U.S. policy toward, and presence in, Haiti

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U.S. policy toward, and presence in, Haiti hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, September 13, 27, and 28, 1994
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US policy toward, and presence in, Haiti
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Politics and government -- Haiti -- 1986-   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Haiti -- United States   ( lcsh )
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U.S. POLICY TOWARD, AND PRESENCE IN, HAITI





HEARINGS
AND
MARKUP
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 27, AND 28, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs




COLUMBiA UNIVERSITY
LAW LIBRA'P:Y
2

U. S DEPOSITORY
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
84-415 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-046226-6







'377


COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman


SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois


BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California


MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Chief of Staff
RICHARD J. GARON, Minority Chief of Staff
MARA E. RUDMAN, Legal Counsel












CONTENTS


WITNESSES
Page
Tuesday, September 13, 1994:
(No witnesses.)
Tuesday, September 27, 1994:
Hon. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary, Department of State .................... 9
Hon. John M. Deutch, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense ............. 11
Lt. Gen. John J. Sheehan, USMC, Director for Operations Joint Chiefs
of S taff ......................................................................................................... 13
Wednesday, September 28, 1994:
Markup (no witnesses).

APPENDIXES
1. Text of H.J. Res. 416, providing limited authorization for the participation
of United States Armed Forces in the multinational force in Haiti and
providing for the prompt withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from
H aiti ............................................................................... ....................................... 83
2. Material relating to the cost of U.S. Government relief efforts in Haiti,
prepared by the Office for Management and Budget and the Department
of D defense ............................................................................................................. 92
3. September 28, 1994 letter to Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker, House of
Representatives, from Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Hon. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, expressing opposi-
tion to any legislation that would require U.S. military operations in Haiti
to end on a fixed date ................................................... ................................. 96











U.S. POLICY TOWARD, AND PRESENCE IN,
HAITI

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1994
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:05 a.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
(chairman) presiding.
Chairman HAMILTON. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will
come to order.
[Whereupon the committee proceeded with consideration of mis-
cellaneous bills and resolutions.]
Chairman HAMILTON. Before we go to the next order of business,
the chair wants to recognize in the audience our former highly es-
teemed chairman, Dante Fascell.
Dante, we are delighted to see you here. We certainly welcome
you to this room where you have performed with such excellence
over a period of many years.
Mr. Gilman.
STATEMENT OF MR. GILMAN
Mr. GILMAN. I want to join you in welcoming our former distin-
guished chairman. We wish him a happy and healthy retirement.
Mr. Chairman, reviewing the agenda for today's markup session,
which deals with several important matters before the committee,
I notice that we don't have anything with regard to Haiti. Since
that has become such an imminent problem, the Clinton adminis-
tration seems determined about an invasion, and yet this commit-
tee, which does have jurisdiction on foreign affairs matters of the
entire House, has yet to hold a full-scale hearing on whether or not
we should be sending military personnel against the sovereign
state of Haiti.
When Secretary Christopher appeared before us in a hearing last
month, I urged the administration to seek congressional approval
before undertaking any hostile action in Haiti and he replied only
that Congress would be consulted. But even consultations would be
limited to the leadership and senior members of the relevant com-
mittees. They would fall far short of providing for full and open dis-
cussion which is needed with regard to this imminent action.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have said several times that the
President should seek approval of the Congress before sending any
troops into Haiti. But even if he chooses not to seek such approval,
at the very least this committee should schedule a day of hearings






on this issue. I know it is late in the session, but I believe the ad-
ministration would welcome the opportunity to make the case
which, to my mind, frankly, they have not yet made to the Amer-
ican people.
There is a serious question as to whether vital U.S. national in-
terests are at stake in Haiti. The administration's position seems
to be that the use of military force against Haiti is appropriate as
a means to restore democracy and redress egregious human rights
violations. I don't recall such arguments ever being made before in
support of committing our troops to combat abroad.
If the grounds for using military force are undergoing redefini-
tion, then Congress, I say, has an obligation to hear those grounds
and to make their views known before the ships and planes are
launched. I believe we should schedule a public hearing as quickly
as possible to hear from our distinguished Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense on the administration's rationale, before com-
mitting an invasion force to Haiti, and to draft legislation that re-
flects the will of the Congress on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to work with you to organize such
an early hearing so that the Congress and the American people can
learn exactly what is at stake for our Nation in Haiti.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. GOODLING. Would the gentleman yield?
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goodling.
Mr. GOODLING. Earlier on I was looking at H.R. 4541, and I no-
ticed a line that said it is best to help Africans defuse these prob-
lems on their own, and I would suggest the same for Haiti.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield to the gen-
tleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROHRABACHER
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like to ask, why is it that the Presi-
dent of the United States has sought guidance and permission from
the United Nations, and from many, many other countries and gov-
erning bodies around the world in terms of his policy for Haiti, but
we haven't bothered to have any type of consultation ourselves, ei-
ther a hearing or any type of a vote on whether or not the U.S.
Government should be invading Haiti? Isn't this one of our jobs as
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and as elected officials?
INTERVENTION SEEN AS U.S. INITIATIVE
Chairman HAMILTON. The question is directed to the ranking
member, as I recall?
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. Well, I do think we have a responsibility in this,
Mr. Rohrabacher, and I think we should be exploring it. The Presi-
dent has indicated that he is reaching out to other countries and
we are finding very limited support in the Latin American con-
tinent with regard to this issue. The CARICOM nations have com-
mitted just a trickle of support for anything of this nature. And for
peacekeeping, some 17 countries are talking about less than 1,000
troops for peacekeeping. So it will become primarily a U.S. initia-
tive, and I think if it is a U.S. initiative, let's explore it fully here
in the Congress and with the American people.






I don't think there is any urgency that we do it within the next
few days. Certainly, we have a little more time to explore the issue
in the Congress and to make certain the American people under-
stand.
I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey,
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF MR. SMITH
Mr. SMITH. I, too, want to make a strong request to the distin-
guished chairman and to the administration to appear before this
committee so the administration can lay out its rationale for the
proposed invasion. My constituents expressed this most recently
during a series of six town meetings I had in my district, my mail
shows this, and I feel it very strongly personally: the administra-
tion feels it need to make its case to the United Nations Security
Council and seek explicit approval for the use of force from the
United Nations; and then to deny that opportunity to the House of
Representatives and the U.S. Senate, I think the priorities are
backwards. I would hope this type of endeavor would either be sup-
ported or opposed. We should at least be given the opportunity to
vote on it.
The gentleman's request is very modest that the Secretary of
State, perhaps the Secretary of Defense, appear before this commit-
tee so we can have a full understanding of this possible invasion,
what it means in terms of commitment of force, what risks would
likely be incurred by U.S. forces. I had one man come to a town
meeting 2 weeks ago whose son is very likely to be part of the in-
vading force, who said this is nuts. He feels that he is willing to
go, his son is willing to go anywhere where the President sends
im, but there needs to be a very clear coherent rationale for that.
Mr. Chairman, that case has not been made, and I would think
that we should have that vote prior to any invasion.
Mr. GILMAN. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Hyde.
STATEMENT OF MR. HYDE
Mr. HYDE. I want to join those who abhor the fact that we are
apparently not going to get a chance to vote on the invasion of
Haiti by U.S. military troops before the fact. I have gone through
the historical record of all of the military operations that this coun-
try has made, and I find it-I cannot find one where American
lives weren't involved, where American interests weren't involved,
sometimes more peripherally than others, but they were involved,
and this situation where I can see no justification whatsoever.
I carry in my pocket the roll call of the vote on January 1991 on
Desert Storm. I carry it because it reminds me how many people
support gunboat diplomacy where Haiti is concerned but who ab-
horred gunboat diplomacy where any other place in the world was
involved.
If restoring democracy is what we are about, there are many
more places, closer places-Cuba certainly is closer to our shores,
it is in our backyard-I think to fail to let this Congress express
itself, and we represent the people-each of us represents 580,000
people, and to go ahead with this, and while we avert our eyes and






look the other way, reduces us to a state of evisceration. We are
potted plants in the classical sense.
We are not involved in a determination on behalf of our constitu-
ents as to whether we should take a military action against a sov-
ereign country to restore somebody who may or may not be worth
the effort. So I just think we ought to have a chance to say some-
thing about it.
Mr. Smith mentioned that the United Nations got a chance to de-
bate this but the U.S. Congress is now in a subordinate position
to the United Nations. I know they are trying to make the military
subordinate to the United Nations. I know they are trying to make
our foreign policy subordinate to the U.N. By failing to permit us
to debate this, now Congress is subordinate to the United Nations.
I think that is outrageous.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman is recognized for an additional
5 minutes.
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentlelady from Kansas, Mrs. Meyers.
STATEMENT OF MRS. MEYERS
Mrs. MEYERS. Mr. Chairman, I think it has been proved in the
past that we have to have a public understanding and support in
this country of any kind of military action. Without a congressional
debate, we are not going to have that kind of public understanding
and support.
I don't know of one serious writer or thinker about Haiti who
hasn't been extremely concerned about the fact that if we invade
Haiti we are not going to be able to get out. There is not a clear
exit for us, because we will have to stay there in order to keep sta-
bility and peace and to keep Aristide in power.
I think the American people need to know why we are going,
when we can get out. They need to know something of what this
is going to cost, not just in dollars, but in lives, and I think they
don't know any of this yet. The President clearly has not made his
case with the American people, and I think in order to do that he
is going to have to make his case with Congress.
Mr. GILMAN. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Manzullo.
STATEMENT OF MR. MANZULLO
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you.
When I look at the calendar, today we are talking about granting
waiver programs for visas for nannies at a time when American
blood is about to be shed in Haiti. Yet the President is not contact-
ing this body; instead runs off to Belize. I think it is a outrageous.
I think it is an absolute outrage that this American Congress is
being ignored by a President who has no respect for the House of
Representatives, who would rather deal with foreign countries to
make some type of alignment and be involved in some kind of a
peacekeeping operation in Haiti, when this country has been there
between 1917 and World War II.
The issue is the role of the House of Representatives when it is
faced with a President that ignores contacting this body when this
Nation is about ready to go off to war. We need a resolution. At
least we need a debate. If we had debated this instead of the bogus






crime bill 2 weeks ago, we would have done more of a service to
the people of this country.
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HAMILTON
Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair wants to make an observation.
We have a pretty heavy schedule here. I want to get through. I
know that this is a very important matter. I have certainly taken
note of the fact that you want more consultation or briefings. The
Chair has requested those. And I understand the process of con-
sultation began this morning at the White House and will pick up
here.
The administration does face a bit of a problem because we are
going out for another extended break because of the Jewish holiday
this week. But I accept the view that there needs to be much more
consultation with the Congress and that includes briefings, and the
Chair is going to do everything he can to arrange those as promptly
as possible.
On the broader point, let me simply observe that whether you
have prior authorization of military action is a constant question
in American political history. And I think history will show that
the Congress has on occasion granted prior authorization for mili-
tary action, on occasion we have not. On occasion we have done
nothing at all. I don't know that there is anything in the Constitu-
tion or in the War Powers Resolution that requires prior authoriza-
tion.
If we look back over the recent commitment of American forces
in Grenada, in Panama, in Somalia, in Rwanda, and now possibly
in Haiti, and, of course, the Gulf war, you will see quite a check-
ered pattern. There isn't any single process that we have observed.
But I take the point made by my colleagues on the Republican
side that they want more consultation. I think that is perfectly
valid, and more briefings from the administration will soon follow.
Mr. Gedjenson.
CONSULTATION DEBATE
Mr. GEDJENSON. I have always felt that administrations ought to
come before Congress, because if a situation works and works
quickly, they don t need Congress' approval. If it gets more com-
plicated, it needs to be a shared responsibility.
I think, if memory serves, that there was no prior approval in
Grenada. There was no prior approval when our troops were placed
in Lebanon. There was no prior approval in Panama. I think those
were mistakes.
I think it is important for the administration to come before the
Congress. I hope as the parties through the years change back and
forth, my colleagues will join me in my view that any administra-
tion ought to get prior approval.
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
I think the idea of briefings and consultation are important. I
think it would be instructive. And I was wondering if you might
pull up the Congressional Record speeches of, just as a sample,
members of this committee on the subject of prior authorization,
the role of executive authority, the constitutionality of the War
Powers Resolution and the role of Congress, just to match what






people are saying now with what they have said in the past about
the inherent rights of the Commander in Chief vis-a-vis the power
of Congress. I think it would be a reasonable piece of information
to produce.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield?
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Berman, do you yield-Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. In the military operations that you cited a
moment ago, don't you differentiate between a situation where
there is an emergency situation or where secrecy is important, as
compared to this situation in Haiti where we have had a President
announcing an invasion time and time again.
Mr. GEJDENSON. The Panama situation is probably closer than
the Grenada invasion, which was of a critical island over which we
now have control. I think Mr. Berman's approach may be the best
one to take, looking at a historical analogy here. I said at the be-
ginning of my statement-reclaiming my time-I forget who said
this, "it is the hobgoblin of small minds to seek perfect consist-
ency," but I do think it is a better policy for this country, as dif-
ficult as it may be for a President to get congressional support.
The point that I was trying to make, and I think the point that
Mr. Berman was making, is that we should carry this beyond sim-
ply Democrat or Republican kinds of debates, that this is an impor-
tant policy that we should have no matter which party the Presi-
dent belongs to.
What happens is, if it works quickly, whether the President is a
Democrat or Republican, it is fine and everybody applauds. Where
there is a longer lasting crisis, you need to have a unified Congress
behind you. That is why I think it is important for Presidents to
come to Congress.
I would be happy to yield.
Mr. BERMAN. To respond to another point made by Mr.
Rohrbacher, it is a very interesting point, if what you are saying
is that if the President hides the ball, chooses not to exhaust a se-
ries of diplomatic and economic efforts short of war, but hides the
ball, undertakes a quick, secret attack, then the constitutional war-
making power for the Congress is suspended. It is only when he
announces beforehand a series of efforts leading to that possible ac-
tion that the constitutional powers come into play.
I think it is a very difficult kind of a context in which to argue
the case that you are seeking to argue.
Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair has Mr. Hastings and Mr. Be-
reuter.
Mr. Hastings.
STATEMENT OF MR. HASTINGS
Mr. HASTINGS. I want to assert that I am appalled at many of
the members' attitudes with reference to this matter, particularly
as it pertains to the actions of President Clinton and the adminis-
tration. I think they have been extremely forthcoming both to the
Congress and to the United States.
Secretary Christopher recently asserted that more than 75 times
that either he or other members of the administration put forward
efforts to alert Congress as to the circumstances involved in Haiti.
I for one as a new Member of Congress, probably not as new as






quite some time ago, have heard discussions about Haiti ever since
I have been here both in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and in
intelligence briefings and in special briefings that this chairman
has called in order that all Members of Congress must be fully in-
formed. So I don't know what they are talking about when they say
that they don't know what is going on. If anybody here doesn t
know what is going on in Haiti, we ought to go home and give it
up.
Haiti presents a very difficult situation for us but the Chair, in
my view, and I associate with the Chair's remarks regarding the
Constitution-the President has responsibility to this Nation, as do
we, and it is, in my view, harmful to suggest that there is some
kind of blueprint for involvement that is going to come magically
from debate from the U.S. Congress.
I find it anathema, as well as a south Florida Congressperson,
that persons who know very little about the urgency of the cir-
cumstances would be hesitant to involve themselves in voting ap-
propriations that would cover the economic losses of people in Flor-
ida. Until such time as we can bring ourselves to fully understand
those dynamics, enough of this hypocrisy and let's get on with the
business of bipartisanship and supporting this President in things
of critical concern to this Nation.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter.
STATEMENT OF MR. BEREUTER
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I sympathize with your urgency
to move on the business of the day, but we are speaking out on
Haiti. There is no foreign policy issue on which I feel more strongly
than this one. I think our policy with respect to Haiti is foolhardy.
For the first time in my life, I am ashamed of American foreign
policy. We are starving children and the general population in
Haiti, and the embargo is not having an impact on what is happen-
ing there. People will be living the rest of their lives without full
mental capacity because pregnant women and young children are
being starved by our policy. Can you imagine how those people feel
about the American people today?
It is foolhardy for us to be involved in an invasion in Haiti, and
the American people know that. We can talk about consultation
with the Congress and about the nuances of the War Powers Act,
and the administration can consult with me as long as it wishes,
but I am still going to do what I can to represent my constituents
and work for the national interest. I will do what I can, limited as
it may be, to keep the United States from involving itself in this
foolhardy invasion.
This is wrong, it is counterproductive, and we will have great dif-
ficulty after the invasion. We will walk in there without any dif-
ficulties whatsoever. The problems will come afterwards. We will
be there for the long term. It will cost us billions of dollars and a
great amount of American funds in the long term.
Almost every thoughtful commentator you can see writing on this
subject today realizes and says this is a mistake for the President
to invade Haiti. The President's credibility is not the reason why
we should be invading Haiti, and I think it is outrageous that we
are proceeding in this fashion.






Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Payne.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAYNE
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I hear all of these outcries about foolhardy policies and starving
people. We have had an embargo on Cuba for as long as I can re-
member and that wasn't started by any Democrat. It iz a shame
that policy breaks down to Democrat and Republican.
We saw the United States invade Grenada and one of the rea-
sons was we had some students who went to a medical college
there and we said we have to protect them. In addition, there was
the alleged Communist threat. Tell me how important of a threat
it really was-when the British were helping Grenada with their
programs and building up the country. In fact they were even as-
sisting the Cubans in building the new airport.
When we went into Panama, no one said a word about that. I
supported President Bush. I think it was one of the finest things
he did at the end of his career, was to go in with a humanitarian
mission to Somalia.
It is a shame that everything becomes so partisan. Any time this
President does something, it is criticized on a partisan basis. We
don't talk about the successes, what is happening in the Middle
East with Syria coming in and the Israel situation becoming better.
We don't talk about the fact that North Korea presently now is
not the threat it was as it was several months ago. We don't talk
about the breakthrough in Northern Ireland with the IRA and
Northern Irish Government officials coming together saying that
we ought to sit down and talk about having a better solution to the
problems in Northern Ireland. So I think it is demagoguery, hypoc-
risy.
I think that it is a pity that we have become so partisan. I think
that it is the right thing to do and I support the President's policy
wholeheartedly.
Chairman HAMILTON. Are there further comments?
Mr. Gilman.
REQUEST FOR HEARING ON HAITI INTERVENTION
Mr. GILMAN. I hope that we would not lose the substance of what
I proposed, and that was not just for consultations but to have an
actual hearing here in our committee, asking the Secretary of State
and whoever else would be in authority to come before us to ex-
plain the necessity and to give us the rationale for the military
intervention.
Chairman HAMILTON. I have taken notes of the gentleman's com-
ments and I thank you for them.
The chair wants to recognize that we have several distinguished
visitors from the House of Commons in London.
I want to say how pleased we are to have you here. We welcome
you and hope you have a good visit to the United States.
[Whereupon the committee resumed its consideration of mis-
cellaneous bills and resolutions.]











U.S. POLICY TOWARD, AND PRESENCE IN,
HAITI


TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1994
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m. in room 2172,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman)
presiding.
Chairman HAMILTON. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will
come to order.
Today we meet in open session to hear testimony on U.S. policy
toward, and presence in, Haiti. Our witnesses include the Honor-
able Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State; the Honorable John
M. Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Lieutenant General
John J. Sheehan, Director for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We are delighted to have you.
Mr. Talbott.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STROBE TALBOTT, DEPUTY
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Deputy Secretary Deutch, General Sheehan and I are glad to
have this opportunity to talk with you and your colleagues about
where we are now and where we want to go in the process of re-
storing democracy in Haiti.
Today, Mr. Chairman, is D plus seven. American armed forces
have been in Haiti for just over a week. We are 18 days from the
deadline for the military regime there to step down.
There have obviously been moments of tension, moments of sus-
pense, even moments of violence and danger. There will be more
of at least some of those ingredients in the period ahead. But our
assessment of the overall situation, Mr. Chairman, in a single
phrase, is "so far, so good."
Our intention, also in a single phrase, is "steady as we go."
I am going to leave it to my colleagues from the Defense Depart-
ment and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the security situation
on the ground. What I would like to do in the next few minutes
is discuss some of the political and diplomatic aspects of our Haiti
policy. Specifically, I want to bring you up to date on sanctions, on
the process of reestablishing legitimate government in Haiti and on
the migrant situation.






Yesterday, President Clinton announced that we will lift all U.S.
unilateral sanctions toward Haiti, except those that directly affect
the three military leaders and their colleagues.
We will lift the restrictions on commercial air traffic and finan-
cial transactions between our two countries as well as the freeze
on Haitian assets. We are also urging other nations to lift their
sanctions.
This weekend, President Aristide publicly called for the loosening
of some of the United Nations sanctions m order to facilitate the
arrival of humanitarian aid. In accordance with Security Council
Resolutions 917 and 940, U.N. sanctions will be lifted completely
as soon as the three military leaders step down and President
Aristide returns to Port-au-Prince.
In regard to the political situation in Haiti, there are several rea-
sons for cautious optimism. President Aristide is now making fre-
quent statements over our Radio Democracy, urging the people of
Haiti to remain calm and asking them not to do anything to dis-
rupt the peaceful transition. The spirit of reconciliation that
Aristide has stressed was demonstrated particularly clearly in his
radio address on Sunday, in which he offered his condolences to the
families of the 10 attaches who were killed the night before.
President Aristide has also called the Haitian Parliament into
special session, and has asked the legislature to make it their first
order of business to consider an amnesty law. Passing such an am-
nesty law will be the quickest way of assuring a peaceful transition
to democracy and the best way to ensure that the country moves
toward reconciliation.
We are hopeful that both houses of the Parliament will be in ses-
sion by the end of the week, possibly as early as tomorrow after-
noon. We have arranged for those Parliament members who have
been living in exile in the United States and Canada to be flown
back to Port-au-Prince. They are due to arrive tomorrow morning.
Our troops are now in the process of securing the parliamentary of-
fice buildings in Port-au-Prince to ensure that the Parliament's de-
liberations are not disrupted.
Looking a bit further down the road, President Aristide has fully
committed himself to working with the United Nations, the Organi-
zation of American States and nongovernmental organizations to
hold parliamentary elections this fall, consistent with the Haitian
constitution.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, President Aristide has also recom-
mitted himself to holding Presidential elections by December 1995
to choose his successor.
In regard to the multinational coalition, I am pleased to tell you
that 28 nations have now agreed to take part in this effort. Some
contingents have been training in Puerto Rico for several weeks
now, and we expect police monitors and other multinational forces
to begin arriving in Haiti later this week.
Finally, the most recent piece of good news we have had concerns
the Haitian boat migrants to Guantanamo Bay; 221 of those mi-
grants voluntarily returned to their country yesterday, and we ex-
pect several hundred more to return today or tomorrow.
Now, I want to turn things over to Deputy Secretary Deutch and
General Sheehan.






Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Deutch.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN M. DEUTCH, DEPUTY
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me make a few remarks about the military mission that we
have under way in Haiti today. But first I would like to emphasize,
Mr. Chairman, that the enterprise that this country is involved in
in Haiti is unique in the fact that it has integrated political and
diplomatic efforts with a military mission and with economic assist-
ance in order to bring this effort to a successful conclusion.
I want to make a few remarks about the military mission, and
begin by saying what that mission is and to emphasize that it will
not be subject to mission creep.
The mission is very simple to state. Simply put, it is to establish
a secure environment in Haiti and assist in the transition to a sta-
ble government.
We have been heartened by the early success in the mission. It
is a unique joint operation involving units of the Army, Navy, Ma-
rine and Air Corps, unusual in its jointness with army helicopters
flying off of Navy carriers in order to assist in the early insertion
of troops into Haiti.
The logistics support has been excellent. There has only been one
naval casualty, and then today we learned of a single death of-
cause unknown, to an American soldier in Haiti. Admiral Paul
David Miller, Lieutenant General Shelton have done an excellent
job of planning and executing this operation.
As Strobe Talbott has just described, we are entering into a
phase of increased humanitarian aid, a phase where we are im-
proving public services and getting the Parliament of Haiti going.
Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili were in Haiti on Sat-
urday and determined that the troops there understood what their
mission was, had adequate resources to carry out that mission, and
a high morale.
I will ask, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, General
Sheehan to say a few words after my comments on the state of play
in Haiti today.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the central security issue is Hai-
tian-on-Haitian violence. That is our main concern. While the
FADH has been cooperative up to the present in some areas of
Haiti, it is dissolving, and it is hardly an ideal instrument to as-
sure civil harmony. There is a mix-of-purpose enthusiasm on that
island and we must be ready to deal with incidents as they occur.
U.S. troops will not perform normal police functions, but will pa-
trol and deter, and by that presence and their demeanor, assure
calm on the island. U.S. troops will intervene directly when life is
at stake, provided that they have adequate means and provided
that it is safe for them to do so. And, of course, our troops are
ready to deal with large-scale violence, riots or looting that will
threaten overall stability on the island.
We have currently some 300 military police on the island that
have lots of training on how to regulate crowd control and how to
assure calm without getting involved in greater levels of violence.
The experience of last Saturday shows that our troops are ready






and able to deal with threats. The Haitian military will not soon
mess with our U.S. troops. And we must be clear about the fact
that while incidents will arise and have to be expected, our troops
are prepared to deal with them.
In general, the Haitian people and the crowds have been very
supportive of our U.S. presence on the island.
In addition to military preparations, there have been supple-
mental conversations directly with both Cedras and President
Aristide, urging them to restrain people that they can influence.
President Aristide has been especially supportive of our efforts in
Haiti up to the present.
We are taking steps to reinvigorate the Haitian police and to dis-
arm the populace. In the near term, we must rely on the FADH,
but we will augment the FADH with military police patrols and be-
ginning at the end of this week, we hope that the international po-
lice monitors will enter Haiti to help us build a civilian and demo-
cratic police force.
We have already begun disarming the militia, and we will con-
tinue to do so throughout the period that we are in Haiti. Our dis-
armament efforts include a successful collection of all heavy weap-
ons in the Haitian armed services; and we have begun a buy-back
program which cannot be expected to be 100 percent successful, but
every weapon turned in is one less weapon that can be aimed as
a U.S. soldier or a Haitian civilian.
As Secretary Talbott has mentioned, repatriation of Haitian refu-
gees from Guantanamo is beginning. The international forces that
are going to be joining us in Haiti are proceeding to train in Puerto
Rico, and reequip, and a battalion of 260 people will be entering
Haiti to help in the police monitoring activities.
We plan to begin to remove our forces as soon as possible, and
should be doing so beginning early next month. We hope to com-
plete the multinational force phase of this operation within less
than 6 months and make a transition to a United Nations mission
in Haiti where U.S. participation will be less than 50 percent of
troops that are involved.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by making a few remarks
about a legislative time limit. We are concerned in the Department
of Defense, both the civilian and military leadership, with setting
a specific time limit for the military mission in Haiti. An arbitrary
time limit, Mr. Chairman, endangers the military in a variety of
ways.
First, it forces our military to complete the mission that has been
set for them on a calendar-an arbitrary calendar that has been
set, not on the military commander's sense of the situation on the
ground and what is the best action to protect our troops.
Secondly, it discourages other nations from participating in our
international efforts to bring democracy back to Haiti because it
says if the United States is going to check out at a date certain,
why should they enter?
Third, establishing a deadline places its own dynamic within
Haitian politics, and this date could easily encourage Haitian forces
to plan incidents for their own. purposes around a particular date.
We believe that Congress setting a date for completion of mili-
tary actions at the outset to be an extremely bad precedent for the






United States. This issue, in the judgment of the civilian and mili-
tary leadership of the Department of Defense, goes far beyond
Haiti.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying military withdrawal
will begin as soon as prudent. We all share the goal of getting out
of Haiti as quickly as possible. But important for success of the op-
eration and long-term U.S. credibility is that the President and the
military commanders have the flexibility to determine how to com-
plete the mission with the least risk to U.S. forces.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If it is agreeable with you
and members of the committee, I would like to ask General
Sheehan to say a few words about the current situation.
Chairman HAMILTON. General Sheehan.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN J. SHEEHAN,
USMC, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
General SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a prepared state-
ment, but I would like to review the task that we have given to
General Hugh Shelton, and describe where we are as of this after-
noon.
The task that we have given General Shelton is, first, to protect
U.S. citizens, the Ambassador and staff that are down there, plus
the international presence of the U.N. mission that is in Haiti-
first; and second, to help stabilize the security situation and assist
in protecting the key Haitian leaders in the public buildings that
are down there.
As Secretary Talbott indicated, we are flying 12 of those legisla-
tors back. We are providing a safe haven for them in terms of
guarding the Parliament. Clearly, we have to have an in extremis
hostage capability down there. There are violent elements in the
Haitian society, and so we have to have that capability there.
We need to pull together the planning for the international and
PVO's and NGO's and the legitimate Government of Haiti that is
still down there. We are feeding 1.2 or 1.3 million Haitians every
single day. Humanitarian flights have started. We started bringing
in the PVO and NGO organizations. There are two flights today.
There was a flight every single day this week.
We brought a barge in with 170 containers of food and supplies.
We are providing technical assistance, and there are hospitals in
Cap-Haitien-they haven't seen bandages for a year, x-ray ma-
chines don't work, and the doctors don't have essential supplies.
We are providing essential medical assistance.
In addition, General Cedras is being managed by General
Shelton. He has agreed, though, to start the disarmament in the
various departments in his militias. As the days go on, those weap-
ons are being turned in and they are being accounted for.
You clearly see control on the part of General Shelton exercised
through Cedras and Francois. It is a security situation that is im-
proving. The FADH and the police in the Cap-Haitien area have in
fact been disarmed by the people of Haiti. They turned their weap-
ons in to the Marines. We have over 700 weapons that were turned
in by the people at the police station, so the situation is under con-
trol.






The situation is a dynamic that is being managed from a tactical
advantage. And this gets to the point that Secretary Deutch has
tried to make. If you establish a date certain, clearly you are going
to change the dynamic on the ground.
We have the tactical advantage now. We should maintain it
through the 30th until we get to the 15th. If you put a date certain,
then those elements of the Haitian society that are of a violent na-
ture and have a vested interest in changing that to their interest;
they are going to do it by killing Americans, and that will change
the dynamic on the ground and change the dynamic here in Con-
gress.
THE U.S. MISSION IN HAITI
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will
proceed with questions.
I want to begin with the mission. Secretary Deutch, you defined
that mission, as I heard you, as one in which U.S. forces were
going to establish a secure environment and assist in the transition
to a stable government. That is a very limited mission, as I under-
stand it.
What I would like to do is read off several things and ask you
whether or not they fall within your definition of the U.S. military
mission there.
Protection of U.S. citizens?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To respond to armed attack?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To maintain essential civic order?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To provide for the departure from power of
the de facto authorities?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To protect President Aristide after he re-
turns?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To protect Haitian civilians from attack by
the Haitian military and police?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To break up the military?
Mr. DEUTCH. Break up the military over time. We would be re-
ducing the military in an orderly and planned way. I am not sure
I would use the verb "break up," but we certainly want to help
draw down the military and put together a police and military
force appropriate to a democratic country, assist President Aristide
in that regard.
Chairman HAMILTON. And to disarm the Haitian population?
Mr. DEUTCH. Partially, yes. We cannot agree-cannot take on the
mission nor is the mission there to do it totally. We have a buy-
back program that has started this morning. We are disarming the
population as best we can through a series of measured steps.
Chairman HAMILTON. You are not going to go sweeping through
the country and confiscate every weapon?
Mr. DEUTCH. No, sir, correct.






Chairman HAMILTON. To establish and train a Haitian police
force?
Mr. DEUTCH. In cooperation with international authorities and
the legitimate Government of Haiti, yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. To repair roads, water, electricity and com-
munication?
Mr. DEUTCH. To a limited degree as part of our economic assist-
ance program and in order to support our military operations, yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. And to set up local governments?
Mr. DEUTCH. No.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Chairman HAMILTON. I was reading an article this morning in
one of our newspapers about U.S. policy. You may have seen that
article. It emphasized the ambiguous nature of U.S. policy with re-
spect to handling Haitian violence.
What are the rules under which U.S. military forces will inter-
vene?
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is to say
that I think most of the ambiguous discussion has been here in
Washington. To the best of my knowledge, and I will ask General
Sheehan to address this particularly, the actual rules of engage-
ment which have been issued to the troops have not changed from
the very first moment.
So, first of all, let me, if I could, just ask General Sheehan; and
then maybe I can come back to an interpretation about which-is
what we hear about here in Washington about how these might
apply, especially in a situation where a U.S. soldier sees violence,
Haitian-on-Haitian violence going forward.
But let me first of all ask General Sheehan to actually describe
the rules of engagement that have been promulgated through the
military chain of command that have not changed since this was
planned.
Chairman HAMILTON. General.
General SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, the rules of engagement have
not been changed since they were issued on Sunday night when we
went from a probable combatant role to an intervention role. The
rules of engagement allow for the use of force and self-defense of
the U.S. forces.
The policy that was made and let out to the troops was that they
would not engage in acts of Haitian-Haitian violence, and that was
the policy discussion you were referring to. But the rules of engage-
ment clearly allow for the right of self-defense, the use of propor-
tional force, and when forces perceive that they are in harm's way
that that force can be used.
Chairman HAMILTON. Well, if they see one Haitian threatening
the life of another Haitian, what do they do?
General SHEEHAN. The graduated policy that was given to the
troops is, first off, that they use the existing FADH police that are
in place. They encourage them, first off, not to do that.
Second, they find an NCO or an officer, if that is possible, and
encourage him to stop doing that. They report it through their
chain of command-
Chairman HAMILTON. An American or Haitian?






General SHEEHAN. Haitian. Clearly, the first line of defense is to
modify the behavior with the Haitian military. They will report
who the individuals are and-et cetera. It is only after they have
very quickly gone through these steps that they allow themselves
to intervene between Haitian on Haitian violence. You can make
that decision in 5 seconds or 3 or 4 minutes, depending on what
the situation is.
Chairman HAMILTON. But if they are confronted with a life-
threatening situation or large-scale violence, they can intervene?
General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.
OPPOSITION TO DATE CERTAIN FOR U.S. WITHDRAWAL
Chairman HAMILTON. All right.
I wanted to ask about the date certain. You were very specific
as to why we should not include one. Do you think that we raise
the risk of injury, casualties to our own forces, if we put in a date
certain?
Mr. DEUTCH. Yes, sir.
Chairman HAMILTON. Can you explain that?
Mr. DEUTCH. Well, if the troops have been given certain set mis-
sions to accomplish, and they are told that these missions which,
under the most careful, thorough planning that I am familiar with
in spending 30 years in looking at the Department of Defense, if
they say it is going to take a period of months, and they are sud-
denly told it has to be done in 60 to 90 days, in order to accomplish
those missions they are going to take risks. They are going to have
to move things faster, move through the countryside faster, go
through the towns-and go through the towns and the police and
military installations in the towns at a more rapid rate than the
planners thought was prudently the best way to go in order to min-
imize casualties to U.S. troops.
And it is in that particular way that it runs a greater risk for
U.S. forces.
I also believe, Mr. Chairman, that it encourages-it encourages
extremists in the Haitian community to take advantage of that
date, manipulate the political process and the military process,
knowing that there is a date certain, planning extreme events
around that date certain in order to have the United States, or try
to get the United States to move in a manner that is convenient
for their political purposes.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Leach.
GEOGRAPHIC RATIONALE FOR INTERVENTION
Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we all know, there are
a lot of problem spots in the world from Rwanda, Bosnia, Burma,
whatever. And yet the rationale for this particular intervention,
among other things, hinges on that it is close to our shores. So we
appear to have a new American doctrine that is reminiscent of the
"Roosevelt corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. But it comes down to
a doctrine of geographic propinquity, and that has some very sa-
lient implications for U.S. foreign policy.
It also has very profound implications for other countries' foreign
policies. Once you establish a doctrine of geographic propinquity,
you are suggesting that other countries of the world may have a






similar doctrine. We have all known of the Brezhnev Doctrine. How
do you think this is going to play out over time?
CUL-DE-SAC NATURE OF HAITI POLICY
Finally let me just note, as a corollary to that question, I have
been very convinced that the Haitian diplomacy of the United
States, which quite frankly was a very ad hoc action and was saved
from a worse catastrophe by the Carter mission, has become of a
cul-de-sac nature. A series of decisions were made that, if they
didn't work, would lead to military intervention unless the United
States chose to backtrack on decisions made.
For example, we put in sanctions that were clearly going to be
tough on the people of Haiti; therefore, we had the choice either of
pulling off the sanctions, which had created more refugees, or of
going in militarily to halt the exodus of boat people.
And so my query here is two things in terms of thoughtfulness:
What of this doctrine of geographic propinquity, and secondly, was
there a cul-de-sac nature of American foreign policy that ought to
be reassessed so that we don't get ourselves in a similar bind in
another circumstance at another point in time?
THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR
Mr. TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman, let me try to be responsive to Con-
gressman Leach's question. And at some point during the discus-
sion, I would like to come back to the question of the delineation
of the mission of the multinational force, which is the current
phase and the UNMIH, particularly with regard to the police func-
tions; and so I hope we can have a chance to do that.
Congressman Leach, obviously geography is a factor in any na-
tion's definition of its national interests, not to say its vital na-
tional interests. Obviously geography is a factor here. And it isn't
just a question of propinquity, of course. It is what comes along
with propinquity or geographical proximity.
And in many cases around the world, including this one, the dis-
integration of a political situation in one country can produce an
outflow of refugees who, in various ways, impinge on the interests
and capacities and resources of neighboring countries. And we saw
that in spectacular and alarming fashion this summer in the case
of Haiti.
But I take your point, and of course, we understand that other
countries might, looking at this situation, say why shouldn't we be
able to define our national interests in the same way? I hope that
other countries looking at this case would follow our example in
several respects.
First of all, the United States showed immense patience through
two administrations, or much of two administrations, in attempting
to use every means at our disposal, short of the use of force. That
meant political pressure, diplomatic pressure, economic pressure,
and sanctions. And it was only when those other means were ex-
hausted that we resorted to the credible threat of the use of force.






INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. POLICY
The second point I hope other nations observing this case would
notice and would apply to themselves would be that the United
States scrupulously, assiduously and successfully worked through
international bodies and under international law.
We had an unprecedented degree of support within the Organiza-
tion of American States, and the ultimate resort to force was under
United Nations Security Council Resolution, 940. And this is obvi-
ously particularly germane today when the President of the Rus-
sian Federation is visiting the United States; and the issue of how
the great powers of the world are going to define their national in-
terests and peacekeeping in the post-cold war era is very much on
the agenda of the discussions between the two Presidents going on
right now.
CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Torricelli.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, history may well determine that Haitian democ-
racy has been enhanced by the American occupation, but will al-
most certainly conclude that democracy in the United States has
not been helped. The United States is occupying a foreign govern-
ment, a foreign country, without this Congress ever having made
a judgment and against the overwhelming sentiment of the Amer-
ican people.
The administration has committed this Congress to what will
probably be a $1 billion expenditure and almost certainly will in-
volve the loss of life, having placed the honor of the nation also at
stake. It may be the right policy or it may be the wrong policy, but
by definition in a democratic society, any judgment without the
consent of the governed is suspect.
You have-by this action, have influenced my own thinking
about our country and our system of government to a great degree,
but none more than my already strong feelings about term limita-
tions. Because listening to you, Mr. Deutch, today I saw Mr. Shultz
arguing with us against limitations in Lebanon; I was reminded of
Mr. Weinberger arguing against putting any restrictions on the
contras; Mr. Aspin, in Somalia.
If I could take back any one day of my whole life, no less my pub-
lic service, it would be when we sat in this chamber and listened
Mr. Shultz arguing how there could be no definition of mission, no
restrictions on time, on the Lebanon military presence; we couldn't
tie the hands of the President.
Mr. Deutch, tying the hands of the President is what shared con-
stitutional responsibilities are all about.
I can remember George Bush meeting with us privately before
the Persian Gulf War. He shared all the sentiments of this admin-
istration about the constitutional prerogatives of the President, but
he made a judgment that the Persian Gulf War could not com-
mence without some intervention by the elected representatives
and the support of the American people because it was not right
to ask the country to make that sacrifice without knowing that we
stood together.






I strongly believe that this Congress must be heard on this ques-
tion. I am offended that General Cedras, a leader of one of the most
reprehensible and despotic governments, would not reach an accord
without consulting with the leadership of his Parliament and the
de facto President of that regime, but the President of the United
States made a judgment about a military occupation of Haiti with-
out this Congress ever reaching a judgment.
There is a chance to reverse this unfortunate precedent and have
the leaders of Haiti understand that we stand together. While I
disagreed with the decision to enter Haiti, I accept that it has been
done. I want it to be achieved successfully, and I want there to be
no mistaking in the Haitian military that we do have a common
purpose now in seeing it succeed.
THE CASE FOR A DATE CERTAIN
You fundamentally misread the decision of this Congress in
reaching a vote on a date certain, that it represented weakness.
That is what Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger and Mr. Aspin and
those before you have all argued. A vote by this Congress setting
a date certain is also an endorsement of a policy. It makes clear
that there are not divisions within the U.S. Government. That is
a vote of strength.
You have not argued that a date-any particular date is wrong.
You have argued that any date would be in error, which suggests
to me that a date-setting a deadline in a year or 6 months or 2
years would somehow jeopardize forces. Inrded, the lives of our
forces have been used a shield to defend against the sharing of con-
stitutional powers which rests in each institution.
No one is suggesting that if a date is set, it would not be ex-
tended. No one is suggesting, because a date is set, that we do not
naturally foresee a succession in our role of those of the United Na-
tions force. Indeed, that is exactly what we do contemplate.
The possibility of a congressional resolution is an invitation to
the administration to share properly divided constitutional powers
and to proceed in this policy together. I would greatly regret if the
administration does not accept the invitation to end any division
and proceed with the policy together.
CASE FOR DOCTRINE-BASED FOREIGN POLICY
Finally, Mr. Chairman, indulge me for a final second. I share Mr.
Leach's concern also about the policy that is evolving. This Nation
should not have foreign policy by anecdote; it should be by doctrine.
It would appear to me that a doctrine is being established and
spheres of influence are being established where there is a right of
powerful nations to have economic and military forces determine
events in their neighboring nations. Simply because a nation is
strong economically or has military power does not mean it has any
monopoly on wisdom. It appears to me that it has neocolonialist
overtones.
In this instance, the United States is certainly right and the Hai-
tian military is certainly wrong. But since the policy is being deter-
mined because of immigration policy, historic relationships, proxim-
ity to -the United States, I believe you are inviting the question
about U.S. response to future coups in Central America or even






South America. You are begging the question about whether Russia
or France or other powers do not exercise similar responsibilities
in spheres of influence that they would define for themselves.
Indeed, in Rwanda, France has already done so. But, remember,
simply because, in Rwanda, France may have been right or, in
Haiti, the United States has a superior position to the Haitian mili-
tary does not mean that the precedents that are being established
will not be followed, what clearly is a new and emerging doctrine
of the Western powers in the Third World.
So, to conclude, for all of the dangers that invites, they mean
nothing; the fact that in the service of Haitian democracy we are
compromising an important constitutional principle in American
democracy, that we not only are achieving little, but potentially
doing great harm to a system of government that is much more im-
portant and invites far greater dangers if executive powers in this
country are to continue to accumulate and risk a great balance
which has been the savior of our own freedom.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me the time.
MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF CONGRESSIONAL TIME LIMIT
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Deutch.
Mr. DEUTCH. I was hoping, Mr. Torricelli, that I could explain
that I was not arguing a constitutional principle. I was trying to
make a much more limited remark. The limited remark that I was
making has to do with the consequences of a military plan to
achieve a well-defined mission by setting an arbitrary time limit.
It may be that there are other mechanisms, other mechanisms
that can be found to express yours or Congress' view on this or
prior military missions that have been undertaken by this country.
I was making a narrow remark, which I believe is accurate, and
that is the consequence for the military in carrying out a des-
ignated mission by putting in a time limit. It is that mechanism
for expressing the congressional will that I was addressing.
So I want to assure you that I was not making a big constitu-
tional principle, but trying to explain the consequences for the
achievement of a military plan that has been worked out in great
detail from setting this particular way of expressing congressional
will.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I will respond very briefly. I rec-
ognize my time has expired.
Mr. Deutch, we all take the same oath of office to the Constitu-
tion. We can differ on whether a time limitation for withdrawal
from Haiti has practical difficulties. There should be no debate that
it is constitutionally a superior, if not constitutionally required, po-
sition.
As the administration balances the practical difficulties of such
a limitation with the overriding constitutional advantages, it
should be a clear judgment. Adhering to the Constitution will al-
ways have some practical difficulties. It may often or always be in-
convenient. It is also the better way to govern.
And it would have, in my judgment, been the better policy to
come before this Congress, having weighed the two and having
reached the proper determination.






Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
welcome our distinguished panel. Let me say at the outset, Mr.
Chairman, that those of us who have raised serious questions and
continue to question the deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti were
never concerned about our force's capability, their commitment or
professionalism; rather our concerns were exclusively focused on
the health and the well-being of our men and women in uniform.
To send others into combat or into an extremely hostile situation
is the most serious decision that anyone can make.
Thus, I remain deeply concerned as to how our commander in
chief has put U.S. forces in danger without first seeking authoriza-
tion from those who directly represent the families and the individ-
ual servicemen and service women. Mr. Chairman, this isn't some
petty fight about the legislative branch versus the executive
branch. This is not a turf battle. What makes this particularly
troubling are the lengths to which the administration went to pro-
cure U.N. authorization while bypassing the legitimate representa-
tives of the U.S. citizens, namely the U.S. Congress.
One question-and I do have others I would like to pose as
well-why wasn't prior congressional authorization sought? Was it
merely a legal or a pragmatic, practical consideration that the
votes simply weren't here on the Democratic nor Republican side?
ARISTIDE'S RECORD
The second question I would like to raise, in response to ques-
tions that were raised by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in May of 1993, Assistant Secretary Alex Watson said, and I quote,
"There was ample evidence that President Aristide incited intimi-
dating or violent-behavior among his followers."
Three days before President Aristide was deposed he was speak-
ing to supporters at the National Palace on September 27, 1991
and said, "If you catch someone who does not deserve to be where
he is, do not fail to give him what he deserves. Do not fail to give
him what he deserves," he said again.
"What a nice tool. What a nice instrument. What a nice device.
It is a pretty one. It is elegant, attractive, splendorous, graceful
and dazzling. It smells good. Wherever you go, you feel like smell-
ing it. It is provided by the constitution, which bans Macoutes from
the political scene."
And one question: Was President Aristide talking, Mr. Talbott,
about necklacing when he said this? If that is the case, and espe-
cially in response to what Secretary Watson said, what assurances
do we have that Mr. Aristide has changed his means, his methods?
Yes, he was duly elected with a mandate from the people, but he
also has a record that cannot be lightly dismissed. What assur-
ances do we have that he has changed his methods? And, I would
like to know whether or not, in your opinion, he was referring to
necklacing.






IMPACT OF POLITICS ON POLICYMAKING PROCESS
Then, Mr. Chairman, there is the issue of politics. As you know,
there was a leaked confidential note for the file dated May 1994,
about a meeting between Mr. Dante Caputo and the Foreign Min-
ister of Canada. The Foreign Minister said, "concerning the United
States' position such as laid out by Strobe Talbott, Dante Caputo
thinks that time is short and that the situation today cannot last
beyond July. Dante Caputo emphasizes that Haiti represents a test
case for which the United States has to have found a solution be-
fore November."
I would like to know for the record, Mr. Talbott, exactly what is
the reference to November? Is there anything in that statement
that speaks to the November elections? On the record, knowing
that what you say is extremely important here, was any of the de-
cisionmaking in any way influenced by the upcoming elections?
LEGALITY OF AGREEMENT
I do have other questions for the second round. But finally, how
do you square the assertion that the Carter agreement is legally
binding when the de facto-we consider him a persona non grata-
President Jonassaint signed the agreement with President Carter?
Why is that legally binding when that same person lacked the au-
thority to bring back the Parliament in order to determine whether
or not an amnesty ought to go forward?
It seems to me that we have his name on one document and one
document only, and that is construed to be authentic and any other
act that he has taken prior to or after that is deemed to be lacking
any authority. How do we back that up?
Because I do believe, Mr. Chairman, that making sure the signa-
ture is binding seems to be an important detail. Also, were we
seeking General Cedras' signature and, for reasons that you might
want to explain, that was not accomplished and therefore we went
to someone else who could then sign the document?
I do have other questions for the second round, and I would ap-
preciate your answers to those.
INTERVENTION CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, sir, Congressman, on the first point, as the
President and other members of his administration, including Sec-
retary of State Christopher made clear many times, President Clin-
ton felt, and continues to feel, that he was operating and is operat-
ing completely under the authority as commander in chief given
him by the Constitution.
He feels that he has both precedent and the Constitution very
much on his side in this important debate which we have joined
here today. And he feels that in addition to proceeding in a way
that maximized the chances of the success of this operation, he also
was upholding a principle of Presidential authority which his pred-
ecessors of both parties have asserted and upheld themselves on
numerous occasions and, no doubt, that his successors will also up-
hold.






