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Haiti views from congress and legislative approaches : hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, July 27, 1994
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Democracy -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Law and economic development   ( lcsh )
Political stability -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Démocratie -- Haïti   ( ram )
Développement économique -- Droit   ( ram )
Stabilité politique -- Haïti   ( ram )
Politics and government -- Haiti -- 1986-   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- United States -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Foreign relations -- Haiti -- United States   ( lcsh )
Politique et gouvernement -- Haïti -- 1986-   ( ram )
Relations extérieures -- États-Unis -- Haïti   ( ram )
Relations extérieures -- Haïti -- États-Unis   ( ram )
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HAITI: VIEWS FROM CONGRESS AND LEGISLATIVE
APPROACHES





HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JULY 27, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs







COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
LAW LIBRARY

FEB I;;r
U. S. DEPOSITORY
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING O 1
84-497 CC WASHINGTON : 1994


For ale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent ol Docunments. Congressional Sales Office. VWashinton. DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-046308-4















-\ L L 1-

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

L.EE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman


SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICEILI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Flonda
ELIOT L. ENGEI:, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAI:(GA, Anmerican
Samoa
JAMES I. OBHERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, Califlirnia
ROBERT A. IlORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALDI) M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEI-Y, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
AICEE L. HASTINGS, Flonda
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florinda
ALBERT RUSSEILI WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohm
LUIS V. GLTIERREZ, Illhnois


BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODIIANG, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG IBEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN liURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
II EANA ROS LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRA;ACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illihnois
LINCOLN DIAZ -BAIART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California


MICLIALI. H. VAN Dl)USEN, Chief of Staff
RICHARD) J. GAl!oN, Minority Chief of Staff
DI)E': lAll HAULc'li, Profe ssional Staffe Mrhier
MILAciiOS MAITIrNI:Z, Staff Associatl


SuL'COMMIII'I'; ON THEill' WESE\Vl. N:I HI.MISI'P EREI
ROIiERT G. TORRICEI.I., New Jersey, Chairman
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES L. OB ERSTAR, Minnesota ILEANA ROS-I.EHTINEN, Florida
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia (ASS BAIENGER, North Carolina
PETER JIELTSC;H,Fl'lnda IITON GAI,.IEGI.Y, (Calilornia
ALBERT RUSSELL, WYNN, Maryland
; Roln HI:NK:EN, Sta/ff Director
DoOiTlIIY TAV'E, Republican P'ro/lsional Sta In//Mermhr
AlAN H. 'I.EINCIM(11NN, ProI essional Sta/ MAemher
.JANE I Btnallf:l I TllKHIY, lrf.,'s final l Sa/ fl M rmhr

(1I














CONTENTS


WITNESSES
Page
Hon. Charles B. Rangel, a Representative in Congress from the State of
N e w Y o rk .............................................................................................................. 3
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State
of N ew J jersey ...................................................................................................... 7
Hon. Major Owens, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
Y o rk ................................................................................. .. ... ...... ................ ....... 8
Hon. Bill Richardson, a Representative in Congress from the State of New
M ex ico ............................................................................. ........... ..................... 1 1
Hon. Jack Reed, a Representative in Congress from the State of Rhode
Isla n d ........................................................................... ....... ............................. 14
Hon. Carrie P. Meek, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida 16

APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
H on. R obert G T orricelli ............................................................ .................. 37
Hon. Christopher H. Smith, with attached copy of H. Con. Res. 264 .......... 38
H on. M ajor O w ens ............................................................................................ 46
H on. B ill R ich ardson ..................................................................................... 48
H on J ack R eed ................................................................................................. 56
Hon. Carrie P. Meek, with attached copy of H.R. 3663 .............................. 58

AO)ITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMrrrEI) FOR TIE RECORD
H.R. 1942, submitted by Hon. Charles B. Rangel ........................................... 76
Prepared statements:
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, with attached copy of H.R. 4114 ......................................... 79
Hon. Porter Goss, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida 100
"Political Repression by Rape Increasing in Haiti", article in the Washington
Post, dated July 22, 1994, submitted by Hon. Carrie Meek .......................... 102












HAITI: VIEWS FROM CONGRESS AND
LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 1994
HousE O1F REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE: ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SuBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m. in room 2200,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert G. Torricelli (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The committee will please come to order.
With planning already proceeding for a possible military invasion
of Haiti, and with the Clinton administration already seeking ap-
proval for such an invasion in the United Nations, the time is at
hand for the U.S. Congress to express its opinion, for members to
be able to formulate their own views, and to take a position.
Today, we have called together several members of this body who
have strong views on the question of Haiti and who have offered
different legislative approaches to that crisis. It is our sincere hope
that the Clinton administration will be listening.
It is my personal belief that a U.S. military invasion of Haiti can-
not be justified unless we are prepared to step in and run the gov-
ernment until democracy has fully taken hold, a process that could
take considerable time. I do not believe that the American public
is ready for that responsibility, and I further believe that American
parents are not prepared to send their children into battle over an
island that holds great interest for the United States, but no stra-
tegic importance.
We are all frustrated and angered by the actions of the illegit-
imate military leaders who rule Haiti. But we cannot allow our
frustration to cloud our good judgment. Just because we support
democracy and oppose totalitarianism does not mean that we can
simply invade every country that fails to meet our high standards.
According to such logic, we would already have invaded Cuba,
North Korea, and Iraq, to name a few.
We cannot overlook the fact that while we can help, the ultimate
responsibility for restoring democratic rule in Haiti rests with the
Haitians themselves, and of course, with the larger international
community. We can provide training, we can provide economic as-
sistance, and we can isolate the military regime, but it is the Hai-
tian people themselves who ultimately bear this responsibility.
It is not to say that the task facing the Haitian people is not dif-
ficult, or indeed in the near term largely impossible. But at some
point we must recognize that the United States cannot do for other
(1)








peoples all that it would like to do, especially replacing the things
that they must do themselves.
Finally, while we will hear different approaches to the Haitian
crisis today, let the military leaders who are occupying Haiti make
no mistake: the American people and their elected representatives
are united in their refusal to accept the illegal government in Port-
au-Prince. We will not rest until democracy is restored in Haiti and
the will of the Haitian people is reflected, as they voted themselves,
to have President Aristide as their elected President.
I thank my colleagues for appearing before us today. I look for-
ward to their testimony. I further want the members of this com-
mittee and the Congress to know that this committee has been pre-
sented with various pieces of legislation from members before it
today and others in the body.
It is our intention to seek legislative approval in this committee
for whatever option the administration might pursue. I believe it
is the responsibility of the Foreign Affairs Committee to be heard
on the question of American policy in Haiti, and ultimately it is the
constitutional responsibility of the U.S. Congress to take a position
on a possible military incursion into Haiti and on the larger ele-
ments of a policy.
I trust that the Clinton administration consistent with the prece-
dents established by the Bush administration, in the Persian Gulf
war and consistent with the legislative responsibilities as envi-
sioned in the War Powers Act, will come before this Congress be-
fore proceeding militarily. It is in any case our intention to have
it do so consistently with our own responsibilities.
We are all pleased that the administration is going to the United
Nations to seek a legal foundation that is complementary with the
constitutional responsibilities resting in this body for possible mili-
tary action, but it does not remove the administration from an ad-
ditional responsibility that rests in the U.S. Congress.
Mr. Ballenger, do you have any comments you would like to
make before we begin'?
Mr. Wynn.
Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to express my appreciation to you for calling
this very important hearing, and also thank our colleagues for com-
ing today to present their various views. I would just like to concur
with the last statement that you made in your opening which was
let the coup leaders make no mistake about U.S. resolve in resolv-
ing this particular issue.
I would also add that it is my view that the administration is
correct in keeping all options open. While I don't think any of us
would hasten toward a military intervention, the complexity of the
situation certainly would make it a wise policy not to foreclose any
option.
I would just stress two quick points, that whatever option or pol-
icy we ultimately pursue, I would hope number one, that it would
be multilateral in its basis, and as you have indicated, the adminis-
tration is wise in going to the United Nations for foundational sup-
port for any military intervention. But secondly, and more impor-
tantly, that in a post-Cedras era that the United States exert lead-







ership in providing economic assistance to the people of Haiti so
that we can help rebuild this country.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would conclude and look forward to
the comments of our colleagues.
Thank you.
Mr. TORImCELLI. I wanted to thank our colleagues for their ap-
pearances today.
Unfortunately, I must share with you that Mr. Dellums has had
a family emergency, so he will not be able to with be us today. We
will of course proceed in order of seniority, and with Mr. Dellums'
absence, Mr. Rangel, we would be glad to hear from you. Mr.
Smith, and then, unfortunately, Mr. Richardson we have this ter-
rible custom here where they use alphabetical order to determine
people who are in the same class. I have always been offended at
this personally, but I am left with the precedent. So then Mr.
Owens and Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Rangel, welcome. Let me in advance of your testimony tell
you that while sometimes our views on this issue may differ, if
there has been a voice of conscious in this country on the question
that there is a level of American responsibility to Haiti, our policy
has often strayed from our national principles. You are reminded
of that fact and brought this country back to its traditions more
than once to correct a policy on Haiti of which we have not always
been able to be proud, and for that we are all grateful.
Thank you for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF IHON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE IN CONGRESS FROM TIlE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You may not know this, but recently I saw you on NBC in an
interview that covered a broad spectrum of foreign affairs issues,
and I paused to write you a letter to indicate that while our views
did differ, that you did make me proud to be a Member of Con-
gress, and that you did the subcommittee and this Foreign Affairs
Committee well.
Mr. TORRICElI,,. Thank you.
Mr. RANGEL. I did stress and underline our disagreement in the
letter, because at one point you were describing your views on
President Aristide and what he represented. And I hear that often-
times mentioned on the Hill.
It seemed very unusual to me that a person that has been in of-
fice such a short period of time, that so many Members of Congress
would know what kind of President he was. And even though no-
body in our country ever receives the type of landslide victory that
he did, it is abundantly clear to me that President Aristide did not
represent all of the things that America wanted in that particular
election, and that the CIA openly endorsed and supported another
candidate, and that General Cedras was very friendly to our em-
bassy.
As a matter of fact, unless it is recent, the CIA is still involved
in one way or the other attempting to have a policy different from
President Clinton. That is no secret in the White House, as relates
to the things that they have written before President Aristide was
elected, during the short period of time he served, and even now







