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U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND PEACE CORPS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
JUNE 28, 1994
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. 1 r. D
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-184 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For salc hi the L .S. Go~crnnent Punting OlTice
SupiintendL nl ot DocL I Ints. (C'ngrssiC ndl S.ile Olhce. Washlmjton, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
CLAIIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island, Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER J. I)OI)D, Connecticut NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
PAUL SIMON, Illinois FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York HANK BROWN, Colorado
CHARLES S. ROIlB, Virginia JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JUDDII GREGG, New Hampshire
HARLAN MATHEWS, Tennessee
GUIYIJD) B. CHIIISTIANSON, Staff Director
JAMES W. NANCE, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMII'REE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND PEACE CORPs AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut, Chairman
CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia
HARRIS WOFFORD, Pennsylvania JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
HARLAN MATHEWS, Tennessee RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
Barnes, Michael, Counsel to President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Hogan &
H artson, W ashington, D C .................................................................................. 34
P prepared state ent .......................................................................................... 36
Graham, Bob, U.S. Senator from Florida ............................................................. 25
P prepared state ent .......................................................................................... 29
Gray, William III, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State
o n H a iti ................................................................................................................. 3
P prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 5
Martin, Ian, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
W ash ington D C ................................................................................................. 5 1
P prepared state ent .......................................................................................... 53
McKinley, Brunson, Acting Director, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
M migration, D epartm ent of State ......................................................................... 96
P prepared state ent ........................................................................................ 97
Newcomb, R. Richard, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Depart-
m ent of th e T reasu ry .......................................................................................... 89
P repaired state ent ......................................................................................... 94
O'Neill, William G., Consultant, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees,
N ew Y ork N Y ...................................................................................................... 4 4
P repaired state ent ......................................................................................... 46
Schneider, Mark, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Carib-
bean, Agency for International Development ................................................... 80
P repare d state ent .......................................................................................... 82
Schultz, Donald E., Associate Professor of National Security Affairs, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army National War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA .. 61
P prepared state ent .............................................................. .......................... 63
Smith, Frederick C., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Inter-
national Security Affairs, Department of Defense .......................................... 85
P prepared state ent ............................................ .......................................... 87
Shattuck, John, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian
A affairs, D epartm ent of State ............................................................................... 74
P prepared state ent .......................................................................................... 76
U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1994
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND
PEACE CORis AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room
419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher J. Dodd
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Pell, Dodd, Feingold, Pressler, and Coverdell.
Also present: Senator Graham.
Senator DODD. The committee will come to order. Let me wel-
come everyone here this afternoon, as we conduct a hearing by the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on U.S. Policy in
Haiti. Just a couple of housekeeping notes. One, first of all, let me
welcome the wife of our Ambassador in Haiti, Mrs. Swing, who is
here with us in the audience, and we thank you for coming by. And
second, Mexico 1, Italy 1, 30 minutes to go in the soccer match. I
want to get the important information out here.
I am delighted to have as our first witness, Bill Gray, who is a
very close and good friend of mine, who is acting as the special ad-
visor to the President and the Secretary of State on Haiti. We have
got a list of other distinguished witnesses. Our colleague, Senator
Bob Graham, will be appearing after Mr. Gray, and then a public
panel and a technical administration panel will appear, along with
various members of the administration. What I would like to do is
just take a minute or so and express some of my own initial
thoughts on this, and then turn to our lead-off witness, Mr. Gray,
for his comments.
It is now almost 3 years since democracy was hijacked-and
there is no other way to describe it-once again in Haiti. It was
September of 1991 when military and security forces overthrew the
lawfully elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and began
yet another chapter in Haiti's long history of violence, repression,
From the very beginning of the Haitian coup, the United States
and its partners in the international community have sought noth-
ing less than the restoration of democracy in Haiti and the return
of President Aristide to power. This afternoon, we will have a
chance to explore, with administration witnesses and outside ex-
perts, our progress toward meeting that goal.
Over the past 2 months, the noose has drawn tighter around the
Port-au-Prince regime. Last month, at the urging of the United
States, the U.N. Security Council enacted a worldwide trade em-
bargo against Haiti. This was quickly followed by a series of unilat-
era measures, including a ban on commercial flights and financial
transactions between the United States and Haiti, and a freeze on
U.S. assets of all wealthy Haitians. These sanctions are clearly
having an impact on Haiti's military leaders, as well as on its eco-
But sanctions alone are not the only threat to those who would
prevent the return of democratic rule in Haiti. Should these sanc-
tions fail, the administration has made clear that it will rule out
no option, including the use of military force, if necessary, in order
to restore democratic rule to the people of Haiti.
In the past 2 months there have also been a number of important
changes in the policy toward Haitian refugees. The administration
has joined forces with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
and with our allies in the Caribbean, to establish a temporary proc-
essing center for refugees off the coast of Jamaica, and is also in
the process of establishing a facility in the British-controlled is-
lands of Turks and Caicos. We look forward to receiving an assess-
ment of that arrangement today.
I want to commend the administration for these important and
well-timed initiatives. I also think it is no accident that many of
these initiatives coincided with the appointment of Bill Gray to be
the administration's special advisor on Haiti. Mr. Gray has seen to
it that the administration speaks with one voice on Haitian issues,
lending commitment and credibility to the overall policy. As a re-
sult, the message we are sending to the military regime in Haiti
is loud and crystal clear: for you and your unlawful activities, time
is truly running out.
Before turning to Mr. Gray, I would like to add a few additional
thoughts of my own on the situation in Haiti. First, I know the ad-
ministration has begun to plan for what happens in Haiti after
democratic rule is restored, and I commend them for that. Plans
which emphasize the deployment of a peacekeeping force and the
retraining of the Haitian military. But I would also urge the ad-
ministration to keep in mind, as well, that Haiti also happens to
be one of the poorest nations not only in this hemisphere, but in
the world. I would hope that the administration has given a great
deal of thought to what happens in Haiti on the economic side of
the ledger as well.
Finally, I would like to make one additional point, and it has to
do with the reason, the reason why all of us are in this room today.
I often hear it said on the floor of the Senate and elsewhere that
Haiti gets far too much attention, that Haiti is not vital to our na-
tional interests. Why are we even talking about it or dealing with
it? And I would have to agree that Haiti certainly poses little stra-
tegic threat to the United States or to the lives of American citi-
zens. But I would also just as strongly suggest that there is some-
thing equally important at stake in Haiti, and that is our credibil-
ity as a leader in the fight for democratic values and democratic
institutions around the globe.
We are always saying in this country that we believe in democ-
racy, that democracy and human freedom and human rights and
values are worth fighting for. That speech has been given ad nau-
seam. But in practice-in practice, I fear that we tend to give far
greater priority to our short-term policy goals and our strategic ob-
jectives than to anything else at all.
Here we have an opportunity, in this small, poor country, only
a few short miles from our shores-here we have an opportunity
to stand up for democracy and human rights not because it is in
our strategic interests, not because it is in our short-term policy
goals, but simply because it is right to do so. That is an awfully
powerful message to send to our allies, not to mention our enemies
throughout this globe. I trust it is a message that we will not hesi-
tate to send when it comes to Haiti.
And with those thoughts, let me turn to my colleague and friend,
Bill Gray, and thank him for being here. We welcome your testi-
mony and any supporting documentation that you would like to
share with the committee.
STATEMENT OF IION. WILLIAM GRAY III, SPECIAL ADVISER TO
THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE ON HAITI
Ambassador GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee. You have a full copy of my testimony. I will not
read the entire testimony, but try to select some of the highlights
of it and leave more time for questions.
I really welcome the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to testify before
you today. This subcommittee, and you personally, Mr. Chairman,
have been instrumental in focusing attention on the difficult issues
confronting us in Haiti. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, many of the measures we are now implementing are
steps which you have been recommending for some time.
Mr. Chairman, the objective of our policy has been constant, the
return of democracy and of President Aristide to Haiti. What has
changed is our sense of urgency in achieving that objective. The
Haitian military has bused the patience of the international com-
munity, as well as the people of Haiti, for too long. The change in
our policy on Haiti that President Clinton announced on May 8 de-
rived from his heartfelt concern that neither the welfare of the Hai-
tian people nor the interests of the United States are served by a
continuation of the impasse.
The root cause of human suffering in Haiti is the continued in-
transigence of the military leaders and their supporters. The Presi-
dent determined, therefore, to step up our efforts to force Haiti's
military dictators to give up their stranglehold on that country. At
the same time, he directed that all practicable steps be taken to al-
leviate the suffering of those subject to their oppression.
I am pleased to report that we have achieved significant progress
in carrying out the President's decision, and I believe we have done
in the manner that the President desires, with multilateral partici-
pation, with no quarter for the military regime and its supporters
so long as they prolong their illegal hold on power, and with com-
passion toward their victims.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like briefly to re-
view the measures that we have taken since May 8. We have put
in place the most comprehensive sanctions possible. On May 21, as
a consequence of the United States leadership, United Nations Se-
curity Council Resolution 917 went fully into effect. It adds to the
preexisting embargo on oil and arms a comprehensive trade embar-
go, a ban on most forms of air service, and a worldwide prohibition
on travel and the freezing of all transactions of all Haitian military
officers, members of the de facto regime, and their supporters.
On May 26, the special representative of the Secretaries General
of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States,
Mr. Dante Caputo, and I met with President Balaguer and reached
agreement on a plan to improve enforcement of the sanctions along
the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and to send
international technical advisers to the Dominican Republic to help
in that effort.
On June 3, the representatives of the friends of the Secretary
General of the United Nations on Haiti, which include Argentina,
Canada, France, and the United States, and Venezuela, decided,
among other things, to urge on a national basis expanded sanctions
that would cutoff all commercial air flights to and from Haiti and
ban international financial transactions with that country. The
United States barred all air traffic with Haiti effective June 24.
Canada, the Netherlands, Panama, and the Dominican Republic
have adopted similar measures. Air France is the last carrier now
serving Haiti, and we are hopeful that the Government of France
will join us in the multilateral consensus on this matter.
The United States prohibited all financial transaction with Haiti
persons on June 10, with only very limited exceptions for humani-
tarian reasons. On June 22, we froze the assets in the United
States and in the United States institutions abroad of all Haitian
residents. And, at the same time, we have increased our humani-
tarian assistance. We are currently feeding nearly 980,000 Hai-
tians each day. We have provided temporary jobs to over 37,800
Haitians. We are providing emergency health services to more than
2.2 million people in Haiti.
And we have completely revised our procedure for addressing ref-
ugee claims. On June 1, the Governments of Jamaica and the Unit-
ed States announced jointly a plan for shipboard processing of Hai-
tian asylum seekers in Jamaica ports. Joined with us in that effort
is the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, which is
supervising the effort and has joined in a partnership in trying to
deal with the refugee problem. On June 3, the Government of the
Turks and Caicos Islands agreed to the United States proposals for
a land-based processing center on Grand Turk Island.
On June 6, Deputy Secretary Talbott and I attended the meeting
of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States on
Haiti in Belem, Brazil. A strong resolution was enacted which in-
cludes a call upon all member states to assist in the resettlement
of Haitian refugees, to support measures by the United Nations to
strengthen the United Nations Mission in Haiti in order that it
may assist the Haitian authorities in maintaining basic civic order.
And we are now engaged in active consultations in New York
with the friends and the United Nations Secretariat to design the
reconfigured United Nations mission called for in that OAS resolu-
tion. In our view, this mission should be broadly multilateral, with
participation from throughout the hemisphere, other countries with
ties to Haiti and with experience in international peacekeeping.
The United States, for its part, should be prepared to participate
significantly in the military and civilian elements of this mission.
As the details of size and composition needed to carry out the ex-
panded mandate called for in the OAS resolution are refined, the
administration will be consulting with the Congress regarding the
United States participation in UNMIH.
And, at the same time, we are taking steps to provide a free flow
of information to the Haitian people. We are working with Presi-
dent Aristide on a system for direct broadcast to Haiti. To me, Mr.
Chairman, this capacity to communicate directly with the Haitian
people, without the risk of censorship by the Haitian military au-
thorities, is crucial to our endeavors. The Haitian people need to
hear from their elected president his message of progress, reconcili-
ation, and nonviolence, to counter the efforts the military regime
has made to further polarize that society.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, let me con-
clude by making it very clear that the responsibility for Haiti's
tragedy lies firmly with its current military leadership, not with
the actions that have been taken in the last 5 weeks. This leader-
ship overthrew Haiti's fledgling democracy. It seized power from
Haiti's legitimate government. It ejected Haiti's freely elected presi-
dent. This leadership is responsible for the suffering of the Haitian
people and for their economic hardships.
It is clear to us that the coup leaders still have a choice. They
can either leave the country and leave the military institution, or
they can stay and destroy those very institutions which they claim
to represent. Responsibility of whether that happens or not, we be-
lieve, is up to the coup leadership.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, President Clin-
ton has determined that our interests require the restoration of the
democratic process in Haiti and the return of President Aristide.
We are embarked on a clear course and are determined to do what
is necessary to achieve this goal. No option is excluded. Democracy
will be restored in Haiti and the process of rebuilding that torn na-
tion will begin, with multilateral support.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to come and tes-
tify before you and this distinguished committee.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Gray follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. GRAY, III
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee: I welcome the opportunity to testify
before you today. This subcommittee and you personally, Mr. Chairman, have been
instrumental in focusing attention on the difficult issues confronting us in Haiti. In-
deed, Mr. Chairman, many of the measures we are now implementing are steps
which you have been recommending for some time.
Mr. Chairman, the objective of our policy has been constant-the return of democ-
racy and of President Aristide to Haiti. What has changed is our sense of urgency
in achieving that objectives the Haitian military has abused the patience of the
international community as well as the people of Haiti for too long. The change in
our policy on Haiti that President Clinton announced on May 8 derived from his
heartfelt concern that neither the welfare of the Haitian people nor the interests
of the United States are served by a continuation of the impasse.
The root cause of human suffering in Haiti is the continued intransigence of the
military leaders and their supporters. The President determined, therefore, to step
up our efforts to force Haiti's military dictators to give up their strangle hold on
that country. At the same time, he directed that all practicable steps be taken to
alleviate the suffering of those subject to their oppression.
I am pleased to report that we have achieved significant progress in carrying out
the President's decisions. And, I believe, we have done so in the manner the Presi-
dent desires: with multilateral participation, with no quarter for the military regime
and its supporters so long as they prolong their illegal hold on power, and with com-
passion towards their victims.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like briefly to review the measures
we have taken since May 8: We have put in place the most comprehensive sanctions
On May 21, as a consequence of United States leadership, United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 917 went fully into effect. It adds to the preexisting embargo
on oil and arms a comprehensive trade embargo, a ban on most forms of air service,
and a worldwide prohibition on travel and the freezing of all transactions of all Hai-
tian military officers, members of the de facto regime, and their supporters.
On May 26, the Special Representative of the Secretaries General of the United
Nations and of the Organization of American States, Mr. Dante Caputo, and I met
with President Balaguer and reached agreement on a plan to improve enforcement
of the sanctions along the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and
to send international technical advisers to the Dominican Republic to help in that
effort. As a consequence, the Dominican Republic has strongly stepped up its en-
forcement efforts, and we are well advanced in our efforts to form and equip the
international technical adviser team.
On June 3, the Representatives of the Friends of the Secretary General of the
United Nations on Haiti, which include Argentina, Canada, France, the United
States, and Venezuela, decided among other things to urge on a national basis ex-
panded sanctions that would cut off all commercial air flights to and from Haiti and
ban international financial transactions with that country:
The United States barred all air traffic with Haiti effective June 24. Can-
ada, the Netherlands, Panama and the Dominican Republic have adopted simi-
lar measures. Air France is the last carrier now serving Haiti, and we are hope-
ful that the Government of France will soon join the multilateral consensus on
The United States prohibited all financial transactions with Haitian per-
sons on June 10, with only very limited exceptions for humanitarian reasons.
On June 22, we froze the assets in the United States and in United States institu-
tions abroad of all Haitians resident in Haiti.
Together, these measures make clear to the Haitian elites that they cannot re-
main on the sidelines, but must use all their influence in favor of restoring democ-
racy. Our review of possible sanctions targeted on the illegal regime and its support-
ers continues, and we are prepared to take still further such steps in the coming
days. At the same time we have increased our humanitarian assistance.
The United States has been the leader in the efforts of the international commu-
nity to mitigate the damage to the health and welfare of the Haitian people of the
severe economic and institutional crisis caused by the actions of the military regime
and compounded by the unavoidable effects of the sanctions. We are currently feed-
ing nearly 980,000 Haitians each day. We have provided temporary jobs to over
We are providing emergency health services to more than 2.2 million people in
Haiti. We are working with other donors to ensure that essential medical supplies
are available to all people in need. We are considering means of helping grass roots
human rights organizations to be more effective in their efforts. And we have com-
pletely revised our procedures for addressing refugee claims.
On June 1, the Governments of Jamaica and of the United States announced
jointly a plan for shipboard processing of Haitian asylum seekers in Jamaican ports.
Today, Haitian asylum seekers are being received in Jamaica and processed with
fairness and compassion under our new procedures. Pursuant to an agreement I
reached with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Mrs. Ogata,
UNHCR is present and cooperating fully in this processing. UNHCR is also cooper-
ating with us in locating countries of resettlement for Haitian refugees.
On June 3, the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands agreed to the United
States proposals for a land based processing center on Grand Turk Island. We are
hoping to have our land based processing center there up and running within a cou-
ple of weeks. We are also exploring the utility of establishing additional land based
processing facilities in other countries.
Our in-country refugee centers continue to offer the safest means of processing
refugee applications. Our efforts are producing the international consensus needed
to restore democracy and assured basic civic order.
On June 6, Deputy Secretary Talbott and I attended the meeting of Foreign Min-
isters of the Organization of American States on Haiti in Belem, Brazil. A strong
resolution was enacted which includes a call upon all member states to assist in the
resettlement of Haitian refugees, to support measures by the United Nations to
strengthen the United Nations Mission in Haiti in order that it may assist the Hai-
tian authorities in maintaining basic civic order, and to support and reinforce exist-
ing and additional sanctions against the military regime.
We are now engaged in active consultations in New York with the friends and
the United Nations Secretariat to design the reconfigured United Nations Mission
called for in the OAS resolution. The task of assistance in maintaining basic civic
order, which President Aristide requested in his speech in Belem, and which the
OAS Foreign Ministers endorsed, will, in our judgment, require a mission of sub-
stantially greater size than that originally envisioned to provide only training and
In our view this mission should be broadly multilateral, with participation from
throughout this hemisphere, other countries with ties to Haiti, and with experience
in international peacekeeping. The United States, for its part, should be prepared
to participate significantly in the military and civilian elements of this mission. Our
preliminary soundings indicate strong support for a strengthened and reconstituted
UN Mission, and a widely shared interest in participation in it.
As the details of size and composition needed to carry out the expanded mandate
called for in the OAS resolution are refined, the administration will be consulting
with the congress regarding United States participation. Meanwhile we are doing
our best to protect human rights.
The human rights record of the Haitian, military regime is abysmal, as our own
human right reports and the recent report of the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission make painfully clear. The only means of preventing the regime from
engaging in unbridled murder of its opponents is the vigilance of the international
community. At the forefront of these efforts have been the courageous men and
women of the joint United Nations/Organization of American States Human Rights
Monitoring Group-the International Civilian Mission.
We are working with Ambassador Colin Granderson, the head of the ICM, as well
as with the Secretariats of both the U.N. and the OAS to ensure that these vital
personnel have all possible support. We have made clear that our leadership in
funding this effort will continue. And we are taking steps to provide a free flow of
information to the Haitian people.
We are working with President Aristide on a system for direct broadcasting to
Haiti. To me, Mr. Chairman, this capacity to communicate directly with the Haitian
people-without the risk of censorship by the Haitian military authorities-is cru-
cial to our endeavors. The Haitian people need to hear from their elected President
his message of progress, reconciliation and non-violence to counter the efforts the
military regime has made to further polarize that society.
A free press is essential to democracy. We envisage a joint collaborative effort, by
the Governments of Haiti and the United States to broadcast the message of democ-
racy to the Haitian people, to give them the access to the voices of their own elected
leaders, and of American policy spokesmen.
UNITED STATES INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN HAITI
Mr. Chairman, much remains to be done. But I am confident that we now have
in place the basis for a successful conclusion to the Haitian crisis. Why Haiti is im-
portant to us as a nation, and how the steps we have taken fit into the President's
overall strategy are matters that both the President and I have addressed pre-
viously. But they are so important that I believe they bear repeating.
President Clinton has defined our interests in Haiti succinctly:
First, Haiti is a close neighbor.
Second, there are approximately 1 million persons of Haitian descent resi-
dent in the United States.
Third, several thousand American citizens live in Haiti.
Fourth, we believe drugs are coming to the United States from Haiti.
Fifth, we face the continuous possibility of a massive outflow of Haitian mi-
grants to the United States because of conditions in Haiti.
Finally, Haiti and Cuba are the only two non-democracies left in our hemi-
sphere, and in Haiti the results of a democratic election were overturned by un-
constitutional and anti-democratic means.
As the President's statement indicates, our interests in Haiti are both moral and
practical. From a moral standpoint, we cannot stand idly by when human rights are
being violated and democracy thwarted. The United States may not be able to right
every wrong, everywhere in the world, every time. This is not an argument, how-
ever, against taking action in places where our interests are heavily engaged, and
our ability to influence events is substantial. Haiti is such a place. This is such a
THE DEPARTURE OF THE IHAITIAN MILITARY LEADERS
Responsibility for Haiti's tragedy lies firmly with its current military leadership.
This leadership overthrew Haiti's fledgling democracy. It seized power from Haiti's
legitimate government. It ejected Haiti's freely elected President. This leadership is
responsible for the suffering of the Haitian people, for their economic hardship, and
for mounting violations of their human rights. When offered an opportunity by the
international community to cooperate in the restoration of democracy to Haiti, this
leadership broke its word, and refused to carry out commitments into which it had
General Cedras and his colleagues will not be given any more chances. Given this
history of bad faith and duplicity, neither the international community nor the
democratic Government of Haiti can be expected to deal with the military institu-
tion under its current leadership. That is why Resolution 917 of the U.N. Security
Council specifically links sanctions to the retirement of General Cedras, and the de-
parture from Haiti of General Biamby and Colonel Francois. Only when these indi-
viduals are gone can the process of lifting the sanctions begin.
General Cedras still has a choice. He can either leave the military institution or
he can destroy it by continuing to pursue his own interests. The responsibility rests
solely on General Cedras.
Mr. Chairman, President Clinton has determined that our interests require the
restoration of the democratic process in Haiti, and the return of President Aristide.
We are embarked on a clear course and are determined to do what is necessary to
achieve this goal. No option is excluded. Democracy will soon be restored in Haiti,
and the process of rebuilding that torn nation will begin. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Bill. We. have been joined
by the chairman of the full committee, Senator Pell of Rhode Is-
land, and my colleague, Paul Coverdell of Georgia.
Mr. Chairman, do you have any comments you would like to
The CHAIRMAN. I have no questions, except to thank you for hold-
ing this hearing, and I look forward to learning from our witnesses.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much. Paul, do you have any
opening comments to make?
Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank
Mr. Gray for his attendance here and his testimony. Thank you for
But I do have a question that I hope this hearing will help us
to clarify. I am among those in this Congress, and I think in the
country, that would be gravely concerned if any American military
were put in harm's way with regard to this crisis we face in Haiti.
By that, I mean I stand opposed to an option being invasion. I can-
not, after reviewing the various documents and details, find a jus-
tification for an invasion to address these crises in Haiti.
Within the last 14 days, there have been repeated reports, both
in public and among personnel on Capitol Hill, suggesting that an
invasion was imminent, that Deputy Secretary Talbott was en-
gaged in discussions with regard to this, and it is asserted that he
feels that the invasion is useful for domestic purposes. Obviously,
this cannot be an acceptable purpose for the invasion, if one is
pending, and I very much, Mr. Gray, would like for you to see if
you can clarify these assertions and make more clear to us, the
members of this committee and the Congress and the American
people, what these discussions were, what they meant, and are
they real, are they factual? Because, if so, I think there would be
grave concern. Would the administration come to the Congress if
it contemplated such an over activity?
As a second issue, you have made clear that the crisis falls at
the feet of the junta, and I do not believe anybody disputes that,
but on the various occasions that we have had to discuss the di-
lemma in Haiti, I have raised the question to what extent does the
world, does the United States impose limitations that result in
broad suffering by a people in order to achieve a broader goal here?
Where is the line in the sand on that?
I mean, it is well enough that we can blame the junta. I think
we all, as I said, agree with that. Some of the reports I am receiv-
ing from Haiti suggest that the Haitians do not necessarily concur
that all this fault falls there, because they are the ones that are
feeling the anguish themselves. So I would like you to address both
those subjects, if you would.
Senator DODD. All right, well that is your opening comments, I
gather. We will get to them.
Let me start off, I can, Bill, with just a few observations or ques-
tions to you, if I can. You went through a litany of the things that
we have done already, and they have been significant. What else
needs to be done, in your view, in the area of the economic or politi-
cal sanctions, in order to tighten the noose even further?
Ambassador GRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the commit-
tee, we are looking at a variety of further steps that can be taken
to help create an environment where the coup leadership begins to
come to its senses and makes a judgment that their continued be-
havior is not in their best interests, and certainly not in the best
interests of the country that they purport to represent, or its insti-
tutions. I am not at liberty at this time to discuss in great detail
all of those that are being considered, but there are a variety of ad-
ditional economic measures, as well as immigration measures, that
we can look at and take to tighten the noose.
One of those, that I will talk about briefly, is the revocation of
all visas, which is one that we expect we will take some action on.
We are also looking at multilateralizing those actions that we have
already taken. When we announced the banning of all commercial
airline flights we were the only nation, but now we have been
joined by four other nations, which means about 90 percent of all
the air traffic has been cutoff.
Senator DODD. Is it just Air France that has the flights going?
Ambassador GRAY. It is now only Air France that has flights into
Haiti, and it is our expectation that they will be making a decision.
We are also in consultation with other nations in the UN, and also
in this hemisphere, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the asset freeze,
with regard to financial transaction. Because if you look at the
OAS statement in Belem, as well as the four friends of Haiti, it
calls upon all nations to consider these additional bilateral steps.
So we think that there is still additional room for additional tight-
ening of economic sanctions to create an atmosphere, as well as iso-
lation such as removing visas.
Senator DODD. Without getting into the specific conversations
you have had with individual countries, could you describe gen-
erally the reaction you are getting, the response you are getting as
you talk to others about cooperation in this area. What is the gen-
eral thrust of the responses you are getting?
Ambassador GRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of this commit-
tee, one of the things that I am most impressed with is the multi-
lateral support that the administration is gaining for the policies.
If you look at what has been happening, we have the support of
the Organization of American States fully, we have the United Na-
tions' full support. This is not a place where you have division, as
in other hot spots in the country, but here you have the entire
United Nations and the Organization of American States in unity
saying these are appropriate steps to be taken, and we expect to
continue to work that way.
And the support has been very strong, it has been forthcoming,
and the attitude of those nations in the Western Hemisphere and
in the UN has been that we have tried negotiations, on two occa-
sions we had agreements, and it was the coup leadership that
backed out of the agreements that they signed and that it is time
for action by the world community, and particularly by those na-
tions in the hemisphere.
Now, as you draw closer to nations in the neighborhood of Haiti,
their desire for action is even more intense, because many of them
are feeling the strain of the lack of democracy and the exploitation,
because they are faced with overwhelming numbers of refugees
that have moved into their island countries, creating a tremendous
strain upon their economic and social infrastructure. So the mood
is one of strong support in the hemisphere, stronger support in the
CARICOM nations, and strong support in the United Nations.
Senator DODD. Let me ask you, one of the comments you hear
quite frequently, and one that my colleague from Georgia has just
referenced, is regarding the plight of poor Haitians. And as I men-
tioned in my opening remarks, and which you have also discussed,
this is a desperately poor country, the poorest nation in this hemi-
sphere and one of the poorest in the world. I spent more than 2
years living on the border with Haiti and know the country fairly
well. It is a great tragedy.
My impression has been that, pitifully, a significant part of this
poor population lives outside of the mainstream of economic activ-
ity. The issue of imports or exports traditionally, as we understand
it, does not impact the lives, regretfully, of the average Haitian.
You have mentioned that we are feeding some 980,000 a day with
food that is getting in, and supplies.
I recall during the debate on South Africa that similar comments
were made regarding the sanctions and embargo and boycott on
South Africa; that, in fact, the very people we were trying to assist
in all of this were the victims. I wonder if you might comment gen-
erally on the thrust of that argument. And I hear it all the time,
and yet my experience and my conversations with Haitians is that
they believe and are desirous of having a free, democratic country.
They obviously want economic opportunity, food and jobs for them-
selves and their families, but the notion somehow that these sanc-
tions are the cause of their particular plight is one that I think
needs to be addressed.
Ambassador GRAY. Well, let me respond, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee. Sanctions do hurt, they do hurt a
country. But a military dictatorship kill people. We have seen that
in the thousands of people who have been killed over the last 3
years. You have seen it and Americans have seen it on television
as they have watched bodies lying on the road and in trucks and
people walking around them, left there all day by the operatives of
the coup leaders who have murdered people and have left the bod-
Yes, sanctions always hurt, but the military dictatorships kill
people and abuse human rights by the thousands. I remember the
situation in South Africa because, as you remember, I was the au-
thor of the 1986 and 1985 Anti-Apartheid Act. Yes, sanctions hurt
in South Africa, but apartheid was killing tens of thousands of peo-
Let me make it very clear that, one, if you look at Haiti, you will
see that the economic conditions, where the per capital income an-
nually is only $350 a year, did not occur because of UN Resolution
917 that went into effect on May 21. There have been historical
reasons for that, and among them, chief among them, has been the
lack of democracy and the lack of free markets.
Wherever we have seen the growth of democracy and free mar-
kets, whether it is in the Western Hemisphere or anywhere else,
we have seen conditions change. The fact of the matter is if you
look back at the time when President Aristide was elected and the
period when he was there, we had practically no refugees fleeing
that country, coming to this country during that period. Why? Be-
cause they understood what we know about democracy; it provides
hope, it provides an opportunity.
Second, when you look at the sanctions that we have imposed
such as financial transactions, a freeze on assets, a ban on airline
travel, that is not affecting the vast majority of Haitians. Haitians
from Cite Soleil are not flying American Airlines or Air France ei-
ther first class, business, or coach class. None of them have great
deposits of assets in American banks or financial institutions. So
these sanctions that we are stepping up are finely tuned and tar-
geted toward those who have had the power to sustain the coup
And so those who argue that we should not take action because
there may be some pain to the entire society, then leave us with
only one other option, which is either to walk away and allow the
military dictatorship to impose its will and thus have, in the West-
ern Hemisphere, one democracy snuffed out with a military coup,
whereas in the 1970's and 1980's, one of the good things that hap-
pened in our hemisphere was we got rid of those military dictator-
ships and started to see free markets rise throughout Latin Amer-
ica and in Central America. That has added stability to the world
and particularly to our region.
I would simply conclude, Mr. Chairman, by pointing out that if
we do not try all of these measures, then we must either walk
away or turn to other kinds of measures. It is the belief of this ad-
ministration and this President that democracy must be restored.
It is in our vital interests, it is in our neighborhood, it is a place
where we are being joined with all of the nations of the hemisphere
and the world united in a policy. And where we can influence be-
havior and make a difference, we ought to do that.
And if we are not willing to do that and use every arrow in our
quiver, including these sanctions, then we must be prepared either
to walk away and allow that dictatorship to stand, send a signal
throughout Central America, Latin America where throughout the
1980's and throughout the 1970's we saw dictatorship after dicta-
torship come down, democracy rise, free markets come up, or we
must take other steps. We believe that this policy ought to be pur-
sued very strongly for as long as possible, be analyzed on a day-
to-day, week-to-week basis to see what progress is being made.
We are seeing signs of progress in the last 4 weeks. There are
clear signs of dissatisfaction in the military. There are clear signs
among supporters of the coup. Some have even called for the coup
leadership to step down. That has never happened before until we
started tightening sanctions with the entire world opinion with us.
And so it is my view that, yes, sanctions do hurt; however, military
dictatorships kill and murder people and deny them all of their
And, second, as I ticked off in my testimony, we are spending
nearly $80 million in aid to offset the hurt among the poorest and
the neediest people by feeding nearly one out of every five Haitians
and providing medicine to over 2 million persons.
Senator DODD. Mr. Gray, let me just on the last point, because
it is one that-and then I will turn to my colleagues. I, for one, be-
lieve that this policy finally is beginning to have an effect. And I
think your last comments about the evidence in the last several
days of the squeeze beginning to take its toll is accurate.
I also would regret to see this country get involved in a military
engagement in Haiti, particularly at this juncture. But I want to
emphasize to you a point that I think, regardless of the situation,
that we ought never to announce to the world what we are never
going to do in these situations where there are interests involved,
particularly this close.
I, for one, never advocated excluding that option during the
Reagan and Bush administrations in Latin America. I believed we
ought never exclude that. I did not believe we needed to move to
it, but nonetheless never thought we ought to exclude it. I cannot
think of anything more harmful to our present efforts to utilize the
political and economic tools to bring about the change than to si-
multaneously announce that it is also the policy of this country
that we would never exercise that other arrow in our quiver. I do
not think we ought to jump to it, but I do not think we ought to
exclude it. If you exclude it, in my view you will do significant dam-
age to your ability to make the political and economic and diplo-
matic efforts fail. And I wonder if you might just comment on that
Ambassador GRAY. Well, I think that is true, Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee, that you have got to have every option
available in order for any of them to be taken seriously and to have
credibility. One of the things that we have been trying to do in the
last 4 or 5 weeks is send a very serious set of credible messages
that are loud and very clear.
And I am happy to say that I believe that that has been happen-
ing, and not simply from the United States but from the Organiza-
tion of American States, as well as the world community, because
they are supporting overwhelmingly this effort. And every one of
the steps that have been taken are multilateral steps. I do believe
that the President feels very strongly that we must keep all options
on the table as we look at this situation in Haiti, and that includes
even the military option.
Senator DODD. Senator Coverdell.
Senator COVERDELL. Well, I, first of all, appreciate your testi-
mony, and you have contributed to some comfort for me in terms
of the application of the sanctions. I think you make an excellent
point of the targeting and bringing the pressure on those for which
we would most want to suffer. Obviously, we have been concerned
about the point I raised about the innocent, by the investment that
you have alluded to in terms of food and medicine.
I do think that is a question, though, you always have to keep
in the balance as you weigh these things, and try to bring about
a correct solution, just who is paying the price and who is not. And
I have raised the question each time we have met on the subject,
and you have made me more comforted about it.
With regard to the military option, well, I guess the option al-
ways has to be there, and I agree with the strategic statement that
the chairman made. I, nevertheless, think it is important-and we
have no alternative because of the nature of our process here-to
talk about these things such as we are in this hearing. And I am
very concerned about the ramifications of an invasion, and I am
concerned about the language that was reported with regard to
contemplation of an invasion and what its purposes would be.
And so, as I said in my opening statement, I would like for you
to elaborate, if you could-I am sure you have seen all these state-
ments as well. I think we can talk about this without removing an
Ambassador GRAY. Senator, if I might respond to your opening
statement and the question was implicit in it. First of all, the
President has made it clear that every option must be on the table
as we look at ways to change the behavior of the coup leadership,
and not simply change their behavior but have them step down.
And, thus, the military option is on the table.
