Humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti

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Humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, February 9, 1994
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Food relief -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Political stability -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Democracy -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Aide alimentaire américaine -- Haïti   ( ram )
Stabilité politique -- Haïti   ( ram )
Démocratie -- Haïti   ( ram )
Politics and government -- Haiti -- 1986-   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Haiti -- United States   ( lcsh )
Politique et gouvernement -- Haïti -- 1986-   ( ram )
Relations extérieures -- États-Unis -- Haïti   ( ram )
Relations extérieures -- Haïti -- États-Unis   ( ram )
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HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS IN HAITI






HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 9, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs





'.IVERSi,

..... ...... ,,,'. 0,







U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
90-428 CC WASHINGTON : 1994
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-044568-X
















COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman


SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois


BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California


MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Chief of Staff
RICHARD J. GARON, Minority Chief of Staff
MILAGROS MARTINEZ, Staff Associate


SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
ROB HENKEN, Staff Director
DOROTIHY TAFr, Republican Professional Staff Member
ALAN FLEISCHMANN, Professional Staff Member













CONTENTS


WITNESSES
Page
Hon. Mark L. Schneider, Assistant Administrator for Latin America and
the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International Development .......................... 4
Mr. William Novelli, executive vice-president and chief operating officer of
C A R E ..................................................................................................................... 14
Michael R. Wiest, deputy executive director, Catholic Relief Services ............ 16
Mr. John Hammock, executive director, Oxfam America ................................... 17
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
Hon. Robert G. Torricelli, a Representative in Congress from the State
of N ew Jersey .............................................................................................. 25
H on. M ark L. Schneider ................................................................................ 27
M r. W illiam N ovelli ........................................................................................ 32
M ichael R W iest ............................................................................................ 35
M r. John H am m ock ........................................................................................ 38

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, prepared statement, submitted
by Joseph P K ennedy ........................................................................................ 45











HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS IN HAITI


WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1994
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in the Ray-
burn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon. Robert G.
Torricelli (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The subcommittee will please come to order.
Nearly 21/2 years after the overthrow of President Aristide, Haiti
remains one of the United States' most frustrating and intractable
foreign policy dilemmas.
We have attempted to bring back President Aristide's democrat-
ically elected government through economic sanctions and isolation.
We have tried negotiation and conciliation. Not only has neither
approach worked, but the dilemma has grown worse.
Today we find ourselves at a crossroads. After Haiti's military
leaders reneged on the negotiated settlement at Governor's Island,
the U.N. reimposed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti. The result
has been increased suffering among the poorest segments of Haiti's
already desperate population, with little movement by the Haitian
military to give up the reigns of power which they continue to hold.
We cannot lose sight of the fact that the tiny nation of Haiti
poses no security threat to the United States. Indeed, the primary
U.S. interest in Haiti must be to help the Haitian people and to
strengthen democracy there so that asylum-seeking Haitians need
not risk their lives to sail to the United States.
As a result, my belief is that a widening of the embargo to in-
clude all commercial trade, as suggested by the United States,
France, Canada and Venezuela-is potentially a very troubling idea.
This approach will not bring the military leaders to their knees,
and it will only harm those we are seeking most to help in Haiti.
Indeed, if the Haitian military is to be suggested that they would
yield power because of the potential suffering of the Haitian people,
they wouldn't have overthrown the government at the outset. By
definition, these military leaders do not care about the potential
victims either of the coup or of the embargo. The policy, therefore,
in my judgment is doomed to fail.
Relief workers in Haiti have reported that since the embargo was
reimposed in October, transportation to most rural areas has all
but ceased. As a result, the suffering of the hundreds of thousands
of Haitians who depend upon foreign relief organizations has grown
worse.




2

In fact, at one point last month CARE reported the number of
daily meals they were able to provide had dropped from 620,000 to
117,000, due primarily to a lack of fuel.
Today, the level has increased to a little over 200,000, which
means that 400,000 meals are not being delivered. The primary
reason is the embargo on fuel delivery.
Instead of a full-scale commercial embargo on Haiti we should be
instituting other sanctions that would precisely target Haiti's mili-
tary leaders.
I was pleased to see that the four friends came around to the
idea of freezing more of the foreign holdings of Haitian military of-
ficers and their supporters, while revoking visas and banning non-
commercial flights. Each of these makes sense; they are a target
at the primary offenders of Haitian democracy. They should have
been enacted a long time ago. This enactment deserves support.
Now, we should go one step further. Additional military officers
can and should be placed on the list, and we must do a better job
circulating that list among other countries. In fact, I believe the list
of 520 or so officers could be increased to over 900 members of the
officer corps, giving real punishment and real sanction to those who
are the real impediment to restoring democracy.
Today, we will be hearing from Mark Schneider of USAID and
from representatives of the three humanitarian relief groups who
have been on the ground in Haiti trying their best in difficult cir-
cumstances to give assistance in spite of the embargo.
With the four friends on the verge of asking the U.N. to consider
extending the embargo again, it is imperative that we understand
the potential for malnutrition, contagious disease, the impact on
the most vulnerable segments of Haitian society. It is answers to
those questions primarily which we seek today, as well as advice
on how, indeed, we can take other measures to help restore Haitian
democracy.
Mr. Smith, do you have any comments you would like to make
at the outset?
Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, let
me begin by commending the outstanding work done by humani-
tarian relief organizations such as CARE and the Catholic Relief
Services.
Day by day, hundreds of thousands in Haiti receive their suste-
nance from selfless relief workers who extend the hand of compas-
sion backed by private and public relief funds. I want to thank you
for your commitment to these people, to the starving and the suf-
fering of Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, I know you agree with me that the embargo is
an issue essential to this whole debate. Many Haitians, including
President Aristide, have pressed for a stiffened embargo, but others
argue that the embargo has "only undermined the economy and
worsened the misery of the poor."
As a matter of fact, Catholic Relief Services, in their testimony
today, will point out that, by all accounts, high-ranking military
and police officers targeted by the international embargo are reap-
ing enormous economic benefits from the distortions to the econ-
omy that the sanctions are causing.








At the same time, they will testify that the suffering of the poor
and the middle class Haitians is significantly increasing. Sanctions
and the embargo are difficult to keep on target. They are like radi-
ation therapy which attacks the life-threatening cells, as well as
the life-sustaining cells.
Mr. Chairman, the United States every day feeds an approxi-
mate 680,000 people. These Haitians would have no other meal in
the day except for our contribution. Sadly, though, we are receiving
news reports of malnutrition particularly among children and those
with illnesses exacerbated by the economic pressures.
We also hear about cases of TB and AIDS and other diseases
that are increasing, which are reason for great concern.
Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, this hearing will help us better under-
stand the unmet need as well. We know that there are targets that
have been set. Perhaps our distinguished director of AID can focus
on the unmet need. Is it possible to ratchet up our contribution so
that these suffering in Haiti can likewise receive additional help
and how quickly we might move to do so, even if the international
community is not forthcoming in that regard?
I look forward to the testimony. I thank you for scheduling this
hearing, and let me say also hopefully at some future date we can
have an additional hearing to discuss the private sector and some
of the other concerns that you and I have discussed so we can,
again, build a case for additional action by the U.S. Government.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Mr. Menendez, do you
have any comments you would like to add?
Mr. MENENDEZ. No.
Mr. TORRICELLI. We are joined by our ranking member of the full
committee. Do you have any comments you would like to make?
Mr. GILMAN. Just that I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman,
for conducting this hearing and for trying to bring us up to date
on the problems involving humanitarian relief for the people of
Haiti. We are all frustrated with trying to find an adequate solu-
tion to restoring democracy to Haiti, and we've tried a number of
possibilities to date, but apparently the embargo is beginning to
have an impact upon the existing Haitian Government, whatever
that may be; even the military is beginning to feel some of that,
and I know the business community is very much concerned about
it, and of course, the people of Haiti are bearing the brunt of all
of that; but I don't think it is the time for us to consider alleviating
that embargo when it is beginning to have an impact; but we would
welcome hearing how we can best help the people themselves while
we are trying to make certain that we return the truly democrat-
ically elected administration to Haiti by way of Mr. Aristide. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman. Ms. Ros-
Lehtinen, do you have a comment you would like to make?
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, tox con-
gratulate you for holding this hearing. International issues dealing
with the political tranquility of the entire Caribbean region become
domestic issues of great concern to those of us who live in South
Florida, and as we struggle with the many plans that are out there
and how to restore democracy to Haiti, and restore is really an odd






phrase to use because it was so short-lived in that small, impover-
ished island.
I look forward to the debate on the effectiveness of the embargo
and what further steps the United States can take to restore a
democratic government-perhaps not Aristide; it seems more and
more likely that that is the direction, but perhaps to restore some
semblance of democracy for the impoverished people of Haiti.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Ballenger. Thank you very much. Mr.
Schneider, welcome to the subcommittee. We are, of course, very
pleased to receive your testimony. It will be entered into the record
at this point without objection in its entirety. We would ask you
to orally summarize it briefly, if you could, and then we will pro-
ceed with questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK L. SCHNEIDER, ASSISTANT AD-
MINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the op-
portunity to appear before your committee today. It affords me a
chance to explain to you and to the public the critical importance
of the United States' humanitarian assistance program in Haiti, in
supporting the U.S. foreign policy goals, and helping to alleviate
suffering in that country.
Haiti and its people are enduring a tragedy brought on by the
refusal of the military and a small band of supporters to accept full
constitutional democracy. The people of Haiti spoke clearly when
they elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by an overwhelming
majority. At the same time, they elected a multiparty parliament.
In that country's troubled history, the election of 1990 marked a
moment of hope, and the international community pledged its sup-
port to that new government. Eight months later a coup led by the
military toppled that regime and drove the President to exile.
Human rights abuse, fear and suffering have followed.
The international community, through the OAS and later the
United Nations, rejected the attempts at extra-constitutional rule.
Throughout the process since, the four friends, including the Unit-
ed States, have sought to help the Haitian people find a pathway
out of this crisis, to restore the constitutional government.
The United States recognized from the first moment of the impo-
sition of sanctions that there was a parallel responsibility to in-
crease our humanitarian relief programs in Haiti.
Let me discuss those programs in the context of Haitian eco-
nomic and social conditions. Haiti was the poorest country in the
hemisphere before 1990 and remains the poorest country in the
hemisphere today. Per capital income is estimated by the World
Bank as $370 per person prior to the crisis, and it undoubtedly is
lower today. At the same time, infant mortality and child mortality
statistics were and are among the worst in the region.
In Haiti, we are carrying out one of the largest per capital hu-
manitarian relief programs in the world this year totaling approxi-
mately $60 million. Our program provides food to nearly 700,000
Haitians daily and basic health care to nearly 2 million Haitians
with no other access to such services. Our feeding program delivers
more than $17 million of Public Law 480 Title II foods through






three U.S. voluntary agencies-CARE, CRS and ADRA-to needy
school children, mothers and infants, and the elderly.
Starting last September, immediately following the indication
that there was going to be a restoration of constitutional govern-
ment with the implementation of the Governors Island Accords, we
had undertaken a new $2.1 million emergency feeding program in
the Northwest. That program has continued through CARE, and
we currently have authorized levels nationwide of approximately 1
million beneficiaries with approximately 500,000 beneficiaries re-
ceiving food assistance. With the assistance of other donors such as
the EEC, Canada, and the World Food Program, 730,000 bene-
ficiaries-essentially children, women and the elderly-are receiv-
ing food each day.
At the same time, the United States provided an agreement with
President Aristide for Public Law 480 Title III, which brought in
$20 million worth of wheat flour, which is being sold to bakeries
to produce affordable bread and other food for the commercial mar-
ket on which millions of Haitians depend.
The USAID program also provides access to basic health services
for an estimated 2 million Haitians, including child survival serv-
ices, vaccinations, nutritional surveillance, oral rehydration tar-
geted on some 300,000 children under 5, and AIDS and family
planning services provided to another 750,000 to 1 million Hai-
tians, both urban and rural.
In addition, in the health field there are other donors that are
active, generally operating through a coordinated committee that is
managed by the Pan American Health Organization. PAHO also
executed some $12 million in assistance this last year with support
from various donors, including the United States.
The third element in our humanitarian program that I want to
mention is a short-term jobs program which is used to provide as-
sistance to the very poorest among the Haitian community. It is
used to clean drainage canals, repair roads needed to deliver hu-
manitarian food, clean up garbage and dispose of solid waste in the
poorest areas in the country. It is implemented, again, through
U.S. PVO's, including the Pan American Development Foundation,
Planning Assistance, and the Cooperative Housing Foundation.
At the moment, there are approximately 5,500 individuals work-
ing each day. We expect within several months to reach 20,000,
and ultimately to reach some 62,000 a day by the summer.
Obviously, Mr. Chairman, this humanitarian program is not
what we had hoped to be carrying out in Haiti. We had planned
with the hope that the Governors Island Accord would be imple-
mented for a medium- and long-term development program that
dealt with Haiti's basic underlying problems of development. Those
programs and those plans remain in suspension, and hopefully if
the political crisis can be resolved, they can immediately be put
into effect. And they cover the range from agricultural reactivation
to urban programs in support of employment generation, technical
assistance in reforming economic policy, public administration, as
well as direct support for democratic institutions, microenterprise
development and support for the judiciary.
In the short term, there are three areas that I would like to high-
light as issues related to our ability to carry out the humanitarian






