of time? First, we
have established a secure environment in Port-au-Prince, Capasien,
and secure environment in all the communities through the most
remarkable work of our special forces throughout the island.
Second, we have accomplished the transfer of political control to
the legitimate democratic, freely elected Government of Haiti.
Third, we have made great strides in establishing public order
through our weapons buy-back program, through the establishment







of an interim public security force, and we have worked to set up
a national police academy, which very shortly will be producing the
professional police force for the island and its people.
Our military force has also been active in providing essential
public services, in power, in water and sanitation, and in providing
medical care.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there was an outflow of Haitian ref-
ugees before we went to Haiti last year. We have managed to han-
dle those people in a caring way, a compassionate way, at Guanta-
namo. And essentially all of those Haitians have now been re-
turned to the island.
In sum, we regard the Multinational Force as an enormous suc-
cess in the performance of our military. It is a tribute to the com-
petence of our military. It is a tribute to the commander in chief
of the USACOM's ability to manage a complex operation.
And frankly, sir, I think it is a unique model in the interagency
cooperation that has been acquired to make this portion of the op-
eration a success, the cooperation between the Department of
State, my Department, and USAID, the Department of Justice and
other concerned agencies.
As you know, sir, at the end of this month, we will be making
a transition to the U.N. mission in .Haiti. We believe that the politi-
cal and security circumstances are such so that this is perfectly
possible to do.
That UNMIH Force will be at most 6,000 people, as decided by
the U.N., of which about 2,500 will be U.S. forces.
The UNMIH Force will be commanded by a U.S. major general,
Major General Kinzer. And, of course, Major General Kinzer will
be have operational and complete control of the U.S. forces.
As I am sure you know, we are planning to end our participation
early in 1996 in Haiti, estimates are February 1996.
Let me conclude with a few remarks. On the most important
scale, this operation has been of low cost. It has been of low cost
in terms of lives. We have had only four casualties throughout our
time in Haiti.
With respect to monetary costs, let me just briefly summarize
those, if I may, sir. Up to the present, in fiscal year 1994, the total
government expenses were $534 million. In fiscal year 1995, we es-
timate total government expenses to be $817 million.
That is an estimate through the end of the fiscal year 1995 that
includes an estimate of reimbursements of the U.N. costs.
Of the $534 million in fiscal year 1994, $376 million of it was the
Department of Defense. And of the estimated $817 million during
fiscal year 1995, $525 million will be the estimate for the expendi-
tures of the Department of Defense.
So we are talking here overall of a mission that will cost the U.S.
Government, after reimbursement, in the range of $800 million.
Very, very low cost in terms of lives, very, very high cost in terms
of money, and also a great achievement because, in our view, we
have given the Haitian people a chance for prosperity, participation
in a democratic government and peace.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Deutch follows:]








PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DEUTCH
Since U.S. military forces entered Haiti on September 19 last year, a great deal
has transpired. You will recall that OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was con-
ducted against a recalcitrant military regime which had, since 1991, defied inter-
national will and the demands of the United States Government to return the con-
stitutionally elected government to authority in Haiti.
The United States interests in this action were several:
The ouster of President Aristide by military coup d'etat in 1991, if allowed to
stand, threatened to affect stability and democratic development elsewhere in
the region.
The outflow of Haitians seeking refuge from poverty and oppression not only
threatened social stability throughout the region, but also placed significant
strains on our own national security and hemispheric interests.
In response to these threats, U.S forces entered Haiti on September 19, 1994, as
part of a Multinational Force (MNF) authorized by UN Security Council Resolution
940 to use all necessary means to secure the departure of the coup leaders; to re-
store the legitimate democratically-elected Government of Haiti; and to create a se-
cure and stable environment that would allow the Haitian people to assume respon-
sibility for rebuilding their country. The peaceful entry of the MNF was achieved
only after Haiti's de facto regime came to the realization, literally on the eve of inva-
sion, that they were under imminent threat of removal by force.
Within a month of the MNF's arrival the coup leaders departed, and President
Aristide returned to Haiti to assume control of the government. In the months that
followed, the U.S. and coalition presence expanded throughout Haiti, providing a
more secure environment and helping to coordinate international humanitarian as-
sistance for the most needy Haitians. Aggressive weapons control and reduction
measures were initiated that seized weapons posing a threat to the MNF and sig-
nificantly reduced the number of illegal weapons in Haiti. Although we recognized
from the outset that it was not feasible to attempt to search out every weapon in
Haiti, these measures were clearly in the interest of promoting overall security for
our mission and in establishing a secure and stable environment. In the process, the
MNF has seized or purchased through a buy-back program nearly 33,000 weapons
in various categories, including grenades and explosives.
Essential public services, such as electrical power, have been restored in key
areas. Direct assistance to Haitian government ministries by military civil affairs
specialists has been vital to helping them reestablish functional governance and
begin rebuilding Haiti's public institutions. As conditions improved, we repatriated
over 13,000 Haitians who had fled Haiti under the military regime.
The GOH, with assistance from the United States, established an Interim Public
Security Force (IPSF) of some 3,400 members of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H)
who were carefully screened before they were allowed to perform public security
functions. In addition, roughly 1,000 trainees recruited from the migrant population
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba returned to Haiti to serve in various capacities with the
IPSF. With routine attrition, these two groups now form an interim force of about
3,800 personnel. Their purpose is to provide a transitional police presence, under
the general supervision of 663 International Police Monitors (IPMs), until a new, ci-
vilian National Police of Haiti (NPH), initially to be comprised of 4,000 personnel,
is recruited and trained. In addition, about 250 former FAd'H have been assigned
to a Palace Security Detachment. This unit will receive non-lethal training by MNF
personnel in security functions.
The IPSF has received a basic police orientation from the Department of Justice
(ICITAP), and is now under the authority of the Ministry of Justice rather than the
Ministry of Defense. IPSF have been assigned posts throughout Haiti. The more
than 2,400 FAd'H personnel who failed the vetting process are being demobilized
and offered jobs in other ministries or offered 6-month career transitional training
(with pay provided by the GOH) under a contract program administered by USAID.
Thus far, nearly all of the screened-out FAd'H have signed up for such training.
The new National Police of Haiti (NPH) will be deployed incrementally over the
next 18 months. They are being selected from applicants throughout Haiti on the
basis of rigorous testing. A small percentage of qualified IPSF personnel will be al-
lowed to apply for admission to the NPH Academy. NPH trainees receive a full four-
month training program by ICITAP. The first class of approximately 375 NPH can-
didates entered training 1 February, with a similar number to begin training each
month until the force is fully-staffed. The IPSF will be incrementally retired as the
NPH is stood up. The next class is scheduled to begin training on 13 March.








These many accomplishments in Haiti are due, in large part, to the professional-
ism and dedication of our armed forces. The United States military has acted deci-
sively, responsibly, and humanely in carrying out a difficult and complex mission.
Though U.S. forces led this mission, great appreciation must go to all thirty-one
nations whose contributions to the Multinational Force have made Operation Up-
hold Democracy a model of international cooperation for peace enforcement. That
same spirit of cooperation will continue as we transition from a United States- to
a United Nations-led mission.
On 30 January, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 975 rec-
ognizing that a secure and stable environment now exists in Haiti and authorizing
the UN Secretary General to terminate the mission of the MNF and deploy the
United Nations Mission to Haiti (UNMIH). In effect, this resolution recognizes that
the MNF sent to Haiti under the authority of UNSCR 940 has accomplished all of
its assigned tasks and is now ready to transfer responsibilities to UNMIH. UNSCR
975 specifies that this transition is to be completed by 31 March.
We will meet that date. Much remains to be done in Haiti, but the military role
is largely completed. The security environment throughout the country, though far
from perfect, continues to improve as Haitians are growing more accustomed to
going about their daily lives without fear. Though common criminal activity and vio-
lence continue, the number of reported incidents is declining. Further, we know of
no organized group capable of seriously threatening the Haitian Government or the
international presence. Nevertheless, the MNF remains alert and prepared to re-
spond as necessary, while preparations continue to transfer responsibilities to
NMIH.
For several months we have been consulting with the UN to determine how we
can best contribute to the UNMIH mission to sustain the secure and stable environ-
ment established by the MNF and to promote continued recovery of Haiti's demo-
cratic institutions. We intend to accomplish as much advance preparation as we can
in order to make the actual transition from the MNF to UNMIH as seamless and
as smooth as possible. In this regard, the Joint Staff has been working closely with
our permanent mission to the United Nations (USUN), the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and General Sheehan's staff at the U.S. Atlantic
Command. An UNMIH Advance Team is in Haiti operating alongside the MNF and
taking advantage of that mission's experience in an effort to identify requirements
prior to the deployment of UNMIH. While there are still details to be concluded,
we have accomplished the following:
Of the 6,000 troops authorized for UNMIH by UNSCR 975, we are prepared to
contribute up to 2,524. About a dozen other countries will provide the remain-
der of the force, most of which already are part of the MNF in Haiti, and will
continue their participation in the UNMIH.
We have agreed on a final force structure for UNMIH, however, refinements
may be necessary as other participating nations finalize their contributions and
requirements. In any event, U.S. forces will comprise less than half of the
UNMIH military force structure, but will represent critical capabilities of the
mission.
-In addition to providing the Force Commander and 60 members of the
UNMIH headquarters staff, we expect to contribute a number of specialized
forces such as Medical, Engineers, Military Police, Civil Affairs, Aviation, Lo-
gistics, Psychological Operations, Special Forces, and a Quick Reaction Force.
-Half of our contribution to UNMIH will be Special Forces and the Quick Re-
action Force. We are committing 550 Special Forces to continue their work
in the Haitian countryside, focusing on civil-military liaison, humanitarian
and technical assistance, and coalition support. We are also providing a 700
man reaction force built around a light armored cavalry squadron.
The UNMIH force commander will be an American officer. Major General Jo-
seph Kinzer, U.S. Army, has been named as the commander of UN Forces in
Haiti, and he will also be designated Commander of U.S. Forces in Haiti
(COMUSFORHAITI). The UN Secretary General will provide political direction
and guidance, through his Special Representative, to the UNMIH Force Com-
mander. The UNMIH Force Commander, MG Kinzer, will make the decisions
involving UNMIH military operations.
All U.S. forces assigned to UNMIH will be under the command of General
Kinzer. As COMUSP ORHAITI General Kinzer will remain under the command
of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and will report directly to
him. Thus the chain of command from the President to the individual U.S. sol-
dier on the ground in Haiti will remain unbroken. General Kinzer will also have
a U.S. Army Brigadier General serving as his Deputy COMUSFORHAITI. The








Deputy will carry out the day-to-day management of the U.S. contingent's oper-
ations for General Kinzer.
We have a clearly defined end date of our participation in UNMIH. In accord-
ance with UNSCR 940, the UNMIH mission will end in February 1996, after
Haiti's November 1995 presidential elections and the inauguration of President
Aristide's democratically elected successor.
The incremental cost for U.S. military participation in operations in Haiti is pro-
jected to be $416 million in FY 1995. This funds U.S. participation in the Multi-
national Force (MNF) and a transition to the UN funded operation (UNMIH). The
FY 1994 costs were $202.2 million for Operation Uphold Democracy and $173.9 mil-
lion for sanctions enforcement, maritime interdiction of Haiti and the care, housing,
and feeding of Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay.
The proposed DOD supplemental appropriations bill, which covers operations in
Haiti among others, is crucial to maintaining current levels of training and readi-
ness for all military services. This year's shortfall of $2.6 billion, if not corrected in
a timely manner, will have severe results. If the supplemental is not passed, com-
manders will be forced again to curtail training, reduce spare parts stockage levels,
defer depot level and real property maintenance, and minimize fixed costs. Without
a timely passage of the supplemental appropriations bill, the net effect will be a sig-
nificant decrease in overall military readiness.
Let me conclude by saying that the way in which the MNF mission has been
planned and executed incorporated many of the lessons learned in past operations.
Similarly, as we assume a prominent role in UNMIH, we intend to apply the same
methodology. Those lessons include the need for:
A clearly defined mission and objectives, as well as an established exit strategy.
Planning that integrates all dimensions-military, political, social, and eco-
nomic-critical to the success of such an endeavor.
A commander on the ground who has been granted the capabilities and oper-
ational flexibility he needs to protect his forces and accomplish his mission.
Recognition that in face of the challenges involved, and the U.S. interests at
stake, it is best for the United States to accept leadership of the mission and
to commit the largest share of forces.
Finally, ongoing evaluation of the overall mission objectives, activities of our
forces, and their capabilities as the situation on the ground evolves to ensure
that these remain mutually consistent.
These factors have contributed significantly to our success thus far in Haiti. We
are now entering a new phase of the task we undertook in September of last year.
Although the mission, and the U.S. role in accomplishing it, will be different, our
focus on ensuring a stable and secure environment that will give Haiti the oppor-
tunity to revive its economy, and rebuild its institutions of government, must re-
main clear. I am confident that this success will continue in the weeks and months
ahead we proceed with the transition of responsibilities to the UNMIH and as the
Government of Haiti continues to assume greater responsibility for its own security
and governance.
Senator COVERDELL. I am going to turn to our ranking member,
Senator Pell.
Senator, do you have an opening statement that you would like
to make?
Senator PELL. Thank you for the opportunity. I have no opening
statement, except to say I look forward to learning how we are
doing this morning and will have some questions when the time
comes.
Senator COVERDELL. All right. We will limit the questioning to
8 minutes, if it is acceptable. So I would ask that this procedure
be implemented, as I start the questions.
Secretary Talbott, if you would come back to my opening state-
ment, I would like you to elaborate on two points: One, the over-
riding question of establishing a precedent and the manner in
which what we have done in Haiti relates to hemispheric manage-
ment on the part of the United States; and second, more specifi-
cally, the exit which you envision including your view of the cir-
cumstances that may follow our exit.







Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir. First, it is important, I think, to see Oper-
ation Uphold Democracy in the context, as you suggest, of our his-
torical involvement in the hemisphere. In some respects, but not
all, the operation in Haiti is in line with actions that the United
States has chosen to take, the prior administrations in the past.
It is not, of course, unprecedented for the United States to deploy
military forces to other countries in the hemisphere, and to do so
for reasons that are related to the nature of the internal regime of
the country in question.
That happened, of course, in Grenada, when President Reagan
concluded that not just the nature but the actions of the regime in
Grenada constituted a threat to American lives in the first instance
and American interests more generally.
Second, of course, President Bush made a similar decision with
regard to Panama. The issue there was very largely the nature of
the internal regime, and particularly the head of that regime and
his identification as somebody heavily involved in narco-trafficking,
which is one of several global threats that we see to our own na-
tional security.
That said, Operation Uphold Democracy can be distinguished, I
think, from preceding operations in Panama and Grenada in sev-
eral respects. One Dr. Deutch has already referred to, and that is
the extraordinarily low level of American casualties.
Also, the overwhelming warmth with which the American forces
have been received there. I have had the opportunity to visit Haiti
several times since the deployment of our forces.
I saw it again this week. To an extent that is moving, indeed
touching, and I think touches all of our prides as Americans, our
forces are welcome there, and the Haitian people are grateful for
them.
Another important difference, Mr. Chairman, between this oper-
ation and earlier ones is the extent to which we have had inter-
national support, both within the Organization of American States
and in the U.N.
This has been, and will continue to be, genuinely an inter-
national operation, albeit one that would have never happened
without American leadership.
U.N. Resolution 940, passed, I believe, last July 31, which au-
thorized the use of all necessary means in Haiti, was in some
senses a precedent-making act by the U.N., because it said that the
support and defense of democracy was in the interest of the inter-
national community.
Certainly, it is in the interest of the United States, and, most
particularly, it is in the interest of the United States here in this
hemisphere.
We have seen an extraordinary and entirely welcome trend in
this hemisphere over the last several decades. There are countries
which had had one form or another dictatorship, have moved away
from that, and now, with the exception only of Cuba, have demo-
cratically elected governments.
It is very much in our interest, as well as consistent with our
values, that that continue. Had the coup against President
Aristide's democratically elected government prevailed, it would







have sent a worrisome signal to forces elsewhere in the hemi-
sphere.
On the issue of exit, Mr. Chairman, you are quite right to em-
phasize that point. I assure you that has been very much in our
mind throughout the planning and the execution of this operation.
We have always had in mind that there would come a point
when the United States, along with the international community,
would withdraw military forces from Haiti. And Secretary Deutch
has just mentioned, once again, when that will be.
It will be approximately 1 year from now, about 11 months from
now, when the democratically elected successor to Mr. Aristide is
inaugurated.
I should say, however, that it is my expectation and hope that
in many respect we will remain, on an open-ended basis, very
much involved in Haiti through the Agency for International Devel-
opment-and I am joined by a colleague from AID here today who
is prepared to answer any detailed questions you have-and most
importantly through the involvement in the American private sec-
tor, hence the importance of the mission that I led this week.
Senator COVERDELL. Secretary Deutch, you said that the U.N.
operation will be commanded by an American commander, I think
General Kinzer.
What will his relationship be to the U.N. command? Who will be
the U.N. commander? Will there be a U.N. commander on site?
Mr. DEUTCH. There will not be an additional military commander
on site. There will be a special U.N. representative there, who is
concerned with the entire political relationship between the U.N.
force and the U.N. headquarters back in New York.
That special representative, Mr. Brahimi, will also be responsible
for the civil/political relationships, which are being headed by a Ca-
nadian.
The electoral assistance, to assure that there are free elections
held there, that will be the political person representing the U.N.
But the military command is in the hands of our general, General
Kinzer.
Senator COVERDELL. You said a moment ago that he would have
operational control of the U.S. command. Is he in a sense wearing
two hats? It raises a question of-
Mr. DEUTCH. I'm sorry. He will have operational control and
command of the entire military operation. I'm sorry. I make that
as unambiguous as necessary, sir.
Senator COVERDELL. Secretary Talbott, there have been several
delegations that have called on me from Haiti, who have suggested,
even alleged, that some of our resources are being distributed and
managed in a way that would have political ramifications.
This is no secret, I am sure, to you or to anyone else. I discussed
this with Ambassador Swing.
Have you received complaints or allegations of this nature, that
our efforts favor certain parties, that there is not an
evenhandedness about distribution of aid, or that it is being fun-
neled, managed, manipulated? Has this been a concern to you? Has
there been any inquiry into this matter?
Mr. TALBOTT. The short answer is yes. I would put the concern
positively. It has been our determination from the beginning to







make sure that all aspects of our involvement, notably including
through the Agency for International Development, support the
process of democracy as the whole.
That means, of course, an inclusive, pluralistic, multiparty de-
mocracy. And we have kept an eagle eye on just that point, includ-
ing in our trip down there this week.
I might say, by the way, that one of the first actions that our
military forces undertook when they entered Haiti on September
19 was to go to the parliament, to make sure that the parliament
was itself a safe and secure environment, so that the parliament
could begin functioning again.
This week, I made a point of meeting with Mr. Brahimi, the head
of the electoral commission which will be overseeing the parliamen-
tary and municipal and local elections that will be taking place in
June.
And I know to make sure that he is satisfied, that the support
that he is getting from the United States in general, and from AID
in particular, is nonpartisan and supports the process as a whole.
He pronounced himself to be generally satisfied on that point.
And if you would like more details, perhaps you would permit,
Mr. Chairman, for Mr. Mark Schneider, the Assistant Adminis-
trator of AID, to join us at the table, either for discussion now or
at any point.
Senator COVERDELL. Please do so. You might comment on-
Mr. TALBOTT. You might say a bit more about what we are doing
to support the political-
Senator COVERDELL. It was specifically AID resources at which
the allegation was directed.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Obviously, we have both policies and prohibi-
tions on that being the case. In this particular instance, when we
heard some of those allegations, we reviewed all of our programs.
The bulk, for example, of our humanitarian programs was dis-
tributed through organizations that you know well, like CARE,
Catholic Relief Service, ADRA, and they utilize then local NGO's
all across the country.
They have been doing that for some years, and those groups rep-
resent, obviously, nonpartisan political views.
With respect to the parliament, initially we had facilitated the
return of the 11 parliamentarians that were exiled in the United
States and Canada. We provided communications assistance for the
parliamentarians.
We are currently working with several U.S. groups, including, I
believe, one that is going to be testifying for you later, as well as
the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, the Center for De-
mocracy, focusing on providing orientation services and support for
the new parliament as soon as it is elected.
But in terms of biased or partisan use of the funds, that is clear-
ly prohibited, and we followed up on any allegations.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you.
I turn to Senator Pell for his series of questions.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I add,
Senator Coverdell, I am very glad you are holding this hearing.







Having an interest in the Coast Guard, I was just curious where
the vessels are now, how many of the cutters are still in use, and
what the plans are for the use of Coast Guard cutters in the future.
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Pell, I will have to get you an answer for the
record. As you know, the Coast Guard has done a tremendous job
in this entire operation.
The current deployments, I do not have at my fingertips. But if
it is agreeable to you, sir, we will get it to you as quickly as we
can.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much. I would be interested. But
I am curious, when we were down in Port-au-Prince, we had some
time with General Cedras, Colonel Francois. I was curious where
they are now.
Have they gone to Europe? Are they in America? Do we know?
Mr. TALBOTT. General Cedras is living in quiet exile in Panama.
I believe that Colonel Francois is in the Dominican Republic.
Senator Pell, I said that Cedras is in Panama and Francois is in
the Dominican Republic.
Senator PELL. In late January, it was reported that Constant,
Emmanuel Constant, the leader of FRAPH, was responsible for
many of the assassinations in Haiti in 1993 and 1994. Is he in the
United States, and does he have a valid U.S. visa?
Mr. TALBOTT. We do not know where Mr. Constant is. He had
been issued a visa at one point in the past. This is according to the
records of our embassy in Port-au-Prince. It was a 5-year tourist
visa.
This was issued, of course, prior to the coup and before FRAPH
was even founded. But his visa was revoked then. And if he has
left Haiti, I assure you that no Department or Agency of the U.S.
Government was complicit in helping him do so.
Senator PELL. Looking down the road, do you see-what concerns
should we be particularly aware of that could arise in the future
to put this operation backward?
Mr. TALBOTT. The No. 1 concern-and I think perhaps both of us
would like to speak to this-is security. We are satisfied with the
progress that has been made, but we are also well aware that more
progress needs to be made.
At the moment, overwhelmingly, the principal force providing se-
curity to Haiti is that of the Multinational Force and soon will be
that of U.N. mission. But they are a short-term presence in Haiti.
They will be leaving at the beginning of next year. And that is
why it is important that we continue to do everything we can to
help the Haitians put in place a security force of their own.
As I indicated in my opening statement before you arrived, Sen-
ator, I was heartened by what I saw at the police academy in Port-
au-Prince.
They are doing very good work, and they are doing it very quick-
ly, to turn out first-rate police officers, who will be able to fill in
behind the interim police force that is now in place and that is
under the supervision of international police monitors. But security
remains, in many ways, job one.
Maybe Mr. Deutch would like to add something.







Mr. DEUTCH. Well, I think that that sums it up right. It is secu-
rity and also, I might say, the protection of our own forces who will
remain in the country.
We believe that the protection of our forces and the security of
the general populous is adequately maintained certainly by the
Multinational Force now, and there will be a seamless transition
to UNMIH, the U.N. mission in Haiti, so that we believe that there
should be no change in the generally positive security outlook, both
with respect to our own troops and for the people of Haiti.
We have paid a good deal of attention to this transition to make
sure that there is no opportunity or suggestion of an opening for
violence in that country.
Senator PELL. You mentioned the interim police force. What hap-
pens to them when the new policemen take over?
Mr. TALBOTT. Some members of the interim police force, Senator
Pell, will join the permanent police force. They are eligible to apply
for membership in the permanent police force, and some are doing
SO.
If I am not mistaken, in the second class, which will be coming
in the next several weeks, there will be members of the interim po-
lice force who will be preparing to be part of the permanent police
force.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
No further questions.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator.
The ranking member of this subcommittee has arrived, Senator
Christopher Dodd.
Senator, I would ask if you have an opening statement which you
would care to make at this time.
Senator DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank our witnesses in advance for their participation.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I think
it is extremely worthwhile and helpful that we get an assessment.
This is a critical time, obviously, with the transfer of authority
in terms of peacekeeping operations moving to the U.N. I would
just make a couple of observations.
I will ask unanimous consent to put my formal statement in the
record.
But first of all, I want to commend our military forces. These are
remarkable people, who did a fabulous job. I was down there on a
couple of occasions and had a chance to meet with the commanders
and some of the troops.
Other people disagree or agree with the policy-
Senator COVERDELL. Senator, I think your-we need to get you
to either try this other mike or-
Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
These young men and women, who are part of our Armed Forces,
just would make every single citizen of this country deeply, deeply
proud. Whether you agree or disagree, as I said a moment ago,
with the policy itself, I just cannot say enough about the quality
of the forces and the job that they did.
It is a new and different world that they are being asked to oper-
ate in, and the conditions are not going to be as simple as they
might have been in the past, not that they were ever simple.