Second, with regard to the comments you made with regard to
the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Talbott, that was in reference
to a news story that occurred several weeks ago that said that doc-
uments of the United Nations had conversations interpreted by a
UN official that said Mr. Talbott believed that there was going to
be military action taken very shortly. I think the timing in those
documents was July. I think it also implied not that it was being
done for domestic reasons, but the document had a phrase called
"domestic pressure," i.e. refugees, et cetera.
Number one, I have talked to the UN official who supposedly was
the author of those memos, Dante Caputo, who is the United Na-
tions and OAS special envoy on Haiti, my counterpart for the UN.
He has assured me that that was not his interpretation of his con-
versations with Mr. Talbott, that Mr. Talbott never said to him
that there will be a military action taken in July, nor that this was
being contemplated as a result of any domestic pressure, including
refugees. And so I think that needs to be reflected. Mr. Talbott is-
sued that statement, Mr. Caputo issued that statement, and a
spokesman for the United Nations issued the same statement on
behalf of the Secretary General.
Let me turn to the other part of your question, and that is the
President will comply with all international and U.S. law with re-
gard to any option that he takes. We want to be in consultation
with the Congress as we move forward in this policy, just as we
are consulting with other nations in the hemisphere and in the
world community. And so I think what I would say to you, if we
wanted to get to a bottomline, is that, one, is the military option
on the table? Yes, it is. Is there an imminent action about to be
taken? No, it is not, but that option is there on the table and we
will assess the effect of sanctions each day, each week, to see if
there is a change in the Haitian situation.
What is the change we require? We require that the coup leaders
live up to the document that they signed nearly a year ago, the
Governors Island Accord, and step down and allow democracy to re-
turn and the elected leadership, that was elected by nearly 70 per-
cent of the vote in an election that every international observer
said was free and fair, to return. That is the change that we seek.
That is the change that the international community has said must
Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Gray, I agree with those laudable objec-
tives. I just am suggesting I do not know that I would want to be
the person that delivered the message to the family of an American
soldier that they had died over this dilemma. And I think that that
needs to be weighed very, very carefully.
A clarification. With regard to the sanctions, you have had grow-
ing international support. You mentioned OAS, the United Nations.
Have there been any positions taken by those organizations with
regard to the military option?
Ambassador GRAY. At this time I am not in a position, Senator,
to comment on any nation's reactions to a military option. If you
ask me what was my general impression after 6 weeks of being on
this job, I would describe it generally as saying if you are close to
the fire, you want as much water put on it as quickly as possible.
If you are further away, you are willing to discuss, look at it a little
In other words, my impression is that the countries that are clos-
er to Haiti want some immediate action taken as soon as possible,
because they are adversely affected. Countries that have had a his-
tory of dictatorship want some action taken, because they know the
message that allowing a military dictatorship to exist in this hemi-
sphere sends to what had existed in the eighties and the seventies
before freedom started to break out all over in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Those that are further removed, that have fewer interests,
are willing to give other options more of a chance to work.
Senator COVERDELL. Mr. Gray, I put myself in the latter option.
Senator DODD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Some Members of Con-
gress have questioned President Aristide's commitment to democ-
racy and human rights. In your view, how did Aristide's perform-
ance compare to the people who were there before him and the
military junta that came in after him?
Ambassador GRAY. The performance of President Aristide in the
brief period that he was President was a far superior performance
in leadership and moving in a democratic way than anything that
I know that has been there before or since. I think that one of the
responses that I would like to give generally, Senator Pell, to that
issue, is that-and I have heard people imply and question whether
or not President Aristide is the best President for Haiti.
I always say in response to it that democracy is democracy. Peo-
ple vote for who they want, just as they do in America. They vote
for Senators, they vote for Congressmen, they vote for President.
And I am sure all of you know that there are some people-very
few, I am sure-in Rhode Island who would question whether or
not you should be here, but that is the democratic process. They
do not have a right to take guns and turn you out of office simply
because they do not think you are the best. And when I look at
President Aristide in my conversations, I have not seen anything
in my contact with him that would have me question to be a demo-
cratically elected president in that country.
The CHAIRMAN. In connection with the damage that is being done
there now and the killing, how many actual American citizens have
been killed in the course of this unrest?
Ambassador GRAY. To my knowledge, I do not believe that we
have lost an American citizen at all during this period of coup lead-
ership. But there have been thousands of Haitians who have been
killed, maimed, and raped, which has been clearly documented by
international human rights organizations and by the American
The CHAIRMAN. In connection with saving the people or securing
the people on the boats and rafts, what is the proportion of Navy
vessels to Coast Guard cutters?
Ambassador GRAY. Predominantly we are using Coast Guard cut-
ters for the interdiction of those who leave Haiti seeking asylum
on the high sea. There are some Navy ships that are involved, and
they are taken, currently, to Jamaica, where they are processed
aboard ship in Jamaica, and a determination is made about their
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, and good luck to you in
your very tough assignment.
Senator DODD. Senator Feingold.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gray, I regret I have been tied up in another meeting, but
understand that you gave a very strong statement, including the
open belief that the sanctions are starting to work. And I congratu-
late you for that. I was one of the Senators, under the leadership
of Senator Dodd, who felt that more could be done, and since you
have been involved it is clear that the heat has been turned up,
and I am very hopeful that it will succeed in removing the generals
from Haiti and putting President Aristide back.
I also share Senator Coverdell's concern that we want to stop
short, if we can, obviously, of using American military force. That
is a difficult proposition to explain to the American people. But I
also respect and believe that it should not be simply taken off the
table, so that the generals know just how very serious we are about
restoring democracy to Haiti. So, again, I congratulate you and
hope the committee can be helpful in keeping the heat on the junta
I understand you referred to broadcasts to Haiti, Radio Democ-
racy. What is the purpose of these broadcasts? Can you give me a
little sense of what the subject matter will be? Will it be part of
the Voice of America?
Ambassador GRAY. The broadcasts that we are talking about will
provide an opportunity for the people of Haiti to hear their elected
leadership and to have free flow of information, which they have
not had now for over 2 years. It will have an opportunity for Presi-
dent Aristide to speak to the people there, to talk about his mes-
sage of reconciliation and exactly of what his plans are upon his
return with regard to the military, with regard to the economy,
with regard to reconciliation, with regard to political compromise,
in order to move the country forward.
We think that that is extremely important. He has not had an
opportunity to talk to the people of Haiti. The people of Haiti have
received a steady diet of disinformation from the military regime
and its supporters, and this would be an opportunity for President
Aristide and also for the United States to clearly articulate views
in contradiction to the military regime.
Senator FEINGOLD. I am pleased to hear that President Aristide
will have this available to him, and I assume he is eager to take
advantage of it.
Ambassador GRAY. He is quite eager to have the opportunity to
articulate his views, as so much of what has been said in Haiti and
around the world has been a distortion of his views.
Senator FEINGOLD. Who will be writing and editing and broad-
casting the programs, and how will the Haitian people be informed
of the broadcasts?
Ambassador GRAY. The programs will be done on the joint au-
thority of the Haitian Government of President Aristide and the
U.S. Government. Each will review all programs before they are
broadcast, with a right of review. And they will be broadcast on a
daily basis. It is our expectation that it will start some time next
Senator FEINGOLD. How will it be financed? What is the budget
for the broadcast?
Ambassador GRAY. It will come out of United States funds.
Senator FEINGOLD. Do you have any idea what the amount would
Ambassador GRAY. No, we do not have an exact cost at this time
as to what it would cost to do this. It would depend on how long
the broadcasts will be and how many per day, per week, and dur-
ing a month. We hope that we can give you an estimate very short-
ly, once we finalize the arrangements. The arrangements have not
been finalized. We expect them to be finalized this week.
Senator FEINGOLD. I mentioned earlier-and I gave you a lot of
questions at once-but will this be under the auspices of the Voice
Ambassador GRAY. No, it will not. It will be directly under the
auspices of the U.S. Government and the Haitian Government, and
it is being done by aircraft that has the capacity to broadcast and
override all of the frequencies of Haiti broadcasting.
Senator FEINGOLD. Let me switch gears to the announcement
that the provisional president, Emile Jonassaint, has announced
that elections will take place in Haiti later this year. What has
been the U.S. response to this announcement?
Ambassador GRAY. The U.S. Government and the administration
does not recognize this government that is the puppet government
put in place by the coup leadership. It has not been recognized by
any government in the world. It is a puppet government put forth
by the coup leaders and, as such, we do not recognize its pro-
nouncements or its statements and find that they are unconstitu-
tional and illegal.
Senator FEINGOLD. And as to refugee policy, is it your feeling
that the new refugee policy, our United States refugee policy for
Haitians, will result in a fairer procedure? And is it in compliance
with international norms and standards for the treatment of refu-
Ambassador GRAY. One of the biggest changes, Senator, that we
have made has been the handling of refugees. As you know, prior
to May 8, there was a direct-return policy which was the policy not
only of this administration, but the previous administration, where
all who were interdicted were returned and told to go to the four
in-country processing centers.
The President, as a result of the increase in human rights
abuses, deteriorating conditions, felt that there needed to be a
change in that policy and that there needed to be hearings and a
fairer procedure. What we have done has begun to change that pol-
icy, first, by putting together an international effort. We now have
a partnership with the United Nations' High Commissioner on Ref-
ugees, the foremost authority on refugees. The standard that is
being used is the international standard.
Second, as a temporary measure we are using ships in Jamaica's
harbor. The Jamaican Government stepped forward, recognizing
that this is a hemispheric problem, not a United States problem
alone, and has given its harbor and much of its infrastructure to
support these two ships where refugees are being processed. At the
same time, we pursued a policy to get other nations involved and
we signed a memorandum of agreement and work has already
begun on the land-based center at Turks and Caicos Islands, on
Grand Turk Island, in the Caribbean. And we are in the process
of talking to other countries about land-based processing centers,
as well as the potential for safe havens.
Senator FEINGOLD. You are talking there about processing, the
help of the other countries in processing, or are there talks with
other countries about actually accepting Haitian refugees? Is that
what you are referring to?
Ambassador GRAY. I was getting ready to go on and say yes, the
second part is not only processing, but also the United Nations
Commissioner on Refugees is talking to other nations about reset-
tlement of refugees.
Senator FEINGOLD. Can you tell us what some of those countries
Ambassador GRAY. Well, at this time we have had about six
countries that have expressed a willingness to consider taking Hai-
tian refugees. We have about a dozen others that are looking at the
possibility of taking Haitian refugees for settlement. They will be
making their own announcements. Senator, we prefer to let them
make the announcements after they have gone through their proc-
ess, but this is what has happened as a result of our partnership
with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.
And the fact is that we are approaching the refugee problem in
a very similar way as we are looking at the democratic, diplomatic
problem. That is, that it is a multilateral approach that we are
pursuing here, because it affects the entire hemisphere. And so we
expect other nations to provide for resettlement as well.
Senator FEINGOLD. Do you expect them to make those announce-
ments soon, any of them?
Ambassador GRAY. Yes, we expect them to be announcing very
soon what each country will do. Some of them will take significant
numbers and others will take a few numbers.
Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Finally, I have one question. Mr. Gray, do you believe that the
bulk of Haitians seeking refugee in the United States are fleeing
economic troubles, or do you believe they are trying to escape polit-
Ambassador GRAY. It is my view, Senator, that what you have
is a combination. You have a deteriorating situation where human
rights abuses are increasing, where people are living in fear, but
at the same time you also have a deteriorating situation in the
poorest country in the Western Hemisphere where the per capital
annual income is $350. It is very clear that if the coup leadership
was not in place and that democracy was there, as we look at the
figures where President Aristide was there, you would not have
this refugee problem, even though the poverty situation would not
have significantly changed.
The reason, I believe, is that in democracies people have hope
and they have the possibility of changing Lhe economic condition.
And so it is my view that you have a combination of motivations
as to why people are leaving that country, and the job of the proc-
essing centers that we have put in place now is to give a fair hear-
ing to people, to make their case when seeking asylum, and to
make the determination of those who are in real danger and to pro-
vide them with a safe haven and resettlement.
And we have started that process. It is moving along. We have
to continue it. At the same time I would, again, remind the com-
mittee that ultimately the solution is not the effect, but it is the
cause. And the cause is the lack of democracy and economic oppor-
tunity, and you will not get economic opportunity simply by remov-
ing the sanctions, because that country has its economic conditions
of long standing as a result of dictatorship after dictatorship. And
so we have a real opportunity here, Senators, to change the course
and to bring stability to the region by restoring democracy and al-
lowing free markets.
Senator FEINGOLD. I thank you for your answer.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Just a couple more questions, Bill. One is would you comment on
the continuation of some of the human rights violations that were
reported in the past? There was-for the first time in my knowl-
edge, rape had become a tool of human-rights violations in Haiti.
Even under the Duvalier governments, rape was never utilized as
a tool. Kidnapping, mutilation of corpses, scorching villages, is this
still a problem?
Ambassador GRAY. Yes, it is, and an increasing problem, espe-
cially the rape of women. As you pointed out, there has not been
a history of that in Haiti, but we are now seeing it as an obviously
political weapon. And there are many people who are coming for-
ward and testifying, people who have seen it, children who have
had to watch while mothers are raped simply because they do not
support the coup leadership, because they supported President
Aristide or because they supported someone who spoke up and
spoke out against the military dictatorship. So, yes, human rights
violations are increasing.
Senator DODD. Second, you have talked about the tremendous co-
operation that we are receiving from the international community,
particularly in this hemisphere, on a number of the sanctions
areas, the consensus about the need for change, and the like. I
think a very important message to Haiti is some sense of what can
come afterward. You talked about hope being a key element of de-
mocracy, and I agree with you. We have had discussions about a
peacekeeping force, training of police officers or military personnel
in Haiti after the departure of the military leadership.
What conversations and discussions have there been with the
international community about any significant assistance to Haiti
to put people back to work, infrastructure, housing, roads, water?
This is one country where a modest amount of investment could
make a significant difference, given the wage levels and the like,
where providing meaningful international cooperation in this area
would seem to me to be a very important message to not only the
average Haitian but to the business community and others, that
not only is there a desire to restore and return President Aristide
and restore democracy in the country, but also to achieve inter-
national cooperation in giving Haiti the chance it has never had,
and that is to get on its feet economically through international ef-
Ambassador GRAY. Senator and members of the committee, going
back to the Governors Island Accord which the coup leaders re-
fused to comply with after they signed it, it was clearly implied in
that agreement that the Western powers and the United Nations
would be a part of an international effort to change economic condi-
tions. Discussions with regard to what comes after the coup leader-
ship steps down are ongoing.
The four friends of Haiti have made it very clear in their state-
ments during the month of June that there must be a plan to bring
about economic revitalization. The Organization of American
States, at its conference in Belem, also made it very clear that
there must be a community, worldwide community effort to bring
about a change in the economic conditions. And I believe that
President Clinton and this administration is already committed to
join with others.
Because, Senator Dodd, you are absolutely right, a little bit can
go a long way in a country like Haiti where the per capital income
annually is only $350. And so there is a commitment from this ad-
ministration to join with others, and we have already seen others
articulated in the statements out of Belem and out of the four
friends and out of the Governors Island Agreement, to do just that,
and there are ongoing discussions as to how that can be carried
Senator DODD. So it is-getting down to the details of this-with
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the lend-
ing institutions. This is a very real effort being made.
Ambassador GRAY. This is a very real effort, and everyone who
is involved in the community of nations knows that it is now sim-
ply enough to get the coup leadership to step down, to return Presi-
dent Aristide, but also to join in an international effort to help turn
that economy around, which would go a long way to ensuring
democratic institutions can grow and the values that are associated
with it and, second, would also begin to deal with the tide of refu-
gees that are looking for economic opportunity.
Senator DoDD. Two other last quick points. There has been a lot
of talk about a UN peacekeeping force or a multilateral peacekeep-
ing force. I have all sorts of numbers being bandied about about
the size of that force. Would you care to share with us today what
is the contemplated size of such a peacekeeping force?
Ambassador GRAY. At this point, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee, there has been no decision made on the exact shape
or size of that contingency. The United Nations Mission in Haiti
grows out of the Governors Island Accord, where it was recognized
that the military and the police need to be retrained, professional-
ized, and as a part of that agreement there was a United Nations
Mission that was set up.
If you remember, the coup leaders refused to allow-the first
sign that they were not going to comply with the Governors Island
Accord was that they refused to allow the first contingent of
UNMIH to land; it was the Harlan County. It is now very clear
that the situation has changed. Under the original United Nations
mission it called for a smaller force with a more narrow mandate,
simply because it was expected that there would be cooperation on
the part of the coup leaders and their supporters in the return of
democracy. That clearly is no longer the case.
Regardless of how those coup leaders leave, the fact is that you
will need a stronger, a wider, broader mandate for the United Na-
tions Mission besides simply the professionalization and training.
It would also have to have civic order, you would also have the pro-
tection of international organizations, you would also need to have
protection of democratic leadership. And so at this point-
Senator DODD. But let me ask you this, is the number 15,000 is
Ambassador GRAY. No, I would not say that it is necessarily in
the ballpark. I know there have been press reports, but a number
has not been agreed upon. We are expecting to get an authorization
from the United Nations, hopefully this week, and then the Sec-
retary General will determine what the strength and size will be.
We will be arguing-this administration will be arguing for an in-
creased mandate and an increased size. What that size is going to
be has not been determined, so I cannot confirm the press reports.
Senator DODD. I understand that.
Last, the visa issue. You raise the point that revoking-or you
are currently considering revoking the visas of all Haitians. Can
you tell us when you expect a decision on that and would it also
include revoking the business visas of Haitian businessmen, for in-
stance, in this country?
Ambassador GRAY. It is my expectation that perhaps this week
there will be a decision made with regard to the visa issue and it
will revoke all visas except for humanitarian reasons, and they
would be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much. Senator Pressler.
Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.
What has been your personal experience of working with Mr.
Aristide? I heard yesterday on a television broadcast that he had
said he would not return to Haiti if he were brought back by mili-
tary force. That seemed to be something new to me. Are you aware
Ambassador GRAY. Yes, I am, Senator. First of all, I think the
President of Haiti has made it very clear and been very consistent,
and he has said it right from the beginning, that under the Haitian
constitution, that if he were to call for an international interven-
tion or one country to intervene, that he would violate the constitu-
tion and be subject to impeachment. On the other hand, President
Aristide has called for the international community to participate
and take part in the United Nations Mission in Haiti, and he has
also said on numerous occasions, including at Belem, that the
international community and the OAS should take whatever steps
are necessary to restore democracy to Haiti.
President Clinton, in citing the reasons that the United States
might have to act, has stressed the issue of U.S. interests that are
engaged in Haiti. So I think that President Aristide has been very
clear and consistent in his pronouncements about the use of force.
Senator PRESSLER. Now, what about the international support
for U.S. policy? What other governments are cooperating with the
United States in implementing various sanctions we have imposed,
the asset freeze, suspension of commercial air service, visa denials,
and so forth? And also comment on the cooperation of the Domini-
Both countries that are cooperating, I guess, to restate the ques-
tion. Maybe the two or three countries that are cooperating the
best and the two or three countries that are cooperating the least
from whom you would like to see more cooperation from.
Ambassador GRAY. Senator, I have got to tell you, there has been
overwhelming cooperation. I do not know if I can even use the best
and the least. I think there have been delays. Some countries have
had to go through a different kind of process in determining what
support they can give to individual bilateral sanctions. They have
all supported-all nations have supported the UN Resolution 917;
the OAS especially has been very very clear and very strong on
There are a number of additional restrictions that have been im-
posed by various countries, such as the commercial airline ban,
that only five countries have a part in doing those, so it would not
be worthwhile for Aero Mexico to ban flights since they do not fly
there. The countries that do fly there, all of them have joined in
banning those flights except for one, Air France, and we are expect-
ing that they will be making their decision very shortly.
With regard to financial assets and a freeze on assets, we have-
I believe Canada has joined in imposing some restrictions in that
area. We are expecting some other nations to join. But, again, it
depends on the country where there would be significant Haitian
assets, and that is why these sanctions have been imposed bilat-
erally as opposed to under the umbrella of UN 917. So I would say,
Senator, that all of the countries have been very, very supportive
in trying to, one, impose 917, which is the umbrella sanctions of
the UN and, second, to join us and other countries as they see fit
and as they have the ability to do so, in the other bilateral restric-
With regard to the Dominican Republic, I visited the Dominican
Republic and met with President Balaguer, along with Dante
Caputo, the UN special envoy, and he made a commitment which
we believe he is trying in good faith to keep, which is to seal the
border. We saw immediately within 2 or 3 days after our visit a
movement of about 10,000 troops to the border. Many of the pic-
tures that we had seen the first weekend that the sanctions took
place on May 21 stopped immediately.
The President of the Dominican Republic has agreed to the rec-
ommendations of a UN team that was sent by the Secretary Gen-
eral to analyze how to close and seal that border. Currently the
President of the Dominican Republic has signed off on all of those
recommendations, and currently the implementation of the rec-
ommendations is moving forward.
Now, if you said to me have we been able to seal that border 100
percent, the answer, Senator, is no, just as we have not been able
to seal the borders of Southern California or Texas. But have we
made tremendous progress in the last 4 weeks? The answer is yes.
And with the arrival of the technical advisory team, which we ex-
pect to be in place in a week or so with additional equipment that
the need in order to seal, such as night-vision goggles, which would
help them in the evening to detect smuggling, we believe that we
will have a much more effective sealing of the border. So there is
cooperation on the part of the Dominican Republic.
Senator PRESSLER. What if we adopted three basic approaches in
our policy to Haiti, what would happen within a year's time that
is not happening now? First of all lift the embargo. Second of all,
make a clear statement the United States will not invade. Third,
on the immigration matter we would just proceed with traditional
visas, legal immigration policy, and maintain current refugee pol-
icy. That is, we would not accept massive immigration except
through traditional routes.
Those would be three things we would announce and do: lift the
embargo, make a clear statement we will not invade, and take a
traditional approach to immigration. What would happen dif-
ferently that is not happening now?
Ambassador GRAY. Essentially, it would be my view, Senator,
that if you announced those, essentially you would be saying to the
coup leadership Haiti is yours; do whatever you want with it. Be-
cause lifting the embargo would not change-
Senator PRESSLER. What are we saying now, though? What are
we saying now?
Ambassador GRAY. We are basically applying pressure to them
and their supporters, giving them a choice.
Senator PRESSLER. Well, you can still apply pressure by saying
you hope democracy will evolve and so forth. What would be dif-
ferent after that.
Ambassador GRAY. Well it would be very unique. I do not think
we ever said that anywhere in the Western Hemisphere during the
1980's or the 1970's, to help bring about change of dictatorships.
If you lift the sanctions, you would be disagreeing with the entire
OAS and the UN, and you would be essentially saying we will just
continue to talk with you and hope to persuade you, even though
we did that for 2 years and had two agreements which they refused
to comply with after signing it. So my viewpoint is if you want to
lift the sanctions, you lift them, and essentially all you will do is
ensure that a military dictatorship survives, thrives, and democ-
racy will never come to Haiti.
Senator PRESSLER. Well, you see, there I would disagree with you
somewhat, because I believe-where we have a disagreement is I
think the embargo is hurting the poor the most, and if the embargo
were lifted there would be more prosperity, more economic activity,
and a chance for people to have some resources that they could use
to work through toward democracy. Now you can say a lot of things
on both sides of this.
Let me ask you personally, do you favor a military invasion by
the United States?
Ambassador GRAY. I favor the United States following the policy
that we are pursuing now, pursuing the policy multilaterally of ap-
plying pressure to the coup leadership to step down through eco-
Let me respond-because I do not think you were here earlier,
Senator, but I responded to the poor question.
Senator PRESSLER. You do not have to repeat it. I can read it.
Ambassador GRAY. But I think you are right. Sanctions do hurt,
but let me assure you, Senator, that the poor of Cite Soleil and the
rural areas are not lining up to get on American Airlines or Air
France to buy economic, business, or first class to come to Miami
to shop. The poor do not have assets in the United States. The poor
do not have financial transactions that they are taking in the Unit-
So I believe my response is that these sanctions are targeted,
they are affecting primarily those who can bring about a change,
and at the same time we are providing meals for one out of every
five Haitians today. We are providing 2.2 million Haitians with
medical care. So we are offsetting, on the humanitarian side, many
of the negative effects. And so sanctions are not hurting the poor
in a society and sanctions did not create the poverty that you find
in Haiti where the average income per capital is $350. And so these
sanctions have only been in place now for 5 weeks, since May 21.
Senator PRESSLER. We have created the expectation that if the
military government does not leave, something dramatic like an in-
vasion is going to happen. Therefore, those Haitians who might be
motivated to try to make a change within their own country are
not going to do that; they are waiting for this great moment that
is going to come. It would seem to me that that great moment
when U.S. troops will invade will not occur, because I do not think
Congress or the President will allow that to happen.
Would it not be better to be very clear about what we really will
do and will not do? I think it is worse to threaten an invasion and
then not carry out the threat, to raise expectations, for no reason.
But at some point, if we are going to have a democracy in Haiti,
and I am for that, and prosperity, the Haitian people have got to
decide that they are going to do this thing for themselves; there is
not going to be anyone from the outside who is going to do it for
them. We are creating an illusion in Haiti that we are going to do
something that we really do not intend to do, ultimately.
How would you deal with that argument?
Ambassador GRAY. First of all, I would say that the President
has made it very clear that every option is on the table, including
the military option. We are not dealing with illusions here; we are
dealing very clearly with the faction that a bunch of military people
with guns have taken over a country. That is unacceptable. It
threatens our interests, it threatens peace and stability in the en-
tire region, and that is why the entire worldwide community has
joined in condemning it and seeking to oust them.
Second, I would simply say to you that I do not see this group
of leaders, simply through talking to us, walking away. We have
had two negotiations. Each time agreements were reached, prom-
ises were made, and it was the coup leaders that refused to. The
fact of the matter is that the people of Haiti cannot oppose the coup
leadership who has the guns and the weapons. That is why it is
necessary for the world community to bring the kind of pressure
that we are bringing, and to do it in a very strong, credible man-
ner. So I would say you would have to continue that.
Senator PRESSLER. Well let me say I am strongly against mili-
tary dictatorship and I am for democracy, but we could apply a lot
of pressure without threatening a military invasion which will not
occur. I think the embargo is a mistake. That is just my view. I
think that if we took those steps a year from now, we would be
closer to real democracy because the Haitian people would see that
they have got to get this job done.
Right now they are expecting us to do something that we are not
prepared to undertake. I think even if people cannot fly to Florida
for the weekend, the embargo is going to strengthen the military,
rather than weaken it. That is just one Senator's judgment. So I
would like to see a change in our policy, and I guess we are just
at a disagreement.
Senator Dom). Thank you very much. I would just suggest-I
would be curious as to the outcome of an amendment that someone
might offer on the floor that would lift sanctions and state firmly
that we would never use military force and establish normal diplo-
matic relations with Cuba, and what the reaction might be that
this would somehow bring about the desired change in that coun-
try. I suspect that such an amendment would be soundly defeated
if anyone suggested that that approach was going to achieve the
I do not know if this one will. I do not think anyone can say with
any certainty, but if we cannot make sanctions work here, we
ought to scrap that policy everywhere else on the globe. If you can-
not make it work in this country with the kind of cooperation we
are getting-and it would be very helpful in this case for those who
do not like the military option-and I appreciate that here. You
cannot not like the military option and not like the sanctions and
expect to achieve change. And we ought to be all singing out of the
same hymnbook at least on the sanctions issue, to try and bring
about the desired change.
And let me underscore your efforts on the visa issue. I realize
that is a controversial question, Bill, but I want to strongly support
your efforts in that regard. I think you have got to send a very
clear, strong, firm message that we are very serious about this and
that there are no deadlines associated with this. This will exist in
perpetuity, if it takes that time to bring about the desired change.
And I think you have got to be willing to make those kinds of com-
mitments if it is going to be successful.
So I thank you immensely for your presence here today, and look
forward to working closely with you. And stay in touch. There may
be some additional comments or questions that members would
like to submit to you, and if they do we will get them along to you,
but we will be in touch.
Ambassador GRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
members of this distinguished subcommittee. I have appreciated
the opportunity and will be glad to respond to further questions
that you may have.
Senator DODD. I thank you.
Let me welcome Bob Graham, our colleague from Florida, if he
is still here. I presume-I saw him walk in at one point. Bob, there
you are. I said I would call you. Bob Graham, our colleague from
Florida, obviously has a strong interest in the subject matter both
personally and from a constituent interest standpoint. And, in addi-
tion to that, he spent a few days in Haiti a week or two ago. And
we welcome your comments here this afternoon and are pleased
that you asked to come by and share your thoughts with us, and
we will go right to your statement.
STATEMENT OF HION. BOB GRAHAM, U.S. SENATOR FROM
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to express my personal appreciation for
your holding this series of hearings on this important issue of
American foreign policy. I know how personally vested you are in
the issue of Haiti, the many times that you have visited that coun-
try, and the leadership which you have provided. I want to thank
you for your personal graciousness in affording me this oppor-
Senator DODD. Thank you.
Senator GRAHAM. I will try to respect that by being brief. I will
commence by submitting my printed statement for the record and
will make a few informal remarks.
Mr. Chairman, the conditions that exist in Haiti today are not
the result of the last few weeks or months. It is a country which
for 3 decades and more has been suffering under an autocratic re-
gime and an economic policy of depression which has brought mis-
ery to most of the people of Haiti. In reflecting on the policy that
is currently being pursued in Haiti, I would make this general ob-
I do not believe that a policy of enhanced economic sanctions is
likely to lead to the result of a voluntary transfer of power by the
current military leadership to President Aristide. I believe that our
current policy needs to be seen as a step in a calibrated series of
steps toward that objective, and it is an elaboration of observation
that I would submit to you.
First, I believe that there are important United States and inter-
national community interests in Haiti, and which the Haiti experi-
ence of the last now over 21/2 years represents. First, we have an
interest in the wellbeing of our neighbors within this hemisphere.
Throughout American history, we have taken a special sense of
neighborliness for those countries within our hemisphere. And
today our neighbors in Haiti are suffering, and suffering grievously.
In terms of human rights abuses alone, between February 1 and
June 1 of this year, there were 295, confirmed by the United Na-
tions human rights observers, political murders in Haiti. Between
February 1 and June 1, there were 91 confirmed political abduc-
tions in Haiti. Between February 1 and June 1, there were 66 con-
firmed political rapes in Haiti. Today there was the report of the
latest United Nations human rights monitors reports of conditions
in Haiti which have indicated that the situation has deteriorated
since June 1.
Second, we have an interest in democracy within the Western
Hemisphere. If this hearing had taken place 25 years ago, you
could have counted on the fingers of one hand the number of de-
mocracies in the Western Hemisphere. Today every nation in the
Western Hemisphere is a democracy except Cuba and Haiti. They
are young and relatively fragile democracies. The message which is
being sent from Haiti is a message of will the international commu-
nity, in particular the international community of the Western
Hemisphere, come to the defense of a democracy which has been
ousted in an old style military coup.
The United States is going to receive many of the adverse con-
sequences of conditions that exist in Haiti. Most visible, but by no
means the only of those consequences, has to do with refugees.
When I was in Haiti 2 weeks ago the INS, Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service officials who were responsible for establishing
our refugee processing centers both in the country and now at sea,
estimated that once there was full knowledge that our policy had
changed, that no longer would people be turned around at sea and
returned directly to Haiti but rather would be afforded an oppor-
tunity for a hearing, that there would be a sharp increase in the
number of persons fleeing Haiti.
That prediction has now come to pass. In the first 24 weeks of
1994, the average number of interdictions of Haitians was 135 per
week. In week 25 of 1994, the week we have just concluded, there
were 1,194 refugees interdicted, and we saw the statistics over this
weekend in which some 1,800 persons were interdicted in a period
of less than 4 days. We are beginning to see the surge of what I
think will eventually be a tidal wave of refugees exiting Haiti.
Just one final matter is the issue of Haiti as a new center for
Haiti has become a significant part of the chain of drug ship-
ments from the source countries into the United States. This has
become a significant source of revenue for the Haitian military. It
is a subject which is now alleged to be under investigation by U.S.
criminal justice officials. Mr. Chairman, I site those as just some
other reasons why I think the Haiti issue is an issue that warrants
the serious attention and the necessary action of the United States.
Second, as I stated, I do not believe that the current strategy-
economic sanctions and political isolation-has the capacity to
achieve the result of restoring President Aristide. The embargo,
rather than impoverishing the military elite, has both enriched and
emboldened them. It has provided them with new sources of reve-
nue through their rakeoffs on contraband, particularly gasoline,
and their control of drug trafficking. It has emboldened them be-
cause they have seen now for over 21/2 years the failure of the
international community to carry out its protest against their coup.
The military has become increasingly isolated from centers of
power that used to be able to exercise influence over them, particu-
larly the economic elites. The military now has more money than
the former rich of Haiti, and therefore are less susceptible to the
persuasion of that group of Haitian society.
Third, I believe that the current strategy of economic sanctions
and political isolation ought to be seen as one part of a calibrated
series of steps. The economic sanctions and political isolation in my
judgment will have the principal benefit in showing to the world
that we have taken the last steps in a nonmilitary means in order
to achieve the objective of restoring President Aristide. It will also
provide us with the necessary time to develop the international
support and our own plans for the further steps that will be nec-
I believe that we ought to be cognizant of the fact that there are
serious adverse consequences that are occurring while the sanc-
tions are in place. Let me just mention a few that were told to me
during my recent visit to Haiti.
A rising level of anti-Americanism under all classes of Haitians;
a whittling away of President Aristide's term, and therefore his
ability to demonstrate to the people of Haiti the benefits of a de-
mocracy; and the fact that in November of this year in Haiti as in
this country there will be elections. Those elections will include all
of the local mayors and a substantial part of the parliament. If we
do not have a credible government in place in Haiti prior to those
November 1994 elections we have no hope of having credible politi-
cal institutions with which to deal for the balance of President
Aristide's term in office.
The middle of Haitian society is eroding. A leader of Haiti who
is a small d democrat, a supporter of the democratic process al-
though not a supporter of Aristide, told me that the middle in Haiti
has now become the distance between his thumb and index finger,
and has diminished. Increased violence will leave scar tissue that
will be difficult to heal, and as one final point, we have attempted,
and Mr. Gray referred to this in his remarks, not to give any tacit
recognition to the elicit government. Soon we anticipate that that
elicit government is going to start to make it difficult to deliver hu-
manitarian supplies, medicine, and food unless we give it some rec-
ognition. And so a continuation of the sanctions puts in a position
in which we may be necessity have to give some recognition to the
I believe that for purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of the
current sanctions we ought to be closely monitoring a series of de-
velopments. One of these is the economic misery of the people. Our
U.S. AID reports on a regular basis a quality of life for the people
of Haiti. In every category of that quality of life there has been sig-
nificant deterioration. We should closely monitor what is happen-
ing over the next few weeks.
Second, we should monitor the United Nations human rights re-
ports to see if what happened in June, an escalation of abuse, con-
tinues into the balance of the summer.
We need to monitor the refugee flows which are a significant in-
dicator of how oppressive conditions have become within the Is-
land. The example of moving from a weekly average of 135 to last
week's 1,194 and this weeks numbers which will be even higher U
indicates more of the people are now voting their misery by board- U
ing their boats. And by effective capabilities we need to be evaluat-
ing attitudes within key components of the Haitian society, particu-
larly the unlisted and junior officer corps of the military.
I believe that those indicators are going to increasingly dem-
onstrate that we need to recognize that another strategy is re-
quired, and I believe the options that would then be before us are
essentially stark, unpleasant, and only two. One is what I would
call the surrender strategy which is to lift the embargo, reestablish
relations with the existing regime, and admit that we are unable
or unwilling to apply those actions required to restore President
Aristide; or second, be prepared for a credible threat and willing-
ness to use military force to restore President Aristide. When those
choices become the last remaining options for the international
community, I pray that we will not surrender and accept all of the
negative consequences of that surrender, but that we will be pre-
pared to use a credible threat of military force.
