Limited authorization for the United States-led force in Haiti resolution : report together with additional and dissenti...

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Limited authorization for the United States-led force in Haiti resolution : report together with additional and dissenting views (to accompany H.J. Res. 416 … referred jointly to the Hse. Coms. Rules & For. Af.
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103D CONGRESS f REPT. 103-819
2d Session I HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Part 1





LIMITED AUTHORIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES-LED
FORCE IN HAITI RESOLUTION


OCTOBER 3, 1994.-Ordered to be printed


Mr. HAMILTON, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
submitted the following

REPORT

together with

ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

[To accompany H.J. Res. 416 which on September 28, 1994, was referred jointly to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Rules]
The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the
joint resolution (H.J. Res. 416) providing limited authorization for
the participation of United States Armed Forces in the multi-na-
tional force in Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of
United States Armed Forces from Haiti, having considered the
same, report favorably thereon without amendment and rec-
ommend that the joint resolution do pass.
PURPOSE
The purpose of H.J. Res. 416 is to provide limited authorization,
through March 1, 1995, for the participation of U.S. Armed Forces
in the U.S.-led force in Haiti and to provide for the prompt with-
drawal of U.S. Armed Forces from Haiti.
H.J. Res. 416 authorizes U.S. Armed Forces to participate in the
U.S.-led force in Haiti only: to protect U.S. citizens; to stabilize the
security situation in Haiti so that orderly progress may be made
in transferring the functions of government in that country to the
democratically-elected government of Haiti; and to facilitate the
provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of Haiti.
H.J. Res. 416 states that the transfer of operations in Haiti from
the U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led force should be facilitated and expe-
dited to the fullest extent possible.
99-006






COMMITTEE COMMENT
On September 18, 1994, a U.S. delegation, sent by President
Clinton and led by former President Jimmy Carter, reached an
agreement with the leaders of the de facto regime in Haiti that re-
quires them to leave power by October 15, 1994, and paves the way
for the return of exiled President Jean Bertrand Aristide.
That agreement also called for the cooperation of Haitian mili-
tary and police forces and U.S. Armed Forces to implement the
agreement. On September 19, 1994, U.S. troops began arriving in
Haiti to implement the agreement. By September 30, more than
19,000 U.S. troops had been deployed to protect U.S. citizens, pro-
tect members of the U.N. mission in Haiti, help establish a secure
environment, and assist in the departure from power of the de
facto authorities and the return of legitimate authorities in Haiti.
Congress did not vote on an authorization before the President
deployed troops to Haiti, despite many Members' stated preference
that the President seek authorization from Congress before com-
mitting U.S. troops.
The committee believes that Congress should provide authoriza-
tion at this time, as part of the responsibility it shares with the
President whenever U.S. forces are sent abroad into situations in
which there is the potential for combat. There is ample historical
precedent for providing authorization after troops are deployed.
Rarely Congress authorized the use of force before the fact.
The committee believes that March 1, 1995 is an appropriate
date to terminate the authorization provided in H.J. Res. 416 for
several reasons:
The executive branch has indicated that it expects the first phase
of the Haiti operation to last less than six months, so.the March
1st date should provide sufficient time for the orderly transfer of
responsibility from the U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led force in Haiti;
and
The March 1st date preserves Congressional prerogatives with
respect to decisions regarding the use of force abroad. It gives the
104th Congress time to organize itself, evaluate reports from the
President, and decide what additional steps to take before the au-
thorization expires.
This resolution does not preclude additional congressional action
before or after March 1, 1995. H.J. Res. 416 expresses the sense
of Congress that the congressional leadership should monitor close-
ly events in Haiti in considering whether to exercise any authority
that may be granted to reassemble the Congress after sine die ad-
journment. When it convenes, the 104th Congress may vote to ex-
tend the authorization, to terminate it at an earlier date, to termi-
nate funding for U.S. forces, or take any other action.
H.J. Res. 416 also provides for a joint resolution of disapproval,
and guarantees priority procedures for its consideration, if Mem-
bers want to block U.S. participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force
or otherwise direct the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces
from Haiti.