as they report that he has lost his mind, that his eyes are glossy,
that he appears to be misdirected. A closer review of their reports
show that it is inaccurate.
So I am just saying that we all are entitled to our views about
the President, but I always resent it when foreigners have any oc-
casion to criticize my President of these United States whether I
voted for him or not. So I think in all fairness that we should be
concerned with the question of human rights, and if this man has
been guilty of violating the human rights of anybody in Haiti, we
should not rely on CIA reports; we should get to the bottom of it
and find out who was violated, and I think we have a right to
speak out against anyone who would do that. But by the same
token, he is entitled to the presumption of innocence, as he has
said, because he was democratically elected.
Now, on this question that you think is before the Congress as
to whether we are going to discuss whether we are going to put any
American men or women in harm's way. Mr. Chairman, I don't like
the way that question is framed. No American should want to put
our soldiers in harm's way. I would hate to believe that America
took a vote when I was sent to Korea in 1950 and they asked my
mom, did she want her son put in harm's way.
I don't recall when we invaded Grenada to rescue these Amer-
ican students that were there as the Cubans were building an air
landing field, that we took a survey and asked whether or not
Americans should be put in harm's way. My God. When we sent
those troops flying and parachuting into Panama to liberate them
from these great international drug traffickers that would change
the whole problem of drugs in this world, as we know it, and took
them out to have them to stand trial, where was I when this poll
was taken as to whether our Americans should be put in harm's
way?
The way I look at this, it is the President of the United States
that determines whether our national interest is being affected and
that he makes a plea to the American people and then he comes
like he should, and no President has, except as relates to the Per-
sian Gulf, and then gets the support of the U.S. Congress. What
bothers me, Mr. Chairman, more than anything else, is when peo-
ple like in the other body, and I don't know whether I am allowed
to mention their names, but I think that there is only one that
would pick up a picture of President Aristide and ask, is this man
worth the loss of one American life'? And I think emotionally and
racistly, the answer has to be no.
So that decision that the House and the Senate should make is
after the President believes that there is no choice. And I would
say that maybe the President's remarks are not based on this little
island out there as to whether or not we are going to assume to
put out every fire and every flash point we have all over the world.
But let me reduce this problem a little bit, Mr. Chairman. Be-
cause it was President Bush who stood up and defined the issues
for us. It wasn't the Congress. It certainly wasn't the Congressional
Black Caucus. But it was Bush who stood up and said as a result
of that coup and a democratic President being chased out of the
country, not in our hemisphere, you don't. He said no, no fragile
democracy should ever have to fear any ambitious general, and







that the message should vibrate from Haiti to Central America to
South America, including Venezuela, including Mexico, including
Peru, and including Argentina, that we are in the business of trade
and we cannot afford to have democracies jeopardized.
Well, I didn't tell him to say it. He was the leader of the free
world, communism had fallen, and Clinton didn't check with me
when he came in and assumed that same posture, that we had a
responsibility. But not alone.
For the first time we were doing things the right way. We
weren't bombing harbors and running the CIA in there and traf-
ficking in drugs. We went to the United Nations. And that is where
we went, and we even brought along the Organization of American
States. And you know how much they love our leadership.
But what happened as a result of it, a sensible diplomatic way
was set to resolve this issue in the great State of New York that
everyone refers to as the Governors Island agreement. It had to be
a good agreement, because no one liked it. They said it was the
only workable document.
Aristide swore that he was being pressured. The military thought
that it was one-sided, according to the international community,
and the United States had to put up all the money. But what did
we say? We set a timetable, not for the United States and not for
the Marines, but for the international community that whether we
like it or not, we are a leader, and if we reached a point that we
decided that we don't want to be a leader, then no President ought
to talk as President that does not believe he is the Commander in
Chief.
And that is where we lost the battle, when our President thought
that he could challenge the illegal government in Haiti and take
the military option off of the table. Well, if you feel that way, then
don't say anything as President.
But we went into an agreement. It was crystal-clear as to what
the military was supposed to leave, the international community
was supposed to come there, build the roads, the highways, and try
to make up for all of the things that we have denied Haiti for cen-
turies. It just made me so proud to say to the poorest country in
this hemisphere that the whole world will be looking at, you can
forget the Chicago south sides, the Harlems, the Newarks and all
of this, but we were identifying with the poorest of the poor that
have been treated so terrible by every civilized government that we
have. And we should be ashamed of what we have done. But I felt
good, because we were the prime movers in the agreement.
Now, who kept the agreement'? President Aristide did. He did ev-
erything and more. The United States did, and so did the inter-
national community. And what did the military do? It killed the
Minister of Justice, it killed every wealthy supporter that Aristide
had. It killed hundreds of people in the street in broad daylight.
It went into communities that because of their poverty and their
color, you knew they supported Aristide, and wiped them out com-
pletely.
They got involved in drug dealing, and then when the inter-
national community came, they sent a bunch of hoodlums to the
dock to chase away a U.S. troopship that had police trainers from







the international community on it. And my God, as an American,
how badly I felt that we cut and run from a bunch of hoodlums.
And once that ship, the Harlan County, turned around and they
knew then that we didn't have the will or the guts to fulfill our
commitment to that document. The countries all over the world
said one thing: America sounds strong, but don't count on her,
don't count on her when the chips are down. Well, that is where
we are today. And the hoodlums are still there.
The international community knows who they are. They are kill-
ing people, the press is saying, they are burning them, they are
mutilating them, and it is not against the Haitians, it is against
all of us. And I submit if there is any hoodlum ambitious general
in any country that has this type of fragile democracy, let America
get on the line and say, let us take a poll with the Congressmen
before the election before we are going to put their bodies in harm's
way. Well, that is not what democracy is about.
Democracy is about the Commander in Chief and the President
sharing with the Congress what the view is, and having this as the
issue that is going to drop today: are we going to invade tomorrow.
Because if we make the mistake of debating this issue before the
election, and I don't care whether it was the Normandy invasion
or not, to send some mother and father's child into a combat area,
before the President of the United States made a decision, it would
have to be a pretty dumb Member of Congress to go home to his
constituents and say, I voted for the troops to go in, even when the
President didn't ask me.
But if what would happen is what I suspect would happen, that
the overwhelming vote of the House would be to say "hell, no" to
this island that no one knows where it is, that I am going to sug-
gest to my constituents before November that we invade, it will be
an overwhelming vote against that option for the President of the
United States.
I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we will not have to invade Haiti
because the question is do those bums in Haiti really believe we
have the will and the credibility to do what we have said we are
going to do. If they believe it, they will be in Paris spending the
money that they have stolen over the years. If they don't believe
it, you bet your life we will have to go in.
But don't ask the United States, don't ask the Organization of
American States, don't even ask the U.N. even to consider going in
if the august bodies of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate has a
debate on the floor and we overwhelmingly decide that the Presi-
dent of the United States has not got that option.
I think you end up the same place that I do, Mr. Chairman. But
I think we get there in a little different ways. I thank you, the com-
mittee and the panelists for allowing me to go far beyond my time.
Mr. TomIulCLLl. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.
Can you remain while my colleagues continue?
Mr. RANGEL. I certainly will.
Mr. TORRICIMI. Mr. Smith.







STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENT-
ATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members
of the subcommittee. I appreciate very much your scheduling of
this hearing today to talk about the various legislative initiatives
that have been introduced in the House in an attempt to positively
affect the outcome in Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, as a fellow cosponsor of H. Con. Res. 264, you
know the resolution we introduced would establish a congressional
commission for the purpose of thoroughly assessing the humani-
tarian, political and diplomatic conditions in Haiti, as well as pre-
senting options for U.S. policy. Such policy options would help forge
an informed, sustainable consensus within the Congress and pos-
sibly among the American people on what action the United States
should take.
The proposed commission would be bipartisan and would be rep-
resentative of the committees which have legislative jurisdiction in
carrying out such options. In addition to seeing the conditions in
Haiti and meeting with a broad section of Haitian political, reli-
gious and civic leaders, the commission would receive testimony
from experts on Haiti and Haitian culture, human rights, health
needs and social welfare, as well as individuals who are experi-
enced in political institution building and diplomatic processes and
negotiations.
We would envision a CODEL to Haiti, at which time we could
meet with nongovernmental organizations that have provided hu-
manitarian assistance to millions of Haitians, church leaders, top
government officials, including members of the chamber of depu-
ties, labor unions, educators, and journalists. In sum, we would
meet with just about everyone who has a stake in the outcome in
Haiti. You may be interested in knowing that several years ago I
was joined by our colleague, Tony Hall and other members of our
committee, in being appointed by the Speaker to an ad hoc commis-
sion on the Kurds when they were fleeing the brutality of Saddam
Hussein's forces.
In that case, the report from our delegation played a constructive
role in focusing U.S. policy toward the humanitarian needs of the
Kurdish population fleeing Iraq into Turkey. While the Haitian
Commission mandate would be significantly larger in scope, seri-
ous, thorough and bipartisan efforts to identify possible solutions
have proven to be productive in consensus building, and I do be-
lieve we need to build a consensus on Haitian policy.
Mr. Chairman, I believe the President should not treat lightly or
dismiss the public's opposition to a military invasion. The latest
polls indicate that the Americans are strongly opposed to military
intervention in Haiti. But, if that is the President's option, the
exact reasons must be spelled out in detail, and the President has
to be the one to do it. I believe that our commission can help form
the consensus on what all of the options are from humanitarian
intervention to the possibility of military intervention.
I would just note for the record, and I would ask that my full
statement be made a part of the record, that a real cross-section
of people have suggested that an invasion would not be in the best