But the complications, the political and social issues involved, I
just was deeply, deeply impressed with them and their command-
ers.
And I think it is worthwhile to note how they felt as well about
their efforts. It is just a great day, I think, and a great time to see
U.S. military forces perform as admirably as they did.
I want to commend the President. This was not a popular deci-
sion. Quite to the contrary, it was rather unpopular. And I think
that takes a certain amount of courage and political leadership that
is absolutely critical.
It is not uncommon throughout our history on foreign policy mat-
ters where Presidents have taken unpopular positions.
I have been reading lately the role of Franklin Roosevelt at the
outbreak of World War II. And while memories fade, they were un-
popular decisions in those days. Certainly Harry Truman with the
Marshall plan, not a very popular decision at the time.
You cannot find anybody who disagrees with it today, but cer-
tainly back when the decision was being made, it was very, very
unpopular. So I commend the President.
I commend President Aristide. He has shown and demonstrated,
since he has been back, a real desire to move on the economic and
political and social front. I think it surprised even his most severe
critics about the fine job that he has been doing.
This has been costly. There is a price tag associated with this.
Roughly, I guess, around $700 million, something in that neighbor-
hood, and those dollars are hard-earned by people.
But I would remind people, as well, that we no longer have peo-
ple fleeing Haiti. We had them at 10,000 a week at one point, hav-
ing as many as 15,000 people in Guantanamo. The price tag was
roughly-as I recall, about $200 million a year is what we were
looking at in order to deal with that problem.
So that while this investment in Haiti, to give this country a
chance for the first time almost since its creation as an independ-
ent republic in 1804, I think is going to turn out to be a good in-
vestment.
It will be hard to prove what was saved if the problems do not
emerge, but if the estimates were correct, about $200 million a year
to deal with just the refugee problems. And then quickly, that $700
million begins to evaporate.
Now, obviously, as Madeleine Albright has pointed out, I think
all of us would agree, ultimately the success of this program de-
pends on the Haitians themselves.
What we have done here is give them an opportunity, and I
think we can be proud of providing that opportunity. But it is now
a chance for them to determine whether or not they are going to
be able to make this work.
And again, I think the fact that we have come this far, achieved
a great deal, it is unprecedented, but it has worked as successfully
as it has, an absolutely minimum loss of life in the process, far be-
yond the expectations of what many thought would be the case, is
something that ultimately, I think, will go down as one of those
events that proved to be an extremely worthwhile investment for
this country to make.








This is not a nation that is thousands of miles away. It is 90 or
100 miles away. I know it very, very well. As my colleague, the
chairman of the committee, knows, I served on the border of that
country for 2V2years as a Peace Corps volunteer.
So I know and have known and watched it going back 35 years.
This is a proud people. They are wonderful people in Haiti. They
have been denied the basic liberties that other nations have en-
joyed, and for the first time now, they have a real, real chance to
be able to command their own destiny.
I think Americans who embrace and hold those values of democ-
racy and liberties so dear can be proud we have helped give a peo-
ple a chance to have a future that we so love in this nation and
of course everywhere else.
So I commend the administration and those responsible, particu-
larly our military leaders, those in the State Department, those in
the White House. They have done a very, very good job in my view.
We are going to have to watch it, obviously, how it works here,
no guarantee of success. But I, frankly, am proud of the fact that
my country stood up for democracy and saved, I believe, in the long
run a tremendous amount of human hardship and cost to us had
we not taken this action.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DODD
Today the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs has convened to review
U.S. policy toward Haiti. I want to commend the Chairman of the Subcommittee,
Senator Coverdell for the timeliness of this hearing. The first phase of international
efforts to restore democratic rule in Haiti is winding down. The next phase-when
the United Nations takes over responsibilities for peacekeeping, police training and
election supervision-is currently moving ahead. In fact, President Clinton has an-
nounced that he plans to travel to Port au Prince to make his own assessment of
the situation and to thank U.S. forces for their incredible service to our country on
March 31-the day that the United States officially turns over operations to the
United Nations.
By any measure, Operation Uphold Democracy has been an incredible success
story. We have clearly learned a great deal from past efforts at peacekeeping. All
the dire predictions of what would happen if U.S. troops were deployed in an effort
to restore President Aristide to office have proven false. Rather than being a cata-
lyst for mass insurrection by the Haitian people, United States forces have been the
object of reverence and adulation.
And based upon press interviews of U.S. service men and women deployed in
Haiti, I believe that by and large it has also been a positive experience for them.
Upon their arrival, U.S. forces observed, first hand, the extreme poverty and brutal-
ity that the average Haitian citizen confronted daily. Elderly women beaten by mili-
tary or security forces without cause. Indiscriminant use of force to disburse peace-
ful crowds. Politically motivated attacks and looting by supporters of the deposed
Haitian military leaders. Such acts of violence were abhorrent to the American men
and women who make up our armed forces-and thanks to them, today such acts
are markedly fewer in the day to day lives of Haitians.
President Aristide also deserves enormous credit for the job he has done. He com-
mitted himself to work for peace and reconciliation among all the sectors of Haitian
society upon his return to Haiti-including among his most virulent critics. He has
more than met that commitment. He also pledged to take a number of other reform
measures-economic, political, electoral, and police reforms-he has made credible
and verifiable progress in each of these areas. The relative peace and stability of
Haiti would not be possible were it not for his efforts and those of his government
to heal the wounds of three years of conflict and violence, and to rebuild a country
devastated by strife and corruption.
Obviously Operation Uphold Democracy and its successor UNMIH are not without
cost. The Clinton Administration has estimated costs associated with U.S. Haiti op-






24

erations for FY 1994 and FY 1995 are estimated at $764 million. The cost of U.S.
participation in the Multinational Force represents roughly $346 million of that
total. The cost of U.S. participation in UNMIH will be significantly less-(roughly
$55 million through July 31 of this year or only 30% of the estimated U.N. costs).
I would argue that this has been money well spent. For the first time since Haitian
Independence in 1804, the Haitian people have a real shot at democracy thanks to
us. Is $700 million too great a price to pay for that possibility?
Moreover, Haitians are no longer attempting to flee their country by the boat
loads. We are quick to forget the images that unfolded on the nightly news during
the height of the Haitian exodus. At its peak in July 1994, more than 10,000 Hai-
tians took to the oceans in the first seven days of that month alone. Overall, any
thousands of Haitians were intercepted and returned to Haiti by the U.S. Coast
Guard during the three years of military dictatorship. Countless others lost their
lives at sea in their futile efforts to flee repression. More than 14,000 Haitians were
provided safe haven in Guantanamo, Cuba by the United States. Still more were
prevented from leaving their homeland by an extensive fleet of U.S. Coast Guard
vessels that patrolled Haitian waters. The overall costs to the U.S. taxpayers of
these efforts had reached $200 million annually-with the prospect of even larger
costs had the worsening conditions in Haiti produced another mass exodus.
Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros Ghali, in a report rec-
ommending to the U.N. Security Council that the time was right for the United Na-
tions to assume full responsibility for Haiti peacekeeping, gave his own assessment
of current conditions in Haiti: "Haitians can now enjoy their fundamental rights, in
particular freedom of expression, association, and assembly.* Overall, there is
a feeling of liberty and a sense of security that did not exist previously." He also
went on to outline the difficulties and challenges that are present today in Haiti
but expressed confidence that the U.N. Mission would be able to fulfill its mandate
to sustain a secure and stable environment in that country.
The U.N. Secretary General went on to conclude that, "everything suggests the
overwhelming majority of [the people of Haiti] are determined to defend their newly
discovered freedom and that they will oppose with determination any attempt to
bring them back to the hated past of intimidation, exploitation, and humiliation.
The Haitian people do not need reminding that the good will of the international
community towards their country is no substitute for their own efforts to build their
future, stand for their rights and protect their dignity."
The Haitian people are an enormously proud people, rich in tradition and history.
U.S. Ambassador Madeline Albright observed during United Nations deliberations
over U.N. Resolution 975-a resolution authorizing the U.N. to take over respon-
sibilities for Haitian peacekeeping-that, "the future of Haiti rests-as it must-in
Haitian hands. Democratic institutions cannot be imposed upon a society; they must
be nourished from within. The road ahead remains an uphill road. But the inter-
national community can be satisfied that those with the commitment to build a free
Haiti now have that opportunity." I believe that we should be rightfully proud as
a nation that we have played a significant role in making this happen.
Senator COVERDELL. We are very honored to have the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee present. I wonder if he might
have an opening statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, a brief one. Of course, Mr. Chairman, you
know that any Senator who says he is going to speak briefly does
not really mean it. But I am going to try and mean it.
Dick Lugar and I have a problem. His committee, of which I am
member, is meeting now; and this committee, of which he is a
member, is meeting now. It is impossible to be in two places at one
time. He asked me to convey to the distinguished guests this morn-
ing his gratitude to them for coming, and I join in that.
Now, I believe we all bandy figures around, but my understand-
ing is that the administration has notified Congress that it has
spent and has plans to spend $1,800,000 in Haiti, is that correct?
Now, Senator Dodd used a lesser figure than that.
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would just try to answer
the question directly. Our view is up till now, January 1, total ex-
penditures have been-end of January, I should say-$944 million.







Our estimates for total expenditures, fiscal 1994 all the way to
the end of fiscal year 1995, would be about $1.3 billion.
If you ask how long will it be to the end of the UNMIH stage
of this participation, which would be February 1996, an estimate
of that, in my judgment, would be about $1.5 billion. We can pro-
vide a detailed table here to break it out for you, but that would
take us into 1996.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will swap. I will give you my figures
and where I got them, and you give me yours and where you got
them. How about that?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes, sir.
[The information Mr. Deutch referred to follows:]

Estimated Total Haiti Costs-All Agencies
(In millions)
Fiscal Fiscal
year year Total
1994 1995
Operations prior to U.N. handoff:
Migrations/safe havens .............................................. 126.9 50.1 177.0
Sanctions enforcement (interdiction) ........................ 67.0 .5 67.5
Pre-September 19 economic and humanitarian ass't 76.8 76.8
Subtotal .................................... ..................... 270.7 50.6 321.3
Operation Uphold Maintain Democracy ................... 263.8 649.7 913.5
Total ................................................................. 534.5 700.3 1,234.8

United Nations Operations:
Logistics support to UNMII .................................. ... 60.0 60.0
Logistics support to U.S. Forces in UNMIH ............... *
U.S. share of UNMIH (assessed) ....................... .. 56.2 56.2
Total ................................................................. 116.2 116.2
Total costs .......................... ..................... 534.5 816.5 1,351.0
These costs are U.S. unique requirements which are not reimbursed by the U.N. and are estimated to
cost $1-2 million per month.

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Now, I do not want to sound like a broken
record, but Mr. Aristide is a second stanza of the same song. We
had the Marines down there in Haiti. They did not instill any
democratic values.
I do not know of any democratic values Mr. Aristide has ever
demonstrated. So I do not know how you figure that he is going to
bring democracy-whatever that means-to Haiti.
Now, about 15 percent of AID's entire fiscal year 1996 budget for
Latin America is going to Haiti. I am right about that, am I not?
Mr. TALBOTT. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. OK. Now, this is one-tenth of 1 percent of the
population of Latin America. I continue to doubt, Mr. Chairman,
that Mr. Aristide has any real commitment to democracy.
Since his return in October 1994, he has actively encouraged the
formation of so-called vigilance committees. These groups have
clearly engaged in intimidating and harassing Mr. Aristide's politi-
cal opponents. I think I read the American public's attitude pretty








well, when I say that the American people resent using U.S. troops
as a cover for a man like Aristide to establish neighborhood cells,
serving as his eyes and ears.
Now, Mr. Aristide's vigilance committees sound remarkably simi-
lar to Fidel Castro's committees, which have tormented the Cuban
people for a long, long time.
But the point is this-and by the way, I appreciate Senator Dodd
complimenting the military. The first commanding general of that
operation was a North Carolinian, General Shelton, and he is now
commander or base commander at Fort Bragg, NC. So he is a tar-
heel, true and blue. So I appreciate any compliments paid to North
Carolinians.
Now, I cannot remember, Mr. Chairman, receiving so many
angry letters from members of the armed forces, criticizing this
Haiti operation.
They are fully aware that the U.S. military has less to spend for
critical operations and maintenance activities because the Penta-
gon O&M account has been, you might put it, robbed to pay for
property of Aristide.
And then there is the comparison that is inevitable. I read in the
paper and heard on the newscast about the intention to loosen the
sanctions on Mr. Castro. And I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I
do hope the administration got the message from the U.S. Senate
yesterday and last evening.
And I thank the Chair.
[The prepared statement of the Chairman follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HELMS
The administration's Haiti policy is a prime example of the U.S. government
throwing away taxpayers' money willy nilly-with no end in sight. We should have
learned our lesson with Haiti long ago. The" 19 year U.S. Marine occupation earlier
this century did not instill democratic values in Haiti. I see little evidence that the
current occupation will leave a democratic imprint on President Aristide.
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, it bears repeating that Congress has
piled a $4.8 TRILLION debt on the backs of American taxpayers. In the past 8
months, the administration has notified Congress of more than $1.4 BILLION in
costs associated with the return of Aristide to power. And the administration pro-
poses to sink another $123 million of foreign aid into Haiti next year.
About 15 percent of A.I.D.'s entire FY 1996 budget for Latin America is going to
Haiti. This is an enormous sum of money for a country representing only .01 percent
of the population in Latin America, and for a country posing no threat to U.S. na-
tional security interests. If we're lucky, President Clinton's Haiti policy will just be
a waste of money. At worst, the American Armed Forces-which will make up much
of the U.N. peacekeeping force-could be stuck in Haiti for years.
I still have questions about Aristide's commitment to democracy. Since his return
in October 1994, Aristide has actively encouraged the formation of so-called vigi-
lance committees. These groups are accused of intimidating and harassing Aristide's
political opponents. Americans do not want U.S. troops used as a cover for Aristide
to establish neighborhood cells serving as his eyes and ears. Aristide's vigilance
committees sound remarkably similar to Fidel Castro's Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution.
U.S. troops went into Haiti to restore democracy, but Parliamentary elections
scheduled to occur last December were postponed to February, then to April, and
now are scheduled to take place in June. In the meantime, Aristide rules by decree.
Many of the soldiers who have served in Haiti are stationed in North Carolina.
I cannot remember receiving so many angry letters from members of the armed
forces criticizing an ill-conceived operation. They are fully aware that the U.S. mili-
tary has less to spend for critical operations and maintenance activities, because the
Pentagon's "O&M" account has been robbed to pay for propping up Aristide.
American troops should not even be in Haiti, and the billions of dollars should
never have been wasted on this mission. U.S. servicemen are the best trained, most






27
committed troops in the world, but even they cannot accomplish the impossible mis-
sion of "restoring" democracy where democracy never existed.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator.
Senator PELL. The message is the other way, too. You should re-
member that.
The CHAIRMAN. Say what the message is.
Senator PELL. There is a message, too, complimenting the admin-
istration on lowering the rachet against Cuba.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, would you-I do not want to take over your
committee hearing, but I think we ought to have this on the record.
Senator COVERDELL. I think, given the circumstances-
The CHAIRMAN. Who complimented the administration?
Senator COVERDELL [continuing].I am going to let you two ask
each other questions.
Senator PELL. I was just saying that we have two different views.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, we generally do, Senator, and I respect you
with great affection. But what is the basis of your view?
Senator PELL. My view is the more contact we have with the Cu-
bans, the more likely they are to come out with-
The CHAIRMAN. Ridiculing?
Senator COVERDELL. No, contact.
The CHAIRMAN. The more contact we have-
Senator PELL. The more contact there is between the Cuban peo-
ple, Cuba, and the United States, the more likely communism is to
be eroded in that unhappy country.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, tell that to-well, OK Thanks.
Senator COVERDELL. All right. We are going to proceed with the
questions.
Senator Dodd?
Senator DODD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess the numbers I was referring to earlier were the incre-
mental costs associated with the Haitian operation, which was
about $764 million. And I would be interested in knowing exactly
what we are looking at here, and I appreciate, Mr. Deutch, your
points on it.
Am I roughly correct? And I do not know who this ought to be
addressed to, maybe you, Secretary Talbott, on what was the basic
cost?
What were we looking at in terms of costs of dealing with the
refugee population in Guantanamo, the costs of Coast Guard activi-
ties that were interrupting these refugees leaving the country?
And, by the way, what is the situation today regarding-obvi-
ously, the economic conditions have not improved dramatically in
Haiti. A lot of the argument was earlier that this was basically eco-
nomic, not political.
So could you give us some sort of picture today of what we are
looking at and what the situation was prior to the decision to go
in and try and restore democracy in Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. The economic situation.
Senator DODD. Yes.
Mr. TALBOTT. Perhaps Secretary Deutch could first speak to the
economic situation.







Mr. DEUTCH. Roughly, sir, you are correct. The $200 million is
a good estimate of what it would have cost to maintain the kind
of sanctions effort and refugee effort at Guantanamo.
Of course, those costs are way down now, because we have man-
aged to return essentially all the Haitians to Haiti; $200 million a
year is a very good estimate of what it would cost.
Senator COVERDELL. Is that the total cost or a partial tally? I
think that the Senator is asking for the total cost.
Mr. DEUTCH. No. Maybe I-I thought the question was: How
much would it cost to maintain the kind of levels for migrants and
for the interdiction effort? Had we not done anything in Haiti, $200
million a year was about the rate at which we were running. I
think that was responsive.
Senator DODD. All right. That's correct. And second, similarly, as
I gather, we are looking at, at the high point, at roughly 10,000
people a week that were either escaping or trying to escape, at the
high point. Is that roughly accurate?
Mr. DEUTCH. That's correct. So there were such weeks, but not
many of them.
Mr. TALBOTT. But we remember them well.
Mr. DEUTCH. We remember them well.
Senator COVERDELL. We remember them very well.
Senator DODD. And what is the situation since our participation,
in terms of the number of people seeking to leave Haiti?
Mr. DEUTCH. I think it is essentially none, sir, none outside of
the normal channels of transportation.
Senator DODD. That is what I mean.
Mr. TALBOTT. That's correct.
Senator DODD. So it has virtually come down to, in effect, almost
zero, except through normal channels.
Mr. TALBOTT. That's correct.
Senator DODD. So those scenes that we all witnessed night after
night of literally dozens and dozens of people aboard those hastily
fabricated craft out there is basically over with at this juncture.
Mr. DEUTCH. That's correct.
Senator DODD. Could you give us some update on what has hap-
pened the names that quickly fade, I guess, into the past, General
Cedras and Colonel Francois, who were very much common names
only a few months ago, and Mr. Biambi, I guess, to add as well?
What is the situation with them? Where are they? What are they
doing? Any possibility they are trying to get?
We know now that Mr. Constant made it into this country.
Where are these fellows? Is there any chance they are. back in
Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. We are not actually sure about the whereabouts of
Mr. Constant, by the way. Mr. Cedras is in Panama, as is Mr.
Biambi. And Mr. Francois is in the Dominican Republic.
We have no reason whatsoever to think that they are con-
templating a return to Haiti.
Senator DODD. So at present, we do know where they are, and
there is no indication that they are moving.
Mr. TALBOTT. We know where they are. We are not sure-the
question about Mr. Constant came up earlier, before you were able
to join us, Senator. He did have an American tourist visa at one







point. It has been revoked, but we are not sure where he actually
Is.
Senator DODD. Secretary Deutch, can you give us some sense-
my colleague from North Carolina has talked about the number of
letters that he received from people in the military who are con-
cerned about this particular effort.
I met with General Shelton on numerous occasions, and I have
a tremendously high regard for him. I think he did just a fabulous
job.
Can you give us some assessment of what you believe the mili-
tary leadership and those who served in Haiti, what their reaction
was to this particular mission?
Mr. DEUTCH. Well, Senator, it is very clear that military, every-
one in the military who I know, believes that their principal duty
is to serve when called upon to do so. And certainly, that is the
way they view this operation. There is widespread pride for the
way this operation has been carried out, both within the military
and without.
So I would say in general those who served in Haiti are ex-
tremely proud of the professionalism of their accomplishment and
certainly deserve our, as civilian, our very great gratitude for the
professional and successful service that they have done down there.
And I think that that is universally agreed everywhere in the
world, that our soldiers, men and women, have just done an out-
standing job there in every possible dimension.
Senator DODD. Quickly, Mr. Schneider, on the efforts that Presi-
dent Aristide has made in terms of economic development in the
country, I understand there have already been decisions to pri-
vatize in a number of areas previously government-run operations
in the country, close association to work with the private sector.
I have met with a number of private sector groups that have
come from Haiti who I remember a few years ago were hostile to-
ward President Aristide-that would be a mild characterization of
how they felt about him-and today come up and are laudatory, in
terms of the steps that are being made in the nation economically,
of his efforts.
Can you share with us your assessment of how President
Aristide is doing economically? And what is the reaction of the pri-
vate sector in Haiti to some of the steps that he is making?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Yes, Senator. I just was pleased to return with
Deputy Secretary Talbott yesterday from a Presidential business
development mission to Haiti that was specifically directed at sup-
porting the efforts in Haiti to restore and to rejuvenate the private
sector.
I think that it is very important to note that from the beginning,
last August, President Aristide indicated his view that the only
way that both the success of democracy could be sustained would
be through economic recovery built on private sector development.
And at that point, when his government made their presentation
in Paris, they called for the privatization of all of the paristadles.
There are about 33 paristadles in Haiti that have been basically
corrupt mechanisms, not providing services.
They then took the step of calling for privatization and chose,
with the work of the International Finance Corp., an arm of the


89-189 0 95 3







World Bank that they have signed an agreement with, that we are
supporting, nine of those major ones to begin the privatization
process.
And that is only one indication. President Aristide, in a series of
steps, has opened up the economy, aimed at reducing tariffs, has
provided specific opportunities for business, both foreign and do-
mestic, to come to Haiti, has invited them several times, has come
to Miami to participate in a variety of conferences, urging both pri-
vate domestic enterprises in Haiti and U.S. foreign investors to
come to Haiti.
And I should add that USAID has been working in the develop-
ment recently of specific efforts to support private sector develop-
ment through credit and technical assistance.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Helms?
The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear all these nice things about Mr.
Aristide. Nobody ever mentions the necklacing, the bicycle tires
and the gasoline, but I guess this is off limits.
But what is on limits this morning is that Mr. Aristide has at
least five lobbyists that I know about. They are advising him on
how to handle the U.S. Congress.
He has the wife of Randall Robinson, the head of TransAfrica.
You have former Congressman Mike Barnes. A former U.S. Ambas-
sador-he was until Ronald Reagan gave him his walking papers-
Robert White.
Now, I understand that at least one of these lobbyists is paid by
Mr. Aristide $60,000 a month. Now, come on. Haiti's per capital in-
come is about $370, is it not, a year?.
Mr. TALBOTT. Less than that.
The CHAIRMAN. Less than that.
Mr. TALBOTT. A little over $200 a year.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, maybe you can disabuse these reports that
are circulating among credible sources. How much is he paying his
lobbyists? And what are they doing for him? And whose money is
he using?
Mr. TALBOTT. Senator Helms, I do not have the details on the ar-
rangements between President Aristide and his government on the
one hand and Americans who are working with him and for him.
Any specific questions that you have, which the State Depart-
ment is in a position to provide concrete answers to, I will under-
take to make sure that that happens.
Having just been in Haiti over the last couple of days, I did see
a number of American citizens, well-known to me since I have been
working on this issue for quite some time, who are indeed working
closely with President Aristide, and particularly working closely
with President Aristide in order to help cultivate good relations be-
tween his government and the legislative branch of the American
Government.
He understands our system very well. He wants to have the best
possible relations with the U.S. Congress.
That is one reason that he has made a point of meeting with all
of the congressional delegations, including some that you gentle-







men have been part of, that have come down there. He is going to
be receiving a congressional delegation headed by your counterpart
in the House of Representatives, Mr. Gilman, in the next couple of
days.
He is putting a lot of attention and no doubt devoting some re-
sources to this, and I welcome that.
I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that you would consider this per-
haps an opportune moment for me to respond to Senator Helms's
earlier statement, which I think was an invitation for some com-
ment or response on our part, about President Aristide's creden-
tials as a democrat. I leave that completely up to you, sir.
Senator COVERDELL. Let me ask you to let the Senator finish his
questions, and I will give you, Secretary, an ample opportunity be-
fore we move to the next panel to respond to that point.
Mr. TALBOTT. Absolutely. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, it is a fact, is it not, that Mr. Aristide has
replaced at least half of the Haitian elected mayors with his own
supporters? Now, without making a speech, is that so? Yes or no?
Mr. TALBOTT. I missed the key word. Has replaced?
The CHAIRMAN. At least half of the mayors in Haiti, he has re-
placed them with people, his own supporters. Now, these were
elected mayors.
Mr. TALBOTT. If you want to get into great detail on that, I might
ask-
The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to get into great deal. I just want
a yes or no.
Mr. TALBOTT. I will ask-that is not my impression, sir. No. In
the case of by far the largest city in Haiti, which is Port-au-Prince,
the democratically elected mayor, Mr. Evans Paul, had been in hid-
ing during most of the coup period and had-and was able to come
back into office to which he was democratically elected as a result
of the Multinational Force coming in.
The municipal and local posts throughout Haiti are going to be
filled by officials who would be elected in democratic, free and fair
elections that will be held on June 4.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, what is the answer to my question? Did he
replace elected mayors with his own supporters temporarily or not?
Mr. TALBOTT. As I say, that-he replaced some on a temporary
basis so that there would be instruments of governance in those
communities.
If you would permit, I would like to ask Ambassador Dobbins,
who is the coordinator of our policies toward Haiti, to come to the
microphone. He may have more details on this.
Ambassador DOBBINs. Just to say that there were communes in
the country which were without effective governance because the
mayors had disappeared, because mayors had been appointed by
the coup leadership, who were clearly associated with human
rights abuses during that period and no longer had any authority.
Temporary appointments were made to replace those kinds of peo-
ple.
This has not been particularly controversial in Haiti. The par-
liament was in session at the time. They could have intervened and
made a problem of it. They did not.