COMMITTEE ACTION
On July 21, 1993, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
held a hearing on "Haiti: The Agreement of Governor's Island and
Its Implementation." The subcommittee heard testimony from rep-
resentatives of the Department of State and private witnesses. The
witnesses were: The Honorable Lawrence Pezzullo, Special Envoy
for Haiti for the Secretary of State, Department of State; and the
Honorable Mike Barnes, Counsel for President Jean Bertrand
Aristide.
On October 13, 1993, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives of the Department of State regarding im-
plementation of the Governor's Island Agreement. The briefers
were: The Honorable Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs; and the Honorable Lawrence
Pezzulo, Special Envoy on Haiti for the Secretary of State.
On October 19, 1993, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives of the intelligence community regarding the
state of events in Haiti.
On October 21, 1993, the committee held a roundtable discussion
with representatives of the Department of State. Executive branch
participants included: The Honorable Alexander Watson, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; the Honorable Law-
rence Pezzullo, Special Envoy on Haiti for the Secretary of State;
and the Honorable Richard Brown, from the Haiti Working Group
at the Department of State.
On November 16, 1993, the committee was briefed in executive
session by representatives of the intelligence community regarding
the state of events in Haiti.
On February 1, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives of the intelligence community regarding the
state of events in Haiti.
On February 9, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives of the Department of State regarding the
situation in Haiti. The briefer was the Honorable Lawrence
Pezzullo, Special Envoy on Haiti for the Secretary of State.
On February 9, 1994, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemi-
sphere held a hearing on "Humanitarian Relief Efforts in Haiti."
The subcommittee heard testimony from representatives of the
Agency for International Development, and private witnesses. The
witness were: The Honorable Mark Schneider, Assistant Adminis-
trator for Latin America and the Caribbean; Mr. William Novelli,
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE); Mr. Mi-
chael Wiest, Catholic Relief Services (CRS); and Mr. John Ham-
mock, Oxfam America.
On April 26, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives of the intelligence community regarding the
state of events in Haiti.
On April 28, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives from the Department of State and the Na-
tional Security Council regarding the situation in Haiti. The
briefers were: the Honorable Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of
State, Department of State; and the Honorable Sandy Berger, Dep-
uty National Security Advisor, National Security Council.






On May 23, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive session
by representatives of the intelligence community regarding the
state of events in Haiti.
On June 8, 1994, the committee held a hearing on "U.S. Policy
Toward Haiti." The witness was the Honorable William Gray, Spe-
cial Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Haiti.
On July 14, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive session
by representatives of the intelligence community regarding the
state of events in Haiti.
On July 27, 1994, the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
held a hearing on "Haiti: Views from Congress and Legislative Ap-
proaches." Witnesses were: The Honorable Carrie Meek, a Member
of Congress from Florida; the Honorable Major R. Owens, a Mem-
ber of Congress from New York; the Honorable Charles Rangel, a
Member of Congress from New York; the Honorable Jack Reed, a
Member of Congress from Rhode Island; the Honorable Bill Rich-
ardson, a Member of Congress from New Mexico; and the Honor-
able Christopher Smith, a Member of Congress from New Jersey.
On August 2, 1994, the committee was briefed in executive ses-
sion by representatives of the intelligence community regarding the
state of events in Haiti.
On September 27, 1994, the committee held a hearing on "U.S.
Policy Toward, and Presence in, Haiti." The Committee heard testi-
mony from representatives of the Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The witnesses were:
The Honorable Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, Depart-
ment of State; the Honorable John M. Deutsch, Deputy Secretary
of Defense, Department of Defense; and Gen. John J. Sheehan, Di-
rector of Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On September 28, 1994, the committee met in open session to
consider H.J. Res. 416. H.J. Res. 416 was ordered favorably re-
ported by a vote of 27-18, a quorum being present.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1-Short title
Section 1 provides that this joint resolution may be cited as the
"Limited Authorization for the United States-led force in Haiti Res-
olution."
Section 2-Congressional findings and statement of policy
Section 2(a) contains congressional findings that: on September
18, 1994, the special delegation to Haiti succeeded in convincing
the de facto authorities in Haiti to sign the Port-au-Prince Agree-
ment under which such authorities agreed to leave power; on Sep-
tember 18, 1994, after the Port-au-Prince Agreement was reached,
the President ordered the deployment of the U.S. Armed Forces in
and around Haiti; and that on September 21, 1994, the President
submitted a report, consistent with the War Powers Resolution on
the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti.
The findings also note that the Congress fully supports the men
and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are carrying out their
mission in Haiti with professional excellence and dedicated patriot-
ism.