Third, we need to have a United Nations peacekeeping capability
prepared to move in as rapidly as possible after President Aristide
has been restored. That peacekeeping force would have the prime
responsibility of establishing a permissive environment, while
President Aristide transitions back into full responsibility.
And fourth and finally, we need to have an effective political and
economic strategy to do such things as assist in the division of the
police function and the military function and professionalizing of
that new police, of providing public works and jobs and other steps
that will show to the people of Haiti the benefits of restoration of
President Aristide. Those are steps which are urgent, and their
successful accomplishment will determine whether President
Aristide, upon return, is able to realize what the people invested
when they elected him President in 1990.
Mr. Chairman, the situation in Haiti in my opinion is at a criti-
cal juncture. Reports that the economic sanctions are working are
by any standard wrong. The wealthy elites cannot influence the
military; the military is benefiting by the sanctions. We must pre-
pare ourselves to take the next step if we are to achieve our stated
goal of restoring President Aristide and the principle of democracy.
[The prepared statement of Senator Graham follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOB GRAHAM
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your giving me an opportunity to make a few brief
comments, and I congratulate you on maintaining a continuing focus on the unfold-
ing events in Haiti.
I visited Haiti last week, the latest of several visits since I have been in the Sen-
ate. I returned this time convinced that current U.S. policy is fatally flawed. With-
out a mid-course correction, we will not achieve our goal of returning President
Aristide to power.
I would like to make just a few brief comments and would be glad to answer any
First, international sanctions designed to pressure Haiti's economic elite into
ousting Haiti's military rulers are not working. The embargo is a sieve, and critical
imports-particularly gasoline--continue flood across the border from the Domini-
can Republic. The rich, although inconvenienced, can still buy virtually anything
they want. The poor, more than inconvenienced, are starving.
Second, the Haitian people, having no confidence in the embargo, their heroic en-
D durance at the breaking point, support-indeed invite-military intervention. Some
of President Aristide's strongest supporters advocate intervention at this point.
They said that sanctions, no matter how comprehensive, will not work in time to
restore Aristide. Aristide supporters have never been so vocal in support of more
Third, time is very short. Everyone we spoke to said that the embargo is having
a devastating effect on the poor and that repression is growing daily. As the situa-
tion becomes ever more polarized, Aristide supporters say that reconciliation will be-
come even more difficult with time.
Fourth, Mr. Chairman, we have a practical and moral decision to make. I believe
that current U.S. policy will not achieve the goal of restoring President Aristide.
Within the next few weeks, the United States and the international community
will be forced to choose: We can either take the necessary steps to return President
Aristide-and I believe that force must remain a credible option-or we will have
to ask ourselves whether it is morally and politically effective to continue with an
embargo policy that will not achieve our goals.
I recommend the following:
We can not back away from economic sanctions but they should continue
for only a limited time.
The President should take all necessary steps to begin making the case for
intervention, either multilateral or, if necessary unilateral effort. Such a force
should intervene, establish the climate for President Aristide's return, and then
withdraw, to be replaced by international peacekeepers.
Peacekeepers should remain in Haiti for a sufficient time required to assist
President Aristide in the transition to democracy.
After President Aristide in reinstated, he will need immediate economic
and political help. We should be ready to assist him with the necessary re-
Mr. Chairman, the situation in Haiti is critical. Reports that the sanctions are
working are wrong-the wealthy elites cannot influence the military, and the mili-
tary is benefiting from the sanctions.
We must prepare ourselves to take the next step if we are to achieve our goal
of restoring President Aristide.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator Graham, and once
again thank you for your tremendous ongoing interest in this issue
and all issues affecting the Caribbean and this hemisphere.
I am struck by the comparison here between Haiti and Cuba. Ob-
viously, you have a significant constituency of Cuban Americans, as
well, in Florida. I have noted that recently we have seen an in-
crease in the number of Cuban refugees leaving, and I am just cu-
81-184 0 94 2
rious. I know there is a different policy. We do not turn away any
Cuban refugees, is that correct?
Senator GRAHAM. The policy of the United States since the com-
mencement of the cold war has been to apply a standard for those
fleeing a communist nation that assumed that they were doing so
for political purposes. Persons fleeing from noncommunist regimes
have been required to demonstrate that on a case-by-case basis.
Senator DODD. So we accept every Cuban who gets out of Cuba,
basically. I think if they make it to our shores we accept them.
They have been a wonderful contribution to the country.
I note that we are applying sanctions in Cuba. It is obviously
having some effect in the increased population, and yet I suspect
that any effort to eliminate the sanctions economically on Cuba
where there is no where near the same extent of international co-
operation that we are getting on Haiti, and basically the rest of the
world is doing business in Cuba except for ourselves.
I cannot imagine any successfully arguing that we ought to lift
economic sanctions on Cuba. Why should there be a distinction
Senator GRAHAM. First, we have had a consistent policy of eco-
nomic sanctions and isolation of Cuba now for almost 30 years.
Most of that period of time was a period of time in which Cuba was
receiving significant external support, particularly from the former
Soviet Union since. Since 1989 that support has been withering,
and with it has been the Cuban economy and evidence that the
Cuban society is beginning to fracture. I believe that we should
continue to follow the policy that we have adopted which this Con-
gress underscored with the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act as
our basic strategy to achieve the goal of a democratic Cuba.
In the case of Haiti, we are trying to influence a very small num-
ber of people, and those people have thus far been able to avoid the
consequences of the sanction; in fact, have even become more en-
riched and more arrogant as a result of their manipulation of the
Senator DonnDD. I appreciate that point, but you understand my
point. Here you have virtually the entire European Community and
a good part of Latin America doing business in Cuba as you and
I have stood here this afternoon; whereas, we have tremendous co-
operation, albeit it is problematical, in Haiti.
Again, you and I have had differences on the Cuban Democracy
Act, but putting that issue aside I would not vote to lift an embar-
go of sanctions on Cuba. The Cuban Democracy Act deals with the
secondary boycott issue, and yet I hear people advocating the lift-
ing of the sanctions on Haiti where arguably we are going to have
a better impact there because of the cooperation we are getting.
That is why I am so curious as to why we would apply that dif-
ferent standard there. Not that I am necessarily convinced it is ab-
solutely assured of victory, but there seems to be a greater likeli-
hood of success here. In fact, more so than any other case I can
In North Korea, for instance, where hardly that economy seems
to relate to what the industrialized West would provide it given the
fact it has lived in isolation in virtually an exclusive relationship
with the People's Republic of China, I would make a case there
that sanctions from the West probably was going to have a nominal
effect; whereas in Haiti, given its dependency on this country, on
France, on Canada, the kind of cooperation we are getting here, for
us to announce in effect that this just is not working because some
bottles of gasoline are making it across the border from the Domin-
ican Republic and lurching to the only other alternative as you
have framed it, and that is a military one, at this juncture I am
concerned that we are giving up too quickly.
Senator GRAHAM. First, I do not believe that the only example
or manifestation of the failure of our policy in Haiti to achieve the
result of the restoration of President Aristide by economic sanctions
is the fact that the price of gasoline has declined since the more
severe sanctions went into effect. That happens to be true. Gaso-
line, the weekend before last in Port-au-Prince, was selling for $6
to $7 a gallon, $1 to $2 a gallon less than it has sold for 45 days
earlier. But there is a whole series of other consequences that are
occurring, which I referred to a few that I think make the time
that we can credibly utilize this economic sanctions strategy lim-
I have suggested what I think should be some of the measure-
ments of success of the economic sanctions, and once it is deter-
mined by those or other standards that it is unlikely to achieve the
goal of restoration of President Aristide, then I think we can no
longer morally justify continuing to punish the poor of Haiti in pur-
suit of a policy that has shown itself to be unable to move the rich
and the powerful of Haiti.
Senator DODD. Let me underscore a point that you made at the
outset of your remarks that I think deserves repeating-I said it
not quite as eloquently as you did in your comment-and that is
the significance of the message we send as a Nation, as the leader
not only in this hemisphere but in the world today, as the sole re-
maining superpower, of how important it is, we believe that democ-
racy is, in preserving, and that what a unique set of circumstances
we have in front of us-with the exception of Cuba and Haiti, every
other country in this hemisphere enjoys to a large extent demo-
cratic governments-and that our retreat from this by doing noth-
ing on sanctions, excluding a military option, virtually walking
away, I think sends the worst possible signal that we could send,
not only in this hemisphere but elsewhere, but particularly in this
hemisphere. And I just want to strongly second your comments re-
garding that particularly point and thank you immensely for your
presence here today. Senator Pressler.
Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham, you are one of the leading authorities in this
area, and we certainly listen to you. I know the White House lis-
tens to you. But let me ask you a couple of questions that are not
meant to be provocative.
This embargo business, I am just not convinced that it is going
to resolve in the kind of changes where we have a small impover-
ished country that has a very mean-spirited military dictatorship
running it. Can you cite any analogous situations where such an
embargo has worked?
Senator GRAHAM. Well, there are situations where an embargo
has worked. The Union of South Africa would be one of the dra-
matic recent examples of that. But I share your assessment that
it is unlikely in the conditions of Haiti that the sanctions are going
to achieve the goal of causing the military leadership to voluntarily
turn power back to President Aristide. That is the standard that
the United Nations, the United States, the Organization of Amer-
ican States, have all set by which we are to judge success in the
application of these sanctions.
Senator PRESSLER. What do you think would happen differently
in the next 2 years if we were to totally lift the embargo and make
a clear statement we will not invade? What do you think would
happen differently, and what will happen otherwise?
Senator GRAHAM. Well, within Haiti I think what would happen
is we would see a continued high level of human rights abuses, we
would see a continued denial of basic democratic rights to people,
we would see a continued surge of large numbers of refugees at-
tempting to leave Haiti, we would see an increase of drugs in the
United States through the institutionalization of Haiti-a relatively
new transshipment point for drugs-become a permanent enlarged
Then the point that the chairman just made, the signal of our
surrender in Haiti, a statement that we do not have the will to re-
move one of the most inept, incompetent, and corrupt militaries in
the world from power and restore a democratically elected presi-
dent, the international community does not put sufficient value on
the restoration of democracy in Haiti to take the steps required to
do so, will send a signal throughout the barracks of the Caribbean
and Latin American. In those Barracks there are the sons and
grandsons of the former presidents of their countries, persons who
may feel that they are superior in character, intellect, or patriot-
ism, to the person who is currently serving as the democratically
elected president of their country, and who would like to see them-
selves reascend to their family tradition of political dominance.
I believe that the situations that have occurred since the fall of
Aristide in Venezuela, Guatemala, and even in Peru where the par-
liament was removed for a period of time, are not unrelated to
what happened in Haiti. Those militaries heard the signal, they
understood what the silence or ineffectiveness, the impotence of the
international community, meant to the prospect of their being seri-
ously challenged. I do not think we can tolerate that kind of signal
to the barracks that a surrender in Haiti would send.
Senator PRESSLER. Well, I am not suggesting a surrender, but as
a practical matter, Aristide has said he would not go back with a
military invasion, as I understand it. Maybe you can expand upon
that. But by threatening this thing which we probably will not do
and also which Aristide said he would not support, what is the real
possibility of it? At some point, the threat wears out and it becomes
worse than if we did not threaten. I am not in an argument with
you here, but Aristide has said he will not go back with a military
invasion. Who would? We would have to find some new folks to be
our democrats, so to speak, propped up by our military in that
country-with a small d.
Senator GRAHAM. I have not spoken with President Aristide, nor
have I spoken with anyone who has spoken with President
Aristide, since his remarks of this weekend. When we were in Port-
au-Prince and met with Aristide's closest supporters, they, one, ad-
vocated military force to restore President Aristide and despaired
of the prospect of achieving his restoration otherwise; two, drew a
distinction between invasion and occupation. Their position was
that international military force might be required-probably
would be required-to restore Aristide. But what they did not want
was a foreign military force in the country for a protracted period
I asked would that reticence of a foreign force extend to the Unit-
ed Nations multinational peacekeeping force that is being con-
templated? They said no, we would not consider such a force to
come under our definition of an occupying force, but rather one
that would be a facilitating force for the restoration of democracy.
Senator PRESSLER. Now, is there much evidence to support the
theory that Haiti is currently a major exporter of drugs? Indeed,
have not the naval blockade and the limitations on the airport
pretty much eliminated it? Of course, they might go back to doing
it, but right now is Haiti a major exporter of drugs?
Senator GRAHAM. I cannot answer that question in the last 5
weeks when the heightened UN sanctions went into effect, but I
can state that during the period from September 1991 until the
spring of 1994 Haiti had become an increasing and significant
point of drug transshipment into the United States.
Senator PRESSLER. OK, so if I understand your suggestion, it is
to keep the embargo in place and to continue to consider the option
of military invasion, and what is your approach on visas, on immi-
Senator GRAHAM. My position is that we need to have a four-step
process: No. 1, the current process of an economic sanctions needs
to be closely monitored to determine if it in fact has the potential
of achieving the goal of the restoration of President Aristide. I
think we need to give that a relatively short period of time in
which to determine its efficacy.
No. 2, when, based on the type of criteria that I suggested, the
decision is made that it is not likely to be able to restore President
Aristide-I prejudge that evaluation to say that I think such a con-
clusion will be reached-then I believe we need to face the stark
choices of either I would define surrender, which means that we
will no longer pursue the goal of restoration of President Aristide
and will seek an accommodation with the current regime; or two,
be prepared for a credible threat and willingness to use that force
necessary to restore him to power.
In terms of the visas, I think that they are probably worth doing,
but do not put a great of strength behind their ability to achieve
the objective of causing the military to give up power. One of the
fundamental things that has happened is that the economic elites
of Haiti have lost a substantial amount of their capability to lead,
persuade, and influence, the military. So those parts of the sanc-
tions that are directed at the economic elites are likely to be rel-
Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much.
Bob, you have been very patient. I appreciate that. This took a
longer time, but normally, for our audience, colleagues come and
make statements and we receive them graciously and then move
along, but you are more than just a colleague testifying here. You
bring a great deal of knowledge to the issue, so we go into ques-
tions with you because we respect immensely your commitment to
this issue, and I appreciate immensely your visit down there, as
well. It helps immensely. Thank you very much.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator DODD. I am going to invite now our first panel to the
table. Because we have several witnesses to go through here, and
I apologize to all of them, let me invite them to join us at the table.
They are the Honorable Michael Barnes, counsel to President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, and a member of Hogan & Hartson, a law firm
here in Washington, DC; Mr. Bill O'Neill, consultant of the Na-
tional Coalition for Haitian Refugees located in New York; Mr. Ian
Martin, senior associate, Carnegie Endowment for Peace of Wash-
ington, DC; and Mr. Donald Schulz, associate professor of National
Security Affairs, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army National
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The staff here will place those
I am going to put the lights on here, and I am going to ask every-
one to try to keep their remarks to about 5 minutes apiece. I apolo-
gize. We will never get you out of here if we do not have some way
to try to keep these remarks down.
We will accept your full testimony and statements and support-
ing documents and include them as part of the record here this
With that, I will ask staff to activate our timer lights.
Mike, we are grateful to you for coming. You have been sitting
here the whole while. I hope it has been worthwhile for you to lis-
ten to Bill Gray and Bob Graham and to share their thoughts. We
are now anxious to hear yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL BARNES, COUNSEL TO PRESI-
DENT JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE, HOGAN & HARTSON,
Mr. BARNES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
President Aristide has asked me to once again thank you and the
committee for your continued commitment to the restoration of the
democratically elected government. President Aristide, on behalf of
all of the people of Haiti who are suffering so terribly under the
crisis which has been described so well this afternoon, is grateful
to you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the committee
who have been working so hard to try to end this crisis.
Let me just give you a couple of very quick personal thoughts
and stay within the 5 minutes because you have a very long pre-
pared testimony from me. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that ex-
actly a year ago President Aristide was on Governor's Island in
New York negotiating an agreement with the military which had
overthrown him. And a year ago this coming Sunday, July 3rd,
President Aristide signed the Governor's Island agreement and
Gen. Raul Cedras signed the Governor's Island Agreement.
That day, General Cedras also signed a letter to President
Aristide that I am not sure has been previously made public, but
in that letter he submitted his resignation, effective last October
15, from the Haitian army. Actually, he chose that opportunity to
state that he would retire from the military, not resign, but retire
from the military on October 15 of last year.
As you know, that is not the only commitment that General
Cedras made at Governor's Island which has not been fulfilled.
None of the commitments which the Haitian military made to the
people of Haiti to permit the restoration of democracy have been
As you also know, every commitment that President Aristide
made a year ago was fulfilled. He committed to grant an amnesty
to the Haitian military who had committed so many crimes against
the people of Haiti at the time of the coup; he granted the total am-
nesty which is permitted under the Haitian constitution for a presi-
dent to grant. He named, as he was called upon to do by the agree-
ment at Governor's Island, a new prime minister, a new cabinet.
He sought in the selection of those individuals to reach out and
demonstrate he wanted a reconciliation in his country.
The gentleman he selected as his prime minister, as he noted
today in remarks before the National Press Club at a luncheon,
was a white man in a country where there are very few white peo-
ple, a member of one of the most wealthy families of the country,
and one who had close ties to the military and the wealthy elite
that supported the coup.
His cabinet was made up by a majority of individuals who had
not supported him in his election. Although he got over two-thirds
of the vote, his cabinet was dominated by people who did not sup-
port him. His defense minister was a general-is a general; his
minister of interior is a colonel from the army; there were others
in the cabinet who had been strong opponents of his. But he
reached out and named these individuals because he wanted, under
the spirit of Governor's Island, to bring the people of Haiti to-
Tragically, that spirit was met with violence. As we all know, his
brave justice minister, educated right here at Howard University
Law School in Washington, was assassinated as he left his office.
None of his ministers were able to function. They could not leave
their homes. They were all told they would be killed if they did try
to function. And just last week the United Nations Secretary Gen-
eral, Secretary General Butrous-Ghali, in a report to the Security
Council stated: "As to human rights, the situation in Haiti has de-
teriorated sharply. With new patterns of repression such as the ab-
duction and rape of family members of political activists. Since the
adoption of Resolution 917, 50 politically related killings have been
documented by the international civilian mission. In a growing
number of cases, the implication of members of FRAPH"-this is
the paramilitary group organized and affiliated with the Haitian
military-"has been established. The executions seem consistent
with a systematic elimination of members of popular organizations
which support the return to constitutional order." That is the re-
port last week by the Secretary General of the United Nations.
Mr. Chairman, it is imperative for the people of Haiti, and in-
deed for the reasons just stated by Ambassador Gray and Senator
Graham, it is imperative for the United States, that this crisis be
ended as quickly as possible and that the democratically elected
President be able to return to Haiti. And as he said at the Press
Club today, when that happens, he knows, and I think we all in
this room know, there will be a celebration in Haiti very similar
to the celebration that President Aristide witnessed in person at
the inauguration of President Mandela in South Africa. The people
of Haiti desperately seek it.
President Aristide is grateful to this committee and your efforts
and leadership, Mr. Chairman, to bring that day closer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barnes follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. BARNES
One year ago, on July 3, the Governors Island Agreement was signed. One year
later, Haitians are looking to the U.S. and the international community to fulfill
their promises while the coup regime and its supporters maintain their grip on
power and the illicit franchises that sustain them. Against this backdrop, there are
four points I would like to address today:
1. President Aristide's flexibility in the negotiations and the limits on his
ability to compromise;
2. The international community's strategy for resolving this crisis now and
over the near term;
3. The coup regime's plunder of government and rollback of Aristide's "good
government" reforms; and
4. President Aristide's vision for Haiti.
Yesterday, we read in the Washington Post that Haitians are taking a "World
Cup" break from the crisis. There is no break in the misery, only a brake on the
press' ability to cover it. The puppet president has sealed off the border and strate-
gic areas. In Cite Soleil, Borgne and Saut d'Eau, they are running for their lives.
Each day the crisis drags on comes at great cost to Haiti and its many courageous
patriots. I hope this discussion will enable policymakers to rethink the conventional
wisdom about why this crisis has dragged on for so long. Haiti deserves an end to
its long national nightmare.
PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S CONCESSIONS IN TALKS
Throughout the crisis, some have charged that President Aristide is intransigent,
inflexible, unable to compromise like a good politician. In fact, President Aristide has
been amazingly flexible, at great political and personal cost.
To help newly elected President Clinton, in January 1992 he asked Haitians to
redouble efforts in Haiti to restore democracy. He also refrained from criticizing
President Clinton's decision to maintain the Bush repatriation policy. In return, he
received a promise that he would be restored to office "in a matter of weeks or
months." He maintained his silence for a year as his constituents endured unspeak-
able abuse in Haiti and pariah status among refugees.
To address negotiators' concerns that without amnesty, the coup leadership would
not voluntary leave office, he pledged last spring-before UN talks-to grant am-
nesty, and then, after signing the Agreement, he granted the maximum amnesty al-
lowable under the Haitian Constitution. In doing so, he became the first elected
leader in the history of the world to grant immunity before civilian authority had
been restored and the first to grant immunity, as a first, rather than last step in
a reconciliation process. The United States and international negotiators pro-
nounced the amnesty President Aristide promulgated as fully in compliance with his
obligation under the Governors Island Agreement.
To respond to the argument that his opponents would not help return him unless
made part of the process, President Aristide convened conferences and included in
his new cabinet representatives of the military and the business elite. There have
been several conferences over the course of this crisis. I will focus on two recent ef-
forts. Immediately after signing the Governor's Island Agreement, President
Aristide met with the private sector in Miami and secured their pledge of support.
In January, with the participation of the U.S. and international community, Presi-
dent Aristide convened a conference in Miami of all sectors of Haitian society to dis-
cuss the political crisis and the enforcement of the Governors Island Agreement.
With respect to his cabinet, at Governors Island, the President agreed to again
name a new prime minister, and a new cabinet. The new prime minister named,
Robert Malval, is a member of the business elite and is widely accepted by them.
The new cabinet included two military officers, a former opponent for the presi-
dency, the chief of staff of another former opponent, and a number of political rivals
from independent parties. Throughout this crisis, President Aristide has reached out
to individuals in the military and the business community, as well as to politicians
who do not support him, even though he has an overwhelming 67% popular man-
To facilitate international community efforts to negotiate the departure of the
coup regime, President Aristide agreed in February 1992 to appoint as prime min-
ister Rene Theodore, a rival and opponent in the 1990 presidential race. Mr. Theo-
dore represented what Mr. Pezzullo termed "the other 30%" that did not vote for
President Aristide. (Pro-coup hardliners in the parliament voted down Theodore's
nomination, scuttling the accord.) Preliminary to talks last year, in addition to
pledging an amnesty, President Aristide agreed to an international technical mis-
sion and, according to UN Envoy Dante Caputo and U.S. Envoy Pezzullo, gave "all
the concessions desired and necessary to obtain the removal of the coup leadership."
(Caputo and Pezzullo were then rebuffed by the coup regime and the international
oil embargo was imposed to force the coup leaders to Governors Island for talks.)
President Aristide reluctantly signed the Governor's Island Agreement. The Agree-
ment permitted the coup leaders to remain in power through virtually the entire
transition process, and to choose to keep their position in the military by leaving
Haiti. It also required the President to select a new prime minister and cabinet and
required the legislature to approve these officials with the coup in control and with-
out a sufficient international presence as a counterweight. At the same time, it re-
moved as leverage the international embargo on fuel and arms shipments. We did
not believe this arrangement offered adequate safeguards and events have tragically
proven us correct.
President Aristide's goals in the talks are simple, straightforward, and well
To return Constitutional government and democracy to Haiti, beginning with
the President's return;
To obtain a significant international mission as soon as possible, with a man-
date to stimulate, rather than stifle, the reestablishment of civilian elected gov-
ernment and the renaissance of civic and grassroots groups that form the back-
bone of Haiti's democratic movement;
To reestablish the rule of law and implement his program of "good government"
reforms for which he has an overwhelming mandate and the solid financial
backing of the international financial community; and
To preside over the institutionalization of democracy.
The limits of President Aristide's negotiating power as a democratically elected
head of state are also self-evident and well known. He cannot provide amnesty be-
yond what the Constitution and the international agreements to which Haiti is a
party permit. He cannot condone illegal and discriminatory treatment of Haitian
refugees. He cannot dialogue with or include in his government Haitians who do not
support his return as democratically elected head of state, the reestablishment of
civilian democracy and the rule of law, and his program of "good government" re-
forms. He cannot agree to his return under circumstances that would make it im-
possible for his government to function or to carry out his mandate for reform.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S STRATEGY
What is the international community's strategy to resolve this crisis now and in
the near term? From the outset, President Aristide has urged that the international
community exert the maximum possible pressure-through comprehensive air-tight
sanctions-so that it will have its intended effect over the shortest possible time pe-
riod. He does not seek to prolong the suffering of the Haitian people but rather to
end it as quickly as possible. Instead, Haiti has gotten the worst of both worlds-
broad-based sanctions that the military and its supporters can easily circumvent
while the rest of Haitians struggle desperately to adjust and survive.
The international community has finally begun intensifying multilateral sanctions
to oust the coup regime. For this strategy to succeed at this late stage, the message
must be unmistakably clear to the coup regime and its supporters: we arc resolved
to hold firm until democracy is restored. To date, the international sanctions effort
has been half-hearted. For example, one of the first sanctions to be imposed, the
oil embargo, is an embargo in name only. Ever since last June, when this sanction
was briefly imposed, it has been clear that the Dominican Republic refuses to stop
the flourishing border trade. Just last week, the price of gasoline in the Haitian cap-
ital plummeted to its lowest level since the crisis began. The U.S. asset freeze, while
a welcome move, had been threatened for nearly three years and had been amply
telegraphed to its intended targets in advance. There are notable omissions from the
list, including the civilians who have served as the coup regime's prime ministers
and cabinets during the crisis, helping to legitimize it, and the parliamentarians
who comprise the pro-coup bloc and have sabotaged the implementation of the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement. Those included, among them Haiti's powerful wealthy
elite, are scrambling to be taken off the list. How the international community
responds to current implementation and enforcement challenges will great-
ly determine whether those in a position to be helpful, or to stop being
harmful, will instead calculate that holding fast is the best strategy-and
that the international community will lose interest as it has in the past.
While the international community redoubles its sanction efforts, it is
critical that it stick to previously negotiated understandings and resist the
temptation to negotiate with the coup regime and its supporters. From the
outset of this crisis, President Aristide has been clear that the entire coup regime
high command must step down if he is to be able to govern and to implement his
program of reform. This was an integral part of the discussions on Governors Island
and of the resulting understandings. Currently, the international community is fo-
cused on three people, the coup leader Raoul Cedras, his deputy Philippe Biamby,
and the police chief, Michel Francois. This is an important start. But it leaves un-
touched others who have played an integral role in the coup's efforts to maintain
power and resist international community efforts to resolve the crisis. As Ambas-
sador Swing has acknowledged, General Cedras was not alone in repudiating com-
mitments to facilitate the deployment of the international technical mission and
thwarting U.S. efforts to secure a berth for the Harlan County on October 12. One
member of the high command responded to the U.S. Charge's entreaties by defend-
ing the demonstrators on the dock and "refusing insistent requests by the Charge
to publicly state that they [he and Cedras] would continue to cooperate with the
UNMIH [the UN technical mission]."
The international community's silence about the rest of the regime high
command raises serious concerns that the daunting tasks of removing the
remaining coup leadership and completing the transition will be shoul-
dered entirely by President Aristide and the civilian government. To appre-
ciate how unrealistic this is, one need only look back to September and Oc-
tober of last year. Human rights abuse steadily escalated to "alarming levels," ac-
cording to the UN/OAS monitors. The prime minister, the new cabinet and the par-
liament were unable to function. Justice Minister Guy Malary, courageously spear-
heading the drafting of legislation to reform the police and judiciary, was murdered
by military-controlled thugs. Civilian elected officials, including popular Port-au-
Prince mayor Evans Paul, were forcibly prevented from retaking office by armed
military groups loyal to the coup regime.
At your last hearing in March, we heard from Mr. Pezzullo on the need to build
a "political center." This approach was correctly recognized for what it was-an ef-
fort to form a group sufficiently distant from President Aristide and the majority
who support him. This group would negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with
the coup regime which President Aristide would then be pressed to accept. This ap-
proach suggested President Aristide's 67% popular mandate was an inadequate
basis for governing. It also implied that the civic and grassroots groups that form
the backbone of the democratic political movement in Haiti were not on a par with
the far less representative political parties.
The so-called "parliamentary plan" did not merely ask President Aristide to broad-
en his political consensus by including diverse parties. President Aristide's cabinet
already included members of the military and elite and a number of political rivals
from independent parties. President Aristide rejected the plan from the outset, be-
cause it gave the coup leaders a veto over the cabinet choices. The parliamentarians
were not representative of the parliament or their parties and were handpicked,
briefed and flown here by the U.S., as Pezzullo admitted at your March hearing.
Mr. Gray was named for the announced purpose of putting that discredited policy
to rest and designing a new policy. Regrettably, our Embassy in Haiti and inter-
national negotiators continue efforts to form a so-called "centrist" coalition with in-
dividuals who have actively participated in or supported the coup regime. Over the
past four weeks, Ambassador Swing has convened several meetings in Port-au-
Prince with politicians from the spectrum of political parties, but dominated by rep-
resentatives of center-right groups. Those invited have included, for example, the
leader of the hardline Duvalierist party, Dr. Volvrick Remy Joseph, who served in
the cabinets of both Papa Doc and Baby Doc Duvalier; members of the pro-coup bloc;
and Marc Bazin.
These meetings have involved encouraging all Haitian political factions to accept
the inevitability of President Aristide's return. But there has also been discussion
of how to form a political coalition that could serve as a counterweight to President
Aristide and his democratically elected allies, in which Bazin has played an active
role. Not coincidentally, Bazin's top lieutenant, Antoine Joseph, has announced the
formation of precisely such a "political center" coalition. It will be dominated by
Bazin's MIDH party; coup supporters and Duvalierists.
The pro-coup bloc has aggressively sought to help the coup regime throughout the
crisis. As the UN Special Rapporteur has noted, the pro-coup bloc appointed civilian
puppet officials, including Bazin, to legitimize the coup; "sabotaged implementation
of the Washington Protocols" (negotiated by the OAS in February 1992); "bitterly
opposed the negotiations mediated by the OAS, the UN and Caputo"; and "have
taken every opportunity to make it known they do not want Aristide to return." In
post-Governors Island talks in New York, the pro-coup bloc agreed to recognize
Aristide and pass necessary reform laws-most importantly, separating the police
from the military. The pro-coup bloc has done none of this.
Bazin was soundly defeated by President Aristide in the 1990 election. He then
lent his prestige to the coup regime, serving as its prime minister in 1992 and ac-
tively campaigning to lift the international embargo and normalize relations. His
close political associates and his party are well represented in the current cabinet
of puppet President Emile Jonassaint.
Events of the past three years make clear that any formula the coup regime
would accept and a so-called coalition having these members would broker would
not be democratic and would be completely unacceptable to the majority of Haitians
that President Aristide represents. The inclusion of these individuals in these meet-
ings raises real concerns that the "center" to be created is intended not only to
broker the regime's departure but also to broker the returning civilian government's
ability to reestablish the rule of law and turn a corrupt, bloated government into
a functioning, responsive one. We urge your subcommittee to seek assurances
that U.S. and UN efforts at outreach and dialogue are intended to reinforce
the effort to oust the regime and return the President with his power to
govern and to implement his reform program fully intact.
It is perfectly appropriate for our Embassy to identify and reinforce the demo-
cratic actors in Haiti. It is completely counterproductive to treat all actors equally,
regardless of their actions during the coup regime's rule. Those who have collabo-
rated with or supported the regime and who do not accept President Aristide's re-
turn, the reestablishment of the rule of law, and an end to government corruption,
waste and fraud should be excluded from the dialogue-and subjected to targeted
sanctions-until after democracy is restored and the reconciliation process has
begun. To do otherwise legitimizes their actions, putting them on an equal footing
with pro-democracy activists who have paid a high price for their activities over the
past three years. Neither the pro-coup bloc nor Marc Bazin is on equal footing with
pro-democracy activists. While the pro-coup bloc in parliament was thwarting nego-
tiators' efforts and Bazin was serving as a coup regime prime minister, the pro-de-
mocracy activists were actively participating in negotiations to restore democracy to
Haiti, suffering reprisals intended to discourage his participation in these talks, and
struggling courageously to continue their work in Haiti as elected officials or read-
We are at a crucial stage in the crisis. The U.S. is trying to maximize
pressure on the coup regime and its supporters. The U.S. Embassy must ex-
clude the pro-coup bloc in the parliament, Bazin and other regime support-
ers from outreach and dialogue efforts and the U.S. must not continue to
spare them from the recent targeted visa and asset sanctions.
THE NEAR TERM-TIE INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL MISSION
What is the international community's strategy in the near term? The Governors
Island Agreement provides for an international technical mission, charged with the
task of assisting the Aristide government to restructure and reform the military and
police. Originally envisioned as a counterweight to the coup regime during the four
month transition period, the mission is now being reconceived to address the chal-
lenges created by the coup regime's refusal to cooperate as it had originally pledged
to do and to secure the safety of the returning civilian government. Among tasks
being considered for the mission, according to the numerous press reports, is main-
taining order. The Aristide government has yet to be formally consulted on these
plans or to take a position on the many issues raised At this preliminary stage, I
have several observations.
First, any international mission must be formed under UN auspices. Its mandate
and terms of reference must be clear and negotiated in advance with President
Aristide and his government. The suggestion that the mandate include the task of
maintaining order is deeply troubling. To ensure a democratic transition, the mis-
sion should be charged with providing assistance, as requested by the sovereign
democratic government of Haiti, to protect and promote the rights of speech, assem-
bly and association. To do otherwise would suggest that the international commu-
nity is not seriously committed to reestablishment of true participatory democracy
until after the difficult issues of police reform, amnesty and preparations for legisla-
tive, departmental and municipal elections have been resolved to the satisfaction of
the regime and its supporters.
To do otherwise would also be to adopt precisely the approach that coup leader
Cedras took in the transition period that followed the signing of the Governors Is-
land Agreement. Although the transition period was intended to permit a renais-
sance of civic participatory democracy, Cedras repudiated that commitment and an-
nounced that "it could be some time before Haitians can exercise such rights as free-
dom to demonstrate." Assemblies were routinely disbanded with force-the presence
of the international human rights monitoring mission did not deter violence by the
military and police. In testing this principle, businessman and Aristide supporter
Antoine Izmery sacrificed his life. The international community has previously pro-
vided assistance to stimulate and protect popular organizing activity, in the 1990
Haitian election campaign, at the request of the Haitian electoral tribunal.
Second, it is critical-that the international community redouble efforts to identify
and prepare this mission so that it can be deployed as soon as possible after the
coup regime steps down. One of the signal tragedies of the four month transition
period was the international community s failure to deploy the international mission
immediately. It is also important that the mission be of sufficient size and with suf-
ficient language capability to function effectively and independently. This suggests
that the Canadians, Caribbeans and French should take a leadership role in its for-
mation. It would be inappropriate to expect that the separate international human
rights monitoring mission can lend personnel or provide logistical or language sup-
Third, bilateral support of police and military reform must be closely coordinated
with the UN mission in order to ensure that it is fully consistent with the overall
mandate and terms of reference. In this connection, the international community
should provide financial and technical support of Aristide government efforts to de-
velop a program for identifying individuals in the current military and police who
would be unsuitable to participate in any reform programs, and to plan alternative
activities for these individuals to ensure the reestablishment of the rule of law is
Fourth, until the mission has achieved the objectives of facilitating the restoration
of civilian authority and the protection and promotion of political rights of speech,
assembly and association, the UN should postpone consideration of activities in sup-
port of elections, including the possibility of a separate election observer mission.