interests of the Haitian people, nor in the best interests of the
American public.
For example, one reaction which has been discussed at length on
the Senate floor is the letter signed by 48 members of the Chamber
of Deputies who, in their July 1 letter wrote, "The dire con-
sequences of Haiti's political crisis in addition to the sanctions for
our society and economy are increasingly evident. We are certain,
however, that foreign military intervention cannot provide a foun-
dation for a lasting solution to Haiti's problems. It must be noted
that as parliamentarians, we firmly oppose the very idea of a mili-
tary intervention which is, in any case, reproved by the different
sectors comprising Haitian society."
I would also note that President Aristide himself has said that
he does not approve of an invasion. Again, if that is to be the op-
tion, it certainly must be the last case option, after all of the others
have been exhausted.
Mr. Chairman, as we look at the humanitarian horror that is oc-
curring in Haiti. It calls upon us to constantly reassess our options
there. Sadly, Haiti, which as a country has ranked very low for
years, is now the worst of the worst in our hemisphere when it
comes to morbidity, mortality, and the children's illnesses that are
pervasive in that country.
I will include in the record some of the very dire statistics from
Haiti. Remember, every statistic represents a person, a child, a
mother, who is suffering severely. Much of the illness is from mal-
nutrition or from otherwise preventable diseases, because of the
crisis that has occurred there.
I would also note for the record, and I will include some of this
in my written statement, the President has had many positions on
Haiti. I think this commission can help bring all of the diverse
views on Haiti together, meet in a sustained way, and focus, be-
cause we have had a lack of focus on Haitian policy, so that we can
come up with a position that is not Democrat or Republican, but
that is American. The commission would try to provide the best
possible solution, bringing in all of those who care deeply about the
Haitian crisis, especially the Haitians themselves. I think this com-
mission can be very worthwhile in that endeavor.
Mr. ToluRICILL,1. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Owens.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAJOR OWENS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. OWENS. I would like to begin by thanking you for the oppor-
tunity to present a variety of viewpoints on this very critical issue.
There has been a lot of disinformation, deliberate disinformation,
and a lot of honest confusion generated around this issue. I would
like to submit the official position of the Congressional Black Cau-
cus for the record, and I will discuss it in a few minutes.
To invade or not to invade is really not the question. No one is
recommending invasion except as a last resort. No one is rec-
ommending that except as a last resort. There are two other basic
and very moral questions that must be dealt with.
One is the humanness of a human refugee policy. We have taken
positions as a nation and doing things as a nation that are incon-







sistent with our laws, the substance and the intent of the laws, as
well as the basic spirit of the laws with respect to immigration.
Asylum is not being treated in the case of the Haitians as we han-
dle asylum with other peoples. We are behaving in a manner which
appears to be racist.
The second question is the rescue of a country being held hostage
by criminals. Haiti is a country being held hostage by criminals.
The government had more credibility and validity and legitimacy
than the Cedras government. Hitler got to where-he got to an
electoral process and then we wiped out his opposition, but he did
go through some process. He did offer a program to the nation.
We are faced with a band of criminals, with no program. They
are doing nothing except skimming off the meager resources of a
country that exists. Seventy percent of the population of Haiti
elected a government that is Aristide's government; 70 percent.
That 70 percent is being held hostage by the 7,000 who have the
machine guns and the weapons supplied by the United States, the
training was supplied by the United States, the officers, the gen-
erals, all trained by the United States; they are holding the country
hostage. That is the predicament we are in.
First the refugee problem, and some people who step forward to
make pronouncements about what should happen in Haiti, I wish
they had chosen "Profiles in Courage" by offering solutions to the
refugee problem. Let some states and some congressional districts
offer safe haven to some Haitians, take the initiative and offer safe
haven. You know, we went-we sent airplanes in large numbers
and brought Hungarians back to this country at the time of the So-
viet invasion of Hungary. We didn't wait for them to get here, we
spent planes to pick them up and brought them back. They landed
and they were given immediate temporary asylum status. Hun-
dreds were handled that way.
We have taken in thousands of Soviet refugees in the last 10
years. On and on it goes in terms of our way of handling refugees
that has been consistent up until now. Suddenly we are doing it
differently with the Haitians. This Congressional Black Caucus pol-
icy I think is pretty clear and I submit the statement for the
record.
In the spring of this year, the CBC set forth what we call a "Seri-
ous Sanctions Initiative." This initiative was first expressed in a
letter to President Clinton. The contents of the letter were later in-
corporated into H.R. 4114, that I think this committee has jurisdic-
tion over, and I hope the committee will consider and act on it.
Following the dismissal of Mr. Pezzulo and the appointment of
Bill Gray, the Clinton administration has undertaken what we call
a serious sanctions initiative. The one important segment of H.R.
4114 that has not been adopted by the organization is the section
that I have just discussed related to asylum. Haitian asylum policy
is not being administered in the same way for Haitians as it is for
other persons.
The other part of the CBC position was adopted earlier in 1993,
October 27, 1993. H.R. 4114, which we decided to emphasize last
spring, did not rescind any previous Congressional Black Caucus
position. Previously we had taken the position which included the
following statement: that all necessary means, including protected







military force, should be utilized to complete the objective of the
Governors Island agreement on schedule; that immediate, emer-
gency steps should be taken to provide protection for all elected of-
ficials of the constitutional Government of Haiti and their families;
the Aristide government and the opposition government, protection
should be provided, and that whatever steps are necessary should
be taken immediately to provide the constitutionally elected gov-
ernment of Aristide with the necessary facilities and resources to
train an army of Haitian freedom fighters to serve as a
counterforce to the existing army of drug smugglers and killers.
If in the fall of 1993 when that resolution was passed we had un-
dertaken the training of Haitian freedom fighters, the question of
one drop of American blood being used to free the people of Haiti
would not be on the agenda. We could just provide logistical sup-
port and the Haitians themselves could take care of the thugs that
happened to have hijacked their government.
I think it is very important that we understand that Haiti is a
special case in this hemisphere. Haiti's affairs have always been
dominated by the United States, and there are very few policy-
makers and historians who would dispute this. From the time of
Thomas Jefferson when he looked upon the freed slaves of Haiti
having established their own government as being a threat to the
institution of slavery in this country, our Government has taken
steps to see to it that Haiti is always contained. We have always
taken steps to see to it that the sphere of influence of any nation
other than this country be limited in Haiti. Haiti is a French-
speaking country and the French have always been kept at bay,
they have not been allowed to come in and develop Haiti economi-
cally.
Business-wise, Haiti has always been forced to have close ties
with the United States. If we want to leave Haiti alone and not
interfere with their affairs and not be responsible for what happens
in this Hemisphere anymore, that is a new policy, that is a new
outlook. I am all in favor of it. But let's not do it now.
Let's atone for our past sins. Let's make some corrections of our
past misjudgments. Let's remove the people that we trained and
supported. We trained the Haitian army. We trained the officers.
Some of them were trained at Fort Benning, Georgia. We have sup-
plied them with the equipment, all of the equipment that they
have, all of the supplies they have. That is our army.
Beyond that, we also have certain key people in the army on the
CIA payroll-this is not disputed. This has been admitted as a
fact-the CIA payroll, who were closely working with the CIA at
the time of the overthrow of the constitutionally elected Govern-
ment of Haiti. So let's correct the problem that we helped to create
and then we can take hands-off.
Finally, I would like to just remind us that the polls show and
the public clearly is in favor of no invasion. You know, I am a non-
violent person, a follower of Martin Luther King and I certainly
don't want to talk about the use of force either. If you leave it all
up to the polls, not knowing all of the facts, not fully understand-
ing the situation, we would never take the kinds of steps necessary
to solve the critical problems of this country.







Abraham Lincoln was outgunned in his own cabinet with votes.
Everybody in his cabinet voted that Emancipation Proclamation
should not be at issue. If Abe Lincoln had gone to the public at that
time and submitted the Emancipation Proclamation as a decision
that he would make only after taking a vote in the Congress as a
result of viewing the public opinion polls, it would have been clear-
ly decided the other way. There would be no Emancipation Procla-
mation and this country would have been saddled with the institu-
tion of slavery for a much longer time.
In more modern times, Harry Truman made a decision to recog-
nize the state of Israel when the public opinion polls clearly showed
that that should not happen. The public did not want to recognize
it as a state.
Some of the key people in President Truman's cabinet, including
General Marshal Shedta, they would publicly denounce such a rec-
ognition, but Truman deliberated, he came and recognized the state
of Israel and a result of that, many other nations recognized the
state of Israel and we had a new democracy born, nurtured and
born in the Middle East.
I think people who have all the facts, all the history, all the bur-
den of what the history of this government has been, all of the bur-
den on their shoulders, they should be allowed to make some criti-
cal decisions and this Nation should go forward in the tradition
that it has always gone forward, for the protection of democracy in
this Hemisphere. That has always been our position and certainly
we do not want to see bandits and criminals hijack any nation and
be allowed to remain in control of that nation.
I thank you for the opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Owens appears in the appendix.]
Mr. TOIHICELLI. Mr. Richardson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL RICHARDSON, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I think we should have three
objectives as we deal with our Haiti policy.
First, we should try to resolve the Haiti issue peacefully under
the Governors Island agreement.
Number two, we should restore President Aristide to power.
Mr. Owens mentioned he got 70 percent of the vote. In my two
recent trips to Haiti, I think that Aristide would receive 90 percent
of the vote.
Third, this is something that we can do now. We need to develop
an aid package for Haiti. We don't need to wait for this issue to
be resolved. We owe this country; it is devastated. We need inter-
national aid agencies; we need to give them humanitarian assist-
ance, food assistance, technical assistance, private sector assist-
ance, budget support. I don't think that we should expect the politi-
cal resolution to end without the international obligation recogniz-
ing that we need to keep this country from dying economically. I
think we have that obligation.
Mr. Chairman, on Monday, July 18, as a member of the House
Intelligence Committee acting on my own, not as a Presidential
envoy or representative of the Clinton administration, but simply
as a Member of Congress, I accepted an invitation with General