32

This was thought to be a perfectly appropriate step in the situa-
tion, the extraordinary situation of the time. And, of course, all of
these people will be replaced by freely elected representatives in
June.
The CHAIRMAN. They were replaced by truly elected representa-
tives. Is that what you-
Ambassador DOBBINS. I'm sorry. They all will be replaced by
freely elected representatives in June of this year.
The CHAIRMAN. But you do acknowledge-but you put the spin,
and it is all sweetness and light-that the ones he replaced, elected
mayors, with people of his own choice.
Ambassador DOBBINS. I believe that the mayors he replaced were
by and large appointed by the coup regime, not elected.
The CHAIRMAN. You believe that, but I do not believe it is so, sir.
And I wish you would check on it and let me know.
[The information referred to follows:]
Answer. President Aristide issued a decree on February 24, noting that the expi-
ration of the terms of all mayors in Haiti left a void in local government. In order
to assure the security of local government institutions, the decree undertook to ap-
point "interim executive agents." The operative article declared that certain named
citizens are appointed as mayors and deputy mayors to administer 124 of Haiti's
135 communes until the investiture of officials elected in the upcoming municipal
elections.
Our Embassy is currently in the process of comparing the names of those chosen
to the names of municipal officials elected in 1990, as well as to the names of those
actually occupying the various city halls according to the best available information.
Once we receive the Embassy's analysis of this information, we will be pleased to
share it with the Committee.
Ambassador DOBBINS. I will, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I do not have any idea how much more time I
have.
Ambassador Swing confronted Mr.-Aristide about a little matter.
Aristide dismissed 1,200 Haitian policemen screened by the United
States to make sure that they were not human rights abusers,
screened by our Government to make sure that they were not
human rights abusers.
And Aristide dismissed them, according to our information, and
then, without saying anything-and maybe you all do not even
know about it-added nearly 1,700 new, unscreened people to the
police force.
Now, is that so?
Mr. TALBOTT. The short answer is yes, and it has been resolved,
precisely because we did make representations. And we feel that
the interim police, interim public security force, is, as it is intended
to be, going to be manned by personnel who have been properly
vetted.
Ambassador DOBBINS. Can I just make one amendment to that,
Mr. Secretary?
This discrepancy between their list and our list did exist. As soon
as it was brought to President Aristide's attention, he took steps
to correct it. We worked with him, and it has been fully corrected.
The CHAIRMAN. So your contention is he did not know anything
about this.
Ambassador DOBBINS. He appeared not to know anything about
it. Everything-all the information we have from all sources sug-
gests that he did not know anything about it.







The CHAmMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, the fact is that the par-
liament was dismissed on February 4 and the mayors were re-
placed by Mr. Aristide about February 25. We can address this fur-
ther either now or later, but there is a great conflict between what
is being said here and what I understand to be the facts.
Senator COVERDELL. Senator Helms, it is my intention to ask
unanimous consent-we might as well do it now, in light of these
questions-to keep the record open for 3 days, so that we can for-
malize these questions.
Obviously, as we go through the additional testimony, other
questions will be raised. And we will give the panel an appropriate
opportunity to respond.
In excusing the panel, I want to thank all of you for the time
that you prepared for being here this morning and for your-
Senator DODD. Can I have an additional question?
Senator COVERDELL. Well, I am about to move on. Is it just a
short question?
Senator DODD. Yes. I just want to come back on this particular
point, because the parliament was not dismissed at all. That word
is totally inaccurate to describe what occurred, and I would ask Mr.
Talbott to respond. What in fact was the situation?
Mr. TALBOTT. It ended under the terms of the Haitian constitu-
tion, which is why both the Aristide Government and the inter-
national community and the United States are working very hard
to make sure that there are elections as soon as possible in order
to convene a new parliament.
Senator DODD. Second, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the may-
ors, these were mayors put in place by the coup leaders. They were
basically thugs, criminals in many instances, members of the
Tonton- Macoute. They were dreaded figures in many of these com-
munities.
Now, the best evidence I can offer to that is to look at the scenes
of what happened when our forces went in and virtually liberated
some of these communities from some of these characters.
There was jubilation over the fact that these appointed leaders
in these communities-there were executions. People disappeared,
who were marginally elected in some cases.
But to talk about people being freely elected in Haiti is a total
misnomer. There was nothing that occurred, unfortunately, like
that at all. And I think the record needs to be clear and straight
on this matter.
We are talking about some of the worst criminal elements in this
hemisphere who were appointed and put in place by the coup lead-
ers in these communities. These were not democratically elected
figures at all.
Am I correct in that?
Ambassador DOBBINS. Yes, sir, I believe you are.
Senator COVERDELL. We will give the Senator a chance to make
a closing statement, too, as we move on to the next panels.
Now, logistically, we have left the record open, so you would be
prepared to respond to questions. I am going to give a list to Mr.
Schneider of organizations to which concerns regarding AID activi-
ties have been voiced; many allegations seem to be Lavalas related.







And I think particular attention needs to be paid to these con-
cerns, because, obviously, on a sensitive question, it raises many
questions of perception.
I will provide that list to you.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I am pleased, Senator, to be able to do that. I
will say that the last time I was here, the same kinds of names
from-were alleged that other people from FRAPH were receiving
AID funds. We investigated that, and we also demonstrated that
that was not to be the case.
We will look at each one of those.
Senator COVERDELL. Very good.
And, Secretary Talbott, I had set aside some time so that you
might respond to the question which you thought arose from the
opening statement of Chairman Helms.
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
President Aristide's credentials as a democrat, small "d," derive,
I think, from two key factors; first, the way in which he became
the President of Haiti.
Ninety percent of the eligible voters in Haiti turned out in the
December 1990 election. Nearly 67 percent of those voted for Mr.
Aristide. That is why we consider him the democratically elected
and legitimate leader of that country.
But the second factor is his record since he has been in office,
and I would put particular emphasis on his record since he re-
turned last October. He has established a broad-based Cabinet.
There are, I believe, 9 or 10 different political parties represented
in his Cabinet. He moved very quickly to put in place an election
law that will make possible the elections that will be held on June
4.
He is committed, also, to supporting a Presidential election at
the end of this year that will elect his successor.
He said in front of the White House, just before he went back,
that in a fledgling democracy, in many ways the most important
Presidential election is the second one. He is doing everything he
can, and we are convinced that it will be sufficient to make sure
that that comes about.
Last, he has not only talked about reconciliation, but he has in
many ways institutionalized reconciliation, and, I might add, in
doing so shown some political courage vis-a-vis his own core con-
stituency.
He has come under some criticism from his traditional support-
ers for reaching out to all elements of Haitian society and all across
the Haitian political spectrum.
Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Secretary, again, I appreciate the pres-
ence of both you and Secretary Deutch.
I have to say that I was pleasantly surprised that there were no
more casualties in the Haiti operation than there were. I do not
know if there was any surprise on your part with the information
that you had, but I was pleasantly surprised. And I give you that.
I am also pleased that you are preparing to pass the baton to the
U.N. Forces. The statement that you restored the legitimate gov-
ernment and established a secure and stable environment, I think,
is a pending question-particularly in light of the timetable of exit
and Haiti's long history which you are endeavoring to reverse.







As I said, there will be an opportunity for additional questions.
I thank each of you gentlemen for being here this morning.
Madam Ambassador, we welcome you to the Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs. I might add that we are very pleased
to have somebody who served as our Ambassador to the U.N. in
such a distinguished way as you did for 4 years.
I think everyone knows that you have returned to teaching as a
leading professor of government at Georgetown University and are
a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. You are a pro-
lific writer and commentator on international affairs and our na-
tional interests.
I have to confess that I am always humbled by anybody who has
received the Medal of Freedom. So, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, I open
the floor to you. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR
FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Coverdell, and members of the subcommittee,
Senator Helms, Senator Dodd.
I am very happy to be with you today. Mr. Chairman, it is a spe-
cial pleasure to appear before-
Senator COVERDELL. Would you pull the microphone just a little
closer to you? Thank you.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you.
I just was saying I was very happy to be here today, honored
that you invited me, that it is a special pleasure for me to appear
before this subcommittee, with a new chairman of the subcommit-
tee and new chairman of the committee.
This distinguished committee, as always, is focusing its attention
on a very serious subject. I had not seen Senator Pell-I am happy
to see the former chairman of this distinguished full committee, as
well.
I would like to offer my observations about what I think we can
expect from Haiti and what also we can do now that we are there.
I think it is appropriate for meto begin by saying that I did not
support the U.S. landing in Haiti, nor the really very harsh eco-
nomic embargo which preceded it and which I felt destroyed all too
much of Haiti's very fragile economy.
I did not think it likely that we could restore democracy in this
country which had almost no experience with democratic govern-
ment or, even more serious, rule of law.
Under those circumstances, moreover, I thought that President
Aristide's record was particularly troubling. It did not suggest to
me that he was personally reliably committed to democratic norms
and patterns of behavior.
We all know the instances in which he incited his own followers
to violence. And we also know that the fact that he had been ex-
pelled from the Silesian order, of which he was a member, for advo-
cacy of violence and class war, as I understand it from reliable
sources. That only confirmed to me the doubts that other informa-
tion had given me about whether he could be relied upon to respect
opposition in the norms of democratic conduct.







It did not seem to me-and, frankly, still does not seem to me-
political style that we could say was conducive to compromise or to
peaceful settlement of disputes.
Obviously, there are other reasons for having serious doubts
about the probabilities that democracy will now be able to strike
root in Haiti. Its per capital income is, of course, among the lowest
in the world. So is its literacy rate.
The extreme poverty of a majority of its citizens and the extreme
disparities in wealth in that country all breed a kind of indigenous
version of class war, which we had seen enough of under the long
dictatorship of President Duvalier, Papa Doc Duvalier especially,
and the brief Presidency of President Aristide before he was re-
turned to power.
I saw the reasons, as well, for not taking military action to sup-
port the return of President Aristide's power. I believe that inter-
vening in the internal affairs of another state rarely produces the
desired results and is not finally compatible with an orderly world
of self-governing states.
The fact that our very skillful Ambassador to the U.N., my col-
league at Georgetown University, was able to finagle acceptance of
the U.S. resolution from several reluctant members of the Security
Council did not fundamentally alter the fact that there was fairly
widespread international misgivings about our undertaking in
Haiti, as well.
There was opposition in the OAS, as well, and many misgivings
in the OAS. And I think that all of us had some good grounds for
our misgivings. However, I believe that now we are in a situation
where we have risked American lives and spent a great deal of
American money.
I understand that the administration has informed us that they
expect that the total cost to the United States will reach about $1.4
billion by the end of 1995. I take their word for that.
I did not know whether that sum included additional amounts of
economic aid, which have been pledged since then, since they gave
that figure, nor did I know whether that sum included the salaries
and other costs of living of U.S. forces who have been assigned to
Haiti at various times.
Frequently, that cost of U.S. forces is not included by the admin-
istration in its estimates of total cost. I presume that the commit-
tee knows the answer to that question. I don't know the answer to
it.
I would just say, before I leave the subject of our intervention,
that I feel that we are rather too casually intervening with force
in other countries, dispatching American forces under chapter 7 au-
thorizations of the U.N. Charter, with the right and the mandate
to use force as necessary.
We have now dispatched American forces in a number of coun-
tries. Most recently, Somalia has provided us an example of a
failed mission of this sort. I think that Bosnia holds a very great
deal danger for us, for dispatching American forces. And Haiti, as
well.
So, in any case, for all those reasons, I doubted that it was a
good policy to send American troops. But we did it. The President







chose not to take the good advice of all the Republicans that was
offered to him.
So we all now, all of us Americans, have a major commitment in
Haiti. We have a commitment in Haiti as neighbors, first of all,
and we have a commitment in Haiti as human beings, because
Haiti is a country for which we should have a very great deal of
sympathy, because they have more than their share of problems.
And we have a commitment because we have now spent so much
money and have such an investment, financial investment, in
Haiti.
So I have asked myself what we might do at this stage to ensure
that this investment might not have been in vain. I had thought
that I would like to take advantage of this opportunity before the
committee to suggest that since the record of building democracy,
not just of the United States but of all countries, is really pretty
poor.
It takes a long time to build democracies, normally. It takes
years, and it takes a lot of determination. And it takes stronger so-
cioeconomic foundations than Haiti has.
It might be a good idea for us to focus as much as we could on
those aspects of the democracy-building process that we could help
most.
And one of those, I suspect, is literacy. I think about literacy as
a factor in development and in democracy-building. It is one of the
most important, most basic, least expensive, least political, uses of
aid resources, money and educational resources that can be made.
And I think that the United States knows a great deal about de-
livering help in promoting literacy. I think it is very important that
the literacy program in Haiti not be permitted to be politicized by
the United States or by the Government of Haiti or anyone else.
But I think we could help in that, perhaps.
I think we could help in perhaps vocational training, elementary
and middle level vocational training. Haiti has a fairly substantial
number of Haitians who are highly educated and sophisticated peo-
ple. A good many of those are in exile and have been for decades.
But Haiti still has a number of very highly educated people.
It above all lacks a popular class-a middle class, a lower middle
class, and a working class-able to really undertake the kind of
work that is required to move the country onto the paths of devel-
opment. I think that is something we can do, too.
We know quite a lot about vocational training, and I would think
it might be useful for the United States to focus on providing as-
sistance in development at the mass level, really, of vocational edu-
cation.
And finally, I believe that we should do everything that we can
to encourage the development of rule of law in Haiti, that of police
and of judges and of mayors and of a parliament.
We all know why the parliament is not in session. There is no
parliament in Haiti. We know why the President is governing by
decree. There is no parliament because the President did not call
the elections, which would have been required to elect another par-
liament.








He had committed to do so, and he let the parliament expire
without having held those elections. Now those elections are sched-
uled for June.
I heard the discussion about mayors and whether they were
democratically elected or whether they had been elected in rigged
elections.
All the elections in Haiti were somewhat, let's say, less than per-
fect, as I understand it, including that in which President Aristide
scored his 90-percent total of the vote. And virtually all of the ap-
pointed officials were appointed by previous regimes.
One of Haiti's big problems, as I understand it, has been its a
highly politicized civil service and military. I think we should do
whatever we can to assist the Government of Haiti in the develop-
ment of a nonpolitical civil service, and especially judicial system.
And I think we should monitor that judicial system closely.
And I think we should hope, all of us, that this turns out better
than some of us thought it was likely to. I, for one, am prepared
to now do whatever I might, in fact, to assist in ensuring a positive
outcome of this very great American investment.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK
Mister Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am happy to be with you
today. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to appear before you as Chair of this distin-
guished subcommittee under a Republican majority.
I offer some of my observations about what we can expect from Haiti and what
we should do and not do now that we are there. On March 31, President Clinton
will travel to Haiti to congratulate U.S. forces for their period of near total control
of Haiti and meet with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The United States passes
command and control in Haiti to the United.Nations forces of whom some 3,000 will
be American troops. There are ominous indications that the mission defined as "re-
storing democracy" to Haiti is far from complete.
I did not support the U.S. landing in Haiti or the economic embargoes that pre-
ceded it which destroyed much of Haiti's fragile economy. I did not think it was like-
ly that we could "restore democracy" in this country which has had no experience
with democratic government or rule of law. Under propitious circumstances it is pos-
sible to help a country develop democratic institutions. Aristide's record did not sug-
gest that he was himself seriously committed to democratic principles and norms.
e had incited on more than one occasion to violence-and death by "necklacing"
behavior which suggests to me a fanatical disposition, an inability to tolerate opposi-
tion, and habitual disregard for law.
There were other reasons as well for pessimism about how quickly Haiti can make
the transition to democracy. Its per capital income is among the lowest in the world.
So is its literacy rate. The extreme poverty of the majority of its citizens, the dis-
parities in wealth, and the habit of violence breed an indigenous version of class
war whose effects could be observed in the governments of the Duvalier's and also
President Aristide.
The fact that Aristide had been expelled from the Silesian Order of which he was
a member for advocacy of violent class war only confirmed that the behavior in
which he had engaged in his brief tenure as president had been manifested in other
times and places. It is hardly a political style conducive to debate, compromise, or
peaceful settlement of disputes.
Haiti lacks the traditions and the institutions conducive to rule of law. Its judicial
system and police have been thoroughly politicized. Now new police recruits are
being trained as a future policy force; but they are not yet ready to assume respon-
sibilities for law enforcement and it is not clear that they will be willing to function
in a politically neutral fashion. Training them to respect citizens and protect per-
sonal security will not be easy. Already the government of President Aristide has
circulated a secret "watch list of thirty" persons who are charged with unspecified
crimes against humanity.







39

Allan Weinstein, President of the Center for Democracy, described the arrest at
the Montreal Airport of Frantz Robert Monde, a political opponent and candidate
for re-election to the Parliament. Canadian authorities acted on the request of the
Haitian government. Strenuous representations by Deputy Secretary Talbott and
others at the State Department had still not secured Monde's release. Weinstein is
deeply concerned about preparations for Parliamentary elections which are ten-
tatively scheduled for June. Will there be adequate respect for personal security to
permit campaigning, opposition, and an honest count? Certainly there is a very slow
start.
Intervening in the internal affairs of another state is undesirable, overturning an-
other government by force or threat of force is still more objectionable-except if
there are truly vital American interests and lives at stake, such, for example as was
the case in Grenada where hundreds of American students were held hostage by a
murderous band of revolutionaries who had already killed in cold blood Grenada's
Marxist Leninist Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, and five of his Cabinet members
and imposed a round-the-clock shoot-on-sight curfew on a terrorized population.
That was an emergency in which the United States Government had an urgent in-
terest.
No such situation existed in Haiti but the Clinton Administration decided on an
unprecedented use of force to change the government anyway. International lawyer
Lori Fisler Damrosch wrote in June, 1993, when the issue was heightened sanc-
tions, "The Haitian's sanctions resolutions go further than any other debate in ap-
plying universal mandatory and severe economic sanctions to influence a domestic
political crisis over democratic government."
Mr. Chairman, the Haiti occupation was, I think, an example that our govern-
ment has become too casual about the use of force, in the deployment of our troops
in foreign places, too casual about assuming new essentially open-ended obligations
in other countries. A recent study of public opinion on issues related to foreign pol-
icy indicates that majorities of Americans feel very cautious about direct military
interventions abroad. A majority was opposed to sending our forces to Haiti and
risking lives before the administration made the commitment. It is interesting to
note concerning American public opinion that the principle interest of the largest
number of Americans in foreign affairs and in Haiti has been discouraging immigra-
tion.
THE COST OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT
The Clinton Administration has much riding on the success and integrity of Oper-
ation Restore Democracy. Opposition to the American plan existed in both the U.N.
Security Council and the Organization of American States. But the Clinton team
pushed forward. Now, to avoid a failure of the Haiti operation comparable to the
failure in Somalia, the Clinton Administration must urgently pursue its own cam-
paign for democracy in Haiti.
Having rejected the views of Republicans and others, the Clinton administration
is now deeply involved in Haiti's political development-at great expense. The
American presence in Haiti in the transition which has put Aristide back in power
has cost over $1.2 billion to date, according to administration's estimates offered in
testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee.
The United States will turn over the reigns of the operation to the U.N. at the
end of the month. However, some 3,000 troops will remain in Haiti as part of U.N.
forces, and, of course, the United States will be called upon to foot a substantial
portion of that bill. The administration estimates the total cost to the United States
will reach $1.5 billion by the end of 1995. Included in that sum are the $207 million
in economic aid and $11.2 million in aid for implementation of elections pledged by
the administration for 1995.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know if this figure includes the salaries and other costs
of U.S. military forces, but the Committee presumably knows if this is the case.
Often this is not clear in reporting. According to the Washington Post of Feb. 2,
1995, international donors have pledged funds for $660 million reconstruction pro-
gram and pledged up to $240 million in addition. The United States, of course, par-
ticipates in the funding operation.
I conclude that once all this money and effort has been applied in Haiti, the
United States must follow through on its investment. First, because human solidar-
ity requires it; second, because we have some responsibility for having pushed Haiti
to the brink of disaster with the U.S. led embargo which also created an increased
flow of refugees; and third, for imposing a military occupation on the Island. Having
so far intervened in the internal affairs of Haiti, the United States must now take
a serious interest in the implementation of democratic practices during and after
the parliamentary elections scheduled for June and the presidential election in De-








cember, and for the provision of non-political police and judiciary systems. It might
even be necessary to act again should President Aristide prove deficient in his re-
spect for the rights of Haitians.
One concern of particular importance is raised by the impending transfer of re-
sponsibility of Haiti operations from the U.S. to the U.N. at the end of March. Even
though the number of U.S. troops has dropped from 20,000 to 6,000 to an antici-
pated 3,000 at the end of March, the United States should, I believe, retain a guid-
ing role in the operation.
Having an American commander, Major General Joseph Kinzer, lead U.N. mili-
tary forces in Haiti is not a guarantee that the United States will have a leading
role in the program. We need also to know who will define the mission? Who will
determine the rules of engagement and procedures? Who will plan the "follow up"
aid program? It is essential to us as well as to the Haitians that the policies of the
next phase be practical and useful. The United Nations Secretariat's capacity for
command and control over UNISOM in Somalia and the associated nation building
effort was neither. It will be important to avoid the same mistakes in Haiti.
THE PROPER FOCUS OF AMERICAN EFFORTS
The U.S. government cannot solve all of Haiti's terrible problems. No one knows
exactly how foreign forces can "help" civil societies or modern states emerge in dif-
ferent cultures organized on principles unlike our own. There are limits on the influ-
ence of an external power on the process of democratization. It will be important
to concentrate on what we can do best. I believe that we should concentrate on lit-
eracy, education for jobs, and police training.
Literacy can be taught from outside a society. Vocational training can also be ef-
fectively taught by foreigners. There are a good many highly-educated Haitians,
though some of these have fled the country. It lacks most acutely an educated work-
ing class, and a strengthened middle class. Haiti has small commercial and business
sectors, which-together with tourism-constitute the country's only source of for-
eign exchange-which is why the U.S. embargo was so devastating. The develop-
ment of a larger, more skilled working class trained for vocations can help create
the foundations for economic and political development.
Obviously, any effort to help with literacy and vocational training should respect
the traditions of Haiti, its language and its educational system. Effective help must
be congruent with the prevailing culture of Haiti and its existing schools. By playing
an active role in programs to promote literacy and technical education, the U.S. can
guard also against efforts to politicize these literacy programs and ensure their ef-
lectiveness.
President Aristide has already used state run media to promote his ideological
agenda, as did Cuban and Sandinista regimes to whom he has had close ties.
RULE OF LAW
The key to following through on the stated goals of the administration to assist
Haiti along the road to democracy is to help establish law and order. Thus far,
President Aristide has not created the rule of law that was manifestly missing in
his earlier tenure as President and in all of Haiti's history.
Unfortunately he has again flaunted law since returning to Haiti. After having
promised to hold parliamentary elections by December, postponed them for so long
that on February 4, the terms of incumbent parliamentarians and local officials ex-
pired, including all of the 83-scat Chamber of Deputies, two-thirds of the 27-member
Senate, 137 mayors, and 565 town council members. Since then President Aristide
has ruled by decree.
Parliamentary and local elections have been only scheduled for June. Moreover,
Aristide has staffed the commission which will run the elections with a network of
loyalists. So the pattern of his systematically circumventing the legislative branch
of government before the 1991 coup is resurfacing in his conduct today.
As for the judicial branch of government, Aristide forced Minister of Justice Ernst
Malebranche to resign after he criticized Aristide for replacing life-time judges with
political allies. In particular, he attempted to pack the Haitian high court with
members of the radical Lavalas movement which he leads, without Senate approval.
As a former aide to President Clinton wrote in an editorial published recently, "The
judicial system is not only unjust; it barely exists." (Washington Times, Mar. 7,
1995)
These are not signs of the reinforcement of rule of law.
In fact, Aristide's policies under American occupation have contributed to further
destabilization of the elements of order which were in place in Haiti beforehand.
Aristide has eliminated the existing structure of police and military forces in Haiti.