The terms of civilian officials, all members of the parliament's lower house, and one-
third of the Senate, elected in 1990, expire this year. The most recent UN sanctions
resolution recognizes the impending deadline for new elections, and suggests the
UN begin to consider appropriate activities. It would be impossible to plan for elec-
tions meeting internationally recognized norms until after the President and his
government are restored, the campaign of terror and intimidation of pro-democracy
activists has ended, and the climate for participatory democracy has been reestab-
lished. This may require postponing preparations, but this would not be the first
time that the coup regime impeded the exercise of the franchise and related rights
or provoked a Constitutional crisis. Until these minimum requirements for a free
and fair election can be met, there is a danger that the coup regime would dominate
the process through the FRAPH, attaches and section chiefs, solidifying its hold on
power through a process that is neither free nor fair, and severely circumscribing
the civilian elected government's ability to reestablish the rule of law and "good gov-
THE COUP REGIME'S RECORD
Mr. Chairman, the controversy over the direction of U.S. policy has deflected at-
tention away from the coup regime's overall record and the implications for the
international effort to reestablish democracy in Haiti. The coup regime has engaged
in an active, concerted campaign of human rights abuse against the pro-democracy
actors and groups; repudiated its commitments to the international community and
made Haiti an international pariah and the object of blunderbuss sanctions; and
converted the government into an enterprise for personal plunder and gain while
completely reversing the Aristide government's progress toward reestablishment of
the rule of law and government that works.
Human rights abuse.-The human rights situation in Haiti is so grave that, just
three months after your last hearing, there are numerous and serious new incidents
to report. Each incident is alone significant; taken together, they are nightmarish
infamous. As the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concluded
after a recent on-site investigation, Haiti's military rules by a brutal terror that has
no analog in this hemisphere. Among the tragic incidents reported by the UN/OAS
human rights monitoring mission are:
a massacre in Raboteau in April in which at least twelve defenseless citizens
were shot and killed by rampaging army troops;
an ongoing campaign of repression in Borgne using murder, rape, arson and de-
struction of cattle and crops-the community's livelihood-to root out Aristide
activists, conducted by army units in collaboration with FRAPH and para-
military groups (the military claimed to be responding to a terrorist threat, but
the Mission could find no proof of this or evidence of the existence of an armed
rebel group and no additional explanation has been proffered);
a pattern of raids of pro-Aristide neighborhoods in the capital in which people
are murdered and property stolen and destroyed, by armed paramilitary groups;
rape and sexual abuse of women supporting Aristide or closely related to active
supporters, mainly in the capital, by the military, the FRAPH and the attaches.
From February to May, the Mission recorded sixty-six cases; there were only
three reported to the Mission during its presence in 1993. Seventeen of these
cases involve successive rape of the victim by several men. The rapists violate
pregnant women and minors; according to Mission reports, two little girls of ten
and twelve were raped in the presence of their uncle by armed civilians.
intimidation of the Mission in Hinche in late March by demonstrators acting
for the FRAPH.
The alarming levels of abuse continue. The Mission reported 53 extra-judicial
killings in the capital in March, and 44 in April. On May 23, the Mission reported
the assassination of 4 political activists in Cite Soleil; we do not yet have figures
for the month. From February to May, there were 62 documented cases of political
kidnapping and disappearances. According to the OAS Commission, 11 of these in-
dividuals were later found dead. This is a staggering figure in a country in which
disappearance is a relatively new phenomenon. Illegal arrests, unlawful detention,
and torture continue. The OAS Commission observed after its recent on-site inves-
tigation in Haiti that "the exercise of the right of assembly does not exist for those
who support a return to democracy. When groups of individuals try to exercise this
right, they are arrested and brutally beaten by members of the military and police
force, and accused of organizing meetings in support of President Aristide." There
is no freedom of speech; the Haitian public is hostage to the regime's propaganda
regarding the crisis and international efforts to resolve it.
The FRAPH's claims of legitimacy as an important political movement are incon-
sistent with its many activities throughout the country in support of the coup re-
gime's campaign of human rights abuse. In the past three months, the Mission has
reported the following incidents:
A local FRAPH leader participated with army soldiers in firing on the house
of a local pro-Aristide activist in Raboteau in April. The leader and soldiers ran-
sacked the house and arrested the activist's father. The attack preceded by
twelve days the army massacre of at least twelve civilians.
The FRAPH, working with armed civilians, has conducted a systematic intimi-
dation campaign in Mircbalais and Hinche since the departure of the Mission
last October, with the acquiescence of the local military authorities.
A group of FRAPH members and armed civilians rounded up citizens in a pro-
Aristide neighborhood of Saut d'Eau in March, beating people, stealing prop-
erty, arresting certain people and taking them to the military barracks, and
mistreating and hitting a local judge and his colleagues. A local military officer
acknowledged FRAPH's responsibility for these events.
FRAPH has participated in the extrajudicial killings, forced kidnapping and
disappearances, rapes of Aristide supporters and relatives of supporters, and
raids on pro-Aristide neighborhoods in the capital in March and April, according
to witnesses to these incidents.
There can be no doubt that the regime is continuing to root out and repress pro-
democracy activists with the active collaboration of the FRAPH and attaches. The
longer the regime remains in power, the more difficult the task of salvaging and
reviving the pro-democracy movement, and the more crucial the task of reestablish-
ing the rule of law, reorganizing and reforming the military and police, and disman-
tling the FRAPH, attache and section chief network that plays an integral role in
The coup regime's intransigence is responsible for sanctions.-The coup regime has
been completely intransigent throughout the crisis, making and then repudiating
commitments to the international community. From the outset of this crisis, the re-
gime has steadfastly refused to honor its commitments. Instead, the coup continues
consolidating its grip on power. Most recently, in May, the regime appointed Emile
Jonassaint president." Among his first acts, the illegal president threatened the le-
gitimate civilian officials with arrest, imposed a state of emergency and threatened
to impede international relief efforts.
The regime's intransigence and complete disdain for its international commit-
ments has put Haiti in the company of the few remaining international pariah na-
tions and triggered sanctions that are the worst of both worlds-so broad as to af-
fect the lives of ordinary Haitians and so lax as to be easily circumvented by the
regime they are intended to oust. President Aristide has always advocated the maxi-
mum tough and targeted sanctions be applied, in hopes they would have their in-
tended effect in the shortest possible time and minimize the suffering of Haitian
citizens. It is regrettable that the international community did not heed the Presi-
dent's call. But it is the coup regime-and not President Aristide-that bears total
responsibility for these developments. The regime can end Haiti's misery by keeping
its commitments and relinquishing power.
Some have argued that the international sanctions are destroying Haiti to save
it. Respected international relief experts agree that it is the coup regime's brutal,
self-interested rule that is causing Haiti's misery. Humanitarian relief has always
been exempt from sanctions, and an emergency fuel program ensures that the oil
embargo does not disrupt distribution of aid. This relief has been expanded as nec-
essary to respond to the country's increasing needs as the crisis continues. Lifting
sanctions will prolong rather than end the misery, because the misery stems from
the coup's reign of terror and its forcible removal of the first government in Haiti's
recent history willing to address the pressing needs of the majority of the population
in a democratic, responsible way.
Plundering the government.-Many well-intentioned observers point to the sanc-
tions' impact on Haiti and conclude that this is the immediate cause of Haiti's cur-
rent woes. But this ignores the wholesale plunder and corruption off the government
by the coup regime.
1. Irresponsible revenue collection policies.-A U.S. Embassy study of the coup re-
gime's economic record concluded that "The fiscal and monetary actions of the de
fact authorities caused harm far more severe to the Haitian economy, and espe-
cially the Haitian poor, than did the lax application of the OAS-imposed economic
sanctions." President Aristide's government achieved a small surplus in VY 91, the
first in six years, through "surprisingly successful revenue collection, all accom-
plished in the last six months of the year" (when his presidency began).
The coup regime abandoned responsible revenue collection policies. The regime
gave business a virtual free ride, to curry support among the powerful elites. The
military officers in control of the port got a lucrative Customs franchise. The Treas-
ury deficit exploded, to 450 million gourdes, representing 35% of expenditures. This
"conscious decision on the part of the de facto government to forego large elements
of revenue-whether in internal tax collection from business or potential customs
revenues lost to military commanders at key ports of entry and their business part-
ners-produced in FY 92 the largest annual deficit since the creation of Haiti's
present monetary system in 1919; then produced a still larger one in FY 93," accord-
ing to the U.S. Embassy analysis.
2. Military control and mismanagement of state-owned enterprises.-The 7,000
member military receives an astonishing 40% of the national budget, in a country
of seven million and ranked among the world's poorest. During the coup, it has ex-
panded its sources of government income and its political power by taking over
many of the state-owned enterprises. The Army War College reports that "The pub-
lic sector has been especially infiltrated by the proxies of the Port-au-Prince police
chief, Colonel Francois, who are thought to control the telephone company, the port,
the electricity company and many basic imports, including cement and flour."
Several of the state-owned enterprises are deliberately mismanaged-the Central
Bank is left responsible for the loss. For example, electricity of Haiti has lost $15
to $20 million since the coup. It is substantially over staffed, bills only 60% of its
charges (the rest is effectively stolen), and collects only 45% of the charges billed.
3. Bloated Public Payrolls.-The Aristide government estimates that the public
payroll has increased from 40,000 to 50,000 since the coup. The figure could be high-
er. The Duvalier-era practice of providing key ministers with lump sum outlays for
unregistered personnel and discretionary use was revived during Bazin's tenure as
prime minister in 1992. The U.S. Embassy calculates that salaries now represent
at least 80% of the Treasury's total expenditures.
This has had a devastating effect. The education system is now almost entirely
privately run. This has undoubtedly contributed to the precipitous drop in school en-
rollment. Only 25 to 33% of Haitians of school age are now receiving an education.
Fewer than 40% of Haitians have access to basic health services, and almost all
services provided are through private groups and international relief efforts. The
country's infrastructure has been abandoned. Virtually all of the country's primary
roads need serious rehabilitation, and the urban infrastructure is in a state of criti-
cal disrepair. Garbage is piling up in the streets of the capital; there is no garbage
This outrageous abdication of responsibility has prompted the U.S. Embassy to
characterize the regime as "a deadly parody of government so corrupt and so
lacking in capacity to govern and to positively affect the lives of its people."
PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S VISION FOR HAITI
Mr. Chairman, much is at stake. It is imperative that we stay the course and re-
turn President Aristide and the civilian elected government to office immediately to
address Haiti's urgent needs. President Aristide is committed to tackle government
corruption and waste, reestablish the rule of law and a functioning judiciary, and
address basic needs in the education, health and agriculture sector. This program
enjoys overwhelming public support as his 67% mandate and outreach efforts in
exile demonstrate. It is backed by the international financial community, which has
pledged almost $1 billion in multilateral and bilateral assistance, half of which is
From the outset, the U.S. has expressed concerns that the major hurdle to restor-
ing President Aristide is the military rank and file's fears regarding the direction
of the President's reform program and his commitment to reconciliation. For nearly
three years, we have asked the administration to facilitate broadcasts into Haiti of
the details of these plans, so the rank and file can know the truth. As President
Aristide has publicly stated many times, he is committed to the establishment of
a modern military, an independent police force, and a functioning judiciary operat-
ing in accordance with the Constitution. The reconciliation process includes reassur-
ing the military and the business community on these points. It also includes adher-
ence to the Constitution, the rule of law, and nonviolence; elimination of government
corruption, waste and fraud; and health, education and other programs to meet
basic needs. Those who publicly commit to these goals and behave consistent with
that commitment are welcome to participate in the reconciliation process. We have
been discussing the broadcast plan in detail with the administration and are hopeful
we can soon proceed.
Among the key goals the President will pursue on his return are:
A stable business environment. Under the coup regime, inflation has soared, the
gourde's value has plummeted, and bank lending has stopped. The Aristide ad-
ministration balanced the budget and properly managed government resources,
bringing an important measure of stability. The President s efforts were praised
by the World Bank as "providing a window of opportunity for the country to fi-
nally move toward sustained social and economic progress." The international
community pledges $49 million to assist in again curbing inflation, balancing
the budget, controlling public sector spending, improving public administration,
undertaking legal and regulatory reform and supporting private enterprise.
Reestablishment of the rule of law and a functioning judiciary. Under the coup
regime, Haiti has experienced its worst period of human rights abuses and the
infamy of the political murder of its chief law enforcement official, Justice Min-
ister Guy Malary. President Aristide established a climate of respect for human
rights, reversing refugee outflows; ended the notorious section chief system, re-
tired senior military officers implicated in notorious abuse and made modest
progress toward a reform minded military; and drafted a law separating the po-
lice from the military and secured a parliamentary consensus to enact it. Sup-
ported by $7 million in U.S. aid, President Aristide will seek enactment of re-
form legislation, create a civilian police force responsive to civilian authority
and independent of the military, again remove section chiefs and corrupt judges
and replace them with qualified civilian elected or appointed officials pursuant
to the Constitution, and establish appropriate institutions for training and ad-
ministration of the new judicial and police officers.
Creation of a professional military force responsive to civilian authority. The cur-
rent Haitian military has been characterized as a band of thugs, sustained by
graft. President Aristide sought a close working relationship with the military,
founded on mutual respect. He retired officers implicated in abuse and corrup-
tion and sought to promote reform-minded officers. Following the resignation of
the coup regime and the replacement of the high command with reform-minded
officers, the military will be reorganized and retrained into a professional, a po-
litical force. The details of this program are virtually complete; President
Aristide's plan is backed by $2 million in international aid.
Access to public education and basic health care. The coup regime's neglect of
governmental responsibilities has further compounded national education and
health needs. Only 10% of Haiti's schools are now public, and 60% of Haitians
now have no access to basic medical services. Last month, President Aristide
met with Haitian teachers to review plans to revamp the education system. The
plan includes expanding and improving public schools, enhancing teacher capa-
bilities, increasing the numbers of children attending school, and raising lit-
eracy levels with a broad-based campaign. This plan will be carried out with
$10 million in international aid. Earlier this month, the President met with
over 200 Haitian doctors and nurses to enlist their involvement in plans to pro-
vide basic preventive health care, address immediate public health challenges,
and coordinate with and stimulate long-standing efforts by private groups to
meet national needs, backed by $30 million in multilateral assistance.
Rebuilding Haiti. The coup regime's frantic efforts over the past week to win
support by filling potholes cannot absolve them of responsibility for three years
of neglect of Haiti s now-crumbling infrastructure. At the time of the coup, the
Aristide government was embarking on a major upgrade program; the coup put
all efforts on hold. During the crisis, the government has revised and expanded
existing plans to reflect additional compelling needs and ensure immediate ac-
tion on priority projects. Supported by $30 million in multilateral assistance,
the Aristide government will repair and upgrade roads, bridges and ports and
construct needed new infrastructure. An additional $20 million in multilateral
assistance will be used to rehabilitate existing water and sewer facilities and
to increase and expand service, particularly in the rural areas. Immediately
upon returning, the civilian government will implement emergency programs
for sewage treatment and waste disposal in urban poor neighborhoods and rural
Revitalizing agricultural production. About 70% of Haitians are engaged in
farming. Throughout Haiti, agricultural production has declined dramatically
during the crisis. The regime and its local section chiefs have provoked disputes
over land ownership, creating insecurity; have brutalized the rural population,
causing massive internal migration and displacement; and have failed to main-
tain, and in some cases destroyed, the infrastructure supporting this sector, in-
cluding rural co-ops and markets. The Aristide administration has consulted
closely with international experts and has prepared a program to address the
challenges facing this important sector. In addition to reestablishing civilian
control in the countryside, the government will restore and rebuild rural infra-
structure; conduct livestock vaccination and pest eradication programs; make
credit, seeds and fertilizer available; and enhance cultivation methods to re-
verse erosion, supported by $26 million in multilateral assistance.
The international community has made significant commitments of $.5 billion to
finance the Aristide government's economic and social reform program upon the
President's return. The Aristide reform program is straightforward, transparent and
fully consistent with the goal of reestablishing civilian participatory democracy. It
promises economic stability, return to the rule of law and respect for individual
rights, and significant progress toward improving the health and education of Hai-
ti's poor majority and reversing environmental deterioration. This substantial inter-
national support shows that concerns regarding the prospects for long-term eco-
nomic stability in Haiti following the coup regime's departure are unfounded and
that the international community s involvement will not be prolonged, ill-defined, or
of little if any lasting value. Haiti will be transformed from a permanent ward to
a partner of the international community.
President Aristide and his cabinet are ready and eager to go to work on building
Haiti's future. We must redouble our efforts to hasten their return. It is long past
time for the coup regime to go.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnes. Mr. O'Neill.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, CONSULTANT, NATIONAL
COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, NEW YORK, NY
Mr. O'NEILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will direct
my remarks to the refugee issues, and if I do have any time maybe
one or two other points. But I will begin with the refugee process-
I am a consultant to the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees
based in New York, and the coalition commends the President's
May 8 decision to end what we believe to be the illegal forced repa-
triation of Haitian asylum seekers without any chance for an inter-
view. And we also believe that this policy undermined refugee pro-
tection worldwide. We are happy to see that that policy has been
changed, but we do have some concerns about the processing as it
is occurring in Jamaica right now and potentially on the Turks and
Caicos Islands in mid month in July as it begins then.
First, we understand that the counseling given to the asylum ap-
plicants on the boat is done in a group, it is kind of a group ori-
entation, there is no individualized counseling to the asylum appli-
cants. This is a crucial step in any kind of refugee processing. The
United Nations High Commission for Refugees has so stated in its
handbook which serves as kind of a rules and regulations, if you
will, on international refugee processing. So we are very concerned
that the applicants who arrive after a perilous sea voyage, often
hungry, afraid, exhausted, while they do have some time to rest,
but they are not getting the kind of individualized advice about
what is coming next; that is, the interview.
Second, we are concerned about the interview itself, principally
the interviewers and the interpreters. I have no question that these
people have the best of motives, and I do not mean to impugn any-
one's intentions, but I think that asylum adjudication is an ex-
tremely difficult, complicated thing do to, and many of the inter-
viewers and interpreters do not have much experience in this type
of activity. They do not have much in-depth knowledge about Haiti.
And again, the UNHCR has noted before in other circumstances
the importance of extremely competent, well trained, experienced
adjudicators and interpreters so that the applicant's story can be
conveyed in all its subtlety and all its complications, and that the
adjudicator can make a reasoned decision. So we do have some con-
cerns about that part of the process.
The third concern we have is the time. I have been told that, and
it also was quoted in the New York Times last week, when there
are only 35 applicants, that they have the luxury of an interview
that lasted on average 1 hour and 45 minutes. That is not long.
That also includes the time for interpretation, so the actual give
and take between the interviewer and the applicant is under an
I have interviewed dozens of Haitian asylum applicants over the
years. I have never been able to do it in less than an hour. Often
it takes several hours, and it also takes several multiple interviews
to get the person's story. And again, this is not unusual after what
the Haitians have been through when they arrive and the inter-
They often do not readily open up right away. Their interaction
with authority in their own country has been most unpleasant usu-
ally, so that any kind of authority figure that they now are faced
with inspires some kind of fear and mistrust, and interviewing does
take time and it is exhausting. So an hour and 45 minutes, if that
is deemed a lengthy interview, is of great concern. And only 35 peo-
ple at a time. We read today that now there have been a thousand
or more. So the pressure to keep people moving through this proc-
ess may mean that the interviews are even shorter than this hour
and 45 minutes, and that is of grave concern because mistakes
then could well be made.
We are also concerned about the review process. There is no ap-
peal. UNHCR can look at some cases and recommend a
reinterview, further information to be gathered, but there is no sys-
tematic review process and there is no standard of review, what
constitutes a mistaken initial decision.
So these are the basic concerns that the coalition has. We com-
mend the effort that the INS has made and that the State Depart-
ment has made, but we think that there are flaws, and these flaws
will only be exacerbated as the crush of numbers and the pressure
of time increases.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say it is the position
of the Coalition that no one-no Haitian-should be forcibly re-
turned to Haiti right now given the documented systematic and
gross human rights violations that are occurring there. To ask
these interviewers to make fine distinctions if someone is leaving
for mostly political versus mostly economic reasons given the
stakes involved is nearly an impossible task.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Neill follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. O'NEILL
Thank you Chairman Dodd and members of the subcommittee for convening this
hearing during this crucial period in the Haitian crisis. I am a consultant to the
National Coalition for Haitian Refugees on whose behalf I am appearing before you
today. I served from June 1993 to March 1994 as the Legal Director of the United
Nations/Organization of American States International Civilian Mission to Haiti.
My responsibilities included providing legal advice on international human rights
law and Haitian law to the Mission's Executive Director and to the Director of
Human Rights and for supervising a study of the Haitian justice system. From 1989
to June 1993 I was the Deputy Director of the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights where one of my principal tasks was to monitor the human rights situation
in Haiti and to examine and assess the Haitian justice system. I have coauthored
two book-length reports on these topics.
The National Coalition for Haitian Refugees was founded in 1982. The Coalition,
since its inception, has sought to ensure protection for Haitian refugees under inter-
national and U.S. law. The Coalition always argued that it was illegal and morally
wrong for the United States to interdict Haitians on the high seas and to return
them to their prosecutors after brief, often cursory interviews on Coast Guard cut-
ters. The Coalition maintains today that Haitians should receive the same treat-
ment as asylum-seekers from other countries with full and fair hearings in appro-
priate settings and essential procedural safeguards in place.
Mr. Chairman, the 33-month-old Haitian crisis is entering a decisive phase. The
administration has belatedly implemented a series of sanctions and withdrawal of
privileges that many of us were urging the Bush administration to adopt in October
1991. Freezing assets, revoking visas, suspending commercial flights and enacting
sweeping UN-mandated economic sanctions will hasten the Haitian end-game.
1 would like to begin my testimony on one immediate issue: the refugee process-
ing currently underway in Jamaica. I will then discuss three issues that will be of
central importance once this end-game has occurred and regardless of the way the
crisis is resolved: reviving civil society, creating a Truth Commission and imple-
menting reforms to the justice system. The planning and hard thinking about these
issues cannot be postponed, however, but should be undertaken right away.
II. REFUGEE PROCESSING IN JAMAICA
The National Coalition commends the President's decision on May 8 to end the
policy of forced repatriation of Haitian asylum-seekers. We believe that the previous
policy was illegal and undermined refugee protection worldwide. The Jamaican gov-
ernment agreed to allow the United States to interview applicants on board the
USS Comfort which is docked in Kingston harbor. This refugee processing only
began on June 23. Nevertheless, the National Coalition has serious concerns about
the fairness of the hearings as conducted on the ship.
First, pre-interview counseling of Haitians is extremely limited and deficient. The
UNHCR legal officers are on board and provide some counseling to groups of appli-
cants en masse prior to their interviews. But no individual counseling occurs. This
seriously prejudices the chances of the Haitian asylum-seekers to prepare their
cases and anticipate what kinds of questions they must be ready to answer. Group
orientation cannot replace one-on-one counseling on the asylum process and the cri-
teria necessary for refugee status.
Second, the interview itself, which is the key event in the entire process, lacks
important procedural safeguards. The competence of the interpreters is of concern.
Have the interpreters received adequate training in asylum and refugee law? Are
they sensitive to the key elements in making a claim for asylum? What may appear
to be an innocuous brush with authority could be crucial to the applicant's claim.
Will such incidents be conveyed accurately and adequately by the interpreter? There
is also a concern about confidentiality: will details of the applicant's case get back
to Haiti with all the obvious dangers for the applicant and friends and family back
It is hard to assess the impact on the INS interviewers of State Department as-
sessments that most Haitians are "economic" refugees and that human rights viola-
tions in Haiti are being "exaggerated." The most recent example of the latter is an
April 12 cable signed by Ambassador Swing which states that "The Haitian left ma-
nipulates and fabricates human rights abuses as a propaganda tool, wittingly or un-
wittingly assisted in this effort by human rights NGOs and by the ICM [UN/OAS
international Civilian Mission]." This cable should be repudiated immediately and
publicly by the administration and INS interviewers should be instructed to dis-
regard this and similar assessments of human rights conditions by the State De-
Third, the INS faces a large back-log in processing asylum claims so it has de-
cided not to send large numbers of its highly trained and experienced corps of asy-
lum officers to participate in the processing in Jamaica. This means that the INS
must find people elsewhere, including border patrol agents and airport inspectors.
I do not question anyone's good faith, but I do think it is asking a lot of people who
understandably have little or no background in refugee law and Haiti to work on
such a complicated issue with such intense time pressure. The INS has arranged
week-long training sessions for its personnel assigned to this program and I have
participated in several of these sessions. The INS is to be commended for including
non-governmental experts in this training, but the hastily trained and inexperienced
interviewers face a daunting task and it would be preferable to assign many more
experienced and trained asylum hearing officers to this program. The well-trained
and experienced UNHCR officers can merely observe interviews, they cannot offer
any legal advice.
Fourth, a senior INS official stated last week that he was pleased that the aver-
age interview lasted one hour and forty-five minutes. This includes time for inter-
preting so the actual time of question and response between the hearing officer and
the applicant was under one hour. I have interviewed dozens of Haitian refugees
over the years and it is impossible to get their whole story in less than one hour.
My experience has been that it takes at least several hours and sometimes multiple
interviews to gain the applicant's trust, go over extensive and often complex fact
patterns (asylum law is no less complex than antitrust or securities law) and ask
the right questions in the right sequence. The incentive to "keep people moving" is
enormous and weighs heavily on the hearing officers and the interpreters but can
only lead to sloppy interviews and mistakes. These shortcomings are potentially
fatal since the applicant's credibility is the primary factor in deciding whether or
not the person qualifies as a refugee. A review of the initial decisions shows that
denials have been based on lack of credibility; it appears that in some cases the Hai-
tians were not given the benefit of the doubt as required under international prac-
tice as described in the UNHCR Handbook.
Fifth, the review process is fundamentally flawed. There is no right to an "appeal"
in any real sense of the word. If the INS adjudicator intends to deny an application,
the applicant is supposed to be informed of this decision and allowed the oppor-
tunity to provide additional information. This additional information is taken down
separately and added to the case file. The papers are then reviewed by a Quality
Assurance Officer who decides whether a further interview is warranted. The
UNHCR legal officers are also supposed to be able to review decisions and suggest
a reversal of a decision to deny or a further interview.
A review based solely on the papers is wholly inadequate. Where credibility is so
central, and when there are shortcomings in the interview due to poor and unin-
formed interpreting, inexperienced hearing officers and a premium placed on time,
it is impossible to review in any meaningful sense the correctness of the initial deci-
sion based on the papers alone.
More disturbing are reports that rejected applicants have not even been informed
of the decision to deny and thus have not had any chance to add information. It
appears that the INS never informed many of 29 Haitians who were denied asylum
on June 16 until they were on a cutter heading back to Haiti. A U.S. army officer
was quoted as saying that "We are going to try not to let them know their asylum
request was denied until they are back on the cutter. It can be very upsetting for
some of them." (Ft. Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, June 17, 1994). This makes a sham
of the program's limited review provision. The INS has reportedly issued an order
directing its personnel to inform applicants of negative decisions before commencing
repatriation, but we remain concerned that the review provision could be flouted
The Haiti that the rejected applicants return to is one of increasing violence and
terror. President Clinton admitted as much in his May 8 statement noting that
there was "increasing violence against citizens of Haiti who did not agree with the
policies of the military regime-and, indeed, some of them seem to be not political
at all-of people not only being killed but being mutilated." (Office of the Press Sec-
retary, the White House, "Statement and Press Conference by the President," May
8, 1994, p. 3).
The so-called de facto president of Haiti, former supreme court justice Emile
Jonassaint, announced on May 22 that a decree from the Duvalier era making it
a crime to leave the country illegally would be enforced. The Haitian army has pro-
ceeded to arrest people that the U.S. has forcibly repatriated and those seeking to
leave the country "illegally." Haitians now face a situation exactly similar to that
in Cuba where illegal departures are also deemed a criminal act. In the coastal city
of Petit GoAive, the UN/OAS Civilian Mission reported that dozens of people were
arrested after Jonassaint's announcement while they waited to leave on a boat. The
local judge stated that "We have to arrest passengers to stop this." (Miami Herald,
May 31, 1994, pp. 1A and 6A). Attempting to leave Haiti is now not only a criminal
act but also a public humiliation of a military dictatorship that is increasingly ruth-
less and paranoid. Jonassaint has recently stated that his government will "enforce
grave punishment against those who 'contact the enemies of the homeland or one
of their agents.'" (Radio AFP Paris, as cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Serv-
ice, Latin America, May 23, 1994, p. 15).
Mr. Chairman, given the reign of terror and massive human rights violations, the
National Coalition for Haitian Refugees believes that no Haitian should be forcibly
repatriated until President Aristide returns and some semblance of law and order
is restored. All Haitian asylum-seekers should be granted safe haven until such
time. The United States and other countries in the region should each take their
fair share. Guantanamo should be prepared to shelter several thousand refugees.
If refugee processing is to continue in Jamaica or is to begin on the Turks and
Caicos, then the defects outlined above must be immediately addressed. The Na-
tional Coalition recommends that the administration:
1. Allow non-governmental organizations to observe and report on the refugee
program in Kingston and in the Turks and Caicos.
2. Provide meaningful individual pre-interview counseling to all applicants,
preferably by UNHCR legal officers or by non-governmental organizations.
3. The interview must be non-adversarial and confidentiality must be guaran-
teed. Interpreters should be thoroughly trained in asylum and refugee law and
be sensitive to the necessary elements in determining whether someone quali-
fies as a refugee.
4. More asylum officers should be assigned to the program. Non-asylum offi-
cers should be carefully vetted by INS senior officials to insure that they can
make the difficult transition from their law enforcement-type training and expe-
rience to the very different world of asylum adjudication. Training in asylum
law and country conditions in Haiti should be increased.
5. UNHCR legal officers should be given a more active role rather than mere-
ly observing or making recommendations. They are experienced and highly
trained and their expertise should be used.
6. The pressure to "keep people moving" should be diminished. Asylum inter-
views are hard work, exhausting for all, and enough time as is necessary must
7. A meaningful chance to have a decision reviewed must be established and
enforced. Haitians must be told if their application has been denied and why.
They must then be given the opportunity to be re-interviewed and to supple-
ment information or clarify any ambiguities or perceived inconsistencies in their
8. The Clinton administration should publicly repudiate the April 12 U.S.
Embassy cable which casts doubt on the competence and integrity of the UN/
OAS Civilian Mission and Haitian human rights organizations.
III. RECONSTRUCTING CIVIL SOCIETY
Ever since the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, and especially during
the eight months of President Aristide's rule, Haitians started to organize and take
control of their lives. With enormous commitment and courage, thousands of Hai-
tians started literacy campaigns, rural development projects, street-cleaning and re-
pair programs, theater and musical groups; they produced newsletters and maga-
zines and radio stations broadcast news that was free from government control.
President Aristide encouraged and reinforced these efforts during his tenure in
Haiti. Since the coup in September 1991, the Haitian armed forces and their death
squads, with the full support of their civilian allies, unleashed a campaign of terror
to destroy Haiti's fledgling civil society.
The military's response to these organizations was to label them as "subversives
and communists." They were subversive because they challenged the fundamental
power structure in Haiti where access to everything: justice, education, health care,
food, water and shelter, is controlled by the military and a tiny elite. If a peasant
could obtain a loan, hold the harvest in a granary until prices rose, get water from
a communal irrigation canal, and settle a problem with a neighbor, all without hav-
ing to pay the powerful rural military officials called section chiefs, then the mili-
tary would lose absolute control and income.
It is no accident that since President Aristide's ouster, the military have crushed
these organizations, killing, torturing and "disappearing" their leaders and those
committed to the rule of law. I cannot possibly describe the thousands of human
rights violations committed by the armed forces and directed against Haiti's demo-
cratic sector since the coup, but the following cases are all too typical:
Evans Paul, the mayor of Port-au-Prince, still limps from the beating the mili-
tary gave him nearly five years ago. Paul was then the leader of a flourishing
grass-roots organization. A Haitian army major hosted a macabre show on state
television the day after the beating that featured Paul's battered face as a
warning to other democrats. Paul was elected mayor with 80% of the vote in
the same elections that brought President Aristide to power but was forced into
hiding after the 1991 coup. When he tried to resume his mayoral duties in Sep-
tember 1993, paramilitary thugs killed at least three people and wounded doz-
ens even though members of the diplomatic community were present. Mr. Paul
lives semi-clandestinely in Haiti, constantly changing his residence and keeping
public appearances to a minimum. He has not been able to go to his office and
resume his mayoral duties.
Chavannes Jean-Baptiste is no stranger to illegal arrests, beatings and exile.
As head of a leading rural organization in Haiti, the Peasants' Movement of
Papaye, the military has frequently targeted him and his colleagues. Their
crime is to organize peasants so that they can have access to credit, create food
banks, avoid middlemen, learn how to read and write and to wrest some control
of their lives from the section chiefs. Within days of the September 1991 coup,
soldiers destroyed the MPP's office, stole equipment, raided food stocks, and ar-
rested and beat MPP officials. Jean-Baptiste was forced into hiding several
months later and subsequently escaped with his life to the United States.
Marc Lamour is a rural grass-roots organizer in northern Haiti. He was instru-
mental in helping to form cooperatives and promote literacy efforts. The mili-
tary has conducted an extensive manhunt for at least the past year in the
mountains around Le Borgne. Just this past May, the army burned dozens of
houses and arrested and beat innocent people all as part of the latest effort to
capture Mr. Lamour.
The most recent surge in human rights violations documented by the United Na-
tions/Organization of American States International Civilian Mission shows that the
army and its death squads are hunting down the remaining members of peasant
and urban grass-roots organizations. Because young people have been particularly
active in these groups, they are especially are at risk in what has become a veritable
war on youth.
A major challenge facing the international community will be to help Haitians re-
suscitate their civil society. The systematic attack on and dismantling of Haitian or-
ganizations by the military requires an equally systematic and thorough rehabilita-
tion effort. The international community must be ready to pour in substantial as-
sistance: money, material and human. UN agencies will have to coordinate their ef-
forts and bilateral assistance will also have to be carefully planned, with the maxi-
mum of Haitian initiative and participation. The effort will take years, but without
a vibrant civil society, fundamental reform and transformation in Haiti will be im-
possible. Fortunately, Haitians have laid the foundation for a civil society and now
await the chance to complete the edifice.
IV. TRUTH COMMISSION
The UN/OAS International Civilian Mission, Amnesty International, Americas
Watch, the National Coalition, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and Hai-
tian human rights organizations have documented massive human rights violations
committed by the Haitian army and its paramilitary allies and death squads over
the past 33 months. The Haitian people deserve at the least a full accounting of
these violations and who is responsible.
In El Salvador and Chile, among other countries, and just last week for Guate-
mala, formal fact-finding bodies have been created to investigate rights violations.
Depending on the unique circumstances of each country, the information obtained
could be used as the basis of prosecutions. Whether or not this would be the case
in Haiti the mere fact of truth-telling would be enormously important to healing
deep wounds and undermining the complete impunity currently enjoyed by the mili-
The Coalition urges the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to call for the im-
mediate creation of a Truth Commission which would operate under the UN's aus-
pices. The details on the composition and exact mandate of this Commission could
be discussed in due course, but he Coalition recommends that it include both Hai-
tians and outside experts in human rights and international law.
The UN/OAS Mission has extensive documentation on human rights violations
and the perpetrators, as do other international and Haitian human rights groups.