Cedras to speak about the issues relating to Haiti. I met with Gen-
eral Cedras and the rest of the military high command, which in-
cluded General Biamby, at General Cedras's home. The meeting
lasted for approximately 5 hours. During that time, I took the op-
portunity to advise him that I strongly supported President Clin-
ton's Haiti policy. I specifically informed the General that the Gov-
ernors Island agreement had to be revived, and that he must re-
sign his position and permit the restoration of President Aristide's
government.
I further informed General Cedras that I was personally opposed
to any unilateral military intervention. However, I advised the
General in no uncertain terms, as I have since my return, that if
the President as a last resort ordered a military intervention uni-
laterally or with the support of the international community, I
would support the President and vote that way in his decision. I
underscored their need most importantly for General Cedras to act
immediately, as time was running out, and a growing consensus
was building in the Congress for more affirmative action to restore
Aristide to power.
Having visited Haiti 2 months ago on a previous trip provided
me with an excellent framework for which to judge the effective-
ness of the sanctions. Two months ago, based on the number of
gasoline vendors on the streets of Port-au-Prince, it was hard to
fathom that any embargo existed. Today, however, the sanctions
are biting. The number of gasoline vendors are substantially less
than 8 weeks ago and the traffic on the streets is significantly re-
duced. Occasional power outages which effect every sector of the
population continue to occur in Port-au-Prince.
During my meeting with General Cedras, he and the military
command acknowledged and admitted that the sanctions were bit-
ing, and that they were in fact hurting the military. As an exam-
ple, Cedras cited a situation where a soldier was shot, transported
to the hospital, but could not be operated on because no electricity
existed. That soldier subsequently died.
Despite the obvious impact of the sanctions, there continue to be
significant leakage along the Haiti/Dominican Republic border. I
personally witnessed violations during my visit. I crossed the bor-
der area from the Dominican Republic at Jimani.
This region is most popularly referred to as Kuwait City due to
the large volume of fuel that moves through the area. While being
processed by a Haiti Customs officer, I saw small boats loaded with
barrels apparently used for transporting fuel across the river be-
tween Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
I might add that this activity took place during daylight hours
and apparently with little or no concern shown by both the Haitian
and Dominican authorities posted along the border. It is my under-
standing that the U.S. monitoring team will arrive at the Domini-
can Republic within a couple of weeks to assist in monitoring the
border.
Additionally, I am aware that President Clinton recently ap-
proved the transfer of equipment, including helicopters, to the Do-
minican Republic to further assist in its enforcement efforts.
Nevertheless, I remain skeptical of the Dominican's ability to
seal the border and thus give the sanctions the strongest teeth pos-







sible. My skepticism is based upon my belief that resolve on the
part of the Dominican military is lacking. This lackadaisical atti-
tude is fueled by the financial gains that can be made through traf-
ficking contraband along the border region. Despite this view, I am
confident that some improvements will be made, because I think
President Balaguer is sincere in making sure these sanctions work.
Mr. Chairman, I also visited Guantanamo Bay, the Grand Turk
Island and the Turks and Caicos. I found that, in summary, our
refugee policy is working. The U.S. military is doing a good job of
dealing with 16,000 refugees, of feeding them, of keeping them in
good sanitation facilities. I found the refugees to be-the morale
very good. I had a chance to talk to them. Approximately half of
those that I polled independently wanted to come to the United
States.
Again, I think our American military, our Marines, our Navy
that are organizing this process are doing an excellent job. I believe
we owe thanks to governments like the Turk and Caicos Islands
that have agreed to make their country as reprocessing centers.
That is happening, and I believe our safe haven policy is looking
for additional nations.
In short, I think the refugee situation, the processing situation,
is improving for all of those refugees that are leaving Haiti because
of the political oppression.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by stating that I support the
President's policy. I think that what he is doing of combining diplo-
matic efforts and gaining support multilaterally at the United Na-
tions makes a lot of sense. The military options should be the last
resort. Prior to initiating any military action, all diplomatic tools
should be explored and exhausted.
I support those multilateral efforts at the United Nations. I
maintain a glimmer of hope that this crisis can be resolved peace-
fully without the need for military intervention. I reiterate my posi-
tion that Aristide must be restored to the presidency. General
Cedras, General Biamby, Colonel Francois must resign and leave
the country.
Once again, I found President Aristide to be enormously popular
with the Haitian people. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think one thing
this committee can be doing. When I was in the Dominican Repub-
lic, many Dominicans, average Dominicans talked about the posi-
tive effect that your hearing had here for the democratic process
in the Dominican Republic. Many people mentioned that, democ-
racy supporting it.
What I think you can do, Mr. Chairman, before this issue is re-
solved is look at that aid package. I think we owe this country as-
sistance. I think the international community needs to do that. I
think we should establish frameworks in the private sector and
public sector to get moving in this direction. We owe this country
that is nearly dying.
IThe prepared statement of Mr. Richardson appears in the ap-
pendix.]
Mr. ToRmICmIA,1. Thank you, Mr. Richardson, very much.
Mr. Reed.







STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM TIHE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the com-
mittee for this opportunity to discuss American policy with regard
to Haiti.
On May 27, I had the opportunity to travel to Haiti with our col-
leagues, Bill Richardson and Julian Dixon. As you know, Bill has
just returned from a follow-up trip. During our visit in May, we
had the chance to talk with a broad spectrum of political figures,
as well as our embassy personnel. My comments are based upon
this trip and consideration of our policy over many, many months.
American policy must address three critical issues: the departure
of the illegal Cedras regime, the establishment in Haiti of a demo-
cratically elected government of President Aristide under condi-
tions that will not require the commitment of U.S. military forces,
and the prevention of the uncontrolled entry of Haitian nationals
into the United States.
Removal of the illegal Cedras regime continues to be a frustrat-
ing and, to date, unsuccessful effort. Nevertheless, resorting to the
expedient use of American military forces to resolve the situation
would, I feel, be a mistake. There is no doubt that American mili-
tary forces would quickly overwhelm any organized resistance.
However, these short-run gains would be rapidly dissipated. Few
policymakers have to be reminded that we spent 19 years in Haiti
trying to facilitate the development of a functioning democracy
with little, if any, long-term results to show for it.
Moreover, our visit to Haiti demonstrated that an American in-
vasion would quickly engender local opposition. We found no sig-
nificant support for such a policy among civilian political leaders.
In fact, the impression was left that most would have to reflec-
tively condemn such an invasion in order to maintain their stand-
ing within domestic political circles. In sum, we would find our-
selves in the awkward position of risking American forces to eject
Cedras and then find ourselves as unwelcome guests by those we
thought we were helping.
Inextricably bound up in efforts to expel the Cedras regime is the
attitude and activities of the Aristide government. Aristide's brief
rule over Haiti has raised considerable controversy over his com-
mitment to the constitutional principles that we would be presum-
ably supporting.
Within Haiti, he is a figure that commands great respect among
many, and great suspicion among many others. At this junction, it
is essential that his government play a more constructive and coop-
erative role in resolving this crisis.
As a first step, a prime minister should be appointed imme-
diately. This individual should represent a broadening of his gov-
ernment and manifest a sincere attempt to be inclusive of respon-
sible civilian elements within Haiti. In this way, there is a possibil-
ity of further weakening the hold of the Cedras regime while begin-
ning to establish a government that can function immediately upon
the departure of the Cedras regime.
With regard to our policy toward Haitian refugees, the various
attempts to provide off-shore processing have been abandoned and
with good reason. The activation and reactivation of these facilities







outside Haiti invariably starts a wholesale exodus which imperils
the refugees and undermines attempts to offer asylum to politically
active Haitians.
During our trip to Haiti, we visited the refugee processing center
in Port-au-Prince. There are additional centers in the southern city
of Les Cayes and the northern city of Cap-Haitien. These centers
continue to operate and process Haitians who seek entry in the
United States. The criteria for entry is consistent with our policy
for offering asylum for political refugees.
According to embassy personnel, these centers have operated
with little or no interference from the Cedras regime. In sum, we
should continue to operate these centers and refrain from the es-
tablishment of centers outside of Haiti.
Mr. Chairman, we all recognize that there are very few answers
to this crisis. I appreciate your effort and the efforts of this commit-
tee to search for a principled resolution of this situation, and I
thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reed appears in the appendix.]
Mr. TOiZICELIAI. Thank you, Mr. Reed.
Mr. Rangel, Carrie Meek has yet to testify. I understand you are
running into difficulty with your own schedule.
Mr. RANGEL. I have to chair a meeting of the New York delega-
tion. We are meeting with the trade Ambassador, and I always wel-
come listening to my colleague, but I just want to thank the com-
mittee for listening and the courtesies that are always extended to
me by the Chairman.
Mr. TO RICELLI. I don't know whether having you miss the New
York delegation is or is not to the interests of New Jersey, so I
don't know whether to try to interfere with your schedule.
Before continuing with Ms. Meek, let me just briefly respond to
a couple of the points that you made.
This committee has been presented with resolutions from Ms.
Meek, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Dellums. If there were a majority on the
subcommittee, and were I convinced that both the full committee
and indeed some significant group on the floor formed, if not a con-
sensus, a center of gravity on Haiti policy, I would proceed with
one of those resolutions as a statement of policy.
It is not my judgment, and I sense most members of the institu-
tion, that we want to prejudge any judgment by President Clinton
on involvement in Haiti. We have our individual views on the mer-
its of military involvement in Haiti. But it is not for the Congress
ultimately to establish that policy. It is for the President to make
his judgment.
By my comments I was simply contributing that when he has
made that judgment, it has been my consistent view that the Con-
gress then has a responsibility to be heard and to participate.
You are genuinely correct in that the questions of Grenada and
Panama, and indeed you might have added Nicaragua and El Sal-
vador, this Congress was neither consulted nor certainly given the
opportunity to participate.
You have argued that they are precedents for President Clinton's
actions. As one who criticized both President Reagan and President
Bush on those instances, they are, in my mind, examples of why