Section 2(b) states the policy of the Congress with respect to the
U.S. forces. In section 2(b), the Congress declares that:
(1) The U.S.-led force should use all necessary means to pro-
tect U.S. citizens, to stabilize the security situation in Haiti so
that orderly progress may be made in transferring the func-
tions of government in that country to the democratically-elect-
ed government of Haiti, and to facilitate the provision of hu-
manitarian assistance to the people of Haiti.
(2) Transfer of operations in Haiti from the U.S.-led force to
the U.N.-led force should be facilitated and expedited to the
fullest extent possible.
(3) U.S. Armed Forces should be withdrawn from Haiti as
soon as possible.
Section 3-Authorization for use of United States Armed Forces
Section 3(a) authorizes U.S. Armed Forces to participate in the
U.S. led force, but limits such participation to three purposes. U.S.
Armed Forces may participate only to protect U.S. citizens; to sta-
bilize the security situation in Haiti so that orderly progress may
be made in transferring the functions of government in that coun-
try to the democratically-elected government of Haiti; and to facili-
tate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of
Haiti.
Section 3(b) places further limitations on the authorization con-
tained in subsection (a). It states that the authorization shall ex-
pire on March 1, 1995 and that U.S. Armed Forces described in
subsection (a) shall remain under the command and control of offi-
cers of the U.S. Armed Forces at all times.
Section 4-Reports to Congress
Section 4(a) requires the President to submit to the Congress re-
ports on the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in the U.S.-led
force in Haiti and the U.N.-led force in Haiti, including information
on the number of members of the U.S. Armed Forces participating
in the U.S.-led force and the U.N.-led force in and around Haiti;
the functions of such Armed Forces; and the cost of deployment of
such Armed Forces.
Section 4(a) also requires that the President submit to the Con-
gress reports on efforts to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from Haiti,
including, for the purpose of achieving a transition from the U.S.-
led force in Haiti to the U.N.-led force, the status of efforts to im-
plement the Port-au-Prince Agreement and to otherwise carry out
the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 917 (May
6, 1994) and 940 (July 31, 1994); the status of plans to accomplish
such transition to the U.N.-led force; and the status of execution
of plans to withdraw U.S. Armed Forces from Haiti.
Section 4(b) requires that such reports shall be submitted-
(1) not later than November 30, 1994, covering the period
since September 18, 1994;
(2) not later than December 31, 1994, covering the period
since the first report; and
(3) not later than February 1, 1995, covering the period since
the second report.





Section 4(c) states that the requirements of this section do not
supersede the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.
Section 5-Reassembly of Congress
Section 5 expresses the sense of the Congress that the Speaker
of the House of Representatives and the Majority Leader of the
Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the Minority Leader
of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader of the
Senate, should monitor closely events in Haiti in considering
whether to exercise any authority that may be granted to reassem-
ble the Congress after the adjournment of the Congress sine die,
if the public interest shall warrant it.
Section 6--Joint resolution prohibiting continued use of United
States Armed Forces in Haiti
Section 6(a) states that if a joint resolution described in section
6(b) is enacted, the President shall remove U.S. Armed Forces from
Haiti in accordance with such joint resolution.
Section 6(b) describes the joint resolution. Section 6(b) requires
that the resolution state, with specifically delineated text, that
Congress directs the President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from
Haiti within 30 days" of enactment of the resolution.
Section 6(c) establishes procedures in the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate for the introduction and consideration of the
joint resolution. Section 6(c) states that the procedures apply only
to a joint resolution described in section 6(b) introduced on or after
the date on which the President submits, or is required to submit,
the final report required by section 4. Section 6(c) also states that
only one joint resolution described in section 6(b) shall be consid-
ered under these procedures. The procedures are those described in
section 7 of the War Powers Resolution, except that, for purposes
of such consideration, the term "calendar days" in such section
shall be deemed to mean "legislative days".
Under these procedures, once introduced, the joint resolution will
be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
ate and must be reported out by such committee within fifteen leg-
islative days, unless such House votes otherwise. Once reported,
the joint resolution becomes the pending business of the House in
question and must be voted on within three legislative days there-
after, unless such House votes otherwise. The procedures similarly
limit the amount of time in which the other House must consider
the resolution.
Section 7-Definitions
Section 7 defines the following terms for the purposes of this res-
olution:
(1) Legislative days.-The term "legislative days" means
days in which the House of Representatives is in session.
(2) Port-au-Prince Agreement.-The term "Port-au-Prince
Agreement" means the agreement reached between the U.S.
special delegation and the de facto authorities in Haiti on Sep-
tember 18, 1994.