COALITION SUPPORT FOR INTERVENTION
Let me be very clear on a matter relating to the second point
that you raised and that has to do with our working through and
with the United Nations.
The United States of America did not go to the United Nations
to seek permission to use force, if necessary, in Haiti. The United
States would never, under this administration or I suspect under
any administration, ask permission of another country or of an
international body to do what it considers in the interests of the
United States.
Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield on that one point? Had
the U.N. Security Council voted no, would we not have had an oc-
cupying force there?
Mr. TALBOTT. Had the President determined that it was in the
vital interests of the United States to act alone in this instance, the
answer is emphatically yes. What the United States did do in this
case was go to the United Nations and work through other inter-
national bodies as well, notably the OAS, to put together an un-
precedented coalition for several reasons. One is so that the leaders
in Port-au-Prince would understand that they had the entire world
community against them. And we were successful in putting to-
gether this coalition.
But a clear distinction should be made on the one hand, assem-
bling a coalition, and on the other hand, seeking the permission of
the United Nations or any other body.
ARISTIDE'S RECORD
As to your question about President Aristide and his own record
when he was the President-when he was in power as the Presi-
dent of Haiti, there is no question that there was and no doubt will
continue to be some controversy about that record.
Several points are germane at this point in the evolution of Hai-
ti's political life. First, I think nobody would contest that President
Aristide's human rights record was by an order of magnitude better
than that of his predecessors, and better than that of the leaders
of the coup who replaced him.
You asked about what President Aristide means when he uses
certain phrases. I can only speak with authority to what he seems
to mean now when he emphasizes reconciliation. When he counsels
his own people and his own followers to avoid revenge. He has been
putting out that message consistently over the past months, and
particularly in recent days.
He has also convened the Haitian Parliament, which should
begin meeting as soon as tomorrow, and he has put as the first
order of business, once the Parliament convenes, the passage of an
amnesty law, which would be, as it were, the institutionalization
of, the legislation of the principle of reconciliation.
The final point I would make in that regard is that from the be-
ginning-and this goes back, I think, to the position of the Bush
administration when senior officials of the Bush administration
said this coup must not stand. The issue has not been so much one
man-though, of course, one man does lead the democratically






elected Government of Haiti; the issue has been the restoration of
democracy as an institution, as a process, and as a set of principles.
And I think that it was important substantively and symbolically
that on the eve of the deployment of the American forces followed
by international forces, President Aristide used a meeting at the
White House to reassert a commitment that he has made before,
and that is that he would serve out his term as stipulated by the
Haitian constitution and that he would preside over what we all
hope will be a free, fair and peaceful election in December of 1995
and turn over his office to his successor in February of 1996.
TALBOTT-CAPUTO COMMUNICATION
You have asked, Congressman-and you can imagine you are not
the first to put this question to me-about certain memoranda sup-
posedly coming from Dante Caputo, who until recently was the spe-
cial envoy of the United Nations Secretary General to the OAS
with regard to Haiti. I simply cannot fathom exactly what was in
those memoranda or explain to you everything that allegedly was
there; I have not seen the memoranda myself.
But I can speak with absolute authority as to conversations that
I had with Mr. Caputo on several cases-several occasions in re-
cent months. And I assure you that, first of all, I never set any
kind of deadline for this policy, because the President of the United
States had not set such a deadline until much later in the game
than when Mr. Caputo and I were seeing each other.
What we talked about was the dynamics of the situation itself,
and the dynamics that were driving the situation had to do with
the steadily deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situa-
tion in Haiti and also, of course, had to do with the attempt to use
all necessary diplomatic means, including those in which Mr.
Caputo himself was engaged.
But in straightforward answer to your straightforward question,
I never discussed with Mr. Caputo, or for that matter with anyone
else that I was dealing with during that period, November, in any
context-notably, in any context having to do with our domestic
elections.
POLICY DRIVEN BY DYNAMICS IN HAITI
Mr. SMITH. Was it discussed within the administration? Was the
November election ever an issue within the administration?
Mr. TALBOTT. The issue within the administration, and I think
in the public debate as well, was driven by the dynamics in Haiti
itself. Nevertheless, I personally, as a participant in the internal as
well as public debate, had some sense of urgency, my own sense of
urgency had at the end of the time line, the period in which we are
now talking-the September timeframe, not the November time-
frame-and that has to do as much as anything with such things
as the dramatic increase in terror, which was already at a very
high level; and also the exhaustion of the diplomatic process that
was particularly dramatic, which just before Secretary Deutch and
I went down to the region at the beginning of September, when
Dante Caputo's last attempt to make an approach to the Cedras re-
gime failed. And that is when the Secretary General of the United
Nations said publicly, "Diplomacy has failed here." And that is






when we in the international community, led by the United States,
decided to make good on the resolution, 940.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Berman.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, there were some questions posed that
were not answered.
Chairman HAMILTON. Did the witnesses have any further re-
sponses?
LEGALITY OF CARTER-JONASSAINT AGREEMENT
Mr. SMITH. The Jonassaint signature and the fact that it was
only binding in the one instance with Mr. Carter.
Mr. TALBOTT. I am sorry, I retained almost all, but not all of
your questions. As I understand your question it goes in some ways
to the nature, in the eyes of international law and perhaps diplo-
matic history, of the document that was signed by President Carter
and the de facto President of Haiti, Mr. Jonassaint.
I hope you will permit me not to plunge into that debate. What
I would like to seize upon is the opportunity to say what was -im-
portant about that agreement, what was operationally important
about that agreement. And what was operationally important was
that that agreement included a date certain, speaking of date cer-
tain, for General Cedras, General Biamby and Colonel Francois to
have to leave power; that was a provision in the agreement that
was included at the insistence of President Clinton.
And the combination of that date certain and the willingness of
the de facto and the military regime down there to cooperate with
General Sheehan's colleagues during the interim is what has per-
mitted us to have something that is almost without precedent, and
that is, as it were, a permissive invasion, an invasion that has been
an intervention that has been carried out with remarkably little vi-
olence, as a result of which American and Haitian lives have been
saved.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Berman.
TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I got
called to another markup, and I missed the earlier questions. I
hope I don't repeat anybody else's points here.
I initially have to say that while I was very skeptical about the
invasion and certainly felt that Congress should vote, the way
things have worked, I think the administration deserves a great
deal of credit for what it has done in Haiti so far, and it is hearten-
ing to see the warm welcome our troops received.
I cannot believe that a large number of our colleagues would
want to see us turn tail tomorrow and pull out automatically at
this particular point, if for nothing else than the message it would
send everywhere else in the world.
But in the discussion of an end date or a reauthorization, can
you just give me a sense of the timetable that you have? It is not
a commitment, it is not an announcement. It is simply a best guess
of what it looks like to you now, understanding that things could
change.
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, Mr. Berman, I will be happy to do that; and
perhaps with the chairman's permission, I could fold into my an-






swer a point that I wanted to add to something that Secretary
Deutch said earlier when talking particularly about our efforts
with regard to the police function in Haiti.
It has been our plan all along that the first phase of this oper-
ation, the so-called multinational force phase, would last a matter
of months-to the end of this year, perhaps to the beginning of
next year at the outside. The reason that we had hoped very much
to preserve maximum flexibility is, of course, the length of that
part of the phase will depend on the conditions on the ground.
TRANSITION TO UNMIH
We are a week into this, and we are encouraged by what we see,
and both of my colleagues have spoken to that. If we continue to
be encouraged, we would hope, within a matter of months, to be
able to hand over this operation to what is called the United Na-
tions Mission in Haiti, UNMIH, U-N-M-I-H. That will be a consid-
erably smaller force totaling about 6,000, no more than half of
whom would be Americans and not all of those, military personnel.
If I could make two points here: First, Secretary Deutch men-
tioned that it is an important part of our overall mission in Haiti
to professionalize the military and help the Haitian Government
set up a truly civilian police force that is responsive to the legiti-
mate government and to the needs of the people, as opposed to
being an instrument of terror, which is what it is now. And it is
now basically a part of the armed forces of Haiti.
During the multinational force phase, our purpose is more lim-
ited than that. During this initial phase, our purpose is to work
with the Aristide government to set up what we are calling an "in-
terim police force," the personnel of which will come entirely from
the ranks of Haitians, many of them from the current armed forces.
Their activities, in turn, will be supervised by 500 to 600 inter-
national monitors from other countries-that is, not Americans-
who will be coming in under various flags as part of the multi-
national force.
During the second phase, or UNMIH phase, one of the principal
purposes will be to deconstruct and reconstruct, you might say, the
military and the police force so that they are separate entities. It
will be a much smaller military and a more genuine police force.
DANGER OF SETTING TERMINATION DATE
The point I wanted to make with regard to the risks and indeed
the dangers that we would run if there were a legislatively or con-
gressionally imposed date certain is this: Under the arrangement
that we have with the United Nations, the United Nations is not
going to come in with the UNMIH, the United Nations force, unless
and until General Sheehan's colleagues on the ground in Haiti cer-
tify that the situation is secure and stable and safe.
If we are operating against a congressionally mandated date cer-
tain, that would provide a very unwelcome incentive to forces in
Haiti, who do not want to see the United Nations mission deployed,
to stage a violent provocation of some kind at D minus five, or
something like that, if D is the date certain for us having to be out.
So we could end up jeopardizing the ability to even have the second






phase of this operation, which I think would undercut the mission
as a whole.
OPTION FOR REAUTHORIZATION
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I make one observation?
Chairman HAMILTON. May I interrupt? Mr. Talbott, a date cer-
tain doesn't necessarily mean that the Congress is saying U.S.
troops have to be out by that date. We can reauthorize. Do you un-
derstand that?
Mr. TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman, of course. And I look to the wisdom
of this body and to deliberations between this body and the admin-
istration during the weeks ahead. But I do think one needs to ex-
amine in fairly stark terms the risks associated with a date certain.
Chairman HAMILTON. It is obviously possible that we would re-
quire withdrawal at that point, but it doesn't necessarily mean
that. We authorize participation up to a certain time; Congress re-
serves the right from that point on to extend it or not. That is the
point.
Mr. TALBOTT. I understand.
Chairman HAMILTON. Excuse me, Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. If I may make an observation also? It is a little bit
along those lines.
I think setting a date certain by which U.S. troops withdraw or
you shift from phase one to phase two is nuts. But I do think that
a date by which we ask Congress to reconsider whether or not to
continue the authorization is not a termination date; it is simply
a way by which Congress exercises what we think are our institu-
tional powers and roles-far more sensitively, presumably, than
the blunt instrument of denying funding in the middle of some-
thing-to participate in this process, to oversee this process.
And even if you don't buy that institutional reason for a date by
which we should reauthorize, not a termination date, I think it is
a very nice defense against the irresponsible notion that we should
immediately withdraw tomorrow.
Mr. TALBOTT. I understand, Mr. Berman. I would only ask that
as this issue proceeds to what I am sure will be a good outcome
that we all be mindful of the danger that if we are not careful, we
could embolden our foes and discourage our friends, including our
international friends on this issue.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mrs. Meyers.
MISSION CREEP
Mrs. MEYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have three questions,
and the first one I will direct to Mr. Deutch because I think it was
he that said that we would not have mission creep-or maybe that
was Mr. Talbott-where the mission-
Mr. TALBOTT. I will say it, too.
Mrs. MEYERS [continuing]. Where the mission just gradually en-
larged. But in an AP story today it said American officials have ex-
pressed concern over what they call "mission creep"; which is de-
fined as going to a country with a specific mission, in this case to
restore the elected government, but finding their role slowly ex-
panding.






In the north of Haiti, for example, many authorities have simply
abdicated to American forces, and in Port-au-Prince even routine
police work is now sometimes referred to the Americans. I would
like you to comment on that.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN U.N. FORCE
The second question is, you have said that in a few months you
expect to hand over to the U.N. forces control of Haiti and that
about half of those forces would be Americans. What do you antici-
pate the total needed would be so that we could get some idea of
how many Americans are going to be in Haiti after the U.N. takes
over?
And, finally, do you have any criteria for determining that Haiti
has been stabilized sufficiently in order that our troops can be
withdrawn, and if so, what are these criteria?
NO ENLARGEMENT OF U.S. MISSION
Mr. DEUTCH. Mrs. Meyers, let me answer these questions, and
maybe Strobe will want to enlarge upon them.
The first is that the mission that has been established for our
troops in Haiti has not changed one bit from when the planning
was taking place. There has been no change in the scope of the
mission, no change in the activities.
Mrs. MEYERS. It sounds as if we are taking over the jobs of local
officials and local police.
Mr. DEUTCH. I don't believe that that is the case. Routine police
functions are not being performed by U.S. troops. And I will just
ask at the conclusion of my remarks for General Sheehan to con-
firm that fact and expand upon it, or contradict the fact if that is
what it should be.
CRITERIA FOR TRANSITION TO UNMIH
Secondly, I believe Strobe Talbott said that it is our plan that the
extent of this multinational force operation would be less than 6
months, at which time we would have the transition to the United
Nations mission in Haiti, UNMIH. At that time we would expect
to have fewer than one-half, both military and nonmilitary U.S.
contract personnel involved, of the maximum of UNMIH, which
would be 6,000 people.
The third question, ma'am was-
Mrs. MEYERS. Do you have any criteria established for when
things are truly stabilized enough in Haiti for us to leave and turn
the mission over to the U.N.?
Mr. DEUTCH. Let me give you a process rather than specific cri-
teria that the decision would be the decision taken by both the U.S.
commander and the Secretary General on the advice of the U.S.
commander of the multinational force. So the U.S. commander
would have the authority to advise the Secretary General on the
specific state of security in the country before such a transition
took place.
Now, if I-






Mr. TALBOTT. Could I just, before General Sheehan contradicts
Secretary Deutch, introduce one additional criterion of a political
nature?
The Haitian constitution electoral calendar called for parliamen-
tary elections at the end of this year, or at the latest, at the very
beginning of next year.
Mrs. MEYERS. Has the date been set for those parliamentary
elections?
Mr. TALBOTT. No, I don't believe so. It will probably be in Decem-
ber, but it could slip into January. But President Aristide has com-
mitted himself--enthusiastically, I might say-several times to
making sure that those elections take place.
To come to your point, one thing that we would be looking at
very carefully is those elections and that they take place in a free
and fair manner. I think that that would be dramatic evidence that
life is returning to normal and that democracy has been restored.
U.S. ACTIONS NOT INDICATIVE OF MISSION CREEP
General SHEEHAN. Congresswoman, in response to that, I think
what they are referring to is the fact, after Saturday's events in
Cap-Haitien when the Marines killed the police and the attaches
that were in the police building, right after that, the citizens of
Cap-Haitien took over another police station and disarmed them
and turned in some 700 weapons.
In order to have an argument, you have to have two sides. And
right now, the police are not in Cap-Haitien; they have dis-
appeared-those that are still left. So the Marines that are up
there and the Army forces that are up there are doing normal pa-
trolling, patrolling that they would have done had both sides been
there.
General Shelton has gone to Cedras and told him to redeploy ad-
ditional forces up to Cap-Haitien that essentially can operate there.
We are going to take some of the police that have been trained in
Gitmo and move them up there to create a vetted FADH because
that is de facto, what we have done.
The citizens of Haiti have vetted their own police department up
in that area, and those that don't particularly want to perform
properly have left. So we don't see that as mission creep, but rather
a reality on the ground that the citizens have in fact disarmed
their own police and are in the process of putting a police force in
place that is going to work.
Mrs. MEYERS. And it does mean that any further Haitian-on-Hai-
tian violence that takes place there, we will be in the middle of it,
unless there are some others deployed there?
General SHEEHAN. We don't expect that level of violence to take
place. The weapons are being turned in. And second, the police
force coming out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba are volunteers to go
back, and they don't have the same bias toward violence that the
previous force had.
COST OF HAITI OPERATION
Mrs. MEYERS. And, finally, Mr. Chairman, do we have any esti-
mate of the total cost of the military operation, including the U.S.
forces that will be there as part of the U.N.?


84-415 0 94 2







Mr. DEUTCH. Mrs. Meyers, let me just say that there are esti-
mates of the costs. They are highly uncertain. Let me give them
to you roughly this way.
In fiscal 1994, that is, which is about to end here at the end of
the month, roughly $50 million. During the coming fiscal year, esti-
mates are varied but in the range of $400 to $500 million.
I would like to emphasize to you how uncertain these estimates
are, because we don't know the scope fully or the length fully of
this operation. I will, if you permit me, provide you the best esti-
mates that we have for the record, but I want to stress that, in my
judgment, it is very hard to make a full accounting today of the
military expenditures.
There are, of course, in addition to that $200 million or so of as-
sistance, economic assistance during fiscal 1995, and I would like
to provide that for the record if that is satisfactory, ma'am.
Chairman HAMILTON. Would the gentlelady yield?
Your figure of $400 to $500 million is the Defense Department
expense for 1995, is that correct?
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Chairman, that is right. And I want to allow
myself, in addition to certainty, accuracy by giving you something
for the record.
Chairman HAMILTON. Who can give us a total figure?
Mr. DEUTCH. I think I would like to do that for the record, sir.
We will do it by fiscal year and add up both economic and military
assistance and give you the best estimates.
Chairman HAMILTON. Do you have a figure in your mind now?
Mr. DEUTCH. My figure for the total would be under $1 billion,
about, but I would like to get you this tabulated for the record, sir.
Chairman HAMILTON. We want an "all spigots estimate."
Mr. DEUTCH. An "all spigots" estimate, but it is highly varied.1
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Faleomavaega.
OAS ROLE IN HAITI
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Talbott, I would like to commend the President for
making every effort to avert the invasion by inviting our former
President Carter and General Powell and Senator Nunn to provide
some form of a negotiation process to avert this invasion, and I
commend the administration for that.
I have just come to realize that you mentioned earlier something
about the OAS assisting with this process in resolving the serious
problems that we face now in Haiti, and I was wondering if you
could elaborate a little further exactly what the OAS has been
doing. I have come to believe that Haiti is not even a member of
the "Latin American country club," so to speak, and I was curious
about that.
PROSPECTS FOR PROLONGED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE
There are a couple of other questions. Seven million people live
in Haiti; approximately 90 percent are in sheer poverty, and I was
wondering if-in most realistic terms, if we could ever build a true

IThe information appears in appendix 2.







democracy in that island country where they have never seriously
given that kind of political maturity in providing for that.
My understanding is that, come October 15, President Aristide
takes over the administration of Haiti. Suppose Mr. Aristide just
is unable to provide law and order-possibly, further assassina-
tions of some of the country's top leaders-and just cannot stabilize
the political situation in Haiti, unless we continue to have a major
presence of U.S. military forces there? What then is the President's
option?
The question of the 60-day period, am I to understand that 18
days are now in the running as part of that 60-day grace period
that the President has authorized to commit this form of policy in
terms of our military presence there in Haiti?
And the Congress is going to adjourn next week, hopefully, and
I am just curious what the President intends to do after that 60-
day period, if the administration has clearly thought out options,
or proposals to the Congress as to what to do afterwards.
ROLE OF OAS
Mr. TALBOTT. First, with regard to the OAS, let me be absolutely
clear on one point. As a body, the Organization of American States
has not explicitly endorsed this particular operation. However, over
the past couple of years, the OAS has repeatedly taken steps, held
meetings, passed resolutions, issued reports, which were both indi-
vidually and cumulatively extremely helpful and supportive of our
goal, which is the departure from power of the military junta and
the restoration of President Aristide.
By the way, Haiti in very much a member of the Organization
of American States. President Aristide's Ambassador to Washing-
ton, and several of his ministers and representatives have been
taking part in meetings of the OAS in recent months.
OPTIMISM ON TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
With regard to the "maturity," to use your word, of Haitian de-
mocracy, we all recognize that Haitian democracy is in its infancy.
It was born, one might say, in December of 1990, making it only
4 years old. But it is one of the premises of our policy, as Secretary
Christopher has put it on several occasions, that it is precisely nas-
cent or newborn democracies that need as much help as possible
from the international community.
Our hope, encouraged and buttressed, I might say, by the experi-
ence of the past week or so, is that the transition back to the re-
stored democracy in Haiti will be relatively smooth and peaceful.
There are institutions in Haiti. There is a parliament in Haiti; it
will be back in session, we believe, as early as tomorrow. I think
that my colleagues, in particular, have already addressed how we
are prepared to deal with the contingency of political violence.
But President Aristide and his colleagues have done everything
they could; and I come back to the point I made earlier about the
message of reconciliation and urging his followers not to seek
vengeance that he has been putting out in recent days. President
Aristide, I think, has increased the chances of a smooth and peace-
ful restoration, not just of democracy but of a broad-based democ-
racy.







WAR POWERS CLOCK
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. On the question of a 60-day period, is it
running now?
Mr. TALBOTT. I am not sure which 60-day period you are refer-
ring to.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The 60-day war powers of the President.
Mr. DEUTCH. We will have to get back to you, sir. Under the War
Powers Resolution?
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes.
Mr. TALBOTT. We, of course, filed a War Powers Report under-
as required by the law.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My question to you gentlemen, if it is to
your understanding that since our presence in Haiti now has been
18 days, is that part of the 60-day period? Is it running?
Mr. TALBOTT. I-of course, Secretary Deutch had a superb an-
swer, which is that we will get back to you on that.
OAS POLICY ON INTERVENTION
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One more question. I am glad that you have
clarified the situation with the OAS. There is one principal element
of the OAS, that we are a member of, and that is that one member
state is not to invade another member state; and are we an excep-
tion to the rule, Mr. Secretary? Why are we doing this to Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. The word "invasion," which has been bandied
around a lot, over the last months in particular, is really not the
right word here. After all, we-by which I mean a multinational
force made up of now 29 nations, including the United States-
have intervened there at the request of and on behalf of the legiti-
mately elected government, and I think it is clear from the recep-
tion that our forces have received in the streets of Port-au-Prince
and Cap-Haitien and elsewhere, very much at the behest of and to
the welcome of the Haitian people.
The Organization of American States is, of course, as the United
States is, against invasion as traditionally or classically under-
stood. But the OAS is very much on record as supporting the prin-
ciple that the hemisphere as a whole must join forces to support
democracy. And that is what happened here.
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I am concerned about that. It is always easi-
er to lend financial support, but I don't think that we could equate
that with when our soldiers bleed and die in the field of battle.
I don't think that even the member states of OAS who financially
support us in this effort-it is ironic that we don't see any presence
of other military forces from the member states of OAS supporting
us in this effort, other than pieces of paper and saying, yes, we do
in principle, but never really put your money where the mouth is.
Mr. TALBOTT. If I could add a word or two to, I hope, reassure
you on that point.
When Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili were down in
Port-au-Prince over the weekend, they met with, among others,
representatives of some of the nations that will, indeed, be de-
ployed to Haiti in the very near future. Members of the multi-
national force are in Puerto Rico right now in training, along with







our own people. And the first group of MNF forces will be in Haiti
in coming days before the end of this month.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Rohrabacher.
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING ARISTIDE
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Talbott, I know there is a tendency for people to ask a
dozen questions, but at times, believe it or not, when you ask ad-
ministration officials a question, they will try to use up all the
time, instead of giving a simple answer, just so you won't get a sec-
ond question in.
I would like to ask a simple question. My colleague asked wheth-
er or not you knew if President Aristide had ever supported
necklacing. To your knowledge, has President Aristide ever sup-
ported the practice of necklacing?
Mr. TALBOTT. There is no yes or no answer to that, Congress-
man.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that is good enough.
Mr. TALBOTT. I have read statements that have been attributed
to President Aristide. And I have also, as of course has the admin-
istration as a whole, studied President Aristide's record while he
was in power; and I think my earlier statements-
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would you rule it out that this man has ad-
vocated the burning to death of his opponents?
Mr. TALBOTT. What is important is what President Aristide stood
for when he was elected the President of Haiti.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I take that as a no. Anybody in this room
knows that we are dealing with a man who, while in power, threat-
ened to burn to death his opponents. Why are we sending U.S. Ma-
rines to Haiti to put this man back in power? Is that the great
cause of democracy that you are talking about?
Mr. TALBOTT. Congressman, the cause of democracy is embodied
in institutions of the kind that will be meeting in Port-au-Prince
tomorrow.
Let me just say that I came relatively recently to this issue. I
had followed a lot of the debate and controversy about President
Aristide. I have had a chance in my present capacity to meet with
him and to work with him, along with other members of the ad-
ministration. And I would like to say here that it is an understate-
ment to say that he does not live up to the stereotypes that we all
are familiar with.
I think that President Aristide has in many ways gotten a bum
rap over the last couple of years. And I think that he has dem-
onstrated by the way that he has handled this transitional period
his commitment to reconciliation.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let's hope that you are correct because
American lives are on the line, and I would hate to think that we
are putting not only the lives of our people on the line, but also
our national treasure to reinstall this man. We are talking about
hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars, for a man who, while
in power earlier, threatened to burn to death his opponents.
Mr. Talbott, I don't believe that this administration has defined
for the American people this mission. I don't believe that the Hai-
tian occupation is justified in terms of a national interest of the







United States. People keep asking why we are in Haiti. Yet, we
haven't received an answer to our question.
Is this the reason why you didn't bother coming to Congress be-
fore the occupation to seek our advice and our consent?
RATIONALE FOR INTERVENTION
Mr. TALBOTT. A number of us, quite a number of us, have been
coming to Congress repeatedly to consult with this body and, of
course, with the Senate; and in the course of those consultations,
we have repeated what we feel is the foreign policy and national
security rationale for this policy.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you believe that the President now has
authority to militarily occupy any country in this hemisphere in
which a democratically elected official is ousted, without consenting
Congress?
Mr. TALBOTT. The President, of course, would make no such
claim with regard to this policy or in general.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. So Haiti is just an aberration?
Mr. TALBOTT. It is by no means an aberration. It is an episode
in which the United States had an opportunity, in coalition with
others from this hemisphere and elsewhere, to support what has
been an immensely positive trend in the Western Hemisphere over
the last 15 or 20 years, and that is the trend of democratization.
Another element of it, which we have discussed in the course of
this hearing, is that the opposite of democratization, that is, a ter-
ror-based dictatorship, was producing a humanitarian and human
rights catastrophe, one result of which was a refugee outflow that
impinged on our national security.
LACK OF CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION
Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would just like to state for the record, that
I worked in the White House for 7 years. I know that the President
has to make tough decisions, and I know that sometimes he doesn't
have time to go to Congress. I understand that.
This was not one of those situations! If it was, I would be more
understanding and the rest of your colleagues on the other side of
the aisle would be understanding as well.
I feel, and many other members of this body feel, that it is an
insult to our democratic institutions for the President of the United
States to be spending so much time seeking permission from the
United Nations about a military mission of American troops and
then ignoring the U.S. Congress.
You are here seeking our cooperation now. You are asking us not
to set a time deadline because it might jeopardize your mission. I
would suggest that the President of the United States should have
had a cooperative mood and a cooperative method with Congress
before he sent in our U.S. military, and he might be getting more
cooperation right now had he done so.
Thank you very much.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Oberstar.
ADEQUACY OF CONSULTATION
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.