this administration should seek better adherence with the law and
seek congressional participation.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, I agree with each and everything
that you have said. There must be some misunderstanding.
Mr. ToIuCcEjLm. Perhaps not. I wanted to clarify the issue.
Mr. RANGEL. I agree 100 percent. What I am saying is that there
are many Members of this Congress that would want to debate this
issue on the floor of the Congress and take a vote before the Presi-
dent of the United States has come to the Congress and shared
with us what his decision is. My only point is that we should not
vote before the President has taken everything into consideration.
This is not a popularity contest. And to do this and to deny him
this option, if you will, I think would impair his ability to resolve
this peacefully. And I don't believe, because we have done this be-
fore, I am suggesting, no one had opposed the invasion of Panama
and the invasion of Grenada more violently than I. I am saying
that this President is going to the United Nations, and I hope and
trust-
Mr. ToimUICiLL. Then there is no difference with you?
Mr. RANGEL. No.
Mr. TolmuICE.Lm. It is not my intention as chairman of the sub-
committee to move on any resolution which would preclude options
to the organization or indeed signal to the generals in Port-au-
Prince that they need to consider any option eliminated. All options
do exist. I have my own personal views about the U.S. military
being used in this instance, and I think a view widely shared about
the need of the United States to comply with international laws
and our own constitution. I think that the administration has made
a dramatic and an important turn in policy in going to the United
Nations, in recognizing that this must be done with international
sanction.
If we restore democracy in Haiti, but do so by continuing the neo-
colonialist history of the United States, interfering in the affairs of
our neighbors without either their approval or being consistent
with international law, then we may achieve something for the
Haitians, but nothing for ourselves or for our neighbors.
Mr. RANGEL. We are in complete accord, complete accord.
Mr. TORHICELLI. I simply approach the issue on that basis.
Mr. RANGEL. But you should know that there are Members of
Congress that want to debate and vote on this issue before the
President has decided what is in our national interests. But you
and I, what you have said and what I have said, perhaps the lan-
guage may be different, but I support you 100 percent.
Mr. TOlmICLLA,. Very good. Thank you very much.
Thank you for your testimony.
Ms. Meek, I apologize for the delay. We welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF lION. CARRIE P. MEEK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mrs. MEEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to members of
the committee.
As all of you know, I live in Miami, Florida. As a prefix to my
presentation, I have visited Haiti; I have also many constituents
who lived in Haiti before they came to America. Just recently, be-







cause of the help of one of our members, Congressman Deutsch, I
visited the USS COMFORT, and I also visited Guantanamo where
the Haitians are held at this time.
I introduced H.R. 3663 to address three specific refugee prob-
lems: forced repatriation, the status of Haitians nationals here in
the United States, and also to provide Federal funds to lessen the
impact to State and local governments on admission of Haitian ref-
ugees to their States.
My first assertion is that immigration is unfair. The immigration
policy in this country is unfair to Haitians. There is a different
standard for Haitians than for other refugees. That is why I intro-
duced this bill.
As I sit here today, at least 1,200 Cubans have come into this
country, but we have not allowed anywhere near that many Hai-
tians to enter. It is not the problem of the Haitians. The problem
is with the immigration policy of this country. There is a double
standard there.
The nonrefoulement section of my bill, H.R. 3663, would make
our policy conform to international law with regard to the return
of asylum seekers to the country from which they are fleeing. Our
policy does not at this time. H.R. 3663 would require the United
States to determine the legitimacy of an individual's claim. At this
time, now that processing has stopped on the ship, there are over
16,000 Haitians at Guantanamo. You can imagine the process. We
saw it. The military people are extremely sensitive to the Haitian
people. Never have I seen such, I would say, fine sensitivity, more
so than their military training would require them to do.
But there is still that kind of processing where the interpreters
and the people who are doing the sensitive kind of processing don't
have the expertise in refugee processing as they should have for
that many people. I would question why we are still doing this at
Guantanamo. And of course, on-land processing is subject to the
same limitations as on ship processing.
I visited the consulate in Haiti. I know how slow that process is.
I understand the backlog that is there; there aren't enough workers
there to really do the processing of the Haitian refugees.
On the other hand, you must understand that no sensible Hai-
tian would try to get processed at one of those in-Haiti processing
centers when they know the intimidation they will face if they are
seen going into one of our processing centers there. So it is not as
easy as you hear it stated, because Haitians on the ground in Haiti
are afraid, many of them, to go to those processing centers. As well
designed as they may be, they are inadequate to make this a fair
process.
My bill would prohibit the United States from returning individ-
uals to their country of persecution if it is determined that they are
refugees. I think we should give a lot of weight to that to be sure
that that determination is a sound one.
I think it was the Bush administration that signed an interdic-
tion agreement with the United States, which was grossly unfair,
to return Haitians without benefit of any hearing. That has been
going on since that time until President Clinton intervened.
This provision is not Haiti-specific in my bill, Mr. Chairman. It
would apply to anyone encountered outside U.S. territory within







the territorial waters of another nation. I would like to make it
clear at this time that I applaud President Clinton's decision to try
to establish safe haven for those who are in fact fleeing political
persecution in Haiti. That is not an easy call. This administration
is trying to do it. But it appears to me, Mr. Chairman, that what-
ever is tried is not enough. If one could just witness the fear, the
persecution, the malaise that is coming over that land, one would
see that we need a stronger and a better policy.
I don't think the sanctions are working that well; they are work-
ing very slowly. I don't know whether we have the time; I don't
know how many people have to die; I don't know how many women
have to be raped before this policy begins to work. There is quite
a bit of documentation to show that women are being raped in
Haiti.
I have an article which I want to place in the record in a few
minutes to you on that. The previous policy was not just a violation
of international law, Mr. Chairman; it was a violation of the most
basic code of humanity. Accordingly, the administration's an-
nouncement on May 8 was clearly an admission that this prior pol-
icy was flawed.
Section 3 of my bill would designate Haitians for temporary pro-
tective status under section 2244 of the Immigration and National-
ity Act, thereby protecting those Haitians who are currently in the
United States from returning to Haiti while there is a human
rights crisis there, and there is clearly a human rights crisis going
on in Haiti.
I don't think a lot of people believe this, Mr. Chairman. Until
they turned the U.N. observers back, you could see then how the
military people there, Cedras, Francois and the rest of them are
snubbing their nose at U.S. foreign policy and how they are con-
tinuing to kill, murder and rape there.
So under the provisions of TPS or Temporary Protective Status
enacted as part of the Immigration Act, the Attorney General is au-
thorized to designate any nation or part of a nation Temporary Pro-
tective Status if she finds an ongoing conflict.
I must say this about Attorney General Reno. She is a deeply
sensitive person. She was provided the fact that there were so
many children over there, Mr. Chairman, living in terror, drinking
water which is infested certainly with all kinds of bacteria. She
was able to give them parole, humanitarian parole in the United
States. And because of the goodness of heart of a Cuban American
in Miami, I was able to bring back 118 of these children, because
of that Cuban American and Haitian community and American
Airlines.
Mr. TomIucLEu. You wouldn't want to identify that Cuban Amer-
ican, would you?
Mrs. MEEK. Jorge Mas Canosa was that Cuban American. When
I called upon him for help, I was criticized for that. But I didn't
really care, Mr. Chairman. Because what I was looking for was
someone who had the heart to do this and he did and so did Amer-
ican Airlines. So we were able to bring back 118 Haitian children
and now they are gladly reunited with their parents who are legal
residents in the United States who live in Miami.







I am aware that the number of people leaving Haiti has dimin-
ished since the administration's announcement that only those who
apply for asylum through in-country processing will be allowed to
come to the United States. I am also well aware of the fact that
the United States can't possibly accept all of the people who would
like to come here. I am only asking the Congress, and I am asking
the administration, to make it fair, to level the playing field so it
is the same for Haitians as well as for other people. I still contend
that present treatment is unfair for Haitians.
No one wishes to provoke a mass exodus of people to this coun-
try. No one wishes to see that. We know that this mass exodus
would have a negative impact on south Florida and some other
areas of this country. That is why in my bill I ask that these cities
and counties that are being negatively impacted, be given rec-
ompense for that through the Federal Government in terms of pro-
viding the funds to reimburse their expenses.
Repression is there, Mr. Chairman. I don't need to talk a lot
about that.
I want to ask unanimous consent to have the article, Mr. Chair-
man, regarding the rape of women in Haiti placed in the record,
unanimous consent on the political repression.
Mr. ToimuCEikLI. Without objection, it will be placed in the report
at this point.
[The information appears in the appendix.
Mrs. MEEK. There are so many abuses that I won't take the time
of this committee. You are well aware of all of them.
The record is there: the killing of the children, the wanton killing
of priests and the political people, the soldiers opening fire on peo-
ple, officials that are trying to push the democratic government
being dragged from their homes, their wives and children being
persecuted and raped; refusing an U.S. Senator, Senator Graham,
the opportunity of going up and inspecting the border with the Do-
minican Republic. It shows you the disrespect they have for Amer-
ican foreign policy. I think that any woman in this group who had
a chance to hear Ms. Alerte Belance and to see her-the National
Organization of Women brought her to our attention-this woman
has been maimed for life. She survived a machete attack by pro-
military terrorists. The attack left her with her right arm severed
below the elbow, a slash across her face, took out her upper palate.
I could go on and on with these atrocities.
The point is that the Haitian people are laboring under very in-
human conditions. And our foreign policy, because it is a disparate
one, is not helping them. So that is what my bill seeks to address,
Mr. Chairman.
In closing, while H.R. 3663 would not eliminate the blatant dou-
ble standard to which Haitians have been subjected, it would guar-
antee at least a modicum of justice. The Haitian people deserve a
caring and effective response from the United States and the af-
fected international community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Meek appears in the appendix.]
Mr. To unICi.:i,. Thank you for your testimony and for the legis-
lation you have submitted to the committee. I was in Florida only
a week ago and heard of your work in bringing the Haitian chif-