(3) United Nations-led force in Haiti.-The term "United Na-
tions-led force in Haiti" means the United Nations Mission in
Haiti (commonly referred to as "UNMIH") authorized by Unit-
ed Nations Security Council Resolutions 867 (September 23,
1993), 905 (March 23, 1994), 933 (June 30, 1994), and 940
(July 31, 1994).
(4) United States-led force in Haiti.-The term "United
States-led force in Haiti" means the multinational force (com-
monly referred to as "MNF") authorized by United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994).
REQUIRED REPORTS
COST ESTIMATE
H.J. Res. 416 contains no direct authorization of appropriations.
A Congressional Budget Office cost estimate was not available at
the time of filing.
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
The committee believes that any inflationary impact that may re-
sult from the enactment of H.J. Res. 416 would be far outweighed
by the benefits to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests
which would flow from the enactment of this legislation.
STATEMENTS REQUIRED BY CLAUSE 2(1)(3) OF HOUSE RULE XI
(a) Oversight findings and recommendations
Among the principal oversight activities which contributed to the
committee's formulation of H.J. Res. 416 were:
Ongoing review and oversight of U.S. policy towards Haiti by the
full committee and the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Af-
fairs; and
Ongoing consultations between committee members and staff
and executive branch officials.
As a result of these oversight activities, the committee rec-
ommends that the House approve H.J. Res. 416.
(b) Budget, credit, and spending authority
The enactment of H.J. Res. 416 will create no new budget, credit,
or spending authority.
(c) Committee on Government Operations summary
No oversight findings and recommendations which relate to this
legislation have been received from the Committee on Government
Operations under clause 4(c)(2) of House Rule X.










ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS
I have been a consistent advocate of U.S. intervention in Haiti
for many years. It is because I am a supporter of Democracy, a hu-
manitarian, and a resident of South Florida that I desire to see this
situation resolved. I have said from day one that if Haiti is not hos-
pitable to its own people those same people will flock to South Flor-
ida. And the ones who are not murdered will be swimming for
South Florida, a state whose emergency health and human services
budgets have already splintered from the weight of illegal immigra-
tion. And we have seen with the recent influx of leaky boats that
that is indeed the case.
Many of my colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Affairs have
criticized President Clinton for sending troops to Haiti. Some argue
that it is not our problem to solve, while others are infuriated that
the President did not seek prior Congressional authorization for
the invasion. I found it fascinating that many members who op-
posed this limited authorization supported, during the 101st Con-
gress, sending $20 million to Haiti. In the report to HR 4636 many
of these same members said: "This aid will send a signal to the
new interim government that the United States supports the effort
to establish civilian authority over the military and encourages fur-
ther movement toward democratic government We believe
that the $20 million authorized in this legislation for Haiti is an
appropriate indication of the U.S. commitment to civilian, demo-
cratic rule in that country and an indication of. the benefits that
could be lost if moves toward democracy falter."
It can probably be said with some authority that there are those
members who will oppose our current policy because they loathe
the person who is directing it. But there are also those who are
truly opposed to our involvement in a situation which does not war-
rant our action. To refute this statement one must ask, for what
reasons should the United States intervene in a foreign crisis?
The United States has, since the inception of the Union, used our
armed forces abroad 234 times in situations of conflict or potential
conflict. There is no formula into which civilian and military plan-
ners plugged numbers to see if we should engage; no concrete theo-
rem that remains constant. Every instance has been decided indi-
vidually. But there are some current threads that take us from con-
flict to conflict.
In terms of U.S. policy, there are several broad concepts for
which the U.S. has traditionally been willing to use force at various
levels. These include: threats to our national existence; specific
treaty requirements; freedom of the seas; opposing aggression by
one state against another; protecting U.S. citizens abroad; counter-
ing terrorism; protecting the sanctity of the Western Hemisphere
from outside powers; lending support to our allies in trouble; and
(8)