Thank you, Secretary Talbott, for being with us today, as you
have on many occasions; and I think shortly after taking your new
position, you were up here before this committee talking with us
about Haiti.
I differ with my colleague from California. There have been nu-
merous consultations in this committee room, informal and in for-
mal session, numerous opportunities. I think there were more than
70 or 80 such opportunities for discussion on Haiti over a long pe-
riod of time. And this administration has been totally open. And
the Bush administration was very open with its policy on Haiti.
And I participated in numerous discussions with that leadership,
as well, I would say to my colleague from California.
Let's not have a double standard. You know, if this were a dif-
ferent administration, we would be hearing a totally different song
from the other side of the aisle, frankly; and I don't care what kind
of justification you come up with, there are some people who will
never be satisfied. They just want to embarrass the President. Let's
lay it out as it is.
SUCCESS OF U.S. POLICY
The question is-the test is really the success of the policy. And
our forces went in in a peaceful intervention. They were greeted
with shouts of joy by the Haitian people. It was something I said
would happen, that that would be the response from the people of
Haiti. They looked to the United States as their source of support,
their friend, their salvation. And you have seen the joy on the faces
of the people in Haiti.
I was there. I was a part of the observer team that President
Bush sent to observe the elections in Haiti. I thought the Bush ad-
ministration policy was right on every step of the way and brought
that democracy about. I was a part of helping it to happen.
The general, the commanding general of the armed forces at the
time was General Gerard Abraham, who was a second lieutenant
in one of my English courses when I taught English in Haiti. I
taught English and not civics, I want to emphasize.
But I did talk at length with General Abraham on many occa-
sions both by phone and in person. And he made the election come
about. He assured that there was tranquility at the polls, that
there was no shooting and not a repeat of the sabotage of the elec-
tion of November of 1987. And we did have a peaceful and a re-
sponsible, honest election.
And as I talked to the people as they were leaving the voting
places and asked them, "Pouqui sa ou te vote?" Why did you vote.
What did you vote for?
"Na vote libete-a." We voted for freedom.
They didn't say, we voted for a better economic life. They didn't
say, we voted to end the World Bank debt. They didn't say, we
voted for jobs. They voted for freedom from the Ton-tons Macoutes
and from the Duvalierism, and that freedom was snatched from
them in the coup of September 1991.
And we have restored that freedom to them, or an opportunity
for that freedom, and I don't want to let it slip from our grasp.
This has been an effort of several years, over three administra-
tions, to bring this result about. And I say, let's stand and support







this policy. The Haitian people will be in our debt for a long time.
They will have an opportunity-they can govern themselves. We
just removed the yoke of the army of oppression from their back.
DISARMAMENT PROGRAM
And I have other suggestions about getting into the countryside
and taking the guns. I don't think that the policy of buying the
guns is going to be very effective. I think you need to seize the
stocks of the Ton-tons Macoutes-the army knows where they are
and how to get them-and take them out of their hands so that in
the aftermath of the departure that we don't, "Se lave mains, essie
pa te," the Haitian proverb that says: Don't wash your hands and
then dry them off in the dirt.
And if we don't get those guns out of the hands of the thugs, the
Macoutes who have used them, we will be, "Se lave mains, essie
pa te".
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Oberstar is the committee linguist, as
you may know.
Mr. Manzullo.
ARISTIDE'S RECORD
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Mr. Ober-
star's statement today is the exact reason why Congress should be
consulted, to have the input of people of his wisdom in addition to
the wisdom of Mr. Talbott.
You are on record today as saying that Aristide has gotten a bum
rap. Let me give you three reasons why that is a disservice to the
U.S. people for you to say that.
He was removed from the church celestial order because of in-
citement to hatred and violence.
Number two, when he assumed power, he named supreme court
justices, including the chief justice, without seeking the approval of
the democratically elected Senate. He also replaced democratically
elected mayors in key Haitian cities all on his own.
And the third reason is this quote from his autobiography, page
126: I welcome those ideas that rest on the values of beauty, dig-
nity, respect and love. Che Guevara-a bourgeoisie, a doctor,
internationalist-certainly incorporated some of those values, as
did Allende. They were severe men. They made mistakes, just as
I will do. Why should I deny it? I feel more affection and sympathy
for them than I do for many others.
Sending American soldiers into harm's way to instill a man who
was a lover of Che Guevara, and you say he has gotten a bum rap?
These are his own words from his own autobiography. Mr. Talbott,
we are engaged in voodoo diplomacy. The United States has no in-
terest in Haiti.
QUESTIONING U.S. POLICY GOALS
And I have been ticking off the things that have been stated in
your own words. We are going to build a civilian and democratic
police force. With what tools? We have just been told that those






Haitians supposedly in exile in Guantanamo Bay, will be the police
force.
We have been told that we are there for the purpose of long-term
U.S. credibility. Nobody in the Congress believes you. The Amer-
ican people don't believe you. We have been told by Mr. Deutch our
military mission is, "to establish a secure environment in Haiti and
assist a transition to a stable government,".
And then we were told that the U.S. commander will advise the
Secretary General of the U.N. Who determines when we pull out?
The United States or the United Nations?
And then we were told by General Sheehan, who has a very dif-
ficult job, that the police force was to come from the exiles at Guan-
tanamo Bay. And I would presume that he is saying that because
those are the orders that he has. But what is most amazing to me
is that when the Members of Congress were briefed by General
Powell, Senator Nunn and Mr. Christopher, who should have been
here also today, about 140 members had questions. Who will be re-
training the police force? And the answer came, well, the current
police force will be retraining themselves.
Now, when you are putting back in power somebody who loves
Che Guevara and somebody who has a disdain for peace as we
know it in this country, and he will ultimately be in charge of the
police, how could we say with any certainty that when we with-
draw from Haiti, the situation at that point will improve?
DEFENSE OF ARISTIDE
Mr. TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman, I think that Secretary Deutch may
want to say a word or two more just to clarify this all-important
issue of how we propose working with the international community
and the Government of Haiti to establish an interim police force.
I think for very understandable reasons some clarification is re-
quired there.
Let me just say the following with respect to President Aristide.
I understand, of course, the thrust of those points you have chosen
to highlight from his biography. I would suggest, respectfully, that
President Aristide's views on Che Guevara are not the most ger-
mane fact here. The most germane fact is that in December of
1990, 90 percent of the Haitian people went to the polls and voted
in a free and fair election and 67.5 percent of those voters voted
for President Aristide.
Mr. MANZULLO. Based upon that, you say that this man believes
in the peaceful democratic process as we do. Hitler was elected
peacefully.
Mr. TALBOTT. President Aristide, even in recent days, I think,
has reestablished-and I stress reestablished, in deed as well as in
word, his commitment to a process.
Mr. MANZULLO. He is telling you that because that is what you
want to hear. He wrote in his autobiography that he has an infatu-
ation with Che Guevara. Now he is going to be in charge of this
police force? That doesn't make sense.
REBUILDING THE HAITIAN POLICE FORCE
Mr. TALBOTT. Maybe this would be an appropriate point to clar-
ify a little bit about the police force. We have probably spent as







much time within the government on the issue of police as any
other single dimension of this very complicated operation over the
last few months. And the reason, I think, is implicit in the discus-
sion we are having here today.
Part of the mission is to establish the conditions of essential civic
order; that is a responsibility that must rest on Haitian soldiers.
The U.S. military is not going to be in the position in an open-
ended way of being the cop on the beat in Haiti. So we have spent
a great deal of time working on this.
It is our plan, which we are quite optimistic we are going to be
able to carry out, that we, working with the Government of Haiti,
will be able to identify somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 person-
nel from the current armed forces of Haiti. These are people who
have been just doing a job-they do not have a record of human
rights violations or anything like that-and will be available to
serve as an interim police force that can be augmented by other
sources.
The Haitian Government is now in Guantanamo, as General
Sheehan said, working with 1,200 to 1,500 of the refugees there
who are police trainees, and it will be a key function of the United
Nations mission when it comes in after the conclusion of the multi-
national force to complete the process of professionalizing the police
force.
But perhaps Secretary Deutch could be given a chance to add a
few words.
Mr. OBERSTAR [presiding]. Briefly. Other members are waiting.
U.S. RETAINS AUTHORITY OVER TROOPS
Mr. DEUTCH. Congressman, I regret that I made my point and
you misunderstood it, exactly the reverse. That is that the United
States has full authority over all of its troops. It makes the decision
when they are coming out, at what pace and when; and the United
Nations Secretary General cannot make a decision without the ad-
vice of the United States commander.
So it is exactly the opposite of the way you interpreted it. I regret
that fact.
We call the shots on when our troops come out, and the transi-
tion cannot be made without our participation by the Secretary
General.
Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Menendez.
SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR HAITI OPERATION
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you.
Secretary Talbott, I have about four questions. Most of them
could be answered by you, but I would be happy to hear your col-
leagues add if they wish.
One is, I heard Secretary Deutch say, in response to the ques-
tions that I intended to ask as well about the amounts of monies
to be spent, saying that for 1994 it is $50 million, an estimate for
the upcoming year is $400 to $500 million. And you said that it is
uncertain and it is hard to make accounting, but you are going to
try; this is your best estimate. I assume that means that it could
be greater or could it be less.






Mr. DEUTCH. Both, sir.
Mr. MENENDEZ. It could go either way. Added to $200 to $300
million in AID assistance that we are contemplating, are we not
heading toward the billion dollar mark in this whole proposal?
And, secondly, where are we taking-especially when I think of
AID, where are we taking those monies from? For those of us on
this committee who have been arguing that certain parts of the
world automatically get raided in that context, I would like to know
where it is that that money is coming from.
AMNESTY FOR COUP LEADERS CRITICIZED
In the context of human rights and democracy that Secretary
Christopher has said were the pillars of foreign diplomacy of this
administration, I wonder out loud, what is it when we, in fact, have
the President of the United States saying that General Cedras and
Francois and company are among the worst human rights abusers,
not in the world, but certainly in the hemisphere? Some of us shud-
der when we think of others who are even worse human rights
abusers, but the bottom line is that they are among the worst
human rights abusers, and yet they walk away with an agreement
that says they can walk away basically with amnesty, without an
obligation to leave the country-maybe an expectation, but without
an obligation to leave the country-and that whatever resources
they may have may very well end up being their own when this
is all over.
What does that say to those we are trying to fight on respect for
human rights and democracy in other parts of the world? Does it
say that if you hang out there long enough we will make a deal
with you and you can walk away with the proceeds of what you
raped a country with and with your actions gone untouched?
POLICY ON U.S. DEPARTURE
Thirdly, it is maybe a minor question in the context of this, but
did I not hear the President give his national address. Is the con-
cern over refugees now part of what we would consider the national
security interests?
And lastly, what are the set of circumstances in which we will
leave Haiti? And I have heard you talk about the U.N. mission, and
I have heard you say that, in fact, we will make a certification to
the U.N. that it is secure and safe and whatnot. But I would like
to hear what are the standards that you will use to determine that
your certification to the United Nations is appropriate, and when
do you expect the timeframe for that to be? And I assume that you
can give us some sense of a timeframe if you can state what you
think is going to be your costs. Your cost is obviously driven by
your manpower and the period of time in which you, in fact, expect
to be there. So I would assume you can give us some sense of time,
even if you don't want to have a date certain hanging over your
head.
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Mr. TALBOTT. Thank you, Congressman. On the first question
with regard to economic assistance, as Secretary Deutch has prom-






ised you, we will, of course, be coming back to you with a very pre-
cise and thorough projection of costs, including in that area.2
President Clinton, in his speech to the United Nations yesterday,
made clear that we feel that it is very important if this mission is
going to succeed that there be an economic assistance component
to it as well,
I would stress several things. First of all, this is not something
that the United States will be doing alone. Our Agency for Inter-
national Development has been working with other nations and
with the international financial institutions, the InterAmerican De-
velopment Bank, the World Bank in particular, in order to put to-
gether a package that will be appropriate. There is already $100
million in the fiscal year 1995 budget for use in Haiti.
We feel that we will need another $100 million, which, of course,
goes to the second part of your question. Obviously, we are in an
era of limited resources, and we will be consulting very closely with
the Congress on identifying sources for those funds.
RATIONALE FOR AGREEMENT WITH COUP LEADERS
With regard to how history, as well as our administration, judges
General Cedras, General Biamby and Colonel Francois, I would
simply say on that score that President Clinton's depiction of them,
which you have referred to, was fully justified, remains fully justi-
fied, and stands as far as we are concerned.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Secretary, I don't mean history, I mean,
what is the message that we send to others similarly situated?
Mr. TALBOTT. As a result of the agreement reached in Port-au-
Prince a week ago Sunday, two things were achieved. A date cer-
tain for the departure from power of Cedras, Biamby and Francois,
and an arrangement-an arrangement with the military regime
there and the de facto government that permitted the peaceful de-
ployment of American forces, thus saving American and Haitian
lives. We think it was a good agreement, for that reason, and I
stress both halves of that.
Now, what will the fate of General Cedras and the other two be
after the restoration of the democratic government? We have said
repeatedly that we believe that they should not only leave power,
but that they should leave Haiti.
That was not provided for in the Port-au-Prince agreement, but
that issue will be resolved in the future in which reality will have
changed considerably in Haiti. Whether they will be beneficiaries
of the amnesty that will be discussed by the Haitian Parliament
when it reconvenes tomorrow is up to the Haitian Parliament.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to welcome
our panelists for joining us and I do have just a few questions.
CONSIDERATIONS GUIDING U.S. POLICY
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Gilman, would you yield for one moment?
Mr. Chairman, I would hope that-while my time to ask ques-
tions had expired, I had two outstanding questions that didn't get
answered-that they could be answered verbally or in writing.
2 See appendix 2.






Mr. OBERSTAR. The chair asks the witnesses to respond to the re-
maining questions in writing.
Mr. TALBOTT. I was aware of that, Mr. Menendez, and I will try
to be responsive on the third of the four questions that you asked.
Mr. DEUTCH. I would also like to respond to the fourth.
Mr. TALBOTT. Yes, the issue of refugees is a consideration and an
important consideration in this policy. The policy-
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Talbott, I know you have a time limitation
here, and the length of your responses is going to determine how
long you are going to stay here.
Mr. TALBOTT. I understand that, but I do feel that the Congress-
man deserves an answer on that, as have others.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I understand that. We have a lot of members that
have-
Mr. TALBOTT. The other components were democracy, human
rights; and taken together, they made up the national rationale for
this policy.
CRITIQUE OF U.S. POLICY
Mr. GILMAN. We support the ideals of constitutional democracy
and recognize the need for respect for human rights in Haiti. Presi-
dent Aristide is certainly a powerful symbol for many of us with
regard to democracy and social justice. But many of us remain un-
convinced that only men with military force could achieve those
worthy objectives; and by intervening in Haiti our Nation has
taken sides in a country with a long history of bloody civil unrest
and no tradition of political conciliation.
Our policymakers have ignored the costly and bitter lesson of our
occupation of Haiti that ended some 60 ypqrs ago, and regrettably,
they seem to be ignoring the lessons that we should have learned
in Somalia. By improvising rules of engagement and committing
ourselves to an overambitious mission, it seems that we are repeat-
ing the lessons that we didn't learn in Somalia.
I will conclude with just this note. If the President wants to re-
write the rules for engaging American military forces, even when
no vital U.S. interests are at stake, those should be debated in the
Congress, fully. Secondly, we have seen no reliable assessment of
what the intervention and subsequent reconstruction and develop-
ment of Haiti will cost the American taxpayer.
I am pleased that Secretary Deutch will forward information on
costs to us-I asked at the last briefing that we had last week, and
we were assured by Secretary Perry that that information would
be provided to us.
Third, our Nation is doing and paying more than its fair share
to restore order in a country that has never known it. Our Presi-
dent's key objectives, which he laid out for the American people-
restoring President Aristide, removing the military junta, and ad-
dressing human rights-can be addressed in a matter of a few
weeks. Beyond that, we drift into nation-building and prolonged oc-
cupation, which will galvanize Haitian nationalism and could exact
a terrible price.
Along with that, I would like to ask our panel this: When will
the U.N. peacekeeping mission be prepared to take over for the
multinational force, and just how extensive is that mission? As far


84-415 0 94 3







as I can see, there are only about a handful of nations, most of
them in the CARICOM, who have offered some help, and just one
or two of the Latin American countries. I think Bolivia, Argentina
and maybe one or two in Central America.
I think the whole offer of help is 2,400 in personnel. And the
President talked about a 6,000 peacekeeping force, and so did our
briefers last week. Where is that help going to come from? How
many peacekeepers are we going to need and how many of them
are going to be U.S. troops?
COMPOSITION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE
Mr. TALBOTT. Taking the last point first, Congressman, in the
multinational force phase, which will involve about a 2,500 force,
it is actually quite a wide geographical reach.
Mr. GILMAN. That is 2,500 without United States being counted?
Mr. TALBOTT. That is correct, 2,500. In addition to Latin Amer-
ican countries and Caribbean countries, there are also European
countries involved-Belgium, Holland, at least one African country,
Benin, Poland.
Mr. GILMAN. I am talking about the Latin American troops. I
know we have got some offers from other countries, but how many
from-
Mr. TALBOTT. These are not just offers, incidentally; these are
commitments. These are troops who in many cases are already in
Puerto Rico.
Mr. GILMAN. 2,500 is the number?
Mr. TALBOTT. Twenty-eight nations and 2,500 personnel.
Mr. GILMAN. And the rest of them will be United States, and we
are still talking about 6,000 peacekeepers?
TIMETABLE FOR TRANSITION TO U.N. FORCE
Mr. TALBOTT. The second phase-this is a U.S.-dominant oper-
ation at the beginning. There is no question that it has always
been conceived that way. But quickly, we believe that we can draw
down the American component and hand this over to the United
Nations peacekeeping operation, no more than half of which will be
Americans.
Mr. GILMAN. When do you anticipate that we could do that?
Mr. TALBOTT. We would hope that would be in a matter of
months, in the beginning of next year.
Mr. GILMAN. By January, we would be in a position to turn it
all over to the peacekeepers?
Mr. TALBOTT. That would certainly be a hope, but in the context
of earlier discussion, I would just emphasize on behalf of the three
of us and the administration once again that there is all the dif-
ference in the world between a plan which we are quite optimistic
about being able to keep and a mandated date certain for with-
drawal.
Mr. GILMAN. When do you think that the bulk of our troops that
have gone in in the last week or two will be coming out?
Mr. DEUTCH. Mr. Gilman, in brief, the plan calls for, within 6
months, to have U.S. forces drawn down considerably to the level
of roughly 3,000 or so, which would be the share that we would ex-







pect at maximum would be present by the United States in the
United Nations mission in Haiti.
Mr. GILMAN. We think that we could get them out by January?
Mr. DEUTCH. Six months. The plan calls for 6 months from the
date of the beginning of the operation in September, so I think that
brings us to March. Now, it would be-we are all hoping to do it
earlier, but 6 months has been the planning date that we have con-
tinually-
Mr. GILMAN. Have you started to remove some of our troops now?
Mr. DEUTCH. We will begin to remove some of our troops as early
as next week.
Mr. GILMAN. Who is going to command the U.N. peacekeeping
mission?
Mr. DEUTCH. Excellent question, Mr. Gilman. We hope, and
trust, that we can have an American commander. We are certainly
hoping for that.
Mr. GILMAN. We are hoping, but do we know? Is that some prob-
lem?
Mr. DEUTCH. I don't think that that has been completely agreed
upon. But it is certainly our expectation that it will be a U.S. com-
mander.
PEACEKEEPING COSTS
Mr. GILMAN. When you give us the costs of our mission to date,
would you also give us a projected cost of our peacekeeping.
Mr. DEUTCH. Everywhere in the world, sir?
Mr. GILMAN. No, I am referring now-I thought the subject of
this was Haiti.
Mr. DEUTCH. I am sorry, sir. I thought you were asking for the
peacekeeping operations everywhere.
Mr. GILMAN. I am talking about the peacekeeping costs in Haiti.
Mr. DEUTCH. Of course, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. When we can anticipate that? Last week Secretary
Perry said that we could anticipate that in a few days.
Mr. DEUTCH. Tomorrow, sir.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if we could make that a part of the
record.
Chairman HAMILTON [presiding]. Without objection.3
Ms. McKinney.
DEPARTURE OF COUP LEADERS
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
commend our three panelists for being up here so long and facing
sometimes unnecessarily hostile questions. I would also like to
commend you.for your thoroughness-and you definitely are pre-
pared-and your responsiveness.
I have a question about the departure of Cedras, Francois and
Biamby. I am wondering what kind of assurance we have that on
October 15 they will indeed step down from power.
Two, what kind of assurance do we have that they will leave the
island; and three, inasmuch as we might be marking up a resolu-
tion that contains a date certain for our departure, how does that
3The information appears in appendix 2.