dren to the United States. It was an extraordinary effort. You have
saved lives and it is a very special statement about you and your
work.
I further want to congratulate you, because some have used the
Haitian crisis to divide the Cuban and the Haitian people. Indeed,
they have both suffered under oppression. Your efforts in reaching
out to the Cuban American community as part of the struggle to
save Haitian children is a good example of how the needs of the
community are not in conflict, but indeed are complementary.
Ms. MEEKS. Yes.
Mr. ToRImuCELi,I. And particularly, that indeed one of the most re-
spected leaders of the Cuban American community was a part of
your efforts I think is a tremendous statement of the ability of the
communities to work together.
In deference to my colleagues, I will be brief.
But I only want to pose a couple of questions, if I might.
The Clinton administration's policy is based on the predicate that
there is a level of suffering that the Haitian military will not accept
and will therefore relinquish power. There is an unmistakable, il-
logical aspect to that policy in-that there is no evidence that the
Haitian military cares anything about the Haitian people, or they
wouldn't have seized the government to begin with.
The United States, however, is in a very different position. There
is a level of suffering to which we cannot, despite our resolve to re-
store democracy in Haiti, allow the Haitian people to be subject.
We have just witnessed in Rwanda the terrible effects of cholera
and of hunger. Make no mistake about it, there is a point at which
a cholera outbreak in Port-au-Prince, large-scale hunger, civil un-
rest, could make the embargo itself morally unacceptable. I won-
dered if any of you, each of you, would share a judgment about how
it is the United States deals with this moral dilemma of the dicta-
torship being unacceptable, but a level of human suffering being
reprehensible.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, the problem in Rwanda is not a prob-
lem of bacteria causing cholera. The problem in Rwanda is reckless
criminal leadership, leadership which called for the massacre of
people over the national radio station. We have the same bandit
criminal leadership in some other parts of the world: in Serbia, Ni-
geria. You have the same bandit criminal leadership in Haiti. A
confrontation of the bandits, the criminals immediately, a recogni-
tion of the fact that the world now is faced with a situation where
a dozen people can hold a nation hostage and we have to deal with
that. And when they hold a nation hostage and they have no con-
cern whatsoever with the lives of the people in that nation, they
can create situations like the crisis in Rwanda where thousands
are dying every day, and we can easily identify it.
In Haiti many people are dying every day from hunger and prob-
ably already from diseases, as well as being killed by the military.
So the handful of bandits, a dozen or less, are causing the problem,
and they are causing a problem with the situation where the peo-
ple of the nation have expressed their desire to have a democratic
government. They have expressed their desire to have certain lead-
ers.







In Nigeria and in Haiti, you have a situation where elections
were held, elections were not disputed in terms of the honesty of
the elections by the international community and the people with
the guns seized power and they hold the nation hostage. Action on
that is the first and most important action and the most reasonable
action.
You cure all of the other ills, you avoid the cholera epidemics,
you avoid the widespread numbers of malnutrition, you avoid the
situation where people didn't get decent health care because there
is no electricity in hospitals where they have to have an operation.
On and on it is goes. We have to confront the fact that when ban-
dits and criminals come forward and take the nation hostage, im-
mediate action by the international community is the best solution
to the problem.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond, sanctions cer-
tainly are a very blunt instrument and I think they need to be re-
assessed from time to time, especially when their outcome visits es-
pecially upon the most weak and vulnerable of society.
In the case of Haiti, it is the children and the women of Haiti
who are suffering most. It would be better to assess that situation,
whether or not this blunt tool is having the desired effect. If indeed
General Cedras and others are looking at this and saying we don't
give a damn about these suffering people, then indeed we are actu-
ally hurting those that we are intending to help.
I think we have to be wise enough that if it calls for a change
or a recalibration of policy, that we will make that move and per-
haps target the sanction in a different way. Meanwhile, I think we
also need a stepped-up humanitarian effort for those who are suf-
fering.
It is a very hard question, I don't think we can answer it in the
affirmative: have we done all we can possibly do to help the suffer-
ing women and children and families in Haiti through humani-
tarian efforts? There is more perhaps that we can be doing.
Mr. TOI IICi.rLLI. Of course, this is exactly the basis of my ques-
tion, that we need to begin to think about it. We are all going to
wake up one morning and the inability to boil water in Port-au-
Prince is going to lead to a problem of contagious disease, or the
shortages of food are going to lead to riots.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, the military has stopped the ship-
ment of food by the humanitarian organizations. The military will
not let this kind of humanitarian relief that he is talking about go
in.
Mr. TOmluICILI. I am not casting blame of who is responsible.
Mr. OWENS. They have to be removed is what I am saying, other-
wise nothing works.
Mr. ToKKIncmLwI. They can, but if they are not, and these events
occur, I am only suggesting that the Haitian military no doubt will
be prepared to hold power while people die of contagious disease
and of hunger. The United States is committed to the restoration
of democracy in Haiti.
We are also committed to the idea that people shouldn't die of
contagious disease and of hunger. And at some point this country
can be facing a choice between these objectives. We do not sit in
the same moral position as the Haitian military. We have a higher







level of responsibility. I am only suggesting that the day of this ter-
rible choice can be coming, and we had best be prepared for it.
That is my only point.
Finally, before I yield, let me ask, in my exchange with Mr. Ran-
gel I made clear my own belief that the U.S. Congress must be con-
sulted before there is a military invasion, though that judgment
rests with the President to recommend in the first instance.
There is also the unusual position of the United States poten-
tially involving itself militarily in Haiti with that government-
with that country having a democratically elected government in
Mr. Aristide. I am not aware historically, though I welcome a cor-
rection, of any instance in history in which the United States has
invaded a nation which had a democratically elected government
where our invasion did not have the approval and indeed the invi-
tation of that democratically elected government.
To my memory as an historian, albeit amateur, I am not aware
of any such precedent. Is it a controlling factor in your minds, a
condition precedent, that President Aristide would publicly endorse
and welcome an American military involvement?
Mrs. MEEK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't think President Aristide
could very well do that, because it would violate the constitution
of the country he represents, Haiti. He could not openly say, go in
and intervene militarily in Haiti. But, of course, I think that the
present Clinton administration policy is a sound one, and that is
the restoration of democracy in Haiti, and to restore President
Aristide. Let's face it, if President Aristide were to go back to Haiti,
you would not see Haitians fleeing as they are doing now. They
would remain in their own country.
Now, whether or not to intervene militarily, I don't think we
have any other choice. The present military coup leaders in Haiti
have had two or three chances to commit themselves to honesty
and integrity, and they have not done that. They did not follow the
Governors Island accord. They had a second chance to do this; they
didn't do it. So I don't think that the policy of this country now
should be to wait around for them to decide when they are going
to do the right thing.
I disagree with what I hear some of our members who have vis-
ited Haiti say: those military leaders are good guys. They are not
good guys, they are bad guys. They are bad guys committing to
killing the breadth and the strength of their country. And they do
it because they have no regard for their own people.
Thank you.
Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, last week President Aristide issued
a statement, and if the committee doesn't have copies of it, I would
be happy to provide a copy of his position, which I think is quite
clear. He did not endorse invasion because he would be setting
himself up for impeachment if he did that.
But that statement is crystal-clear as to what his sentiments are,
and I think if you read the statement, you will know what I mean.
He is calling for enforcement of the Governors Island agreement,
enforcement by the international community. That is as far as he
can go, and I think that clearly is a clear statement to us, and it
is an instruction almost as to where he stands.







Mr. TonmICEI:i. There are few sovereign nations in the world
whose constitutions would not prohibit by definition the loss of sov-
ereignty to a foreign power. That, however, does not preclude an
elected President from, consistent with national sovereign, calling
upon police actions by other states for civil difficulties, for the
maintenance of sovereignty-
Mr. OWENS. I think if you read his statement, you will find that
that is what he is doing. He is calling for action by the inter-
national community to correct the situation. It is not an invasion,
really, it is restoration.
Mr. TonRImCEI,. Well, that is my point.
Mr. OWENS. Of the government which is doing-it is not an inva-
sion. We keep saying "invasion." It is the restoration of the govern-
ment.
Mr. TORRICEIi-. Therefore, President Aristide claiming that he
could not endorse American military action because it is unconsti-
tutional, indeed, in my judgment is insufficient.
Mr. OWENS. You say that he could not endorse military action be-
cause it is unconstitutional. He said he could not endorse invasion.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I only wanted to establish in my own mind, that
a proper and unambiguous statement is a condition precedent. For
military action the United States of America cannot be having mili-
tary forces going into other nations where there are democratically
elected governments, unless it is clear that it is at their, not only
invitation, but insistence.
Mr. OWENS. I think Mr. Aristide would issue a statement in writ-
ing which is clear, and I would be happy to supply that to you. Un-
fortunately, I have to leave to go to the same meeting that Mr.
Rangel had to go to.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I am afraid we are exhausting my witnesses.
Mr. Wynn, my apologies. You are next to be recognized.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman-
Mr. TORRICKEI,. I know Mr. Owens is trying to get out the door,
but I think if Mr. Wynn speaks quickly we can get to him before
he does.
Mr. WYNN. Actually, I wanted to direct my questions at Mr.
Smith and I will be brief in that regard as well, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Smith, if I recall before I had to step out, your recommendation
was for the creation of a commission to create a national consensus
on this question.
Mr. SMITH. A congressional commission which hopefully would
reflect a national.
Mr. WYNN. In light of Mr. Rangel's remarks regarding our past
President's informed policy, wouldn't you concede that creating
such a consensus and having that sort-and having that kind of
debate would in fact hamstring the President's flexibility?
Mr. SMITH. Well, the President would still have the flexibility.
These would be nonbinding recommendations that would still have
to be embraced by the President or rejected; it would be offered by
responsible members, obviously starting with-let me just finish-
starting with the Speaker right on down to-
Mr. WYNN. Was such a commission or consensus developed prior
to Panama?
Mr. SMITH. To the best of my knowledge, no.