program. The first relates to continued fuel availability during the
period of the embargo; the second is the timely monitoring of social
and nutritional conditions; and the third is the need for continued
close cooperation with our voluntary agencies and with Haitian vol-
untary agencies and other donors.
With respect to the first, the need to ensure humanitarian fuel
supplies, it does little good if we have the food and the medicines
in the country and an inability to get them to the people who need
them.
As a result, the United States consulted with President Aristide
and his government and attempted to coordinate with a variety of
international agencies the establishment of a rather unique hu-
manitarian fuel program. An interagency team developed that pro-
gram; it was negotiated with the United Nations, the Organization
of American States, and the Pan American Health Organization
was selected by them to run the system.
Prime Minister Malval made a specific request to the Exceptions
Committee of the U.N. Security Council, with respect to putting
into effect this fuel program. It was agreed to, and despite initial
concerns, the first shipment of fuel has reached Haiti and through
a combined UN/OAS team, the allocations of that fuel to the var-
ious nongovernmental organizations has begun. Approximately 125
organizations have gone in and received fuel to carry the food and
medical supplies to the various feeding sites and clinics around the
country.
At this point, a second shipment of fuel is being procured, which
would provide the fuel for these humanitarian relief agencies ap-
proximately through March, and so long as necessary into the fu-
ture.
Let me add a point now with respect to the problem of nutri-
tional monitoring. It is obviously a continuing issue of concern to
all of us. USAID collects data from 38 health clinics around Haiti
on a continuing basis. It is the most systematic and accurate data
that is available on a regular source for any institution in Haiti.
There are problems, there are lag times in terms of the informa-
tion, and obviously these are 38 sites within communities in the
country, and one never can be sure that every community is
reached.
Nevertheless, we have had CDC teams-Centers for Disease
Control-going down to help us determine whether these monitor-
ing systems, in fact, are providing an accurate reflection of the cur-
rent situation in Haiti.
At the same time, with our voluntary agencies-CARE and oth-
ers-we have been carrying out short-term assessments of the nu-
tritional situation.
And finally, because there is a concern that some specific commu-
nities may not have been reached on the regular program, we are
setting up a rapid assessment team that would move around the
country in response to expressions of concern and attempt to deter-
mine whether or not in some particular community there is a seri-
ous problem.
At this point, I will tell you that all of the reporting has indi-
cated that while Haiti's nutritional situation, as we all know, was
among the worst in the hemisphere to begin with, that there has






not been any sharp decline; that the levels of malnutrition are very
serious, they continue to be serious, and there are some disturbing
trends in terms of those levels in the various categories; but there
has not been a precipitous fall-off, and I think that that is largely
as a result of the humanitarian assistance programs.
Let me recognize, if I could, and applaud the efforts of our co-
operating agencies, Catholic Relief Services, the Adventist Develop-
ment Relief Agency and CARE. They are not only working under
difficult circumstances, but at times at great personal risk, and I
think we have to appreciate the efforts that they have undertaken
to attempt to meet this humanitarian need.
At the same time, I should say that the AID personnel are along
with them on the ground in Haiti in attempting to assure that
these humanitarian needs are met.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, during this time of the embargo, as you
have said, which affects everyone in the country, USAID has taken
a lead role in responding to the obligation to alleviate the suffering
in the most vulnerable groups. We are prepared to strengthen
those efforts along with those of other donor organizations, and we
have in fact recently requested two of our cooperating agencies to
come to us with proposals for increasing the levels of assistance. At
the same time, we have discussed with the other donor organiza-
tions the possibilities of their increasing their feeding programs.
However, as was stated earlier, the only sure answer to Haiti's
crisis is the restoration of democratic government, and inter-
national commitment to democracy, development, and justice.
Thank you again.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider appears in the appen-
dix.]
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. At this point the
committee is going to have to break for a vote. I suspect there will
be two. We will come back here just as quickly as we possibly can.
Excuse us.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you, Ambassador Schneider, and I apolo-
gize for the chairman who is in the chair right now. I actually have
an amendment up in another committee, so I am really not here,
either.
I know we are set for questions. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen,
if you would like to begin.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. I do not have anything right now.
Mr. DEUTSCH. Congressman Mica.
Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to take just a
moment to thank Chairman Torricelli for calling these hearings. I
think that this is a question that certainly deserves the attention
not only of this subcommittee but also of the Congress, so I com-
mend you in addressing a problem that is very important to the
United States, and in particular my home State, our home State
of Florida.
I did not get a chance to hear the testimony, but I read some of
the testimony, and I had a question, if I may, sir. Some of the hu-
manitarian aid that you indicated in your submitted testimony-
and you may have referred to it verbally; I believe it is on page 2,
the last three paragraphs-talks about some of the humanitarian






8
aid that is being delivered to Haiti, and yet in the testimony of the
representative from CARE, he says, in fact, that a lot of that aid
is sitting on the docks in Haiti, and in fact, that a small percentage
of the aid is actually getting-I guess it is somewhere up now to
around 200,000, still two-thirds less than the targeted goal; and I
also came to this committee because I attended the Miami congres-
sional workshop and learned there that the infant mortality death,
at least according to one report, is now exceeding 1,000 infants a
month. It has increased 1,000 infants a month, infant mortality in
Haiti as a result of our sanctions policy.
I would just like your response, if I may.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Congressman. First, with respect to
the feeding question, CARE has two programs. One was the regu-
lar program that had an approved level of about 300,000 bene-
ficiaries. The second one was an emergency program that was to
begin last September for another 300,000. The second program was
getting started right at the time of the Harlan County and it is a
program where the food has to be brought from Port-au-Prince up
to Gonaives and then distributed to about 1,500 actual sites around
the Northwest.
The regular program has continually had levels of implementa-
tion that have been fairly close to the desired levels. The emer-
gency program has been the one where there have been difficulties.
That is a program that's called "dry feeding," where they take it
in bulk and they provide to the families a designated amount of
food. They were hit by the impact of the fuel crisis at the same
time that they were setting up. That's why they have had difficul-
ties in raising their levels. I was just speaking with them, and as
of February 4, with the humanitarian fuel program that we've put
into effect, they've brought about 62 containers from those 600 up
to Gonaives and they have increased now their emergency program
up to 25,000. Their regular program is 170,000; and they anticipate
that they will be able to raise those levels significantly with these
62 containers.
They also now have some 91 trucks that have received fuel to
bring additional containers from the warehouse up to Gonaives. So
the situation is difficult, but I think we are likely to see those lev-
els increase, and I think that they will concur when they testify.
With respect to the question of infant mortality, we have not
seen any drastic increase. The infant mortality rate in Haiti, as an
example, prior to the crisis was the worst in the hemisphere. It was
approximately 100-104 deaths for every 1,000 live births.
The current situation is approximately the same. You should
know that is about double the average in Latin America. The aver-
age is around 50 per 1,000 live births.
Mr. MICA. I understand the information that I am getting and
that I have obtained is that that has increased again and that our
policy, our sanctions, the inability to get this assistance is doubling
the infant mortality. I am not a rocket scientist or I don't tend to
be an expert in humanitarian efforts, but it seems that our policy
is directly increasing the infant mortality, and what concerns me
even more is I had heard this week that the administration was
looking at possibly proposing to the United Nations or ourselves in






forcing an even stricter embargo which, in fact, would even have
a more negative result on our baby-killing policy.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. First, I wouldn't accept that characterization.
None of the statistics that we have from any source-any source-
show that increase in infant mortality. We have a reporting on a
monthly basis from 38 sites around the country of health clinics
that provide data on nutrition and on health conditions. In addi-
tion, we have tried to collaborate with the range of voluntary agen-
cies that will be testifying after me on this particular issue.
We obviously are greatly concerned. The impact of an embargo
and the consequence obviously does affect the country as a whole.
In a country as poor as Haiti, there is obviously suffering; however,
we have not had any reporting that would reflect a large increase
in infant mortality.
Also, I should add that we are part of a humanitarian committee
in Haiti with the Pan American Health Organization and other
international institutions. Everything that we have seen around
the country would show that there has been a slight increase in
malnutrition, but that there has been in no way any sharp increase
of infant mortality.
Mr. MICA. Well, I have read even some of the preliminary testi-
mony, and that conflicts, and also with observers who have been
there most recently in the country, and that also conflicts. Are you
in fact, then, recommending to the people that are making the pol-
icy as to how the United States should proceed that there is no im-
pact on the well being of the children, infants, elderly and that pop-
ulation?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. What we are recommending is that we need to
increase and, if we can, do a better job in providing food and medi-
cal facilities to the poor in Haiti. We have increased levels-as I
mentioned in my testimony earlier-and we are now reaching ap-
proximately 730,000 beneficiaries a day with our programs and
with those of other donors. Also, approximately 2 million Haitians
are receiving some access to health services funded by USAID
through a variety of private organizations, including the inter-
national organizations.
Mr. MICA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to belabor this, and
I do appreciate both the consideration given to me as a nonpanel
member, but having dealt in Haiti prior to the overthrow in trying
to establish some economic programs with the associations both in
Haiti and my state and the private sector, I am particularly con-
cerned about the policy that we have and that we may, in fact, be
killing the potential-you know, it is easy to give these people a
fish and let some of them live for a day or another week, but our
policy should be toward teaching them to be fishermen and eco-
nomic development and restoring democracy; and I think we have
failed dramatically, and this policy is now spilling over. It is sort
of summed up by the statement I read in the next witness's com-
mentary, and he said "Haiti's poor should not become the victims
of good intentions of the international community." And I guess we
will hear that from Mr. Novelli, but just my comments, I appreciate
your response, and it is concern beyond the boundaries of this
panel, and thank you again, Mr. Chairman.







Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. If I could, I agree totally with your
comments with respect to Haiti's development, that the only long-
term answer is the restoration of democracy and the long-term de-
velopment that does provide the people of Haiti with the ability for
sustainable development.
Mr. MICA. Well, yesterday we had two Haitian children and
adults wash up on the shores of our state. I think we are only be-
ginning to see, again, the human misery and result of our lack of
having a policy; and obviously if conditions are good or stable
there, the people are not risking their lives and their children's
lives to make it to our shores.
Mr. DEUTSCH. Thank you. Any questions from Congressman
Menendez?
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Adminis-
trator. I am sorry I have been in and out, but I heard all of your
testimony earlier before the votes, and I hope my questions are not
repetitive.
Let me ask you, in November of this past year the New York
Times reported on a Harvard University study that said sanctions
in Haiti, crisis in humanitarian action, and it alluded to the fact
that the oil embargo and other sanctions kill approximately 1,000
children each month.
Based upon what I heard you say, that this is not-I have heard
you before in a briefing, I have heard you now publicly, so I will
talk about it-that it has not exponentially increased. If the facts
in that study where it talked about the 1,000 children additional
each month and that normally 3,000 children in Haiti die under
normal conditions; 33 percent is not an exponential figure?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. The study itself we have looked at quite care-
fully. It was based on a single community and with an extrapo-
lation based on that community's experience during a period when
the community was also undergoing a serious epidemic of measles.
We do not think-at least from everything that we have looked
at, using that study as a basis and sending the CDC down there
to look at it-we do not believe that the extrapolition is an accurate
assessment of the national situation in Haiti.
Let me just say, Dr. Chen is a good friend, and as soon as that
study was released, I sat down with him to talk about it because
I was obviously equally concerned. Then we sent it back to our mis-
sion and we asked them to go out and inspect the Northwest and
attempt to verify the situation.
As I say, there was a unique situation in that community. Our
best estimate is that the extrapolation does not accurately reflect
national conditions.
Mr. MENENDEZ. What would you say is an accurate extrapo-
lation?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. We have, if you will, the statistics that are re-
ceived each month from some 38 health clinics throughout Haiti.
In addition, we have reporting from the World Health Organization
and UNICEF and every other organization. We do not see an in-
crease nationwide of infant mortality in Haiti. The most recent sta-
tistics have remained approximately at the extremely unacceptable
levels that I mentioned earlier. We are talking about 100 deaths
per 1,000 live births. That should not be occurring.






Mr. MENENDEZ. But what you are telling us is that unacceptable
figure was a figure that existed preembargo?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is correct.
Mr. MENENDEZ. And that there is no change whatsoever as a re-
sult of the embargo, or it is-
Mr. SCHNEIDER. One would have to expect that there would be
some worsening of conditions. From all of the reporting that we
have had, there has not been a significant increase in other indica-
tors that would point toward increases in infant mortality, nor has
there been a significant increase in the regularly reported data on
infant mortality, either.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Your delivery system, with reference to the aid
that you are providing both in terms of food and medical assist-
ance, is unimpeded by those in control on the island?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. It has not been impeded. The concern was, spe-
cifically with respect to the embargo of fuel, that we would have
difficulties in moving food and medical supplies. We put into place
with the United Nations and the OAS this humanitarian fuel pro-
gram where the fuel is purchased through the international organi-
zations. It's brought in, and the individual PVO's and local non-
governmental organizations apply for and get a chit for their allo-
cated levels of fuel. One hundred and twenty-five organizations
have done that in the past 3 weeks since the program began. No
one has been impeded so far as we know. We are talking here
about, perhaps, half of the 420,000 gallons that we brought in, and
there has not been any reported interference. We are hopeful it will
continue, in the sense that there will not be any obstacles placed
to impede the program.
We have also gone forward in arranging for the next shipment
so we won't run out before the next shipment arrives. That is the
situation at the moment.
Mr. MENENDEZ. One last question, if I may Mr. Chairman, and
that is-a two-part question. One is, is there any siphoning off of
the goods or services that we are providing, not reaching individ-
uals but being somehow deviated to other purposes? Are you satis-
fied that in addition to the delivery system being one in which you
have no impediments there, is it all accounted for? And secondly,
you mentioned three issues with reference to continuing to be able
to mitigate the suffering, and do you foresee any impediments to
those and if so, what are they?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Let me deal with the second question, and I will
come back to the first. With respect to those three issues, one was
the fuel. As I said, we have managed to obtain a supply of fuel that
thus far has resulted in no impediments in its delivery to the indi-
vidual organizations which are providing food and medicine.
The second issue is a question of our monitoring system, and as
I mentioned, we have an ongoing monitoring system of 38 health
clinics around the country. In addition, we have the reporting from
the NGO's themselves. We just recently completed, and perhaps
CARE will provide some of the information, a joint study with
CARE looking at this issue in the Northwest. Our concern was to
look at both the system of delivery as well as the current nutri-
tional situation.