He reduced the army to one-quarter of its previous size. And last month he dis-
missed the whole tier of officers above the rank of major. He tried to put in place
a civil security force consisting of followers who had committed human rights abuses
in his earlier tenure, until he was pressed by the United States to revise this politi-
cized recruitment plan.
This latter move is part of Aristide's more general reliance on private militia-
a habit with a longstanding tradition in Haiti.
Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier was an elected president of Haiti who created per-
sonal paramilitary forces, the Tonton Macoutes, to terrorize the population and
maintain himself in power. During his rather brief previous stint as president,
Aristide often seemed to be following Papa Doc Duvalier's example. Aristide toler-
ated and incited gruesome attacks on political opponents and institutions. His fol-
lowers bypassed Haiti's parliament, threatened the lives of parliamentarians, estab-
lished a private gang of enforcers and repeatedly violated the law and constitution.
Establishing a rule of law in Haiti will encourage Haitian exiles to return to Haiti
from the United States, France, and South America. Establishing order for Haiti's
exiles can help in political and economic development, if they can be persuaded to
return.
Rule of law can also obviate the very real danger of total breakdown and chaos
emerging in Haiti. No one knows exactly how to reconcile Haiti's hostile elites, end
violent behavior, or induce a respect for law and restraint in the use of power. But
we should focus our efforts on trying to sustain the sources of order already existing
in Haitian society and preventing President Aristide from perpetuating the least
positive legacies of Haiti s past. Going beyond these more limited goals and seeking
the total renovation of Haiti as a "failed state" would be an inappropriate lapse into
neo-colonialism.
I have been pessimistic about the prospects for democracy in Haiti-at least for
the short run. I am not much more sanguine today about the chances of democracy
taking root where its cultural, social and economic foundations are missing. Sociolo-
gist Anthony Maingot concluded a grim article on poverty and corruption in Haiti
by saying, "All that has changed are some of the actors. The play is a tragedy and
in Haiti, as in theater, the outcome of a tragedy is predictable; it invariably ends
without solutions and with many death." (Current History, Feb. 1994)
Since we have committed ourselves to involvement in Haiti, at a substantial cost
to the American taxpayer, we should concentrate on those activities where there is
the best chance that we can do the most good and the least harm. We should help
promote literacy and technical education, from agriculture to electronics. And if we
are major participants in these activities and paying a good deal of the bill once this
operation is turned over to the United Nations, we should reserve command and
control of U.S. forces.
Mr. Chairman, I think it rather unlikely that we foreigners who with very dif-
ferent patterns of valuing and acting can bring order that will last to Haiti, or devel-
opment, or democracy. But we can transmit skills, and information and literacy.
And we should.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. I have just
a couple questions before I turn to my colleagues.
First of all, I accept your premise in saying that you have op-
posed U.S. Haitian policy in the past, but you are now trying to
think through what would be best for the future.
Nevertheless, this incident will be a chapter in our relations
within the hemisphere, a rather defining chapter. It is one of the
questions I brought up with Secretary Talbott, and I am going to
pose it to you.
Secretary Talbott uses Grenada and Panama, in a sense, as a
roadmap-a justification-for the actions in Haiti. Do you see dis-
tinctions between those incidents? Would you care to comment on
that? And then I will follow up with another question.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator, I would be happy to com-
ment on that question. I think that Grenada and Haiti provide us
examples of diametrically opposed situations with regard to the
American national interest.
In Grenada, we had several hundred Americans held hostage al-
ready by some very violent men, who had already murdered the







Marxist President of Grenada, Morris Bishop, and five of his Cabi-
net members, and who had put the country under an around-the-
clock, shoot-on-sight curfew and were threatening immediate vio-
lence, imminent violence.
We had a treaty with the OECS states, the Organization of East-
ern Caribbean States, under which they called on us and on Ja-
maica and some other states for help.
So that situation was, in my judgment, a perfect example of an
extreme emergency where there was a clear and vital American na-
tional interest at stake and a very strong legal basis, first because
of the nature of the emergency itself, but finally, also, because of
the treaty arrangements which we had with the OECS states.
Now, I think Grenada was a wholly lawful operation under inter-
national law. I believe that Panama, while not quite as clear as
Grenada, was nonetheless clearly justified, because in Panama, we
had a dictator again.
There has been a lot of talk about dictators in Haiti. Well, we
had a dictator in Panama, too, who had run some rigged elections.
And he was the successor of a dictator who had run some rigged
elections, too.
Not only was he there and was he illegitimate, but he was
threatening Americans. He was attacking American property, and
he was setting his thugs, who had different names, Lavalas and so
forth, on American soldiers who were stationed in the Canal Zone,
and who declared war on the United States.
I heard the recording in which he declared war. He was not quite
compos mentis when he did it, but he announced to the world that
he was declaring war on the United States. And he, again, threat-
ened the American forces.
So I felt that that created a sufficient emergency to American
military men and to the national interest, given the proximity of
the Canal and its importance, that President Bush was justifiable
in sending those forces.
Now, it seems to me that Haiti is very different, because Haiti
clearly did not constitute a threat to international peace and secu-
rity, first of all. Second, it did not constitute a threat to American
life and limb.
It was not, to the best of my knowledge, threatening, really, any
interest of the United States, except our broad interest in having
democratic and lawful neighbors.
You know, I have a comment that a rather well-known, liberal,
international lawyer made about the resolution, which imposed the
tightest of sanctions. She said that it was an unprecedented resolu-
tion, that when we made the decision to tighten the screws further
on the economic embargo on Haiti, she described it as an unprece-
dented example of international intervention to change a govern-
ment of a state which was not at war. That was Lori Fisler
Damrosch.
What she said precisely was, "The Haiti sanctions resolution goes
further than any other to date in applying universal, mandatory
and severe economic sanctions to influence a domestic political cri-
sis over democratic governments."







There never had been invoked, in fact, a right, as it were, to re-
place a government on grounds a previous democratic government
should have had a right to govern.
Maybe there should be a right to democratic governments, but if
we are going to establish a right of people to have a democratic
government, we had better have somebody designated to have an
obligation to provide that democratic government.
I think that our operation in Haiti was unprecedented, both po-
litically and legally. And, as I said, I thought it was unwarranted,
in fact. But it has happened. I do not think it was anything like
either Grenada or Panama.
It was not like any other situation that I can think of. We have
been in a lot of countries in various ways in the last decades, and
I do not think we have ever done anything quite like this.
Senator COVERDELL. Two questions. One, would you comment,
from your perspective, about what that intervention's effect would
likely be on our other neighbors, in terms of their attitudes toward
the United States?
And second, would you care to speculate as to what you feel the
prognosis will be when we exit in February 1996?
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, I think that we all know that
there are a lot of doubts and misgivings in the OAS and among
states in this hemisphere about the idea of an armed U.S. interven-
tion in Haiti.
And right down to the day of our landing, when we sent in troops
and planes, there was a committee of five so-called Latin American
states, including several major Latin states, who were working
very hard to try to find a way to negotiate some other ending to
this problem and to the disagreements between the United States
and the Government of Haiti.
And the U.S. Government was repeatedly and, as I understand
it, doggedly unwilling to pursue the pathways of negotiation in this
instance. I found that unfortunate myself.
I think that it is always undesirable for our relations in the
hemisphere, as well as for our relations outside the hemisphere in
the world, to be casual, if you will, in our decisions to use force and
to be eager to turn to force.
I believe that under the U.N. Charter, there are very strong lim-
its on the legitimate use of force, and it really is only for self-de-
fense and collective self-defense in cases of aggression across an
international border.
Nothing like that happened in Haiti, needless to say. And I think
the resort to force should always be a very last possible alternative,
embraced only in crisis and where there are vital interests in-
volved.
And I think that other people in this hemisphere think that, and
other people in the world think that. So I do not think it is good
for our relations in the hemisphere.
I do not think it has done any great immediate harm, because
I do believe that we are moving forward in some other respects in
our relations in the hemisphere at this time, including with
NAFTA, for example, and of course promoting the great explosion
of democracy in the hemisphere beginning in the eighties.







So I do not think there has been terrible damage, but I think the
effects are very negative.
Senator COVERDELL. Senator Dodd?
Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Ambassador, it is a pleasure to have you before the com-
mittee. Let me commend you for your comments about where we
go from here. I think that is highly responsible.
You say there were disagreements over how we ought to proceed
and whether or not we should have taken any action at all in Haiti,
but we are all well-served if we certainly analyze what happened
in the past, but then try to figure out how, in a bipartisan way,
we can proceed.
I mean, too often in recent times with foreign policy, this country
is unfortunately degenerating into a partisan contest, and I do not
think the country is well-served in the long run by that.
So I thank you for your comments and underscore your last com-
ment, that military force ought to be the last alternative that we
consider. We ought to exhaust whatever options we can in order to
try and achieve desired results.
I remember Jim Baker, within hours, I think, after the coup in
September 1981-and I am probably not quoting him exactly, but
words to the effect of "This will not succeed. This will not stand.
We will not tolerate this," certainly words coming from the Sec-
retary of State.
I do not know if President Bush said anything similar to that,
but he may have. But certainly letting people know that we were
going to respond to the situation, which in a sense sets up the
backdrop of then, what do we do?
When the Secretary of State makes a statement like that, it is
not a statement made by a Member of Congress or some second-
or third-level bureaucrat. It is a profound statement, and respond-
ing to it is of critical important.
And I, as one who supported the actions in Grenada, and in Pan-
ama for that matter, there are obviously dissimilarities in the
events.
But I wonder if you might comment, just stepping back a bit,
taking a look at the situation, on what you might have advocated
that we would have done differently that might have achieved the
results that we are in today.
At least by your own statements, which I commend you for, that
at least we have an opportunity today, and that is all that really
exists here. There is not much to recommend the future, given the
past in Haiti, but nonetheless, there is an opportunity.
Could you sort of outline for us what you might think would have
been the series of steps either the Bush administration, and this
administration inheriting the policy, might have taken that would
have brought us to the position we are now in in March 1995, with
the U.N. about to take over operations, with an economy and a po-
litical process with all of its warts and bumps and so forth that at
least is by, I think, all admission in a far-better position today than
it was in September 1991 when the coup occurred?
Ambassador KmIKPATRICK. Senator Dodd, I remember the re-
marks of then-Secretary of State Baker, and let me say, I have a
longstanding personal interest in Haiti. I have visited Haiti many







times. My husband and I have had very good Haitian friends. So
I followed it more closely than I have some other places.
Senator DODD. I have a similar-I served in the Peace Corps on
the border for 2V2 years.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Right.
Senator DODD. And I have a similar interest in it.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. That is interesting. I did follow it
closely. And as a nonexpert, I thought that the Bush administra-
tion was right. I had my doubts about Secretary Baker's statement,
quite frankly.
I think it is always very dangerous for a high official of a govern-
ment to say that something will not be tolerated unless they are
really quite certain that they meant it and that they will have
means at their disposal moreover to make certain that it is not
going to be tolerated.
But anyway, Secretary Baker said what he said. And they did
follow up, of course. They went to the United States and to the
OAS and took an initiative in imposing sanctions. And the OAS did
as well. And I thought, personally, that that was a fairly appro-
priate response.
I was not unhappy personally. I supported the sanctions at the
level where they were applied initially. I thought they could be
maintained without really destroying the Haitian economy, because
I think the economy of Haiti is so fragile to begin with. But I was
very reluctant to see what there was, what infrastructure there
was, really destroyed.
I thought, also, that the Bush administration, frankly, could have
been more active in its pursuit of positive initiatives, constructive
initiatives, if you will, projects, negotiations aimed at a new gov-
ernment in Haiti and new elections, and the sort of thing that we
have in fact done many times in many places and a lot of other
countries in the U.N. do in other places.
And I think there was more room for that. I would have liked
to see us continue further on that course with less destructive sanc-
tions, but real ones, and more constructive effort at negotiated set-
tlements.
Senator DODD. And it is your assessment that would have pro-
duced the results, had we pursued that course.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. You know, I do not have much con-
fidence, Senator Dodd, that any of these courses are going to
produce the desired results.
But I would have been personally more pleased and comfortable
to see that path followed than the resort to force, or than the resort
to harsher sanctions, which did in fact create a large flow of refu-
gees and which, of course, further damaged the Haitian economy.
Senator DODD. Well, that flow has stopped, and conditions are
not much better today economically. So if nothing else, it seems to
be that tragic sight and the tremendous human toll of people flee-
ing. Obviously, there were some, I presume, for economic reasons.
I wonder it you might agree that at least it would now appear,
given the fact that the economic situation is measurably better,
that the primary justification, it would appear, for that exodus was
rooted in the political situation in the country?







Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Oh, I don't think so, frankly, Senator
Dodd. I have thought that Haiti has never had a good govern-
ment-it has never had a government of law for any period of time.
It has mainly had absolutely oppressive dictatorships, like the
Duvalier, General Namphi, and others. I think that it is actually
unlikely that Haitians were fleeing for political reasons, because I
think they were accustomed to a level of oppressive government.
But, I think the fact that the rate of refugee flow has diminished
almost correlated exactly with the strength of the sanctions is a
more likely explanation of the flow of refugees.
Senator DODD. Thank you.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Helms?
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman and Madam Ambassador, the one
thing that interests me about these hearings is the number of
young people who attend them, with the Close-Up Organization
and the Presidential Classroom, amongst others, and some just
came in.
I would say to them that in the judgment of this Senator, they
are present at a hearing featuring a lady whom I hope one day will
be the U.S. Secretary of State.
As a matter of fact, two or three of us talked to President Reagan
about that, and we thought we had him in a position to do that.
But President Reagan discovered this lady, really. She is a great
American, and I welcome you here.
It is instructive to hear you itemize the things that need to be
done, and none of them is the use of a dictator. None of them is
the propping up of a dictator. None of them is trying to make of
a person, a gentle individual, who is known to have advocated
necklacing, putting gasoline in a bicycle tire and hanging it around
a political opponent's neck and striking a match to it, that sort of
thing.
Now, you are exactly right. The people of Haiti have never had
a chance to taste democracy. The Marines were there early in this
century, and they were there for 19 years. And nothing emerged
from that. The leaders of Haiti, Papa Doc being the most promi-
nent of them, have no respect for the law.
I know you do not have a crystal ball with you this morning, but
do you believe that the United States can be successful in develop-
ing democratic institutions in Haiti?
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Helms, thank you. Thank you
for your kind comments.
I believe that democracy has struck root in more places than
most of us ever dreamed. And I think that represents an unquench-
able desire of human beings for freedom, and freedom under law
moreover, freedom with security.
I think that when democratic governments come into being, it is
almost always principally as a consequence of the efforts of the peo-
ple themselves of that country.
The CHAIRMAN. Right.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I always think of John Stuart Mill's
"On Government" which proposed that the first requirement of a
democratic government was that the people should desire it, and
I think that is true.







And he said, "And therefore be willing to do what is necessary
to establish and preserve a democracy." And I think that is true.
So I think above all, whether Haiti becomes a democracy now
will depend on the Haitians. I think that other governments, for-
eign governments, and peoples can occasionally help on the edges,
and I really do mean on the edges.
And that is why I was trying to think about how, given the fact
that we are there, and we have this great investment, how we
might try to help on the edges, so to speak.
And that is how I came to focus on some relevant literature, in-
cluding the most recent book of Samuel Huntington, on the estab-
lishment of democracies. His book looks at the establishment of de-
mocracies in the period since the cold war ended, and is called The
Third Wave.
And looking at all that and thinking about Haiti, I concluded the
one thing that I am pretty sure that we can do, that can be done
by foreigners outside the government, is to help with a crash lit-
eracy program.
If you are foreigners, and you are not part of the society, and you
really want to do something that might in the long run help, you
have to think about the long run.
That is why I came, also, to the conclusion that vocational edu-
cation might help strengthen a popular and middle class in Haiti.
We are not going to be able by our decisions to establish a demo-
cratic Government in Haiti now. I think that is virtually certain.
However, I think we ought to monitor with the U.N. and the
OAS-though I like the OAS better for hemispheric activities-
monitor elections, monitor rule of law,, monitor the compliance of
the government with the norms of democratic government in Haiti.
The OAS made the Santiago declaration, and I think we should
encourage the OAS to really be vigilant in its monitoring of Haiti's
record in this regard.
If we do all those things, why, that might help them.
The CHAMMAN. I asked you a sort of leading question, and you
answered it just exactly as I hoped you would.
And I say again to the young people, this distinguished lady
served as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. She personally has ex-
amined problems all over the world in terms of positions that the
United States should take or not take.
The main thing that the United States, the U.N., and all the rest
can do; is if somehow we can inculcate a spirit of moral and spir-
itual principles in a place where about 80 percent of the people
have voodoo as religion. That just emphasizes the depth of the
problem.
I hope that whatever we do, we do not just turn over money to
this government, but somehow have it directed to teach people-
the old axiom about teaching people how to fish instead of giving
them fish. You are exactly right when you mentioned literacy. How
in the world can you do anything until they can communicate?
I appreciate your answer, and I appreciate your coming here this
morning. It is good to see you again.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very
much.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you.







Senator Pell?
Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have long been an admirer of Ambassador Kirkpatrick, inter-
ested in her comments. She brought up the question of Panama,
and I have always been struck by the fact that what we did there,
we really had a government we did not like, headed by Noriega's
chief of government.
We kidnapped him and tucked him away. It seems to me that
that would not set a good precedent either, and I was interested
in your reaction.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Would you like me to comment on
that?
Senator PELL. Please.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Pell, quite frankly, I was not
enthusiastic about our military operation in Panama. I think it is
barely justifiable. That is the way I felt about it at the time.
I would not have ever recommended that we send those U.S.
troops into Panama in the fashion that we did, when we did, and
how we did, personally. That was not my decision, and nobody
asked for my recommendation. And I have never expressed myself,
I think, since the time that it occurred. I did write about it at the
time that it occurred.
I do not think it was a very good policy. I think we resorted rath-
er too quickly to force in the case of the Panama landing or "arriv-
al," I should call it.
I think it is more justifiable than the use of force in Haiti for sev-
eral reasons. But I do not think it was good policy, and I will not
say so today.
Senator PELL. I guess what I was more concerned about was not
so much the use of force, but the fact that we kidnapped a piece
of government that we did not like or approve of. That sets a bad
precedent.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, you know, Senator Pell, I have
my doubts about that, too. And I have my doubts about trying the
head of state of another country in American courts.
I have talked to my sons, who are attorneys, about that at some
length, and some other attorneys, who were more experienced than
my sons. I find that among attorneys, there is a lot of difference
of views, but generally that was a big surprise to the world.
I am not certain that it was a very good precedent, either. I
would like to say that there is another aspect of it that I regret,
too, personally, and it is that after all of that, the result is that in
the last elections, the leader of General Noriega's party was elect-
ed. So now we have another Noriega, so to speak, governing Pan-
ama.
Senator PELL. Thank you very much.
Senator COVERDELL. Madam Ambassador, we are very honored
that you would be with us today. As you can tell from the nature
of the testimony, you are a very highly respected American public
servant.
We have left the record open here, and there might be a question
or two that would be posed to you as regards to the testimony we
have heard. Would you be willing to respond if any of the other
senators might pose a question?







Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
Senator COVERDELL. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you asked a ques-
tion a moment ago as to what were the costs of the administra-
tion's Haiti policy. Deputy Secretary Deutch indicated a total cost
for fiscal year 1994 of $534 million, including the Department of
Defense costs, and for fiscal year 1995 of $817 million. He specu-
lated that the cost would be $1.5 billion by February 1995.
We will pursue further clarification of these costs. It is very im-
portant to understand them. And we would be glad to share those
with you when we have the official responses from Deputy Sec-
retary Deutch.
He also indicated that the cost, the annual cost, of dealing with
the crisis of refugees was running about $200 million a year, of
course, being the equivalent offset, so to speak.
But we would be glad to share those with you. Thank you so very
much for being with us today.
Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Senator Coverdell, for in-
viting me. And I would be happy to respond to questions.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Ambassador.
Let me introduce to those in attendance and to those watching,
Mr. Andrew Postal and Prof. Allen Weinstein. Mr. Postal is presi-
dent of the Judy Bond, Inc., of New York and Chairman of the
Haiti Task Force for the Caribbean/Latin American Action.
He has long experience as a manufacturer in Haiti and knows
first hand the situation in Haiti, including how the private sector
can contribute to Haiti's economic development.
I will begin with you, Mr. Postal, and then continue with the in-
troduction of Dr. Weinstein.

STATEMENT OF ANDREW POSTAL, CHAIRMAN, HAITI TASK
FORCE, CARIBBEAN/LATIN AMERICAN ACTION
Mr. POSTAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have prepared testi-
mony, which I have no intention of reading into the record. I will
just move it into the record, if that is OK with you.
Senator COVERDELL. Very good.
Mr POSTAL. My company is a manufacturer of women's apparel.
We are producers in the United States, as well as in Haiti. We
produce in Costa Rica, Mexico, and a few other countries in Asia.
We have operated plants in Haiti for approximately 13 years.
I just returned from Haiti along with Secretary Talbott and par-
ticipated on the Presidential business development mission to Haiti
that returned late last night.
Haiti today is embroiled in a huge task, and the U.S. Govern-
ment is as well-engaged in a huge undertaking in Haiti in trying
to build a democratic society functionally from scratch.
Virtually a'l of the comments in this hearing and indeed in other
hearings that I have attended focus on either the issue of institu-
tion building and a conversion from military to civilian rule and on
the issue of security.
And it is rare, other than in passing mention that anyone gets
around to talking about the state of the economy in Haiti.
I noted with some interest Senator Dodd's comment that things
were economically much better in Haiti. From my opinion, having








just returned from Haiti, I think nothing could be further from the
truth. And I will get back into that.
Both Secretary Talbott and indeed President Aristide, 2 days
ago, reaffirmed what I think is a fundamental truth, and that is
that a functioning democracy is inextricably entwined with a func-
tioning private sector.
And if that society does not have an economy which puts its peo-
ple to work, then that form of government is not going to be sus-
tainable, regardless of how much money the U.S. Government
pours into Haiti.
Currently in Haiti, their private sector, for all practical purposes,
has been wiped out. They sustained over 3 years of economic sanc-
tions prior to the military intervention.
We all tend to focus on the military intervention, because obvi-
ously, from the standpoint of the United States, that was a pivotal
issue.
But I think it is important that you bear in mind that that coun-
try was faced with continually ratcheted up sanctions over a sus-
tained period of time, directed exclusively at the economy of the
poorest nation in our hemisphere.
So I think that is important to bear in mind when you consider
that today, at best, they have 15 percent of their eligible work force
working.
There are a lot of numbers thrown around about Haiti, because
the unemployment is so massive. And what little employment there
is, much of it is underemployment. So you will hear numbers, 40-
percent, 60-percent, 80-percent unemployment thrown around, and,
quite frankly, nobody really knows.
In addition to the massive unemployment, the infrastructure of
the country is virtually not usable. Their electrical generation ca-
pacity is nil. Their port is not functioning terribly well.
Notwithstanding that, it has the highest port charges in the re-
gion and is completely noncompetitive, as a result of policies that
came from prior abusive administrations. There is little or no new
investment in Haiti from a private sector point of view and rel-
atively little meaningful economic activity.
The United States and the international donor community are
preparing to put a lot of money in Haiti. You have already put a
lot of money in Haiti, and you are preparing to put a lot more
money in Haiti.
And I suspect from the tenor of some of the questions here that
there is a real interest in whether you are going to get a return
on that investment of any long standing.
And I would respectfully suggest to the committee that if the
Haitian populous is not put to work, if the jobs that both their peo-
ple and their governments so desperately need and ask for are not
created, that when the day is done and the aid money runs out,
if that private sector is not functioning, then that money will have
been spent for nothing.
And I suspect that Haiti will not be a sustainable nation state
in our region, and we will be looking at the largest welfare state
off our border, which I think would be a terrible result.
So the question becomes: How do you really help Haiti? And how
do you build an economy there? I think it is naive to think that






51
General Motors is going to go in there and build cars or that Boe-
ing is going to go in there and build planes.
Given the state of their work force, both its assets and its liabil-
ities, we have argued that the light manufacturing sector, which
has been the engine of economic growth throughout the Caribbean
and Central American region, is the principal industry that can
help put that country back on its feet.
Indeed, if you look at the region, you will see that in countries
such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras,
Costa Rica, that industry runs anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of
the GNP's of a lot of these countries.
And in fact much of the U.S. trade policy over the last 10 to 15
years, through MFA, the Multi-Fiber Agreement, and a lot of the
trade policies vis-a-vis quota in our industry have been designed to
force that growth that occurred into the Caribbean Basin and
Central America. Those policies worked.
The advantage that the assembly sector offers a country like
Haiti, and indeed anywhere in the developing world, is that it is
not capital intensive. It does not take a lot of money to start these
kinds of businesses, and they are very labor intensive.
So it is not unique to Haiti that these are exactly the kind of
businesses that countries on the first steps of economic develop-
ment turn to in order to put a lot of their people to work produc-
tively. And I think it is an important point to consider a second.
We are talking about productive, meaningful, long-term jobs. I
take great issue with some of what USAID is doing in Haiti, and
part of it is paying people to just sort of do make-work kinds of
things on a very short-term basis.
That, to me, is not meaningful employment. It is a colossal waste
of money. It may keep people off the street temporarily, but I do
not think it represents an investment in human capital.
I think the thing to bear in mind about Haiti is that you are
talking about a country with little else but its people as an asset.
And quite frankly from the perspective at having operated there for
12 years, it is a substantial asset.
The Haitians are wonderful people. They work very hard. They
need to work. They have a very good work ethic, and we are believ-
ers in them.
A lot of people have asked me: "Why are you fighting to go back
to Haiti when there are so many alternatives in the world?"
But we have found the Haitians, when given an equal oppor-
tunity, can be very competitive workers.
So the issue then really becomes: How does one build an assem-
bly sector in Haiti when that sector was one of the principal targets
of the U.S. economic sanctions? I should note that the U.S. Govern-
ment recognized that and permitted that sector to function under
license during the pendency of some of the economic sanctions.
We were allowed to move goods in and out of Haiti under a very
complicated set of rules, because they understood the argument we
made, which was that the U.S. firms that had been doing business
in Haiti constituted an irreplaceable asset to anyone seeking to re-
build that country, because these companies were going to function,
if you will allow me an analogy, like magnetic schools.