Mr. WYNN. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. It is an irrelevant-
Mr. WYNN. I don't want to take much time. What is the time-
frame for this process that you are envisioning?
Mr. SMITH. Forty-five day timeframe.
Mr. WYNN. At the end of 45 days, if Mr. Cedras has not stepped
down, what would we-what would be your recommendation at
that point?
Mr. SMITH. Well, the commission would meet, assess where we
have been, where we are now and where we are going, and I am
not going to prejudge what the consensus recommendation would
be from that commission. Hopefully it would very much be an in-
formed policy suggestion.
Mr. WYNN. I guess my point is if at the end of our study we
ended up where we are today facing a crisis with health implica-
tions and the other implications that have been discussed consider-
ably here today, would we not have basically wasted our time?
Mr. SMITH. Not at all. Again, the President has the capability to
act unilaterally on a whole host of areas-let me finish. He would
have that capability to do so. I believe we would be strengthening
the President by having additional serious law makers from both
parties looking at this, trying to provide for a consensus position.
You know there is no easy answer. We all know that so well. When
President Bush faced this problem and now President Clinton faces
it, nobody has the panacea for Haiti. Hopefully, this will provide
some additional insights so that we can formulate a sustainable
policy that will work.
Mr. WYNN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORiICELI,. Mr. Gallegly.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try
to be brief so every member has a chance to ask a couple of ques-
tions.
Mrs. Meek, you made a couple of comments relative to the per-
ception by many as it relates to our U.S. foreign policy, or the lack
of foreign policy and the concern that many people are thumbing
their nose at our foreign policy; is that correct?
Mrs. MEEK. The military coup.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, that they have thumbed their nose at the
U.S.'s position as it relates to our foreign policy.
Mrs. MEEK. Yes.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Would you say that that would be in small part
or significantly due to the administration's indecisive actions or
change in positions on Haiti and other issues in the past 2 or 3
months?
Mrs. MEEK. No, I would not. I would say it is clue to the bellig-
erency of the Haitian military people, the coup that overthrew the
government there. They are the problems that is where the blame
is. It is not on the Clinton administration. A lot of people want Mr.
Clinton to go in there and wave a magic wand and get everything
corrected, but here we have a military coup that overthrew the gov-
ernment there and quickly took over everything. That country has
no government, they have no-they have nothing there. They have
a parliament that is afraid to act because they are under the
throws of the military coup, and paramilitary attaches as well.







Mr. GALLEGLY. I am a little confused as to how another country's
action would cause the image of the United States' foreign policy
position to be one way or the other, rather than the actions of the
United States on its own foreign policy positions.
Mrs. MEEK. Well, it has done that. The Haitian situation is a
good example. It is a good model of what happens when we as a
country will allow-and I must say that we were a little bit late
with all of our policy, that is, to get a little bit deeper into the
point. I see where you are going.
We should have acted sooner in Haiti, right after the Governors
Island accord. The Governors Island accord was not honored by the
attaches or the military coup leaders that signed this agreement.
They did not keep that agreement. At the time the Harlan County
came into the shore there, and they were scared off or frightened
away, the policy of this country should have changed. I think that
Mr. Clinton's policy is deliberate, but it is deliberative. It is too
slow to have made the changes that I would have liked to have
seen.
Mr. GALLEGLY. But it has changed several times.
Mrs. MEEK. Well, that happens when you are in a country where
the dynamics are changing. Since Mr. Clinton first started with
this and Mr. Bush as well, a lot of things have changed. They
thought the Governors Island accord would work. They also
thought the second one would work. They thought the sanctions
would work, the first sanctions. Then they thought the further
heavier sanctions would work. They have not worked.
Foreign policy can't be that inflexible. It has to be able to change,
particularly when you are dealing with a country where there is
no, quote, unquote, leaders, democratically elected leaders.
Mr. GALLELY. You have said that you definitely support the
Clinton's policy as it relates to Haiti today, yet I understood you
to say that you believe that invasion or intervention or whatever
term we want to use is the only way that we are going to resolve
this matter. Isn't that somewhat in conflict? Why hasn't the Clin-
ton administration advocated that if, in fact, you agree with the
Clinton administration?
Mrs. MEEK. Well, you need to understand to what extent I agree
with the Clinton administration.
Mr. GALLEGLY. So you don't agree with them wholeheartedly.
Mrs. MEEK. The Clinton administration has not come out for in-
vasion of Haiti. I personally feel that the only way that this whole
thing, this quagmire can be resolved, is for the United States is to
go into Haiti quickly and remove the military coup leaders. And
when they remove those military coup leaders, by whatever means
necessary, and also try to restore democracy to Haiti, I think that
is the answer. But I am not the President. But I don't think that
waiting around for any length of time to try and assuage the mili-
tary leaders will resolve the problem.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Do you support an up and down vote of this
House on the issue?
Mrs. MEEK. No, I do not. I think that is why we elected the
President. We should not take away the President's prerogative
and his ability to lead. That is why he was elected. Let him make







that decision. I don't think the Congress should make that decision.
They are not constituted to do that.
Mr. GALLEGIY. Do you think the President is going to do that?
Mrs. MEEK. I don't know. I don't know what the President-if I
were President, if you want to change this thing around, then I
could speak for him. But right now, I don't know what he is going
to do.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, there is no question that it is a very com-
plex issue, and there is a lot of concern by many of us here that
an invasion, intervention, again, whatever term you want to use,
could exacerbate an already terrible problem as it relates to the as-
sassination of many, many innocent people, and the people that I
know as well as I know I am sitting here that you are firmly con-
cerned about their well-being. I don't think there is any question
in anyone's mind about that. I think we all want to get to the same
place; maybe we just have a different way of getting there.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TouRICELIi. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MINENDI)E. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I came here primarily today, although I have just
made about all of our meetings, but I came here primarily to listen
to my colleagues and their views. I will say this, that we are hem-
orrhaging in Haiti and we are hemorrhaging in this hemisphere.
There comes a point in time where we have used the power of the
United States and different parts of the world to stop hemorrhag-
ing there. We have done it whenever we can with international
multilateral forces, and I think that is appropriate, and I think
that it is appropriate to now see this administration moving for-
ward to seek multilateral support by the appropriate organiza-
tions-to stop the hemorrhaging here in our own hemisphere.
But I particularly wanted to seek recognition to congratulate the
gentlelady from Florida on her legislation which I was proud to join
with her as a cosponsor. I believe that from the very start early on,
she expressed what is the concern of many of us: if our immigra-
tion policy is to stand, it must be equal for all. And if not, it fails
to have a fundamental basis in which it can be supported. And so
I was glad to join with her.
I still support it, strongly support it and am ready to vote for it
when it comes forth, and I also want to congratulate her on her
work on behalf of the children that she brought from Haiti. I know
that back in your district they reverently call you grandma, and
your sense in that respect in terms of the children you brought
from Haiti has served them well. It serves us well as a nation,
gives us our better side, and I salute you for your work.
I also will take the opportunity to say that you have been a
bridge-builder between our respective communities and for that of
course I have a great deal of respect for you as well.
So we look forward to continuing to working with you on your
legislation and on this issue.
Mrs. MEEK. Thank you.
Mr. TORRICmILu. Mr. Goss.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, thank you for letting me participate in
this panel as a-I guess ex-officio member of the Foreign Affairs







Committee still. I have a statement for the record which I would
like to submit.
Mr. TORRICICELI. Without objection, entered at this point.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goss appears in the appendix.]
Mr. Goss. Thank you. I am sorry that some of our other wit-
nesses had to leave. I well understand the pressing business. There
are a couple of statements I would like to make about some of the
statements they have made, which I think need correction. But I
would like to ask my colleague from Florida, Carrie Meek, about
some of her points.
You felt in your testimony that the sanctions are not working;
did I hear you properly?
Mrs. MEEK. See, they just started. I think the sanctions have-
the heavy ones have just been initiated about 8 weeks now. That
hasn't been long enough for the real impact of the sanctions to take
hold. I wish they could have been in there earlier, Mr. Goss, so that
if they were going to work they would have had much more time
than now to measure the efficacy of them.
Mr. Goss. If they haven't worked in the past 2 months, even
though they have been ratcheted up and gotten more intense, as
I think you said, then it doesn't seem like, based on the other testi-
mony here, that there is any indication that general Cedras is real-
ly going to leave and that Biamby, or if they do that somebody else
just like them may not replace them, the question is why have the
sanctions? What is the point of them? Why don't we lift them?
Wouldn't that be better?
Mrs. MEEK. I think that perhaps in a matter of time, the sanc-
tions will be lifted. I think so. I think because a lot of people are
suffering both ways because of the sanctions, and I think that if
we give them time, however, we might see some changes. I don't
think there has been enough time for the sanctions to work.
But frankly, Mr. Goss, I don't really believe in sanctions as being
the answer. Because sanctions are quite punitive on their own, and
I think, as I said before, that the time is over now for us to use
the kind of techniques we have been using in Haiti. You know
where I stand in terms of Haiti.
I just feel that the sanctions have been there about 8 weeks; they
haven't worked; it hasn't been a long time. Whether or not they
will bring about the two things I think should happen, and that is
to restore the restoration of democracy and to restore President
Aristide, to answer your question, I don't think so.
Mr. Goss. Well, I agree with you. I don't think they will either.
I think you and I are in agreement on that. I know of your compas-
sion. I know how sincere and real and heartfelt indeed that is. I
know that you have just said it, the misery that going on because
of the sanctions is something that none of us like. And if the sanc-
tions aren't likely to work and haven't worked, then it seems to me
there is no excuse for adding to the misery that we know is there
and that frankly we are contributing to as a country. I find that
very hard to accept. I think it is a very poor policy.
I would hope that you would encourage President Clinton to
change his policy to lift the sanctions. Now, we may not agree on
where we go after we lift the sanctions, but we agree if the sanc-