And then the third was the question of the need to increase the
levels of assistance. Given that our approved levels are 1.4 million,
and we have not been able to reach that, we are looking at possible
alternatives or additional organizations which can come into the
program in order to move the levels of feeding upwards. We have
asked the various NGO's to come to us with proposals for doing
that.
Going back to your first question, the question of diversion: in
this kind of a situation where we have such substantial amounts
of food and medicine being provided, I think you would have to say
that you would expect that there would be some leakage. Where
there is, we go after it, and where we find something to have oc-
curred, we then obviously take measures to prevent it. We do have
four people who are permanent investigators looking at just that
issue.
You have to remember as to some of the reports that you get
back, that we are not the only organization financing delivery of
humanitarian assistance. The organizations that we are working
with, we think, are themselves making every best effort to prevent
diversion, and we have our own people that are double checking.
There are other organizations, and in some instances there may
be some diversion that takes place there, and there probably is. We
have not been able to identify and significant diversion. There were
two instances where we heard of possible diversion. We followed it
up and took action to resolve it.
With respect to the fuel, thus far, and I think there was some
mention in testimony about this, we have not had any evidence of
diversion.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, the reason I ask the question of
diversion-which is always a question obvious-is also since you
are having what sounds like a smooth process of unimpeded deliv-
ery of your aid, I was wondering whether in part because there is
a diversion and therefore there is a desire and we are helping indi-
rectly and unwillingly, maybe, but nonetheless helping people who
we certainly don't want to help who are oppressing others. Not
now, but if you could quantify that for me, I would appreciate that.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Let me just say, very, very small. What we are
talking about is a very, very small amount that we have heard of.
You will find that this is a very, very poor country. Most of our pro-
grams are what are called wet feeding programs. That is, the food
is taken to a church, to an orphanage, to a clinic and then the orga-
nization there actually prepares it and they serve hot meals to chil-
dren or lactating mothers or to the elderly. So you know that that
it is going to the right people.
There are some programs where you provide dry food. They get
their container of rice, et cetera. When you use the word diversion,
what I am talking about there is that somebody then takes it and
sells it, an individual.
We have not had any evidence, thus far, of vast amounts of this
at all.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you.
Mr. DEUTSCH. In terms of specific data that AID or any of the
voluntary relief agencies have collected to ascertain the impact of






the sanctions on the poor, is there specific data that you can point
to on the impact?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. In terms of the impact of the sanctions them-
selves?
Mr. DEUTSCH. Correct.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is difficult to aggregate, obviously. The sanc-
tions have impacted throughout the society in the sense that, if you
have a reduction of fuel, businesses cannot operate and so you
have, presumably, an increase in unemployment.
If you are talking about in the agricultural areas, for example,
there is a degree of survival skills that the poor utilize. Seventy
percent of Haiti is still rural. Most of the impact of the sanctions
initially is felt in the urban areas as your commercial embargo
takes effect.
But it is not possible, I don't think-it is very difficult to meas-
ure the direct impact of the sanctions on the poor, as such. As I
say, we have attempted through the monitoring system to deter-
mine overall what the increases in levels of malnutrition are, and
there have been very slight increases reported.
There are other kinds of impacts, obviously: as the fuel takes ef-
fect, you have a reduction in electricity; in some places, it is down
to 2 hours a day; in other places it is cutoff entirely. That, obvi-
ously, impacts on everybody.
Certain of the manufacturing firms are severely impacted-one
example, the sector that was mentioned earlier, the assembly
firms, at one point had a level of employment in about September
of about 10,000 employees. They are now down to about 7 or 8. At
their high point they were probably up to 40.
The problem of fuel ultimately impacts on farmers getting their
produce from the fields into the market. In some instances, where
that is done by truck, that obviously is going to be impacted by the
fuel embargo.
Mr. DEUTSCH. Is there anything in the future over the next cou-
ple of weeks, days, or months that you are trying to get more infor-
mation specifically about the impact? If we are hearing 1,000 chil-
dren a month dying-
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I don't believe that that is a good statistic. We
have gone out with the CDC to our monitoring centers to try and
determine whether there are any flaws in the reporting. We intend
also, as I mentioned earlier, to get a group of investigators to go
out into areas-particularly isolated areas-where we may not
have received information in order to try and get additional re-
ports.
Mr. DEUTSCH. One last question. I am assuming you have seen
a press account that President Aristide made a statement yester-
day that he is disagreeing with President Clinton's proposal-or
really, policy-of asking Haitians to stay in Haiti, and Aristide in
that comment seems to be-or is he signaling encouragement to
people to flee Haiti? Have you seen the story, the AP wire service?
Mr. SCHNEIDER. I did. What I would like to do, if I could, since
that is really for some one in of the State Department to respond.
I would like to take that question and have a response prepared
for the committee.


80-428 0 94 2







Mr. DEUTSCH. OK. I appreciate your time. Any further ques-
tions? Thank you very much.
Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you.
Mr. DEUTSCH. We are going to have a new panel and a new
chair, so thank you very much.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Our next panel, if they would step up, Mr. Wil-
liam Novelli, Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer
of CARE; Mr. Michael Wiest, Deputy Executive Director of Catholic
Relief Services; and Mr. John Hammock, Executive Director of
Oxfam America. And we will start off in that order, with Mr.
Novelli first.

STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM NOVELLI, EXECUTIVE VICE-
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER OF CARE
Mr. NOVELLI. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, my
name is Bill Novelli. I am the executive vice president of CARE
and its chief operating officer. On behalf of CARE I would like to
thank you for giving us this opportunity to testify on the urgent
topic of humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti.
CARE has maintained an uninterrupted presence in Haiti since
1959. Chronic economic and political instability have made it very
difficult to promote sustainable development there. Thus, we
watched with cautious optimism the establishment of Haiti's first
constitutional democracy.
In 50 years of relief and development work, CARE has learned
that sustainable development cannot reach its fullest potential in
an environment of endemic poverty and economic neglect of the so-
ciety at large, so we strongly support the restoration of the demo-
cratic process in Haiti. Decades of bad government have stripped
the Haitian people of their most basic human needs and rights.
CARE commends the position taken by the United States, the OAS,
the U.N. and the friends of Haiti on the restoration of democracy
there.
We also recognize the need for using sanctions against those who
illegally seize power. However, sanctions must be accompanied by
a comprehensive humanitarian assistance program. Haiti's poverty
is well documented, but statistics alone cannot adequately convey
the persistent misery suffered by the majority of the Haitian people
throughout their lives.
Northwest Haiti where CARE presently targets most of its pro-
grams has always been the poorest region in the country. People
there have been dealt a series of crushing blows-years of drought,
massive deforestation, low crop yields and the additional hardships
caused by sanctions.
The effect of rising food prices-about 50 percent higher than a
year ago-leaves an already vulnerable population in greater jeop-
ardy. A recent USAID monitoring report on Haiti for December
1993 documents the continuing decline in the Northwest. Total
malnutrition rose in this area, a trend begun earlier in the year.
Twenty-five percent of infants born in the Northwest are under
weight, food stocks here and in the North are desperately low, and
even the production of traditional famine foods such as green man-
goes is down.







CARE, with funding from USAID, the American public, CARE
International, the Canadian Government, and others is operating
a supplemental feeding program for the nutritionally vulnerable in
northwest Haiti. This program requires approximately 4,000 metric
tons of food per month for a target of 620,000 people.
The difficulties of working under the complicated political and
economic conditions created by this embargo are formidable. At
present, about 550 shipping containers of much-needed food do-
nated by the U.S. Government are in the harbor in Port-au-Prince.
Mr. Chairman, this number is down since we presented our writ-
ten testimony, and I believe that Mr. Schneider presented the fig-
ures that are very promising; that is to say that we are able to get
62 of those containers up to Gonaives in the last week, and right
now we have about 91 trucks on the road. So, the food is moving
from the harbor now. The backlog, of course, was caused by the
need for fuel and spare parts for the trucks which deliver the food
to our distribution points.
While these commodities remain at the port, our food inventory
levels in the Northwest are critically low, and as I say, they are
now beginning to rebuild and we expect the beneficiaries fed to
now go up.
Immediately preceding the startup of the UN's emergency fuel
program, which commenced on January 15, the number of recipi-
ents which we were able to reach had dropped dramatically to
about 117,000. As of today, that number is about 200,000. It is still,
though, two-thirds less than our targeted goal. Now, if all goes rel-
atively smoothly, it will still require several weeks to reach full re-
cipient levels.
The situation in Haiti is very bad right now, but hunger and pov-
erty in Haiti are not entirely consequences of the embargo, in our
view. The embargo has only exacerbated an already fragile situa-
tion for Haiti's poor majority. Haiti is a food-deficit country where
most of the citizens live on the edge. Even if the democratic process
were restored today, there would remain a large impoverished and
illiterate population.
As it is clear to the international community that tightening
sanctions is a necessary means to restore the democratic process
there, then it must be equally clear that there has to be an ade-
quate immediate and longer term humanitarian assistance pro-
gram in place. Haiti's poor should not be the victims of the good
intentions of the international community.
If and when the sanctions are tightened, we require the following
to carry out an effective assistance program in Haiti for at least the
next 6 months. An extension through July of the emergency part
of the feeding program, which Mr. Schneider explained was the dry
feeding. Expeditious issuance of export licenses and waivers from
the sanctions committee and the office of foreign assets controlled
in the U.S. Treasury Department to meet procurement and delivery
of additional trucks, spare parts, spare engines, tools and.tires.
And a timely and regular delivery of humanitarian relief supplies,
including the emergency fuel.
In summary, CARE strongly supports the restoration of the
democratic process and recognizes the need for using sanctions. We






commend the position taken by the United States, the OAS, the
friends of Haiti, and the U.N. on restoring democracy there.
In accord with international principles, we believe it is essential
that the international community provide adequate humanitarian
assistance during this embargo and afterward to protect the most
vulnerable people from its intended consequences. Despite the for-
midable obstacles created by the embargo, CARE, with assistance
from the U.S. Government, the American public, and others, will
continue to do our very best to mitigate the adverse effect of sanc-
tions on the most vulnerable people in Haiti. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Novelli appears in the appendix.]
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you. We will next hear from Mr. Michael
R. Wiest.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. WIEST, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES
Mr. WIEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Michael
Wiest. I am the deputy executive director of Catholic Relief Serv-
ices, and I just returned from a 1-week-long visit to Haiti. I re-
turned on Monday, and I went there on my first visit to learn
about the Catholic Relief Services relief and development efforts in
the country. We have a program of emergency and development as-
sistance of approximately $9 million per year.
I traveled from Port-au-Prince to Les Cayes to Jeremie by road,
and I visited many schools, markets, hospitals, villages, and I met
with Catholic church authorities.
I want to emphasize that I am no expert on Haiti, having re-
cently been returned from over 20 years working in Africa and
Asia. I certainly do not have as much area knowledge as most of
the people in this room; however, I have over 20 years' experience
in prefamine and food insecure and famine circumstances on other
continents, especially in Ethiopia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, northern
Kenya, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mauritania. My impres-
sions in Haiti are shaped by these food security experiences.
First of all, in traveling through the southern peninsula in Haiti,
one is shocked by the fact that the public infrastructure in Haiti
is as poor as the poorest of African countries. It is obvious that
public investment in rural areas has been minimal over the past
decades; however, free market mechanisms have not been sup-
pressed as they were in Ghana, Ethiopia and Tanzania. As a con-
sequence, Haitians are better able than these other populations to
cope with food security problems.
Also, nature is still more forgiving and giving than in other coun-
tries like Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Sahel and is better able to sus-
tain communities in emergency times such as the present.
Also, children are in better health than most African children, at
least by appearance, and are less susceptible in the short term to
serious malnutrition.
Nonetheless, suffering is relative to the circumstance, and the
Haitian people are suffering intensely. There is growing economic
and food insecurity brought about principally by economic contrac-
tion, which has been at approximately half a percent since 1980
per year; agricultural decline, which has reduced at approximately
2 percent per year since 1980; and which has been exacerbated by