They were going to be magnets in that if they came back in and
succeeded, it would offer the Haitian economy success stories.
These were companies that knew how to operate there and were
less likely to fail than new entrants probably would be. They tend-
ed to legitimize the market for not only other U.S. firms but local
Haitian firms who are dependent on contracts from U.S. companies
for their work force and for their work.
Unfortunately, most of those companies, all of those companies,
were basically forced out with the full U.N. embargo in May.
And the question now is: How do you get them back? Because it
is much more likely to succeed getting them back than it will be
to bring in new companies that have had no experience in Haiti.
The U.S. Government traditionally would have turned to USAID.
USAID, during the eighties, was the instrumentality of the U.S.
Government clearly designed to help build economies in exactly
this kind of situation, Unfortunately, USAID is not in that business
anymore, regardless of what they tell you.
They are fundamentally today, as a result of the 60 Minutes pro-
gram and the whole scare about export of U.S. jobs, now focusing
either on microenterprise which means they are giving minute
amounts of money to individual, small entrepreneurial kinds of
things, but not real business, as you or I might define it, or, on the
other end of the spectrum, very interested in infrastructure and
privatization kinds of projects. But everything in the middle, which
is what Haiti is all about, is not on their plate.
So, therefore, what do you do? Well, they have turned to OPIC,
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, for one piece of what
is needed, which is some of the firms that were devastated by the
embargo need working capital assistance to go back in.
OPIC has set up a loan-a guarantee facility, if you will, with
certain local U.S. banks to help provide working capital to U.S.
firms that were damaged.
That may or may not work, and it sort of gets you over the initial
threshold of can you afford to go back in. But on the larger ques-
tion of how do you build the assembly sector back and how does
the Haitian Government help build a larger assembly sector, which
in the middle 1980's employed 100,000 people when Haiti enjoyed
18 percent of the 807 trade between the United States and the re-
gion-today it is less than 1 percent-if Haiti had continued on
that path, they would probably have 300,000 or 400,000 people
working in that sector today.
The issue is: How do you get these firms, who are taking a wait-
and-see attitude on Haiti, to come back in? And a lot of them are
waiting to see whether what is going to be there when they get
there is the old Haiti and old way of doing business or a new, more
modern Haiti that is prepared to compete for what is a very
changed world.
I am sort of going on a little bit, but I am just going to make
a couple points. Haiti is reentering economic life of this hemisphere
at a very different point than when it left it.
New nations have come on stream as producers that are very
competitive people, like Honduras and Guatemala. Jamaica has
grown dramatically. El Salvador has now become a producer. Nica-
ragua is looking to come on stream.







We have NAFTA, which has changed the analysis or the sourcing
decisions for most U.S. firms dramatically. There has been, if not
disinvestment for many countries in the region, at least a suspen-
sion of investment pending figuring out exactly how it is going to
affect companies.
And finally, the U.S. Government concluded its agreement, or the
GATT agreement, the Uruguay Round Agreement, which com-
pletely turns the rules on trade in textiles and apparel on its head
and basically has given away back to the Pacific Rim the dominant
position it once had and had lost during a period of quota con-
straint.
So Haiti is going to be coming on stream with a much tougher
competitive environment. And let's assume, for the sake of argu-
ment, that their government is well-intentioned, and I think it
probably is.
They want to put their people to work, if for no other reason
than they know that their government is going to fall if they don't.
But this is not a country with a great deal of technical expertise
in how to do that, and they keeping looking to their private sector,
and our Government now keeps looking to the U.S. private sector
to sort of solve this problem.
I don't believe that is fair, and I don't believe it is going to work.
I think the vacuum created by USAID's voiding the field of econ-
omy development, technical assistance, the kind of vocational train-
ing that Ambassador Kirkpatrick was talking about, is the kind of
thing that USAID used to do.
I think the issue of helping them promote their economy and
teaching them how they stack up relative to other countries so they
know what policies to take on an economic front are critical.
I think the White House or the State Department has to come
up with the political will to find the resources in the U.S. Govern-
ment. And I do not think it is necessarily going to take a lot of
money.
I think the recreation of the private sector is one of the lowest
cost, best investments that can be made relative to what it is going
to cost to develop infrastructure and to send an army of consult-
ants down there to teach them how to run a court system.
I think that the lessons of U.S. policy over the last 10 or 15 years
is that you must build the economy and predicate these fledgling
democracies on an economy. We can sit here and talk about institu-
tion building and elections and rule of law and all of that, which
is true, which is all necessary.
But the question is: What is the cart and what is the horse? And
how long are the Haitian people, who are absolutely starving, going
to sit there and eat the hopes that the return of President Aristide
has given them? And I maintain not terribly long.
And I suspect, based on my conversation with President Aristide,
that he does not think it is going to last terribly long. I think that
honeymoon is going to come to an end.
So I think that as a businessman who did business there for
many years and hopes to be able to return, I think that far more
attention needs to be paid in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy to
the private sector than has thus far been excluded by the U.S. Gov-
ernment.








Thank you.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you, Mr. Postal.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Postal follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. POSTAL
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: My name is Andrew Postal. I am tes-
tifying as a manufacturer with long experience in Haiti and a continuing commit-
ment to its future, and also in my capacity as chairman of the Haiti Task Force
of Caribbean/Latin American Action, a private, non-profit group whose mandate is
to promote the growth of the private sector in the Hemisphere as the best vehicle
for true economic stability and democracy. On behalf of C/LAA's chairman J. Paul
Sticht, former chairman of RJR Nabisco, and on behalf of the other members of our
Board of Trustees, I would like to thank this Subcommittee for the invitation to
speak with you today.
In my C/LAA role I am able to speak for a large majority of those American com-
panies that have made major commitments in the Haitian manufacturing, agricul-
tural, communications, finance and transportation sectors over many years, and
that have witnessed over the past seven or eight years the collapse of the Haitian
economy generally and the assembly sector in particular.
I am very grateful to have this opportunity to speak with you about Haiti, from
the depth of my personal experience and from the breadth of experience represented
among my business colleagues on the C/LAA Haiti Task Force.
THE URGENT TASK IN HAITI
Today the United States is attempting an honorable but incredibly difficult task
in Haiti-helping a nation construct a viable democratic government from scratch
on the wreckage of decades of dictatorship, corruption and poverty. In such an ambi-
tious undertaking, we cannot afford the luxury of many mistakes, or of failing to
take simple and obviously needed steps that are readily at our disposal.
The current U.S. mission in Haiti has had three immediate objectives-to shift
power from the old military establishment to the elected civilian government; to
build up functioning institutions so that democratic government can sustain itself
in the future; and to re-start the economy so that the fledgling democracy won't be
brought down in its infancy by economic collapse and political turmoil.
Present policy is addressing the first two objectives, but is timidly approaching
the third. While U.S. assistance has concentrated on disarming the military, build-
ing up civilian institutions, and assisting in immediate public-sector tasks of relief
and reconstruction, little has been done since the restoration of President Aristide
to create permanent jobs for Haiti's unemployed.
I believe that U.S. policy must place a far greater emphasis on private-sector de-
velopment in Haiti in order to create the job base necessary to support political and
social stability. Having embargoed Haiti back to the economic equivalent of the
Stone Age, the U.S. Government must now act to get Haiti's economy back on track.
The importance of economic reconstruction in Haiti is acknowledged by U.S. offi-
cials. Let me illustrate by quoting some of the points made by Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott in testimony before the House International Relations Commit-
tee two weeks ago.
Secretary Talbott stated, "Before the coup of September 1991, Haiti was the poor-
est country in the Hemisphere; it may take until the end of this decade for its peo-
ple to work their way back even to that level."
He also stated, "No matter how successful the Haitian people are at establishing
Sa secure environment or building democratic and legal institutions, stability will
elude them without strong, steady, broad-based economic growth."
And as the Secretary stated unequivocally later in his testimony, "Haiti's real eco-
nomic future lies in the private sector."
Mr. Chairman, we at C/LAA strongly agree with each of those propositions. Taken
together, those three facts-the terrible state of Haiti's economy, the indispensabil-
ity of economic growth to hopes for democracy, and the centrality of the private sec-
tor to economic recovery-all point to the obvious conclusion that helping to resusci-
tate the private sector in Haiti should be among the highest priorities of the U.S.
assistance effort.
In fact, however, it is not. Among a long list of current priorities, creating private-
sector jobs is hardly mentioned. The programs intended to address this problem are
minuscule in the overall scheme of things, and lack many of the needed elements.








Secretary Talbott's testimony also contained these statements: "They have begun
to jumpstart their dead economy" and "There is already evidence that the Haitian
private sector is getting on its feet."
Mr. Chairman, it is with that statement that I take serious issue. Those of us
watching from close range cannot agree either that the situation is getting materi-
ally better or that the U.S. programs to address it are adequate.
The main point I would like to communicate to you today is a sense of urgency
about the need to create a functioning private sector in Haiti. Haiti is a country
where only 15 percent of the labor force is fully employed. It is a country without
significant social safety nets to provide food, medicine, clothing and other necessities
to the long-term unemployed. It is a country where we are trying to develop new
loyalties to new governmental institutions from increasingly desperate people with
no stake in their economy, no history of trust in their police or laws or judicial insti-
tutions, no history of being able to turn to their elected legislative or executive rep-
resentatives for advancement of their interests, no enduring history of change being
brought about other than by violence.
For Haiti's new democracy, making it through the next few years will be difficult.
The United States and the rest of the donor community is prepared to invest over
$1 billion in Haiti. This is on top of the already substantial $1.6 billion investment
made in re-establishing the Aristide presidency. This investment will prove to be a
colossal waste of U.S. taxpayer moneys unless Haiti-at the end of the day-repays
that investment by succeeding as a democratic nation state. This will not happen
if the Haitian economy is not functional and, when these external investments
cease, it falls of its own weight. Nothing would do more to give individual Haitians
a positive stake in their economy, society and government than putting them to
work.
In fact, this most basic proposition was expressly stated by President Aristide two
days ago to the President's Business Mission to Haiti, in which I had the oppor-
tunity to participate. President Aristide stated that his efforts to build the demo-
cratic institutions of Haiti and to provide security for his people will fail if his peo-
ple could not find jobs.
I could not agree more with President Aristide-what Haiti needs are jobs that
are immediate, widespread, full-time, permanent, and part of an expanding private
sector, where newly created jobs beget other jobs, where newly healthy companies
attract other companies, and a newly healthy sector quickly graduates from reliance
on any form of public support.
THE SINGLE BEST WAY TO CREATE JOBS
What it takes to create the jobs Haiti needs is not a mystery. We do know what
to do. We know from experience in Haiti itself, and in other nations across the re-
gion, that among the most cost-effective means of putting people to work is by sup-
porting the rapid reconstruction of the assembly sector.
During the mid-1980's, a vibrant assembly industry developed in Haiti, employing
at its peak approximately 100,000 workers. And this was when the assembly indus-
try in the whole region was much smaller, before the boom hit the Caribbean Basin.
If Haiti's assembly industry had continued to grow on the same curve it had been
on, and had grown commensurately with those of other Caribbean and Central
American countries whose assembly sectors had just begun to take off, we would
probably be looking at a Haitian light manufacturing industry with upwards of
400,000 jobs today. Clearly it has the potential for employing hundreds of thou-
sands, rather than tens of thousands.
The pattern can be seen throughout the region, where growth since the mid-80's
has been four-fold or more. The lion's share of this has been in garments assembled
from U.S. cut pieces for re-export to the U.S. market under the old Item 807 in the
Tariff Schedules. In 1986, total 807 trade between the United States and the Carib-
bean Basin stood at around $725 million. Haiti, with 18 percent of the total, ranked
third in the region, exceeded only by the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. Then
the DR and Jamaica took off dramatically, Costa Rica maintained its strong posi-
tion, while other Central American countries-El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras-
became major players. For some of these countries, the apparel assembly sector now
contributes a huge portion of their gross national product, and a tremendous num-
ber of jobs.
But just as other countries in the region were jumping forward, Haiti jumped
backward. In 1994, the same figures for 807 trade showed regionwide exports of
$3.5 billion-a four- to five-fold increase since 1986-of which Haiti's share had
dropped to one percent. In Haiti from 1987-1991, political instability and labor un-








rest shrank its assembly sector from 100,000 jobs to 40,000 or 50,000. By the time
of the embargo, it was down to 30-40,000. And today, it is barely 6,000.
Some U.S. officials have made much of the fact that some factories have restarted
operations. But most of these are Haitian, and virtually all are operating far below
full capacity. And they are restoring a very small number of jobs relative to pre-
coup or pre-embargo levels, let alone the level achieved in the mid-80s. Unless the
sector gets going soon, many of the firms trying against heavy odds to start back
up will themselves be forced once again to shut their doors.
Haiti's advantage in attracting industry in the past was the size and quality of
its labor force, the relatively inexpensive price of its labor, and an outstanding work
ethic. Other factors have made it less competitive-heavy-handed bureaucracy, high
operating costs, inadequate infrastructure. Today, not only are some of these prob-
lems worse than ever, but Haiti faces a much tougher competitive environment than
it did three or four years ago. There are several reasons for this:
New producing countries have come on stream, with larger industries, better in-
frastructure, newer plants, better political stability.
NAFTA has come into being, causing many companies to put off investing in
the Caribbean Basin in favor of Mexico, or at least to defer these decisions until
they can get a clearer picture of the Mexico situation.
The Uruguay Round has been concluded. The GATT agreement does away with
the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and thus will unleash the Pacific Rim, adding a
whole new level of competition for Haitian production. During the 1980's, quota
served to limit the growth of Asian production, and helped to create an oppor-
tunity for Caribbean production. In about five years that advantage will be
gone.
To meet this new competition, Haitian assembly manufacturing must be more effi-
cient, more productive than ever. It has only a few years to gear itself up to face
the tide of Asian competition head-on. This brief time window must be used to best
advantage. The good news is the workers themselves, some of the best in the region.
The bad news is that most of the other factors affecting the ultimate price of an
exported article-utility costs and reliability, plant security, port costs, etc.-do not
favor Haiti.
Two of the most egregious problems are the electric power and the ports. Elec-
tricity is currently running at about 10 percent of the level needed to meet the
needs of full-capacity plants. Power is sometimes available for as little as an hour
and a half a day. This makes it difficult to profitably operate a factory at anything
approaching full capacity.
Port charges are astronomical. An example has been provided by a sporting goods
company, that says it costs $2,200 to ship a container from New York to Hong Kong,
but $3,600 to ship the same container from New York to Haiti. It is important to
note that Haiti's port charges are by far the highest in the Caribbean region.
Important attention is being directed toward infrastructure. The Haitian Govern-
ment, with assistance from the international donor community including AID, is
making a serious effort for the rebuilding and modernization of the country's basic
infrastructure, including power generation, telephones and roads. However, this in-
herently long-term effort is still in the planning stage. By the time the power prob-
lem is solved, the communications are working, and the road system is functional,
many opportunities for attracting manufacturing companies may well be lost.
IHOW TO BRING THE U.S. FIRMS BACK
Given the numerous problems facing the assembly sector in Haiti, it is unlikely
that many companies new to Haiti are going to commence operations quickly. Hai-
tian and U.S. business leaders agree that the U.S. firms that did business prior to
the embargo occupy a unique role in restarting the assembly sector. Most Haitian
factories making up the assembly sector were operated either by U.S. firms or Hai-
tian firms under contract to produce for the U.S. market.
The U.S. government recognized the importance of these companies by granting
licenses for them to operate during the pendency of U.S. sanctions. Those operations
ended with the full embargo. Some of these firms will never come back to Haiti.
Others want to come back, but their decision will depend on the kind of help that
is available for them. Many are taking a wait-and-see approach in order to deter-
mine whether Haiti can be turned into a competitive manufacturing site. My com-
pany is an example of those with a long-term history and-we would like to think-
a long-term future in Haiti. We spent over 12 years developing our Haitian plants.
They were very good at what they did. We value these plants and these workers.
We will go back if we can.







57

For virtually all of the U.S. companies that had been operating in Haiti, the U.S.
sanctions and the UN embargo had drastic consequences. Most firms suffered sub-
stantial losses on their Haitian operations. Many were forced to disappoint impor-
tant customers. Some were unable to effectively replace Haitian production. This,
in turn, led to several consequences not easily reversed with the lifting of the em-
bargo:
The financial condition of many of the companies was weakened.
Confidence by bankers, shareholders and customers was seriously undermined.
Further investments in property and equipment were canceled or deferred.
Alternative manufacturing sites were developed.
That is why U.S. policymakers need to be asking themselves, not just whether the
assembly companies seem to be going back, but how U.S. policy can help attract
them back, and what changes the Haitian Government can make that would make
it easier for these firms to do business there if they return.
The beneficiaries of the improved conditions, and/or financial incentives, would
not only be the returning companies and their immediate employees. I am convinced
that once the experienced companies regained a foothold, others would follow. U.S.
firms that had experience operating facilities in Haiti will have an easier time-not
easy, but easier-than new companies in convincing their customers that Haiti is
a safe manufacturing site for their products. Once a new post-embargo track record
for reliability is established, these pioneer companies will, in a sense, legitimize
Haiti for other companies. Their presence will also enable other companies produc-
ing in Haiti-both Haitian and American-to win contracts with U.S. customers.
Thus the returning firms can serve as "magnet companies"-if they flourish, others
will follow them in. This is not theory-this is what happens.
That's why it is so important to ask what can be done to induce as many of the
experienced companies as possible to return as quickly as possible, and to seek max-
imum use of their capacity.
Some of the U.S. companies considering return to Haiti are facing a threshold
question of how to secure the working capital necessary to finance their Haitian op-
erations. In the past, that would have led them to USAID. USAID previously was
the U.S. agency principally responsible for private-sector development and invest-
ment promotion. AID used to have an array of incentives to promote private-sector
development, including loans, through grants to financial institutions in Caribbean
and Central American countries. This was one part of the broad-based commitment
during the CBI era to helping these countries develop non-traditional industries, at-
tract investment and promote exports. But since the runaway plant scare from the
notorious "60 Minutes program in the fall of 1992, AID has opted out of direct sup-
port for the U.S. private sector. Now, in the face of the crisis in Haiti, USAID-
the most logical agency to undertake this most fundamental task of economic devel-
opment-has not only eliminated itself as a source of financing and support for the
business sector, but has avoided any program contact whatsoever with this sector.
As an alternative, the U.S. Government has come up with a plan for using OPIC
as the mechanism to provide the needed working capital. But using OPIC for this
purpose has proved to be rather a case of putting a square peg in a round hole.
OPIC is geared toward providing investment capital for project finance; working
capital loans are outside its natural function. Under pressure to provide assistance
in Haiti, OPIC started discussions with two U.S. banks operating in Haiti-Citibank
and Bank of Boston-to make working capital loans available to U.S. companies
wanting to do business there. The loans would be made by commercial banks, and
OPIC would guarantee 75 percent of the total loan amount.
We sincerely hope that the OPIC program solves the working capital needs of
those U.S. and Haitian assembly sector companies most adversely affected by the
embargo. But there is a second and, for Haiti, more fundamental and urgent issue:
How to build a modern, competitive manufacturing sector and put it on track quick-
ly enough that it can begin to create the jobs Haiti needs in the short term leading
up to the November elections.
This is not new territory. During the 1980's, USAID provided leadership and sup-
port to countries throughout the Caribbean region on precisely this issue. AID was
able to provide countries with guidance on investment promotion, technical advice
on constructing necessary plant and infrastructure to support the light manufactur-
ing industries, and, in a number of cases, provided targeted financial assistance.
In our discussions with the Haitian Government and the Haitian private sector,
we repeatedly came to the joint conclusion that the very type of programs and as-
sistance that USAID used to provide to the countries of the region as they struggled
to create and sustain democracy is the very assistance Haiti desperately needs now.
The vacuum created by USAID leaving the field of assembly sector job creation
has not been filled. The Department of Commerce is taking a commendable,.








proactive role in seeking to stimulate business and investment in Haiti, but when
all is said and done, their efforts must of necessity rely on the private sector shoul-
dering the load.
I believe that the White House and the Department of State must bear the re-
sponsibility of providing the political will to find the resources within our govern-
ment to assist Haiti in creating jobs-real, permanent jobs. This need not be an ex-
pensive undertaking. But without a serious job-creation effort, the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars being spent on infrastructure and institution building could be jeop-
ardized by political instability.
Let me return to the initial point I quoted from Secretary Talbott-that it will
take Haiti to the end of the century to work its way back to the level of poverty
it was experiencing immediately before the coup.
Mr. Chairman, if that is our aim, we are aiming too low, and we are hitting even
lower. If we think Haiti has the luxury of waiting until the year 2000 to get its peo-
ple back to work, we are deluding ourselves. And if we think that pre-coup employ-
ment levels would constitute putting Haiti back to work, we are deluding ourselves
even worse. If the Government of Haiti, with the help of over $2 billion in inter-
national aid, can't do a lot better than that, a lot faster than that, it won't be around
in the year 2000.
At Secretary Talbott pointed out, without economic growth, stability will elude
Haiti no matter how successful the security and democracy-building efforts seem to
be. Democracy must be built on the bedrock of economic betterment and hope. U.S.
policy toward the Caribbean region as a whole has recognized this reality. For the
last ten to fifteen years, U.S. policy across region has been built on this principle-
that if we don't want dictatorships, civil wars, revolutions, and massive social and
political instability in the lands and waters bordering the United States, it behooves
this country to help these neighbors develop economically.
In Haiti, the relationship between jump-starting the assembly sector and building
a stable economic and political future is even more closely intertwined than in many
other parts of the Caribbean Basin. That is because, unlike other countries blessed
with a variety of natural resources or strategic location features, all Haiti really has
to work with is its human capital. The Government of Haiti must be investing in
this human resource. And so should the U.S. and other donor agencies.
Haiti today is at a crossroads. A reborn Haitian assembly industry could face a
truly exciting future. The large work force is there. The desire to work is there. The
skills are there. The experienced companies want to be there. The expanding market
is there. The potential for large-scale employment is very real. I and many other
U.S. business people can see ourselves as part of that future.
The opposite potential is also very real. Everything the U.S. Government is doing
to try to maintain the peace and develop sound governmental institutions and meet
immediate human needs is obviously very important. But I believe the most impor-
tant thing the U.S. Government can do today to tip the balance toward hope and
away from failure is to make private-sector job creation an urgent, immediate prior-
ity.
The technical details of how to stimulate more jobs are not hard to figure out.
I've mentioned some today; no doubt there are others that could be devised. The
missing ingredient is the political will to do it-to understand why it's so important,
and then to insist that it be done.
I hope that this Committee will take up that challenge. Thank you.
Senator COVERDELL. Prof. Allen Weinstein is president and chief
executive officer of the Center for Democracy. Professor Weinstein
is a historian and author of numerous articles and essays. In 1985,
he founded the Center for Democracy as a means of promoting and
strengthening democratic processes worldwide. The center has been
in Haiti since 1991 and has been in the forefront of programs to
assist that nation's pro-Democratic sectors.
Dr. Weinstein, if you would proceed with your comments, and
then we will have a general round robin in terms of the questions
and answers.