This information could be the starting point for the Commission's own investiga-
tions. But the Commission must also seek out Haitians to gather their testimony:
the forum for Haitians to tell what happened to them is an essential step and will
send a clear signal to all Haitians that the horrors they have endured will not be
V. JUDICIAL REFORM
The Haitian justice system is incapable of protecting people's fundamental human
rights and prosecuting the perpetrators of rights violations. Based on hundreds of
meetings between the UN/OAS Mission's observers and Haitian judicial officials and
lawyers, countless visits to Haitian prisons and detention centers, and meetings
with members of the Haitian military, several overriding problems precluding the
fair and independent administration of justice were identified. Among the most seri-
1. The military's utter domination of the judiciary. Few judges or prosecutors
are willing to enforce the law if a member of the Haitian armed forces would
be adversely affected. Soldiers frequently threaten members of the judiciary and
several have been beaten, arrested or forced into hiding.
2. Corruption and extortion are endemic to the system. Justice is literally for
sale with victory going to the highest bidder or the most powerful. In other
cases, soldiers demanded money from detainees who wished to avoid being beat-
en or who wanted to receive food brought to them by their family.
3. Judges and prosecutors, for the most part, are poorly trained and moti-
vated. Many judges have never been to law school, have never been trained to
be a judge, and show no interest in receiving such training. Most prosecutors
or investigating judges have no idea how to conduct a criminal investigation or
to try a criminal case.
4 The judiciary faces a monumental shortage of essential materials. Court-
houses are in complete disrepair, basic legal texts are rare, courts do not have
phones, typewriters or even electricity, and record-keeping is abysmal.
5. The Haitian people, with good reason, have little respect for those charged
with enforcing the law. The "law" and the entire justice system are viewed with
6. Soldiers are rarely prosecuted in civilian courts, or even in military tribu-
nals, for horrendous human rights violations. This impunity reinforces the cycle
of rights violations and the population's cynicism about the legal system.
Despite these flaws, some extraordinarily brave judges and prosecutors strive to
do their jobs properly at great personal risk. These men and women are truly on
the front lines, exposed with no protection at all from the forces intent on prevent-
ing the emergence of a fair and effective justice system. The military forced out sev-
eral competent, independent and honest judges and prosecutors precisely because
they possessed these qualities.
Others, like Justice Minister Malary, have paid with their lives for their commit-
ment to real justice and human rights. Haiti s chief prosecutor, Laraque Exantus,
was an energetic, honest and competent lawyer who agreed to accept the position
after his predecessor fled because of death threats. Exantus was responsible for
many politically explosive investigations, including the killing of the man who ap-
pointed him, Justice Minister Malary, who was gunned down by a death squad in
broad daylight on October 14, 1993. Exantus was "disappeared" from his home
sometime during the night of February 12, 1994. He has not been seen alive since.
His own office refuses to investigate and officials at the Justice Ministry are too ter-
rified even to discuss the case. He too is probably dead.
Respect for human rights is impossible without respect for the rule of law. With-
out an independent judiciary willing and able to enforce the law equally before all,
human rights violations will continue in Haiti at an appalling level.
The international community should be drawing up plans to reform the Haitian
justice system. With full participation from Haitian lawyers, judges and academic
experts, from both within Haiti and the extensive Haitian diaspora, key reforms and
plans to implement change should be ready the moment the political crisis is re-
solved. Some reforms already identified include:
Demilitarize the Haitian justice system and insure the independence of the judi-
ciary, otherwise all other reforms will be merely cosmetic and doomed to fail.
Put all prisons and detention centers under the control of the Justice Ministry
and not the military.
Launch a public education campaign on reforms to the justice system to enforce
people's respect for the rule of law.
Conduct intensive training programs for judges and prosecutors in criminal in-
vestigations and trial procedures.
Since Haiti's justice system is based on the Napoleonic Code, French lawyers
judges and jurists should take the lead role in judicial reform. Judicial officials from
the overseas French departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe are particularly
well-positioned to provide training since they speak Crdole, share a similar culture,
history and heritage with their Haitian colleagues and come from the same region.
The United States should fully support such initiatives.
Haiti will never have a durable democracy or a rights respecting society if it does
not have a sound, independent and viable justice system. After so much suffering,
the Haitian people deserve no less than a maximum effort from the international
community to help them create the rule of law.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. O'Neill. Mr. Martin.
STATEMENT OF IAN MARTIN, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to ap-
pear here. I do so as a professional in the field of human rights,
and I think I can claim a record of some objectivity in assessing
human rights situations around the world. For 6 years I directed
the worldwide human rights work of Amnesty International, and
last year I was employed by the United Nations as the Director for
Human Rights of the UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in
Haiti which has been frequently referred to in this and previous
The human rights situation in Haiti today is the worst in this
hemisphere and one of the worst in the world. It is the only human
rights situation in the world whose victims are prevented by a gov-
ernment other than their own from exercising their right under
international law to flee their country and apply in another country
for asylum. In my written statement I describe that situation as I
and the human rights observers of the mission in Haiti experienced
it last year, and as it has further deteriorated since the strategy
of the international community collapsed with the withdrawal of
the Harlan County last October.
Activists in popular organizations are being hunted down and
killed by members of the Haitian army, by the armed thugs or
attaches which they direct, and by members of the FRAPH. The
practice of abductions and enforced disappearances has reached
alarming proportions; the minority of victims who reappear alive
tell of torture in clandestine detention centers where they have
been interrogated about the activities and membership of popular
Rape is being used as a weapon of political repression, with 66
known cases in 4 months: 17 attacks in which women were violated
successively by several men; and victims including 10 minors, the
youngest being 10 and 12 years old. Arbitrary arrests, illegal deten-
tion, torture and ill-treatment continue throughout the country,
now beyond the reach of the International Civilian Mission or other
human rights monitors.
The creation of FRAPH has solidified the complete elimination of
freedom of expression for all except the extreme neo-Duvalierist
right wing and the political elite. FRAPH presents itself as a politi-
cal party, but it comprises former soldiers, attaches, former
Tontons Macoutes and other armed civilians, and it operates as a
paramilitary force conducting joint operations with the military
against popular sectors.
Three characteristics of this human rights situation I think de-
serve emphasis. First, the effect of killing upward of 70 people a
month may be underestimated when they are set alongside the
scale of genocidal massacres in Rwanda. But Haiti is not torn by
ethnic conflict nor in a state of civil war. Victims in Haiti are not
only those who are killed and tortured, not only those who flee or
the tens of thousands who live in hiding, but a whole society of 6.5
million people living in fear.
Second, the violence is simultaneously both targeted and general-
ized. There is a systematic effort to eliminate community leaders,
but few people are safe. Female and male relatives may be victim-
ized in the place of family members. The charge of being a sup-
porter of President Aristide can be sufficient to bring persecution,
and random violence is used to terrorize entire neighborhoods.
Third, the responsibility for human rights violations of the most
serious kind extends right up the chain of command of the Haitian
army. Senior members of the military are directly linked to the op-
eration of death squads.
Until recently, I think, the full reality of political repression in
Haiti has been downplayed in such reporting as I am aware of by
the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince. It has been an extremely dis-
turbing experience for me to discover that the findings of our mis-
sion have been distorted in this reporting. The April 12 cable
signed by Ambassador Swing, which has been widely cited in the
media, is a disgrace I think to any government, not only in its un-
warranted slur on the integrity and competence of the Inter-
national Civilian Mission and of Haitian human rights organiza-
tions, but also in its dismissal of reports of rape which were al-
ready by then well attested.
Mr. Chairman, there are five implications of the human rights
reality in Haiti which I urge should be fully taken into account in
U.S. policy. One, the international community today is powerless to
protect Haitians in Haiti. Since its return at the end of January,
the mission has played an invaluable role in recording human
rights violations and bringing them to international attention, and
has given assistance to victims of rape and other torture. But its
observers would be the first to say that their presence no longer
serves to prevent violations.
Two, it follows that it is not possible for anyone to protect or
monitor the fate of asylum-seekers returned to Haiti. The possibil-
ity that they will be targeted because of their departure has in-
creased. I share the view of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and most refugee organizations that no one should be
returned against their will in present circumstances.
Three, there must be a profound change in the Haitian army.
The new police must have little continuity with the past in its lead-
ership or its personnel.
Four, the military are today continuing to commit grave human
rights violations, with the expectation, encouraged by the U.S. and
the UN, that they will be immune from legal proceedings.
Popular vengeance is a symptom of a society in which there is
no hope of justice through due process of law. If the international
community expects President Aristide to be able to restrain popular
vengeance, it must share his understanding that reconciliation re-
quires the possibility of justice.
Five and last, there can be no possibility of holding elections
which could be observed and recognized by the international com-
munity until freedom of expression and association have been re-
Mr. Chairman, those of us who have lived in Haiti for any part
of the period since the coup know more than can be conveyed here
of how the Haitian people have suffered. If that suffering is not to
have been in vain, what is required is not just the departure of
three military leaders and not merely the physical return of Presi-
dent Aristide. What is required is the permanent removal of the
military veto on democratic progress and the resumption of the
process of social change and building respect for the human rights
of ordinary Haitians for which they voted so overwhelmingly in
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN MARTIN
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your sub-
committee to testify about the human rights situation in Haiti and its implications
for the international community and for U.S. policy. My name is Ian Martin, and
I am currently a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
From 1986 to 1992, I followed the human rights situation in Haiti as one among
the many serious human rights situations around the world which was monitored
by the Research Department of Amnesty International for which I was then respon-
sible as the organization's Secretary General in London. In February 1993, I was
one of three human rights experts asked by the United Nations to visit Haiti and
advise on how best the human rights protection and monitoring tasks of the Inter-
national Civilian Mission (ICM), formally requested by President Aristide and just
accepted by the de facto authorities in Haiti, should be undertaken. Our report was
presented to the UN General Assembly in March 1993 and became the basis of the
operational planning of the Mission. I was subsequently appointed Director for
Human Rights and Deputy Executive Director of the integrated OAS/UN Inter-
national Civilian Mission, and was in Haiti from late April until the ICM was evac-
uated after the withdrawal of the USS Harlan County in mid-October.
As Director for Human Rights for the ICM, I was responsible for the training and
guidance of the human rights observers, for the collation and analysis of information
regarding the human rights situation and specific violations, and for the drafting
of representations to the High Command of the Haitian Armed Forces and of the
public statements and reports of the ICM. I participated with the Executive Director
of the ICM in meetings with the High Command. My appointment ended on Decem-
ber 31, at which time the ICM remained in the Dominican Republic to which it had
been evacuated; I did not return when a group of observers was sent back to Haiti
in late January, so I have had no direct involvement in the ICM's reporting in 1994.
I have however remained in close contact with the ICM and with others following
the human rights situation there, and most recently visited Haiti in late May in my
capacity as a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The Human Rights Situation in Haiti in 1993
The human rights situation as experienced by the ICM up to its evacuation in
mid-October 1993 has been described in three reports to the UN and OAS, pub-
lished as documents of the UN General Assembly on June 3, October 25 and No-
vember 18, 1993. From the deployment of the ICM until the signature of the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement on July 3, observers investigated and, where possible, in-
tervened in a large number of cases of arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, beatings
and torture carried out by members of the military, their attaches (civilian auxil-
iaries) and the rural section chiefs (who are themselves members of the armed
forces). Many of the victims had been targeted because they were identified as sup-
porters of President Aristide. The presence of the ICM, although it had some posi-
tive effect upon the human rights situation in some regions and at the initial stage,
at no time overcame the refusal of the military to allow freedom of expression and
association. When students attempted to organize demonstrations in support of the
President's return, they were beaten off the streets and some of their organizers
were arrested and severely ill-treated. When peasant activists emerged from hiding
to resume organizational work, they were arrested, severely beaten, and forced to
leave their homes again.
The terms of reference of the ICM provided for observers to have immediate ac-
cess to detainees. Although the terms of reference had been accepted by the de facto
civilian authorities, the degree of cooperation from the military authorities varied
in different parts of the country and they were never fully respected in practice.
ICM observers did manage to obtain access to prisoners in many cases, and often
to bring about their release. The ICM assisted over 80 victims in obtaining medical
treatment; most had sustained injuries classified by the ICM's medical personnel as
severe. But access had often initially been denied: the High Command and the Chief
of Police of Port-au-Prince themselves signaled their refusal to respect the ICM's
terms of reference when as early as April 1993 they denied observers access to trade
unionists who had been arrested and severely beaten in the capital. After the ICM
first deplored such violations publicly, regional commanders were instructed to
check "gratuitous violence." But no adequate investigations were ever carried out
into violations which the ICM put to the High Command, nor was the ICM aware
of any legal or disciplinary action being taken against the perpetrators, beyond the
occasional transfer. The ICM's terms of reference required the authorities to see to
the security of people who were in contact with the ICM. In fact, such people were
regularly subjected to threats to their personal security by the military and those
linked to them, and some were arrested and beaten after contacting the ICM.
If the Haitian Armed Forces had intended to respect the Governors Island Agree-
ment, the human rights situation and the climate of freedom of expression and asso-
ciation ought to have improved after its signature on July 3. Instead, by early Au-
gust it had become clear that the situation was seriously deteriorating. Many hun-
dreds of people had been killed in the immediate aftermath of the coup, and the
killings had continued during 1992; Haitian human rights groups were estimating
some 3,000 deaths before the arrival of the ICM, and this is probably not an exag-
geration. But relatively few killings were reported to the ICM in its early months.
In July and August, however, 58 known killings or suspicious deaths occurred in
Port-au-Prince. In September alone the toll doubled to more than 60. Some of those
killed were political activists in their local communities, and some of the killings
were witnessed, with the killers identified as members of the military or attaches.
In other cases the victims appeared random, but the violence was carried out with
an impunity which implied police complicity; and the concentration of victims in the
poorer localities suggested that the purpose was to terrorize those places where sup-
port for President Aristide was strongest.
During September and October, the political character of the violence became in-
creasingly clear. When the legitimately-elected mayor of Port-au-Prince was rein-
stated in his office, his supporters and some bystanders were attacked by attaches
while uniformed police watched and did nothing, with at least three people killed
and others savagely wounded. The testimony of people who had resurfaced after
being seized, tortured and interrogated, and the pattern of abductions and killings,
afforded growing evidence of targeted political assassinations and disappearances
carried out by paramilitary groups linked to the armed forces or by members of the
armed forces themselves. The victims were members of popular organizations con-
sidered pro-Lavalas (the movement which supported the election of President
Aristide), in particular leaders who continued to be active in their localities. The
perpetrators were armed men mostly operating in civilian clothing, usually at night-
fall, without covering their faces. They were armed with automatic weapons and op-
erated in red or white pick-up vehicles, sometimes with government plates. In sev-
eral cases there was information regarding a direct link between the perpetrators
and the military, and the impunity and logistical support with which they operated
was strongly indicative of military involvement. Their activities appeared to be sup-
ported by a major intelligence operation, evidenced by the nature of the interroga-
tion of victims of enforced disappearance who subsequently reappeared.
The military's refusal to permit public pro-Aristide activity was reinforced in a
calculated message to the whole nation when the businessman Antoine Izmery was
publicly executed on September 11. A financial backer and prominent supporter of
President Aristide, he had defied the military in organizing peaceful but highly pub-
licized displays of support for the President's return. He was dragged from a com-
memorative mass and shot in the street in the presence of international observers.
The ICM carried out a special investigation into the killing. It found that the assas-
sination team, which included a person identified as a member of the armed forces
as well as several attaches, operated with the support of uniformed police, and ar-
rived and departed the scene protected and escorted by police vehicles. It concluded
that the scale and nature of the operation were such that it could only have been
carried out with the complicity, if not the direct participation, of highly placed mem-
bers of the Haitian Armed Forces.
Outside Port-au-Prince, there was in the weeks following the Governors Island
Agreement a continuation but not at first a marked increase in cases of arbitrary
arrest, torture and ill-treatment. If however the military had been preparing for a
transfer of authority to legitimate government, and were afraid of possible popular
reprisals with the return of President Aristide, then they should have been relaxing
the repression. In fact there was no greater tolerance of freedom of expression, and
threats and harassment of activists prevented any revival of popular organizations.
As the October deadline drew near, the situation became increasingly tense in some
districts. Although only a small number of killings were reported outside the capital,
there were many reports of the distribution of arms to increasing numbers of
attaches, and threats that supporters of the President would be massacred in the
event of his return.
The military's determination to strengthen rather than relax their control was
also evident in the establishment of the neo-Duvalierist political party FRAPH
(Front revolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progress en Haitj), which drew upon
much the same elements as the military has always relied upon for civilian terror.
FRAPH was allowed the use of arms, and its intimidatory demonstrations were
clearly not just tolerated but assisted, and probably directed, by the military, at the
same time as peaceful expression of the political views of the majority of the popu-
lation had been terrorized out of existence. Very soon after its establishment, and
before the evacuation of the ICM in mid-October, there was credible testimony di-
rectly implicating members of FRAPH in killings and other human rights violations.
Armed men considered attaches in their areas of origin were reported to be operat-
ing in the slums and working class districts of Port-au-Prince, together with or act-
ing as members of FRAPH, to seek out internally displaced people in the city.
It was of course FRAPH which mounted, in the presence of police, the demonstra-
tion against the disembarkation of U.S. and Canadian members of the United Na-
tions Mission from the USS Harlan County on October 11. The Harlan County was
withdrawn from Haitian waters on October 12. This withdrawal, ordered without
prior consultation with or notification to the UN, precipitated the withdrawal on Oc-
tober 14 of the Canadian UN police contingent. On the afternoon of October 14, the
Minister of Justice, Guy Malary, was gunned down in the streets of Port-au-Prince,
hours after President Clinton had warned publicly that the U.S. would hold the
military responsible for the safety of members of the constitutional government. The
Minister of Justice's responsibilities had included presenting to Parliament legisla-
tion to create a new civilian police force, separate from the army, triggering the re-
placement of Colonel Michel Frangois as Chief of Police of Port-au-Prince. On the
evening of October 14, it was decided to evacuate the ICM, which had experienced
increasingly threatening behavior from the military and its attaches.
The Human Rights Situation in Haiti in 1994
There was no direct human rights monitoring by the intergovernmental organiza-
tions between the ICM's evacuation in mid-October and the return of a first group
of observers at the end of January. Haitian human rights organizations faced in-
creasing acute difficulties and dangers in their own work; they reported over 400
killings in the three months October-December. When ICM observers returned, they
found that the human rights situation in 1994 was worse than at any time during
its presence in 1993. Between January 31 and May 31, 296 killings or suspect
deaths were reported to the ICM, 254 of them in Port-au-Prince alone. These are
conservative figures: the ICM recognizes that it receives only partial information re-
garding killings. In most cases, the victims had been shot and their corpses aban-
doned in the streets. Some of the victims remain unidentified: a new phenomenon
in 1994 has been the extensive mutilations perpetrated on some of the corpses.
Killings are particularly prevalent in the slums of the capital, known to be areas
of the strongest support for President Aristide. 50 out of the 130 Port-au-Prince vic-
tims whose identity has been established were known activists in popular organiza-
tions or members of organizations presumed to be in favor of the restoration of con-
stitutional order. 21 of the victims were children. Where there is information about
the perpetrators, they have included members of the armed forces, attach6s and
members of FRAPH.
The military have launched major operations apparently to hunt down popular
leaders in different provinces, in which many civilians have been killed, and dwell-
ings and other property deliberately destroyed. One such operation took place in the
Raboteau district of Gonaives on April 22; the ICM was initially able to determine
that at least 12 people were shot to death by uniformed soldiers, but believes the
full total may be considerably higher. Another operation took place on and after
April 7 in the region of Borgne (Department of the North); the ICM was prevented
by the military from carrying out investigations in the area and thus verifying infor-
mation from a credible source regarding civilian deaths. In both cases the military
alleged that there had been attacks on military posts, but neither the ICM nor other
international visitors to the areas have found any credible evidence to support this.
The practice of abductions and enforced disappearances has reached alarming pro-
portions. Between January 31 and May 31, 91 cases were reported to the ICM. 62
could be established to be politically-related cases. 28 of those reported to have been
abducted were released, the majority of them from clandestine detention centers.
Their interrogation had been focused on obtaining information on the structure, ac-
tivities and membership of popular organizations. The interrogations had almost al-
ways been accompanied by torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
During its presence in 1993, the ICM received information on only 3 cases of rape.
Between January 31 and May 31, a total of 66 rapes were reported to the ICM, and
it became clear that rape was being used as a weapon of political repression. 11 of
the victims are themselves members of popular organizations, and another 35 close
relatives of activists, who were being hunted by the armed men who entered their
homes. In 24 cases the perpetrators could be identified as members of the armed
forces, attaches or members of FRAPH. In 17 of the attacks the victims were vio-
lated successively by several men. The victims included 10 minors, the youngest
being 10 and 12, and one woman who was six months pregnant.
Killings, disappearances and rape are only the most extreme of the human rights
violations committed by the military and its allies: the ICM continues to report arbi-
trary arrests, illegal detention, torture and ill-treatment. From the time of the coup
onwards, the military's action has been directed at repressing the popular organiza-
tions which supported President Aristide: in the most recent phase its destruction
of these organizations has become more systematic. The complete elimination of
freedom of expression and association for all those except the extreme neo-
Duvalierist right-wing and the political elite has been solidified through the creation
FRAPH is not to be underst6od as a genuine political party, although in establish-
ing it the military may well have intended to be in a position to validate their con-
tinuing power by arranging an eventual election victory for FRAPH. The presence
within it of former soldiers, attaches, former members of the Tontons Macoutes and
other armed civilians makes it a paramilitary force which conducts joint operations
with the military against popular sectors. It has now established a pervasive pres-
ence-including a network of offices-throughout the country. In this context, large
numbers of members of popular organizations have been victims of serious human
rights violations; many have sought asylum outside the country and the number
who are in hiding in the country but away from their homes has been growing.
Those who remain in their homes are in fear and cannot exercise their fundamental
Many human rights violations throughout the country today remain unreported.
The ICM has been unable, for reasons of security, to reopen offices in the provinces.
It has sent teams to make inquiries in different parts of the country; in a number
of cases they have been prevented from proceeding by the military, and in some
have been threatened. In late March, a team was forced to leave Hinche, the main
town of the Department of the Centre, one of the areas of heaviest repression, in
the middle of the night by an armed mob of members of FRAPH and soldiers in
civilian clothing; the ICM has not yet revisited the area.
The military does not now recognize the legitimacy of the presence of the ICM
in Haiti. The High Command has refused to meet with it, although some local com-
manders have done so. On only one occasion in the four months since its return has
the ICM been allowed access to detainees. Haitian human rights organizations oper-
ate to whatever extent they can in highly intimidating circumstances, but their cov-
erage of the country is now extremely limited.
Characteristics of the Human Rights Situation
Three characteristics of the human rights situation in Haiti deserve emphasis.
First, the effect of killings of upwards of 70 peopled a month may be underesti-
mated when they are set alongside the scale of genocidal massacres in Rwanda. But
Haiti is not torn by ethnic conflict, nor in a state of civil war. The ICM noted in
its October report that:
"the violence practiced in Haiti during the presence of the Mission has been
unilateral: violence practiced by the security forces of the State and by
those operating under their direction or with their complicity against un-
armed civilians. Violence exercised against agents of the State by the civil-
ian population has been almost non-existent.'
Despite claims by the Haitian military in 1994 that some of those killed or ar-
rested have been engaged in or planning armed resistance, the ICM has found no
evidence to support this. Killings, disappearances, rape, beatings and other forms
of torture are perpetrated in order to suppress any peaceful freedom of expression
or association by the great majority of Haitians. Their victims are not only those
who are killed and tortured, not only those who flee or live in hiding, but a whole
society which lives in fear and the great majority of whose members are unable to
exercise their fundamental human rights.
Second, the violence is simultaneously both targeted and generalized. Activists
in popular organizations have been hunted down and killed in order to destroy lead-
ership at the community level. At the same time, few people arc safe: female and
male relatives may be victimized in place of their family members; the charge of
being a supporter of President Aristide, of which the great majority of the popu-
lation remains guilty, can be sufficient to bring persecution; and random violence
is used to terrorize entire communities.
Third, the responsibility for human rights violations of the most serious character
extends up the chain of command of the Haitian Armed Forces. The failure of com-
manders to act to investigate human rights violations and punish the perpetrators
would in itself establish such a responsibility. Recent operations, such as that in the
Raboteau district of Gonaives, in which civilians were deliberately killed, were
under military command. But the responsibility for the operation of death squads
and disappearances is also direct. The ICM received credible testimony directly link-
ing senior members of the military to the operation of armed groups carrying out
killings in Port-au-Prince; and the nature of the operation of paramilitary groups,
both in general and in specific cases such as that of Antoine Izmery, clearly implies
the complicity of highly placed members of the Haitian Armed Forces.
Department of State Reporting on the Human Rights Situation
The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, in my experience, rarely during 1993 sought
the overall assessment of the ICM of the human rights situation. The first such oc-
casion after my arrival in April as Director for Human Rights was in mid-July. A
meeting then took place between the Embassy official responsible for human rights
reporting, and myself and a senior colleague. An unclassified version of the Embas-
sy's report on the meeting was quoted (without being identified as such) at the July
21 hearing on the Agreement of Governors Island and its implementation before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives, in the statement of Nina Shea, President of the
The Embassy report seriously mis-stated the assessment I and my colleague had
provided at the meeting. We were quoted as saying that the human rights situation
over the past six months had been "relatively calm with sporadic serious abuses;"
and that human rights violations had remained at a relatively constant rate since
January. This was not the experience of the ICM, and we had applied the descrip-
tion "relatively calm" to the situation at the time of the meeting only. We were
quoted as referring to "the extraordinary Haitian propensity, on all sides, to manip-
ulate the truth for political ends" and to "often media-oriented human rights
events;" and as saying that "both sides regularly alter the factual, forensic accounts
of events aftcr the fact to suit their political needs of the moment." No such state-
ments had been made by ICM officials, who did not hold these views. We were
quoted as characterizing political abuses as merely "sporadic incidents," and as oc-
curring chiefly in Port-au-Prince; in fact, we had made clear that the experience of
the ICM was of political repression generalized throughout Haiti.
I have not seen any other of the human rights reporting by the Embassy during
1993. When the Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 1993 were published in February, I wrote to Assistant Secretary of State John
Shattuck a letter dated February 3, which the chairman of this subcommittee sub-
mitted for the record at your March 8 hearing on U.S. Policy Toward Haiti. I de-
scribed the country report on Haiti as a disappointingly flawed account of the period
I experienced there, and noted that despite its positive comments on the credibility
as well as the effect of the presence of the ICM and citations of our findings, it did
not reflect our published or private assessment of the nature and extent of human
rights violations. It understated the death toll, and minimized the extent to which
killings could be assumed to have been politically motivated.
In early May, a classified cable dated April 12, from Ambassador Swing was
quoted in the news media, which I have since read. It recognized that abuses, in-
cluding "the persecution and elimination of Aristide partisans," were increasing, and
argued for more human rights monitors and observers, although its concern seemed
to be less with human rights violations per se than that "President Aristide and his
lobbying apparatus in Washington have increasing substantiation for charges that
the human rights situation here is getting worse." Its most widely quoted conclusion
was the allegation, given emphasis as part of its summary, that:
"The Haitian left manipulates and fabricates human rights abuses as a
propaganda tool, wittingly or unwittingly assisted in this effort by human
rights NGOs and by the ICM."
This statement is a slur on both the competence and the integrity of the ICM,
and of human rights NGOs inside and outside Haiti. The staff of the ICM include
a number of people with extensive experience in human rights fact-finding, in pre-
vious positions with the United Nations and with NGOs of proven authority; the
training of observers, for which I was responsible, emphasized the care and objectiv-
ity essential to human rights reporting; and the ICM is under the direction of per-
sons of the highest integrity. The ICM's experience in its extensive contacts with
Haitian human rights NGOs was that they made whatever efforts they could in very
difficult circumstances to establish the facts regarding specific violations, and were
certainly not involved in the "fabrication" of abuses. Since this unwarranted slur
has become public, it requires an on-the-record retraction and apology from the De-
partment of State. A letter I have received from the Department of State about the
matter contains neither.
The most disturbing aspect of this cable as an insight into the Embassy's own
human rights reporting is its suggestion that incidents of rape reported by the ICM
are a case of "violence as propaganda:"
we are, frankly, suspicious of the sudden, big number of reported rapes,
particularly in this culture, occurring at the same time that Aristide activ-
ists seek to draw a comparison between Haiti and Bosnia."
No evidence whatever was advanced in the cable for this suspicion; there is no
indication that the Embassy attempted its own investigation of these incidents; and
the Embassy sought no information about the evidence the ICM had collected, which
includes medical examinations in all rape cases, before calling it into question.
President Clinton and administration officials have in recent statements ex-
pressed publicly a view of the deterioration of the human rights situation in Haiti
which now largely accords with that of the ICM and human rights NGOs. Serious
questions remain, however, about the quality of human rights reporting by the U.S.
Embassy in Haiti over a period that was a critical one for U.S. policy towards Haiti
and Haitians seeking political asylum.
Implications of the Human Rights Situation
(a) The lack of protection for Haitians in Haiti.-When the ICM was de-
ployed in early 1993, there was reason to believe that the presence of international
observers throughout the country could have a positive effect on the human rights
situation. Until its evacuation the ICM played three roles: it served as a dissuasive
presence, with some positive effect which varied in different regions and during dif-
ferent phases; where its presence did not prevent violations, it intervened promptly
on behalf of the victims, in many cases securing their release and ensuring medical
treatment for the consequences of torture and ill-treatment; and it reported publicly
on the human rights situation, to enable the international community to bring pres-
sure to bear on those responsible.
The human rights situation today is dramatically worse than the one the ICM
was conceived to confront. It could have some effectiveness when the predominant
violations were arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, torture and ill-treatment. These
still occur throughout the country, but the ICM is not able to maintain a presence
out of Port-au-Prince; even if it were able to, the current attitude of the military
and FRAPH offers no hope that the mere presence of civilian human rights observ-
ers can dissuade repression. Today the predominant violations are killings, dis-
appearances and rape, particularly in the capital. Since its return in early 1994, the
ICM has played an invaluable role in recording these and bringing them to inter-
national attention, and it has given assistance to victims of rape and other torture
and ill-treatment. But its presence does not serve to prevent violations, and the re-
fusal of cooperation from the military leave it with extremely limited opportunities
for intervention on behalf of victims.
(b) The danger to asylum-seekers.-It follows from the above that it is not pos-
sible in present circumstances to afford protection to, or indeed to monitor the fate
of, asylum-seekers who are returned to Haiti or whose applications under the in-
country processing program are denied. A number of the victims of political killing,
arbitrary arrest and torture whose cases have been investigated and reported by the
ICM are people whose in-country applications had previously been rejected. The ad-
ministration has stated that it will continue to monitor, through the Embassy in
Port-au-Prince, the welfare of those who are repatriated: in fact, neither the Em-
bassy, nor the ICM, nor anyone else is in a position to be able to do so.
The possibility that asylum-seekers who have left Haiti by boat and been returned
will be targeted because of their departure has increased following the threat by the
illegitimate President Jonassaint that anyone fleeing Haiti illegally will be punished
under a 1980 Duvalier decree. On two occasions, during the night of May 16-17 and
again on May 22, groups of people about to board boats near the town of Petit
Goave have been attacked by soldiers, in the latter case assisted by FRAPH, and
some of them beaten seriously.
Those with a well-founded fear of persecution in Haiti today are not confined to
the categories defined in the criteria established by the State Department in Feb-
ruary as the basis for in-country interview. The nature of the human rights situa-
tion as described above means that while some can be identified as particularly like-
ly to be targeted, many more who do not meet the test applied in-country or under
the new procedure for those interdicted at sea are at risk because of the generalized
character of the repression in Haiti today. I share the view of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees and most refugee organizations that no one should be returned
against their will to Haiti in present circumstances.
(c) The problem of the IHaitian Armed Forces and the need for a new po-
lice.-It is clear from the description of the human rights situation that members
of the Haitian Armed Forces at all levels are deeply implicated in serious human
rights violations. The present army has its origins in the gendarmerie, later called
the Garde, formed by the U.S. Marines. As one Haitian historian has written,
"the Haitian Garde was specifically created to fight against other Haitians.
It received its baptism of fire in combat against its countrymen. And the
Garde, like the army it was to sire, has indeed never fought anyone but
Haitians. Its most important campaign was its participation alongside the
Marines in the war against the peasant nationalists But the Garde
did not turn its arms against the peasants alone. From the earliest days
of the occupation, the new form of state violence it represented was also ap-
plied against urbanites, and this repressive role intensified as time went
on, especially when the occupiers found a growing number of individuals
willing to join the Garde the young men who joined the new armed
forces could not have had any doubt as to what was expected of
[Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 1990]
The institutional nature of the Haitian army, its conduct throughout its existence,
and its recent behavior since the coup all indicate that profound change is essential
if Haiti is to have a future in which those with arms do not maintain a veto on
democratic political change, and the rule of law is maintained with respect for fun-
damental human rights. There may be some past and present members of the
armed forces whose record is suitable for service in a civilian police force, but the
new police must have little continuity with the past in its leadership or its person-
nel. Whatever small army Haiti's political leadership may decide the country needs
and can afford must also have a leadership which truly accepts democratic political
control. Those who have ordered or committed serious human rights violations must
be screened out of its ranks. The efforts of the international community, especially
the U.S. which has built up the Haitian army over the years, must be to assist
President Aristide and his government in the sensitive task of reintegrating else-
where those who should not be retained in the army or police, and not to press for
inappropriate institutional continuity.
(d) The approach to reconciliation and justice.-In his recent address to the
Organization of American States in Belem, Brazil, as on many other occasions,
President Aristide declared that after the restoration of democracy in Haiti there
must be "reconciliation among all, and justice for all." The U.S. and the inter-
national community have been concerned to secure an amnesty for members of the
military, seeing this as necessary to bring about the stepping down of the military
leaders responsible for the coup and subsequent human rights violations. President
Aristide undertook to grant an amnesty under Article 147 of the Haitian Constitu-
tion, which limits the power of the President to grant amnesty to political offenses,
and agreed that he would not oppose an amnesty law if one were adopted by the
Parliament. The Governors Island Agreement reflected this undertaking, without
clarifying in any way the scope of measures to be adopted by Parliament. On Octo-
ber 3, 1993, President Aristide issued his amnesty decree, covering political offenses
from September 29, 1991 (the date of the coup) to July 3, 1993 (the date of the Gov-
ernors Island Agreement).
The public position of U.S. and UN/OAS negotiators has been that the scope of
an amnesty is a matter for the Haitian decisionmakers. In practice, however, they
have pressed for Parliament-at a time when it remains subject to military intimi-
dation and some constitutionalist legislators feel unable to participate for reasons
of personal security-to adopt a draft law intended to cover all criminal offenses,
including murder, enforced disappearance, torture and rape. This draft law is open-
ended in date, up to the time of its passage, so that today the military continue to
commit grave human rights violations with the expectation that they will be im-
mune from legal proceedings.
An amnesty covering such crimes would be contrary to international human
rights law, as it has been developed and defined within both the UN and the Inter-
American systems. The positions of the U.S. and the UN in relation to amnesty in
the Haitian context contrasts with their commitment to prosecutions for war crimes
in former Yugoslavia. The UN Secretary-General expressed grave concern when the
legislature of El Salvador adopted an amnesty law, and UN participation in the
Guatemala negotiations has assisted an agreement which includes a "commitment
against impunity," in which the Government has promised that it "shall not sponsor
the adoption of legislative or any other type of measures designed to prevent the
prosecution and punishment of persons responsible for human rights violations."