17

recent sharp price increases partially brought about by the increase
in fuel costs.
Although there is a long way to go in the southern peninsula be-
fore classic famine occurs, the population is experiencing increases
in illness, especially diarrhea and respiratory infection, and local-
ized increases in child malnutrition.
More alarmingly, tuberculosis is on the rise and there is great
risk of cholera outbreak resulting from impure water.
Finally, it is evident, even to the nonprofessional, that the envi-
ronment is deteriorating. Charcoal is the only commodity which
has decreased in price, as peasants glut the market in an attempt
to increase their meager incomes. Mountains with access to prin-
cipal roads are becoming deforested.
Although famine is not likely in the southern peninsula in the
short term, without an upturn in the economy, stabilization of the
environment, and without responsive and principled government
which are necessary to sustain both, Haiti will suffer from Sahel-
type famine in the not too distant future.
In response to the current economic health and food security cri-
sis, Catholic Relief Services is planning to increase its program-
ming, especially in regard to school and institutional feeding, water
resources development, and provisions of medicine and health care.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wiest appears in the appendix.]
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you. We will now hear from Mr. Ham-
mock.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN HAMMOCK, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
OXFAM AMERICA
Mr. HAMMOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the com-
mittee. Oxfam America is a nonpartisan agency which has been
working in Haiti for many years, has an office there and a rep-
resentative working primarily on long-term development issues in
Haiti.
I have lived in the Caribbean myself for 18 years. I have been
visiting and working in Haiti since 1971, and I was just there 3
months ago. Haiti is not Bosnia. In Bosnia sometimes it's hard to
know who to blame for what is happening. It is not confusing in
Haiti. It is clear that who is causing the problems in Haiti. The
problem is the military and the police that overthrew a democrat-
ically elected government 2 years ago. The problems are the thugs
who waved their guns on a dock in October and blocked a U.N.
ship from landing. The problem is the power-hungry-excuse the
word-assassins who wield power through a ruthless reign of ter-
ror.
I was there 3 months ago, and the number of people being shot
on the street every day is appalling. A reign of terror which in-
cludes the murdering not only of the minister of justice of the elect-
ed government in front of the Sacrecoeur Church, but also a reign
of terror which is more insidious and more pervasive by reaching
out at all levels of society and killing anybody who deems it impor-
tant to speak out.
It is important for you to know that this reign of terror has made
long-term development in Haiti impossible at this time. Organiza-






tions with which Oxfam American has worked for years have been
destroyed; programs that we have helped to start have been pur-
posely wiped out by the military leaders, by rulers, and the leaders
that we have worked with for years have been killed, are now in
the United States, or are in hiding.
Let me make sure that you understand very clearly what I am
saying. There has been a systematic wiping out of all popular orga-
nizations in Haiti that at all challenge the dictatorship or try to do
any type of ongoing work in that country. There are over 400,000
people in hiding in Haiti at this time. I spoke to people under-
ground there 3 months ago, and those people are very clear about
what is happening in Haiti, and you need to understand that in
order to then move to the next point.
The restoration of the democracy is absolutely crucial to the long-
term development of Haiti. Some people say that that's all well and
good, but people are suffering now under the embargo, and
shouldn't something be done about the embargo. Garbage is piled
high in the streets, absolutely. The countryside is devastated eco-
logically, absolutely. People have no medicine, children are hungry,
absolutely. But what caused this? The embargo? Absolutely not.
If you look at the history of Haiti, Haiti has been poor for years.
I was as shocked and appalled in 1971 when I went to Haiti for
the first time. Children have been malnourished, medicine has
been in short supply for years. Haiti has been the poorest country
in this hemisphere for years. Why? Not because of the current em-
bargo, but rather because of policies of the Haitian Government
run by a tiny elite, reinforced by a military that is ruthless and
does not care for its people.
And now it is these same military who have cynically discovered
poor people and are using poor people in the public relations battle
that is going on between that military and the Aristide govern-
ment. They have argued that the short-term pain of the embargo
is too much for the poor. But one man told me when I was in Haiti,
echoing what a lot of people told me, "I have been living under an
embargo all my life. I have had no education, very little food and
absolutely no hope." The key is not the embargo. The key is what
are the policies to change the current situation. What can we do?
Let me be brief. First, we must be very clear what is at the root
cause of the problem and have a clear goal. The goal is to get rid
of the current military rulers of Haiti as a precondition for democ-
racy which is a precondition for long-term development, which is
what Oxfam America is interested in.
Second, this country-the United States-must have one clear
and unambiguous consistent policy on Haiti. We have not had that.
It must speak with one voice forcefully. It must not send conflicting
signals to the military. The CIA and the Defense Department and
others must work within the guidelines of a clear policy, not out-
side of them; and we need to end our vacillation which goes on
even as we speak in terms of what is happening with the U.N. res-
olutions that are being put forth by the French.
Third, we must strengthen the embargo. The embargo as it cur-
rently stands is not working. I believe that it needs to be strength-
ened at this point in terms of hurting and trying to do what we
want, which is to restore the elected government. It needs to be






strictly enforced. We need to expand freezing of assets in the Unit-
ed States of a broader number of people, as Mr. Torricelli said ear-
lier, to include all 950 military officers rather than just the 500
that are on that list right now.
We must seal the Dominican Republic border, which at this time
is allowing fuel to go to people who have the money to purchase
it; and I disagree with assessments that have been made by the ad-
ministration on that point.
Fourth, we must take measures immediately to continue to in-
crease humanitarian assistance in Haiti. The sending of the ship
of fuel shows that we can provide assistance in Haiti at this time.
It needs to be increased at all levels through the agencies that have
just testified and through other agencies so that we, in fact, do
ameliorate some of the effects of the embargo.
And fifth, when democracy is restored, aid must flow-not
through the elite and the organizations in Haiti which I believe
often have helped to perpetuate the problem-but we need to have
aid flow through popular organizations, organizations that actually
are of the poor and that deal with long-term solutions to the prob-
lems of Haiti.
This will require a flexible USAID, and I recommend that Con-
gress make Haiti a special country with a special case so that in
fact AID is not ruled by all the requirements and regulations that
it has to meet. For example, right now, to give a $5,000 grant to
a Haitian group, it's probably got to spend much more than that
to do the accounting on that grant. That needs to change so that
they can be flexible and provide the kind of assistance needed
when democracy is restored in Haiti.
Let me end by saying that I was really struck when I was in
Haiti. I've been to many countries throughout the world. I have
never been as depressed as I was when I went to Haiti. The situa-
tion there is alarming. The situation is one that requires clear and
consistent action at this time. Every Haitian is a human being who
has a tremendous potential, and that potential has got to be liber-
ated. The only way that we are going to liberate the potential of
the Haitian people is by having democracy in that country. Democ-
racy needs to be restored if we are going to have long-term develop-
ment. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hammock appears in the appen-
dix.]
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Hammock. Thank you to the en-
tire panel.
The chair recognizes the lady from Florida.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Quick comment to say that I agree with the
last witness' analysis of the embargo and the ones who are truly
guilty of starving the Haitian population. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you. I have one or two questions, starting
with Mr. Novelli. As I read and listened to your statement, on your
fourth paragraph, are you telling us that what we are doing is not
enough?
Mr, NOVELLI. At this point, CARE believes that with the advent
of the new U.N. fuel program we can reach the peak levels of feed-
ing that we are targeting.






It is difficult to talk about enough because the poverty is so ab-
ject and the misery is so complete that there can always be more
that is done.
At this time, the fuel program seems to be working. We are not
having problems at the moment with security. From a standpoint
of just thinking about the humanitarian program, I would say that
we could do a better job of monitoring, and Assistant Administrator
Schneider addressed that. There is a CDC team in the field now.
I think that is an important thing to do.
We have to make sure the fuel keeps flowing. The other elements
that I was talking about in terms of spare parts and so forth, that
would be an adequate level of effort to keep the status quo. It is
difficult to quantify the status quo and to say that it is acceptable.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, maybe I should clarify my question. I think
you have answered it, anyway, but I wasn't suggesting in the
longer problem of Haitian poverty and need, which predates the
question of the embargo. I was referring to my question in the con-
text of the embargo, are you telling us we are not doing enough.
I gather that you are saying that for the moment-correct me if I
am wrong-assuming the fuel continues to flow, that we are doing
enough as it relates to the imposition of the embargo. Not the
longer-term question about the needs for the Haitian people that
predated the embargo; or is that not correct?
Mr. NOVELLL. You are speaking about the humanitarian endeav-
or.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Yes.
Mr. NOVELLI. I think that we could be doing more in many re-
spects. It has been very difficult, as we have all said, to work there.
The key question that you kept asking earlier about whether there
is a deterioration in health status, I think, is the crux of the issue;
and there are many suggestions that there is a deterioration, and
the AID monitoring report of December suggested in many parts of
the country there are, we believe that is taking place; although, as
I say, it is very difficult to quantify. I would stay the course as it
is now being conducted regarding the humanitarian program and
monitor it very closely.
Mr. MENENDEZ. The deterioration of the health status that you
just said is one issue. Is it leading to increased mortality rates?
Mr. NOVELLI. I do not know the answer to the question. I know
that it is very difficult to quantify anything in Haiti. Mr. Schneider
referred to an AID-funded study that CARE and AID just con-
ducted. It is still in the preliminary stages of reporting on, but
since he mentioned it, I would say, if I may quote from it, that
there has a been a long history of nutrition deficits in the north-
west region. These attenuate the continual downward trends in re-
source depletion and environmental degradation. There is a high
prevalence of moderate acute malnutrition. These do not at this
time reflect famine conditions and also indicate there are no cases
of severe acute malnutrition.
So, what that suggests to us is there are real problems, there is
malnutrition, but we have not reached famine levels at this time.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Are you in a position to comment-are you in
agreement with the Administrator's comments as it relates to the







Harvard report, that it is an isolated set of circumstances from
which it is not appropriate to extrapolate?
Mr. NOVELLI. We did not do the same analysis of that report that
USAID did. We recognize that it was difficult to extrapolate from
that report to the entire country. I would prefer to say and hope
that the CDC assessment that is being conducted now will give us
a much better picture.
Mr. HAMMOCK. Mr. Congressman, if I might jump in on that just
briefly, I have known Dr. Chen for many years, and we have
worked together in the city of Boston for many years. His study is
very clearly based on the study of one community. He states in his
study that he is extrapolating from data in one community; and so
I think that is the given. What Mr. Schneider was saying is that
he did not necessarily agree with the idea of taking that one com-
munity, which was undergoing a measles epidemic at the time, to
be able to extrapolate to the whole country.
Mr. MENENDEZ. But he went further than that. He went further
to say that the available data is such that he sees no significant
increase in particularly infant mortality rates. My question, then,
since you have joined in and said that in fact this is a limited study
based on one location and some specific unique circumstances. Are
you in a position to be in agreement with Mr. Schneider?
Mr. HAMMOCK. Personally, when I was in AID in October/Novem-
ber reviewing the data there with AID-and this is now data just
through last October, not in the last 2 or 3 months-the data there
seemed fairly clear.
Now, what Mr. Schneider is saying that that data has continued
to show the same results for the next 3 months, I have no reason
to doubt the veracity of that.
Mr. MENENDEZ. But you have none of your own.
Mr. HAMMOCK. No.
Mr. MENENDEZ. With reference to the number in your last set of
summaries, Mr. Novelli, you talked about that the United States
as well as the other international donors need to continue to work
to mitigate the adverse impacts.
Who are the other international donors that are participating
and to what extent are they participating?
Mr. NOVELLI. CARE receives most of its food from the U.S. Gov-
ernment. In addition to that, we receive food from the Canadian
Government. It is a very important portion of the whole. It is her-
ring-fish-which we use to supplement the U.S. Government food.
The fish is for the wet feeding program. We don't include it with
the emergency dry feeding program.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Is that it?
Mr. NOVELLI. We also receive-
Mr. MENENDEZ. I mean it on behalf of the international commu-
nity.
Mr. NOVELLI. We also receive monetary support from other
CARES in other parts of the world-that is money, not commodity.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Are any of you in a position to answer the ques-
tion, are there other countries that are assisting in the humani-
tarian other than the United States and Canada?
Mr. WIEST. We receive assistance not from other governments
but from other countries through our network of Catholic agencies







in Europe-very large agencies such as Miserior provide assistance.
We also receive significant medical assistance from Catholic Medi-
cal Mission Board in the United States that comes from American
pharmaceutical companies.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I see.
Mr. HAMMOCK. The same is true for Oxfam in terms of England,
Canada and Australia; but it is also true that besides these three
agencies there is government money coming from Europe to Haiti.
I know that the EEC is a major contributor also in Haiti.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me ask this question. It seems that you all
agree that the conditions in Haiti are preembargo, not necessarily
post-embargo in terms of-let's see how you use your own words.
Hunger and poverty in Haiti are not consequences of the embargo,
and I think similar statements were made. Is that a unanimous
statement?
Mr. WIEST. I would say they are not principally the con-
sequences. They are principally the consequences of economic
downturn over the past 12, 13, 14 years and decrease in agricul-
tural production and increase in population. Those are the prin-
cipal-and environmental deterioration.
Certainly, the rise in the cost of fuel since the embargo has had
an effect on rural communities, but also in our statistics which are
more limited than the USAID statistics, we do not see a sharp de-
terioration in child malnutrition. We have seen anecdotal cases. I
visited the hospital in Les Cayes, I visited the Missionaries of
Charity, Mother Theresa's group, in Jeremie. There are reports of
increased cases of tuberculosis and respiratory infection and child
abandonment in certain circumstances, but on a nationwide scale,
or in our case with the southern peninsula, we have not seen any
statistics that indicate significant downturn in the nutritional sta-
tus of the population.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Attempting to quantify the differences pre- and
post-embargo is what I am trying to grasp, and I gather that that
is a difficult proposition.
Mr. NOVELLI. Quantifying anything in Haiti is a difficult propo-
sition. I think that what we are agreeing upon here is that there
is a long downslide in the country-environmentally and in terms
of health and in virtually every sector-and that one might pre-
sume that the embargo has contributed to it.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me ask you again. You say here CRS feels
that the international community needs to do much more to miti-
gate Haiti's misery.
What is it that you believe needs to be done? Is it different than
Mr. Novelli's comments, are they the same or-
Mr. WIEST. Well, I don't know if it is much different. I think now
since the fuel problem has been largely alleviated since January,
for Catholic Relief Services in Haiti from a planning point of view,
it is a new universe; and we are looking to significantly expand our
coverage in the southern peninsula, especially through schools.
Before, our people in our program office in Port-au-Prince were
not considering outreach into other schools, other orphanages,
other dispensaries. Now we are, and we are considering putting a
higher level public health specialist and emergency coordinator in