59
STATEMENT OF PROF. ALLEN WEINSTEIN, PRESIDENT, THE
CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted
written testimony, and I think, given the hour, I will not read most
of that. I would like to summarize it in a few minutes, if I may.
Senator COVERDELL. Please, and then the full statement will be
entered into the record.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Absolutely.
The burden of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, some of which has
been expressed in comments and questions by you and other Sen-
ators on the panel, some of it by Ambassador Kirkpatrick in her
eloquent presentation, has to do with the half-finished job of deal-
ing with assisting, facilitating, the development of democratic insti-
tutions and processes and habits in Haiti.
I agree with Ambassador Kirkpatrick on the basis of my 15-years
experience in one or another organization, including the current
one, which I have led for 10 years, that there is only so much one
to help can do from the outside that makes enormous sense in a
country. But in Haiti, we are at a kind of turning point.
To summarize my testimony, it has to do with what little the
United States can do in the 3 weeks left to us-only 3 weeks before
we turn this process, at least administratively, over to U.N. control
at the end of the month. We need to try, first of all, to facilitate
and assure the development not only of one but of two fair and free
elections in Haiti at a time when you have almost no useful voter
rolls; the election commission, whatever its good intentions, is new
and comprised largely of partisan novices; the political parties are
underfunded and more or less in disarray. And there are many
other conditions which suggest that there are enormous difficulties
standing in the way of assuring that kind of election-or two elec-
tions, because of course there is President Aristide's commitment
to assure an election that will result in a successor freely chosen
and to hand over power.
At the end of the day, Mr. Chairman, if in February or March
1996, those two elections have not been free and fair and a set of
democratic processes and institutions have not taken root in Haiti,
then the $1.5 billion to $2 billion that seems to be floating around
as a figure that we will have spent in Haiti may indeed have not ,
been spent as successfully as we would have liked.
All of that is in my testimony in a number of very specific, con-
crete suggestions as to what the United States might do in the
weeks ahead, Mr. Chairman.
But I feel as a debt of honor to inform this committee of some-
thing mentioned at the beginning of my testimony, which is a per-
sonal matter that also has, it seems to me, larger implications in
terms of the process that is unfolding.
I call urgently to your attention, Mr. Chairman, an unfortunate
incident which has occurred not in Haiti but in Canada, one that
dramatizes the problem of placing in the hands of even our closest,
most democratic friends within the U.N. the responsibility for pro-
viding security, which is still the preeminent problem in Haiti for
all Haitians and for administering there a fair and free election.
Last Friday, March 2, the president of Haiti's Chamber of Depu-
ties until his term expired in February, Frantz Robert Monde-







whom I think you probably met when you were in Haiti, Mr. Chair-
man, a political opponent of President Aristide's and a candidate
for reelection in the new parliament, was detained at the Montreal
Airport en route to visiting friends in Canada.
As I completed the preparation of this testimony, he remained in
detention a week later, his name apparently culled by Canadian
immigration officials from what they called a watch list of 30 Hai-
tian political figures alleged to have been supporters of the recent
military junta. He is in detention as we meet, Mr. Chairman.
There have been some assurances that he will be released later
today, possibly not, possibly only with a hearing. I have sent some-
one from my staff up to take him back at that time.
Mr. Monde, like many Haitian politicians, has led a jagged politi-
cal odyssey. At one point a strong proponent of the dictator Fran-
cois Duvalier, by February 1994 he had emerged as a key sup-
porter of a parliamentary plan to restore President Aristide, which,
you will recall, proved unsuccessful.
Then, after American troops reached Haiti last fall, Mr. Monde-
I can attest to this personally, having been there that week-
worked closely with U.S. officials in gaining passage in parliament
of the amnesty legislation submitted by President Aristide.
In turn, President Aristide has treated Monde with great cour-
tesy, by Monde's testimony, in their frequent conversations, a sym-
bol to Haitian politicians of the genuineness of the returning Presi-
dent's commitment to national reconciliation.
Despite this recent record and despite the fact that Monde has
not been charged with any crime in Haiti, not only was he detained
in Canada, but when Canadian officials informed Haitian dip-
lomats there of his detention and of Monde's interrogation on un-
specified charges of crimes against humanity, the Haitian dip-
lomats in turn declined to intervene to obtain Monde's release,
stating and restating in response to our inquiries that Monde's de-
tention, and I am quoting them, "is none of our concern. It is a
matter for the Canadians.
I should note that Mr. Monde has a heart condition and other ill-
nesses treated locally in Haiti during the weeks after Aristide's re-
turn, at the request of U.S. authorities, in order to allow him to
complete his legislative duties.
In Canada, apparently, Monde's request to see a doctor was ig-
nored until he phoned our office, and we in turn alerted State De-
partment officials.
It is worth examining, Mr. Chairman, the consequences, upon
transfer of U.S. authority into U.N. hands, of actions such as those
displayed toward Mr. Monde over the past week.
If he is released soon, it will be mainly because of the strenuous
representations of Secretary Talbott and his colleagues to both Hai-
tian and Canadian authorities.
Mr. Monde informed me by telephone yesterday that the Cana-
dian authorities had insisted, after having been arrested, that he
appear before an immigration judge this afternoon. We are now
told that may not be necessary, but his fate remains unclear.
And what of other Haitian opposition politicians on this mysteri-
ous watch list of 30? First of all, who are they? Second, who pre-
pared the list and when? Third, what criteria led to inclusion on







the list? And finally, which governments have been given and are
honoring the list?
At present, the list is secret. Will Canadian officials in Haiti be
instructed to watch these individuals in Haiti as well and impede
their activities while the election campaign proceeds?
The supposedly impartial U.N. technical support mission, after
all, contains a Canadian as its No. 2. Can we expect further one-
sided intrusions into Haitian political life from Canadians and
other U.N. mission countries as the campaign progresses?
I speak, Mr. Chairman, as someone who has worked closely with
the U.N. I have the privilege of holding the U.N. Peace Medal. This
incident, however, is appalling.
What treatment then can opponents of President Aristide, who
may lose in the forthcoming election, expect from the Haitian Gov-
ernment?
Indeed, what future has national reconciliation if arguably the
most prominent current Haitian opposition leader, after months of
friendly cooperation with Aristide, is ignored and denied the sup-
port of his own Embassy in bringing this unwarranted humiliation
to an end?
I will conclude now, Mr. Chairman, with one or two other com-
ments addressing your specific questions at the beginning of this
hearing.
The cost, you have some figures. So I compliment you on that.
Having testified on the House side recently, the figures now seem
to be-
Senator COVERDELL. Jelling.
Dr. WEINSTEIN [continuing]. Jelling. I think we are all in agree-
ment that unless things change, the U.S. component of the U.N.
forces will be out of there sometime early next year after the Presi-
dential election.
We just heard very excellent testimony from my colleague on
what the economic problems are, which is to say an overt degree
of concern for the structural problems and, if you will, for the im-
mediate question of work, but total inattention, or almost until re-
cently, to the business community.
I say that as someone whose organization has hosted six trips by
Haitian business leaders to Washington to try to get the attention
of this community. That seems to be happening.
In terms of the legislature, Mr. Chairman, one correction to a
statement made this morning. Yes, the Center for Democracy
worked for 2 years, from 1991, 1992, into 1993, in the periods we
could, with the Haitian legislature.
We have worked with the legislature since the spring of this
year, after the parliamentary initiative, entirely on private funds.
As of today, there has been no government involvement, no AID in-
volvement, in that. We are told that support will be renewed, but
that has not yet happened.
I think the issue of securing a democratic future for Haiti,
though, is indeed still very much, as I say in my testimony, poised
between hope and despair.
I do not think one can declare a victory, but neither, given the
performance of America's extraordinary military, can one rule out
the prospect that this situation will move forward.








But if it is to move, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that we must
become much more sharply focused-for example, when President
Clinton visits Haiti on March 31 and thereafter, and when congres-
sional delegations such as yours go down-on the full spectrum of
Haitian political life.
Yes, of course, one must and should visit with President Aristide,
who has done important things to address the concerns that many
of those who were skeptical about his return had before he re-
turned. He deserves credit for how he has dealt with some of these
issues.
But President Aristide is not the only Haitian political leader. All
too often, people from the United States go to Haiti and spend an
inordinate amount of time with the President.
They sometimes do not even bother seeing the Prime Minister,
Smarck Michel, a businessman who could talk about these eco-
nomic issues.
Most certainly, American visitors do not see the full spectrum of
Haitian opposition and pro-government leaders, because even the
Aristide coalition is in some disarray, one hears, in terms of the
various parties within it, Lavalas not being the only one.
So in that connection, Mr. Chairman, I would strongly urge con-
gressional leaders, such as yourself, and the President, when he
goes down, to make time. If the process and procedure is impor-
tant, then one must make time for the people who will lead that
process.
I will stop here, Mr. Chairman, and take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Weinstein follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. WEINSTEIN
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Allen Weinstein,
and I am President of The Center for Democracy, a non-profit and non-partisan
foundation, Washington-based, created in 1985 to assist in strengthening the demo-
cratic process, especially in countries undergoing a transition to democracy. Since
1991, the Center has worked in Haiti and, with Haitian leaders, in the United
States to help facilitate democratization in that country through various programs.
We have been working with the Haitian Parliament, cooperating with pro-demo-
cratic Haitian business and political leaders, and assisting municipal officials. My
testimony today reflects personal perspectives and in no sense is an organizational
statement on behalf of The Center for Democracy.
I have appended to this testimony a description of Center programs related to
Haiti. These efforts have led to a half dozen personal visits, together with other
Center Directors and staff, to that country since last September. I leave for Haiti
again next week with Center Directors and staff both to work on organizing an ori-
entation conference and providing other help to the new Parliament (scheduled for
election in June) and to monitor the pre-election situation. Perhaps my most produc-
tive and memorable recent visit occurred shortly after the arrival of U.S. troops on
the island last September. Traveling by military transport and encouraged by the
Administration, our staff worked with the newly-reconvened Haitian Parliament as
it debated and passed the amnesty bill, which sped Generals Cedras and Biambi
into exile, clearing the way for President Aristide's return.
[The information referred to above may be found in committee files.]
At that time, Mr. Chairman, Haiti was the subject of impassioned and elaborate
debate in this country as pro- and anti-Aristide, pro- and anti-occupation, argu-
ments raged in Congress and in the country. Today, for the moment, Haiti no longer
dominates national debate as an issue; the argument over intervention has been
overtaken by the reality of occupation. America's immediate goal, that of restoring
President Aristide to power, was achieved five months ago. Unfortunately, our larg-
er mission of facilitating development in Haiti of democratic institutions and proc-
esses, has proceeded since then fitfully and (at best) unevenly.








Mr. Chairman, much of my testimony today tracks the testimony which I gave
in the House on February 24, if only because the problems which I identified at that
time remain largely unaddressed. If anything, they have become more glaring as we
approach in three weeks, on March 31, the formal transfer of authority in Haiti
from United States to United Nations hands. Indeed, as American responsibilities
decline and those of the U.N. increase, the difficulties of encouraging democratic
habits in a country which has never known such habits may have grown.
In this connection, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I call ur-
gently to your attention an unfortunate incident which has occurred not in Haiti but
in Canada, one that dramatizes the problem of placing in the hands even of our clos-
est, most democratic friends within the United Nations the responsibility for provid-
ing security for all Haitians and for administering there a fair and free election.
Last Friday, March 2, the President of Haiti's Chamber of Deputies until its term
expired in February, Frantz Robert Monde, a political opponent of President
Aristide and a candidate for re-election in the new Parliament, was detained at the
Montreal airport en route to visiting friends in Canada. As I complete the prepara-
tion of this testimony on Wednesday, March 8, Mr. Monde remains in detention, his
name apparently culled by Canadian immigration officials from a "watch list" of
thirty Haitian political figures alleged to have been supporters of the recent military
junta.
Mr. Monde, like many Haitian politicians, has led a jagged political odyssey. At
one point a strong proponent of the then-dictator Francois Duvalier, by February
1994 he had emerged as a key supporter of a parliamentary plan to restore Presi-
dent Aristide which proved unsuccessful. Then, after American troops reached Haiti
last Fall, Monde worked closely with U.S. officials in gaining passage in Parliament
of the amnesty legislation submitted by President Aristide. In turn, Aristide has
treated Monde with great courtesy (by Monde's testimony) in their frequent con-
versations, a symbol to Haitian politicians of the genuineness of the returning Presi-
dent's commitment to national reconciliation.
Despite this recent record and despite the fact that Monde has not been charged
with any crime in Haiti, not only was Monde detained in Canada. When Canadian
officials informed Haitian diplomats there of Monde's detention and his interroga-
tion on unspecified charges of "crimes against humanity," the Haitian diplomats in
turn declined to intervene to obtain Monde's release, stating (and restating, in re-
sponse to our inquiries) that "Monde's detention is none of our concern; it is a mat-
ter for the Canadians."
I should note that Monde has a heart condition and other illnesses, treated locally
in Haiti during the weeks after Aristide's return, at the request of U.S. authorities
in order to allow completion of his legislative duties. In Canada, apparently,
Monde's request to see a doctor was ignored until he phoned our office and we, in
turn, alerted State Department officials.
It is worth examining, Mr. Chairman, the consequences upon transfer of U.S. au-
thority into U.N. hands of actions such as those displayed toward Mr. Monde over
the past week. If he is released soon, it will be mainly because of the strenuous rep-
resentations of Secretary Talbott and his colleagues to both Haitian and Canadian
authorities. Mr. Monde informed me by telephone yesterday that the Canadian au-
thorities insist that, having been arrested, he appear before an immigration judge
this afternoon, a few hours after this hearing. His fate remains unclear.
And what of other Haitian opposition politicians on this mysterious "watch list"
of thirty? First of all, who are they? Second, who prepared the list-and when?
Third, what criteria led to inclusion on the list? Finally, which governments have
been given the list?
At present, the list is secret. Will Canadian officials in Haiti be instructed to
"watch" these individuals in Haiti as well-and impede their activities-while the
election campaign proceeds? The supposedly impartial U.N. Technical Support Mis-
sion, after all, contains a Canadian as its Number Two, designated "Senior
Logistical Officer." Can we anticipate further one-sided intrusions into Haitian polit-
ical life from Canadians and other U.N.-mission countries as the campaign pro-
gresses?
And what treatment can opponents of President Aristide who may lose in the
forthcoming election expect from the Haitian government-indeed, what future has
"national reconciliation -if arguably the most prominent current Haitian opposition
leader, after months of friendly cooperation with Aristide, is ignored and denied the
support of his own Embassy in bringing this unwarranted humiliation to an end?
In this connection, Mr. Chairman, the burden of my testimony is to urge this Sub-
committee, the Congress and the Administration to pursue on a bipartisan basis,
prior to formal transfer of troop authority on the island from United States to Unit-
ed Nations command on March 31, measures that will lay essential groundwork for








a lasting democratic system. Now that the United States has returned Jean
Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, it must use its remaining weeks of virtually-complete au-
thority to help the Haitian people pursue the even more difficult mission of building
democratic structures and habits atop the ruins of tyranny.
A decade ago, testifying before the Senate at another watershed in the struggle
for democracy, I noted that the country in question prior to an historic election (in
that case, the Philippines) stood poised between hope and despair. The words apply
to Haiti today. Haiti confronts in the next critical three weeks the departure of half
the remaining U.S. troop complement, de jure transfer of authority from American
to United Nations control and, most importantly, a defining moment of preparation
for the parliamentary and municipal elections now scheduled for June. Disquieting
revelations in the media last month of the Haitian government's apparent ignoring
of the vetting process to screen out human rights violators, injecting instead hun-
dreds of police trainees without prior U.S. consultation, has only added to the unre-
solved questions regarding selection and control of Haiti's fledgling professional po-
lice force over five months after "Operation Uphold Democracy" was begun and four
months after President Aristide's return.
On its face, the American restoration of the Aristide government appears different
from earlier U.S. ventures into military-backed democratization. In Haiti-unlike
post-World War II West Germany and Japan, much less our mini-expeditionary
forces to Grenada and Panama during the past decade-the United States has acted
in concert with and under the framework of United Nations resolutions. In Haiti,
also uniquely, the U.S. has shared authority not only with U.N. officials but with
a restored President.
But in the end, as in these other instances, assuring democracy in Haiti has been
and will continue to be in the foreseeable future primarily an American responsibil-
ity. For that reason, the U.S. military and civil personnel responsible for coordinat-
ing our occupation of Haiti in all ranks deserve our gratitude for the skill, tact and
bravery with which they have implemented the policy.
As a result, democracy's beachhead has been secured in Haiti and at minimal cost
thus far in American or Haitian lives. Now, however, in the weeks remaining prior
to turning over primary responsibility for Haiti to the United Nations, the moment
has come for the United States to lead decisively the process of helping to consoli-
date a democratic future for all Haitians. I believe that four major efforts to be
taken under American leadership, in cooperation with Haitian and U.N. authorities
during the weeks ahead, if achieved, can help to confirm an unprecedented "politics
of hope" on the island. If not taken now, however, the bright promise of a new be-
ginning which U.S. soldiers brought to Haiti while dispersing the entrenched op-
pressors may quickly turn to popular disillusionment. These four steps are crucial:
1. Consolidating democracy for Haiti requires immediately energizing a sluggish
and divisive pre-election process. Electoral conditions minimally acceptable to the
broad spectrum of Haitian political parties and leaders. whether pro- or anti-
Aristide, must be created. An election constitutionally stipulated in late-1994 now
slouches toward possible achievement in June '95 under U.N./O.A.S. auspices de-
spite horrendous procedural difficulties. These include an absence of current voter
rolls and an electoral council comprised largely of partisan novices. Political parties
remain disorganized and mainly unfunded. There are no campaign groundrules, and
one over-riding concern permeates the entire political atmosphere--a fear for per-
sonal security.
Guaranteeing security for political candidates and their supporters remains a
Herculean task in a country filled with hidden weaponry. Dealing with thousands
of disbanded, discredited and largely unemployed former soldiers and-at the other
political extreme-angry and potentially-violent "popular" associations will require
a coordinated effort by international observers and military personnel throughout
Haiti. In this effort, American leadership will be required to encourage consensus
among the major political groupings so that they choose to participate fully, without
threat of withdrawal on grounds of unfairness should defeat loom. Persistent Amer-
ican oversight of every aspect of the electoral process during the weeks ahead will
help to catalyze a process now assigned to United Nations responsibility.
Nor is the election of parliamentary and municipal officials in June the only con-
cern in this respect. Haiti will elect a new President in December '95, and Jean
Bertrand Aristide made a solemn commitment both prior to his return and since
then not to be a candidate for re-election (something which the Haitian constitution
proscribes). President Aristide has insisted that he will preside over a fair and free
presidential election, handing over power (for the first time in two centuries of Hai-
tian history) to his elected successor. The President deserves praise for this pledge,
made more generous still by the years he spent while in exile deprived of his office.







65

The international community must help Aristide assure that such a peaceful trans-
fer of power occurs at year's end.
2. In order to reduce the residue of Haiti's historic climate of fear, iron-clad proce-
dures must be installed for verifying that the officer corps and recruits in the coun-
try's new police force now undergoing training respond to professional and not politi-
cal direction. Otherwise, we will witness the replacement of the old, blatantly op-
pressive military with merely a newer, subtler but no less oppressive "police." Ef-
forts from whatever quarter in Haiti to employ alleged human rights violators, in-
sert recruits unvetted by American experts, and otherwise undermine professional
training procedures for the new-hopefully, community-based-police cadre in the
country will badly injure its credibility at the outset and open the road to future
abuses.
Continued close monitoring of the police training process by experienced U.S. De-
partment of Justice and military personnel should be the norm. Any Haitian offi-
cials or government advisers incapable of adapting to this demanding standard of
police behavior should be replaced. The model displayed by American troops and
those of other nations in Haiti toward ordinary citizens-an exemplary courtesy, re-
straint and fairness as they pursue quasi-police duties-must not be subverted in
the arduous process of training the new Haitian police force. Preventing the integ-
rity of a largely-U.S. based professional police training program from being under-
mined, Mr. Chairman, will require special vigilance in the weeks ahead. Here, as
in safeguarding Haiti's fragile and incomplete new electoral process, American polit-
ical will and leadership can mean the difference between nominal and genuine com-
pliance with international norms.
3. Strengthening and accelerating national reconciliation is immediately essential
to the establishment of democratic habits in Haiti. For two centuries, Haitian politi-
cal losers have felt unsafe, going into hiding or exile-but not into domestic opposi-
tion. The practice of protected political opposition has little meaning for most Hai-
tians. At a time when there are few political guidelines for the elections to come
and a negligible number of functioning institutions, it is little wonder that many
Haitians-especially those who have opposed Aristide in the past-assume that the
older habits will prevail. Despite the President's admirable and continuing calls for
national reconciliation and not vengeance, the degree of disbelief among his adver-
saries has remained high. Comparably intense, also, is the measure of anxiety
among Aristide supporters concerning the potential for violent assaults upon their
ranks from armed and unregenerate "attaches" or former Haitian soldiers, espe-
cially once "the Americans" have gone or been further reduced in numbers. Given
the evident absence of security for ordinary Haitians of all political viewpoints, I
trust it will not appear hopelessly naive on my part to suggest that the process of
national reconciliation in Haiti would benefit from some immediate steps under
American leadership in the remaining weeks of our mandate. These specific actions
could include:
convening (as a number of Haitian political leaders have suggested) a "national
dialogue' prior to the parliamentary and municipal elections, one comparable to
those which helped to develop civic links across party lines in countries else-
where with few democratic traditions (like Haiti) such as Nicaragua;
encouraging adoption by consensus of a formal "code of conduct' among key po-
litical, governmental, economic and civic leaders in Haiti to define the condi-
tions and limits on political behavior during the two elections which lie ahead
this year, a code which deals voluntarily with acceptable-and proscribed-con-
duct during the campaign months;
recognizing the institutional legitimacy (through maintaining official contacts,
for example) of the remaining handful of legally-elected Haitian Senators (with
the entire Chamber of Deputies and all other Senators now up for election),
thus acknowledging the Haitian Parliament's institutional continuity and im-
portance as an independent and co-equal branch of government (rather than ne-
glecting Parliament, as the U.S. has largely done since President Aristide's re-
turn).
These are only some of the practical steps which the United States could take in
the weeks ahead to assist in national reconciliation. They would reaffirm our com-
mitment to the primacy of democratic process and procedure over personality in
Haitian policy. Such actions would have special relevance today, when there does
not exist in Haiti even the beginnings of an independent and effective judicial sys-
tem.
4. Helping the newly resurgent Haitian private sector, especially the pro-democratic
businessmen and women anxious to rejoin the inter-American market system, is vital
in developing Haitian democracy. Although economic discussion of the Haitian situa-
tion falls more properly within the realm of expertise elsewhere on this panel, it








is appropriate for me to point out the courage and energy of a number of Haitian
businessmen and women with whom The Center for Democracy has worked individ-
ually and through organizations such as The Center for Free Enterprise and Democ-
racy (known by its French acronym CLED). Not only did they publicly support res-
toration of President Aristide at some personal risk prior to his return. Just as im-
portantly, they have rejected the traditional Haitian "business" pattern of seeking
and dispensing government-supported preferences for politically-favored entre-
preneurs. If my friends within Haiti's business community-which was devastated
by the embargo's impact-have a common complaint, it has been with the ele-
phantine pace of delivering the support measures promised by the various mega-
packages of economic aid periodically announced by the U.S. and/or the "inter-
national community." Secretary Talbott's just-ended business mission to Haiti
should focus governmental attention on this critical area.
Surely a country such as ours, which could draft and begin implementing assist-
ance to all of devastated post-World War II Europe through the Marshall Plan in
a matter of months, can finally in the weeks ahead respond to the job-creating pro-
posals of Haiti's responsible business leaders. Otherwise, where do the unemployed
and desperately-poor majority of Haitians turn in pursuit of a decent economic fu-
ture, if not to an activated local private sector?
Each of the goals previously described, Mr. Chairman, can be addressed dramati-
cally and effectively by American leaders in the weeks remaining prior to handing
over our unilateral responsibilities to officials representing the United Nations.
Each is an interrelated factor in the overall mosaic of democratization in Haiti: as-
suring fair and free elections, guaranteeing personal security under professional po-
lice protection, encouraging genuine national reconciliation, and supporting the re-
vival of a strong private sector.
Nor is funding the primary problem; rather, the major difficulty has been in reas-
sessing the American mission in Haiti to focus on today's-not yesterday's-realities
and imperatives. If democracy in Haiti is not to be left on the beachhead, American
leadership must recognize that we have dawdled long enough. Sadly, we have
watched while our Haitian friends did likewise. The time has come to move out: to
recognize that our initial goal, that of restoring President Aristide to power beyond
challenge, has been achieved. That was then; this is now.
On March 31, we must leave as our legacy to the United Nations command and
to the Haitian people a coordinated framework to sustain and consolidate demo-
cratic procedures in the months and years ahead. Achieving that framework will re-
quire strenuous effort between now and the end of March, a period in which we
Americans must confront our problems in Haiti as candidly as our initial success.
In that fashion, we can best seize our opportunity to extend and develop what nas-
cent democracy has already achieved in Haiti during its few fragile months of exist-
ence.
Senator COVERDELL. I am very honored that both of you would
be here. I think you both provided most interesting and excellent
testimony on the question of Haiti. You both have been alarming,
in a sense.
I was unaware of this situation with Mr. Monde. I think it will
require some rather immediate interaction between yourself and
our staff to see what we might do to ferret out both his personal
situation, and perhaps more importantly, the systemic issue that
caused it to happen in the first place.
Do you want to elaborate? Conjecture is often a complicated
thing to do, but can you give at least a reference point as to where
we might begin to investigate?
Dr. WEINSTEIN. I am happy to do it, Mr. Chairman, because I
made the same comment to Secretary Talbott this morning, when
he was here, and to Ambassador Dobbins. They have been terrific
all week in trying to get the Canadians to focus on this and to get
President Aristide himself to focus on this.
No. 1, there is the issue of the U.N. If the U.N. is going to over-
see a fair and free election in Haiti, then the question is: Who is
capable of running? And who-in the opposition-is an adversary?