certain situations which require intervention for humanitarian rea-
sons.
Some of the more recent conflicts in which we involved ourselves
include Panama, Grenada, Nicaragua and the Persian Gulf. Our
objectives in Panama were to safeguard the lives of Americans
there at that time; to defend their "democracy" after the Noriega
regime declared their democratic elections null and void; to combat
drug trafficking (and the unstated desire to apprehend Noriega);
and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.
The stated objectives in Grenada were to protect the American's
on the island and restore law and order after the counter-coup at-
tempt. With the request for assistance from the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States, and the fact that the Cubans were in
the process of building an airport on the island, President Reagan
did not seem to have a difficult time ordering U.S. involvement.
We involved ourselves in Nicaragua, covertly at first and then
openly, because we did not like the Sandinistas and we did not like
Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in other countries like El Sal-
vador.
We later involved ourselves in the Persian Gulf to force the with-
drawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; to restore Kuwait's legitimate
government; to protect U.S. citizens abroad; and neutralize the fu-
ture military threat from Iraq. But most importantly, we wanted
to ensure the continued access to energy supplies in the Middle
East.
So what are our interests in Haiti and do they fit into the pro-
involvement puzzle? The people of Haiti elected a President, Jean
Bertrand Aristide. That President was overthrown by the head of
the military, Raoul Cedras. Aristide and Cedras signed an accord,
the Governor's Island Accord, to facilitate the return of the Presi-
dent. That accord was virtually ignored by the Haitian military
leaders for almost two years until President Clinton dispatched to
Haiti a delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter. President
Carter worked out an agreement with the acting "President" of
Haiti which set a deadline for the military leaders to retire and the
democratically-elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide to return
to Haiti. Our forces are now in Haiti assisting with this transition.
By virtue of the fact that there was a coup by the military which
overthrew a democratically-elected president, U.S. intervention is
justifiable. Couple this coup with a humanitarian tragedy, food and
energy shortages, regular politically-motivated rapes against
Aristide supporters and their family members, and an unmanage-
able tide of refugees to our shores. Each of these factors alone may
justify our intervention. All of these factors combined demand it.
ALCEE L. HASTINGS.






MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, HON.
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, HON. JIM LEACH, HON. TOBY
ROTH, HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, HON. HENRY J. HYDE,
HON. DOUG BEREUTER, HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH,
HON. DAN BURTON, HON. JAN MEYERS, HON. ELTON
GALLEGLY, HON. CASS BALLENGER, HON. DANA
ROHRABACHER, HON. DAVID A. LEVY, HON. DONALD A.
MANZULLO, HON. EDWARD. R. ROYCE
We oppose H.J. Res. 416 as reported by the Committee on For-
eign Affairs because it provides retroactive Congressional author-
ization for the unilateral decision by the President to deploy U.S.
Armed Forces to occupy Haiti. We believe this resolution blesses an
ill-conceived and perilous policy and, like the President's decision
to commit our troops to Haiti in the first place, neglects the will
of the majority of the American people. Congress should move in-
stead to call for the immediate, safe, and orderly withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Haiti.
The President failed to heed an early bipartisan call-as well as
the manifest will of the American people-that he come to Con-
gress for approval of his policy before deploying troops in Haiti. In-
stead, the President rushed to deploy U.S. armed forces (launching
an invasion while his own negotiators were in the clutches of po-
tentially hostile elements) so that they would be committed before
the Congress could act. Unlike the case of Grenada, American lives
were not at risk. Unlike Panama, our national security interests
were not threatened. And unlike the Persian Gulf, the President
acted without Congressional approval. We cannot, as H.J. Res. 416
would have it, condone this foolhardy course of action that neglects
the bitter lessons of the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934
or the recent costly experience in Somalia.
Because most members of the Committee did not have an oppor-
tunity to review the text of the resolution until a few before it was
reported, we did not offer amendments. We refrained from doing so
with the express intention of offering amendments and substitute
language for consideration on the House Floor. We welcomed the
statement of the Chairman to the Committee on September 28th
that he would support a rule permitting a full debate and amend-
ments reflecting various policy options.
H.J. 416 grants Congressional authorization for the participation
of U.S. forces in a mission "to stabilize the security situation in
Haiti" during a transition back to democratic government. This lan-
guage accepts the President's definition of the U.S. mission in
Haiti, despite the fact that ambiguous objectives, improvised rules
of engagement, and ever-expanding tasks assumed by the U.S.
military have rendered this definition virtually open-ended. This
vague authorization could lead our troops down a blind alley with
unintended consequences.
Moreover, the Administration has made it clear on a number of
occasions-including at the meeting of the Committee during which
this resolution was reported-that the President does not need
Congressional authorization to continue the Haiti occupation and
that the expiration of such authorization of March 1st is of no legal
significance whatsoever. The only real effect of passing H.J. Res.






416 as reported, therefore, is to authorize the mission through
March 1, after which the President can be expected to proceed with
his plan to deploy 2,000-3,000 U.S. troops in Haiti through Feb-
ruary 1996 (as part of a UN peacekeeping force). The March 1 date,
therefore, is non-binding and virtually meaningless. It emphatically
is not a date certain for the withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces from
Haiti.
H.J. Res. 416 does provide a mechanism for Congressional con-
sideration of the planned long-term deployment of U.S. forces in
Haiti. However, under the terms of the resolution, such a vote
would not occur until early April 1995; after the approval of any
joint resolution disapproving of continued deployment, the Presi-
dent would have yet another 30 days to comply. In sum, if Con-
gress were to move as quickly as possible to disapprove the deploy-
ment of U.S. forces pursuant to these "expedited procedures," U.S.
troops might still be in Haiti more than seven months from now.
Many of us believe that this issue should be considered imme-
diately.
This resolution does not effectively address the important issue
of whether U.S. forces in Haiti as part of a planned UN peacekeep-
ing mission will remain under operational command and control of
U.S. military officers. Although Administration officials have stated
their "expectation" that this would be the case, Congress should ex-
plicitly prohibit the foreign command of U.S. military personnel at
any time in Haiti.
Our opposition to the occupation of Haiti is grounded in sub-
stance:
The President has thrust U.S. forces in the middle of a vola-
tile situation with the vague mission of restoring democratic
order to a country that has never known it.
Many question whether there can be civil order and respect
for human rights in Haiti without a prolonged military occupa-
tion.
By assuming new responsibilities on a daily basis, as was
the case in Somalia, U.S. forces assume increasing unaccept-
able risks.
The cost of these military operations as well as U.S. con-
tributions to planned peacekeeping, humanitarian, and devel-
opment programs approaches $1 billion by the end of Fiscal
Year 1995.
We are doing and paying more than our fair share: 25,000
U.S. troops are deployed in these operations now, while fewer
than 300 third-country soldiers have set foot on Haitian soil to




12

date as part of this "multinational" operation.
BEN GILMAN.
JIM LEACH.
HENRY J. HYDE.
CASS BALLENGER.
ED ROYCE.
DAVID A. LEVY.
BILL GOODLING.
TOBY ROTH.
CHRIS SMITH.
DOUG BEREUTER.
JAN MEYERS.
DANA ROHRABACHER.
DON MANZULLO.
DAN BURTON.
ELTON GALLEGLY.
OLYMPIA SNOWE.

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