Haiti to try to increase perhaps by as much as 50 percent our pro-
gram volume. And that is a result of the fuel availability.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Hammock, to close with you, in your written
text you say that the Dominican Republic has begun to crack down
on the widespread illegal passage of petrol across the border with
Haiti because it has caused fuel shortages within the Dominican
villages, but in your suggestions for diplomacy and sanctions, sug-
gest that the United States and the U.N. must threaten the Domin-
ican Republic with sanctions if it fails to enforce the embargo at
the border. Which is it?
Mr. HAMMOCK. We have very recent indications that there is still
fuel going across the border from the Dominican Republic into
Haiti, and that comes from eyewitnesses who are there at the bor-
der not only of Oxfam staff but of other agencies. That is why I
said the embargo is not working. In large measure, the current em-
bargo, if you have money in Haiti you can still buy fuel, and that
tends to be people in the elite, etc. So that it is clear that the bor-
der with Haiti has to be sealed right now for fuel, but I would hope
that it should be sealed for other items, as well.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Is it a question of will of the Government of the
Dominican Republic or capacity?
Mr. HAMMOCK. That is a very good question. The Government of
the Dominican Republic, to be honest, has said repeatedly that it
is in favor of doing all it can to stop the embargo, but the history
of the Dominica Republic with Haiti is very long. The animosity be-
tween the Dominican Republic and the current elected Government
of Haiti is very long, and I don't know the answer specifically to
your question, whether or not its government is doing everything
it can.
I believe that it is a difficult border to patrol. In most countries
where we've seen embargoes, there is always a black market, and
it is hard to stop.
Mr. MENENDEZ. It is that long-standing history and what you
said, the animosity that would make me think that the Dominican
Republic would actually seek to enforce the embargo versus, in
fact, not do it; and so that is why I asked the question, hence, is
it will or capacity.
It would seem that based on history it would be more capacity
than will, is the problem.
Mr. HAMMOCK. That may be true, except my own interpretation
of the Dominican Republic is that the current President of the Do-
minican Republic has not had a very good standing relationship
with the current elected President of Haiti, and I would think that
there may be some concern about the return of that elected govern-
ment; but to be honest, I am speculating.
Mr. WIEST. I would like to comment on the administration of the
embargo, too, if I could, please. I was there last week, and during
my trip I discussed with dozens of people just this issue. No one
that I talked with in Haiti is in favor of the embargo as it is cur-
rently being administered.
Mr. HAMMOCK. This is very true.
Mr. WIEST. No one on either side of the issue. I spoke with peo-
ple who were very conservative and felt the embargo was evil in
that it is having such a devastating impact on the poor; but even







those that were pro-Aristide people who were very revolutionary in
their rhetoric called this particular embargo immoral in that the
only impact was on the poor and had no impact on the rich. At
least that is how it is perceived.
Anyone who has the financial wherewithal can buy petrol in
Haiti.
Mr. MENENDEZ. How does that reconcile with your statement,
Mr. Hammock, that there are signs that the 3-month-old oil and
arms embargo appears to be working. In Haiti, and here in the
United States, supporters of democracy are anxiously awaiting the
proposed resolution by the United States, Canada, France and Ven-
ezuela to the U.N. Security Council for tougher sanctions?
Mr. HAMMOCK. Well, I absolutely agree with the comment just
made. The current embargo does not work, and people on all sides
of it are saying on one hand let's get rid of it; on the other hand,
let's tighten it. I feel very strongly that the current embargo does
not work and needs to be tightened.
What I am talking about is the reported splits that are now tak-
ing place between the military and the police inside Haiti and the
reported-these are in the press-statements of the press which
claim there is some pressure being brought to bear on the military
now by some members of the elite, which wasn't the case before.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Is that your understanding, Mr. Wiest, that
what they are seeking is a stronger embargo that would be more
effective?
Mr. WIEST. People on one side of the issue, people who are very
close to President Aristide that I met with, but especially some
priests who are close associates of his use the word criminal, im-
moral as it is currently being administered; that there is even ru-
mors that it's an arrangement between the U.S. Government and
the military elite to enrich the elite and pauperize the poor. I
mean, it goes that far. People are so depressed and so frightened
that they extrapolate from these type situations, but no one on ei-
ther side of the issue is happy with the embargo as it is currently
being administered-that I talked to, anyway, in a week's travel.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Well, I want to thank the panel for their presen-
tation. We commend you for your work, your humanitarian work
in Haiti, and hopefully you will continue to give us insights to the
conditions there. Thank you so much.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]













APPENDIX





OPENING STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT G. TORRICELLI ON HUMANITARIAN
RELIEF EFFORTS IN HAITI
Nearly two-and-a-half years after the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, Haiti remains one of the United States' most frustrating and intractable
foreign policy dilemmas. We have attempted to bring back President Aristide's
democratically elected government through economic sanctions and isolation, and we
have tried negotiation and conciliation. Not only has neither approach worked, but
the dilemma has grown worse.
Today, we find ourselves at a crossroads. After Haiti's military leaders reneged
on the negotiated settlement at Governors Island, the United Nations reimposed an
oil and arms embargo on Haiti. The result has been increased suffering among the
poorest segments of Haiti's population, but little movement by the Haitian military
to give up the reins of power.
We cannot lose sight of the fact that the tiny nation of Haiti poses no security
threat to the United States. Indeed, the primary United States interest in Haiti
must be to help the Haitian people and to strengthen democracy there so that asy-
lum-seeking Haitians need not risk their lives to sail to the United States.
As a result, my belief is that a widening of the embargo to include all commercial
trade-as suggested by the United States, France, Canada and Venezuela-is a ter-
rible idea. This approach will not bring the military leaders to their knees, and will
only harm those we are seeking most to help in Haiti.
Relief workers in Haiti have reported that since the oil embargo was reimposed
in October, transportation to most rural areas has all but shut down. As a result,
the suffering of the hundreds of thousands of Haitians who depend upon foreign re-
lief organizations has grown worse.
In fact, at one point last month, CARE reported that, the number of daily meals
they were able to provide had dropped from 620,000 to 117,000, due primarily to
a lack of fuel. Today, the level has increased to a little over 200,000, which means
that over 400,000 meals still are not being delivered.
Instead of a full-scale commercial embargo on Haiti, we should be instituting
other sanctions that would precisely target Haiti's military leaders. I was pleased
to see the "Four Friends" come around to the idea of freezing more of the foreign
holdings of Haitian military officers and their supporters, revoking visas and ban-
ning non-commercial flights.
Now we must go one step further. Additional military officers can and should be
placed on the list, and we must do a better job circulating that list among other
countries. In fact, I believe that the list of 520 or so officers should be increased
to include all 925 members of the officer corps. In addition, the ban on flights should
be extended to commercial, as well as non-commercial aircraft.
The purpose of today's hearing is to find out first-hand the effects of the oil em-
bargo and the status of humanitarian relief efforts in Haiti.
We will be hearing from Mark Schneider of the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, and from representatives from three humanitarian relief
groups who have been on the ground in Haiti. We will, of course, be asking our wit-
nesses for our Judgement on the impact of a full commercial embargo and how effec-
tive such an embargo would be in bringing about the desired results in Haiti.
With the Four Friends on the verge of asking the United Nations to consider ex-
tending the embargo, it is imperative that we know how widespread are conditions
of malnutrition in Haiti and to what extent relief efforts are most vulnerable seg-
ments of the population.






26

Only by obtaining answers to those questions can we responsibly consider a pro-
posal that could lead to even greater famine in one of the world's poorest and most
beleaguered nations.
Finally, I would like to add that while today's hearing will not specifically address
the issue of Haitian refugees, I did find quite disturbing President Aristide's criti-
cisms yesterday of the Clinton Administration policy to return refugees to Haiti.
Encouraging refugees to flee Haiti in open boats on the high seas may serve his
political interests, but it also threatens massive loss of life and the possible violation
of U.S. law. This criticism will not be well received by those in the United States
Government who have questioned Aristide's judgement, but who are sensitive to the
restoration of his government.








STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE MARK L SCHNEIDER
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
FEBRUARY 9, 1994

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before
your committee today. It affords me a chance to explain to the public the critical
importance of the United States' assistance program to Haiti in supporting United States
foreign policy ard in helping to alleviate suffering in that country.

This Administration is clear about its objectives: we support the return of
constitutional government and of the Haitian people's choice as President, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. We believe only 1he fulfillment of the democratically expressed will of the
Haitian people can serve a< a basis for responsive and responsible governance. Only
when Haitian institutions of authority recognize and address the needs of the people will
the cycle of political and sc cial instability end. U.S. policy pursues these objectives, along
with our humanitarian goals.

Haiti and its people are enduring a tragedy brought on by the refusal of the
military and their small band of supporters to accept full constitutional democracy. The
people of Haiti spoke clet)ly when they elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by an
overwhelming majority. At the same time, they elected a multi-party Parliament. In that
country's troubled history, -he election of 1990 marked a moment of hope and the
international community pledged its support to that new government. Eight months
later, a coup led by the military toppled that regime and drove the President into exile.
Human rights abuse, fear and suffering have followed.

The international community, through the OAS and later the UN, rejected the
attempts at extra-constituti.mal rule. Sanctions were imposed, including a voluntary
commercial embargo under; the OAS. Last July the Governors Island Accord was signed
under international auspices with the United States fully engaged in seeking a negotiated
solution to the crisis. It had been hoped that by October 30, the provisions of that
agreement would have been implemented and President Aristide would have returned.
The refusal of the military to permit the arrival of the Harlan County once again
produced a new wave of dismay in Haiti. The US responded with additional targeted
sanctions oi the officers involved and subsequently supported a fuel embargo adopted by
the United Natiors.








Throughout this process, efforts by the Four Friends, including US, have sought to
help the Haitian people find a path out of this crisis which would produce a restoration
of constitutional government.

From the first set of sanctions adopted by the OAS and later with the UN fuel
embargo, the United States recognized that there was a parallel responsibility to increase
our humanitarian relief programs in Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, let me discuss the humanitarian relief programs in the context of
Haitian economic and social conditions.

Haiti was the poorest country in the hemisphere before 1990 and remains the
poorest country in the region today. Its per capital income is estimated by the World
Bank as 370. At the same time, its infant mortality and child mortality statistics were and
are among the worst in the region.

In Haiti, the U.S. Agency for International Development maintains one of its
largest per capita humanitarian efforts anywhere in the world, reserving in this fiscal year
approximately $60 million. Today, our program provides food and basic health care to
millionss of Haitians with no other access to such services. In concert with other
humanitarian donors, we hatve constructed a social safety net for nearly 20% of Haiti's
population. Allow me to briefly describe our program and to touch on three near-term
issues for maintaining it.

USAID's feeding program delivers more than $17 million per year of PL 480 Title
II foods through three U.S voluntary agencies -- CARE, CRS and ADRA -- to needy
schoolchildren, mothers an.l infants, and the elderly. Starting last September, we added a
52.1 million emergency feeding program for particularly vulnerable groups in the isolated
Northwest. Nearly one million recipients are authorized to receive help daily under these
programs, with about 500,000 currently being fed.

O0her major food aid donors include: the EEC (currently feeding 135,000
beneficiaries out of 267,5C(' approved); the World Food Program (currently feeding
81,000 beneficiaries out of 142,000 approved); and Canada (feeding 60,000 beneficiaries
against an approved level of 50,000.) All food donors in Port-au-Prince collaborate
closely. EEC and WFP cv,-n attend USAID's biweekly meetings with their cooperating
food PVOs







Besides PL 480 Title II feeding programs, the United States also signed with
President Aristide late in FY 1993 a PL 480 Title III agreement for $20 million of wheat
flbur. This flour has been delivered and is being sold to bakeries to produce bread and
other food for the commercial market. The intent of this program, apart from balance-
of-payments support, is to moderate the price of flour so that commercial food prices will
remain atfordable to the poor, and to generate local currencies to augment the dollar
resources supporting the humanitarian program.

USAID also provides access to basic health services for nearly two million
Haitians. This includes chi'd survival services such as vaccinations, nutritional
surveillance, oral rehydration therapy and treatment of acute respiratory infections to
some 300,000 Haitian children. AIDS and family planning services are provided to
another 750,000 to 1 millio;t Haitians in both urban and isolated rural areas.

Other major donors in the health arena include: EEC (channelling its funds
through PAHO, Medecins .'ans Frontieres, and the Red Cross); UN organizations (with
assistance for midwife training, malaria prevention, potable water, child survival); and
WFP (assisting some 10,0(N) tuberculosis patients through hospitals). PAHO is
coordinating a joint donorfrVO health committee which provides a forum for discussing
health conditions and also executedd for donors in 1993 $12 million of health activities.

Another major element of USAID's current humanitarian portfolio in Haiti is a
$32 million initiative begun last September to fund short-term jobs to clean up garbage
and dispose of solid waste, clean drainage canals, and repair roads needed to deliver
humanitarian food and health services. Implemented through three U.S. PVOs, the Pan
American Develcoment Fcundation, Planning Assistance, and the Cooperative Housing
Foundation, this program -as already provided income and basic infrastructure repair by
financing nearly 9,000 person-months of work for 5,500 extremely poor people. For each
person employed, up to five, fewer people will use the already strained feeding centers
spread throughout the country.

Mr. Chairman, USAID is concentrating on maintaining these feeding health
activities but tiey do not represent the entirety of our program. In July through
September 1993, USAID prepared a package of activities to accompany and support the
restoration of constitutional government, including: assistance for clearing Haiti's arrears
uith the IFIs; an initiative o10 reform the administration of justice; the short-term
employment generation project linked to infrastructure repair I already mentioned; and,
a program to provide technical assistance in reforming economic policy and public
administration. When Haiti's military prevented the implementation of the Governor's
Island Accord and the return of President Aristide, most of these transitional activities







were put on temporary hold. However, they can be quickly reactivated upon resolution
of the political crisis.

I would also note that USAID has activities in place that address longer-term
development, such as projects in democracy strengthening, microenterprise development
and environmentally-sustainable agriculture. These were developed before the 1991 coup
d'etat and are now operatir.g at less than full capacity because of the political turmoil.
The U.S. is prepared to help Haiti advance toward its long delayed development needs
when constitutional government is reestablished.

Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, there are a number bf issues key to our continuing
ability to mitigate suffering in the near term. I would like to highlight three of them: the
need for continued fuel availability, the need for timely monitoring of social and
nutritional conditions, and the need for continued close cooperation with U.S. and
Haitian voluntary agencies and with other donors.

When it became cle.'r in November that Haiti's fuel reserve would soon run out
due to the embargo, the United States consulted with President Aristide and his
government and took action to ensure fuel delivery for humanitarian programs. USAID
fielded an interagency team to design an emergency fuel delivery plan. The U.S.
negotiated with the United Nations, OAS and PAHO to establish and run such a system.
The formal request to permit the establishment of this system was made by Prime
Minister Malval to the Excptions Committee of the United Nations Security Council and
PA.HO--with its proven on-the-ground implementation capacity--was designated by the
UN to implement the plan. While seeking multi-donor funding to support this
irternationr;l effort, the United States now bears the full costs of this system.