If, in fact, they have Mr. Monde on a list of adversaries because
of his background prior to the return of President Aristide.
Senator COVERDELL. Let me pursue that. I always get edgy about
who "they" are.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Well, at this point, the Canadian Government, I
think, has some questions to answer. First of all, I think we all
ought to see that list. Who is on that list?
Obviously, there could be real human rights violators and mur-
derers on it. If they have an allegation to make against Mr. Monde,
they should make it. If they don't, then when they release him
today we can fly him back and get him medical treatment.
My feeling is that the Canadian Government has to respond to
the question of how this happened. Why, when one is dealing with
a prominent Haitian political figure, who reported all of this when
he was detained and asked the authorities to get in touch with the
U.S. Ambassador or someone in Canada, they just did not comply?
Senator COVERDELL. Did Ambassador Blanchard-
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Ambassador Swing. Our Ambassador there, no;
but Ambassador Swing in Haiti, whom he had worked closely with.
And nothing happened.
So I would like to hear some things from our friends in Ottawa
and in Montreal, where he was detained.
Second, I am appalled, if it is true, that the Haitian Ambassador
in Canada, whether acting on his own or not, simply brushed this
aside and said, "Well, too bad."
What would have happened if speaker Gingrich or majority lead-
er Dole or for that matter even speaker Foley, going back to the
last Congress, what if they had been detained in some cir-
cumstance of this sort?
What would have been the reaction of our Government? We
know. We would have gone ballistic. And I want to know why the
Haitian Government did not go ballistic at this point.
Perhaps President Aristide did not know this. Well, the whole
Haitian Government has known this for the past several days.
In terms of assessing whether we have to go back to square one,
in reviewing how the U.N. is dealing with election procedures to-
ward opposition politicians, to see what sort of watch list exists, a
lot will depend on who from the politicians of the old regime are
going to be allowed to run.
Obviously, if a politician has committed crimes or human rights
abuses, he ought to be charged with those, even though there is no
legal system to speak of.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick is absolutely correct. There is nothing
resembling a serious rule of law in Haiti.
But those are issues that have to be dealt with before, it seems
to me, this country can comfortably turn over its mandate to the
U.N. They should be dealt with prior to the President's visit there,
if only to avoid embarrassment.
Senator COVERDELL. I appreciate that point, and we will be in
communication with you further on this incident.
Mr. Postal, the question that kept rattling around in my head
was: Are you opening your business in Haiti?
Mr. POSTAL. I was down there in part to make that assessment.
We have not opened as yet. We had two factories there, employing







about 400 people prior to the full shutdown embargo, and had em-
ployed close to 600 at the high.
Senator COVERDELL. Are those facilities still intact?
Mr. POSTAL. Yes. Yes, they are.
Senator COVERDELL. They were not damaged.
Mr. POSTAL. They were not damaged.
Senator COVERDELL. So it is strictly an economic decision for you.
Mr. POSTAL. For us, it is strictly an economic decision.
Senator COVERDELL. At this juncture, how close are you to mak-
ing that decision?
Mr. POSTAL. Well, as a practical matter, we are going to have to
make that judgment in the next 30 to 60 days. We have had exten-
sive conversations with OPIC, and now they have concluded a deal
with at least one of the two U.S. banks they have been talking to,
the Bank of Boston.
We have talked to them about a working capital facility. We hope
to have an answer whether those funds will be forthcoming fairly
shortly.
It is the case that many U.S. banks at this stage of the game are
somewhat, how shall I say, conservative about the notion of putting
working capital funds into Haiti, particularly since their funds
would not have OPIC guarantees.
Companies facing investment in Haiti today are having to an-
swer questions to their bankers and indeed their shareholders and,
in many cases, their customers, as to whether there would be-
whether it is prudent at this stage of the game to put money into
Haiti. We, however-
Senator COVERDELL. Are the businesses interested in doing
this-to follow up-are you having to convince capital to support
you?
You know, I am a former businessman, and I have gone to pur-
sue capital because of something I wanted to do. I obviously would
not have gone to get capital, if I had not made a decision I was
going to pursue a venture.
Mr. POSTAL. We do want to go back.
Senator COVERDELL. You do want to go back.
Mr. POSTAL. Yes, sir, we do.
Senator COVERDELL. So the obstacle is convincing other interests
that it is in their interest to support you to go back.
Mr. POSTAL. Correct. There are-for the U.S. firms looking at
Haiti, there are sort of two questions. For some of us, and it is al-
most in direct proportion to how important Haiti was to your com-
pany insofar as your manufacturing was concerned. The more im-
portant Haiti was, the more you were hurt by the economic sanc-
tions.
One company that was employing 3,000 people went out of busi-
ness. They struggled to survive. Now they have resold their busi-
ness, and, as I understand it, they are considering going back into
Haiti.
We hope not to reach that point, but we sustained substantial
losses on our Haitian operations. Our traditional banks are not en-
amored of the notion of putting their money in there.
The U.S. Government, after a lot of conservation, because USAID
was not in that business, and traditionally that is where you would







have gone, it would have been a much quicker process, now came
up with OPIC, which is sort of a round peg in a square hole, if you
will.
I mean, they are basically in the project finance and overseas in-
surance business, not in the working capital business.
But for lack of anybody else to do it, OPIC has been sort of
pushed the forefront. And I think they have made a good faith ef-
fort to respond. Now, they have concluded an agreement with one
of the two banks they have been talking to. It has taken them
about 6 months.
That facility was signed yesterday. How quickly that bank will
entertain loan applications, go through their judgments, we don't
know.
It should also be noted that those funds are going to not only
have to pass credit muster with the Bank of Boston or Citibank,
depending on who you go to, but there is also an OPIC oversight
on the issue.
We are going to have to be studied by OPIC economists to deter-
mine whether we are exporting U.S. jobs under 599-type con-
straints before those loans will be approved. They will also look at
workers' rights and environmental concerns on the ground in Haiti.
So as a practical matter, some firms need working capital fi-
nance. A lot of firms, who are large enough that they do not need
to concern themselves with that or for whom Haiti was not that
large a portion of their overall sourcing mix, may not be making
the decision solely on the issue of whether there is economic assist-
ance available to them, but rather are looking at the economic en-
vironment on the ground and trying to determine whether there is
sufficient security to send their people back, whether there is suffi-
cient economic stability, if you will, to put people and material in
the country.
A lot of them who have found alternative sites during the pend-
ency of the economic sanctions or the embargo, it is almost a year
since the full embargo, if they have gone and set up a plant in Hon-
duras, now the question is: Why would they want to go back, or
is there a reason to go back?
And a lot of them are taking a wait-and-see attitude. They really
want to see what the Haitian Government does. They really want
to see what the U.S. Government does.
They want to see if it is going to be the same old infrastructure
with port costs that-it costs dramatically more to move a con-
tainer from Port-au-Prince to the United States than it does from
Hong Kong to the United States.
Senator COVERDELL. You know, you describe a situation that cre-
ates a good bit of anxiety, because if the exit date is February
1996-I think back to the time it took me and Georgia is a fairly
stable political situation.
Mr. POSTAL. We do business in Alabama, so that is about equally
stable.
Senator COVERDELL. Yes. It does not take much to envision the
exit, political exit, that has occurred prior to this sorting out.
And, in fact, you could even make the political exit the deter-
minant, that you would want to see what happened following the







political exit before you could really draw a conclusion on the ques-
tions that you were raising.
Mr. POSTAL. Well, I might add one other variable, and this has
been sort of a pet peeve of mine. But, you know, there has been
sort of a change on the Hill of late, and maybe there is a slightly
different perspective.
There has been in this administration, since Larry Pezzullo, Am-
bassador Pezzullo, had the Haiti portfolio, if you will, sort of the
perspective that they could solve Haiti's problems through public
sector kinds of things.
They were going to basically build a society in some manner,
shape, or form without an economy. I mean, you never heard them
mention the words "private sector economy."
You know, jobs are great, but business, you know, that is one of
those things we do not talk about.
I find that a little bizarre. And I suspect that if you went home
to your district and you were looking at 60-percent unemployment,
you would have a hard time getting reelected.
People want to work. I think that is a fundamental thing. And
I think if the average Haitian were given a choice between dollars
being invested in sort of the Haitian governmental bureaucracy, as
important as that might be long term, or invested in a private sec-
tor that is going to mean immediate job creation for people who
have a great deal of difficulty feeding their families, I suspect they
would not have a terribly hard time making that choice.
And I think if you have studied some of the Pacific Rim nations
and how they have developed over the last 10 or 15 years, they had
little difficulty in making decisions as to whether to put their avail-
able capital into their economies on the one hand or into infrastruc-
ture, governmental infrastructure, on the other.
And they always went to economy first. And that is why the ti-
gers are running rampant all over everybody.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Can I add a point to that, Mr. Chairman?
Senator COVERDELL. Certainly.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. I think Mr. Postal would probably agree with me
that if a representative of the Haitian entrepreneurial community
was here, if we had a Haitian business person with us-now there
are more progressive elements who did want Aristide back, who did
want life to go back to a semblance of economic, as well as political,
normalcy-this person would endorse, I think, virtually everything
that you have heard from Mr. Postal in terms of analysis and sug-
gestions, because Haitian businessmen welcome the joint venture
partnerships with American companies and other companies.
At the same time, they would highlight this concern that they
are not being attended to, that it is all well and good perhaps to
bring missions of American business people into Haiti. That is to
be commended.
On the other hand, these folks who are invited into the U.S. Em-
bassy, go to all the receptions-those who are "rolled out"-there
are some favorites, including dear friends of mine, who are invited
whenever people from the Hill come, because they know so much
about how life works here, up here in Washington. But it does not
produce the kind of immediate support and involvement with them
that they would have liked to have seen up to now.







I hope that this recent trip by Secretary Talbott is a foreshadow-
ing of perhaps some more intensive degree of engagement by the
various agencies of the U.S. Government with those folks.
Mr. POSTAL. Let me answer that.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. I just felt we could not really get through this
hearing without saying: What about the Haitian business people?
Mr. POSTAL. Let me answer that. We met extensively with the
Haitian business community over the last 2 days. And, quite frank-
ly, at C/LAA, we have had extensive contacts with the Haitian pri-
vate sector, particularly ADIH, which is the Association of Export
Companies. The former president of ADIH has now become the
president of the Presidential commission in Haiti, which has gotten
1 million worth of aid money to support its activities.
And that Presidential commission is comprised of some of the en-
trepreneurial class in Haiti, a lot of them from the export sector,
who are, I guess, advising President Aristide with respect to the
needs of the business community.
My sense of it is that he is being receptive to what they are say-
ing to him. Now, they are trying to get together a professional staff
to help advise them on recommendations to be made to him.
I think they have an aggressive agenda. I hope that their agenda
is advanced quickly, and I suspect it is going to get an ear in the
Presidential palace in Port-au-Prince.
My concern, based on what I have seen all through Central
America, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, everyone in the hemi-
sphere, is that a lot of these countries just do not possess the tech-
nical expertise and a lot of the manpower and a lot of the compara-
tive knowledge and so on to really do this alone.
I do not mean to suggest that the U.S. Government ought to go
in there and run their economy for them, but there was a blueprint
for a long time in terms of how we might provide certain kinds of
assistance. And what is bizarre about what USAID has become is
we have stripped out just one piece of it.
So instead of infrastructure, private sector development, pro-
motion of workers' rights and labor movement stuff, and a whole
panoply of things that are encompassed in a functioning private
sector, now you have them in the infrastructure business, and you
have them in the union promotion business.
You just do not have them in the private sector promotion busi-
ness. It is bizarre. You know, it is a three-wheeled car.
And I think, whether it is the State Department-the Commerce
Department is making, I must tell you, yeoman-like efforts to try
to fill the vacuum, but they do not have the bucks, and they do not
really have, as you say in Washington, the wheels to really do the
job. They can try to interest other people in assisting nations.
Senator COVERDELL. Well, I would in conclusion say that it has
been very intriguing testimony that both of you have presented. Dr.
Weinstein, we will get in touch with you with regard to a list, a
public list--
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Thank you.
Senator COVERDELL [continuing]. With whom you would suggest
a delegation interact.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Excellent.





72
Senator COVERDELL. And we will get both of your extended state-
ments and be back in touch with both of you with regard to the
questions you have raised here this morning.
Dr. WEINSTEIN. Thank you very much for this opportunity.
Mr. POSTAL. Thank you.
Senator COVERDELL. Thank you.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned, to recovene
subject to the call of the Chair.]














APPENDIX


RESPONSES OF MR. DEUTCH TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY CHAIRMAN HELMS
Question. Will the rules of engagement (ROEs) for U.S. forces change when the
transition occurs from the MNF to UNMIH? If so, what will the new ROEs be? Will
the new ROEs put U.S. military personnel at a greater risk?
Answer. The rules of engagement (ROEs) for U.S. forces in UNMIH will remain
essentially the same as those established for the MNF. The right to self-defense is
non-negotiable and is allowed for under the ROEs of U.N. operations at all times.
The new ROEs will not put U.S. military personnel at any greater risk than that
experienced under the MNF. The ROE are more than sufficient for the protection
of our forces.
Question. What has been the impact of Haiti operations on U.S. military readi-
ness?
Answer. Operations in Haiti as well as other unplanned contingency operations,
have made it difficult for the services to maintain optimum levels of training and
readiness. This year's total shortfall of $2.6 billion-if not corrected in a timely man-
ner-will have devastating results. As commanders must again develop and execute
plans to curtail training, reduce spare parts inventories, defer depot level and real
property maintenance, and minimize fixed costs. The net effect will be a significant
decrease in overall military readiness. Our forces will not be able to respond as
quickly, endure as long or fight at the level of excellence to which our Nation is ac-
customed without a timely passing of the supplemental appropriations bill.
Question. What is the Defense Department's assessment as to the security envi-
ronment in Haiti between the time of the June parliamentary elections and the De-
cember presidential election?
Answer. While the security environment in Haiti has been generally safe and se-
cure, the period leading up to June's scheduled parliamentary and local elections
could contain somewhat higher levels of Haitian on Haitian violence. Despite the
restoration of democratic government, Haitian society remains deeply polarized and
isolated incidents of violence could occur. Political parties from both the left and
right are vying for public office in the upcoming elections, this could contribute to
an atmosphere of heightened tension. Haiti's immature political traditions and his-
torical patterns of violence portend a difficult campaign period. Nonetheless, we are
confident that the UNMIH forces and Haitian police will project sufficient presence
to maintain order. After the summer election, we expect that political tensions will
subside until the presidential campaign begins. Generally, we expect crime and civil
unrest to remain at current low levels. Haitians will continue to stage small sponta-
neous demonstrations to express their frustration with particular social, economic,
political, and labor-related problems. However spillover into widespread civil unrest
is unlikely. It is unlikely that members of UNMIH, to include the U.S. contingent,
will be targeted for any acts of violence.
Question. What are the consequences of withdrawing U.S. military personnel from
Haiti, including U.S. military participation in UNMIH, in near term?
Answer. We believe it would be unwise, if not dangerous, for Congress to legislate
a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces from the U.N. Mission in Haiti. If we are
to protect U.S. troops and maximize their chances of accomplishing their mission,
the end date of this operation should be determined by progress on the ground, not
by an arbitrary deadline.
If the U.S. withdraws prior to the completion of its mission, the probability of re-
newed instability and violence in Haiti is high as plans for standing up a credible
police force arc based upon timeliness that allow for little leeway. Without a credi-
ble, apolitical police force that respects human rights and internationally accepted
standards, risk will be high that Haiti would return to its previous repressive state.
Further, an early withdrawal which precipitates a return to instability and re-
pression, would adversely impact the credibility of the United States and its inter-
national commitments in the future and reopen significant immigration risks.






74

Question. What is the role of the Special Operations Forces in Haiti? What is the
risk involved in their activities?
Answer. The role of the Special Operations Forces in Haiti is to function as a force
multiplier and aid in the furtherance of nation building activities. The focus of the
SOF actions is technical rather than combative in nature. Special Forces acting in
a foreign internal defense role in a peacekeeping setting are much more likely to
use their technical engineering, medical, language and communications capabilities
to assist the local population in returning to normalcy than they are to function in
an armed security role. We believe that the reputation of our Special Forces soldiers
has preceded them and has done more to promote security in the countryside than
could have ever been possible with a much larger conventional force.
Special Forces teams are small, highly trained teams (8-12 personnel) capable of
operating independently in austere environments. The teams are uniquely suited to
interact with local officials and civilians. The alternative to Special Forces requires
a much larger conventional force.
At the peak of the MNF operations in Haiti, Special Forces teams were deployed
throughout the countryside at 44 locations. From these bases they visited over 500
towns and villages where they guided the locals toward effective "local governance"
by organizing town meetings and organizing self-help projects aimed at improving
conditions within these communities. In limited cases they have provided emergency
medical care. These teams have assisted and facilitated the interagency/inter-
national effort in these communities by providing limited military support where it
was deemed essential. UNMIH plans are to deploy up to 500 personnel in the coun-
tryside. We expect that as the situation improves the requirement for these forces
will also diminish.
Concerning the degree of risk our Special Forces teams will encounter in the coun-
tryside, we believe that the close cooperation and relationship these teams will have
with the four regional UNMIH infantry battalions will only enhance their security.
Because these teams are the only military elements in outlying areas, they could
be the first to respond to a security incident. They would assess the situation, re-
spond in accordance with the ROE, and request assistance from the UNMIH re-
gional infantry battalions if required. Additionally, because of the civic actions and
assistance provided to the local communities, the Special Forces teams develop close
ties with their respective communities. As a result, much greater intelligence is re-
ceived from the populace and the communities most often adopt a protective atti-
tude towards "their" Special Forces.
Question. Please provide the Committee with the number of violent incidents on
a monthly basis, directed against U.S. military personnel since their deployment to
Haiti?
Answer. Since the 19 September introduction of U.S. forces into Haiti, U.S. mili-
tary and Coast Guard personnel have been involved in four incidents which involved
weapons fire or the use of force:
On September 24, a USMC squad exchanged fire with members of the Armed
Forces of Haiti (FAd'H) at thee police headquarters in Cap Haitien. One mem-
ber of the U.S. military was wounded, and ten Haitians were killed.
On October 2, unidentified individuals fired shots over a wall in Les Cayes.
One member of the U.S. military was wounded.
On December 26, 50 former Haitian enlisted men gathered outside the FAd'H
headquarters in Port-au-Prince to ask questions about their pay and their fu-
ture. The gathering turned into a spontaneous demonstration, and someone
opened fire, which touched off a melee. A U.S. infantry unit was called to the
scene, and U.S. soldiers used their individual weapons to restore order. Three
FAd'H members were killed, apparently by the demonstrators, while five were
wounded.
On January 12, the first operationally-related U.S. fatality took place in the
city of Gonaives in northern Haiti. Sergeant First Class Gregory Cadott was
shot and killed as he approached the vehicle of a former Haitian military officer
who had refused to pay at a toll booth. SFC Cardott's teammate was wounded
but escaped life-threatening injury. Although there is no evidence that this ac-
tion was premeditated or directed specifically against the MNF or Americans,
MNF reinforcements were sent to the area as a precaution.
Question. What will be the command-and-control arrangements between the U.S.
component of UNMIH, the U.S. commander, the U.N. commander, and the U.N.
Secretary General?
Answer. The military commander for UNMIH will be an American, Major General
Joseph Kinzer, USA. As UNMIH force commander, General Kinzer will also com-
mand U.S. forces in Haiti. As such he will work for the U.N. Special Representative
of the Secretary General, Mr. Brahimi, and will have operational control over all






75

U.N. forces in Haiti. General Kinzer will also be designated commander, U.S. Forces
Haiti (COMUSFORHAITI), and will exercise command and control over all U.S.
forces assigned to UNMIH. As COMUSFORHAITI, he will be under the command
of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command. As COMUSFORHAITI, Gen-
eral Kinzer will also have a U.S. Army Brigadier General as his Deputy. The Dep-
uty will actually oversee the day-to-day management of the U.S. contingent.

RESPONSES OF MR. TALBOTT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY CHAIRMAN HELMS
HAITI: OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY
Question 1. What are considered to be the greatest obstacles to establishing strong
democratic institutions in Haiti? How are U.S. aid programs addressing those obsta-
cle?
Answer. Establishment of strong democratic institutions in Haiti will depend on
the development of democratic values and procedures by the Haitian Government
and people. A good start has been made since the return of President Aristide last
September. A secure and stable environment has been established allowing for the
transition from the MNF to UNMIH on March 31. The upcoming parliamentary
elections will be a major milestone and test of the progress made toward political
democracy.
USAID s $40 million governance program is being used to support municipal, par-
liamentary, and presidential elections. In addition, the program provides funding to
establish an independent Ministry of Justice, encourage public participation in gov-
ernment, provide job and outplacement services to separated members of the Hai-
tian armed forces, strengthen key institutions of democratic governance, such as the
Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and provide institution building support to key
Haitian ministries and government offices.
HAITI: SUPPORT TO PARLIAMENT
Question 2. What specific types of technical and/or financial support and assist-
ance, if any, have we provided to the Haitian Parliament?
Answer.
USAID facilitated the return of 11 Parliamentarians exiled in the United States
and Canada.
USAID facilitated communications between Parliamentarians in Haiti and in
exile, and between Parliamentarians and President Aristide's office in Washing-
ton.
USAID provided immediate assistance in the form of office supplies, type-
writers, radios and a computer based on parliament's requests.
USAID is negotiating with The Center for Democracy (CFD) and has awarded
a grant to the Parliamentary Human Rights Foundation (CHRF) to train the
permanent staff of the parliament, as well as new and returning parliamentar-
ians legislators after the elections in June.
Other planned activities include:
-limited computerization of both houses; and
-assistance with a legislative information/reference library service.
HAITI: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Question 3. What guarantees have been given by the Government of Haiti that
the parliamentary elections set for June 4, 1995 will not be postponed again? What
assurances has the Government of Haiti given that the elections will be free and
fair? Will the parliamentary elections be internationally-supervised?
Answer. Although the CEP has made considerable strides in setting up regional
election boards and beginning the training of election officials, formidable adminis-
trative and logistical problems lie ahead, including: the opening of local electoral of-
fices, preparing a voter registration list, and recruiting, staffing and distributing
ballots to some 9,000 polling sites. We have had frequent discussions with the Gov-
ernment of Haiti about the need to hold to the elections timetable and have offered
our advice and assistance where appropriate. All parties will need to exert maxi-
mum effort to keep to the schedule.
We have expressed our view at the highest levels of the Haitian Government that
the elections must be conducted in a fair and free manner. We know President
Aristide places a high priority on the integrity of these elections. He has personally
worked with all political parties on arrangements for the elections.
The UN, which has a permanent elections office in Haiti, will serve as coordinator
for election activities, and the Organization of American States (OAS) will provide








international observers and monitors and handle the verification aspects of the elec-
tions. Both the MNF and, since March 31, UNMIH are helping the Provisional Elec-
toral Council prepare for the elections, and UNMIH will assist the GOH in provid-
ing security throughout the electoral campaign.
HAITI: HAITI'S ELECTORAL LAW
Question 4. In February, President Aristide signed an electoral law which largely
ignored the version approved by the Haitian Parliament. Under what constitutional
authority was he able to ignore the Haitian Parliament? Has the U.S. Administra-
tion discussed this with President Aristide?
Answer. The Haitian Parliament made several amendments to the draft electoral
law proposed by the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) altering provisions regard-
ing candidates' residency requirements and the candidacy of priests. Since the Hai-
tian Constitution itself defines conditions for candidacy, there were questions raised
regarding the constitutionality of the Parliament's changes. The Parliament re-
turned the law to the executive branch just before the term of office of the lower
chamber of Parliament expired. Under the Haitian Constitution the President nor-
mally would have resubmitted the draft law to the Parliament with his suggested
alternatives, but he could not do so because of its expiration. Consequently, he con-
sulted with the CEP, which is duly authorized to supervise the electoral process,
and then promulgated the law as it was originally drafted by the council. The CEP
concurred in all the changes made by President Aristide, and he made only the
changes suggested by the CEP. The constitution does not address the situation in
which Parliament is not available, but President Aristide's decision to consult with
the CEP and follow its guidance seems a reasonable approach in the circumstances.
Question 5. What assurances does the United States have from the United Na-
tions (U.N.) that, after U.S. forces leave Haiti, the U.N. will support the integrity
of the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF)?
Answer. United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 establishes the mandate
of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to include assisting the democrat-
ically-elected Government of Haiti in: Sustaining the secure and stable environment
established during the multinational phase, and creating a separate police force.
That process has begun under the Multinational Force, with the establishment of
the Interim Public Security Force, and will continue under UNMIH. The Govern-
ment of Haiti, the UN and the U.S. have agreed to continue training and support
for the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF). UNMIH will deploy more civilian po-
lice (900) in support of the IPSF than the MNF did International Police Monitors
(IPM). As the title of the force implies, of course, the IPSF is not intended to be
permanent and will be phased out as newly-trained permanent Haitian police grad-
uate from the police academy. That process may begin as early as mid-1995.
Question 6. Early this year there was an attempt to dismiss 1,200 Haitians, who
had been screened to make sure they were not human rights abusers, from the po-
lice and to replace them with 1,700 unscreened individuals. Please provide the Com-
mittee with the State Department understanding as to whether President Aristide
knew about this, the specific steps the Administration (including the U.S. Ambas-
sador in Haiti) took to rectify this situation, and whether the 1,700 unscreened indi-
viduals have been removed from the police and the 1,200 restored.
Answer. In early January, the U.S. Mission in Haiti and the MNF received infor-
mation that some individuals who had been trained by ICITAP in special six-day
courses (after screening by the Mission to ensure that they were not human rights
abusers) to be members of the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) had been dis-
missed by the Government of Haiti. At that time, confusion had also been created
through the existence of two GOH lists, one of 2,000 individuals designated as IPSF
and another 1,500 who were listed as members of the IPSF but who were des-
ignated for membership in a new Haitian Armed Forces should one eventually be
established.
The Mission, in conjunction with the MNF, undertook a thorough review of the
composition of the IPSF and created a computer database. The Mission asked the
GOH to consolidate their various lists and to present one consolidated list for the
IPSF. The GOH provided such a list of 3,413 personnel.
The Mission and the MNF then made a comparison of that list with the com-
prehensive list of all personnel who had been screened for human rights abuses and
trained by ICITAP in their six-day courses. That resulting database revealed that
approximately 1,200 persons on the GOH list of 3,413 had not been trained by
ICITAP and screened, and that over 1,000 personnel who had been trained by
ICITAP and screened were not on the GOH list of 3,413. (The initial figure of 1,700








for non-ICITAP trained went down to 1,200 as names were more carefully cross-
checked.)
In early February, these discrepancies were brought to President Aristide's atten-
tion. He immediately directed that no non-vetted, non-ICITAP individuals should be
permitted to remain on the IPSF rolls.
On February 16, President Aristide, in the presence of the U.S. Ambassador, in-
structed his officials to work with the U.S. Mission in order to fully resolve the re-
maining discrepancies between the USG and GOH lists. It appears that President
Aristide was unaware of the issue before we brought it to his attention. Once we
were able to document the discrepancies, he took decisive action to correct the prob-
lem. Following February 16, Joint Teams, composed of U.S. Mission officials, MNF
representatives, and GOH officials, travelled throughout the country to recompose
the IPSF lists to ensure that only ICITAP-trained and screened personnel are mem-
bers of the IPSF. All those who were not ICITAP-trained and screened were in-
formed that they could not serve in the IPSF.
HAITI: PIERRE CHERUBIN AND RICHARD SALOMON
Question 7. The Committee has been informed that Pierre Cherubin and Richard
Salomon continue to be close advisers to President Aristide. What official or de facto
positions or relationships do either of these individuals have with President Aristide
or his government? Have we conveyed our concerns about these two individuals to
President Aristide directly? Is it true that Cherubin will be named to head the Hai-
tian telephone company?
Answer. Pierre Cherubin and Richard Salomon are separated from the Haitian
armed forces and hold no official positions with the Haitian Government. Cherubin
has ceased to work in the Presidential Palace or to function as an official adviser
to President Aristide, nor are we aware of any ongoing regular unofficial contact.
We have seen reports, so far unconfirmed, of the sort you mention concerning
Cherubin's future employment.
Question 8. What information does the State Department have on the background
of Major Dany Toussaint, a top ranking officer in the Haitian security force? What
information does the Department have about allegations of his involvement in
human rights violations, drug trafficking, and/or corruption? Is the State Depart-
ment prepared to pressure President Aristide to remove Toussaint if it has informa-
tion that Toussaint is involved in either of the aforementioned activities?
Answer. Major Dany Toussaint is currently chief of the interim public security
force (IPSF). During President Aristide's first months in office in 1991, Toussaint
held positions as commander of the 48th Headquarters Defense Unit and deputy
commander of the presidential security service.
There are unsubstantiated allegations that Toussaint was on the fringes of narcot-
ics activities early in his military career. In the early 1980's Toussaint served in the
Dessalines Battalion under Col. Jean-Claude Paul, who reportedly used his military
position to carry out a variety of illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking.
Paul was indicted in the United States for this activity. Toussaint, who was resident
in the United States while this case was active, was not.
Given the absence of credible information of serious human rights or narcotics-
related abuses, we have not objected to Major Toussaint's appointment. The IPSF
will be phased out as its duties are assumed by the new Haitian national civilian
police. This process will begin in the summer of 1995. A new civilian head of the
national police will be appointed in the near future.
HAITI: UNDESIRABLE INDIVIDUALS
Question 9. Beyond those individuals mentioned in questions seven and eight
above, what information does the State Department have on undesirable individuals
having leadership positions in the presidential secretariat, palace advisory positions,
or positions in the ministries of justice, interior, public works, or defense? Which
individuals has the Administration pressured Aristide on? How has Aristide re-
sponded to our representations and pressure? For those individuals on whom action
has been taken by Aristide, what new positions do they have now?
Answer. There are no individuals in the Haitian military or police establishment
about whom the U.S. Government has negative information comparable to that we
possess concerning Cherubin and Salomon, in terms of the seriousness of the allega-
tions and the credibility of the information. The United States has actively screened
individuals who are connected with U.S. sponsored programs assisting the Haitian
Government. In that connection, we have vetted members of the Haitian armed
forces, who applied to be members of the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), to
exclude known human rights abusers. The results of our vetting were made avail-