The New York Pact signed by Haitian Parliamentarians on July 16, 1993, in pursu-
ance of the Governors Island Agreement, envisages an act establishing a compensa-
tion fund for the victims of the coup. But the international community has advanced
no proposals for a Truth Commission to investigate past violations, analogous to
that established in El Salvador or now to be established in Guatemala.
What is at stake is not only a principle of international law but also the practice
of national reconciliation. In the Haitian context, fears have frequently been ex-
pressed that acts of popular vengeance will occur. These have taken place in Haiti
in the past, most notably against Tontons Macoutes at the time of the fall of Jean-
Claude Duvalier. They are a symptom of a society in which severe human rights
violations have been perpetrated and there is no hope of justice through due process
of law. This situation exists again today, and if the international community expects
President Aristide to be able to restrain popular vengeance, it must support and not
oppose measures which will encourage reconciliation through truth and justice.
(e) The revival of political participation: free and fair elections.-Elections
are required by the end of this year to renew the mandate of all elected local offi-
cials, all members of the Chamber of Deputies, and two-thirds of the Senate (one-
third whose mandate expires in February 1995, and one-third whose mandate ex-
pired in February 1993 and who were illegitimately replaced in unfair elections held
by the de facto regime in January 1993). The human rights situation described
above makes clear that there can be no possibility of holding elections which could
be observed and recognized by the international community until freedom of expres-
sion and association have been restored, and not only President Aristide but all local
leaders wishing to return to a democratic Haiti have been able to do so. While all
parts of the political spectrum should of course be represented in the democratic
process, FRAPH should not be permitted to participate as a political party before
legal inquiry and proceedings regarding its role in human rights violations have
The role of the international community in ensuring the conditions for political
participation will be a key one as soon as constitutional order has been restored.
The administration has proposed that a "reconfigured" UN Mission in Haiti should
be charged with helping to assure basic civic order. This would include ending
killings, illegal detention and torture. The mandate of the ICM extends beyond this,
to pay special attention to freedom of expression and freedom of association, as well
as the right to life, personal safety and security. The UN military and police pres-
ence must operate in a way which is compatible with the rapid restoration to the
Haitian people of their freedom of expression and association, and the expanded
presence of civilian human rights observers should ensure that these rights are
Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Martin, very, very much.
Mr. Schulz, welcome, and pull the microphone close to you, as
STATEMENT OF DONALD E. SCIIULZ, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, STRATEGIC STUDIES IN-
STITUTE, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE
Dr. SCHULZ. OK. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Just as a preface to my remarks, I would like to say that my tes-
timony here today represents my own personal views and analysis
and does not necessarily represent the position or policy of the U.S.
Army or the U.S. Government.
Senator DODD. I always have to make that statement when I say
Dr. SCHULZ. I was very clearly instructed to say that before I
My testimony is based on a study that I coauthored earlier this
year with Dr. Gabriel Marcella, a study entitled, "Reconciling the
Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy Towards
Haiti." Since that work was completed, many of its recommenda-
tions have become policy. I do not claim that there is any cause
and effect relationship; I think it more a matter of happy coinci-
dence. Nevertheless, many of the recommendations have become
policy, but the question that I think now has to be posed is wheth-
er the policy changes that have been put into effect are too little,
In Haiti, U.S. policy has undergone a funnel effect. The failure
of the United States and the international community to impose
81-184 0 94 3
strong and effective sanctions much earlier has meant that it is
much more difficult to effectively pursue such a course of action
today. The risks and costs are greater, and so are the chances of
failure. In the end, what we may very well be facing down the road
is a choice between two unpalatable alternatives: capitulation or in-
There are important lessons here about how and how not to exer-
cise power. One is that procrastination and wishful thinking are no
ways to make foreign policy. In Haiti, we tried to avoid coming to
terms with unpleasant realities, and in the end have had to face
even more unpleasant realities. Halfway measures led to halfway,
ineffective results. The problem did not go away, it just got worse.
Another lesson, I believe, concerns the liabilities of allowing do-
mestic politics to determine what you do in foreign affairs. It is one
thing to take domestic pressures and constraints into consideration
when making foreign policy, quite another to allow them to dictate
policy. In Haiti, I would suggest that to some extent U.S. foreign
policy became the hostage of domestic politics. Policy has been
made with a view to placating certain domestic political constitu-
encies, rather than with a view to solving the problem that is being
faced. And that I would suggest is a prescription for disaster.
Indeed, I think this is part of the reason for the extraordinarily
ambivalent position that the U.S. Government has taken with re-
gard to Haiti. There has been a lot of waffling and backtracking.
What happens is that policy has in effect been whiplashed between
various domestic political constituencies both inside and outside
the administration, and the result is that our credibility has been
seriously damaged. In the end, when this type of thing happens
you are likely to find that policy will fail and you will be faced with
precisely the choices that you most wanted to avoid all along.
In short, inconsistency and lack of resolution breed failure, and
that may very well thrust us into the very intervention that many
people, including myself, are so desirous of avoiding. I believe that
we are moving in the direction of such an intervention. It is not
inevitable. In my judgment, the odds are still probably less than
fifty-fifty. But there is no question in my mind but that this is an
increasingly likely option. It has become much more likely in the
last few weeks. And so I think we need to ask ourselves some fairly
hard questions, and let me simply throw out a few of them.
First, what are our objectives in Haiti, and by that I mean what
are our real objectives? Are they to restore President Aristide or
are they to democratize Haiti? These are not necessarily the same
thing. At best, the restoration of President Aristide will only be a
first step in a long and uncertain process of democratization that
will take years, indeed decades, to fulfill.
At the same time, the same question might be posed with regard
to the pursuit of economic development. The problem is that in
Haiti there is so little to build on. There are no strong institutions
and scant basis on which such institutions or structures might be
assembled. The political culture is highly authoritarian. Demagogy
and intolerance are commonplace. Political and class conflicts are
so bitter that no matter who is on top at any given moment vio-
lence is never far from the surface. What are the odds in this kind
of political culture that we can, that we have the ability, to bring
about economic development and democracy?
Another question, or series of questions: Assuming that we know
what we want to do in Haiti, and I am not entirely sure that we
do, do we have the resources and the will to do the job right, to
stay the course, or will we try for a quick fix to alleviate the imme-
diate problem at minimum cost? How long a commitment are we
willing to make? At what expense? Is Congress willing to support
the kind of substantial ongoing commitment to promote the long-
range goals of democratization and economic development? And re-
member, when we are talking about those things we are talking
about generations rather than years. If not, what is likely to hap-
pen is that you will see the country fall back into its traditional
patterns of chaos and tyranny once the United States and the
international community lost interest and leave.
Let me simply cut my presentation short here, with one last
question. I have said that I thought that an intervention is becom-
ing increasingly likely. Do we have an exit strategy? It is easy to
get in. It may not be so easy to get out. Is there an exit strategy?
Is this being discussed seriously? I have not heard it. Should we
think about it now, or should we wait until we are already in and
we have to grope after it bit by bit? My fear is that the latter will
be the case.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schulz follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD E. SCIIUL
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to thank you for giving me this
opportunity to speak to you today on the subject of U.S. policy toward Haiti. It is
a subject that I have spent a great deal of time thinking about these past several
years, and I welcome the chance to share my thoughts with you. As a preface to
my remarks, I would like to make it clear that both my testimony here today and
my previous writings on the subject represent my own personal opinions and ideas
and do not necessarily reflect the policy or positions of the Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, the U.S. Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Department
I am an Associate professor of National Security Affairs and a specialist on Latin
America and the Caribbean at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College. I have been writing on the Caribbean Basin for over two decades and have
published a number of books on the region, most recently The United States, Hon-
duras and the Crisis in Central America and Cuba and the Future. My testimony
today is based on a monograph that I coauthored with Gabriel Marcelia earlier this
year, entitled Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy
In our study, Dr. Marcelia and I examined the socioeconomic and political dimen-
sions of the Haitian crisis and the efforts of the United States and the international
community to resolve that crisis. We assessed the prospects for restoring President
Aristide and the difficulties that are likely to attend any attempt to promote sus-
tained political and economic development. Specific criticisms were made of U.SJ
international community policy, options were evaluated, and recommendations set
forth. Among the major conclusions and recommendations were the following:
INTRACTABLE SOCIOECONOMIC CRISIS
At the heart of the dilemma is that there is almost nothing to build on. Haiti's
human and material resources are either in such short supply or have been so de-
graded by poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, violence, corruption, overpopula-
tion, rapid urbanization, deforestation, and soil erosion as to raise questions as to
its continued survival as a society and an independent nation-state.
Since the September 1991 coup that overthrew the Aristide government, this
bleak panorama has gotten considerably worse. Widespread repression and the im-
pact of the O.A.S and U.N. embargoes have combined to ravage the Haitian socio-
economic structure. Unemployment has soared. The health care system has been
decimated. Repression has all but destroyed a once flourishing civil society. Several
hundred thousand people have fled to the countryside or gone into hiding. Rural de-
velopment projects have been destroyed; crops have gone unplanted. Only the pres-
ence of international nongovernmental organizations, which have provided food for
800,000 Haitians daily, has prevented massive starvation.
Complicating the problem further is the fact that there are no strong institu-
tions and scant basis on which such structures might be assembled. There is no pro-
fessional class in the sense that most countries have a large corps of competent
managers and technocrats, dedicated to the public good. Any government will be tal-
ent-thin; its human resources will be largely neutralized by corruption. It will be
years before enough Haitians can be found (trained or lured back from exile) to run
the government and the economy in a reasonably efficient manner. And that will
be the easy part. Much more difficult will be the task of instilling the values of hon-
esty and professionalism that would give Haiti's politicians, administrators, police-
men, and military officers the will to place the public interest above their own per-
Without the above, no amount of aid will be enough. One cannot simply pour
money into Haiti and assume that its problems will be solved. The country has no
capacity for absorbing large-scale foreign aid. Without foreign supervision, such as-
sistance will rapidly find its way into the pockets of Haitian elites, old or new. Nor
can one expect to just be able to set up an infrastructure and leave it. Roads and
buildings have to be maintained. If the United States and other foreign donors are
not willing to stay and perform such tasks, while training the Haitians to take over
in the longer run, then international efforts will be largely wasted.
IRRECONCILABLE POLITICAL FORCES
International efforts will take place within a political context that is unlikely
to be conducive to socioeconomic development. Haiti is an intolerant society. Politi-
cal and class conflicts are so bitter that, no matter who is on top at any given mo-
ment, violence is never far from the surface.
Even should Aristide be restored, the prospects for democracy and political sta-
bility would be problematic. Aristide himself is a product of a political culture
marked by authoritarianism, demagogy and intolerance. As President, he showed
little interest in establishing a rule of law or abiding within constitutional re-
straints. Rather, his politics were those of messianism and class struggle. He gov-
erned as a populist demagogue, appealing directly to the country's impoverished
masses through fiery speeches that inflamed class hatred and at times condoned
The other element in the internal Haitian political equation is the ruling class
(the military and its allies in the economic elite) and its instruments of violence (the
enlisted soldiers, the paramilitary attaches, and the resurgent Duvalierists in the
FRAPH). Haiti has long been ruled by a shifting coalition of groups whose record
of rapaciousness and brutality is as sordid as that of any ruling class in the world.
This power structure is by no means conflict-free; moreover, it seems to have no
solid center. The only thing that binds these diverse elements together is their ha-
tred and fear of Aristide and "the mob."
Even if it were possible to obtain the cooperation or acquiescence of certain in-
dividuals or groups, it is unlikely that this could be parlayed into a broad consensus
on such issues as Aristide's return, the professionalization of the armed forces, or
the creation of a separate civilian police. The perceived threats are too great, both
personally and institutionally. On one level, military officers worry about physical
survival; on another, they fear that professionalizing the armed forces would cost
them their careers. Furthermore, the creation of an independent police force would
deprive the military of its primary mission-maintaining internal order-and its ap-
paratus of control in the countryside. At the same time, it would present the mili-
tary with the prospect of having to deal with another armed institution, under civil-
ian authority, which would become a competitor for resources and, most likely,
power. Finally, there is the question of booty. Currently, the military receives about
40 percent of the national budget; it controls many state-owned enterprises. Officers
routinely use their positions for economic gain by extorting bribes and engaging in
contraband, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. Any government that
threatened these sources of wealth-as Aristide has vowed to-would invite a coup.
For the enlistees and attaches, also, the international community's plan to "re-
store democracy" and reduce and "professionalize" the military represents more of
a threat than an opportunity. Many of them will lose their jobs. Moreover, the
lower-ranking elements in the apparatus of repression tend to be even more anti-
Aristide than their commanders. They have borne most of the brunt of the violence
committed by Aristide's followers. Whereas officers can always flee into exile if
things get too hot, the enlistees and hired guns are not so fortunate. Their ultimate
nightmare is to be deserted-left alone to face the mob.
While significant conflicts have developed between the military and its civilian
allies (especially those in the economic elite), the latter still risk losing their privi-
leged positions, and perhaps much more, if Aristide returns. Currently, there are
at least a dozen power centers outside the armed forces, based mainly in the drug/
contraband/Duvalicerist complex. During 1993, these groups grew in both number
and size as extreme right-wing exiles returned to the country and organized their
own private armies. Whereas institutions like the Army and police are easy to iden-
tify, these "occult groups" are extremely difficult to deal with. What seems to be
emerging looks more like a warlord system than a centralized repressive apparatus.
Can these seemingly irreconcilable antagonists be reconciled? The instinctive
answer is "no." The military and its allies worry that their power, wealth, and lives
will be endangered should Aristide be restored. Aristide fears that he will be in con-
stant danger of a coup or assassination. And both sides have ample reason to be
afraid. To be feasible, a restoration of the Haitian President would have to be ac-
companied by the introduction of an international peacekeeping force, capable of
providing security for both sides.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: PART
OF THE PROBLEM
A successful policy toward Haiti must have at least three elements: There must
be (1) clearly defined and realistic goals, (2) the means of attaining them, and (3)
the will to persist. Unfortunately, these have been precisely the qualities that have
been lacking in the international community's policy. (At least this was the case
until very recently. Whether the more aggressive tactics of the last few weeks can
be sustained and built upon remains to be seen.) By any standard, international
sanctions have been a failure. They have further devastated the Haitian economy
without restoring President Aristide. The O.A.S. and U.N. embargoes have acceler-
ated environmental damage, contributing to near-famine conditions in some areas
and causing (in conjunction with other factors) extreme hardship for ordinary Hai-
tians while only belatedly touching the elite. Indeed, many of the latter have grown
richer through smuggling and drug-running operations.
Much of the responsibility must be laid at the door of the United States. U.S.
policy has been marked by incomprehension and misjudgment of Haitian realities,
a flight from leadership, and a reluctance to take measures that might have con-
vinced the Haitian power elite of Washington's seriousness of purpose. The result
has been weak and indecisive behavior that has sent all the wrong signals, Haitian
leaders came to the conclusion that the United States could be manipulated and
outmaneuvered. Consequently, they have sought to stretch out negotiations and pro-
long the crisis in the expectation that, when push comes to shove, the United States
and the international community will back down rather than inflict unacceptable
suffering on ordinary Haitians.
The July 1993 Governors Island Agreement to restore Aristide was inherently
unworkable. By providing for the lifting of sanctions before Aristide returned and
at a time when General C6dras, Colonel Francois and their allies still occupied key
positions of power, the accord enabled the latter to obtain short-term relief while
they restocked supplies and protected foreign financial holdings in preparation for
the longer struggle to come. Moreover, the agreement had no enforcement mecha-
nism beyond the threat to reimpose sanctions. The foreign military and police that
were to be introduced into Haiti were trainers, engineers, and observers rather than
peacekeepers. They were lightly armed and operated under highly restrictive rules
of engagement. Nor was there any provision for purging the Haitian military and
police of corrupt or abusive elements. Under such circumstances, it was unlikely
that mere "training" would have much effect. Indeed, the signals that were sent
were interpreted to mean that the international community was not serious about
what it was doing and that the accord could be sabotaged with minimum risk or
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The United States and the international community have suffered from illu-
sions about their ability to fashion an effective Haiti policy in the absence of strong
U.S. leadership. They have seriously misread the Haitian military and its allies, as-
cribing to them a degree of reasonableness and flexibility that is largely nonexistent.
Rather than using their bargaining leverage firmly, they resorted to wavering, in-
cremental pressures that stretched out the crisis and inflicted far more damage than
would have been likely had an effective embargo been imposed from the beginning.
In Haiti, the intentional community had been dealing largely with thugs rather
than military officers. And what thugs understand is power. One has to use it in
a way that will be credible, keeping in mind that a failure to apply leverage that
is so obviously available will be interpreted as weakness and will simply encourage
further recalcitrant behavior.
The United States and the international community cannot create democracy
in Haiti. Only Haitians can do that. But for that to happen, there would have to
be a wholesale transformation of the political culture. The restoration of Aristide
would only be the first step. Far more difficult would be the creation of professional
military and police forces that would be reasonably competent and subordinate to
civilian control. Equally important, moreover, would be the construction of an effec-
tive and fair judicial system. All this would require a substantial, ongoing U.S. and
international effort. A U.N. peacekeeping force would have to be introduced to pro-
vide political stability and security for all sides. Haitian troops and police would
have to be vetted and human rights offenders removed. U.S. and other foreign spon-
sors would have to provide much of the human infrastructure that would assure
that humanitarian and development aid would be used effectively. Beyond the tasks
of administering aid, providing medical care, building roads and schools and so on,
there would have to be a major, long-term educational and training program to en-
able Haitians to acquire the skills and values that would gradually enable them to
replace foreign personnel.
Even if such a program were to be launched, there are no guarantees that it
would succeed in its most ambitious objectives. Political cultures are hard to change,
and one must be prepared for considerably less than optimum results. In addition,
some Haitians will resent a large-scale, indefinite foreign presence, no matter how
well-intentioned. If international forces should become involved in Haitian domestic
politics-as seems likely-the stage would be set for a serious nationalistic back-
Nevertheless, to do much less would be to seriously constrain the prospects for
success. The current crisis can be alleviated through a massive, short-term humani-
tarian effort. But unless the international community-and especially the United
States-is willing to stay the course, one must expect Haiti to once again descend
into chaos or tyranny once the foreigners pull out.
Stick with some version of the Governors Island Agreement. This would provide
for the introduction of foreign military and police observers, trainers, and engineers,
but not heavily armed peacekeepers. While this may be the most probable course
or action, its prospects for success are not good. Even if Aristide can be restored-
and this is no sure thing-without a substantial number of international peace-
keepers and a strong, reliable security force, his longevity could not be expected to
be very great. Assassination is a real possibility, and it might well plunge the coun-
try into truly massive violence.
A second option, military intervention, was until recently dismissed as "un-
thinkable" by U.S. policy makers. Yet, there are a number of circumstances (for in-
stance, the outbreak of xenophobic violence, especially if directed against U.S. citi-
zens) that might produce such a scenario. The possibilities here range from a full-
scale occupation (for which the will does not presently exist) to a limited interven-
tion (much more likely). In either case, the international commitment would have
to be ongoing to be successful. The temptation will be to try to do the job "on the
cheap." The smaller the commitment and the shorter the duration, the greater will
be the chance of failure.
On the other hand, a "success" is problematic in any event. Among other
things, it is not clear that Aristide and his followers could accept an extended mili-
tary presence. A nationalistic backlash (perhaps violent) is a very real possibility.
Thus, a more limited intervention-while less likely to foster democracy and politi-
cal stability-would at least reduce some of the risks and costs involved.
A military intervention would have been much easier prior to last autumn.
Since then, however, the Haitian Army and its allies have institutionalized a struc-
ture of terror throughout the country. That structure will not be easy to uproot.
Even if Aristide is restored, the apparatus of terror will seek to undermine his gov-
ernment in preparation for his overthrow once foreign troops have left.
Another possibility would be to create a Haitian liberation army to invade the
country and overthrow the current regime. The problem is that a competent fighting
force cannot be created overnight. It would take months-probably a half year or
more-to implement. Meanwhile, the crisis will grow worse.
Beyond this, the strategy would probably lead to a major increase in bloodshed.
The Haitian military might well try to preempt the attack by stepping up the vio-
lence against Aristide's supporters. Furthermore, while it would be easy to start a
war, it might not be so easy to end it. In Haiti, revenge is a powerful motivator.
How do you stop the killing once the enemy has been defeated? It may make sense
to create such a force as a means of exerting pressure on General C6dras or to help
legitimize a U.S. or U.N. invasion. But to set it loose on its own is another matter.
This is a prescription for a bloodbath. Moreover, a victorious liberation army could
well become the basis for a new dictatorship. While this may not be inevitable, given
Haiti's history, it does seem probable.
Still another variant of the military option is a nonpermissive (i.e., forcible) hu-
manitarian intervention. The problem is that unless the basic causes of the crisis
are eliminated, it is likely to reemerge once the peacekeepers leave. A real solution
would require an extended foreign presence and the disarming of those elements re-
sponsible for the crisis. The pitfalls of such an operation are painfully evident in
the U.N. operation in Somalia.
Another possibility is a nonmilitary humanitarian option (permissive humani-
tarian intervention). The United States and the international community are al-
ready engaged in such an effort through nongovernmental organizations such as
CARE. This aid might be expanded even as sanctions are tightened. If successful,
a permissive intervention would ameliorate (though not solve) the immediate hu-
manitarian crisis. But it would not address the larger political problem or the long-
range socioeconomic needs of the country. The Haitian military, moreover, might
well refuse to allow such deliveries, or might seize or siphon off these resources.
Only if the expanded operation were to be accompanied by substantial concessions
would the Haitian military be likely to cooperate.
Finally, there is the option of disengagement. The international community
could accept defeat and lift the sanctions on the grounds that they have become un-
acceptably destructive. This would do nothing to address the fundamental problem
of the society. It would consign the vast majority of Haitians to oppression and pov-
erty and deprive them of hope for the future. Pressures to emigrate would continue.
The United states would be faced with a choice of indefinitely pursuing a policy of
forcible repatriation, with all its objectionable moral overtones and economic costs,
or suspending it and inviting a sharp increase in boat people. At the same time,
there would be significant political costs to such a policy change. Critics would de-
nounce it as a sell-out of democracy and a capitulation to thuggery. The credibility
of the Clinton administration, the United States, and the United Nations would be
This is a terrible menu of options. For that very reason, the United States and
the international community have taken the easiest way out: They have avoided
coming to terms with Haitian realities and the implications of their own behavior.
Unable to go either forward (intervention) or backward (disengagement) without in-
curring unacceptable costs, they have resorted to (ineffective) sanctions as the least
painful course of action.
In our study, we argued that this tactic had now come up against the limita-
tions of political reality, and that hard choices had to be made. Rather than trying
more of the same (which no longer seemed feasible, given the humanitarian implica-
tions) or opting for disengagement (which would have abandoned the Haitian people
to the tender mercies of their tormentors) or invasion (which had little political sup-
port), we recommended that the United Stated and the international community
should get serious about sanctions. Specifically, we said that:
A worldwide U.N. embargo, enforced by warships of the United States
and other interested nations, should be placed on all trade and aid except
for food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods and services. These sanc-
tions should be targeted much more heavily on Haitian military and civil-
ian elites than has been the case in the past. This would mean striking not
only at the very top of the armed forces pyramid, but at the officer corps
as a whole. Such measures (for instance, the seizure of foreign financial as-
sets, the denial of visas, and the restriction of air traffic) should also be ap-
plied more broadly against the economic elite. The object is to create and
aggravate divisions within the power elite and provide the motivation for
dissident elements to challenge the power and policies of the current mili-
Such moves would send the Haitian military and its allies a powerful message
and go a long way toward restoring the credibility of the United States and the
international community. Beyond this, pressure could be placed on the Dominican
Republic to choke off cross-border trade that has been ameliorating the impact of
These measures might bring the Haitian military into line, but then again
nothing is guaranteed. The Haitian military and its allies have had ample time to
stockpile supplies. Much depends on the will and ability of the United States and
the international community to effectuate the sanctions and keep them in place
until they have had time to have the desired effect. In the meantime, however, those
measures will accelerate an already serious humanitarian crisis. To avert a disaster
on the ground, therefore, we recommended that humanitarian aid should be rapidly
A "humanitarian corridor" should be opened to ensure that the most es-
sential human needs are met and guard against the misuse of aid.
Should the Haitian military refuse to allow such an operation, it should
be put on notice that obstructionism and violence will not be tolerated. The
United States and the international community must be prepared to back
up this message by stationing a sizable contingent of appropriately armed
and equipped U.N. guards to protect the operation. Haitian military leaders
should be told that (1) they will be held personally responsible for any vio-
lence that might occur, (2) that any perpetrators of such actions will be sub-
ject to prosecution under international laws dealing with the gross viola-
tions of human rights, and (3) that should a full-scale intervention be re-
quired, the Haitian armed forces would be dissolved.
Such a strategy contains very real risks and costs: it would not end Haiti's
problems or U.S. and other foreign involvement in them. The country would need
massive development aid for the foreseeable future. But this course at least offers
the hope that the country's grave socioeconomic and political ills might at last be
seriously addressed. Under such circumstances, it might be possible to reduce
human rights abuses and normalize migration. (The latter being by far the most im-
portant national interest that the United States has in Haiti.) If successful, the
strategy would enable the United States to reclaim the moral high ground and re-
store some of its currently tattered reputation as a Great Power. It would also re-
place a policy of weakness with one of strength, while allowing the U.S. Government
to fulfill its obligations to those Haitians whom it encouraged to risk their lives and
who now feel abandoned.
Since this study was completed early this year, many of these recommendations
have become policy. The question now is whether they are too little, too late. in
Haiti, U.S. policy has undergone a funnel effect. The failure of the United States
and the international community to impose strong and effective sanctions much ear-
lier has meant that it is more difficult to pursue much a course of action now. The
risks and costs are greater, and so are the chances of failure. In the end, we may
well be faced with a choice between two unpalatable alternatives: capitulation or in-
There are important lessons here about how and how not to exercise power. One
is that procrastination and wishful thinking are no ways to make policy. In Haiti,
we tried to avoid coming to terms with unpleasant realities and in the end have
had to face even more unpleasant realities. Half-way measures led to half-way, inef-
fective results. The problem didn't go away; it just got worse.
Another lesson concerns the liabilities of allowing domestic politics to deter-
mine what you do in foreign affairs. It is one thing to take domestic pressures and
constraints into consideration when making foreign policy; quite another to allow
them to dictate policy. In Haiti, U.S. foreign policy became the hostage of domestic
politics. Policy has been made with a view to placating certain domestic political
constituencies rather than to solving the problem faced. That is a prescription for
Mr. Chairman, committee members, I thank you for your time. I would be pleased
to try and answer any questions that you might have.
Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Schulz. That is an upbeat piece
of testimony. [Laughter.]
At any rate, I thank all of you for your comments and sugges-
tions here, and again, I appreciate your willingness to try to syn-
thesize these remarks. Let me just ask some questions and run
down the group here with you.
There are two points. The first is as you see it on the effective-
ness of the present sanctions that are being imposed or are im-
posed, we have heard varying testimony here from Mr. Gray, from
Ambassador Gray and Senator Graham, about whether or not they
are doing the job. I do not mean whether or not it is perfect or not,
but whether or not it is doing the job. And I would like your quick
comments on whether or not you think this is having any effect at
all on the targeted audience in Haiti? Mr. Barnes.
Mr. BARNES. Well, Mr. Chairman, clearly the sanctions are
stronger than they have been throughout this crisis.
Bill Gray deserves credit for helping to move this process for-
ward, both in our own Government and internationally in the
meetings he has had with representatives of other governments.
But there is a lot more that could be done, could be done quickly,
to help get this crisis over with quickly, and if all of it were done,
the crisis could in fact end very quickly in the view of President
For example, as was discussed, Air France is still flying. All the
other countries have ceased their flights but Air France is still fly-
Senator DODD. Given the close relationship between Haiti and
France historically, how do you explain that?
Mr. BARNES. Well, I am hoping it is a bureaucratic thing in
Senator DODD. That is being redundant, is it not? [Laughter.]
Mr. BARNES. Bill Gray just told us this afternoon that the French
are going to be taking a decision on that issue perhaps this week.
Senator DODD. Are you optimistic about it?
Mr. BARNES. We are hopeful. I do not know if optimistic would
be fair, but we are hopeful, so clearly that would have important
impact. Again, as he stated, that will not hurt any poor Haitians.
Second, we could expand the visa and asset sanctions to cover all
Haitians, paralleling the Cuban embargo as you discussed earlier
with other witnesses.
We could facilitate broadcasts by President Aristide throughout
the country. Currently, radio and television broadcasts are largely
controlled by the Haitian military, and their message is being
heard by everyone, but the message of democracy and hope and
what will happen after the restoration of democracy is not being
heard. That is a story that is exciting and a very hopeful message
for all Haitians whether they supported President Aristide's elec-
tion or not.
We ought to be conducting a propaganda campaign against the
officers and the coup backers through broadcast and through other
mechanisms that are available to the international community.
There could be charges brought in international courts or in do-
mestic courts in other countries on drug trafficking, for drug traf-
ficking crimes, against the members of the high command of the
military. There is ample evidence now that these individuals have
in fact been engaged in drug trafficking.
Senator DODD. Let me ask you this, Mike: Do you think, assum-
ing a lot of these things get done, is it your opinion that sanctions
using that word to describe all of these activities, can produce the
Mr. BARNES. It is President Aristide's strong view, and always
has been, that tough sanctions coupled with a clear, firm, political
will that is undeniable, that the actors in Haiti all come to under-
stand is real, they are not going to win, they are going to lose, it
is a matter of what time their plane is leaving, it is President
Aristide's view that it can in fact succeed.
Just another couple of items that could be done quickly: only
about half of the Haitian military officers are currently on the list
of individuals who have had their assets frozen. Well, why not all
of them? Why not their family members? Why not the members of
the puppet governments that have been propped up by this Haitian
military dictatorship? Marc Bazin, who played the role of prime
minister and tried to get the embargo lifted and what-not, his
name is not on the list. Mr. Honorat, the first phony president, his
name is not on the list. The cabinets of these phoney governments,
they are not on the list. Their family members are not.
So these are things that could be done today, should be done, and
would certainly be helpful to moving this process forward.
Senator DODD. Mr. O'Neill.
Mr. O'NEILL. Yes. I just want to say before I joined the UN Civil-
ian Mission in Haiti I was the deputy director of the Lawyers Com-
mittee for Human Rights, and my organization precisely called for
worldwide sanctions, revoking visas, and asset freezes in October
1991, about 32 months ago, and I just regret that it is only very
recently that those steps have been taken.
So I think I might fall between Senator Graham and Mr. Barnes.
I am certainly more sanguine than Senator Graham about the
sanctions working. I do hope they work, but I also feel it may be
too late in the day, that those people know how to move around
money and to hold onto power, and they may just after 33 months
continue to believe they can call a bluff.
Senator DODD. Mr. Martin.
Mr. MARTIN. I am less certain than Mr. Barnes on behalf of
President Aristide that sanctions alone can work, and certainly less
certain than Senator Graham that they are having no effect on the
military or that the business elite is not in a position to bring real
pressure to bear on the military.
The two things I tried to explore when I was most recently in
Haiti, which was when the border with the Dominican Republic
was sealed but before the application of the cutoff of flights and the
freezing of assets, was, one, what were the signs of discontent at
different levels of the military, and two, did well-informed people
believe that the business community still had the possibility to ex-
ercise effective pressure on the military or, as Senator Graham
suggested, did that leverage no longer exist.
There were then, and have been since I think, real signs of divi-
sions within the military, and the view then was that there were
those in the business community with the ability to bring pressure
to bear on the military, and their will to do so should have been
increased by recent measures.
So I am not at all sanguine the sanctions alone or the present
policy, sanctions backed by the credible threat of the use of force,
will succeed, but I do not discount it.
Senator DODD. You have sort of answered this already, Mr.
Schulz, but I will give you a chance to respond.
Dr. SCHULZ. I essentially agree with Ian. I think that the sanc-
tions have a fair chance, but less than fifty-fifty. I think it is fair,
however, that the sanctions combined with the threat of interven-
tion have aggravated divisions both within the military elite and
between the very top- and middle-level-officer corps; also between
the military and its civilian allies. I would not be surprised to see
a falling out of thieves, a possible coup attempt, who knows?
Senator DODD. You ought to be a novelist, I think, Mr. Schulz,
with all of those theories.
We are going to hear shortly from John Shattuck, who is a good
friend and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights for the adminis-
tration, and I want to ask both of you because you both have been
very critical, Mr. O'Neill and Mr. Martin, of the administration's
handling of the human rights information, and particularly reports
coming out of the Embassy regarding the level of human rights vio-
lations. How do you explain this? You all both know, certainly,
John Shattuck. You know his office; you know the people there.
There is no history of any lack of commitment on human rights at
all; in fact, quite the contrary. Would you put some more flesh on
your statements, which were rather critical?
Mr. MARTIN. I think the Embassy's resources to do real human
rights monitoring have been very limited, but I also think that a
major priority for the Embassy has been providing information re-
lating to the refugee policy, and the refugee policy has established
an interest in the Embassy of downplaying the extent to which re-
pression is political and gives rise to refugee claims, and therefore
either underestimating the extent of repression or underestimating
the extent to which it is politically targeted rather than generalized
Senator DODD. Mr. O'Neill.
Mr. O'NEILL. Yes. I concur, and I think it is not only that cable,
but also if you look at the State Department Country Report for
Haiti for 1993 it contains many of the failings and shortcomings
that Mr. Martin has just described with regard to the cable. And
also I think for the same reasons, it is directly tied to the refugee
Senator DODD. Mr. Barnes or Mr. Schulz, do you want to com-
ment on that?
Mr. BARNES. Every independent observer has recognized that
Haiti is a human rights nightmare. That is a quote from Human
Rights Watch. It is unfortunate that the U.S. Government, as has
been indicated by the other witnesses, consistently downplayed
what has been happening there.
I think Bill Gray, in his testimony today and in other remarks,
is making clear what in fact is happening in Haiti. I think it is now
more recognized. But our Embassy in Port-au-Prince needs to be
part of the program, not undermining the program, in this instance
and in others.
I might just mention one other area. While pressure is being ex-
erted through sanctions on the military and the elite who support
the military, our Embassy continues to in some respects reach out
to people who are close to the military and give them reason to be-
lieve that they can be part of a political solution like the one we
discussed at the last hearing before this subcommittee on this sub-
ject, Mr. Chairman, which would not really be a democratic solu-
tion but one that would ultimately result in power-sharing.
The American Embassy in Port-au-Prince needs to be very care-
ful about what kinds of signals it sends. It is one thing to meet
with people who are supporting the military or close to the military
to encourage them to push the military to do the right thing. It is
altogether another issue to meet with them to suggest that they
might be part of some kind of power- sharing arrangement once the
military leaves power.
Senator DODD. Mike, do you want to pick up on this? There are
some press accounts, and I understand the Constitution of Haiti
when it comes to military intervention, but I would like you to see
if you cannot articulate this obvious reticence on the part of Presi-
dent Aristide to endorse the option of military intervention in light
of the fact that, as we hear, that option is one that is getting more
consideration. It seems to me there ought to be some better choice
of words than placing the situation in such a case where you have
the very person we are trying to help restore rejecting that option.
At least that is the clear implication. And I wonder if you could
take a minute and try and sort this out, this contradictory-at
least apparent contradiction.
Mr. BARNES. Well, as you would expect, President Aristide was
asked about this at the Press Club today at lunch, and he re-
sponded at some length on the subject. It is his view that military
action will not be necessary to resolve this crisis and is not the
right way to resolve this crisis. The best thing for Haiti is for the
effect of the sanctions to be maximized, the pressure to be intense,
so intense that this crisis ends very quickly.