Despite widespread initial concern that the first humanitarian fuel tanker would
be turned away by the Haiian military authorities or that fuel deliveries would be
diverted by bandits, we have so far seen a smooth and efficient operation. As of a week
ago, some 125 organizations lifted fuel without interference. This will enable them to
keep their feeding and health programs goirg. A second shipment of fuel is expected in
the near future to enable humanitarian activities to continue through March.

We are also committed to ensuring -- to the greatest extent possible -- that the
level and targeting of donor food aid is sufficient. Haitians are living a marginal
existence and struggling to survive another dry season. We must keep a sharp vigil on
the nutritional status of the Haitian people, particularly those in isolated pockets where
conditions might deteriorate rapidly.





31

USAID collects data from 38 health clinics around Haiti -- the most systematic
and accurate data regularly available from any source -- but this system was designed for
long-term trends analysis and operates with a 4-6 week time lag between data collection
and publication. The methodology and relevance of this monitoring system has been
validated in two surveys by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. USAID also
recently undertook with CARE an indepth food security assessment of their existing
programs in Northwest Haiti. Finally, recognizing the possibility that particular
communities may have sevre food needs at this time, we are developing a rapid
assessment capability to en.;ure food and other humanitarian aid is appropriately targeted
and effectively used.

Finally, I would like to recognize and applaud the efforts of our cooperating
agencies in food distribution, particularly Catholic Relief Services, the Adventist
Development and Relief Agency and CARE. They are working under difficult
circumstances, sometimes taking personal risks, to ensure that the destitute get a break
from the grinding economic pressures caused by military intransigence in the face of the
international embargo. Tli: U.S. values the work of these voluntary agencies and relies
on continued close cooperation with them.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, during this time in which the international community
has adopted a stringent embargo on Haiti, USAID has :aken a lead role in responding to
the international humanitarian obligation to alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable
groups in Haiti. We are prepared to strengthen our efforts, along with those of other
donor organizations, as the circumstances demand. However, the only sure answer to
Haiti's crisiS is restoration nf democratic government and a national commitment to
democracy, development, and justice.

Thank you, again, fc'r this opportunity to appear before your committee.






32

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILULIAM D. NOVELLI
EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT
CARE
before the
Subcommittee on Wester Hemisphere Affainrs
Committee on Foreign Affain
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
Febnmuay 9, 1994



Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Bill Novelli. I am the Executive Vice-
President of CARE and its Chief Operating Officer. On behalf of CARE, I would like to thank
you for giving us the opportunity to testify on a most urgent topic, humanitarian relief efforts in
Haiti.

CARE has maintained an uninterrupted presence in Haiti since 1959. During the past thirty-five
years, chronic economic anc political instability has made difficult efforts to promote sustainable
development there As such CARE watched with cautious optimism the establishment of Haiti's
first constitutional democracy. In over fifty years of relief and development work among the
world's poor. CARE has learned that sustainable development cannot reach its fullest potential
in an environment of endemic poverty and economic neglect of the society at large.

We strongly support the restoration of the democratic process in Haiti. Decades of inefficacious
governance have stripped tt'e Haitian people of their most basic human needs and rights. CARE
commends the position taken by the United States, the Organization of American States, the
United Nations, and the Friends of Haiti on the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

We also recognize the need for using sanctions against those who illegally seized power.
However, sanctions must be accompanied by a comprehensive humanitarian assistance program.
As an advocate for the pcc.r, CARE urges the United States Government and the international
community to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to protect the most vulnerable of Haiti's
already impoverished majority.

Haiti's poverty in well-documented. It is one of the poorest countries in the world. The vast
majority of Haitians, about three-quarters of the population, live in absolute poverty. About 47%
of the adult population is illiterate, and only 43% has access to safe water. Infectious disease is
widespread, and in the best of times, more than half the population suffers from malnutrition.
The infant mortality rate stands at 95 per 1000 births. These statistics cannot adequately convey
the persistent misery suffered by the majority of the Haitian people throughout their lives.

Northwest Haiti, where CARE presently targets most of its programs, has always been the
poorest region in Haiti. The poor of the Northwest have been dealt a series of crushing blows:







years of drought, massive deforestation, low crop yields, and the additional hardships caused by
sanctions. It is here, in the Northwest region, where the poorest of the poor must purchase
almost all their food as a result of the extreme environmental degradation that has brought
increased erosion, poor soil fertility, and meager agricultural production that prevents any
modicum of household food security. The effect of rising food prices, about 50% higher than a
year ago, in an area characterized by very few income-generating activities, leaves an already
very vulnerable population in greater jeopardy. A recent USAID monitoring report on Haiti for
December 1993 documents the continuing decline in the Northwest: total malnutrition (mild plus
moderate plus severe) rose in this area mirroring the trend begun earlier in the year. 25% of
infants born in the Northwsst are underweight and food stocks here and in the North are
desperately low, and even the production of traditional "famine foods", such as green mangoes,
is down

CARE, with funding from USAID, the American donor public, members of CARE-International
and other international donors, is operating a supplemental feeding program for the nutritionally
vulnerable in Northwest Haiti This program requires approximately 4,000 metric tons of food
per month for 620,000 people. This food represents a critical supplement to the rapidly
deteriorating diets of those most vulnerable to malnutrition.

The difficulties of maintaining a humanitarian program under the complicated political and
economic conditions created by the embargo are formidable. At present, over 600 shipping
containers of much needed food, donated by the U.S. Government, are sitting in Port-au-Prince
because of the need for fuel and spare parts for the trucks which deliver the food to distribution
points in the Northwest. ,While these commodities sit at the port, food inventory levels in the
Northwest remain critically low. CARE's plan calls for the distribution of daily supplemental food
to 620,000. Interruption in the supply of fuel has caused irregular and inconsistent deliveries to
the Northwest. Immediately preceding the start-up of the U.N.'s emergency fuel program which
commenced on January 15 th, the number of recipients had dropped dramatically to 117, 000. As
of today, that number has risen to over 200,000, still over two-thirds less than the targeted goal.
lf all now goes relatively smoothly, it will still require several weeks to reach full recipient levels
again.

Hunger and poverty in Haiti are not consequences of the embargo. Even if the democratic process
were restored today, there would remain a large, impoverished and illiterate population Haiti
has been, and continues to be,a food deficit country with limited resources for food production
because of the lack of investment in agriculture and a chronically unstable political and economic
environment. If it is clear to the international community that sanctions are a necessary means
to restore the democratic process in Haiti, then it must be equally clear that there has to be an
adequate humanitarian assistance program in place to protect the poor. Sanctions should impact
those for whom they are intended. Haiti's poor should not become the victims of the good
intentions of the international community.

CARE, with humanitarian assistance from the U.S. Government, American donors, members of
CARE-International, and otl-er international donors, is working to mitigate the impact of sanctions








on Haiti's poor. Both sanctions and humanitarian assistance can only work with the full
cooperation of the international community. As the sanctions are tightened, we require the
following to carry out an effective humanitarian assistance program in Haiti:

o a six-month extension, through July. of the emergency feeding program
targeting 320,000 of the most vulnerable people in the Northwest and
North Antibonite.

o expeditious issuance of export licenses and waivers from the Sanctions
Commirtce and Office of Foreign Assets Control in the U.S. Treasury
to meet procurement and safe delivery of additional trucks, spare
parts, spare engines, tools, and tires.

o the timely and regular delivery of humanitarian relief supplies, including
emergency fuel.


SUMMARY

1. CARE strongly supports the restoration of the democratic process in Haiti, recognizing the
need for using sanctions against those who illegally seized power.

2. CARE commends the pa.ition taken by the U.S., the O.A.S., the Friends of Haiti, and the
U N on restoring democracy in Haiti.

3. In accordance with generally accepted international humanitarian principles it is essential that
the international community provide adequate humanitarian assistance during an embargo to
protect the most vulnerable people from its intended consequences.

4. In spite of the formidable obstacles created by the embargo, CARE, with assistance from the
U.S. Government. the Aenrican donor public, members of CARE-International, and other
international donors will continue to work to mitigate the adverse impact of sanctions on the most
vulnerable population in the Northwest.














MICHAEL R. WEST
Deputy Executive Director
Catholic Relief Services



Michael Richa2rd Wiest was born May 20, 1945 in Albany, New York, the son of
the late Lawrence Cot nelius and Mary Elizabeth Wiest. He received his eariy educa-
tion a: St. Pius X and teic Christian Brothers Academy, both in Albany. He received his
B.A. in Englih Literat.re from Fordham University in 1967 and his M.A. in English
Literature from Duquene University in 1969.

Following graduia'o.i, Mr. Wiest worked in the financial management department
at General Electric, ur-d- joining the U.S. Army in 1970 as a 1st Lieutenant and serving
in Vietnam.

Following his mihrtay service, he worked briefly for the state Department of Labor
m New York before jciing Catholic Relef Services (CRS) in 1973. CRS, one of the
largest inrerr-nonal rcb.1'fand development agencies in the world, currently operates in
over 80 coun-ries aroiur d the world and is supported by the Catholic community in the
United States

Mr. Wiest's career at CRS has taken him around the world. His first assignment
was in the country ofS :cegal in West Africa where he worked as a program assistant
following tha:, he wor.'d as the Country Representative in Sierra Leone and Upper
Volta. Mr. Wiest .hen earnedd to CRS headquarters in the United States and served
as the Asstscnt Regior.1 Director for Africa.

Returrc-g to the feli. Mr. Wiest was assigned to the position of Regional Director
for Fast Afr.ca, based t Nairobi, Kenya. This was followed by two appointments as
Country Represecrtc to Indonesma and, most recently, to Morocco. In 1993. he was
named Deputy Execu'. e Director for CRS, responsible for all overseas operations.

Mr. West and his v" e. Torm, a teacher in American schools overseas for the past 15
years, have two ch:ldrer Michael Christian, 24, a graduate of Dartmouth College and
school student in Mo-o co, who plans to attend Northwes:ern University m the fall
of 1994








[MBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERED



PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. WEST
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WABHINGTOM, D.C.

FEBRUARY 9, 1994


Catholic Relief Services (CRS) operates a relief and
development program in Haiti and has maintained a continuous
presence in that country for more than 35 years. CRS Programs in
Haiti geographically target Port au Prince and the Southern
Peninsula. Our programmatic foci include: health, small
enterprise development, agriculture and strengthening Haitian
social welfare organizations. CRS participates as a cooperating
sponsor with USAID in distributing food commodities under the PL
480 Title II Program. CRS currently distributes food to nearly
200,000 needy Haitians through school feeding, maternal and child
health (MCH) and institutional programs that include, the aged, the
sick, the physically and mentally handicapped and orphans. Since
the September, 1991 coup d'etat, CRS has also implemented several
emergency feeding programs targeting economically vulnerable
families and orphans.

I returned on Monday from a one week visit to Haiti. While I
was in Haiti, I traveled extensively throughout the Southern
Peninsula. I drove from Port au Prince to Les Cayes to Jeremie and
back to Port au Prince. I visited many of the institutions that
CRS is supporting, including, schools, hospitals, MCH centers, and
institutions for the sick and handicapped.

There is little doubt that the majority of Haitians are
suffering. Although the economic embargo directed against their
country exacerbates their suffering, the fundamental reasons for
this misery certainly predate the embargo. A visitor to rural Haiti
is immediately struck by the almost total lack of infrastructure,
e.g., poor roads, dilapidated hospitals and schools, the absence
of water and sanitary facilities, etc. The prices of basic food
have doubled in the past year. Tens of thousands of rural Haitians
are living at less than a subsistence level by selling charcoal,
which ironically, is the only Haitian commodity that currently
commands a lower price than it did a year ago. There is also
anecdotal evidence that health and nutritional levels are





37

deteriorating in isolated areas of Port au Prince and in the
Southern Peninsula.

This is not to say that the Southern Peninsula of Haiti is
approaching a famine situation. Famine conditions do not appear
likely over the mid-term future. Unlike other famines that the
world has witnessed in recant years, coping mechanisms exist in
southern Haiti. Micro-economic activities, for example, have not
been disrupted by a rigidly enforced ideology. Petty trading is
highly visible and abundant and although food is expensive, it is
readily available in rural and urban areas. Large groups of people
are not leaving their communities in search of food.

While CRS does not believe that Haiti will face a famine
situation in the short to mid-term future, our assessment of likely
socio-economic conditions during the same period remains
pessimistic. It is a well known fact that the country's
environment and natural resources are being degraded at an alarming
and, perhaps, irreplaceable rate. Haiti's food security situation
is precarious. Health and nutritional conditions are markedly
deteriorating and will continue to deteriorate. There is a severe
shortage of essential drugs in the country, while at the same time,
the incidences of AIDS and tuberculosis are dramatically
increasing. Last week, I visited several institutions that treat
tuberculosis patients. Many of the institutions did not have anti-
TB drugs on hand. Because of the lack of potable water and
sanitation facilities in the countryside, the risk of a severe
cholera epidemic presents a very real danger.

CRS feels that the international community needs to do much
more to mitigate Haiti's misery. High ranking military and police
officers targeted by the international embargo, by all accounts,
are reaping enormous economic benefits from the distortions to the
economy that the sanctions are causing. At the same time, the
suffering of poor and middle class Haitians is significantly
increasing.