date certain impact the behavior-our expected behavior as far as
Cedras, Francois and Biamby are concerned?
Mr. TALBOTT. We are, I think I can say, totally confident that
General Cedras, Biamby and Francois will step down, which is to
say, give up all political power on October 15 under the terms of
the agreement to which they are committed. And our reason for
that is the American military presence and the multinational force
in Haiti.
. And I might say-and General Sheehan may want to comment
on this, because his colleagues are working directly with General
Cedras in order to effect the transition of power there. But it is my
understanding that everything we have seen suggests that that is,
indeed, their intention; and we certainly have the wherewithal to
make it happen in any event.
On the second question of their leaving Haiti-and I realize I am
now going back over ground covered earlier. It is not provided for
in the Port-au-Prince agreement signed a week ago Sunday; none-
theless, it remains our view that they should leave. And we think
there is a good chance that they will when they are confronted with
the new political and other realities in Haiti.
On the effect of a legislative date certain for withdrawal with re-
gard to those three, I would simply say that the point I made in
general applies in the specific case, that a congressionally man-
dated date certain for withdrawal, I am concerned, might embolden
those who do not want to see the restoration of democracy there.
Ms. McKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Roth.
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON HAITI INTERVENTION
Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The more I see of this
Haiti, reminds me of when I was a young man there was a movie
that was quite popular, The Mouse that Roared. A small country
declared a war on the United States to get foreign aid, and it
seems to be playing out somewhat here.
Last year Secretary Christopher was before our committee, and
he said in committing U.S. forces, there were four criteria that this
administration has adopted. One was that it had a clear goal; two,
support of the American people; three, a reasonable chance for suc-
cess; and four, a plan to get out.
Would you please tell me how these criteria have been met in
Haiti?
Mr. TALBOTT. We have a clear goal. It is the restoration of the
legitimate, democratically elected government of that country. We
are quite confident about having a reasonable chance of success; I
would say even better than that. We did not go in without a clear
notion, both of how we will get out and when we will get out. There
has been a lot of discussion about that here.
On the question of support of the American people, there is no
question whatsoever, Congressman, that this is a highly controver-
sial, much-debated and indeed much-opposed policy. On that score,
I would only echo what President Clinton has said on a couple of
occasions; and that is, to their credit, the American people are al-
most always reluctant to see force used. That has been the case in
virtually every exertion of American force that we have seen, and







I think it speaks well both for the prudence and the peace-loving
nature of the American people.
It is the administration's hope that as they see this drama unfold
in coming days and weeks, they will feel what those of us in the
administration feel, and I hope many outside of the administration
feel as well, and that is not only pride in what our young men and
women in the armed services are doing there, but also will see a
vindication of the political mission.
Mr. ROTH. Well, if I can respond, I would say, a chance for get-
ting out, I think that is-from the answers we heard here today,
it is nebulous at best. As far as reasonable chance for a success,
there is a civil war going on in Haiti between these different fac-
tions and you are not going to reestablish peace by putting 15,000
Americans into Haiti to try to establish peace among 6 or 7 million
people.
As far as support of the American people, well, if the American
people are wise-and they are-this is their government; why don't
we listen to them? Why did we go into Haiti? I don't think that has
ever been answered.
As far as a clear goal for success, when is this election *with
Aristide going to take place? Because according to the President,
we are going to stay there until this election is going to take place.
Mr. TALBOTT. December 1995, and his successor will be installed
in February 1996.
COMPOSITION OF MULTINATIONAL FORCE
Mr. TALBOTT. The multinational force phase of this, which is the
one that most Americans will be involved, will be finished long,
long before that; and we have talked a little bit about the time-
frame of that here. The United Nations mission which will come in
after the multinational force would be mandated to remain until
February 1996.
Mr. ROTH. Isn't this multinational force really a deception?
Let's be frank. Let's put all the cards on the table. You said 2,500
from 28 different countries. The Americans are going to do the
heavy lifting. This multinational force is a deception on the Amer-
ican people to say that there are others than Americans involved.
I have seen all of these multinational forces before. It amounts to
50 people from here, 25 doctors from some other country, 100 peo-
ple from somewhere else, and Americans are doing all the heavy
lifting.
Mr. TALBOTT. Let me just-and General Sheehan has a word or
two to say on this, as well-the police function and the police mon-
itoring function is absolutely critical to the overall success of this.
Virtually all of the police monitors will be drawn from the multi-
national force.
General SHEEHAN. This is not a place where there is an assault
combat requirement. This is a stability force operation. Colonel
Graham and his Caribbean force is a professionally well trained
force, as is the Bangladeshi battalion that is coming in. And the
Israelis are as good as you can get in the police business, and so
I would give them very high marks.
Mr. ROTH. Well, the Israelis right now are debating whether or
not they are going to come; isn't that true?







General SHEEHAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROTH. So what I am saying is that you get a few people from
28 other countries and you say it is a multinational force. No, it
is not; that is just window dressing. Americans are doing all the
work. And I think that you have an obligation to tell the American
people that, General.
General SHEEHAN. Sir, the forces that are coming in clearly in-
tend to carry their load.
Mr. TALBOTT. I would just say, Congressman, that in all the con-
sultations that we have had with your colleagues, we have taken
pains to lay out exactly what the role would be of the international
participants, as well as the American role; and what we are seeing
unfold coincides with the plan.
U.S. RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL CEDRAS CANDIDACY
Mr. ROTH. I just have one more question. If Cedras runs for
President-and he may well do that-and he wins, are we going to
back him?
Mr. TALBOTT. The United States stands for democracy and that
means free and fair elections and the result of free and fair elec-
tions.
Mr. ROTH. So the answer is yes. If he wins, we will back him?
Mr. TALBOTT. Rather than addressing it in a hypothetical, with
a specific personality, I would just underscore the principle.
Mr. ROTH. But it is not a hypothetical; it is very straightforward.
Mr. TALBOTT. With respect, I would suggest that at this point it
is quite hypothetical. But I believe I have been responsive to your
question. The reason that we are in Haiti today is because the Hai-
tian people had a chance to conduct a free and fair election, and
they elected a government. That government was overthrown by a
coup d'etat and that coup d'etat is about to be reversed and the
democratically elected government is going to be given a chance to
go back in.
Mr. ROTH. And if Cedras runs for President and he wins, then
we are going too back him because we back any-
Mr. TALBOTT. We will continue to support the workings of democ-
racy.
Chairman HAMILTON. The gentleman's time his expired. We are
going to have to conclude the hearing. The bells have rung for a
vote. We have two members remaining, Mr. Payne and Mr. Hast-
ings. I will have to ask them to share the time and I regret that.
Mr. Payne and then Mr. Hastings.
Mr. PAYNE. I yield to Mr. Hastings. And then I will take the last
question.
DEFENSE OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you for yielding and thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
I would like to briefly disabuse my colleague, Mr. Roth, of a cou-
ple of theories, one being the notion that there was and is a civil
war in Haiti. At least it is not a shooting civil war because the
military junta has been in control of all the circumstances.
Another is the notion that American soldiers in this particular ef-
fort under Phase One of U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 are







doing the heavy lifting. I believe that all of the presenters would
agree that that is the case. But I would remind you that there are
19 peacekeeping missions ongoing in the world today.
I happened to see one in Croatia where 27,000 ground personnel
are involved and not a single American soldier is there. Of those
67,000, less than 2,000 of them are American soldiers.
We are about the business of being involved after the post-cold
war era in something more than war-making; it is now peace-
making. And I see no reason at all why if everyone else is turning
to the United Nations we, as the remaining superpower of the
world, shouldn't be the leaders in peacekeeping efforts.
As we speak, this Nation-and this is directed to my colleague,
Mr. Rohrabacher, as he leaves-in calling-I was going to tell you
whether you were here or not-the notion about Aristide; let me
make it clear. I don't support necklacing, and I don't believe any-
body does. But we are meeting with Yeltsin from the Russian Gov-
ernment and the Russian Government and the former Soviet Union
committed atrocities that would dwarf the human rights violations
of many other countries in the world.
We have MFN in China, and we know all the circumstances
there. This is a different world. And the fact of the matter is that
other people change. I have been a critic of these same persons who
are here today and that is the upshot of all of my remarks, Mr.
Talbott. We are there not only at the behest of the elected rep-
resentatives, but we are at the behest of the United Nations; and
fortuitously, because of the success of the Carter mission, we are
also there because of the de facto government and their invitation
pursuant to whatever that agreement was in Port-au-Prince.
I don't feel President Clinton has failed in foreign policy, and I
keep hearing that garbage from my colleagues on the other side of
the aisle. In Somalia, we saved 1 million lives. In Bosnia, as I indi-
cated, no American ground forces are involved at all. North Korea
was a volatile kettle of confusion a few days ago; now it has more
stability to it. We are dealing with Russia, and in Africa we have
done extraordinary things.
The policy that you all asked for is a correct policy, and I hesi-
tate, because I am very supportive of the chairman of this commit-
tee-I don't think that we should have a date certain, and the rea-
son is not tying the President's hands or whether the President
came here and consulted-and I can concur with many of the re-
marks that have been made. The fact is, I don't want to tie those
kids' hands, who are on the ground, and that is where the action
is and I don't think that in many respects we should.
PUBLIC OPINION ON HAITI POLICY
Let me say finally, Mr. Chairman, I heard Mr. Torricelli talk
about what overwhelming sentiment is in America today. And,
Don, I apologize for taking the added time, but I sat here and
fumed when I heard what overwhelming sentiment is.
Let me tell you where overwhelming sentiment came from. Over-
whelming sentiment as regards Haiti came as questions put by
pollsters to the effect of would you invade Haiti? The answer to
that is no. If you asked if you knew that invading Haiti would stop
Haitians from coming to America and would save American dollars








and give democracy a chance to flourish and would cause taxpayers
in other communities throughout the world not to have to suffer
abuse of their systems, either socially, hospital-wise, or school-wise,
would you favor intervention to stop that? The answer is yes, with-
out hesitancy.
It is time for us to get on with this business.
One word of caution on the buy-back, Mr. Deutch. Make sure
that the Dominican border is not a place where added arms can
come through.
And I thank you all so very much, and I thank President Clinton,
and President Carter and Colin Powell and Senator Nunn and all
of the people that are involved; and I will stand toe to toe with any-
body on the other side and tell them that I think that this adminis-
tration deserves a round of applause and immense credit and com-
mendation.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Payne.
WORLD OPINION ON U.S. INTERVENTION
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Since there is very little time
left, I would certainly associate myself with the remarks of my col-
league from Florida. I would also like to indicate that being at the
U.N. yesterday and talking to a number of the delegates from other
countries, there was a tremendous amount of praise for the stand
that the United States made and for its decision to act and to act
in a very strong and forceful way.
And so I was very proud yesterday, on the floor of the U.N., in
conversations with many people, to see the U.S.A. being talked
about in more glowing terms about its resolve.
I think that what has been indicated earlier about regional areas
being-I disagree with Mr. Torricelli talking about this is
neocolonialism. The reasons that we were in Haiti before and in
Latin and Central America is a lot different from the reasons that
we are going back.
And I think the debate is whether Japan ought to take more of
a role in the Pacific and whether Russia, under the U.N., should
take more responsibility in the New Independent States, and I
think that in Africa whether the stronger African nations, South
Africa, should take a role in peacekeeping; and I think the only
way to go is through the United Nations with the stronger powers
being able to have governance. If we have a world without govern-
ance, without policing, then we have a chaotic place.
OPPOSITION TO TERMINATION DATE
And so I would also like to say that I think a date certain would
be a tragedy. I think that it does not make sense. You cannot do
a job like you are attempting to do with a date certain. You have
a plan. Every plan needs to be modified every once in a while. But
to tie the hands of the administration I think would be a big mis-
take. And I would hope that all of my patriotic friends on the other
side of the aisle would remember that as we are talking about lives
of U.S. military personnel being in harm's way and the threat, that
when they make this a partisan issue this, is not partisan, those
young people are there-Democrat, Republican or Independent, or





49
whatever, they are there because it was a decision that they made.
But I just hate to see continuing this partisanism in this policy.
Concluding, I would like to commend the President again for
staying the course, and making an unpopular decision. But it took
us 10 years after World War II because that was unpopular, too,
as a matter of fact. The majority of the people opposed World War
II when we declared war on Germany on December 8 after the
bombing on December 7.
There has not been a popular war period. Even the War of 1812
was unpopular.
And so, let me just say that it is not new; if you poll the people,
they would say let's not go to war. People just don't like war in this
country. But I think sometimes we have to-we are not at war, but
sometimes we have to intervene militarily. As has been indicated,
I don't think the War Powers Resolution applies here because we
didn't intervene militarily, we used troops to go in, not to wage any
conflict.
So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And with that, I will adjourn the meeting.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]














U.S. POLICY TOWARD, AND PRESENCE IN,
HAITI-CONSIDERATION OF H.J. RES. 416


WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1994
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton
(chairman) presiding.
Chairman HAMILTON. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will
come to order.
[Whereupon the committee proceeded to other business.]
Chairman HAMILTON. The next order of business is H.J. Res.
416. The joint resolution before the committee makes clear that the
U.S. military mission in Haiti should be limited in time and scope,
and that it should have clearly defined responsibilities.
First, the resolution authorizes the U.S. military presence in
Haiti until March 1, 1995. Congress should share responsibility
any time that U.S. troops are deployed abroad for possible combat
purposes. Congress should be on record with respect to Haiti.
Most of our colleagues, I believe, want to set a deadline for our
involvement in Haiti, and this resolution includes a deadline. A
date earlier than March 1 for troop withdrawal is irresponsible
from an institutional and operational standpoint. Our troops should
not be abandoned in the field without congressional support. The
authorization should not expire while Congress is out of session.
Congress will not be sufficiently organized before March 1 to give
this issue full consideration.
We should also provide the greatest chance for the success of the
operation. We should do what we can to ensure an orderly transfer
of the mission to a follow-on force. This resolution should provide
sufficient time for transfer to the United Nations led force.
Second, the resolution makes clear that we are authorizing the
deployment in Haiti for limited purposes. Those are to protect U.S.
citizens, to stabilize the security situation so that orderly progress
can be made in transferring the functions of government in Haiti
to the democratically elected government, and to facilitate the pro-
vision of humanitarian assistance.
We are not authorizing nation building in the resolution, and we
are not authorizing U.S. troops to build democracy. U.S. Armed
Forces should not be running Haiti or rebuilding it. Military force
cannot be expected to achieve anything beyond the purposes in the
resolution. The job of rebuilding in Haiti should not fall on U.S.
(51)







Armed Forces. It is the responsibility of Haiti and the international
community.
Third, this resolution guarantees that members of Congress will
have the opportunity to vote again after March 1, 1995, if they do
not approve the President's plan for a U.S. role in the United Na-
tions led force. It provides expedited procedures for consideration
of a joint resolution that would direct the President to withdraw all
troops from Haiti.
Today is not the day to decide whether the United States should
participate in the United Nations mission. The decision to partici-
pate in the United Nations mission should be made in the context
of circumstances in Haiti at the time of the mission's deployment
when we will better understand what that decision will imply.
In summary, this resolution defines the limited role to be played
by our armed forces. It gives them a reasonable period to accom-
plish their mission. And it retains the prerogatives of Congress to
pass judgment on the continued wisdom of this operation at a later
date.
The chair simply wants to acknowledge that he has had some
discussion with the ranking member on this. I think that Mr. Gil-
man has met with the minority caucus. I have met with the major-
ity caucus. We recognize that in each of our caucuses there are dif-
ferences of views.
We also recognize that the real determination of the final status
of this resolution will be made on the floor of the House. So it is
the intention of the chair, and I think of Mr. Gilman as well, and
he can speak to that of course, that when we do go to the floor that
we will urge the Speaker and the Rules Committee to provide-and
we have reason to think that they will-all of the options, so that
members will be able to vote for an early withdrawal, whatever
that date may be, and I understand that might be determined at
a later time by the Republican leadership, that they will be able
to vote for no date at all. There are certainly members in our cau-
cus on the Democratic side who favor no date at all.
And there will be an option, of course, to vote for a date on or
about March 1. There may be other options as well. But I want to
assure members that the chair has every reason to think that all
of your options will be protected when you go to the floor, so that
you will be able to vote however you think best for American policy
at that point.
I also want to thank Mr. Gilman very much for his cooperation
in working with this approach. The chair has tried to be responsive
to his concerns here. And we have worked together to proceed in
this manner. Mr. Gilman.
STATEMENT OF MR. GILMAN
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for yielding,
and thank you for the opportunity to try to work out some sort of
an arrangement on the procedures of this bill.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, we first received this proposed
Torricelli resolution late last night. It was first distributed to our
minority members this morning.






Mr. Chairman, our minority, having met in caucus this morning,
is firmly opposed to the adoption of this resolution. We oppose it
both procedurally and substantively.
Our procedural objection is that the resolution was drafted vir-
tually in private and withheld from the minority until almost the
last minute. And a copy was provided to our minority staff only at
about 7:30 p.m. last evening.
Accordingly, many of us first saw the resolution just a few hours
ago, and simply had not enough time to carefully review and de-
velop possible amendments to a resolution of this nature, one that
includes the question of whether or not we should authorize a mili-
tary operation in which American lives may be lost, which is prob-
ably the most solemn issue that can come before our committee.
Mr. Chairman, we would prefer postponing this measure for a
mark-up to enable us to more fully digest the resolution. But be-
cause of the shortness of time, we will not offer any amendments
today, nor will we make any more than a few observations about
the substance of the resolution.
I expect that we will have amendments if the measure does
reach the floor. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will support a rule
making such amendments in order.
But I do suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the procedures which have
been followed to date have been a disservice to the Congress and
the American people. The American people have been demanding
a full and careful debate and consideration of the President's policy
in Haiti. While we all agree about trying to restore a democrat-
ically elected President in Haiti, we do differ about the extensive-
ness of military involvement. I regret that to date that we have not
had such a debate on the House floor. Turning to the substance of
the resolution, Mr. Chairman, I think that we owe it to our con-
stituents to be frank about what this resolution is all about. It pro-
vides retroactive authorization for President Clinton's decision to
launch a U.S. military occupation of Haiti.
Most of us are of the opinion that the President could have re-
ceived congressional authorization in advance for his plan to occupy
Haiti, something which we have been urging him to do. That may
be why the President never really came to the Congress to seek out
such an authorization.
But now, not having been made part of that decision by the ad-
ministration to intervene, the proponents of this resolution want to
try to bring Congress back into the picture by having us provide
retroactive authorization of the President's action.
Some will say that it is congressional complicity and a gross for-
eign policy blunder by the administration, a blunder that is certain
to cost hundreds of millions of dollars, and will cost American lives,
and is questionable in any event about achieving its stated objec-
tives.
This measure would require a congressional acquiescence to a
policy that a significant majority of us believe to be wrong. Our
constituents expect more of us than this kind of a resolution.
Undoubtedly, the argument will be made that even members who
oppose military occupation of Haiti should support the resolution,
because it does set a firm date of March 1, 1995 for winding down







the U.S. occupation. For that, we commend Mr. Torricelli for trying
to set a final date.
But, Mr. Chairman, this March 1 date actually is not any dead-
line. All that happens on March 1, according to this resolution, is
that the authorization granted to the President by this resolution
expires on that date. But the President already has our forces in
Haiti without any authorization. He has made clear that he is com-
fortable relying on his constitutional authority to keep our forces
there as long as he deems it necessary.
In other words, Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, all that hap-
pens on March 1 is that the situation will revert to the one that
exists today. If the President wants to keep our forces in Haiti be-
yond that date, he can and will do so. All this resolution does is
to give the administration legal and political cover under the War
Powers Act.
Let us remember what President Clinton had in mind in Haiti.
He plans to keep 2,000 to 3,000 U.S. forces there as part of U.N.
peacekeeping force until February of 1996. That is almost a year
and a half from now. We recognize that the resolution contains ex-
pedited procedures which may allow us to vote on that plan some-
time next spring.
Such an expedited procedure is a sound idea. But we question
why the resolution postpones its availability until as late as next
spring. Many of us would like to vote on the President's plan to ex-
tend the occupation into 1996 now rather than next spring.
It has been suggested that the U.N. peacekeeping force, which
may be as much as 50 percent American in its composition or more,
may be put under foreign command, but the resolution is silent on
any foreign command of the U.N. led force.
These are just a few of some of our objections to this resolution,
Mr. Chairman. It is not our intention to offer any amendments at
this time. But we do reserve our opportunities to have our amend-
ments considered when this measure reaches the floor. We will
welcome your cooperation to that extent.
Accordingly, I urge my colleagues to oppose the adoption of this
resolution. And I thank the chairman for yielding.
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair will recognize members who
want to speak. But let me get the resolution in front of us. The
Chief of Staff will report the resolution.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. H.J. Res. 416, "Providing limited authorization
for the participation of U.S. Armed Forces in the multinational
force in Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of U.S.
Armed Forces from Haiti."
Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, further reading of the
resolution is dispensed with and printed in the record in full.
[H.J. Res. 416 appears in appendix 1.]
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
New Jersey, Mr. Torricelli.
STATEMENT OF MR. TORRICELLI
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, of all of the difficult and conten-
tious issues that I can recall coming before this committee, this is
among the most troublesome. There are many of us who believe
that a long time ago this country learned a lesson, that our mili-






tary forces should never be engaged in the field unless our people
were united in purpose, and this Congress was fully supportive.
There are 17,000 young Americans now occupying a foreign na-
tion without this Congress ever having had a debate, and against
overwhelming opposition by the American people.
The approach that is now being followed in this committee in de-
bating and adopting this resolution is not as I would have had it.
There are few members of this committee who would have proposed
this approach. It is, however, an attempt to deal with the reality
of the situation.
Without this resolution, there is no congressional debate, and no
procedures for a termination. And instead, the Congress is likely
to be faced with a situation where there will be an attempt to end
all appropriations immediately, or the policy goes forward with no
control or congressional involvement.
This country and our soldiers deserve better. While I personally
did not support intervention in Haiti, I would not support and be-
lieve that it is not fair to end without notification and simply re-
move all appropriations for young Americans while they are serv-
ing their country and deserve our support regardless of our beliefs
about policy.
Nor do I believe that it is in the best interests of our constitu-
tional government or in protecting the prerogatives of this institu-
tion to proceed without the Congress having debated and establish-
ing some control over this policy.
Both the resolution before you and the scenario that Chairman
Hamilton has outlined is an attempt to serve all of these objectives.
And proceeding to the House with a March 1 deadline, and protect-
ing the rights of Mr. Hastings to offer an amendment to remove the
date consistent with his own interests and objectives, and for Mr.
Gilman to offer a date significantly in advance of the March 1
deadline.
Speaking for the resolution itself, it does, however, offer a real
opportunity to set a limit on both the scope and the details of the
U.S. commitment, while offering the institution a chance after Feb-
ruary 1 on an expedited basis to bring legislation to the floor to ter-
minate the U.S. involvement, if that is the judgment of the Con-
gress at that point.
It requires the President to submit three different reports on the
cost, the scope, and the nature of U.S. involvement in the interim.
The resolution specifically limits the scale of the U.S. involvement
to the restoration of the democratic government, and providing se-
curity to that objective.
Therefore, the mission, both in its scale and the date, is well de-
fined. I recognize that there are members who would have ap-
proached the issue differently. My own sentiments are no different
than yours. But to fail to act is to have this Congress adjourn with-
out debate in setting absolutely no limits on this involvement. I be-
lieve that would not be responsible.
I would urge my colleagues to have this resolution passed today
in committee, and proceed to the Rules Committee. Mr. Hastings
and Mr. Gilman can offer their alternative approaches. And before
we adjourn and return to meet our constituents, we have a full,
free and fair debate about this involvement in Haiti.