He noted in his comments at the Press Club that in three recent
instances dictators left Haiti without the necessity of foreign mili-
tary intervention. Obviously, Jean-Claude Duvalier, "Baby Doc,"
left without foreign military intervention. He was assisted by an
airplane. General Namphy, General Avril, all of them decided,
under international pressure as well as domestic pressure, that the
best thing for them-I do not think they were thinking about the
best thing for Haiti, but the best thing for them-was to get on a
plane and get out of the country. Those are precedents which are
not altogether irrelevant to the current situation.
Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Schulz, one last point to you. I under-
stand and I share a lot of your concerns about having missed some
opportunities earlier on to make the case and then act on it, and
I think you are correct in your assessment of that. But let me ask
you to put on your military hat. I think we have all heard it: If
you are going to get in, you ought to know how to get out, an exist
strategy and so forth.
But if you would, take a couple of minutes and assess the mili-
tary difficulty of succeeding with a multinational force or a unilat-
eral force or however it would be described. Assuming it had tech-
nical capability, modern capability. How difficult would you imag-
ine a military intervention to have in ousting the Haitian military
and the police force from power?
Dr. SCHULZ. I do not think it would be a difficult thing at all to
oust them. I would not expect the Haitian military to put up much
of a fight. I would expect them to kind of meld into the woodwork
and try to preserve the structure of terror that has been created
throughout the countryside particularly.
Senator DODD. How well armed is FRAPH?
Dr. SCHULZ. Mostly light weapons. They have got some heavy
arms, but not anything that would cause any problems for the U.S.
Army. Many of their weapons are antiquated or nonfunctional. Dis-
cipline is very poor. The naval and air forces are virtually nonexist-
ent. One would except some light initial resistance, along with iso-
lated instances of sabotage or assassination attempts-snipers,
that type of thing.
I think the Haitian military has been profoundly influenced not
only by the Harlan County affair but by Somalia. Remember, the
Harlan County came right on top of the Somalia affair where we
lost 18 servicemen and had pictures before American TV audiences
of the bodies of American troops being dragged through the streets.
I think they would expect-some of them would expect, or at least
hope-that if they could kill a few, or perhaps a few dozen, U.S.
servicemen that there would be such a hue and cry in Congress
and the public that Mr. Clinton would have his hand forced and
would have to withdraw U.S. troops.
I think the longer we stay in there the more likely you are to see
a nationalistic backlash-that also is a very worrisome thing-not
only on the part of the extreme right-the FRAPH, etc.-but also
within Aristide's camp itself. You asked why he is so reluctant to
embrace the idea of an invasion. One reason certainly is that a
large part of his own constituency in the popular sector of his polit-
ical movement has always been very strongly anti-intervention,
He might very well be rejected by many of his own people, and
I would not discount the possibility of violence, even violence di-
rected at him.
Senator DODD. Well, thank you all very much. I appreciate im-
mensely your testimony here today, and there may be some addi-
tional written questions for you, but in the meantime we will be
in touch with all of you.
Thank you very much.
Our last panel-and I am grateful for their willingness to sit
through the testimony of today, I hope it has been helpful for them
to hear it-will be the Honorable John Shattuck, Assistant Sec-
retary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of
State; the Honorable Mark Schneider, Assistant Administrator for
Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for International Devel-
opment; the Honorable Frederick C. Smith, Principal Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of
Defense; Mr. R. Richard Nucomb, Director, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Department of the Treasury; and the Honorable Brunson
McKinley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Population, Refu-
gees, and Migration, at the Department of State.
I hope it has been helpful for you to hear some of the testimony
and the comments during the day. I am grateful to you for your
willingness to be here with us today.
Let me begin with you, Secretary Shattuck, and ask you to com-
ment. We will leave this clock on here to act as a reminder more
than anything else. You do not have to live exactly by it, but try
to keep your remarks, if you could, relatively brief, and we will try
to get all of our panel members here and respond to not only your
testimony here but I would like to take advantage of your presence
here to respond to some of the things you have heard if your re-
marks do not include that. It saves me going back to questions at
a later point.
So if you could pick up on some of these issues that have been
raised here, whether it is regarding the human rights issue, the
prospects of aid after a successful result here, or a refugee policy
and the like, I would like you to comment on those, if you would.
With that, Mr. Secretary, we are delighted you are here.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHATTUCK, ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. SHATTUCK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for performing the service of having this extremely important
hearing on the subject of Haiti. I have a prepared statement which,
as you indicate, I will submit for the record and summarize por-
tions of it, and make some other comments in addition, Mr. Chair-
The human rights record of the military dictators of Haiti, as
Ambassador Gray has pointed out, is appalling. Since the very time
of the coup against President Aristide, the situation, the human
rights situation in Haiti, has been very serious indeed. I want to
focus on the period where abuses began to rise dramatically, in
July and August of last year when the international community
took efforts to implement the Governor's Island accords, and of
course they were not unilaterally, they were violated by the mili-
The number of politically motivated killings in Port-au-Prince
rose at that time, culminating in the brutal assassinations of pro-
Aristide activist Antoine Izmery and Justice Minister Guy Malary
in October. In the wake of the military regime's failure to imple-
ment the accords, the international observers withdrew for security
reasons, removing one of the few effective restraints on political vi-
olence at that point, which was getting more serious. The ICM
monitors returned in January 1994, and now there are 69 in the
country, all stationed in Port-au-Prince.
Human rights abuses have remained very high throughout this
period and have qualitatively and quantitatively worsened in re-
cent months. At the beginning of April, following several shocking
reports from not only our Embassy but from the ICM, from non-
governmental organizations in Haiti, and from the media, the State
Department issued a series of additional statements denouncing
the political violence and holding the military responsible, under-
scoring all the earlier reports by all of these groups of an increase
in human rights abuses.
The violence reported then and now included deeply disturbing
reports of almost nightly raids on neighborhoods where many
Aristide supporters live. A new elements to those reports was the
use of rape for the first time in Haiti as far as we know for political
reasons against family members of political activists; the abduction
of children; and the disfigurement of victims faces and other por-
tions of their body. I have presented in my prepared statement a
listing of examples of some of the most egregious or some egregious
examples of human rights abuses that have occurred during this
period involving targeted killings, the terrorizing of neighborhoods,
the use of rape as I have indicated, political abductions and the
burning of homes, a catalog of abuses that certainly ranks the mili-
tary dictators of Haiti among the most serious abusers in the world
today of human rights in a world situation where human rights are
in grave jeopardy in a lot of places.
The daily abuses continue, and indeed they seem to be in some
respects worsening. As I point out in the testimony, there are a
number of instances that we are aware of in June where among
other things a labor activist was beaten on June 15 and fatally shot
in front of her three young children, and a wide variety of other
situations similar to that.
Most recently, a delegation from the Inter-American Commission
visited Haiti from May 16 to May 20. They found that the human
rights situation in Haiti had deteriorated seriously since their last
visit in August 1993. The delegation identified 133 cases of
extrajudicial killings between February and May of this year; it
found that a new practice of leaving severely mutilated corpses on
the street to terrorize the populace was being used; the delegation
also found evidence of rape and sexual abuse committed against
the wives and relatives of the regimes opponents and interviewed
20 of the victims; it also identified numerous cases of arbitrary de-
tention, disappearances, and torture. The delegation attributed full
responsibility for the deteriorating situation to the military and
their puppets, and this is a conclusion which we fully share in the
The key to ending these abuses, of course, is to resolve the crisis
by removing the military from power and restoring President
Aristide to his democratically elected and rightful position. We are
urging the UN and the OAS to maintain the number of inter-
national civilian observers, and if possible to augment their num-
ber. At the same time we are committed, as the Embassy draws
down in the context of the process of imposing the sanctions while
at the same time we are committed to strong and continued human
rights reporting by our Embassy political officer. The Embassy co-
operates closely with the ICM and offers logistical support for its
efforts. The U.S. has also pledged $13 million to fund the operation.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to be very clear about the extremely
important role that has been and is being performed by the ICM.
In his testimony, Ian Martin, an old friend and colleague from our
days at Amnesty International together, cited an April 12 Embassy
cable which seemed to call into question the accuracy of ICM
human rights reporting. I want to state very clearly for the record
that Ambassador Swing has expressed in a letter to NGO's his sin-
cere regret and apology at any implication in this cable that the
ICM was erroneously reporting human rights abuses. I want to
state unequivocally my own view and the view of our Embassy and
the State Department that the ICM is the backbone of human
rights reporting in Haiti. Its fact-finding activities are both accu-
rate and essential, and any statement or implication to the con-
trary does not represent the position of the U.S. Government.
I just want to underscore this point in concluding by indicating
that Ambassador Swing who I spoke with yesterday and have fre-
quently been in touch with over the course of the last week regu-
larly joins the ICM to denounce human rights abuses and confronts
the military with their culpability. He has personally visited the
sites of some of the worst human rights violations, including
Raboteaux, the scene of a massacre in April, and in December I
traveled to Haiti to present a posthumous human rights award, the
First Annual Human Rights Award, to Guy Malary, and his family
accepted the award at a large public ceremony in Port-au-Prince.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shattuck follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN SHA'ITUCK
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me the opportunity to testify today. I will
address the human rights situation in Haiti. The broad political and strategic issues
in U.S. policy toward Haiti have already been discussed by Ambassador Gray.
Sadly, this does not mean that I do not have much to tell you today. On the con-
trary, there is much to say because the human rights and democracy picture in
Haiti is grim.
The democratically elected government and its representatives are in exile or are
unable to exercise their authority. Those who exercise effective power in Haiti do
so as a result of their illegitimate and violent overthrow of President Aristide. The
military and their allies-the police, the attaches, the section chiefs, the aptly
named FRAPH-The Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti, or "punching
blow" in French-maintain their control through brute force, now thinly veiled by
the bogus regime of Emile Jonassaint. (Parenthetically, the FRAPH announced last
week that their acronym now stands for the Armed Revolutionary Front of Haitian
People.) The United States has taken a leading role in United Nations and Organi-
zation of American States efforts to dislodge the illegal regime, and last week we
acted to further tighten sanctions.
Mr. Chairman the human rights record of the de facto regime is appalling.
Let me begin by turning back to 1993. The first half of 1993 was a period of rel-
ative-and I stress relative-quiet marked by the presence of the UN/OAS Inter-
national Civilian Mission (ICM) of human rights observers. Tensions and human
rights abuses began to rise in Haiti in July and August as the international commu-
nity undertook efforts to implement the Governors Island Accords. The number of
politically motivated killings in Port-au-Prince rose at that time, culminating in the
rutal assassinations of pro-Aristide activist Antoine Izmery in September and Jus-
tice Minister Guy Malary in October.
In the wake of the military regime's failure to implement the Governors Island
Accords, the ICM observers withdrew for security reasons, removing one of the few
effective restraints on political violence. The ICM monitors returned in January of
1994, but only at partial strength, and even now there are only 69 in the country,
all stationed in Port-au-Prince. Human rights abuses have remained very high
throughout this period and have qualitatively and quantitatively worsened in recent
In April, following several shocking reports from our embassy, the ICM, non-
governmental organizations in Haiti, and the media, the State Department issued
a statement denouncing the political violence and holding the military ultimately re-
The violence reported, then and now, included deeply disturbing reports of almost
nightly raids on neighborhoods where many Aristide supporters live. A new element
to those reports was the use of rape against family members of political activists,
the abduction of children, and the disfigurement of victims' faces.
A brief chronology of egregious examples of the escalating human rights abuses,
reflecting the best of our knowledge of the situation, illustrates the deterioration of
the situation over the last six months:
On December 27 of last year, a fire in the Cite Soleil section of Port-au-Prince
destroyed some 200 dwellings, killed four people and injured 61. We believe that
the fire was set by FRAPH in retaliation for the killing of one of its members.
On February 3, a house occupied by pro-Aristide activist youth was surrounded,
and eight to nine youths were killed when the military opened fire.
On that same day, the military fabricated an attack by Aristide supporters, the
so-called "Lavalas Commandos," to justify terrorizing and beating residents in
the vicinity of the south claw city of Les Cayes. One elderly man was beaten
to death, and the military subsequently attacked those who attended his fu-
On March 23, five ICM observers were harassed and physically abused in the
central plateau town of Hinche by plainclothes military and FRAPH members.
ICM reported increased lawlessness in the region, and that FRAPH members
and soldiers were shooting up neighborhoods and committing burglary and ex-
tortion with impunity.
In late March, the Embassy and the ICM reported concerns about the increased
use of rape and other violence perpetrated against the families of persons op-
posed to the military.
On April 18, soldiers opened fire on slum-dwellers in the pro-Aristide area of
Raboteaux in Gonaives, killing perhaps as many as thirty.
On May 23, a dozen right-wing gun-men-probably FRAPH-hunted down and
brutally killed four Aristide supporters in Cite Soleil.
On May 27, the reestablishment of the Ton Ton Macoutes was announced.
And the daily abuses continue. For instance, on June 21, one employee of the
Petionville mayor's office was severely beaten, and another imprisoned, for unwit-
tingly violating a new decree that the Haitian flag not be lowered until so-called
international oppression of Haiti ends. On June 15 in Port-au-Prince, a labor activ-
ist was beaten and fatally shot in front of her three young children.
The ICM, NGOs operating in Haiti and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, share our judgment that the human rights situation is worsening
Most recently, a delegation from the Inter-American Commission visited Haiti
from May 16 to 20. They found that the human rights situation in Haiti had "dete-
riorated seriously" since their last visit in August 1993. The delegation identified
133 cases of extrajudicial killings between February and May 1994. It found that
a new practice of leaving severely mutilated corpses on the street to terrorize the
populace was being used. The delegation also found evidence of rape and sexual
abuse committed against the wives and relatives of the regime's opponents and
interviewed 20 of the victims. It also identified numerous cases of arbitrary deten-
tion, disappearances, and torture. The delegation attributed full responsibility for
the deteriorating situation to the de facto authorities: the military and their pup-
pets. This is a conclusion which we fully share.
The key to ending these abuses is to resolve the crisis by removing the military
from power and restoring President Aristide to his rightful position.
We are urging the UN and the OAS to maintain the number of International Ci-
vilian Mission observers, and, if possible, to augment their number. At the same
time, we are committed to strong and continuing human rights reporting by our em-
bassy political officers. Our embassy cooperates closely with the ICM and offers
logistical support for its efforts. The U.S. has also pledged $13 million dollars to
fund the operation.
Ambassador Swing regularly joins the ICM to denounce human rights abuses and
confronts the military with their culpability for those abuses. The Ambassador has
personally visited the sites of some of the worse human rights violations, including
Raboteaux, the scene of a massacre in April. In December, I joined the Ambassador
in a visit to the site of Justice Minister Malary's assassination. At that time, we
also initiated an annual human rights award to Haitian human rights activists. Am-
bassador Swing and I presented the first of these awards posthumously to Mr.
Malary, whose family accepted the award at a large public ceremony at the Ambas-
sador's residence; USIS grants have also been made to local human rights activists.
We are also maintaining-and actively considering ways to enhance-our support
for the brave men and women of Haiti's human rights groups, doing noble and dan-
gerous work in the face of overwhelming difficulties.
The situation in Haiti is grim. But the world cares about what happens there, and
the dictators are on notice of that fact. Let me reiterate Ambassador Gray's pledge
that we are committed to taking all necessary steps to restore the democratically
elected government and respect for human rights, to Haiti.
Senator DODI. John, I appreciate your comment on the letter
from Ambassador Swing. I am looking at a letter from John Leon-
ard sent to Mr. Martin, and will ask that it be included in the
[The information referred to follows:]
81-184 0 94 4
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC, 20520,
(postmarked June 20, 1994).
Mr. Ian Martin,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2400 N Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20037-1153
DEAR MR. MARTIN: Thank you for your letter of May 26 concerning the contents
of a cable that had appeared in the press recently. I have been asked to reply on
behalf of the Deputy Secretary.
After receiving your letter, I reread the cable in question. Clearly, it needs to be
viewed in its proper context. The Embassy in Port-au-Prince consistently and abun-
dantly reports on the complex human rights situation in Haiti. These many reports
demonstrate the high level of concern the U.S. Government has over the deteriorat-
ing situation, and the respect that we have for the various organizations, including
most notably the ICM, that monitor the human rights situation.
The Embassy's job is to report the facts as it sees them. Our Embassy reporting
officers, in whom we place great trust and in whose integrity we have complete con-
fidence, routinely investigate human rights abuse cases. While the ICM and the Em-
bassy may occasionally differ on interpretations of specific events or aspects of the
situation, the thrust of the Embassy's reporting is that the Haitian military and its
allies are the primary cause of the human rights violations in Haiti. In this conclu-
sion is certainly no disagreement between ICM and the U.S. Embassy.
In conclusion, I would like to underscore the commitment of the U.S. Government,
the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, and our Ambassador and his staff there to the
protection and promotion of human rights in Haiti. I also believe that ICM plays
a vital role in Haiti, especially so as the human rights situation worsens.
Thank you for bringing your concerns to our attention. Please feel free to write
again if I may be any further assistance.
JOHN P. LEONARD,
Director, Haiti Working Group.
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
May 26, 1994.
Mr. Strobe Talbott,
Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, 20520
DEAR MR. TALIO'rr: I was from April to December 1993 Deputy Executive Direc-
tor/Director for Human Rights of the OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in
Haiti. In that capacity, I was in periodic contact with officials of the U.S. Embassy
in Port-au-Prince, and also had the opportunity to brief Assistant Secretary Alexan-
der Watson on the human rights situation when he visited in Haiti in September
I am writing now in connection with the communication dated April 12 from Am-
bassador Swing which has been cited in Newsweek, the Miami Herald, the New
York Times and elsewhere. I have read this communication in its entirety, and am
deeply disturbed by it, although I also have to say that it confirmed concerns I had
from my own experience during 1993.
The most widely quoted conclusion of the communication is the allegation, set
forth in its summary, that:
"The Haitian left manipulates and fabricates human rights abuses as a
propaganda tool, or wittingly or unwittingly assisted in this effort by
human rights NGOs and by the ICM."
This is a slur on both the competence and the integrity of the ICM. Although I
have had no responsibility for the ICM's reporting since its return in 1994, as Direc-
tor for Human Rights I played a major role in selecting its personnel, especially
those with the central role in its research and investigation department. I did so
with the highest regard to the care and objectivity of human rights reporting, to
which I had previously been committed in my work for Amnesty International (of
which I was Secretary General from 1986 to 1992, and before that Head of the Asia
Region of its Research Department). I was fortunate to be able to recruit a number
of people with solid experience in human rights fact-finding, in previous positions
with the United Nations and with NGOs of proven authority, and with them was
responsible for the training of observers and other human rights staff of the ICM.
Some of these experienced staff have again been responsible for the ICM's reporting
in 1994, under the direction of Colin Granderson and Ti6bile Dram6, whom I know
to be persons of the highest integrity.
I also wish to say that the ICM's experience in its extensive contacts with Haitian
human rights NGOs was that they made whatever efforts they could in very dif-
ficult circumstances to establish the facts regarding specific violations, and were cer-
tainly not involved in the "fabrication" of abuses.
When I attended the National Security Council briefing on Haiti on May 13,
where this communication was referred to, I said that this allegation required an
on-the-record retraction and apology. I continue to feel strongly that this is the case,
and am so far unaware of any such statement.
There are many other disturbing aspects of the communication, especially the sug-
gestion that incidents of rape reported by the ICM are a case of "violence as propa-
ganda." No evidence whatever is advanced for this; there is no indication that the
Embassy has attempted its own investigation of these incidents; and I understand
that the Embassy made no attempt to probe the evidence the ICM had collected,
including medical examinations.
I had the experience in 1993 of seeing a communication from the Embassy sup-
posedly based on a meeting with me and a senior colleague, in which our assess-
ment of the human rights situation at the time was substantially distorted. I also
wrote to Assistant Secretary John Shattuck on February 3, after the State Depart-
ment human rights report was published, setting out why, in my opinion, despite
positive comments on the credibility as well as the effect of the presence of the ICM
and citations of our findings, the Haiti section of the report did not correctly reflect
the ICM's published or private assessment of the nature and extent of human rights
I very much welcome the strong concern President Clinton and members of the
administration have expressed regarding the human rights situation in Haiti in re-
cent statements. The administration has also expressed a desire to see the work of
the ICM extended, and must therefore be concerned that its morale and credibility
is not undermined. I hope you will agree that a clear repudiation of what has be-
come public and an insistence on more objective human rights reporting from the
Embassy in Port-au-Prince are essential in this context.
I am sending copies of this letter to Assistant Secretary Watson, Assistant Sec-
retary Shattuck, and Deputy Assistant to the President, NSC, Samuel Berger.
Senator DODD. It is postmarked June 20, a few days ago, and it
is not quite the same letter that Ambassador Swing sent. There are
totally different reactions to the criticism. Are you familiar with
this letter, as well?
Mr. SHATTUCK. I have seen that letter, Senator, and I am aware
that it has been sent. I think that it states broadly the importance
the role of the ICM. I do not think it takes the personal approach
of Ambassador Swing, who has been on the scene and has written
the kind of letter that I have described which I think is an appro-
priate response with respect to the reporting that came directly out
of the Embassy.
Senator DODD. Here he says the Embassy's jobs is to report the
facts as it sees them, in effect restating, I gather, the cable. And
yet Ambassador Swing's letter admits in effect that the cable was
incorrect. They seem to be totally inconsistent responses.
Mr. SHATTUCK. Well, I think the Ambassador is, as I say, on the
scene, and I think he is aware of the circumstances regarding the
nuances and ways in which reporting may be coming out of the
Embassy. I also want to point out that this particular cable is one
of literally hundreds that have been coming from the Embassy. The
policy of the United States has become, in all the ways that have
been described in the earlier portions of the hearing, particularly
aggressive vis-a-vis the regime. That policy has been significantly
affected by the human rights reporting, not only from the Embassy
but of course from the international monitors of the UN, the OAS,
and nongovernmental organizations.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, John. Mark, please bring
the microphone closer so we can hear you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK SCHNEIDER, ASSISTANT ADMINIS-
TRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, AGEN-
CY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also submit my
statement for the record and I will summarize it.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Haiti have been living in an ever
deepening state of crisis brought on by the September 1991 coup
by the military and its small band of antidemocratic supporters.
The de facto regime is stealing government resources. The military
and paramilitary forces have shown total disregard for human
rights. They have brought desolation and chaos to Haiti.
The illegitimate dictators of Haiti are alone and isolated, with
the weight of nearly the entire world thrown against them. They
have no allies, no friends, and no future. The return of constitu-
tional government to Haiti and the restoration of President
Aristide must be the next step in this process.
Until that happens, the United States in concert with other do-
nors will continue to provide humanitarian assistance to mitigate
the effects of the crises on the Haitian people. Together with other
donors we are now feeding more than 1.4 million Haitians each day
at about 2,500 feeding centers in schools, hospitals, orphanages,
and community-based canteens.
The U.S.-sponsored programs alone are feeding approximately
980,000 Haitians. We are attempting to increase that to 1.3 mil-
The programs are operated by CARE, the Catholic Relief Serv-
ices, and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency. I think we
should all take pride in the heroic efforts of those volunteers work-
ing in the field under the most difficult circumstances.
In addition, we are carrying out and sponsoring with both pri-
vate volunteer organizations and U.S. and Haitian NGO's health
services and AIDS prevention services accessible to about 2.2 mil-
lion of Haiti's people.
At the same time, somewhat in response to the increase in
human rights abuses, killings, and disappearances that have been
mentioned, USAID is working to design a human rights fund to
provide direct assistance through Haitian NGO's directly to the vic-
tims and their families.
Obviously, while our humanitarian assistance program is de-
signed to relieve some of the pain and suffering, ultimately only
the restoration of democracy will allow each Haitian to enjoy basic
As both you and special advisor Gray have emphasized, in the
immediate aftermath of the departure of the illegal military de
facto regime, Haiti and President Aristide will face a devastated
economy, a breakdown of law, and collapsed public institutions.
In that context the international community has begun to con-
sider how it can respond immediately upon the return of President
There are three things that are essential. First, the humani-
tarian support system for the most vulnerable of Haiti's population
must be maintained.
Second, the economy must be reactivated, jobs created, farmers
given access to seed and credit, businesses assisted in reopening
their doors, and normal commerce restored. Small entrepreneurs
will need assistance to get started again.
Third, highly visible actions are required to demonstrate that the
restoration of basic public services has begun. We need to finance
government operations in the first several months before normal
tax revenue can begin to flow and before international financial
flows can be restored.
In that context, as you mentioned, we need to talk about, prepar-
ing and supplying health clinics, schools, undertaking urgent public
works projects, et cetera.
I believe we supplied the committee with a chart which attempts
really to summarize the very detailed emergency economic recovery
plan that was produced about a year ago in conjunction with the
World Bank, the UNDP, ourselves, and other international donors
that focused on several aspects of the recovery program including
infrastructure, agriculture and industry, and public social services.
That part of the plan was estimated to require about $195 mil-
lion, and the emergency economic recovery plan within the overall
context of recovery was a portion of total need. In addition to that,
as my testimony notes, we have to consider clearing arrears for the
international financial institutions, beginning to deal with the
problem of balance of payments and dealing with other aspects of
rebuilding the government structure.
Senator DODD. Was this a U.S. commitment, or was it world-
Mr. SCHNEIDER. This is a worldwide consideration of what was
needed with some estimates by the international financial institu-
tions of what they were ready to program, including projects that
they had frozen that they would restart after an economic program
is put together in conjunction with President Aristide.
Senator DODD. I will put these in the record, the Haiti Recovery
Plan, First Year.
[The information referred to follows:]
Haiti Recovery Plan-1st Year
[Approximately $500 million]
Economic recovery-60 percent
GovtlPolitical Institution Building-25 percent
Emergency Economic Recovery Plan-EERP-1993
Agriculture and Industry-26 percent
Public Social Services-26 percent
Senator DODD. So, it is $500 million the first year and $195 mil-
lion in 1993?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That $195 million was the estimate last summer
of cost after restoration. That would be necessary until the econ-
omy begins to recover.
You have to maintain the humanitarian program, carry out this
emergency economic recovery plan, and clear the arrears that the
Haiti Government faces. Last September the arrears was $42 mil-
lion. Now it's $70 million. And in addition, the government needs
to function. So, everything that we looked at last year essentially
is as bad or worse.
In that context, we have begun to talk with the international fi-
nancial institutions, the United Nations, the UNDP particularly,
and bilateral development agencies of other countries. I would say
that they are all essentially ready to participate in refining the
plan that was done last year, taking account of the current situa-
tion and the increased chaos on the ground in Haiti, and then to
begin to respond with resources. And we have begun to talk with
them about how that can move forward with President Aristide as
soon as the solution to the crisis takes place.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Could I say, Mr. Chairman, there is one last
point. Obviously there is a price in helping Haiti rebuild, but it is
a price with a purpose, a price to be borne in the highest and finest
traditions of the American people.
Haiti will need the world's help not as a dole but to give the Hai-
tian people a chance for rebuilding a fair, just, and democratic soci-
ety, a chance at healing the violence that has seared their land, a
change at creating a nation in which they can raise their families
without having to fear for their lives.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee.
The people of Haiti have been living in an ever-deepening state of crisis brought
on by the September 1991 coup by the military and their small band of anti-demo-
cratic supporters. The de facto regime is stealing government resources and the
military and paramilitary forces have shown a total disregard for human rights.
They have brought desolation and chaos to Haiti.
The economy is devastated; the rule of law has completely broken down since
Minister Malary was assassinated on the streets of Port-au-Prince last October; the
social sector has collapsed-only food and health programs sponsored by the United
States and others in the international donor community are protecting many of the
In the past days, this crisis has intensified. The illegitimate dictators of Haiti are
alone and isolated with the weight of nearly the entire world thrown against them.
They have no allies, no friends, no future.
Haiti is now in the grip of such powerful international measures that a resolution
is inevitable. The return of constitutional government to Haiti-the restoration of
President Aristide-will be the next step.
Until that happens, the United States, in concert with other donors, will continue
to provide humanitarian assistance to mitigate the effects of the crisis on the Hai-
The United States and other donors now are feeding some 1.4 million poor Hai-
tians each day at 2,500 feeding centers in schools, hospitals, orphanages and com-
munity based cantines. These U.S.-sponsored programs now reach about 980,000
Haitians and we plan to reach as many as 1.3 million. The programs are operated
by CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Adventist Development and Relief
Agency (ADRA). We should all take pride in the heroic efforts of these people work-
ing in the field in the most difficult imaginable circumstances.
To reduce death and suffering among those most at risk from disease, an emer-
gency health assistance program is providing critical medical, child survival, epide-
miological surveillance, family planning and AIDS prevention services to about 2.2
million of Haiti's 6.7 million people. USAID-sponsored health services are delivered
through nine U.S. private volunteer organizations, forty Haitian non-government or-
ganizations (NGOs), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). These programs are being expanded to provide
wider support for child survival efforts.
Canada and the European Union, among other international donors, are also ac-
tively working through local NGOs to provide relief.
The United States also supports a job creation program providing employment to
the poorest Haitians to improve public sanitation, restore collapsing infrastructure,
counteract environmental degradation and support small farmers. The program has
provided jobs to more than 16,000 Haitians. One result has been the removal of
180,000 cubic meters of solid waste and sediment from the streets and drainage sys-
tem of Port-au-Prince. We estimate that the income for each person employed pro-
vides for the basic food needs of up to five people, helping to relieve the strain on
the feeding centers.
Support also continues for nongovernmental organizations working in the areas
of human rights and strengthening civil society. The United States is currently
funding three Haitian NGOs which provide civic education, legal aid and prison
monitoring. Given the repression in Haiti today, implementation of these programs
is extremely difficult. As a result, USAID has recently designed a human rights
fund to provide direct assistance to human rights victims. The Fund will provide
small grants to human rights groups for direct assistance to the victims and their
All of these efforts to assist Haiti's poorest are being conducted under extremely
difficult circumstances. The shutdown of commercial air flights and the new sanc-
tions impose new problems in moving supplies. We are taking a series of steps to
insure the continued flow of necessary humanitarian supplies, including special ex-
emption provisions incorporated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), ex-
pedited license procedures and help in arranging charter humanitarian flights.
Conditions in Haiti are changing minute-by-minute as the tighter sanctions hit
home. We are doing what we can to ease the impact on the poor. We recognize the
pain, but we must all recognize that it is absolutely essential that the constitutional
government be restored. That is why the restrictions are in place. We must all re-
member the Haitian people are suffering because of repression by the only remain-
ing military government in the Western Hemisphere, besides Cuba. Our humani-
tarian assistance program is designed to relieve some of this pain, but, ultimately,
only the restoration of democracy will allow each Haitian to enjoy basic human
Soon, we all hope, constitutional government will be restored, and Haiti can begin
to rebuild. But in the immediate aftermath of the departure of the illegal military
oppressors, Haiti will face:
A devastated economy: rampant inflation, soaring unemployment, empty
government coffers; public employees clamoring to be paid; competing claims for
almost zero financial capital; a wrecked infrastructure; no foreign exchange re-
serves to cover imports essential to sustain and reactivate the economy; and a
projected arrears to the international financial institutions of $70 million as of
today, mounting to $79 by the end of 1994.
A breakdown of law: non-existent rule of law; civic organizations stifled and
their leadership in disarray; government ministries unable to carry out minimal
functions; and distrust between those with opposing political views and no
mechanisms to foster dialogue and reconciliation.
Collapsed public institutions: non-functioning government services; a
breakdown of public health services; and a devastated primary school system
with only one-third of all school age children enrolled and only 50 percent of
the teachers literate and able to calculate a simple math equation.
As Special Advisor Gray has indicated, a modified United Nations Mission in
Haiti is being designed and organized to help insure civic order following restoration
of constitutional government.
Three fundamental actions are essential upon the return of President Aristide,
and the international community is poised to assist in each.
First, the humanitarian support system for the most vulnerable of Haiti's popu-
lation must be maintained. The food and health needs of the poorest of Haiti's citi-
zens will require continued external assistance. I can assure the Committee that the
U.S. Government will continue to provide the bulk of that support through our U.S.
and Haitian grantees. We would hope that the need for those programs would di-
minish over time as the poor in Haiti have opportunities to participate in the eco-
nomic life of their country.
Second, the economy must be reactivated, jobs created, farmers given access to
seed and credit, businesses assisted in reopening their doors and normal commerce
restored. Small entrepreneurs will need assistance to get started again.
The formal definition of a new emergency recovery program will require the re-
turn of President Aristide and his economic team to their rightful place with the
opportunity to put into effect sound economic policies. It also will require the par-
ticipation of the international financial community, the United Nations system and
the bilateral donor community.
A year ago, the World Bank and the UNDP, along with President Aristide's min-
isters, coordinated the international economic analysis to produce the Emergency
Economic Recovery Plan (EERP). That $195 million program, aimed at the first year
restoration of essential private sector activities, was ready to be put in place when
the military backed away from the Governors Island Agreement. In agriculture,
roads, urban infrastructure, water, sanitation and basic services, the costs of recov-
ery are greater today than at that time.
It is clear that those prior estimates are likely to be insufficient since both eco-
nomic and institutional deterioration has worsened considerably during the past
year. In addition, the level of financial chaos in Haiti has risen.
Clearing arrears and finding the foreign exchange assistance to cover imports,
particularly food, during the first several months are likely to require the most ur-
gent response of the international community.
Third, highly visible actions are required to demonstrate that the government is
restoring basic public services. There will be urgent need to finance government op-
erations during the first several months before normal tax revenues and inter-
national financial flows can be restored.
During this period, government ministries and public services normally delivered
through municipalities likely will have to be reorganized, reformed and financed to
repair and supply health clinics and schools, undertake urgent public works
projects, assure functioning public utilities and restore everyday services. The min-
istries may well be starting from scratch in terms of basic equipment, materials and
Our initial estimates now clearly show that the total cost of the Haiti Recovery
Program may well exceed $1 billion over five years. The first year costs, in fact the
first several months, are undoubtedly going to require front-loading of the support
of the international community.
Special Advisor Gray noted the commitment of the administration to work with
our colleagues to insure not only the return of President Aristide but the success
of his restoration. The USAID mission in Port-au-Prince, along with an inter-agency
U.S. Government team, is working to further refine the essential requirements of
a Haiti Recovery Program. We obviously will be consulting closely with President
Aristide on these matters.
At the same time, we have begun to consult with the other donors about their
views on the costs of the Recovery Program, their own plans for providing support
to Haiti and their willingness to join in organizing an immediate international re-
I am pleased to be able to report that the World Bank, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations,
through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), are poised to partici-
pate in developing that response. The international financial institutions have two
kinds of assistance available after restoration of legitimate government in Haiti.
First, they are prepared to help on balance of payments support. Second, they have
already planned infrastructure projects which were frozen and will be reactivated.
Disbursements are expected to exceed some $150 million for the first year.
In addition, many of the international bilateral assistance agencies also have
planned allocations for a restored government. They have expressed to us their in-
tention to respond across the board in the humanitarian, financial and development
programs. Those commitments exceed several hundred million dollars for the first
year to 18 months.
Although exceedingly uncertain, it is possible that as much as $500 million could
become available over this first time frame from all sources, including USAID's
budget request for Fiscal Year 1995 of $86 million.
Mr. Chairman, the design of a program for restoring Haiti, to be triggered by a
return of constitutional government, is an ongoing work which will involve your
committee and the rest of the Congress, many elements of the executive branch, the
constitutional government of Haiti, donor nations, international financial institu-
tions and private volunteer organizations in and out of Haiti. There will be plenty
of work to go around.
Haiti is in desperate condition, and success in rebuilding that often tragic land
will require significant outside assistance. It is in the interest of the United States
to make sure that assistance arrives.
There is a price, of course, in helping Haiti rebuild, but it is a price with a pur-
pose, a price to be borne in the highest and finest traditions of the American people.