Catholic Relief Services will continue its efforts in Haiti to
ameliorate, to the extent that it can, the suffering of poor
Haitians. CPS plans to address the very serious food security
situation by requesting USAID to provide additional food
commodities that CRE will distribute through institutions, i.e.,
schools, orphanages, homes for the aged, the sick and handicapped,
tuberculosis sanitoria and hospitals. CRS also plans to purchase
essential drugs and to distribute them through Catholic and
Protestant mission hospitals in Port au Prince and the southern
peninsula. We also plan to expand our potable water and latrine
program in rural areas.
Mr. Chairman, CP.S is committed to doing all it can to help the
suffering people of Haiti -- today, tomorrow, and in the many
months and years to come. Our words and deeds have shown that we
are in for the long haul. As representatives of the Catholic
community in the United States, we urge all parties associated with
the ongoing political stalemate in Haiti to redouble their efforts
to work toward a peaceful solution that gives the Haitian people a
chance to decide their future. We stand ready to assist in this
process in any way we can in order to prevent further disasters
from befalling the people of Haiti.







PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN C. HAMMOCK
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OXFAM AMERICA

before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC

February 9, 1994


Thank you for providing Oxfam America with the opportunity to share our views
on the current crisis in Haiti. Oxfam America is an international development
agency which works with grassroots groups in 30 countries throughout the world.

Oxfam America works in Haiti in partnership with groups representing peasants,
who make up 80 percent of the population. The resilience of the Haitian peasants
is remarkable; after withstanding generations of oppressive rule, their strong will
secured the democratic election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. And despite a
campaign of intimidation and violence by the military, they continue to call for
their exiled President's return.

Now is a critical time for the Haitian people. There are signs that the three-
month-old oil and arms embargo appears to be working. In Haiti and here in the
US, supporters of democracy are anxiously awaiting the proposed resolution by the
US, Canada, France and Venezuela to the UN Security Council for tougher
sanctions against the military. Meanwhile, questions are being raised about the
impact of the embargo on the Haitian people: USAID has reported no appreciable
rise in malnutrition while aid groups report that fuel shortages are making it
increasingly difficult to carry out feeding programs which provide a sizable portion
of Haiti's poor their only meal of the day.

These questions must be sorted out, and the voices of the Haitian majority must
be beard in this debate. My testimony reflects both my own observations from
visits to Haiti -- most recently in October and the opinions of representatives of
grassroots groups with whom Oxfam America works.

Oxfam America believes that the restoration of constitutional rule is a precondition
for long-term development in Haiti. Unless the intimidation, murder, and complete
disregard for the poor majority now exercised by the military regime ends,
sustainable development and prosperity will be forever stifled. We simply cannot
lose sight of long-term goals that can only be realized by the return of democracy.








Unless democratic rule is restored soon, the people of Haiti will continue to be the poorest
in the hemisphere and the children of Haiti, saved in the short term, will remain victims -
condemned to oppression, handouts and fear.


IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO ON THE POOR

Many observers, ironically including military officials, have concluded that the embargo is
responsible for increasing suffering and therefore should be lifted for the sake of the Haitian
poor. This analysis is misguided. In fact, an often misreported study conducted by a
Harvard researcher to measure the embargo's impact concluded that:

"the human toll over this crisis period (possibly as high as 1,000 extra child deaths per
month) has resulted from a myriad of factors including government mismanagement,
economic and agriculture disruptions, population movements, economic sanctions and
humanitarian neglect."

There is little doubt that the current embargo is hurting poor people and hampering the
delivery of emergency assistance. Transportation costs have skyrocketed; poor people
cannot get to work, send their kids to school or purchase supplies. People are selling what
little capital they have, mostly livestock. And there are reports that deforestation, already
a serious problem, has accelerated as people are forced to cut down trees for cooking fuel.
Many cannot afford to travel to health clinics even where they exist.

Despite this suffering, peasants I spoke to this fall were unequivocal in their call for the
restoration of democracy and the return of President Aristide. They are willing to endure
strict international sanctions as a means to bring him back. As many poor Haitians told me:
we have always lived under an embargo no food, no education, no health care, and no
jobs. It's only the self-serving oppressive regime that has assets to lose.


IMPACT OF THE EMBARGO ON THE MILITARY

At the same time, Haitian military officials seem to have escaped much of this suffering.
While most of the country receives little or no electricity, the military buildings are
untouched by the shortage. A lack of enforcement of sanctions has actually bolstered the
military, in particular, failure to close the Dominican border has enabled military officers
to make enormous profits by cornering the black market on fuel.

There are signs, however, that the embargo may be working. Splits within the military
leadership are being reported and pressure is rising among the lower level military officers,
perhaps due to the recent move by the US to expand the number of Haitian military officers
whose assets and visas have been frozen. The Haitian elite and the business sector also
appear to be fed up. Many businesses are observing a strike to protest the embargo and








press the military to resolve the crisis. Even the wealthy neighborhoods are affected by
electricity and water shortages. In addition, the Dominican Republic has begun to crack
down on the widespread illegal passage of petrol across its border with Haiti because it has
caused fuel shortages within Dominican villages.


THE 1991 COUP

Any discussion of the impact of the embargo on the humanitarian situation in Haiti cannot
be separated from the 1991 violent military coup. Even before the coup, Haiti had a long
history of political violence and had been considered the poorest country in the Western
Hemisphere. Since the coup, Haitian human rights groups estimate that 3,000 to 4,000 pro-
democracy supporters have been killed by the military, most grassroots groups have been
dismantled and their leaders murdered or jailed. Anyone involved in organizing peasants
or engaging in community development is targeted. For example, members of the Peasant
Movement of Papaye (MPP), an Oxfam America project partner which educates, trains and
organizes peasants, have been arrested, beaten and driven underground. Several of MPP's
members have been murdered; in fact, as recently as two weeks ago, one of its leaders was
gunned down.

Also since the coup, tens of thousands have fled the country. An equally important refugee
problem concerns the 300,000-400,000 people who have been internally displaced forced
into hiding by political repression and thus been unable to send their children to school, see
a doctor, go to work or farm their land.

Under the coup regime, government programs for the poor have also come to a halt. There
is no interest in maintaining water management, sanitation or health services. For example,
while private hospitals have managed to operate, public hospitals have no food, no bedding,
no medicine and no electricity. Reports of profiteering, corruption, and theft of government
property are widespread.


THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

The response by the United States and the international community to the violent coup has
received mixed reviews from supporters of democracy inside and outside of Haiti. While
the US and the United Nations denounced the coup and were successful in pressuring the
military to sign the Governors Island Accord, efforts to restore President Aristide through
diplomacy and sanctions have been plagued by setbacks.

From the beginning, implementation of sanctions has been half-hearted. The first embargo,
sponsored by the Organization of American States in 1991, was publicly endorsed by the
Bush Administration. Yet, privately, 150 export licenses were granted to US companies with
assembly plants in Haiti. Enforcement of the most recent fuel embargo is also erratic.







Oxfam America's Haiti representative has witnessed firsthand the free flow of petrol across
the border from the Dominican Republic. Yet the Clinton Administration denies this
activity occurs.

Despite official pronouncements that the US commitment to restoring democracy was
unshakable, the US government has sent numerous mixed signals from a CIA smear
campaign against President Aristide and the financing of right-wing political groups, to
military training of Haitian nationals in the US, to DEA sharing of information with the
Haitian military despite widespread reports of their involvement in drug-running. Most
damaging perhaps is the continued policy of systematically returning fleeing Haitians back
to their oppressors. These actions have prolonged the suffering of the Haitian poor, by
playing right into the hands of the military, making them think they could simply wait out
the crisis.

More recently, the United States has waffled on many fronts. First, it has dragged its feet
in response to calls by the Aristide government, along with members of Congress and our
allies, to tighten the sanctions. Then in December, the US issued a warning to the Haitian
military to take steps to restore Aristide by January 15, 1994, or face tougher sanctions. Yet
it wasn't until 12 days later that the US Treasury extended the freeze on visas and assets.
And now three weeks have passed and the US has yet to offer a formal recommendation
to the UN on international sanctions. These delays seriously undermine the effectiveness
of the sanctions.

While Oxfam America project partners continue to call for full commercial trade embargo,
they are extremely critical of the way the current sanctions have been implemented. They
describe the current embargo as a slow strangulation of the poor.


THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

For many years Oxfam America has supported long-term development projects in Haiti
including literacy training, legal assistance, health promotion, and the distribution of seeds,
tools, and livestock. This work has been hampered by the coup: most of these projects'
leaders have been forced into hiding and many peasants are afraid to take the risk of
participating in our revolving credit programs.

Since Oxfam America does not provide emergency food assistance, I cannot offer statistics
on increasing hunger and malnutrition except to say that, despite the commendable efforts
of aid organizations, food and medicine is not reaching all of those who need it.

I would like to comment on some of the concerns expressed by our Haitian partners. First,
Oxfam America is getting more and more requests for assistance from Haitian non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide aid to persons not reached by current
emergency programs, particularly displaced families. Second, our partners worry that the








increased reliance on food handouts is hurting local food producers and leading to increased
dependance on outside aid. A few NGOs, including a Canadian program, are trying to
address this problem, and have been successful in purchasing surplus food on local markets.
Another solution recommended by NGOs in Haiti is to expand humanitarian aid to include
inputs such as seeds, tool, and fertilizers so that, where feasible, Haitians can grow their own
food.

In addition, it is clear that some aid intended for the poor is being misdirected. Food
products stamped "not for sale" can be found in numerous markets. And while Oxfam
America is fully supportive of the UN emergency fuel program, we have received reports
that 10,000 gallons of fuel were missing from the first shipment. This program must be
closely monitored by the UN to keep it from further strengthening the military.


RECOMMENDATIONS

I would like to close by recommending several steps which must be taken immediately to
show the military that the international community will not back down until democracy is
restored to Haiti. I must emphasize that sanctions must be coupled with an adequate and
responsible humanitarian response to ensure that the basic needs of poor people are met.


Diplomacy and sanctions:

o President Clinton should reiterate his unequivocal support for the immediate return
of the democratically-elected government of President Aristide.

o The US should provide leadership within the UN for a full commercial trade
embargo, with exemptions for humanitarian aid. The US government must reject
calls for special exemptions from US-licensed assembly plants in Haiti.

o The international community must ban all non-commercial flights to and from Haiti.

o President Clinton should encourage our allies to join us in freezing the assets and
visas of the Haitian military and their civilian supporters.

o Stringent enforcement measures must be applied, including a strict naval, aerial, and
border blockade by the UN.

o The US and the UN must threaten the Dominican Republican with sanctions if it
fails to enforce the embargo at the border.








increased reliance on food handouts is hurting local food producers and leading to increased
dependance on outside aid. A few NGOs, including a Canadian program, are trying to
address this problem, and have been successful in purchasing surplus food on local markets.
Another solution recommended by NGOs in Haiti is to expand humanitarian aid to include
inputs such as seeds, tool, and fertilizers so that, where feasible, Haitians can grow their own
food.

In addition, it is clear that some aid intended for the poor is being misdirected. Food
products stamped "not for sale" can be found in numerous markets. And while Oxfam
America is fully supportive of the UN emergency fuel program, we have received reports
that 10,000 gallons of fuel were missing from the first shipment. This program must be
closely monitored by the UN to keep it from further strengthening the military.


RECOMMENDATIONS

I would like to close by recommending several steps which must be taken immediately to
show the military that the international community will not back down until democracy is
restored to Haiti. I must emphasize that sanctions must be coupled with an adequate and
responsible humanitarian response to ensure that the basic needs of poor people are met.


Diplomacy and sanctions:

o President Clinton should reiterate his unequivocal support for the immediate return
of the democratically-elected government of President Aristide.

o The US should provide leadership within the UN for a full commercial trade
embargo, with exemptions for humanitarian aid. The US government must reject
calls for special exemptions from US-licensed assembly plants in Haiti.

o The international community must ban all non-commercial flights to and from Haiti.

o President Clinton should encourage our allies to join us in freezing the assets and
visas of the Haitian military and their civilian supporters.

o Stringent enforcement measures must be applied, including a strict naval, aerial, and
border blockade by the UN.

o The US and the UN must threaten the Dominican Republican with sanctions if it
fails to enforce the embargo at the border.








Humanitarian aid:

o The US must support UN efforts to increase humanitarian aid and establish corridors
of humanitarian relief. The UN must monitor the humanitarian exemptions and the
delivery of assistance and fuel needed to transfer aid to ensure that aid is not
misdirected.

o UN and US aid should include seeds, tools, and fertilizer to poor Haitians so that
they can grow their own food.

o To the extent possible, US and UN aid programs should purchase surplus food on
the local market.

o US and UN aid programs should expand assistance to include persons not currently
being served, including displaced people.

o USAID and the UN should work with Haitian NGOs to provide agricultural inputs
and other aid.


Human rights:

o The US should press for the immediate return of the UN mission to Haiti as agreed
to by both parties at Governors Island.

o The US must reverse its repatriation policy towards Haitian refugees. Under no
circumstances should any Haitian citizen refugee be returned to Haiti until the
current crisis is resolved.


I would like to point out that these recommendations reflect the policy statement Keeping
Our Word: Toward Effective US Support for Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, signed
by over 55 major US religious denominations, citizens groups, and human rights and
humanitarian aid organizations with constituencies of some 50 million Americans. I request
that a copy of the statement be submitted into the hearing record.

I urge you to take action immediately. Too much time has already been lost as a ruthless
band of military thugs holds Haiti hostage.

With the iron will and steadfast determination that has made the United States so great, we
must advance the principles of freedom and democracy in Haiti. Our own people expect
no more from its leaders; our Haitian neighbors deserve no less.


Thank you.








Written Testimony Prepared for Congressman Robert Torricelli
Chairman, Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
House Foreign Affairs Committee
by the
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee

From January 10-14, the president of the Unitarian Universalist
Service Committee, Dorothy Smith Patterson, led a fact-finding
delegation to Haiti to examine the human rights situation and U.S.
efforts to support multilateral problem-solving and a return to
constitutional rule. The UUSC group met with Haitian human rights
and grassroots organizations, as well as with the UN/OAS
International Civilian Mission. They talked with Haitian cabinet
ministers, the acting Prime Minister and diplomats at the United
States, French and Venezuelan Embassies.