I believe that is the responsible approach, while being fair to our
soldiers and indeed giving the President of the United States a full
measure of support consistent with the kinds of controls we believe
are in the national interest.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair has the following members who
have indicated that they want to speak. On the minority side,
Hyde, Roth, Smith, Bereuter, Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Royce, and
Burton. And on the majority side, Engel, Menendez, Hastings,
Johnston, McKinney, Wynn, and Payne. Mr. Hyde.
STATEMENT OF MR. HYDE
Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to congratulate Mr. Torricelli and you for bringing this
resolution forward. It is a vehicle for us to study and to debate this
very important issue. It is unfortunate that it comes so late. This
situation, as distinguished from Grenada and Panama, which in-
volved secrecy, speed, and American citizens, could have and
should have been debated before we committed our troops to what
may well be an insurmountable task, for which they are ill
equipped, for nation building, restoration of democracy where there
has never been a democracy despite the one event of the election,
and developing an economy of a country that is certainly a basket
case.
We do not want an open ended authority to tie our military
down. Our military is increasingly being eviscerated by Congress
and the administration. And therefore, it is good that this has a
date of March 1.
My suggestion to Mr. Gilman and the Republicans would be that
we accept the date of March 1, because we do not want to be
charged with under-cutting or short circuiting the reasonable ef-
forts of the administration to extricate ourselves from a situation
that now we are there, that we need to be extricated from.
So I would urge that we accept the date of Mr. Torricelli, and as-
suming that is Mr. Hamilton's date, but that we put some teeth
into it, rather this merely being an authorization which sits there
and does nothing. That on March 1 that Mr. Gilman's resolution,
which withdraws funds for this adventure, for this excursion, for
this operation, be incorporated by way of an amendment into this
resolution, so that it does withdraw our troops. And Congress as-
serts its power of the purse to withdraw funds for any further stay
there. And at the date selected by Mr. Torricelli.
So I would think that is the proper resolution of this. And we can
debate this on the floor. Again it is unfortunate that we did not
have a chance to debate it earlier where the expressions of the
American people as expressed through Congress would have been
heard in opposition to this.
We, Republicans, and I daresay plenty of Democrats do not want
to be associated with a retroactive authorization of something that
they disapproved of and would not have authorized. And that is
what is supporting this resolution as it is currently drafted does.
So for that reason, I am going to oppose this resolution, mean-
while again welcoming its selection of March 1. And instead of just
ending the authority for us to be there, I would like to have our







authority effectively terminated by withdrawing funds on that
date.
And I thank the chairman for giving me this opportunity to ex-
press myself.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Engel.
STATEMENT OF MR. ENGEL
Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I rise in support of the resolution. And let me say that I substan-
tially want to associate myself with much of the remarks of Mr.
Torricelli. I think that Congress obviously needs to be consulted
and to authorize going into Haiti. And I think that the administra-
tion should have come to Congress.
But I think that we also need to give credit where credit is due.
And I think that it has been very fashionable these days to bash
the President and bash every move that he makes in foreign policy,
and criticize everything that he tries to do.
The fact of the matter is that credit should be given to the Presi-
dent. When the mission to Haiti was successful by former Presi-
dent Carter, and Colin Powell, and Senator Nunn, President Clin-
ton was able to get an agreement whereby our troops could go into
Haiti peacefully and occupy the country peacefully. I think that
was a major breakthrough in diplomacy. President Clinton de-
serves tremendous credit for it.
You know, there is a dangerous attitude of isolationism in some
circles in Congress, which I think is very, very dangerous. I have
often said that foreign policy ought to be bipartisan. That it should
not be used as a means of trying to get the President, or box him
in, or humiliate him, or prove him wrong.
I think that there are times when America does have vital inter-
ests. We have vital interests in Cuba-we just passed a resolution
about Cuba, because it is in our hemisphere. And when refugees
leave Cuban shores, it affects us. And I think that the same is true
for Haiti.
I do not think that we can continue to have a policy where refu-
gees leave and want to come to our shores, and somehow we say,
well, that somehow or other is not in America's vital interests. I
think it is.
So we can quarrel over procedures, and we can quarrel over
whether the President should have come to Congress. And as I
said, he should have. But here we have a resolution before us
which reasserts congressional control over the situation.
We can argue about a March 1 deadline. And frankly, I have
some reservations over whether there ought to be a deadline at all.
I think that the military certainly is opposed to a deadline. And
there can be a case made to say that a deadline would give the en-
emies of democracy a chance to kind of hold out for a fixed date.
I think that we ought not to have a Somalia mentality here.
What happened in Somalia was a terrible thing. But I do not think
that we ought to use it as a base so that every time American
troops are in potential hostility that we want to quickly set a date
and urge the troops to come home.
I did not see a great clamor in some circles here, by some of my
friends on the other side of the aisle, with Grenada and Panama,







or the bombing of Libya, when Congress was not consulted at all,
and there were Republican Presidents.
I think sometimes that the Commander in Chief has to do what
he thinks is in the best interests of the country. We are here now,
and we are debating a policy. There have been some charges for in-
stance that American troops are somehow going to come under for-
eign command. If you read the resolution, that is not the case at
all. American troops must always be under American command.
And I think again that we do have a stake in restoring democ-
racy and human rights in Haiti. The United States has to have the
credibility to say and do the things that we think are important in
this hemisphere. Haiti is not very far from our shores. And what
happens there does absolutely affect us.
So I think that this resolution is a good compromise. I am keep-
ing my options open when Mr. Hastings makes his amendment on
the floor. Because again I am very concerned about tying the hands
of our military.
But let us conduct our foreign policy in a bipartisan fashion. Let
us not attempt to use it to play politics, or to bring the President
down. We have a resolution before us here. I think that it is a rea-
soned resolution. It is a compromise. It reasserts congressional con-
trol. It sets the March 1 deadline, and authorization would be
needed to go beyond that deadline.
I think that this is fair, and I certainly support the resolution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Just so members know, I have had several
inquiries about when we will vote. It is hard, of course, for the
chair to estimate that. I do have 14 speakers who have requested
to speak. Mr. Roth.
INQUIRY ON DATE FOR FLOOR CONSIDERATION
Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, a question to the chair. I have an
amendment, but I do not know if I want to offer it at this time.
The question that I have for you is next week may be the last week
that we are in session.
Do you have a commitment from the leadership that they are
going to bring this up to the floor next week?
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Roth, I do not think that I have a com-
mitment. I certainly have the expectation that they are fully plan-
ning on bringing this bill to the floor. I have never had any sugges-
tion that they would not. But I cannot honestly say to you that I
have a commitment. I have never asked them for one. I just as-
sumed that it would move forward.
Mr. ROTH. And further, Mr. Chairman, when you go to the Rules
Committee, did I understand you correctly, are you going to ask for
an open rule?
Chairman HAMILTON. I did not say an open rule. I said that we
would try to assure that members on the time question have all of
their options in front of them. I am aware of three or four of those
options now. Now there are other issues raised by this resolution
other than the time certain. And my position would be that we
ought to debate and have a rule that permits the major policy op-
tions. But I did not say an open rule.







STATEMENT OF MR. ROTH
Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, with respect to this resolution, I think that we in
the Congress, as I read this resolution, are acquiescing much too
easily. Basically, what we are doing here is saying hey, we were
not there for the take off, but we are going to be there for the crash
landing.
I remember as a youngster watching the Laurel and Hardy mov-
ies where Oliver Hardy used to say Stan Laurel, "Mr. President,
that is another fine mess you got us into."
Haiti also reminds me of the movie of a tiny country declaring
war on the United States and then surrendering to get foreign aid,
"The Mouse that Roared." It was very humorous.
While Haiti is Bill Clinton's mouse that roared, it is no joke, this
is reality. And the cost to the American taxpayer can only be ex-
pressed in one word, wow.
But do you know what upsets me most about this policy? It is
the duplicity of it. We are now told that President Clinton is going
to use $5 million. Stop and think about this. He is going to use $5
million of secret funds to facilitate Aristide's return.
Well, my friends, if this is a democracy in Haiti, and the people
love Aristide so much, why has our CIA been down there spending
millions of dollars, and why is the President using $5 million of se-
cret funds, of taxpayer funds, to grease the skids for Aristide's re-
turn? I would like an answer to that.
Now I want the American people to know when they see the
demonstrations in Haiti for Aristide that they may well be fi-
nanced, yes, by your American tax dollars. Now if we are going to
restore Aristide and we say that there is democracy in Haiti, to me
that is real duplicity.
And then we wonder why the American people have no trust and
confidence in their government or in their President. How can
they?
Mr. HASTINGS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROTH. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. HASTINGS. I would just like to ask a question.
Do you have authority for the proposition that you set forth re-
garding the spending of $5 million?
Mr. ROTH. Yes, it was in the news this morning.
Mr. HASTINGS. The news?
Mr. ROTH. It was on public radio this morning, that the Presi-
dent is going to use $5 million to grease the skids for Aristide's re-
turn. And I take back the balance of my time to continue.
What we should be doing in this resolution is trying to save the
troops from another Lebanon massacre and another Somalia disas-
ter. We have here in this country Haiti where every leader since
1804, every leader since 1804, has either been deposed or has fled
except for Papa Doc. There has not been democracy in Haiti.
But our President is risking the lives of American soldiers simply
to try to save what is left of his tattered and torn credibility. Now
the President is committing hundreds of millions of taxpayer dol-
lars to this pointless fiasco.







And the Clinton policy in Haiti is destined to fail. The only ques-
tion is how many Americans will be killed, and how much money
will be squandered. Haiti has never been a democracy. The last
time that we foolishly entered Haiti, we were stuck there for 19
years with nothing to show for it but dead Americans and dead
Haitians.
As we sink further into this swamp, the same thing is going to
happen. In Haiti, Bill Clinton has nowhere to go but down. Our
troops should never have gone into Haiti. And the last time we
should have learned a lesson to leave as quickly as possible.
Now when Christopher was before our Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee, he said that when the Clinton administration goes into a for-
eign country, there are four questions that have to be answered.
One, what is the goal? Two, is there a reasonable chance for suc-
cess? Three, does it have the backing of the American people? And
four, how do we get out?
And these four questions have not been answered in this policy.
And we as the Congress have an obligation to the American people,
and we have to speak forthrightly. All of the Congressmen are
going to scream after the crash landing. Now is the time to speak
up. Now is the time to speak up, not when the crash landing takes
place.
I thank the chairman for yielding.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Menendez.
STATEMENT OF MR. MENENDEZ
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very briefly. I intend
to support the resolution as a vehicle to create a debate on the
House floor, but my support now is in no way an indication of my
intentions on this matter as to the different options that may be
considered on the floor. But I do believe that this is a proper way
to proceed, to have a debate. Whether it is finally had now versus
when it could have been had.
The important part is that the debate does take place. And I be-
lieve that the resolution is a vehicle to accomplish that, and I will
be supporting it.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF MR. SMITH
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, the debate and the vote on the invasion and occu-
pation of Haiti should have occurred-and I think that members on
both sides of the aisle agree with this-before and not after that
invasion.
I would remind members that I had introduced a resolution, H.
Con. Res. 264, on June 30 which would have configured a biparti-
san congressional commission. The commission would have con-
sisted of members of both sides, who would present possible policy
options, and report back within 45 days. Had the resolution passed
when it was introduced or soon thereafter, we would have had the
product sometime in August, or at the latest in early September.
Unfortunately, the administration was very much against that.
As a matter of fact, both in response to my own resolution and that






which was proposed by Senator Dole, the administration lam-
pooned the initiative as a dilatory tactic.
We wanted to have an honest, thought-provoking, incisive debate
about Haiti and what the options were. We sought to mitigate the
human rights abuses in Haiti, and facilitate democracy there, with-
out imperiling the lives of Americans. We wanted to find a peaceful
solution rather than a solution brought by the barrel of a gun.
Unfortunately, the administration shunted all of that; aside, and
accused us of delaying tactics. I can absolutely assure you that my
intentions were not for delaying. They were to find. a just solution
to the crisis and the agony that is Haiti's.
I tried for several weeks as well, Mr. Chairman, to put together
a delegation. We had responses from both Republican and Demo-
cratic members who wanted to go to Haiti, and meet with duly-
elected members of their parliament, who like President Aristide,
were elected in an authenticated election, approved by the Organi-
zation of American States. We were denied that opportunity to
travel to Haiti.
Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. GILMAN. And they invited us to come.
Mr. SMITH. Yes, they invited us. They wanted to find some com-
mon ground, parliament to parliament in recognition that they too
are part of the governing body of Haiti-President Aristide and the
duly-elected members of their parliament. And we found no co-
operation from the State Department to facilitate that trip and ob-
tain the necessary waiver from the U.N. Sanctions Committee.
Again, an attempt made in a bipartisan way to find a peaceful
solution was put aside. Now we find ourselves faced with this reso-
lution after the fact. I do thank my friend, Mr. Torricelli, for his
well-meaning effort to set a day for withdrawal of U.S. Armed
Forces from Haiti, although it remains an open question, whether
or not the March 1 deadline is binding as drafted in the resolution.
Let me note for the record that my chief reservation about the
pending resolution is its authorization of the use of U.S. Armed
Forces to "stabilize" the security situation in Haiti, so that an or-
derly progress may be made in transferring the functions of govern-
ment in that country to the democratically elected Government of
Haiti.
It seems to me that the administration, even if this is binding,
can find enough wiggle room and enough open endedness in that
language to justify virtually anything that they might do in Haiti.
Let me just ask the administration, perhaps Secretary Sherman,
to explain.
Chairman HAMILTON. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. SMITH. I would ask permission to ask a question of the ad-
ministration vis-a-vis this resolution.
Chairman HAMILTON. The gentleman asks unanimous consent to
proceed for-
Mr. SMITH. Two minutes.
Chairman HAMILTON. For two additional minutes.
Is there any objection?
If not, you may proceed.
Mr. SMITH. I thank the chair and my colleagues.







I wish to ask some brief questions about the resolution, so that
we know exactly where the administration stands.
One, does the administration believe that the authorization con-
tained in the resolution is legally necessary to keep U.S. forces in
Haiti?
Two, does the administration consider the March 1 date con-
tained in the resolution to be legally binding; in other words, does
it require the withdrawal of U.S. forces by that date?
And three, does the administration support this resolution?
Ms. SHERMAN.4 Congressman, as you know, this administration,
as other administrations, has disagreed with the Congress over
who authorizes and whether the President is Commander in Chief
of U.S. forces. And as your colleagues have pointed out, forces are
in Haiti without prior authorization from the Congress. And this
administration believes, as did virtually every other administra-
tion, including President Bush who prior to the Gulf War vote said
that he felt that he had the authority to proceed whether or not
Congress gave him the authority to do so, that the deployment was
consistent with the President's authority as Commander in Chief.
So there has been an ongoing debate between the executive and
legislative branch. So we,' as other administrations, do take the po-
sition that the President as Commander in Chief can deploy U.S.
forces as he has done in this case.
Nonetheless, we are quite well aware that if the Congress sets
a deadline in a piece of legislation, that it has a tremendous politi-
cal force. And it also sends signals to our troops on the ground and
to both our friends and our enemies on the ground. And as in the
letter that has come up with this morning from General
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary
Perry, and as you heard in open testimony yesterday at a hearing
held by this committee, the administration does not support a fixed
date.
We appreciate what the chairman is trying to do, and what Con-
gressman Torricelli is trying to do, and what this committee is try-
ing to do to bring about a debate on this issue. But we firmly op-
pose a fixed date.
Mr. SMITH. You said this resolution has tremendous political
force.
But, the language in the resolution is not legally binding on the
administration?
Ms. SHERMAN: The administration, as other administrations,
takes the position that the President has the authority as the Com-
mander in Chief to deploy forces. There will be disagreements
about that, and the lawyers will probably be debating this, if this
is enacted into law, for some time. But we certainly take it quite
seriously.
Mr. SMITH. But there is no assurance that this has any legal ef-
fect on the administration?
Ms. SHERMAN. As I said, there has been long disagreement over
this issue.
Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, the letter to which Ms.
Sherman refers, to the Speaker from the Chairman of the Joint
4Hon. Wendy Sherman is the Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs.






Chiefs of Staff and from the Secretary of Defense will be made part
of the record.
[The letter appears in appendix 3.]
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Hastings.
STATEMENT OF MR. HASTINGS
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, as most members of the committee know, I have
been a consistent advocate of our involvement in Haiti and our
intervention. And I have been an advocate even before coming to
this Congress.
It is because I perceive myself as a supporter of democracy and
as a humanitarian, and certainly as a resident of south Florida, I
fervently wish to see this situation resolved. I said from day one
that if Haiti is not hospitable to its own people, those same people
will flock to south Florida. And we have seen with the recent influx
of leaky boats that this is indeed the case.
Mr. Chairman, I do not advocate sending young Americans into
a potentially dangerous situation carelessly or haphazardly. And
nor am I a blind supporter of the Clinton administration with ref-
erence to the Haiti policy. On the contrary, I have been a constant
critic of the administration. But I support the administration's pol-
icy on Haiti, because I support the concept of democracy in its
purest institutions.
I listened to many members of this committee during the cold
war lament the lack of democracy and democratic regimes around
the world. And there is one little country in our own backyard that
is screaming for our help to try to establish democracy.
Should we ignore their pleas, because the person who chose to
throw out a life preserver is a President that some members of this
committee and members of Congress want more than anything to
embarrass?
A footnote right there, Mr. Chairman. It is ironic that we are
here debating a successful occupation at this point. There has been
extraordinary successes too numerous to mention without great
prolixity.
I would pray that between now and March 1 that our forces will
be able to stabilize the situation in Haiti without one single drop
of American blood being shed. But I feel strongly that it is in the
best interests of our troops to let their commanders decide when
it is best for them to decide to return home.
Their future should be determined by what is best for them and
the United States of America, rather than sordid election year poli-
ticking.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you very much, and Mr. Torricelli,
and those who have been involved in the run up to this particular
resolution. Today I support the resolution, and I most respectfully
thank you for allowing me to reserve the option to offer an amend-
ment at the appropriate time on the floor. I thank the chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Bereuter, and then Mr. Johnston. Mr.
Bereuter.






STATEMENT OF MR. BEREUTER
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose this resolution.
The incursion into Haiti was haphazardly and incrementally con-
ceived. It was ill begotten from the beginning, and it remains ill
begotten policy. It is an illegitimate, improper, and ill advised in-
cursion that we are involved in in Haiti.
I would have brought up the same language that Mr. Smith has
already read from section 3. He points out to all of us here, and
I say to my colleagues, that what we are doing is putting ourselves
on line as authorizing the Haitian incursion in order to stabilize
the security situation and to deliver humanitarian aid.
And I ask you if you really want to be involved in authorizing
the Clinton administration to proceed with this ill begotten policy.
We have heard the obvious answer from Secretary Sherman that
the end date, the get out date, in March was sent to the Congress
only. It is not binding. I do not think that too many of us are going
to disagree with that conclusion on her part. So what you are doing
is putting yourself in line here and authorizing what was happen-
ing there.
I would say to my colleague, my friend, Mr. Engel, and say to
Mr. Hastings that if you care to check the record, you will find that
this objection is not partisan, and it is not aimed at embarrassing
the President. If you check the record, you will find that this mem-
ber and a couple of other members of Congress, who were trained
as infantry officers or marines, objected strenuously to a Repub-
lican administration putting marines in a tactically indefensible po-
sition in Beirut Airport.
And I complained about that before the tragedy. I complained in
the well of the House on at least two occasions. It was a proper use
of military force, and I certainly lined up in support of the proper
use of military force. But this was improper.
And I would have to say about the March 1 date, although well
intended I am sure, I believe that a specific date is not a good idea.
It establishes a set of circumstances that sometimes result in trag-
edy.
What this Congress should do before we leave is to pass a resolu-
tion which suggests that we should expeditiously get our members
of the armed services out of Haiti consistent with their safety, at
the earliest possible time consistent with their safety.
If we have a date like March 1, I am suggesting that it puts in
play a variety of factors that we are not going to be happy about.
And people are going to be waiting us out, and activities are going
to take place between now and that date.
There is no proper end date. The important point is for us to say
let us get our personnel out of there as expeditiously as we possibly
can consistent with their safety. They do not belong there in the
first place, and they ought to be pulled out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Johnston, and then Mr. Rohrabacher.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHNSTON
Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.





65
Mr. Bereuter and I agree on the last part there that there should
not be a date there. And I think that we also agree that they
should get out as quickly as possible. And I appreciate his objectiv-
ity there.
The fact that he may have been against Lebanon though does not
disregard the fact that this has become very partisan. I did not
hear any debate against unilaterally invading Grenada or unilater-
ally invading Panama.
What we are doing is unprecedented in this century, if you go
back. There was no drop dead date in Vietnam where half of the
casualties occurred under the Nixon administration, more than
under the Johnson or Kennedy administrations. There was no drop
dead date on Saudi Arabia and Desert Storm where President
Bush went in during the August recess with 500,000 troops with-
out any congressional authority at all.
There was no drop dead date initially in Somalia where Presi-
dent Bush went in during the Christmas break. And when Presi-
dent Clinton was sworn in on January 20 of last year, there were
27,000 troops there. You know, when you talk about the fiasco of
Somalia, that fiasco has got to be spread around among a lot of
people.
Going back to Grenada and Panama, there are more Americans
today in Haiti than there were in those countries combined, if you
are talking about saving American lives.
Going back to the history of Haiti, the history of Haiti is that it
was occupied under three Republican Presidents; Harding, Hoover,
and Coolidge. So this stuff about foreign policy stopping at the
shoreline I think is very embarrassing today. And I just think that
we are embarking on something that is going to be tied around our
necks in the future.
And if you listen to the people in the Defense Department, and
if you listened to the professors yesterday and the open briefing
today, they said the worst thing that we could possibly do is to
have a drop dead date, that it is going to put our troops in peril.
And I, like Congressman Hastings and Congressman Menendez,
support this with a reservation that I will vote against it on the
floor if it has a date certain in there.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Rohrabacher.
STATEMENT OF MR. ROHRABACHER
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The professionals in our military who have spoken to this Con-
gressman have opposed this operation as being a waste of their re-
sources and a drain on resources that have been stretched to the
breaking point.
If we keep committing our military personnel, at a time when we
are decreasing military spending, by sending troops to Somalia,
Rwanda, Haiti, or other countries which are not in the national se-
curity interest of the United States of America, we are not going
to have the money and the resources available when our national
security is really threatened in the future.
I just participated in the decommissioning of a Seabee reserve
unit in my area of Orange County. The reason that this unit is


84-415 0 94 4







being decommissioned is because we do not have the resources to
keep it alive. We do not have those resources, because they are
being wasted on nonsensical operations that have nothing to do
with our security overseas.
Yes, Somalia did happen under the last administration. Yes, this
Congressman was as opposed to that operation as he is opposed to
this operation. There has been no explanation, a justified expla-
nation, or any rational justification as to why Haiti is in the inter-
est of the United States.
The bottom line is that most Americans believe and I certainly
believe, as do most Members of Congress believe, that Haiti is not
worth the loss of one American life. It is not in our national secu-
rity interest.
What are we doing there? Maybe there is some sort of humani-
tarian impulse that is being satisfied. Maybe there are some politi-
cal considerations that were given this by the White House before
the decision was made, much more political consideration perhaps
than we are making right now.
I would suggest this. Had the administration come to us and
given us a chance to debate this and talk about it, things would
have been different right now, and you would not have had to risk
any American lives by saying oh, there is going to be a drop dead
date, and thus it is going to put our people at risk.
I believe that the consensus throughout the Congress today is
that those troops should be withdrawn. I know that this is the con-
sensus throughout my congressional district, and I imagine
throughout other people's congressional districts. It was a mistake
for the President to send those troops into Haiti. They should be
withdrawn at the earliest possible moment consistent with their
own safety.
In terms of our discussions about the cold war, let me just note
this. That there was an emergency situation in Grenada. American
lives were at risk. Today, however, nobody is suggesting that the
American lives in Haiti are at risk. I would, too, say that there was
a lot of partisan attacks on the President after the military oper-
ation in Grenada as well.
What gets me is we have so many of the same people, that were
opposed to any type of assistance for other countries that were
fighting Communist aggression during the cold war and would not
permit us to offer assistance, now supporting American interven-
tion-the use of American troops abroad.
There is nothing inconsistent with saying that during the cold
war when U.S. national security was at stake that we should some-
how help those countries being threatened by a Communist take-
over. But, I never advocated that a number of U.S. troops be sent
into El Salvador.
Chairman HAMILTON. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I would suggest to you that that would
have been a mistake then, and this is clearly a mistake now.
Chairman HAMILTON. Ms. McKinney, and then Mr. Manzullo.
STATEMENT OF MS. MCKINNEY
Ms. McKINNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.