Haiti will need the world's help, not as a dole, but to give the Haitian people a
chance at building a fair and just and democratic society, a chance at healing the
violence that has seared their land, a chance at creating a nation in which they can
raise their families without having to fear for their lives.
It will be the most important challenge the people of Haiti will ever face. It will
be difficult to accomplish. Some will say it is impossible. But I believe with all my
heart that it is possible. And, if it can be done-by Haitians with our help-it will
set a new standard in the post-Cold War world. It will demonstrate that there is
hope for all people-if they choose the path of peace, reconciliation and democracy.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mark. Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK C. SMITH, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECU-
RITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I
will summarize my statement and submit the text for the record.
Senator DODD. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. The Department of Defense fully supports the Presi-
dent's goal of restoring constitutional government in Haiti. We are
helping to enforce U.N. sanctions, providing support for migrant
interdiction and refugee processing, providing security for U.S. per-
sonnel in Haiti, and preparing to participate in a revitalized United
Nations mission in Haiti once circumstances permit.
Mr. Chairman, you asked that my testimony focus on steps being
taken to enforce the economic sanctions embargo. Naval vessels of
the USA Command are deployed around Haiti as they have been
since President Clinton announced their deployment on October 15,
1993. Allied participation has included Canada, Argentina, France,
the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Our ships operate
under U.S. command and flag.
The Commander of Joint Task Force 120 is embarked aboard
USS Wasp. Ten U.S. Naval vessels are assigned to Joint Task
Group 120.1, nearly double the number we testified to before this
committee in March.
Since its inception last fall, Joint Task Group 120.1 has inspected
over 1,100 vessels. More than 100 ships have been denied passage
to Haiti either because their cargoes were not fully accessible for
inspection or because they carried prohibited items.
Three weeks ago we inaugurated a more strident enforcement re-
gime to divert suspected violators to port for a thorough inspection
process. This change has produce immediate, tangible, and gratify-
ing results. The new enforcement regime has also had a deterrent
effect upon vessels contemplating the evasion of U.N. trade restric-
Prohibited cargoes, which originally included only imported
weapons and fuel, were expanded by U.N. Security Resolution 917
to include all commercial goods except humanitarian aid and food.
While previous inspection procedures diverted perhaps 1 vessel
in 10, that number has now risen to approximately 1 in 4. Ships
found carrying contraband are offered to the country of origin or
are disposed at the behest of the flag state. These steps have pro-
duced a sharp decline in the number of vessels seeking to call at
While maritime enforcement efforts have been effective, problems
continue to plague attempts to stop the flow of fuel and other com-
modities across Haiti's land border with the Dominican Republic.
Recent estimates suggest that contraband Dominican gasoline and
diesel fuel satisfy approximately 40 percent of Haiti's pre-embargo
consumption requirements. The price of gas in Port-au-Prince has
dropped from as high as $12 a gallon to $4.59 per gallon.
Technical experts from the USA Command recently completed an
assessment of the personnel and equipment requirements for a
land border monitoring effort. We have also been working with the
Dominican Republic Navy to establish procedures for cooperative
enforcement in coastal waters. We expect these cooperative efforts
to pay dividends in the coming weeks as the enforcement regime
In addition to sanctions enforcement, the ships of Joint Task
Force 120.1 support the Coast Guard's alien migrant interdiction
operation. Under an agreement between the Department of De-
fense and the Coast Guard, ships of one force can be temporarily
assigned to the tactical control of the other.
On May 8, President Clinton announced that we would imple-
ment new procedures to adjudicate asylum claims by Haitian immi-
grants interdicted at sea. The Department of Defense is supporting
this operation with a hospital ship, the USNS Comfort, and char-
tered commercial vessels. The first such center is operating at
The Turks and Caicos Islands Government has also agreed to es-
tablish a processing center on Grand Turk, 90 miles north of Haiti.
And based on recent migrant activity, the administration is taking
steps to increase the capacity at Guantanamo Naval Base.
As in other areas of tension, we stand ready to evacuate Amer-
ican citizens, should that become necessary. Currently, the threat
to American lives and property in Haiti is low. Anti-American and
anti-foreign sentiment could increase, however, as new sanctions
begin to bite.
When a political settlement is reached, and upon the invitation
of the Haitian Government, a decision by President Clinton, and
after a consultation with Congress, the Department of Defense is
prepared to participate in a U.N. mission to help train the Haitian
military and assist in the transition to a constitutional government.
Specifically, we expect that a responsibility of the military com-
ponent of a U.N. mission to Haiti will be to help Haiti's military
attain a high degree of professionalism, train the Haitian police
force, help maintain basic civic order, and protect international per-
sonnel engaged in humanitarian assistance efforts.
Planing for UNMIH is proceeding. There are, however, as Mr.
Gray testified, no firm details to give at this time. U.S. forces de-
ployed in support of a U.N. mission to Haiti will have the numbers,
equipment, and rules of engagement needed to carry out their mis-
sion and protect themselves.
The Department of Defense supports the administration's firm
stand with the United Nations and other members of the inter-
national community in demanding that the Haitian military relin-
quish power to legitimate civilian authorities.
The twin imperatives of U.S.-Haiti policy-democratic reform
and economic renewal-must be achieved if Haiti is to be secure
and stable enough to sustain a viable government.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF FREDERICK C. SMITH
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to describe the Department of De-
fense's role in supporting the Administration's Haiti policy.
The Department of Defense fully supports the President's goal of restoring con-
stitutional government to Haiti. We are pursuing this policy through the coordi-
nated efforts of international diplomacy, reinforced by economic sanctions against
the military regime. Objectives of that policy include:
to restore democracy to Haiti and the return of Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's
duly elected president;
to assist the democratic government of Haiti in reforming and reorganizing Hai-
ti's governmental institutions, including the police and military, to create condi-
tions under which democracy can flourish and basic human rights are protected;
to promote economic renewal and sustainable growth.
The Department of Defense has played, and will continue to play, an active role
in achieving these policy objectives. Specifically, our role is to: (1) help enforce UN
sanctions, (2) provide support for migrant interdiction and refugee processing, (3)
provide security for U.S. personnel in Haiti, and (4) participate in a revitalized Unit-
ed Nations Mission in Haiti once circumstances permit.
Mr. Chairman, in your request for today's hearing, you asked that the Depart-
ment of Defense focus on steps being taken by the United States and other govern-
ments in the hemisphere to enforce the economic embargo against Haiti's illegal
military regime. That request is especially timely in view of recent measures adopt-
ed by the international community to increase pressure on Haiti's rulers to relin-
quish power and to enforce sanctions more effectively.
The Department of Defense is helping to enforce the UN embargo, an embargo
whose scope has broadened considerably in recent weeks in tandem with efforts to
make enforcement more credible and comprehensive. Naval vessels of the United
States Atlantic Command (USACOM) are deployed around Haiti, as they have been
since the President announced their deployment on October 15, 1993. Allied partici-
pation has included Canada, Argentina, F rance, United Kingdom, and the Nether-
Our ships operate under U.S. command and flag. The Commander, Joint Task
Force 120 (CJTF 120), the task force to which this naval task group is assigned,
is embarked aboard USS Wasp, now operating routinely in the Western Caribbean.
Ten U.S. Naval vessels are assigned to Joint Task Group (JTG) 120. 1-nearly dou-
ble the number since we testified before this committee in March. This force in-
cludes destroyers, frigates, and a support ship, recently augmented by Cyclone-class
fast patrol boats. These boats provide a near-shore interception capability that we
previously lacked, thereby closing a major gap in maritime sanctions enforcement.
Since its inception last fall, JTG 120.1 has performed on-board inspections of over
1,100 vessels. More than 100 ships have been denied passage to Haiti, either be-
cause their cargoes were not fully accessible for inspection or because they carried
Three weeks ago, we inaugurated a more stringent enforcement regime that di-
verts suspected violators to port for a thorough inspection process. This change-
coupled with enhanced sanctions and an expanded area of operations-has produced
immediate, tangible, and gratifying results. The new enforcement regime also had
a deterrent effect upon vessels contemplating the evasion of UN trade restrictions.
Prohibited cargoes, which originally were included only imported weapons and
fuel, were expanded by UNSCR 917 to include both import and export of all com-
mercial goods except humanitarian aid and food.
While previous inspection procedures diverted perhaps one vessel in ten, that
number has now risen to approximately one in four. Whereas violators previously
faced little more than the inconvenience of diversion from Haitian ports and the un-
certain promise of eventual flag state prosecution, operators now face immediate
loss of their vessel. Ships found carrying contraband are no longer returned to their
crews, but are offered to the country of origin or are disposed at the behest of the
flag state. Taken together, these steps have produced a sharp decline in the number
of vessels seeking to call at Haitian ports.
While maritime enforcement efforts have been highly effective, problems continue
to plague attempts to staunch the flow of fuel and other commodities across Haiti's
land border with the Dominican Republic. Recent estimates suggest that contraband
Dominican gasoline and diesel fuel satisfy approximately 40 percent of Haiti's pre-
embargo consumption requirements. As smuggling networks have become more so-
phisticated and dispersed, the price of gas in Port-au-Prince has dropped from as
high as $12 per gallon to $4.59 per gallon.
But here, too, we and others are moving aggressively to strengthen the embargo.
Following up on the work of a UN survey team, which proposed a phased deploy-
ment of international observers along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border and in
adjacent coastal waters, U.S. and UN officials have secured President Balaguer's
commitment to curb massive smuggling activities.
Technical experts from USACOM recently completed an assessment of the person-
nel and equipment requirements for a land border monitoring effort. At the same
time, we have been working with the Dominican Republic Navy to fashion proce-
dures for cooperative enforcement in coastal waters. Several other nations have ex-
pressed a willingness to contribute to a multilateral border monitoring program. Al-
though cross-border fuel smuggling remains a problem, we expect these cooperative
efforts to pay dividends in the coming weeks as the enforcement regime takes shape.
The U.S. has instituted new controls on commercial air service to Haiti, as well
as broad controls on financial transactions (other than small-dollar remittances by
which Haitians working in the U.S. support relatives back home). Each of these
steps will further isolate the military regime and increase pressure on Cedras, Fran-
cois, and Biamby to step aside.
Support for Migrant Interdiction and Refugee Processing
In addition to sanctions enforcement, the ships of Joint Task Group 120.1 support,
as necessary, the U.S. Coast Guard's Alien Migrant Interdiction Operation (AM10).
Under an agreement between the Department of Defense and Coast Guard, ships
of one force can be temporarily assigned to the tactical control of the other. For ex-
ample, a Coast Guard cutter may intercept, board, and inspect cargo vessels bound
for Haiti. Likewise, Navy ships may interdict boats carrying Haitian migrants,
though only the Coast Guard repatriates Haitian migrants found to be ineligible for
On May 8th President Clinton announced that we would implement new proce-
dures to adjudicate asylum claims by Haitian migrants interdicted at sea. To do
this, we have established Migrant Processing Centers (MPCs) in the Caribbean. The
Department of Defense is supporting this operation with a hospital ship, USNS
Comfort, and chartered commercial vessels. The first such center is operating at
These vessels house the Haitian migrants during their screening process. The
Turks and Caicos islands government agreed, in principle, to establish a processing
center on Grand Turk, 90 miles north of Haiti. Haitians approved for refugee status
at either site will be moved to Guantanamo Naval Base for final arrangements for
admission to the U.S. or resettlement in other countries.
Security for U.S. Personnel
Currently, the threat to American lives and property in Haiti is low. Anti-Amer-
ican and anti-foreign sentiment could easily increase, however, as new sanctions
begin to bite. We continue to monitor the threat and to maintain forces in an alert
posture. As in other areas of tension, we stand ready to evacuate American citizens
should that become necessary.
Support for a UN Mission
When a political settlement is reached, and upon invitation of the Haitian govern-
ment, a decision by the President of the U.S., and after appropriate consultation
with the Congress, the Department of Defense is prepared to participate in a UN
mission to help train the Haitian military and assist in the transition to constitu-
tional government. The Department of State is consulting with members of the
United Nations on composition, duration, and scope of activities of such a mission
to ensure that it can safely carry out its mandate. Defense is working with other
U.S. agencies to determine appropriate roles and missions.
We expect that a responsibility of the military component of a UN mission to
Haiti will be technical assistance along the lines requested by President Aristide in
a July 24, 1993 letter to the UN Secretary General. In his letter, President Aristide
expressed hope that such assistance would help Haiti's military attain the degree
of professionalism required to discharge its constitutional obligations, ensure the se-
curity and integrity of the Republic, help the nation in time of natural disaster, and
carry out development tasks.
In a June 5, 1994 speech to the Organization of American States (OAS) Foreign
Ministers, President Aristide called for a reconstituted and strengthened UNMIH
that would also help maintain essential civic order and protect international and
other personnel engaged in human rights and humanitarian assistance efforts.
On June 6, the Ad Hoc Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS approved a reso-
lution that endorsed President Aristide's report. The relevant provision of the reso-
lution calls upon "all member states to support measures by the United Nations to
strengthen the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in order for it to comply
with its terms of reference to assist in the restoration of democracy through the
professionalization of the Armed Forces and the training of a new police force, help-
ing to maintain essential civic order, and protect international and other organiza-
tion's personnel involved in human rights and other humanitarian efforts in Haiti."
The U.S. supports this approach.
U.S. forces deployed in support of a UN Mission in Haiti will have the numbers,
equipment, and rules of engagement needed to protect themselves and carry out
their mission. For any U.S. military role in Haiti, we will have clear objectives,
goals, and a delineated timetable for accomplishing mission objectives.
The Department of Defense supports the administration's firm stand with the UN
and other members of the international community in demanding that the Haitian
military relinquish power to legitimate civilian authorities. We remain committed
to helping establish a constitutional democracy in Haiti. We are helping enforce the
embargo against Haiti, and we are prepared to safeguard American lives and prop-
erty, if necessary. The twin imperatives of U.S. Haiti policy-democratic reform and
economic renewal-must be achieved if Haiti is to be secure and stable enough to
sustain a viable democracy.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. Mr. Newcomb,
thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF R. RICHARD NEWCOMB, DIRECTOR, OFFICE
OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF THIE TREASURY
Mr. NEWCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be
here today to discuss the role and responsibility of the Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury Department in the im-
plementation and the enforcement of the economic sanctions pro-
gram with respect to Haiti, relying on the President's powers under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United
Nations Participation Act.
In my remarks today I will discuss the increasingly restrictive
economic sanctions that have been imposed against the de facto re-
gime in Haiti, and that were recently augmented on June 21 by the
Executive order affecting U.S. assets of all Haitian nationals resid-
ing in Haiti.
The U.S. Government has tightened sanctions against the de
facto regime and its supporters through a series of measured yet
increasingly comprehensive actions contained in eight Presidential
Executive orders affecting assets blocking, financing, trade, and
At the outset of the Haiti crisis, the President signed an Execu-
tive order in October of 1991 blocking property of the de facto re-
gime, its agencies, instrumentalities, and controlled entities as well
as the legitimate government of Haiti. Also, payments by U.S. per-
sons to the de facto regime were prohibited.
In October of that year another Executive order banned most
trade with Haiti. In June 1993 an Executive order specifically pro-
hibited the sale and supply of arms and petroleum products to
Haiti, and the use of U.S. registered vessels to carry those goods.
Following the failure of the military and the police in Haiti to
fulfill their obligations in the July 1993 Governors Island Agree-
ment, President Clinton issued an Executive order on October 18,
1993 which expanded the categories of blocked persons to include
those who contributed to the obstruction of the agreements or the
U.N. mission in Haiti, perpetuated or contributed to the violence in
Haiti, or materially or financially supported those activities.
Following extensive coordination with the State Department, we
named and designated 83 individuals and 35 entities as so-called
specially designated nationals of the de facto regime in June 1993.
Identification as a specially designated national targets specific in-
dividuals and front companies acting on behalf of the de facto re-
An additional list was published in October 1993 with the names
of 41 additional individuals categorized as blocked entities from
The continued intransigence of the de facto regime, particularly
the officers of the Haitian military in the face of the U.N. resolu-
tions to produce a return of democracy to Haiti resulted in April
1994 in the designation of all officers of the Haitian Armed Forces
as blocked individuals. That action has resulted to date in the addi-
tion of 550 named Haitian military officers to that list.
In May 1994, the President issued an Executive order imple-
menting a tighter trade ban following an additional U.N. Security
Council Resolution to deal with Haitian family members acting on
behalf of the blocked individuals to evade the sanctions. Earlier
this month, on June 2, we began identifying as specially designated
nationals immediate family members of Haitian military officers
and police, major participants in the coup d'etat of 1991.
We also began listing as blocked persons the members of the
Jonaissant regime and those Haitian legislators who have sup-
On June 10, an Executive order prohibited the transfer of funds
from or through the U.S. to Haiti, and to or through the U.S. from
Haiti. Also on June 10, the President broadened the transportation
ban by prohibiting future regularly scheduled commercial pas-
senger flights by U.S. and Haitian air carriers.
Most recently, as a signal of the United States' seriousness and
resolve, a further refinement was made to focus sanctions on those
wealthy Haitian mercantile families who have been instrumental
in supporting the de facto regime. In an Executive order signed on
June 21, President Clinton blocked the U.S. property of all Haitian
nationals residing in Haiti. While all Haitian nationals residing in
Haiti fall within the Executive order's blocking provision, we will
continue to identify by name those individuals associated with the
business elite who are most likely to have assets with U.S. jurisdic-
Senator DODD. Well, now, you were here to hear Mike Barnes.
He went down a list of some people that I would assume were on
the list. Why were they not?
Mr. NEWCOMB. The list is continually updated. As we get names
that are available we put them on the list. More names will be des-
ignated soon. We have currently over 850 names.
Senator DODD. Why do we not just do it across the board? Is
there a lot of resistance in the Treasury to this whole idea?
Mr. NEWCOMB. No, not at all. And, in fact, the President has al-
ready done that. What we are doing by adding additional names is
specifically identifying, in addition to all who fit within the cat-
egory, all Haitian nationals resident in Haiti. These particular per-
son are something that our staff continually looks to, continually
updates, and continually refines. And we have something under re-
view as we speak.
Senator DODD. Well, how do you miss the previous cabinet? How
do you miss the guy? I mean, this is not some obscure Haitian we
are talking about.
Mr. NEWCOMB. Well, as we go through the names of individuals
to be included on the list we work and coordinate with the State
Department to make it as all inclusive as possible. And I anticipate
those individuals we are speaking of will be included.
As I mentioned we have over 850 names and continue to work
to augment that. Theoretically, every individual who is listed in the
Haiti phone book could be on that list because they all fit the class
of Haitian nationals resident in Haiti, so long as we can identify
the nationality and the fact that they have been in Haiti within a
recent number of months after the designation.
So, those names are included. Financial institutions know those
names are included and are acting accordingly.
Senator DODD. Why do we not say that? I mean, it gets to the
point of if you are on the side of this thing you begin to wonder
whether or not people take it seriously. In the last panel, people
pointed out that we seem to be sort of dripping this thing in. Why
do we not make the statement that, in fact, that is what we are
going to do?
Mr. NEWCOMB. Mr. Chairman, we have made that statement and
I will submit to you today for the record the instructions being
given to U.S. financial institutions where that is just unequivocally
clear, and the names that we have sent out, that have been sent
out by the Treasury Department throughout the Federal Reserve
system to all U.S. banks that have international transactions.
That specific statement is included and was included from the
date of the Executive order. That is what the President has done
and that is what we have implemented.
We are now going through the process of naming names. Now we
are a week into it. We are continually updating those names, some-
thing that is a dynamic process that is evolving. As long as we can
be sure that they meet the standard, all Haitian nationals resident
in Haiti, they will included and in effect they are included by the
language of the Executive order and in our implementing instruc-
Senator DODD. To what extent have been in contact with the
other nations, friends of Haiti, where a similar process is going on
so to avoid the transfer, the obvious easy transfer?
Mr. NEWCOMB. Bilateral and multilateral consultations are tak-
ing place with regard to similar financial activities. That is in an
Senator DODD. Are we getting cooperation on this?
Mr. NEWCOMB. That is not something that I have been person-
ally involved in but in meetings I have attended I have been told
that that process is moving forward, yes.
I can amplify that further for you.
Senator DODD. I would like you to.
[The information referred to follows:]
As of late July 1994, the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("FAC") has identified
894 individuals and 36 entities are Blocked Individuals and Entities of Haiti. Of the
individuals listed, 254 have been named principally because they qualify as Haitian
nationals resident in Haiti under Executive Order 12922. The remaining 640 indi-
viduals, of whom 582 are military officers and 25 are military family members, fall
within the criteria of one of the preceding Executive Orders. We believe that nearly
all of these 640 individuals would fall within the criteria of paragraph 3 of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 917.
The Department of State is the appropriate agency to discuss the U.N. procedures
for Haitian individuals who may fit within the scope of UNSCR 917. However, it
is our understanding that most of the 640 individuals specifically identified as meet-
ing those criteria have had their entry to the United States suspended and have
been recommended by the State Department to the United Nations for similar ac-
tions by other countries. FAC's designations of them have caused their assets with
U.S. jurisdiction to be blocked.
Senator DODD. There is a sense of urgency about this. You know,
it does not require a brain surgeon. If you have got assets in the
People's Bank in Bridgeport, Connecticut and you are going to
show up on a list, you move it to some bank in Canada or France
Mr. NEWCOMB. I think the one important point here is that the
administration is looking to work with other foreign governments.
This action taken by the President was an action of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. It was not a multilateral requirement of the U.N. resolu-
However, we are working multilaterally to achieve that goal, and
we are constantly refining these lists. This action took place on
June 21. Here it is a week later, and we anticipate still further
So, I anticipate the exact goal you are after is something that we
will achieve as more names become available. But it is by defini-
tion an all inclusive list-all Haitian nationals resident in Haiti.
Senator DODD. Thank you. Mr. McKinley.
Mr. NEWCOMB. Excuse me, I still have a few more comments.
Senator DODD. I am sorry.
Mr. NEWCOMB. In addition to the punitive blocking action
against the de facto regime and its supporters which was recon-
firmed and amplified by that Executive order, we previously
blocked the Government of Haiti's U.S. property to keep it out of
the hands of the de facto regime.
Acting on the foreign policy advice of the Department of State we
have licensed periodic disbursements from blocked Government of
Haiti accounts to fund the official and diplomatic operations of the
Aristide government both in the United States or abroad.
One of the most important elements of the Haiti program is the
maintenance of an effective humanitarian assistance strategy.
While we continue to administer a forceful sanctions program, we
will never lose sight of the humanitarian needs of the Haitian peo-
ple, and we will attempt to ensure that humanitarian goods will
continue to flow.
The President's Executive order excludes nongovernment organi-
zations which are engaged in humanitarian assistance or in refugee
operations in Haiti. The Haitian business owners blocked in the
Executive order lease property and provide services to the inter-
national humanitarian operations in Haiti, including the State De-
partment's AID, and these business owners also control a signifi-
cant portion of retail food sales in Haiti. We hope to facilitate hu-
manitarian shipments through our licensing procedures.
To assist AID and its approved organizations in Haiti, we have
issued a blanket authorization that makes case-by-case licensing by
the Treasury unnecessary. After State or AID confirm that the hu-
manitarian activities of a nongovernmental organization, or an
NGO, are appropriate, we issue a registration number to the orga-
nization and specific instructions to enable the NGO to route funds
to Haiti without having the payment order rejected or blocked by
a U.S. financial institution. We have issued instructions to all U.S.
banks, including their overseas branches, to honor transactions au-
thorized for the NGO's.
A major concern in imposing tightened sanctions against Haiti
has been to ensure that supplies of essential medicine and food
continue to flow. The embargo exempts a number of commodities
including rice, sugar, beans, wheat flour, cooking oil, corn, corn
flour, milk, edible tallow, and medicine and medical supplies.
We have implemented a system in which payments related to the
export of these commodities can flow freely through the United
States banking system, and have instructed U.S. financial institu-
tions holding accounts for Haitian banks to open special accounts
to handle these authorized transactions.
We have also been working to secure exemptions for humani-
tarian flights to carry the exempt or U.N. approved shipments to
Finally, with regard to enforcement, working through the bank
supervisory agencies and the Customs service, our compliance and
enforcement units have worked to provide the fullest enforcement
at each stage of the Haiti sanctions program. Through our efforts
to date we have assessed numerous monetary penalties against vio-
lators, seized and forfeited goods and merchandize.
Information provided to us by the maritime multilateral interdic-
tion force operating in the sea lanes in Haiti has proven valuable
in identifying vessels which have surreptitiously left the United
States with contraband for Haiti. Vessels which are not U.S.
flagged can be escorted to the nearest U.S. port, and the offending
the cargo removed. Such vessels are then detained or released to
the flag state for such action as they may take.
At each stage of the U.S. sanctions program against Haiti we
have been mindful of the need to balance an effective sanctions
program with the need to maintain the essential flow of humani-
tarian goods. While pursuing sanctions measures calculated to
apply real pressure to the de facto regime and its supporters in
Haiti, we have provided either by exempting language or through
the issuance of licenses means by which humanitarian shipments
can continue. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Newcomb follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. RICHARD NEWCOMB
U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON HAITI
Chairman Dodd and members of the Subcommittee, good afternoon. The Office of
Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department is responsible for the implemen-
tation and enforcement of economic sanctions programs relying on the President's
powers under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act and the United Nations Participation Act with respect to various
countries, including Haiti. In my remarks today, I will discuss the increasingly re-
strictive economic sanctions that have been imposed against the do facto regime in
Haiti that were recently augmented on June 21, 1994 by the President's Executive
The Stiffening Sanctions Against Haiti.-The U.S. Government has tightened
sanctions against the de facto regime and its supporters through a series of meas-
ured, yet increasingly comprehensive actions contained in eight Presidential Execu-
tive orders addressing asset blocking, financing, trade and transportation restric-
At the outset of the Haiti crisis, the President signed Executive Order 12775 on
October 4, 1991, blocking property of the de facto regime, its agencies, instrumental-
ities, and controlled entities, as well as the legitimate Government of Haiti. Under
this standard, following extensive consultation with the State Department, OFAC
designated 83 individuals and 35 entities as Specially Designated Nationals
("SDNs") of the de facto regime in Haiti on June 4, 1993. Identification as a "Spe-
cially Designated National' targets specific individuals and front companies acting
on behalf of Haiti. On October 8, 1991, Executive Order 12779 banned most trade
with Haiti. On June 16, 1993, Executive Order 12853 specifically prohibited the sale
and supply of arms and petroleum products to Haiti, and the use of U.S.-registered
vessels to carry those goods.
Following the failure of the military and police in Haiti to fulfill their obligations
under the July 1993 Governors Island Agreement, President Clinton issued Execu-
tive Order 12872 on October 18, 1993, which expanded the categories of blocked per-
sons to include those who have: (a) contributed to the obstruction of the Agreement
or the U.N. Mission in Haiti, (b) perpetuated or contributed to the violence in Haiti,
or (c) materially or financially supported those activities. Using these criteria, a new
SDN list was published on October 20, 1993, with the names of 41 individuals, cat-
egorized as blocked individuals or entities of Haiti.
The continued intransigence of the de facto regime, particularly the officers of the
Haitian military, in the face of U.N. resolutions to produce a return of democracy
to Haiti, resulted in April, 1994, in the designation of all officers of the Haitian
Armed Forces as blocked individuals. That action has resulted to date in the addi-
tion of 550 named Haitian military officers to the list.
On May 21, 1994, the President issued Executive Order 12917, implementing a
tighter trade ban. Following an additional UN Security Council resolution to deal
with Haitian family members acting on behalf of the blocked individuals to evade
the sanctions, on June 2, 1994, OFAC began identifying as SDNs immediate family
members of Haitian military officers and police, major participants in the coup
d'etat of 1991 or in any of the succeeding illegal governments. We also began listing
as blocked persons the members of the Jonaissant regime and those Haitian legisla-
tors who have supported its. On June 10, 1994, Executive Order 12920 prohibited
the transfer of funds from or through the U.S. to Haiti or to or through the U.S.
from Haiti. Also on June 10, 1994, the President broadened the transportation ban
by prohibiting future regularly scheduled commercial passenger flights by U.S. and
aitian air carriers.
Most recently, as a signal of the United States' seriousness and resolve, a further
refinement was made to focus sanctions on those wealthy Haitian mercantile fami-
lies who have been instrumental in supporting the de facto regime. Through Execu-
tive Order 12922, signed on June 21, 1994, President Clinton blocked the U.S. prop-
erty of all Haitian nationals residing in Haiti. While all Haitian nationals residing
in Haiti fall within the Executive order's blocking provision, we will continue to
identify by name those individuals associated with the business elite who are most
likely to have assets within U.S. jurisdiction. With the latest actions under Execu-
tive Order 12922 and the prior Executive orders, OFAC has designated a total of
894 blocked individuals and 36 blocked entities of Haiti. More will be designated
In addition to the punitive blocking against the de facto regime and its supporters
which was reconfirmed and amplified by Executive Order 12922, we previously
blocked the Government of Haiti s U.S. property to keep it out of the hands of the
de facto regime. Acting on the foreign policy advice of the Department of State, we
have licensed periodic disbursements from blocked Government of Haiti accounts to
fund the diplomatic operations of the Aristide government both in the United States
Blocking, Financial, Trade and Transportation Prohibitions.-On June 21, 1994,
the President signed Executive Order 12922 blocking all property and interests in
property in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons of (a)
any Haitian national resident in Haiti; or (b) any other person subject to the pre-
vious Haiti Executive-orders and Haitian citizens who are members of their imme-
diate families. Excluded from this order is the property of nongovernmental organi-
zations providing essential humanitarian assistance or conducting refugee and mi-
gration operations in Haiti, as identified by OFAC.
Executive Order 12922 takes the significant step of blocking the property of Hai-
tian nationals who are owners of the principal Haitian businesses sustaining the de
facto regime in Haiti. This new Executive order cuts off most business ties between
the Haitian business class and the U.S. business community by blocking the assets
of more than 250 prominent Haitian business owners and their families.
Under the Executive orders, trade and transportation with Haiti have been re-
stricted. No Haitian goods or services may be imported into the United States,
whether directly or through a third country, with the exception of publications and
other informational materials. No goods, technology, or services may be exported to
Haiti from the United States, either directly or through a third country, other than
informational materials and certain humanitarian exports.
Vessel and air traffic to and from Haiti is also highly regulated. A vessel is pro-
hibited from entering U.S. ports unless it demonstrates to us that its calls in Haiti
were for transactions consistent with the U.S. and U.N. sanctions programs. In ad-
dition, virtually all flights to or from Haiti are prohibited, including regularly sched-
uled commercial passenger flights. The ban on commercial air service between the
United States and Haiti will make visits to the United States for the Haitian busi-
ness community less frequent and far more difficult. Cargo and charter flights car-
rying authorized humanitarian assistance to Haiti require approval from our office
and the United Nations.
Humanitarian Aid.-One of the most important elements of the Haiti program is
the maintenance of an effective humanitarian assistance strategy. While we wish
to administer a forceful sanctions program, we will never lose sight of the humani-
tarian needs of the Haitian people and we will attempt to ensure that humanitarian
goods will continue to flow. The President's Executive order excludes nongovern-
mental organizations which are engaged in humanitarian assistance or in refugee
operations in Haiti. The Haitian business owners blocked in the Executive order
lease property and provide services to international humanitarian operations in
Haiti, including the State Department's Agency for International Development
("AID") and these business owners also control a significant portion of retail food
sales in Haiti. We hope to facilitate humanitarian shipments through licensing pro-
To assist All) and its approved organizations in Haiti, we have issued a blanket
license that makes case-by-case licensing by OFAC unnecessary. After State or AID
confirms that the humanitarian activities of a non-governmental organization
("NGO") are appropriate, OFAC issues a registration number to the organization
containing specific instructions to enable the NGO to route funds to Haiti without
having the payment order rejected or blocked by a U.S. financial institution. We co-
ordinate such requests with either AID or State in order to be sure that the activi-
ties of the NGOs are consistent with U.S. foreign policy with respect to Haiti. As
of June 23, OFAC had received 66 requests from humanitarian organizations to reg-
ister projects in Haiti. OFAC issued instructions to all U.S. banks, including their
overseas branches, to honor authorized transactions for NGOs. Accounts and trans-
actions of Haitian citizen personnel who are verified as employed by registered
NGOs will be excluded from blocking. In addition, registered NGOs have been au-
theorized to pay Haitian nationals who provide services to NGO-sponsored projects
and to handle U.S. financing for local contractors working on NGO projects, pro-
vided that no debits are made to blocked accounts.
A major concern in imposing tightened sanctions against Haiti has been to ensure
that supplies of essential food and medicine continue to flow. The embargo exempts
a number of commodities, including rice, beans, sugar, wheat flour, cooking oil, corn,
corn flour, milk, edible tallow, and medicine and medical supplies. We have imple-
mented a system by which payments related to the export of these commodities can
flow freely through the United States banking system and have instructed U.S.
banks holding accounts for Haitian banks to open special accounts to handle author-
ized transactions. We are also streamlining the process of verifying the legitimacy
of funds transfers involving the sale of exempt goods by U.S. exporters, while con-
tinuing our enforcement role in ensuring that unauthorized transfers do not flow be-
tween the United States and Haiti.
In a similar manner, we have been working with the Departments of State and
Transportation and AID to secure exceptions for humanitarian flights to carry ex-
empt or UN-approved shipments to Haiti. This pmeess currently involves requesting
and securing approval of the flight from the UN Sanctions Committee and coordi-
nating approved flights with the FAA. The UN Sanctions Committee has approved
a number of flights, and requests for others are currently being processed.
Sanctions Enforcement.-Working through the bank supervisory agencies and the
Customs Service, OFAC's Compliance and Enforcement Divisions have worked to
provide the fullest enforcement of each stage of the Haitian sanctions program.
through our efforts to date, we have assessed more than 120 civil penalties totalling
nearly a million dollars against violators of various sanctions prohibitions, in addi-
tion to the amounts collected-and merchandise seized and forfeited-by the Cus-
toms Service for concurrent violations of the customs laws. Information provided to
us by the maritime Multilateral Interdict ion Force operating in the sea lanes to
Haiti has proven valuable in identifying vessels which have surreptitiously left the
United States with contraband for Haiti. Although such vessels, which are not U.S.-
flagged, can be escorted to the nearest U.S. port and the offending cargo removed,
authority to seize the vessel is lacking in either the applicable UN resolutions or
Executive Orders, or in the underlying sanctions statutes. As a result, such vessels
can only be detained for release to the flag state for such action as it may wish to
At each stage of the U.S. sanctions program against Haiti, we have been mindful
of the need to balance an effective sanctions program with the need to maintain the
essential flow of humanitarian goods to Haiti. While pursuing sanctions measures
calculated to apply real pressure on the de facto regime and its supporters in Haiti,
we have provided-either by exempting language or through the issuance of li-
censes-the means by which humanitarian shipments can continue.
Thank you for your invitation to appear here today. I would be pleased to answer
any questions you might have.
Senator DODD. Thank you very much. Mr. McKinley.
STATEMENT OF HION. BRUNSON McKINLEY, ACTING DIREC-
TOR, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRA-
TION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. McKINLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to be very brief. I
have a prepared statement that I would like to submit for the
Senator DODD. It will be accepted.
Mr. MCKINLEY. Much of the material in it has already been cov-
ered by Bill Gray earlier and by my colleague, Mr. Smith, just now.
I would simply highlight something Bill Gray already mentioned
and that is our pride and pleasure in having UNHCR and many
NGO's associated with the refugee processing operation that we are
We are also very pleased with the degree of multilateral coopera-
tion that we have encountered from the Jamaican, British, Turks
and Caicos Governments, and many others who are willing to par-
ticipate with the resettlement of the refugee population.