The delegation included a member of the staff of Congressman Joe
Kennedy, representatives of Unitarian Universalist churches in
Miami and Washington, and UUSC staff including the Washington
Representative. UUSC is a 55-year old human rights and
international development agency with headquarters in Boston. The
following observations are based on conversations with Haitians and
others interviewed during the trip to Port-au-Prince.

1. Widespread Rights Violations and Unchecked Military Power.
Great concern was expressed about widespread repressive actions by
an emboldened Haitian military which feels unconstrained by the
rule of law or international agreements to which it has put its
name. No real avenues for legal recourse exist, nor expectations
of accountability, even in highly publicized cases such as the
killings of Justice Minister Guy Malary and Antoine Izmery, a
financial backer of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Paramilitary
groups enjoy the freedom of movement closed off to those believed
to be supporters of Aristide or proponents of constitutional rule.
Frustration was expressed about how widespread repression forced
many into hiding, inactivity or silence. This precluded broad-
based participation in discussions about how the country might
return to the democratization process. Nothing better captured the
human rights challenge than rural Haitians who expressed their
yearning to be treated with dignity. They spoke of being viewed as
subhuman by local chieftains acting like warlords. Others echoed
this when they described Haiti as a feudal society in which there
was blanket disregard for individual rights and the rule of law.

2. Economic Self-Sufficiency At Risk for Thousands. At least
300,000 Haitians are internally displaced, having fled their homes
in response to threats and attacks on their life, physical
integrity or economic livelihood. This situation contributes to a
break-down in the Haitian family unit, especially when a parent
must leave the interior to seek greater personal safety in the
city. The prolongation of emergency responses to the post-coup
crisis has intensified the frustration felt by those still unable
to return to their homes and traditional means of livelihood. Some







46

warned that this situation is fostering dependency in traditionally
self-reliant people. The generalized climate of repression was
seen as a decisive factor in internal migration, with some Haitians
later seeing no option but to flee their country.

3. Flight and Scarcity., Aggravated by Monopolistic Price-Fixing.
The uprooting of thousands of Haitians has reduced local food
production, given farmers' displacement from lands they worked.
Shortages caused by decreased production of subsistence crops are
aggravated by sharp price increases for basic necessities, such as
cooking oil and water. Increased imports of basic foodstuffs risks
undermining further the local economy. Sharp price increases,
unresponsive to supply and demand, hurt both middle class and poor
Haitians, and reflect a closed monopolistic economy dominated by a
few. Tax measures enacted early in the Aristide presidency aimed
to address the closed Haitian economy and the limitations it offers
for creating jobs through increased production.

4. The Military. Black-Marketeering and the Embargo. Limited in
scope and slow in application by the international community, the
current embargo has failed to achieve its objective: to influence
the behavior of Haitian military leaders who promised at Governors
Island to step down, only to break their word. While gas stations
are closed and power is rationed to several hours a day, men at
roadsides openly sell gasoline widely believed to come from
military storage depots. Interviews led one observer to conclude
that some 50 percent of the oil arriving in January destined for
humanitarian purposes would be siphoned off by the military, while
diplomats estimated some 20 percent. A corrupt military and elite
served by private loading docks have yet to feel the pinch of the
economic sanctions. Rather, the present embargo's impact is borne
primarily by the middle and poorest sectors. These range from
salaried employees whose life style requires clothing and
transporting children to private schools, to workers whose survival
depends on public transportation and, when lucky, a daily wage.

5. Clearer Signals to Haitian Military Leaders Needed. The
economic embargo was adopted by the international community,
including the United States, as an appropriate diplomatic tool to
bring pressure to bear on a Haitian military leadership which
resisted action on its July 3rd promises at Governors Island. But
the present embargo proved too weak, in scope and application, to
send strong enough signals to Haitian military leaders. To attain
its objective and minimize harm to the Haitian on the street, such
a measure must be comprehensive, swift and well-monitored. In
addition to a vital humanitarian aid component, a comprehensive
commercial embargo must be accompanied by political initiatives
that signal clearly and repeatedly the international community's
intent to support and pressure for a return to constitutional
government. One such political signal is the important recent step
taken by the U.S. to tighten control of visas and assets of more
Haitian military officers. (That this measure comes many months
late underscores the importance of timing to achieving a desired
impact.) Another such signal would be attention to Haiti's porous








border with the Dominican Republic. Although the U.S. joined the
other U.N. Friends of Haiti in threatening action on the border and
embargo issues, no date has been set for U.N. debate. In comparison
with Canada and France, the U.S. is now perceived as foot-dragging
on the shared commitment to seek a more comprehensive embargo
through the U.N. Security Council.

6. Disregard for Haiti's Future and the Fundamentals of Democracy.
Sharp language was used to describe how appeals to the Haitian
elite to consider the common good, the well-being of the country's
most vulnerable or the Haiti inherited by a next generation, have
fallen on deaf ears. The will of the majority does not resonate as
a democratic principle to be respected; the rule of law is not
deemed a goal worthy of personal sacrifice. The elite, it was
predicted, would never again make the mistake of allowing elections
based on one person, one vote. Because the 67 percent which
elected Aristide did not include some of Haiti's prominent voices,
it was considered suspect by them and not a determinant factor in
shaping the country's political future. Similar stories were told
that spoke to the military leadership's disinterest in the
fundamentals of democracy and representative government. Efforts
to divide the military -- through dialogue, "professionalization"
or other means -- come up against one problem. A common goal
unifies military leaders who otherwise operate as individual
chieftains: preventing the return of Aristide. There is little
evidence in the last two years to suggest that the Haitian military
leaders' lockhold on power can be significantly altered without
intense international diplomatic and economic pressure.

7. Incipient Political Parties and Expression of the Public Will.
Many commented on the need for Haitian politicians to develop
improved mechanisms for consensus decision-making and majority rule
politics, especially within the Parliament. Parliamentarians'
dialogue with the business community has drawn special attention.
Support for democrats and their contribution to problem-solving
requires attention to the broadest array of "democratic players,"
including Haitians who exercised their electoral rights and the
many organizations of civil society. This broadened focus is
especially important, given the incipient and fractured nature of
Haitian political parties and limitations on their ability to speak
credibly for all Haitians on future steps in a return to democracy.

8. Selective Restrictions on the Rights to Free Speech, Assembly.
The inability to move freely and speak openly -- together with
widespread fear -- presents serious obstacles and dangers for those
involved in popular education, union organizing, social justice
promotion and religious activities. This has greatly hampered
civil society's ability to call publicly for the protection of its
basic rights, organize effectively for a return to constitutional
rule or participate in efforts to focus attention on the Governors
Island objectives. Restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly
fall disproportionately on supporters of President Aristide. But
they also affect those who speak out in favor of constitutional
rule or believe that a return to true democratic practices cannot









occur without the return of Aristide. Limitations on free speech
and assembly have far-reaching effects...from Mayor Evans Paul's
inability to assure garbage collection in Port-au-Prince, to rural
communities too fearful to continue their work with malnourished
Haitians having no access to international humanitarian relief.

9. Roadblocks to Crucial Human Rights Reporting. Haitian human
rights groups are often targeted for their role in education and
data collection activities, as has been well documented by
international rights groups. The director of one Haitian human
rights organization was forced to flee the country in the fall of
1993 after he spoke out against paramilitary bands. Other groups
cannot operate openly, much less travel freely in the countryside
to conduct their normal work. Gatherings of as few as three people
may be considered subversive and participants subject to suspicion.
This same repressive climate -- with no checks and balances on the
military or the power of rural warlords -- makes training programs
and rural development activities virtually impossible.

10. Returned International Mission Retraces Its Steps. The
decision to withdraw the UN/OAS International Civilian Mission
(ICM) came in the wake of violence that erupted following the
abrupt turning back of the USS Harlan County. The departure of the
international monitors who worked throughout the Haitian
countryside left a vacuum in human rights reporting, especially
communications with the interior. It also generated fear among
those who had talked with the international monitors, and direct
recrimination against some. The Mission's closing represented a
serious setback in efforts to collect human rights information and
provide a concrete demonstration of the international community's
commitment to human rights protection. The ICM has planned, and
recently implemented, a limited return of staff to Port-au-Prince,
under difficult security and political conditions. While welcome,
their return is to a more hostile political environment than they
previously faced. The international community can best show its
support for the work of the mission by redoubling its efforts to
back multilateral problem-solving in Haiti. The Mission's work
will remain limited in scope and impact if little progress is made
in restoring constitutional rule, with the promise that offers for
reducing military impunity and strengthening rule of law. The
Technical Mission's ability to return is another key yardstick.

11. Questions About International Community Resolve. Haitians
most affected by repression or restrictions on their rights of free
speech and assembly hold strong views on the international
community's response to the post-coup period, especially the weeks
of repression following the signing of the Governors Island
agreement and the unilateral U.S. decision to return the US Harlan
County. First inaction and then lack of political resolve have
contributed to a widespread sense of abandonment, and anger among
many. The international community's failure to follow through
decisively after the January 15 deadline set by the U.N Friends of
Haiti further encourages this cynicism about support for democracy
and efficacy of multilateral efforts.






49

12. Democratization Off Track and Constitutional Rule Imperiled.
Continued impasse in the reestablishment of constitutional rule,
including the return of the president chosen by 67 percent of the
Haitian electorate, could seriously undermine the advances
represented by the 1990 elections and lead to a 10-year setback in
Haiti's incipient democratization. Political solutions that fail
to address the reality of military power and military impunity, or
involve strategies that disregard constitutional rule, will not win
broad popular support or be effective in building democratic
practices in Haiti. The current political situation is marked by
the emergence of paramilitary groups which move about freely,
combining repressive paramilitary activities with electoral
ambitions and populist language described by some as fascist.
These developments represent both a distortion of the essence of
democracy, and a potential flash point for future violent
confrontation. Faced with Haitian military recalcitrance, some
early proponents of the Governors Island agreement now take a
reductionist approach. They argue that the Haitian military
responds only to the threat of force or force itself, but that no
U.S. consensus exists on the use of force. A more constructive
focus for future U.S. action is the wide array of intermediate
political/diplomatic steps, public and private, which could send
stronger signals to Haitian military leaders, their families and
civilian backers. It is essential that U.S. bilateral steps be
paralleled by swift U.N. Security Council deliberation.

13. Dialogue in the Context of Military Usurpation of Power. Some
Haitians seek new mechanisms of dialogue, so as to facilitate
consensus decision-making, form working majorities and reestablish
civilian governance. Polarization suggests such advances could be
slow. To be true to the goal of a return to constitutional rule,
new political initiatives and consensus-building need to include
the active involvement of the President and his government. Any
coalition initiatives need to be predicated on, and address
specifically, the reality that the military leadership remains the
major stumbling block in efforts to return to constitutional order.
If unaccompanied by international pressure and new multilateral
action, dialogue among Haitian democrats -- however broad-based --
cannot be expected to alter significantly the present power
equation between the military and elected civilian leaders.

14. A Political Vacuum, with Elected Officials on the Sidelines.
The inability of President Aristide's cabinet ministers to carry
out their work creates a political vacuum and non-functioning state
apparatus. One view is that this could lead to a situation of
"implosion" in a society in which there is no real governance. The
military is seen as the only institution able to function as such.
This situation of de facto rule has blocked or short-circuited
efforts to strengthen civilian rule through institution-building.

15. Government Officials Unable to Provide Basic Health Services.
One serious repercussion of military intransigence and the
resulting civilian power vacuum is that basic government services
such as sanitation and health have not been allowed to operate.






50

The responsible and relevant Ministries find themselves impotent
before pressing humanitarian needs, given the political impasse in
the return to constitutional rule. Blocked from performing their
duties, officials serving the constitutional government are unable
to tabulate which health and hunger problems are new and more
acute, and which show less change and reflect the decades-long
problem of Haitian governmental failure to provide the most basic
social services to the general population.

16. The Humanitarian crisis in the context of Historical Neglect.
Haiti's long history of poor health and nutrition is an important
reference point for anyone seeking to draw conclusions about the
present humanitarian situation and its relationship to the embargo.
Recently, international aid agencies seem to report varied hunger
and nutrition-risk findings for different geographic locations.
Some of the many factors relevant to assessing humanitarian need
and the effects of the present embargo are: the restrictions
military rule presents for cabinet and local government officials
to carry out their preventive health work; the ability to collect
data which permit careful assessments of hunger in different areas
and comparisons over time; the adequacy of humanitarian relief
operations designed to parallel UN/OAS determinations on economic
embargoes; practices that block or limit Haitians' ability to
produce their traditional subsistence crops; unchecked actions that
intensify hardship for the average Haitian, including price-fixing
and black-marketeering by the military and elite; and the Haitian
military leadership's perceptions about the political will and
resolve behind international economic measures.

17. The USS Harlan County Torpedoes Political Momentum. There is
broad consensus that the abrupt mid-October departure of the USS
Harlan County bearing the UN technical mission resulted in a grave
setback to the Governors Island goals. Governors Island was
alternately described as "a car in the ditch" and requiring active
resuscitation after being "sunk" by the ship's departure. The
recall of the ship put in jeopardy the diplomatic process whose
goal was the diminution of Haitian military power, and parallel
steps to ensure the restoration of constitutional rule. Some
military officials intErviewed shortly after the ship's departure
at first expressed amazement at how the U.S. had responded to a
noisy yet small group o: dockside agitators; soon however they were
celebrating the political bonanza that had fallen in their lap.

18. A Special U.S. Responsibility for Forward Movement. Because
it brought to a halt the uneven yet forward momentum of the
Governors Island process, the Harlan County incident has led many
to believe that the United States now bears a special, even
disproportionate, responsibility to lend its fullest support to on-
going multilateral efforts. These efforts use the Governors Island
agreement as reference pint, because that agreement is predicated
on what first motivated international community involvement in
conflict-resolution in Haiti: active support for a return to
constitutional order, includingg respect for the decision of the
Haitian electorate in what were recognized as free elections.

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