I would like to join with my colleagues, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Bereu-
ter, and Mr. Johnson, and say that, as you know, I am opposed to
any legislation that sets a date certain. I would just like to say that
we have already seen the benefits of the American presence. The
Haitian parliament has begun the process of legislating an am-
nesty. The weapons buy back program is working. Human rights
abuses are diminishing. The police and armed forces are on notice
that atrocities will not be tolerated, and civil order is being re-
stored.
President Aristide continues to underscore his commitment to
peace, reconciliation, and national unity, and for free and fair elec-
tions. The Haitian people have been dying for democracy and now
we have an opportunity to correct some of the mistakes that we
have made in the past, and to help set that nation on the course
for democracy. I will vote for this resolution, but I will support
Representative Hastings on the floor.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Manzullo.
STATEMENT OF MR. MANZULLO
Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very much disturbed over not only the timing of this resolu-
tion, but the wording of it. With regard to the timing, we are voting
on a date to get out, but never had the opportunity to vote on
whether or not to go in in the first place.
Second of all, as Mr. Smith from New Jersey pointed out, on
page 3, section 3A, it says, "The U.S. armed forces are authorized
to provide, participate, and lead the U.S. led forces in Haiti." In
other words, this is a retroactive authorization and approval of
what the President has done.
But more disturbing, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that on page 4,
section 2, it talks about prohibition on foreign command. It says,
"U.S. armed forces described in Subsection [a] shall remain under
the command and control of officers of the U.S. armed forces at all
times."
Now paragraph [a] in section 3, only applies to the present incur-
sion of U.S. Armed Forces and supposedly bringing the country into
stability. However, section 2 talks about transferring the oper-
ations in Haiti from the U.S. led force in Haiti to the U.N. led force
in Haiti.
We are going to be in the same position where American troops
are under the command of a conciliatory Danish general in Mac-
edonia. This resolution is silent in terms of once the U.S. forces
turn over operations to the U.N., whether or not the U.N. would
be in charge of the rest of the operation.
Mr. Chairman, finally, this resolution again is indicative of the
voodoo diplomacy of the Clinton administration's Haiti policy. We
were told yesterday by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
that Mr. Aristide had been given a "bum rap."
The American people should be aware of the fact that he is a de-
frocked Roman Catholic priest, who was thrown out of his order be-
cause of his belief in violence. This is the man who while President
replaced the entire Supreme Court of Haiti, and many mayors in
that particular country. He replaced the Supreme Court without







getting the permission of the parliament, and it was the par-
liament's job to give him permission.
And third of all, this is the man who in his autobiography on
page 196 stated his love affair with Che Guevara, who was Castro's
hatchet man.
To place American troops in harm's way to restore democracy led
by a man like this is wrong.
But most of all, Mr. Chairman, this joint resolution leaves open
the door for U.N. control, for a commander outside of the United
States to lead the U.N. forces. Will that commander be from Anti-
gua, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Jamaica, or Trini-
dad and Tabago? Or perhaps it will be from Russia, because Mr.
Yeltsin has offered to send troops there also.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Wynn, and then Mr. Royce. Mr. Wynn.
STATEMENT OF MR. WYNN
Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I understand that this resolution is designed to preserve all of
the options that reflect the various points of view of the members
of this committee and the members of Congress. And to that end,
I intend to support it.
Personally, I would subscribe more closely to the views expressed
by Deputy Secretary Deutsch yesterday to the extent that it is
probably militarily unwise to telegraph to your opposition when
you intend to leave.
Notwithstanding that though, Mr. Chairman, my concern is that
we not set a date prematurely. There is some merit, I believe, to
the arguments that a date certain gets us out of what many con-
sider to be an intractable situation.
My point is simply this, Mr. Chairman. That if we are going to
set a date certain, it should not be done until after we have
achieved our one clear objective. And that is the transition of gov-
ernment from the military coup leaders to the democratically elect-
ed government of President Aristide.
I feel very strongly that if a date is to be set, that we ought to
wait until Mr. Cedras steps down. Because it seems to me, particu-
larly given his past pattern, that if we say that we are going to be
out February 1 or March 1, that he will find some excuse for re-
maining in place, and therefore we would not have accomplished
even our most fundamental objective. Or we will be faced with a
situation where U.S. troops are forced into a much more aggressive
posture in order to accomplish our stated initial objective of having
him step down.
So if we were to exercise a little temperance and perhaps wait
until after October 15, in which case he would have stepped down,
then it certainly would make more sense to set a date certain in
those circumstances.
So I would just note that for the committee, that I do intend to
support the resolution.
SCHEDULING OF ADDITIONAL MARKUP SESSION
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair makes the following announce-
ment. After consulting with Mr. Gilman, the chair wishes to notify
members that we will have a short mark-up tomorrow at 10 a.m.







to take up resolutions on which floor action would be expected next
week.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman-
Chairman HAMILTON. That includes two-
Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, could we have a discussion on
this before this is set?
Chairman HAMILTON. You are suggesting that it is not ready to
come forward?
Mr. ACKERMAN. That is correct.
Chairman HAMILTON. OK. Then we will cancel this notification.
I will ask that the members who are involved in these two resolu-
tions on Vietnam, insofar as the chair knows they are Mr. Gilman,
Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Rohrabacher, and Mr. Leach, to see if they can
reach some kind of an accord before tomorrow morning.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, that is the first I knew that we were
not prepared to move forward.
Is there some substantive problem?
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair would just ask that the members
involved discuss it.
Mr. Royce is recognized, and then Mr. Payne. Mr. Royce.
EXTENDING PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN COMMAND OF U.S. FORCES
Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would ask unanimous consent
to address a question to the author of the resolution, Mr. Torricelli,
if I could.
Chairman HAMILTON. To Mr. Torricelli?
Mr. ROYCE. Yes. And the reason for that, Mr. Chairman, is that
Mr. Engel made a statement that American troops will not be
under foreign command. He said that if you read the resolution
that you will notice that American troops will not be under-under
U.N. command, he said.
Now this is very curious, because this is the opposite of the read-
ing that our staff had of the bill. Of course, our staff points out that
the President would like to have up to 3,000 U.S. forces in a U.N.
led force in Haiti. And their feeling was that this might be a ruse.
So let me just ask this question forthrightly.
Does this resolution prohibit foreign command of U.S. troops
under a United Nations led peacekeeping force in Haiti? That is my
question.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The resolution deals with the presence of U.S.
forces under U.S. command until there is a transfer of authority of
the operation to the United Nations. After March 1, if this is adopt-
ed and complied with by the President, presumably this operation
changes to become from the U.S. occupation to the U.N. peacekeep-
ing forces.
The judgment at that point about whether or not the United
States participated in that force and who would command it is en-
tirely independent of this resolution. This resolution deals solely
with the issue of U.S. occupation of Haiti until the March 1 dead-
line. Passing this or not passing it does not impact the U.N. ques-
tion.
Mr. ROYCE. In light of that, then Mr. Engel might want to reread
this resolution and understand what it really states. And I would
ask a second question.







Mr. ENGEL. Would the gentleman yield, since he mentioned my
name?
Mr. ROYCE. Yes.
Mr. ENGEL. I would ask the gentleman to look at the bottom of
page 3 when it says limitations and termination of authorization,
'The authorization provided shall expire March 1, 1995." And at
the top of page 4 it says, "Prohibition on foreign command. The
U.S. armed forces described in Subsection [a] shall remain under
the command and control of officers of the U.S. armed forces at all
times."
So what Mr. Torricelli said is absolutely true. This talks about
American troops being under the command of Americans, and it
talks about until March 1. And it does not address what happens
after March 1 when the United Nations takes over. But this does
not influence it in any way.
Mr. ROYCE. Then my question to the author would be would you
be open to friendly amendments when we reach the floor, which
would extend the prohibition on foreign command of U.S. Armed
Forces to U.N. led American forces in Haiti? That is my question.
Mr. TORRICELLI. In answer to your question, and this actually
goes to several questions that were asked, I believe that it is some-
what disingenuous of the administration to argue that there is a
danger to American forces by setting a deadline, when the adminis-
tration recognizes that after the U.S. occupation forces leave that
there is going to be a United Nations peacekeeping force.
Therefore, international presence and security forces are not
leaving Haiti. And there is no inherent advantage in people attack-
ing our forces or creating incidents when they already know when
we are leaving, but another force is going to remain in occupation.
I believe that Mr. Engel has answered accurately the question of
while there is a U.S. occupation force that it is solely under U.S.
command. But I would remind the gentleman that there is also a
provision where after February 1 under expedited procedures that
this Congress can deauthorize any U.S. presence after that date.
Therefore, the gentleman, and indeed any member of the institu-
tion, can file a request to have the United States to have no further
presence after February 1. So if the gentleman's concern is after
March 1, there is a continued presence, and it would be under for-
eign command. Under this resolution, the gentleman has the option
of ending that potential.
Mr. ROYCE. Then, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one last question.
And that would simply be unanimous consent to call up Assist-
ant Secretary Sherman to ask her if the administration could give
this committee assurance today that the U.N. led force in Haiti
would be under the command and control of an American officer?
Ms. SHERMAN. Congressman, that question was asked of Deputy
Secretary Talbott and Deputy Secretary Deutsch yesterday at the
hearing. And their answer was that we have every expectation that
it will be a U.S. commander. I think that I should also hasten to
say here, because it is very important and this is an issue that has
been debated in the Congress in the past, that it is my understand-
ing that the armed services, and the President, Secretary Perry,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs always maintain a chain of
command where our forces always ultimately are under the com-







mand and control of the U.S. chain of command to the President
under any circumstances.
But the actual commander is being worked out with the U.N.,
but it is our expectation that it will be a U.S. commander. And that
is what they said yesterday which I am delighted to repeat today.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Payne. And he will be followed by Mr.
Burton. Mr. Payne.
STATEMENT OF MR. PAYNE
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As you probably know, I am one who supports the President
wholeheartedly in his actions. As I indicated at one of the other
hearings, I had the privilege to get at the United Nations when
President Clinton gave his address to the United Nations on Mon-
day.
And during the break following that and the reception that
evening, the comments were the United States is resolved, and the
fact that the President stayed the course. And the action of the
U.S. military was one that was discussed by many nations around
the world that the United States of America was looked at in a
proud and dignified manner.
I would also say that we are throwing around terms that I ques-
tion whether they are appropriate, when we talk about an occupa-
tion force. I question whether the U.S. military now or under the
U.N. is going to be considered an occupation force.
I also heard the word "blunder" used as it talked about our inter-
vention into Haiti. I think that you could not have had an introduc-
tion of troops in a more orderly manner. And if that is considered
a blunder, I do not understand that word.
The fact that we have troops in other countries seems to be a
revelation to some members. In South Korea, we have tens of thou-
sands of troops. And when we are talking about the remaining
2,000 troops in Haiti perhaps after March, April, or May, when we
hear people talking about U.S. troops being in a foreign country,
in Europe we have had tens of thousands of troops, and throughout
the world. So it is really not a new policy for U.S. troops to be on
foreign soil.
I would just like to say that none of us want to see, and we hope
that there is not loss of American lives. We hope that everything
could work without any casualties. But we know that in the real
world that these things do not always occur.
But I was just reminded that it was decided that we would use
the U.S. military in fighting fires on the West Coast. And you may
recall tragically about 4 or 5 months ago or 3 or 4 months ago that
19 local fire fighters died in a battle tocontrol the fires in that re-
gion. And it is unfortunate.
So when we look at situations where people have difficulties, you
can never say that there will not be a casualty anywhere. So I
would just like to say that our resolve-in Grenada, there were 350
Americans, and in Haiti there are over 3,000 Americans.
So when we compare these things together, we hope that all will
work well. The parliament is meeting today. I am proud of the job
that our servicemen are doing. And I think that we should support
them 100 percent.







Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Burton, and then Mr. McCloskey. Mr.
Burton.
STATEMENT OF MR. BURTON
Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I would just like to ask the Secretary, Secretary Sherman, if she
would respond in writing to the question posed by the gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, regarding whether or not it is binding
for us to set a date certain for us to get our troops out of there.
We would like to have that in writing, not just your statement for
the record.
[The information follows:]
If enacted, the resolution would have provided explicit congressional authorization
for U.S. Armed Forces to participate in the U.S.-led force in Haiti until March 1,
1995. It would not, by its terms, have required the withdrawal of U.S. forces by
March 1.
Mr. BURTON. I would like to set the record straight on Grenada.
I went down to Grenada right after the invasion. And the Demo-
cratic leadership was doing everything they could to undermine
what the President had done. There is just no question about that,
and the record would reflect it.
In addition to that, on November 1, 1983, the House approved a
resolution that we would get our forces out of Grenada within 90
days, and that is a matter of record.
The other thing is that it was indicated that there was no real
threat to human life. I want you to know that there were 500-plus
students at that medical college down there that literally got off
the plane and kissed U.S. soil, because they thought that their
lives were in jeopardy. That they were held hostage by Mr. Bishop
and the Communist Grenadan Government. So this is not the same
situation as that which we faced in Grenada in 1983.
Now let me just say this. President Clinton did not talk to the
Congress, and he did not ask the opinion of the American people,
even though probably 75 to 80 percent of the Congress and the peo-
ple did not want this invasion to take place. But he did talk to the
United Nations, and he asked their support for a resolution in the
Security Council.
Now my question is why in the world is the President going to
the Security Council instead of the people of the United States
through their elected representatives? It shows a disdain I think
for this body. And I think that every one of us, Democrats and Re-
publicans, should be concerned about that.
We had a dubious policy in Somalia. Granted that the troops
were sent into there under a Republican who was going to get them
out in a very short period of time. But that period of time was ex-
tended. And after it was extended by President Clinton, the Sec-
retary of Defense, Les Aspin, would not allow M-1, or A-1 tanks,
or armored personnel carriers there. And as a result, it took us
12/2 hours to go across Mogadishu to try to save 17 marines who
were downed in a helicopter, and they were killed. And we wit-
nessed one of them being dragged through the streets naked.







The American people do not want a replay of that, because of our
ineptness as a government, and because we are in a place where
we should not be.
Now the President has not listened before, and I do not think
that he is going to listen now. But I think that we ought to be very,
very concerned about where we are going with this. It does not
have the backing of the American people. The American people
want those troops out of there now. Not 6 months from now, and
not a year from now. And most certainly, they do not want Amer-
ican troops put under foreign command.
And if you do not believe that, go back to your home districts and
ask your constituents. They do not want our troops under foreign
command. And there is no guarantee that I have heard yet today
that that will not take place. I want an ironclad guarantee that we
are not going to have some hair brain down there running Amer-
ican forces around over Haiti.
And I would just like to say that the gentleman that we are put-
ting back in power down there is no democrat. He does not believe
in democracy and human rights. And if you do not believe that,
look at his record. The gentleman down here just a few moments
ago cited many of his past performances and his record.
And what we are doing is risking American lives for no good rea-
son because we do not have any national interest down there. We
should bring our troops home as quickly as possible, faster than
March 1. And I am very concerned that we are going to keep them
there much longer, and we are going to see a lot of them get killed
or maimed unnecessarily.
The American people do not want it, and the Congress does not
want it. Let us bring them home. It is not in our national interest
to keep them there. And this resolution I do not think is going to
solve the problem, even though I have great respect for Mr.
Torricelli.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. McCloskey, and then Mrs. Meyers. Mr.
McCloskey.
STATEMENT OF MR. MCCLOSKEY
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try
to be brief. I guess that nearly everything has been said, but not
all of us are on the record saying it, to paraphrase one of our dis-
tinguished predecessors. I have great respect for Mr. Burton, but
I really do not agree with him very much on a percentage basis.
But, on some things, I do.
I think that the President did fail in not consulting with the Con-
gress and the American people more in building the case for inva-
sion. And particularly, I did press very much and argued for an au-
thorizing vote, even if that possibly could have gone against the
President. But I sincerely do think that overall that the adminis-
tration has a very rational and justified policy as far as the stakes
in Haiti and the concerns in Haiti.
And I might say in passing also that I am a little bit concerned
about the oft recurring phrase, and I hear it in my district, that
all of Haiti is not worth one American life. But I would like to
think that lives are of infinite value, both Haitian and American.
No one wants an American killed.







There are recent reports that U.S. troops have opened up some
of the Cedras prisons, Mr. Chairman, with political prisoners there
with their backs flayed open. I would like to have someone ask
them and their families if the American effort is respected and ap-
preciated. There are problems and challenges there as to regional
stability. You cannot say that the refugees coming up onto the
shores of Florida and potentially destabilizing that State's economy
are of no concern to us.
And most particularly you cannot say that the human rights con-
cerns in Haiti as to what is happening to thousands of poor and
innocent human beings are inconsequential.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. No. I would like to finish, and then I will yield
given the chairman's pleasure.
I appreciate very much the administration's concerns as to a date
certain. I would prefer at this time, although I will be open to the
arguments on the floor, that we leave this up to the administration,
particularly to such people as General Shalikashvili. I would hope
that my colleagues consult with-and I do not know what the an-
swer would be-people like Colin Powell as to what that distin-
guished general in this case thinks of a date certain.
We need greater U.N. funding and commitment. We need a
peaceful transfer of military troops and resources there, if you will.
And it is a very volatile time with an election a matter of weeks
away. Careers can rise or fall on what happens hundreds of miles
or more away in Haiti. But this is no time for politics. There was
no bashing.
There was no bashing of Reagan when he went into Grenada
with no consultation, and no talk of American interests. We should
give the President of the United States the same respect. We
should give the President strong backing, not vitriolic criticism.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair will just say that we have four
remaining speakers. Mrs. Meyers, Mr. Fingerhut, Ms. Cantwell,
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mrs. Meyers.
STATEMENT OF MRS. MEYERS
Mrs. MEYERS. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I oppose this resolution. The President did not come to Congress
before his intended invasion, and we should not retroactively reau-
thorize now what Congress would not have authorized then.
But that is done. And a previous speaker indicated that we
should pass this resolution to support the troops. But last week,
this House voted to support the troops. So there is absolutely no
question about that.
Finally, the resolution is ambiguous. It reads that the authoriza-
tion expires on March 1. But on line 13, it is obvious that that per-
tains to U.S. led forces only. And we will have 3,000 to 4,000 troops
there under U.N. command after that time with no final authoriza-
tion date at all.
I oppose the resolution, Mr. Chairman. And I would yield for 1
minute to my colleague, Mr. Burton.







HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN HAITI
Mr. BURTON. I would just like to say to my colleague from Indi-
ana that he did not read the newspapers. Because Michael Barnes,
who was chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee,
wrote a very spurious article about the invasion of Grenada. The
Speaker of the House during the invasion of Grenada, Mr. O'Neill,
took issue with it.
And even after they did criticize the President roundly, we did
accept, both sides of the aisle, a 90-day limitation on the troops,
and we did get them out of there.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Burton, will you yield?
Mr. BURTON. I have the time, do I not, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman HAMILTON. Yes.
Mr. BURTON. Regarding the whipping and the human rights vio-
lations in Haiti, let me just say that the President is going back
there, Mr. Aristide. And Mr. Aristide has advocated publicly on nu-
merous occasions putting a tire filled with gasoline around people's
necks and burning them to death after tying their hands behind
them.
Now tell me, is that worse than whipping? We are not putting
a democrat, a human rights person, back in power. This guy is a
bad apple, and we are risking American troops to do it. So do not
give me that human rights baloney, because it will not wash.
I thank the gentle lady for yielding.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Fingerhut.
STATEMENT OF MR. FINGERHUT
Mr. FINGERHUT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It strikes me that the productive nature of this debate may be
winding down. But it is important I think for those of us to put
on record our votes and our reasons for voting as we do. I do not
agree with our policy in Haiti and would not, had I had the oppor-
tunity to vote, have voted to support the mission.
However, it is clear to me, as the chairman stated, that once
American troops are on the ground that the Congress of the United
States is involved, must become involved, and ought to have the
right to speak on this issue.
This committee, while we have profound responsibilities with re-
spect to the House of Representatives' position on foreign affairs
ought r.,t to presume to speak for the House as a whole. What the
chairman and the sponsor of this resolution have done is frame a
resolution that we can present to the House, so that the House can
work its will.
On that basis, I will support the resolution in the committee
today, although my own personal views on this resolution will be
expressed in greater detail when we do reach the floor.
I would add that I also take the chairman's assurance, as his
word is always good, that with respect to the Rules Committee
handling of this resolution, that it will attempt to structure the de-
bate in such a way so that all of those of us on the committee who
have a variety of viewpoints will be able to express those views, as
will our colleagues not on this committee, when it comes to the
House.







So I thank the chairman and the sponsor for framing this resolu-
tion for debate on the floor. I will support it, solely to get it to the
floor.
Chairman HAMILTON. Ms. Cantwell.
STATEMENT OF MS. CANTWELL
Ms. CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just as every member of this committee or almost every member
of this committee has sought recognition to speak on this issue, I
believe that the members of the full body also deserve that same
opportunity. That is why I support the Torricelli resolution today.
If you are looking for more clarity in U.S. policy, this is at least
a beginning. Not only in the policy area of saying bring our troops
home as soon as possible, but in various reporting periods, author-
ization, and a termination date.
You may not agree with this termination date, as well as I have
concerns about this termination date, and will be looking at various
alternatives offered on the floor, this is the vehicle that w6 have
before us now. If we want this fully debated, if we want to send
a message that we have concerns, and that Congress wants to par-
ticipate, then move the Torricelli resolution forward, so that all of
our colleagues and the American people can fully have this issue
debated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair has Mr. Faleomavaega and Mr.
Ackerman remaining. I think I have covered everybody. Mr.
Faleomavaega.
STATEMENT OF MR. FALEOMAVAEGA
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to commend the gentleman from New Jersey for
offering this joint resolution with your support.
Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, I raised the question of a time
table that the President intends to maintain our military presence
in Haiti. And I asked Under Secretary Talbott yesterday specifi-
cally whether the 60-day requirement under the War Powers Reso-
lution runs with some 19 days now since the President ordered our
forces to be in Haiti.
As you know, the administration's response was they will get
back to us. There was some uncertainty in the administration's po-
sition on this issue. And this bothers me, Mr. Chairman, because
I reflect that there was also a resolution that we did some years
ago. It was called the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I do not think that
there is any question in anybody's mind that the last thing that we
ever want to do is to enter a protracted war like we did in Viet-
nam. And I do not think that it was ever the intention of the ad-
ministration. And I pray to God, certainly not in the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I can appreciate the President's concerns that he
has got to be given some sense of flexibility in handling this critical
issue. The lives of our men and women in the armed services and
U.S. civilians are at stake. There are the tremendous problems of
logisticals and the movement of forces is not a very easy task by
any means.







At the same time, Mr. Chairman, the law is firm concerning the
limitations placed upon the Presidential authority to use military
forces. Beyond the 60-day grace period, I believe, the resolution
now before us adequately addresses the concerns of the Congress.
And it still leaves open in principle at least in my understanding
the option for the President to come before the Congress to justify
himself and his foreign policy concerning Haiti.
Now within that context, Mr. Chairman, I support the proposed
resolution now before the committee.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ackerman.
STATEMENT OF MR. ACKERMAN
Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I suppose that it might be interesting to note that one of the
products that Haiti has historically had, has been baseballs for the
American and National Leagues of our country, and there does not
seem to be much need of that right now.
I think that it is also interesting to note how partisan we can
suddenly get when it comes to protecting democracy for a bunch of
people whose skins are darkly colored in comparison to how non-
partisan we can be when it comes to preserving democracy for a
bunch of other people whose skins are lighter and provide us with
our gasoline and our oil.
RACIAL FACTOR IN DEBATE ON HAITI INTERVENTION
Mrs. MEYERS. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. MEYERS. Would the gentleman yield?
Chairman HAMILTON. Does the gentleman yield to the gentle-
woman from Kansas?
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would be glad to yield.
Chairman HAMILTON. The gentlewoman.
Mrs. MEYERS. Mr. Chairman, I really resent that remark about
partisanship and dark skins. I really think that Presidents, this
one and the past one, have indicated that when we go into an area
that it should be to solve a problem that is resolvable. That we
should know what our goal is, and we should have a way in and
a way to get out. And we should be able to do something effective
while we are there.
We have not gone into Bosnia. We have not gone into other areas
where the skins were light. And I think that is really an inappro-
priate thing to say.
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair recognizes-
Mr. ACKERMAN. Just reclaiming my time for a second. I am one
who supported President Reagan. I am one who supported Presi-
dent Bush. I am one who is supporting our President right now,
although I thought his initial policy was rather ill advised. I think
that we ought not have gone in. I think that better consultation
should have taken place with this Congress.
But I think that when we take a look at what resources the peo-
ple have to bear on the system, that we suddenly jumped right in
there on the Persian Gulf protecting what was the 68th province
supposedly when we went in to save Kuwait, I think that the hand-
writing is pretty clear. I think people's points of views are colored.