78

able to the Government of Haiti and action was taken to remove negatively vetted
individuals from active service. President Aristide has agreed that only U.S. vetted,
ICITAP trained personnel should serve in the Interim Public Security Force, which
is for the present, the only armed or police force in Haiti. The United States Govern-
ment as well as the UN and the Governments of France and Canada have been in-
volved in the recruitment of the new National Police, which is being selected in an
objective, competitive, non-politicized fashion, and is attracting a very high caliber
of recruit.
Question 10. In January 1995, the DEA reportedly notified President Aristide of
an impending "drug bust' involving a boat in Port au Prince harbor. The boat mys-
teriously disappeared the next morning. What does the State Department know
about this incident?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince has no record of any contact with
President Aristide in January concerning an alleged drug shipment in Haiti. DEA
officials have not had direct contact with President Aristide over this or any other
matter. We are not aware of any incident in January, or at any other time in recent
months, when a planned "drug bust" of a boat suspected of carrying narcotics in
Haiti did not take place because of the disappearance of the boat.
We are aware that, in February, a news reporter asked a DEA official in Miami
about an alleged incident in January involving a suspect drug shipment by boat to
Haiti; and we also have at least one unconfirmed intelligence report-which we re-
ceived after the fact-about a ship oMfloading drugs in January at a port in Haiti
other than Port au Prince. We cannot tell whether the alleged incidents in these
two reports are related to an incident such as that described in your question.
HAITI: CONTROLS ON FOOD DISTRIBUTION
Question 11. The Committee has heard a number of allegations of the sale for
profit by private Haitian groups of U.S. humanitarian groups of U.S. humanitarian
aid. What mechanisms are in place to ensure the U.S. assistance is not diverted or
illegally used?
Answer. The USAID Inspector General has investigated allegations of substantial
diversions of food shipments. While a final report has not yet been released, we un-
derstand that they have concluded that losses were largely "due to the unique cir-
cumstances resulting from the vacuum of civil authority and uncertainty during the
political transition period" last fall.
USAID/Haiti has procedures in place to regularly monitor any commodity losses.
This information is then shared immediately with the Multinational Force and the
International Police Monitors. Other measures, such as a system of coding the bags
of food with markers according to the feeding center of final destination, is also
being used so that if food is found for sale, it can be traced back to the feeding cen-
ter and appropriate action can be taken.
USAID and the Cooperating Sponsors are working on a daily basis with the IPM
and MNF to obtain greater security for food deliveries.
We have been assured by the commander of the MNF forces that they will work
closely with UNMIH to ensure continued assistance in dealing with looters.
HAITI: POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
Question 12. There are also allegations that U.S. assistance is going to Haitian
groups and organizations associated with President Aristide and/or Lavalas. For ex-
ample, questions have been raised about the political affiliation with Lavalas of the
following Haitian organizations which have received USAID funds through non-gov-
ernmental organizations:
-A Tet Kole Dessources
-Comite Lavalas pour le Development et de Santi Du Peuple Haitien
-Pired
-Youth Collaboration Committee for Lavalas Operation
Please provide the Committee with the Department's understanding as to wheth-
er these organizations are affiliated with any Haitian politician and/or political
movement or entity. What mechanisms are in place to ensure that U.S. aid is not
used for political purposes or provided to groups with a specific political orientation?
Is the Administration prepared to deny funding to any group or organization that
is closely affiliated with a Haitian politician or political entity?
Answer. USAID's program focuses on the restoration of stability and security as
a condition precedent to the political development in Haiti. A variety of groups rep-
resenting a broad range of political views is the distinguishing feature of this transi-
tion period.






79

Thus, in working with indigenous NGOs in Haiti the criteria for support embraces
two concepts: first, will support of this request improve the political development
of the community which will promote security and stability, and second, if the
project will provide the basis for a more democratic society, then everyone becomes
a potential partner.
We are not analyzing groups by their affiliation, but rather what they can bring
to the table as far as manpower, ideas, and constructive efforts in support of devel-
opment.
It is absolutely contrary to USAID policies and procedures to use this program
to promote specific political interests.
Regarding the four organizations mentioned in your question, your information is
incorrect. USAID funds only one of the above organizations, PIRED, which has no
political affiliation; it is the Haitian name/acronym for the American Development
Foundation, a well respected U.S. private voluntary organization.
HAITI: HAITIAN LAWS ON ELECTIONS
Question 13. What Haitian laws currently exist regarding a prohibition on the use
or diversion of government resources to a political candidate, party or movement?
How will the U.S. Government ensure that no resources provided by our Govern-
ment will be used to benefit any particular political candidate, party or movement
during the upcoming election?
Answer. The Haitian Electoral Law prohibits such diversion of government re-
sources to a political candidate, party, or movement. Specifically,
Article 99 of the Electoral Law prohibits any agent of the government, in the
course of his function, to participate in electoral propaganda, under penalty of
dismissal.
Article 124 of the Electoral Law provides for prison terms of 5 to 10 years,
for a public official who abuses his authority to influence the vote of an elector.
Article 131 of the Electoral Law prescribes forced labor for any civilian or
military authority using his position to influence the vote while addendum 1 of
the same article prescribes banishment from the Civil Service of any govern-
ment officer who shows negligence to enforce or abide by the Electoral Law.
The Project Implementation Letters signed by both governments explicitly pro-
hibits the use of U.S. funds for other than intended uses. Obviously, we would close-
ly monitor compliance with any such agreement.
HAITI: ASSISTANCE TO PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Question 14. What assistance will the United States provide for the June par-
liamentary elections?
Answer. USAID will provide a total of approximately $10.8 million to assist the
parliamentary, local and presidential elections.
About $9 million is being provided through the UN/EAU and will be used for the
following:
-voter registration
-civic and voter education;
-training of pollworkers and political party pollwatchers;
-technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council; e.g., transportation
and logistics;
-assistance in drafting the electoral law; and
-candidate and national party fora.
Approximately $2 million will be provided to the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems (IFES) which will be responsible for the procurement of ballots.
Other USAID support for the electoral process includes: political party training
(NDI); voter education (AIFLD) and radios and computers for voter registration.
HAITI: U.S. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ELECTION SUPPORT
Question 15. What are the individual U.S. agency responsibilities for assisting the
U.N. and Haitian Government for the June elections?
Answer. The United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit has primary responsibility
for providing technical assistance and support to the Haitian Electoral Commission.
The Department of State and U.S.A.I.D. are taking the lead in coordinating the
provision of USG assistance to the U.N. 's efforts to ensure open, fair and free elec-
tions in Haiti this June.








HAITI: COST OF HAITI ELECTIONS
Question 16. How much will it cost the United States and U.N. respectively, to
support the June elections? What are other donors providing?
Answer. The United States will provide approximately $11.3 million to the esti-
mated U.N. elections budget for Haiti of $18.5 million.
Other donors, who are being demarched, have pledged as follows:
Canada: $1.5 million
France: $1.0 million
Japan: $650,000
EU: $1.3 million
HAITI: ELECTION TIMING SLIPPAGE
Question 17. What will be the impact on the December presidential election if the
parliamentary elections slip beyond the current June date?
Answer. We will make every effort to assist the Government of Haiti to avoid slip-
page in the parliamentary elections. Presidential elections in Haiti are scheduled for
November 26, 1995. Even were parliamentary elections to slip a short time beyond
the current June date, there should be more than sufficient time to organize presi-
dential elections. Running the parliamentary elections will provide valuable experi-
ence on how to organize a nation-wide election and what pitfalls to avoid.
HAITI: STABILITY BEFORE THE ELECTIONS
Question 18. What indication of stability leading up to the June elections does the
Department see?
Answer. The Haitian people live today in an environment that is, in relative
terms, safe, secure and free of political violence. Criminal acts in Haiti are typically
crimes of passion or crimes against property. The level of criminality in Haiti is low
by comparison with many other societies, especially societies in transition. Recent
instances of vigilante justice do occur, but people have begun to help capture sus-
pected criminals and turn them over to the IPSF and International Police Monitors.
Steps now in train to better equip the Interim Public Security Force in addition to
the entry on duty of the new graduates of the National Police Academy beginning
in May will effectively continue the success achieved thus far in securing a safe and
stable environment. The MNF and UNMIH are both giving high priority to security,
particularly election security.
HAITI: EXTENSION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM
Question 19. Does the State Department anticipate that President Aristide will
seek to extend his presidential term? Are there any indications that Aristide intends
to dissolve his cabinet and/or not hold parliamentary elections?
Answer. President Aristide has stated clearly that he will not stay on as president
beyond the end of his term in February 1996. We have no reason to believe that
his firm position on this point has changed.
There is no indication that President Aristide intends to dissolve the cabinet, al-
though since Haiti has a parliamentary system, it would not be unusual for a cabi-
net shift to occur once the new Parliament is installed. Every indication is that the
parliamentary elections scheduled for June 4 are still on track.
HAITI: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Question 20. Does the State Department have any indications that declared or po-
tential parliamentary candidates are being harassed or intimidated (e.g. stoned) in
Haiti today?
Answer. There have been reports of intimidation of communal and local electoral
officials by both the left and the right. Overall, however, complaints of violence and
intimidation have been sporadic, as the Haitian people have remained largely peace-
ful since voter registration began March 26. UN peacekeeping forces and civilian po-
lice, OAS observers, and the Government of Haiti are cooperating to provide a se-
cure environment in which the upcoming elections can take place in a free and fair
manner. We remain confident that together they will prove equal to the task.
IIAITI: SECURITY OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION
Question 21. What measures are being taken to protect members of the Haitian
political opposition? If a member of the political opposition goes to the U.S. Embassy
and/or UNMIH to request protection during the campaign, what type of support will
be provided? Specifically, have any political figures, parties, or entities raised con-








cerns about the lack of security with the MNF, the U.S. Embassy, or the UN/OAS
international civilian mission?
Answer. As explained in question 18 above, MNF, UNMIH, and Haitian security
forces are monitoring the run-up to the elections very closely and are formulating
a comprehensive election security plan to deal with any emerging situation. The
UN/OAS International Civilian Mission, with a force of 200 monitors, has agreed
to investigate and report on all allegations of politically motivated violence and in-
timidation.
HAITI: FUTURE OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY
Question 22. Does the Administration believe that Haiti should have a military?
What does the Aristide Government want to do about the Armed Forces of Haiti
(FAd'H)?
Answer. As Deputy Secretary of State Talbott made clear in his testimony to the
HIRC and the SFRC, the decision whether to retain a military is for the Govern-
ment of Haiti to make. All remaining FAd'H personnel have been transferred to the
IPSF, under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. About 2,000 other members
of the Haitian military have been separated from the service and offered six months
of training for civilian employment during which they will continue to be paid. We
are working with Haitian government officials to make sure that this process of de-
mobilization, however far it may extend, takes place in an orderly, responsible and
equitable fashion, consistent with President Aristide's emphasis on reconciliation.
All senior FAd'H officers above the rank of major have been retired.
HAITI: DUTIES OF SECURITY ELEMENTS
Question 23. If President Aristide does not want a military, how will residual se-
curity elements (border patrol, coast guard, engineers, counternarcotics, intelligence,
and palace security units) be organized?
-What will be the precise structure of and relationship between the palace/presi-
dential security organizations?
-What is the level of Haitian Government and U.S. Government funding for the
creation and sustainment of the above mentioned Haitian organizations.
-Specifically, what U.S. agencies and funding authorities will be involved in the
creation and sustainment of these agencies?
Answer. The Haitian Government is in the process of deciding how security ele-
ments such as the border patrol, coast guard, palace security, etc. will be organized
and directed. We are actively discussing these matters with Haitian government of-
ficials. We expect that some of the functions mentioned may be performed by the
national police and some by other new units to be set up under the Ministry of Inte-
rior and the Ministry of Public Works. We believe the assignment of police and secu-
rity responsibilities to several ministries to be sensible and consistent with our own
practices, and we are prepared to work with the Government of Haiti to help design
and support a structure suitable to Haiti's needs.
HAITI: PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORT
Question 24. The Committee has received a number of complaints from the U.S.
private sector (particularly the assembly sector) that it was not taken into account
when U.S.A.I.D. designed U.S. aid programs for Haiti. Please provide the Commit-
tee with details of the Administration s consultations with the U.S. private sector
in the development of the U.S. private sector in the development of the U.S. aid pro-
gram to Haiti.
Answer. USAID has undertaken a number of initiatives to facilitate dialogue with
the private sector in the rebuilding of Haiti, including:
participating in a number of fora and conferences in both the United States
and Haiti to discuss the reconstruction of Haiti with Haitian and American
business leaders.
USAID addressed 150-200 firms in Congresswoman Carrie Meek's district at
a November event sponsored by the White House and the Representative. The
Agency cooperated with OPIC to counsel the business community on potential
opportunities with USG agencies working in Haiti.
USAID sat on a panel at the November 30th conference, "Constructing Haiti."
The event, sponsored by the Haitian-American Alliance, Inc, targeted the busi-
ness community.
USAID participated alongside Haitian and US government officials in a busi-
ness seminar hosted by the Miami Chamber of Commerce.
USAID assisted the Embassy of Haiti in organizing a March seminar for Hai-
tian-American enterprises.








providing financial and technical support to the Presidential Commission for
Economic Growth and Modernization, which will drawn on expertise from the
private sector to introduce measures to strengthen budget and monetary policy,
modernize the investment code and regulations, mobilize capital and savings,
improve banking practices, and upgrade the regulatory framework under which
business and commerce operate.
facilitating discussions between AIFLD and the Caribbean and Latin Amer-
ican Action (CLAA) to resolve concerns over workers rights, AFL-CIO interests,
the return of assembly plants to Haiti, and avoidance of labor strife.
providing financial support to the Trilateral Commission to facilitate dialogue
among government, labor and private sector leaders in Haiti.
A major result of these discussions with the private sector is the establishment
of the Multilateral Private Enterprise Development Fund. Proceeds from this fund
will finance direct business loans, loan guarantees, technical assistance, business
feasibility studies, venture capital and the brokering of investment deals between
local and foreign entities for joint ventures.
HAITI: STATUS OF OPIC LENDING FACILITY
Question 25. The Committee has heard concerns that once the "lending facility"
is announced, participating banks will still not be willing to make loans to the as-
sembly sector. What is the status of the OPIC "lending facility"? What steps are
being taken to ensure that the OPIC facility will address the concerns of the private
sector?
Answer. Commercial banks in Haiti have had tight lending policies in the past;
however, we are unaware of any unwillingness on their part to extend loans to
qualified applicants from the assembly sector.
The U.S. Government recently announced the creation of an "on-lending" facility
supported by the OPIC that will make more than $65 million in working capital and
loans available through the Bank of Boston to commercially viable business ven-
tures in Haiti.
OPIC is guaranteeing $50 million of the facility which will make small and me-
dium-size loans on commercial terms to expand businesses in Haiti engaged in man-
ufacturing and providing services to the local economy.
HAITI: ANNOUNCEMENT OF ENTERPRISE FUND
Question 26. When was the first formal announcement of the "enterprise develop-
ment fund"? How soon will this fund be in place? How will it function?
Answer. The "enterprise development fund", now called the Multilateral Private
Enterprise Program (MPEP), was announced initially as a desirable concept during
the Consultative Group on Haiti in late January. Additional exploration occurred re-
cently and the intention to create an MPEP was publicly announced in Haiti earlier
this month during the Presidential Business Development Mission to Haiti.
USAID is now working actively on this effort with several other donors, including
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Union,
and the InterAmerican Development Bank, as well as the Government of Haiti, and
the Presidential Commission. USAID will work in concert with these participants
over the course of the next few months to develop the operational aspects of the Pro-
gram.
The MPEP is expected to provide technical assistance to strengthen financial in-
stitutions and non-bank intermediaries, while helping to recapitalize and expand
the overall capacities of those institutions.
Technical assistance, grants and small loans to businesses are among the pro-
posed options which would provide direct support for the private sector.
This program will consolidate several USAID private sector initiatives, including
support for the GOH privatization program which targets key parastatal enterprises
through the International Finance Corporation as well as providing support for the
agenda of the Presidential Commission and the Tripartite Commission.
HAITI: EXIM BANK
Question 27. Are there plans to involve the EXIM Bank and the multinational de-
velopment banks in helping the U.S. private sector restore its operations in Haiti
in the short term?
Answer. The U.S. Export-Import Bank is not currently open for business in Haiti
due to existing legal requirements. They are currently preparing for the time when
those conditions can be met.






83

HAITI: ENCOURAGEMENT FOR U.S. BUSINESS
Question 28. How is the U.S. government helping to solicit and encourage the re-
turn of American companies to Haiti, especially those in the apparel sector, which
operated in Haiti until the embargo?
Answer. Among the initiatives the United States Government has taken to en-
courage U.S. firms to return to Haiti are:
-committing $100 million in OPIC financing and guarantees over the next four
years;
-restoring Haiti's sugar and textile quotas;
-conducting a Presidential Business Development Mission and other trade pro-
motion in Haiti;
-opening a Foreign Commercial Service office in Port-au-Prince;
-supporting a US-Haitian Business Development Council.
Deputy Secretary Talbott led the Presidential Business Development Mission to
Haiti March 7-8 with 28 executives of business firms and trade associations. Other
missions will be organized over the next several months.
While the mission was in Haiti, OPIC signed an agreement with Bank of Boston
to provide more than $65 million in loans to commercially viable business ventures.
A similar facility will soon be arranged through CITIBANK. OPIC funds could also
be available for infrastructure development.
Two apparel sector firms took part in the mission and one of them announced
plans for substantial expansion of its business in Haiti. Firms in this sector may
enjoy the benefits of the OPIC On-Lending Program.
The apparel sector can again benefit from the provisions of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Haiti has the potential to increase significantly its apparel exports to the
U.S. Its ability to do so and to attract U.S. firms to return will depend largely on
its success in creating a secure and competitive environment which will encourage
firms to restore operations and induce other firms to begin new operations or pro-
curement in Haiti.
HAITI: ASSISTANCE TO POTENTIAL INVESTORS
Question 29. What part of U.S.A.I.D.'s programs in Haiti assist with investment
promotion, and technical and financial assistance to potential investor's?
Answer. USAID is providing a broad range of assistance to establish an environ-
ment in Haiti to encourage investment by potential investors, including:
Active planning for a Multinational Private Enterprise Program, in coopera-
tion with the World Bank, European Union, possibly the IDB, and other donors,
to strengthen the financial sector, broaden the base for commercial lending and
to foster local and foreign investment, economic growth and employment gen-
eration;
Establishment of macroeconomic stability essential to the revitalization of the
private sector (Balance of Payments support; clearing arrears to allow IFI lend-
ing and technical assistance to start);
Creation of an "enabling environment" which will support the return of busi-
nesses and the reinvigoration of the Haitian private sector (assistance to the
Presidential Commission to reform the legal, regulatory and policy environment;
Policy and Administration Reform Project; Administration of Justice project);
Technical, financial and legal analysis of the highly inefficient parastatals
(electricity, telephone, marine port and airport, two state banks, cement, flour
and vegetable oil mills); leading to privatization of ownership; and,
USAID projects provide credit and technical assistance to help the small and
microenterprise sectors.
HAITI: JOB CREATION
Question 30. What resources (both Haitian and U.S.) have been committed to cre-
ating permanent jobs?
Answer. USAID strategy is to create a climate in which private enterprise endeav-
ors can flourish and thus provide badly needed permanent employment to Haitians
in both urban and rural areas.
USAID is supporting the Tripartite Commission and the Presidential Commission
on Economic Growth and Modernization. The Presidential Commission recently cre-
ated by President Aristide will identify bottlenecks and recommend actions to be
taken by the Government of Haiti to improve the business and investment climate.
We are also supporting the Tripartite Commission.
The Aristide Administration has already eliminated Haiti's 40 percent surrender
requirement of foreign exchange earnings from exports, extended tax exemptions for




84

export assembly sector firms, lowered tariff restrictions on imports and eliminated
visa requirements for foreigners.
USAID is actively planning a Multinational Private Enterprise Program in co-
operation with the World Bank, European Union, possibly the IDB and other do-
nors.
USAID is facilitating discussions between AIFLD and the Caribbean and Latin
American Action to resolve concerns over workers rights, AFL-CIO labor union in-
terests, the return of assembly plants to Haiti, and avoidance of labor strife.
The USAID Provincial Enterprise Development project has provided over 1,000
loans through the Haitian Development Foundation to small and micro-enterprises
in Port-au-Prince and the provinces.
USAID is supporting a credit program to small and microenterprises throughout
the Haitian Development Foundation. Over a thousand loans are now assisting
small business through this program.
USAID is funding a "skills bank" to identify highly trained Haitians and Haitian
Americans, and other qualified individuals with relevant technical and language
skills. This program will act as a clearing house of information to match potential
employers to qualified personnel interested in the rebuilding of the Haitian econ-
omy.
HAITI: REBUILDING THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Question 31. What is being done by both the Haitian and U.S. Governments to
rebuild a modern competitive manufacturing sector?
Answer. The creation of a modern and competitive manufacturing sector in Haiti
requires the development of a sound investment and business climate.
The Aristide government is committed to promoting private-sector led economic
growth. Shortly after his return, President Aristide established a joint Presidential
Commission on Economic Growth and Modernization, composed of 15 leading rep-
resentatives of the Haitian private sector and 7 senior Government of Haiti (GOH)
officials, including the Prime Minister and the Governor of the Central bank. The
commission's mandate is to define the agenda for private sector growth and advise
the GOH on the policy reforms and implementation actions required to carry it out.
USAID is providing funding for consultants and the Commission's operations.
The following steps are other examples of recent actions by the Haitian and U.S.
Governments that will help stimulate modernization and expansion of Haiti's manu-
facturing sector:
Import duties have been reduced from a maximum rate of 57 percent to a
maximum rate of 15 percent.
A requirement for forced surrender of foreign exchange earnings has been
eliminated.
A process has begun to privatize nine public enterprises, including several
which have given the public sector a monopoly over the manufacture of key
products (cement, flour, cooking oil) and others whose inefficiency has imposed
costs on the manufacturing sector (power, telephones, ports).
USAID has funded technical assistance to implement the privatization pro-
gram with the IFC.
The Government of Haiti has committed itself to disciplined management of
its public finance, which will allow credit to the private sector to expand by 25
percent this year.
The U.S. Government recently announced the creation of an "on-lending" fa-
cility supported by the OPIC that will make more than $65 million in working
capital and loans available through the Bank of Boston to commercially viable
business ventures in Haiti.
The Presidential Business Development Mission to Haiti, led by Deputy Sec-
retary of State Strobe Talbott, during March 6-8 highlighted the importance of
private sector involvement in Haiti's development. The Mission was comprised
of some 30 U.S. firms from a broad spectrum of industries.
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on December 16 between the
U.S. Department of Commerce and the Haitian Ministry of Finance creating a
U.S.-Haitian Business Development Council.
The Department of Commerce opened its office in Haiti on February 6. The
U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service will provide on-site trade and investment
counseling and facilitative commercial services to U.S. exporters and investors
interested in doing business in Haiti.
HAITI: FROZEN ASSETS
Question 32. The Committee is informed that Haiti's Central Bank Governor may
ask the U.S. Government for an accounting of the frozen assets that were spent by




85

the Aristide Government during its three years in exile. Will the Administration
give him and the U.S. Congress that full accounting?
Answer. All Haitian Government funds in the U.S. were blocked to prevent their
transfer to the de facto regime in Haiti and to preserve access by the recognized
government of President Aristide, consistent with executive orders and UN security
council resolutions.
During its period of exile, the duly recognized representatives of the legitimate
Government of Haiti made disbursement requests at roughly quarterly intervals. In
each instance, we advised the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Con-
trol, the office administering the blocked funds, of the Department's policy that, as
the head of the legitimate Government of Haiti, President Aristide should have ac-
cess to his Government's own funds for its expenses. Copies of these disbursement
requests are available in response to an appropriate request from the Government
of Haiti, including from the Central Bank Governor, and to the Congress from the
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
These funds belonged to the legitimate Government of Haiti. The U.S. Govern-
ment played no role in monitoring their expenditure, and does not have information
as to how Haitian Government funds were expended by the Haitian Government.

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