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103d Congress, 2d Session - - House Document 103-309
WITH REGARDS TO HAITI
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
A REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES AND CHARACTER OF THE
PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES INTO HAITI,
PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 103-139, SEC. 8147(c)
SEPTEMBER 19, 1994.-Referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign
Affairs and Appropriations, and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1994
THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 18, 1994.
Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I am providing this report, consistent with
the sense of Congress in section 8147(c) of the Department of De-
fense Appropriations Act, 1994 (Public Law 103-139), to advise you
of the objectives and character of the planned deployment of U.S.
Armed Forces into Haiti.
(1) The deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti is justified
by United States national security interests: To restore democratic
government to Haiti; to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens
of thousands of Haitians; to secure our borders; to preserve stabil-
ity and promote democracy in our hemisphere; and to uphold the
reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments oth-
ers make to us.
From the very beginning of the coup against the democratic gov-
ernment of Haiti, the United States and the rest of the inter-
national community saw the regime as a threat to our interests in
this hemisphere. Indeed President Bush declared that the coup
constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."
The United States' interest in Haiti is rooted in a consistent U.S.
policy, since the 1991 coup, to help restore democratic government
to that nation. The United States has a particular interest in re-
sponding to gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close
to our shores.
The departure of the coup leaders from power is also the best
way to stem another mass outflow of Haitians, with consequences
for the stability of our region and control of our borders. Continu-
ing unconstitutional rule in Haiti would threaten the stability of
other countries in this hemisphere by emboldening elements op-
posed to democracy and freedom.
The agreement regarding the transition between the de facto
government and the elected government, negotiated by former
President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin
Powell, will achieve the objective of facilitating the departure of the
coup leaders. Their departure will substantially decrease the likeli-
hood of armed resistance.
(2) Despite this agreement, this military operation is not without
risk. Necessary steps have been taken to ensure the safety and se-
curity of U.S. Armed Forces. Our intention is to deploy a force of
sufficient size to serve as a deterrent to armed resistance. The force
will have a highly visible and robust presence with firepower ample
to overwhelm any localized threat. This will minimize casualties
and maximize our capability to ensure that essential civil order is
maintained and the agreement arrived at is implemented. The
force's rules of engagement allow for the use of necessary and pro-
portionate force to protect friendly personnel and units and to pro-
vide for individual self-defense, thereby ensuring that our forces
can respond effectively to threats and are not made targets by rea-
son of their rules of engagement.
(3) The proposed mission and objectives are most appropriate for
U.S. Armed Forces, and the forces proposed for deployment are
necessary and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the pro-
posed mission. Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 940,
a multinational coalition has been assembled to use "all necessary
means" to restore the democratic government to Haiti and to pro-
vide a stable and secure environment for the implementation of the
Governors Island Accords. The deployment of U.S. Armed Forces is
required to ensure that United States national security interests
with respect to Haiti remain unchallenged and to underscore the
reliability of U.S. and U.N. commitments.
This crisis affects the interests of the United States and other
members of the world community alike, and thus warrants and has
received the participation of responsible states in the coalition to
redress the situation. The United States is playing a predominant
role because it is the leading military power in the hemisphere,
and accordingly, has the influence and military capability to lead
such an operation. The coalition is made up of representatives from
25 member nations, including the United States. During the initial
phase of the operation, the force will be of sufficient size of over-
whelm any opposition that might arise despite the existence of the
agreement. In the follow-on, transitional phase, forces from other
members of the coalition will assume increasingly important roles.
At all times when U.S. forces are deployed in whatever phase, they
will be equipped, commanded, and empowered so as to ensure their
(4) Clear objectives for the deployment have been established.
These limited objectives are: To facilitate the departure of the mili-
tary leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected Presi-
dent and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Gov-
ernment of Haiti. We will assist the Haitian government in creat-
ing a civilian-controlled security force. We will also ensure the pro-
tection of U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities.
(5) An exit strategy for ending the deployment has been identi-
fied. Our presence in Haiti will not be open-ended. After a period
of months, the coalition will be replaced by a U.N. peacekeeping
force (UNMIH). By that time, the bulk of U.S. forces will have de-
parted. Some U.S. forces will make up a portion of the UNMIH and
will be present in Haiti for the duration of the U.N. mission. The
entire U.N. mission will withdraw from Haiti after elections are
held next year and a new Haitian Government takes office in early
1996, consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 940.
(6) The financial costs of the deployment are estimated to be the
following. A conservative, preliminary estimate of Department of
Defense and Department of State incremental costs for U.S. mili-
tary operations, U.S. support for the multinational coalition, and
the follow-on U.N. peacekeeping operation is projected at $500-
$600 million through February 1996. This covers potential costs to
be incurred in FY 1994, FY 1995, and FY 1996. Final deployment-
related costs could vary from this estimate depending on how oper-
ations proceed in the first few weeks, how fast civic order is re-
stored, and when the operation is replaced by a U.N. peacekeeping
operation. A preliminary estimate of U.S. nondeployment-related
costs-migrant operations, sanctions enforcement, police training,
and economic reconstruction-will be provided separately. The Con-
gress will be provided more complete estimates as they become
WILLIAM J. CLINTON.