I think that this issue, although there is a lot of gray, that there
is also too much black and white involved. And I think that there
is partisanship here when it comes to forming ranks behind the
President.
Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield on that?
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Ackerman has the time.
Mr. SMITH. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would be glad to yield.
Mr. SMITH. Now I have to join in and say that I, too, resent that
comment. There has been no partisanship. We have tried before
this became an issue to make this a bipartisan issue, which would
essentially provide cover for the President. Most importantly,
though, before any plans of this invasion or occupation occurred,
we tried to come up with nonviolent solutions to Haiti.
If you look at the resolution that I introduced, it had equal rep-
resentation of Democrats and Republicans on a congressional com-
mission that would seek answers, and would go to Haiti to try to
find answers. There is no partisanship here.
Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. ACKERMAN. There is no partisanship on your part, Chris,
that is for sure.
Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Chairman HAMILTON. Does the gentleman yield to Mr. Gilman?
Ms. McKINNEY. Would the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. ACKERMAN. I would be glad to yield to the gentle lady.
Ms. McKINNEY. Thank you. I would just like to commend the
gentleman from New York for having the courage to say what
many of us have felt all along. So I would just also like to associate
myself with the words of the gentleman from New York, the very
strong words.
Chairman HAMILTON. The time of the gentleman from New York
has expired. The chair recognizes Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I, too, join my colleagues in resent-
ing making this a racial issue. Go back to Somalia, go back to the
Persian Gulf, go back to any hostility, we have raised the War
Powers Resolution time and time again. Regrettably, each adminis-
tration has refused to accept the importance of the War Powers
Resolution that the Congress has adopted.
I am sure that the gentleman from New York recognizes that
most of us see the problem of trying to return a democratically
elected President to his sovereignty. We all want to find the best
resolution for that.
But in like manner, we also want to make certain that we are
not doing anything to defeat the purpose of the War Powers Reso-
lution, to allow the Congress to have the last say on whether or not
we are going to be engaged in any hostility. Putting a color picture
to all of this, a racial picture, does a disservice to the debate.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. Yes, I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Which democratically elected leader did we re-
store in Kuwait, did I miss something?
Mr. GILMAN. Apparently, you missed the aggression by an over-
powering nation trying to defeat a smaller nation.







Mr. ACKERMAN. I did not miss it at all.
Mr. GILMAN. That is what brought us to the issue.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I was very supportive of our President.
Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield from New York?
Mr. GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield.
Mr. BURTON. Let me just say that I am the senior Republican on
Africa. And I want to say that we have supported efforts in Angola.
You may not have agreed with it, but we supported efforts in An-
gola. We have supported efforts in Zaire. We supported efforts in
Mozambique. We supported efforts in the Sudan. In the Sudan
where there is all kinds of oppression, racial oppression going on.
We supported Ethiopia. We did support Somalia, although we did
not like the way that it was handled. So do not give us that stuff
that we are racist.
Mr. ACKERMAN. I do not remember going into Ethiopia.
Chairman HAMILTON. The gentleman from New York has the
time. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman from
Florida.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. I thank the ranking member.
I would ask the gentleman from New York, as the consequences
of his most unfortunate comment, that if those Democrats who
criticized President Reagan for liberating Grenada were racists?
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. The chair recognizes Mr. Torricelli to close
debate.
STATEMENT OF MR. TORRICELLI
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, before calling the question, I
would like to again thank Mr. Gilman and Mr. Smith for their co-
operation to bring this to this point, particularly my friend Alcee
Hastings, who has been particularly cooperative in allowing the
committee to proceed, and in allowing the full House to reach its
own judgment.
I recognize that there are strong feelings on all sides of this
issue. No question could be more important to members of this
committee than dealing with the life and death of our armed forces,
and the life of an entire people of a nation.
We have each in the balance, while protecting the prerogatives
of the institution and the constitutional workings of our Govern-
ment. At any time, that is a great number of issues to be consid-
ered. With a nation so divided and this Congress having been ab-
sent from the debate to date, it becomes particularly difficult.
In closing the discussion today, I simply want to briefly return
to a pivotal question in the resolution raised by Mr. Smith earlier.
And that is, does what we do here today have real meaning. Sec-
retary Sherman provided a legal answer to Mr. Smith's legal ques-
tions.
I want to close the debate by providing a matter of policy. Be-
cause what we intend to do here today should have real meaning.
On March 1, authorization for remaining in Haiti, the U.S. military
forces, terminates.







There may be some who choose to debate that legally. But it is
impossible for me to concede that, absent further authorization,
that the President would violate the will of this Congress in re-
maining.
After February 1, on an expedited basis, members of this institu-
tion can go to the floor to specifically direct the President to remove
the U.S. Armed Forces.
There may be well reasoned legal arguments constitutionally on
all sides as to the powers involved. But I do not believe that the
Clinton administration would violate the expressed will of this in-
stitution.
I believe that when the Congress speaks on this issue that we
will proceed together. And notwithstanding the legal judgments
that were provided by Secretary Sherman, I believe that the Presi-
dent of the United States has enough respect for this institution,
and recognizes the necessity of this government remaining united
in the matter of foreign policy, that when either in response to Mr.
Hastings' motions, or Mr. Gilman's, or my own that the judgment
of this House will prevail.
SUPPORT FOR OPEN RULE
Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield for a question, please,
my good friend?
Mr. TORRICELLI. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. BURTON. Since you are the sponsor of the resolution, and
since it will be brought to the floor undoubtedly, would you be in
opposition to having an open rule, so that we can have a full and
thorough debate, and propose amendments to make the resolution
better for all concerned?
Mr. TORRICELLI. As the gentleman knows, of course that is not
my judgment. It is my own belief that the rule should be as open
or as open as possible to allow for a free, fair, and open debate. The
commitment that I believe that we have to date is simply one to
allow a minority position and to allow Mr. Hastings' position. I per-
sonally do not have opposition going beyond that. But I am not
sure that my view is really relevant.
Mr. BURTON. I appreciate the sponsor saying that we should
have an open rule. Thank you.
Chairman HAMILTON. Is there further discussion?
VOTE ON H.J. RES. 416
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move the resolution.
Chairman HAMILTON. The question occurs on H.J. Res. 416.
All those in favor signify by saying aye.
Those opposed no.
In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. The gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, on that I would call for a roll call.
Chairman HAMILTON. All those in favor of taking the vote by roll
call raise their hands.
The Clerk will call the roll.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Hamilton.
Chairman HAMILTON. Aye.







Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. LANTOS. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Torricelli.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. ACKERMAN. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Johnston.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Engel.
Mr. ENGEL. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Faleomavaeg
Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Oberstar.
Chairman HAMILTON. Aye by prox
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Schumer.
Chairman HAMILTON. Aye by prox
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Martinez.
Mr. MARTINEZ. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Borski.
[No response.]
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Although I oppose it,
it to the floor.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Andrews.
Mr. ANDREWS. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Brown.
[No response.]
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. McKinney.
Ms. McKinney. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. Cantwell.
Ms. CANTWELL. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Hastings.
Mr. HASTINGS. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Fingerhut.
Mr. FINGERHUT. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Deutsch.
Mr. DEUTSCH. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Wynn.
Mr. WYNN. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Edwards.
Chairman HAMILTON. Aye by prox
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. McCloskey.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. SAWYER. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gutierrez.
Chairman HAMILTON. Aye by prox


I will vote aye in order to bring







Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Goodling.
Mr. GILMAN. No by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Leach.
Mr. LEACH. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Roth.
Mr. GILMAN. No by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. Snowe.
Ms. SNOWE. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Hyde.
Mr. GILMAN. No by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. GILMAN. No by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Burton.
Mr. BURTON. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mrs. Meyers.
Mrs. MEYERS. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GILMAN. No by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. BALLENGER. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Levy.
Mr. GILMAN. No by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. MANZULLO. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Royce.
Mr. ROYCE. No.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Borski.
Mr. BORSKI. Aye.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Brown.
Chairman HAMILTON. Aye by proxy.
Mr. VAN DUSEN. On this vote, Mr. Chairman, there are 27 ayes
and 18 nays.
Chairman HAMILTON. The resolution is approved.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I request that the minority have the
customary 3 days in order to file its views on this matter.
Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.
Chairman HAMILTON. The committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]










APPENDIX 1



103D CONGRESS
SESSION H R 416


Providing limited authorization for the participation of United States Armed
Forces in the multinational force in Haiti and providing for the prompt
withdrawal of United States Armed Forces from Haiti.



IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 28, 1994
Mr. TORRICELLI (for himself and Mr. HIAtlLTOX) introduced the following
joint resolution; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign
Affairs and Rules




JOINT RESOLUTION
Providing limited authorization for the participation of
United States Armed Forces in the multinational force
in Haiti and providing for the prompt withdrawal of
United States Armed Forces from Haiti.

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
4 This joint resolution may be cited as the "Limited
5 Authorization for the United States-led Force in Haiti
6 Resolution".








1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

2 (a) FINDINGs.-The Congress finds the following:
3 (1) On September 18, 1994, the special delega-
4 tion to Haiti succeeded in convincing the de facto
5 authorities in Haiti to sign the Port-au-Prince

6 Agreement under which such authorities agreed to
7 leave power.

8 (2) On September 18, 1994, after the Port-au-
9 Prince Agreement was reached, the President or-
10 dered the deployment of United States Armed
11 Forces in and around Haiti.
12 (3) On September 21, 1994, the President sub-
13 mitted a report, consistent with the War Powers
14 Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), on the intro-

15 duction of United States Armed Forces into Haiti.
16 (4) The Congress fully supports the men and
17 women of the United States Armed Forces who are
18 carrying out their mission in Haiti with professional
19 excellence and dedicated patriotism.
20 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.-The Congress declares
21 the following:
22 (1) The United States-led force in Haiti should
23 use all necessary means to protect United States
24 citizens, to stabilize the security situation in Haiti so
25 that orderly progress may be made in transferring
26 the functions of government in that country to the








1 democratically-elected government of Haiti, and to
2 facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to

3 the people of Haiti.
4 (2) Transfer of operations in Haiti from the

5 United States-led force in Haiti to the United Na-
6 tions-led force in Haiti should be facilitated and ex-
7 pedited to the fullest extent possible.

8 (3) United States Armed Forces should be
9 withdrawn from Haiti as soon as possible.
10 SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES
11 ARMED FORCES.

12 (a) AUTHORIZATION.-Subject to subsection (b),
13 United States Armed Forces are authorized to participate
14 in the United States-led force in Haiti only-
15 (1) to protect United States citizens;
16 (2) to stabilize the security situation in Haiti so
17 that orderly progress may be made in transferring

18 the functions of government in that country to the
19 democratically-elected government of Haiti; and
20 (3) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian
21 assistance to the people of Haiti.
22 (b) LIMITATIONS.-
23 (1) TERMINATION OF AUTHORIZATION.-The
24 authorization provided by subsection (a) shall expire
25 on March 1, 1995.









1 (2) PROHIBITION ON FOREIGN COMMAND.-
2 United States Armed Forces described in subsection

3 (a) shall remain under the command and control of
4 officers of the United States Armed Forces 'at all
5 times.
6 SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
7 (a) IN GENERAL.-The President shall submit to the
8 Congress reports on-

9 (1) the participation of United States Armed
10 Forces in the United States-led force in Haiti and
11 the United Nations-led force in Haiti, including-
12 (A) the number of members of the United
13 States Armed Forces that are participating in
14 such United States-led force and such United
15 Nations-led force;
16 (B) the functions of such Armed Forces;
17 and
18 (C) the costs of deployment of such Armed
19 Forces; and
20 (2) the efforts to withdraw United States
21 Armed Forces from Haiti, including-
22 (A) for the purpose of achieving a transi-
23 tion from the United States-led force in Haiti
24 to the United Nations-led force in Haiti, the
25 status of efforts to implement the Port-au-







Prince Agreement and to otherwise carry out
the terms of United Nations Security Council

Resolutions 917 (May 6, 1994) and 940 (July
31, 1994);
(B) the status of plans to accomplish such

transition to the United Nations-led force in
Haiti; and
(C) the status of plans to withdraw United
States Armed Forces from Haiti.
(b) REPORTING DATES.-A report under this section
shall be submitted-

(1) not later than November 30, 1994, covering
the period since September 18, 1994;
(2) not later than December 31, 1994, covering
the period since the report described in paragraph
(1); and
(3) not later than February 1, 1995, covering

the period since the report described in paragraph
(2).
(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REPORTING RE-
QUIREMENTS.-The requirements of this section do not
supersede the requirements of the War Powers Resolution
(50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).








1 SEC. 5. REASSEMBLY OF CONGRESS.
2 It is the sense of the Congress that the speaker of
3 the House of Representatives and the majority leader of
4 the Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the mi-
5 nority leader of the House of Representatives and the mi-
6 nority leader of the Senate, respectively, should monitor
7 closely events in Haiti in considering whether to exercise
8 any authority that may be granted to reassemble the Con-
9 gress after the adjournment of the Congress sine die, if
10 the public interest shall warrant it.
11 SEC. 6. JOINT RESOLUTION PROHIBITING CONTINUED USE
12 OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN HAITI.
13 (a) IN GENERAL.-If a joint resolution described in
14 subsection (b) is enacted, the President shall remove
15 United States Armed Forces from Haiti in accordance
16 with such joint resolution.
17 (b) DESCRIPTION OF JOINT RESOLUTION.-For pur-
18 poses of subsection (a), a joint resolution described in this
19 subsection is a joint resolution the matter after the resolv-
20 ing clause of which is as follows: "Pursuant to section 6
21 of the Limited Authorization for the United States-led
22 Force in Haiti Resolution, the Congress hereby directs the
23 President to remove United States Armed Forces from
24 Haiti not later than 30 days after the date of the enact-
25 ment of this joint resolution, except for a limited number
26 of members of the United States Armed Forces sufficient








1 to protect United States diplomatic facilities and person-
2 nel.".
3 (c) PRIORITY PROCEDURES.-
4 (1) INTRODUCTION OF JOINT RESOLUTION.-
5 Paragraph (2) shall only apply to a joint resolution
6 described in subsection (b) and introduced on or
7 after the date on which the President submits, or is
8 required to submit, the report required by section

9 4(b)(3).
10 (2) CONSIDERATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION.-
11 Only one joint resolution described in subsection (b)
12 and introduced in accordance with paragraph (1)
13 shall be considered in accordance with the proce-
14 dures described in section 7 of the War Powers Res-
15 solution (50 U.S.C. 1546), except that, for purposes
16 of such consideration, the term "calendar days" in
17 such section shall be deemed to mean "legislative
18 days".
19 SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.
20 For purposes of this joint resolution, the following
21 definitions apply:
22 (1) LEGISLATIVE DAYS.-The term "legislative
23 days" means days in which the House of Represent-
24 atives is in session.








1 (2) PORT-AU-PRINCE AGREEMENT.-The term
2 "Port-au-Prince Agreement" means the agreement
3 reached between the United States special delegation
4 and the de facto authorities in Haiti on September
5 18, 1994.
6 (3) UNITED NATIONS-LED FORCE IN HAITI.-
7 The term "United Nations-led force in Haiti" means
8 the United Nations Mission in Haiti (commonly re-
9 ferred to as "UNMIH") authorized by United Na-
10 tions Security Council Resolutions 867 (September
11 23, 1993), 905 (March 23, 1994), 933 (June 30,
12 1994), and 940 (July 31, 1994).
13 (4) UNITED STATES-LED FORCE IN HAITI.-
14 The term "United States-led force in Haiti" means
15 the multinational force (commonly referred to as
16 "MNF") authorized by United Nations Security
17 Council Resolution 940 (July 31, 1994).






91



00- THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301



2 3 SEP 1994



Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During my September 28 congressional testimony, you
requested additional information on the total costs that are
being incurred by the US Government to support our relief effort
in Haiti. Enclosure 1 is OMB's response to Senator Byrd on
these costs and enclosure 2 is a fact sheet which summarizes and
simplifies the letter OMB prepared for Senator Byrd. In both
cases, the figures include the estimated costs of all government
agencies.

Sincerely,




Enclosures


cc: Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
Ranking Republican









APPENDIX 2



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OrFI"C OF MANAGEMENT ANO BUOCET
6 S WAsHLNOTaN. D.C. ZB

rot ciAK-i SEP 27 1994




Homoamb Robca C. Byrd
Chairman
eCammiM on Appopriaton
United SqtM SnatM
Wahlingto D.C. 20510-6025

Dear Mr. Caimn:

Thank yo for you rce = regprdng tha cot of U.S. option in Tidti. Lt
me azu= you that I tar~ ymr int= in idatfying, as quicdy and =ray u
poains, Lth oa= the Pedmal sovemas in IBaly to incr in and uZoud Eaid.

The a greeme reached o Sep= ber 18L hermen tha U.S. deeW o and Uthen do
farov mm of alEd a ignifidmdy c=cted saom of the planning fto that ha
prvnoaily bcm ua d to detem th cat of U.S. Hati-teattd opcioa. Were
zamea the impact of thea ch2aes and will not be able to prowid* fMlal cot edxazm
ni ama a~ tis I fy ctor hav be deded. In the meetman however, we have
provided below, pittminmy c~dmna of cam tfr FY 1994, 1995 and 1996, wem
MsiLbeit, fdr the foUowing uODtlr

MIdntion Opedan, coverUing Ifrtm Arn, imnigradon prceeing and naf
haven co Defes and Sto and the U.s. Coma.tant.

Santedons Wnfam at Opecation, Draning anhaning the Caohluties of ft
D .m.i,= ReptbB border pml ,- and ,ppwdng pn=mmnl who
foenls enfom mnt at the border. alo ininde ttb U.S. naval


Pakrfm ng Opuc, coverting the U.S.-led Mult-Ntical Force (MN)
Sad the U.N. p'-rpin3 sic in Haid (UNMI) to re Haii's
rimnocnii guvCezztn.

Relf sdo Au ino Asiztmac, covering hnmmin aid and ecnmic/
czvpoliuicai rocoxsrc=on, ibncifg the reonxama of Httian poleo
=md =ilitry. Thi ans will be t dnid = primarily by the U.S..
A y fr Ensioi Devopnt (USAID) and the Dc Mens of State
Lwi jLmiaft


Enclosure I








FRl Yesr 1994 Costs

The majority of FY 1994 incremental cost are associated with the migranon and
anciou enforcement operations (eamated at roughly $200 million, including funds for the
U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. naval enforcement of sanctions at sea) and the early phases
of the MNF. Our costs for the MNF; which began September 19th, are il under review
becauS the size, openrtg tempo and timing could all be affected by the changed
cirCounanccs of its arrivaL With respect to recoosrucion assistance, it should be noted
that USAID has been crying out a program of assistance in Haiti, overwhelmingly
humamftarin in nature, throughout FY 1994. The program has been implemented solely
through non-govenenttl agencies. The total cost of that program during this fiscal year,
including incremental costs, is estimated at about S95 million, most of which had been
budgeted Ir earlier i the year.

Some of the FY 1994 Icremental costs, Le., $48 million for naval sanltions
enforcement, were covered by a previously acted supplemental appropriation. Other PY
1994 increental costs will be covered through diversion of funds from other ope aional
activides, reprogramming of available funds, the drawdown of available DoD services and
stocks, and the use of other authnritin

FiS~al Year 1995/96 Cosa

For Flcal Year 1995, the costs of the migrant operation and the sancdons
enforcement operation ar likely to be negligible. The majority of PY 195 incremental
costs am associated with the peacckeping opradon the MNP and UNMIH and
Dqpartmen of State and USAID _t- truc-ion assimce,. As we ned in paragraph 6 of
our recent report to you in response to seedIon 8147 (c) of the DoD Appropriatons Act of
1994, x preliminary esd~at of the U.S. deployment-Irlated costs associted with the MNF
and TUNMI through FY 1996 was projected at $SO-S600 million. This estmat is.likely
to charge for the reason cited above and becau the timing of a tanitioc from the MNF
to UNMIC, currently ucrtain, is a key detenninant of cost. We will provide you with
more detailed estimates as they become available.

Under reconstruction assistance, humanitarian aid will continue in PY 1995 and
will be augmented by rconstrudon ctivits. Total reconstruction assistance in FY 1995,
including restructuing of the Haitian police and military, could be around 1200 million
There is no firm esd ma yet for FY 1996 contribution assistance.

Some FY 1995 incrmental costs for Hu activities can be covered within available
resources s in FY 1994, but consideration will be given to submission of an FY 1995
supplemental when bettr information on nmal costs is available either in Fcbrnary with
the 1996 budget or lstr in the year.. We anticdipata working with the Congress to identify
the most appropriate designation for a potential supplemental request under the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.









APPENDIX 3



2 9 SEP 1994

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Spc
Hoe of Representatives
Washington. D.C. 20515-6501
Dear Mr. Speaker:
We are writing to express our opposition to any legislation that would require U.S.
military operations in Haiti to end on a fixed date.
We have developed a phased plan that encompasses the introduction of U.S. forces,
establishment of public order, gradual reduction in U.S. force level, transition to a U.N. mission,
and withdrawal of U.S. troops. According to this plan, the initial phase of predominant
American involvement will end in a matter of months, and the UNMIH phase will end with the
inauguration of a new, democratically elected President of Haiti in early 1996.
However. it is too early in the operation to set fixed dates. For the operation to succeed
and meet the intended schedule with minimum risk to U.S. personnel, our military forces need
to proceed with achieving objectives, not T-eeting fixed deadlines. The success of the operation
to date is due largely to the force commLa. r having the freedom both to devise and implement
military plans and to make necessary adjustments as circumstances change on the ground. A
fixed end date would deprive us of this advantage.
More important, a legislatively required withdrawal date would change the dynamic on
the ground and affect the actions of our friends and those who oppose us. Those who oppose us
will find reasons to try to outlast us. Our friends -- including those who would support us in the
MNF and those who would relieve us in UNMIH -- might find excuses not to join us. Also, if
Congress were to direct a withdrawal from Haiti now, our troops would lose an important
psychological advantage they now enjoy. The bottom line is that the dynamic created by a
mandated withdrawal date could make the situation more dangerous to our troops.

Sincerely,




ohn M. Shalikshvili William rry
Chairman Secretary of Defense
the Joint Chiefs of Staff




COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL LIBRARY
95

3 5005 00542 646/
In your letter, you requested that we identify the participation, financial or
otherwise, undertake by other nrdons. We are not asking other countries to fund the coits
of U.S. military operations. Member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation Lnd Dovelopment (OECD) patiipuing in the MN will cover their own
costs. Th U.S. will cover the incremental costs of participation by non-OECD countries.
When the UNMH force tks over, the peacekeeping operation will be funded through the
U.N. As you point out, the U.S. is aw.qed juit aver 30 percent of the costs of U.N.
peacekeeping operations. With respect to economic reconstruction, the international
community has br. centrally involved in drawing up a comprhensive, multi-year
economic assistance program for HaitL We anticipate significant international participation
in this pzgram.

Thank you again for your letter. Pless be assured that we will continue to provide
you additinnl informacin as eatmat become available.

Sincerely,





Alice M. Rivlin
Acting Director









USG Estimated Costs of Haiti Operations
($ in Millions)


As a result of the agreement reached on September 18 between the
US delegation and the de facto government of Haiti, many of the
planning factors which determine the cost of the, US Haiti
operation have changed. We are currently updating these changes
and will not be able to provide final cost estimates until some
of the key factors have been decided. In the meantime, provided
below are preliminary estimates for FYs 1994-1996 of migrant
operations, sanctions enforcement, and peacekeeping operations
based on current information available.

Migrant Operations/Sanctions Enforcement 200

Covers costs related to interdiction, immigration processing,
safe haven construction activities, US naval sanctions
enforcement at sea, and the multinational observer group that is
monitoring enforcement at the Dominican Repuulic/Haiti border
primarily incurred by the Departments of Defense and State and
the US Coast Guard. FY 1995 costs are likely to be negligible.

Peacekeeping Operations 500 600

A preliminary estimate of the US deployment-related costs
associated with the Multinational Force (MNF) and the UN Mission
in Haiti (UNMIH), through FY 1996 was projected at $500-600
million. The costs for the MNF, which began September 19, are
still under review because the size, operating tempo and timing
could all be affected by the changed circumstances of its
arrival. This estimate is also likely to change due to the
uncertainty of the transition from the MNF to UNMIH, which is a
key determinant of cost. The above estimate also includes
Department of State costs for the UN assessment and other
support costs related to both the MNF and UNMIH.

Reconstruction Assistance 295

The USAID has been carrying out a program of assistance in
Haiti, overwhelmingly humanitarian in nature, throughout
FY 1994. The total FY 1994 cost of that program is estimated at
$95 million. Total reconstruction assistance in FY 1995,
including restructuring the Haitian police and military was
estimated to be around $200 million. There is no firm estimate
yet for FY 1996 reconstruction assistance.






Enclosure 2



ISBN 0-16-046226-6
90000






9 780160 14 62269