tions aren't working, probably aren't going to, why are we adding
to the misery in Haiti? What is the point?
Mrs. MEEK. Well, not working right now.
Mr. Goss. Well, if they are not working, let's get rid of them be-
cause we know they are causing trouble.
The second thing I wanted to point out, you did make a good deal
of comment about the different standard question. I understand
where you are coming from on that. Believe me, we have had the
debate many times in our district and down in our area. I gather
it is your view that Cubans and Haitians should be treated the
same.
Mrs. MEEK. Yes. I think all of them should be treated the same.
The fact that Cubans come in under the Cuban Adjustment Act,
which gives them-there is no deadline to the time that they can
adjust their status once they come to this country.
Mr. Goss. There is no question, it is a different setup.
Mrs. MEEK. Yes.
Mr. Goss. Would you prefer that the Cuban Adjustment Act be
repealed?
Mrs. MEEK. Definitely not.
Mr. Goss. So you would like to see a Haitian Adjustment Act
made in order for Haitians?
Mrs. MEEK. That is right.
Mr. Goss. My question is, what would be the ground rules for
that? Would we also do it for Rwandans? Do we do it for what
other countries under what conditions?
Mrs. MEEK. You have the U.S. immigration policy limits, certain
kinds of immigration to this country, so I would say stick by that
particular rule of thumb as long as you allow, go up to the amount
of eligibility that you have at this time.
Mr. Goss. What you are suggesting, I believe, if I understand
your resolution properly, however, is that we treat Haitians dif-
ferently and make them privileged?
Mrs. MEEK. No.
Mr. Goss. Give them special attention?
Mrs. MEEK. No. I want to be sure that they get a chance to get
a hearing. Right now the Haitians are not allowed a hearing.
See, if Haitians now leave Haiti, they are interdicted, if they
happen to leave, they are interdicted, and they are not allowed to
get to this country. But if a Cuban leaves Cuba, they are allowed
to come to this country, and they will have a year or more to adjust
their status. I guess that is what I am trying to say.
Mr. ToRuICILu.. If the gentlewoman will yield.
Mrs. MEEK. Am I reaching your point?
Mr. ToRmiuci.LLi. This exact problem exists with the Chinese.
Boats were found in the Pacific full of Chinese and they are also
returned. This, as Mr. Goss is demonstrating intellectually, you
have to extrapolate out, one could foresee virtually unlimited num-
bers of Chinese in exactly the same circumstances coming to the
United States and demanding hearings. The Pacific may be larger
than the Caribbean, but it has not proven to be a barrier. There-
fore, you could be dealing potentially not with thousands, not even
with hundreds of thousands, but with millions of people who, if we







are going to provide equity, would demand exactly the same oppor-
tunity.
Mrs. MEEK. I am not sure those are democratic countries you
have alluded to.
Mr. TORIciui,i. Well, none of them are democratic countries.
That is exactly the point.
Mrs. MEEK. But the Haitians have an established democratic
leader and they are on their way to a democracy, the same way-
Mr. Toi{Iuci:i.:. They are not living in a democracy. That is
what is giving right to a human rights claim. They have a human
rights claim, neither do the Cubans, neither do the Chinese, nei-
ther indeed probably do 21/2 or 3 billion people on earth. If we are
to provide an identical status, I am just simply suggesting to you
that as a practicality, this is a very large world.
Mrs. MEEK. My suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is that you allow the
same chance to Haitians as you are allowing to Cubans.
Mr. TORRICiiLL. Yes. And Mr. Goss and I are demonstrating that
along with the Cubans and the Haitians come a good deal of other
nations with very similar status. I am just trying to demonstrate
the point.
Mrs. MEEK. Well, if you look at the record, there has been more
Cubans coming into this country, about 1,200 of them a month
Congress into this country. I am saying, I go back to my original
premise, to allow Haitians the same freedom of access. That is if
they are eligible, if they are eligible, allow them.
Mr. TORuICIui. Mr. Goss.
Mr. Goss. Well, I think the point has been well made, Mr. Chair-
man. I don't want to belabor it. One other point. I did want to point
out what the administration has done to their credit is to try and
establish safe havens around the area in the Caribbean. They have
processing centers in a number of places in Haiti. I agree there
may be a significant danger for some people to use those, not for
everybody, but for some, that is clear, and it is also clear that there
has been a magnet established which explained some of the exodus,
that plus the misery level in the country.
But we do have processing centers and we are looking for others.
And we had some testimony about what we-the thanks we should
give to the Turks and Caicos Government, to the Bahamas Govern-
ment. I am sure that we are expressing our thanks to them not
only in words, but in dollars, for them helping us make a process-
ing center, as well as to the Jamaican Government, as well as to
many other governments where we have tried all levels of induce-
ment to get these centers.
The administration really is trying. There is not a tremendous
amount of receptivity to it, as you know, in the Caribbean at this
point. But we do have some different safe haven areas, at least in
theory, and Mr. Gray keeps telling me that we are going to get
some. So we don't have to worry about getting these folks from
Haiti to the United States; we need to just worry about getting
them out of harm's way. And it seems when we do that, an awful
lot of them do go back to Haiti. They choose rather to stay in the
safe haven rather than go back to Haiti, which I think proves a
point that we in fact have a lot of economic refugees.


QA _AQ'7 A 0







But the one thing that has happened is that along the lines that
you are trying to accomplish, and I would like your comment on it,
is that Mr. Gray has told us that he has changed the level from
a well-founded fear of persecution to a credible fear. Now, that is
a much lower test, a much easier test and it certainly made it
much easier for Haitians who feel that they may be endangered to
get into a safe haven circumstance. Do you agree with that?
Mrs. MEEK. Yes, I do.
Mr. Goss. Well, then, therefore we are basically taking care of
the refugees. If we lifted the sanctions and took care of the refu-
gees in those safe havens, why would we invade?
Mrs. MEEK. I think that we should invade Haiti, this is my opin-
ion, unless President Aristide is restored. I think that the Haitians,
any chance that they get will get on those rickety boats and come
to the United States if Aristide is not restored. So that-the illus-
tration you have shown there is one that is conjecture. That is, you
just don't know what will happen.
But you do know one thing, based on what has happened in the
past, that they will take to the boats and come to the United
States. They will not take a boat and go to some other place as a
safe haven, because I think what they are feeling when they get
on those boats, as all immigrants feel, that this country is a coun-
try that has opened its arms to everyone, and they believe that
woman who stands in New York harbor. So they would try to get
here.
Mr. Goss. Well, I think that that is probably true, and I think
that part of that is that we need to have the rules applied equally,
and I agree with you there is a disparity with the Cubans because
of the Cuban Adjustment Act and the question is how to deal with
that.
The other point, Mr. Chairman, I have taken a lot of time, and
I wanted to just say that while Mr. Smith is here that I very much
support what Mr. Smith is trying to accomplish in his resolution,
because the point has been made by you very articulately that we
are talking about here a democratically elected government that
was partly deposed. The President was deposed, but the Congress,
their parliament was not deposed.
Now, the problem in Haiti is they have a somewhat different con-
stitution than we do, and their parliament happens to be a bigger
player in their state of affairs in their governance, than in our
country, curious as that may be. It doesn't seem that way, but that
is the constitution of the country.
There happen to be some properly elected members of the par-
liament who have issued an invitation to us as parliamentarians,
as Members of Congress, to come and talk about a negotiated solu-
tion dealing with legitimately elected people. They would like to
have an exchange of groups between Members from this Congress,
representatives from both Houses and all parties to go there, and
then a reciprocal exchange up here, to see if there isn't a better
way to resolve the problem and take the moderate approach to
democratic institution-building and to isolate the extremists in this
issue.
That, of course, allows for the opportunity to deal with the
Aristide question and all of the positive things that we should be







talking about for the people of Haiti instead of ratcheting up the
misery level even more with these sanctions, threatening innocent
victims as well as the military down there with the threat of an
invasion, and going about the business of restoring democracy
through a negotiated parliamentarian type settlement.
Now that seems to me to be a credible idea. Mr. Smith has
brought it to the attention of this subcommittee appropriately. The
Chairman has spoken to the fact that we do in fact still have some
democratically elected people in Haiti. Yes, there are limitations on
how much they can do. Freedom has surely been shut down to a
degree, and that is something they have asked us to talk about.
And I believe that we should proceed with that process.
Do you disagree with that?
Mrs. MEEK. I disagree because I have a time constraint. I don't
think that we have 45 days to decide or deliberate as to what will
happen in Haiti. I go back to my original premise. I believe that
the United States should either through unilateral or multilateral
help quickly go into Haiti and clear the military coup leaders out.
That is the first thing.
Mr. Goss. If we did that, what would happen? Who would take
over?
Mrs. MEEK. Well, then after that there should be a peacekeeping
force left there from OSA.
Mr. Goss. How big?
Mrs. MEEK. You know, I am not a military planner.
Mr. Goss. These are peacekeepers.
Mrs. MEEK. I will just say the peacekeepers, a credible amount
of them that would keep the peace in Haiti. I can't tell you how
many.
Mr. Goss. 15,000? If I told you the Secretary General suggested
it would be somewhere around 15,000, would that sound about
right?
Mrs. MEEK. If that is what the Secretary General said, yes.
Mr. Goss. That is a lot of people.
Mrs. MEEK. Yes.
Mr. Goss. So those people are going to be down there. Then what
happens?
Mrs. MEEK. I think that when they get there they should begin
immediately to assist in the rebuilding of the infrastructure in
Haiti, that is to be sure that Haiti is built back, that there is infra-
structure placed after the government is given the kinds of re-
sources that they need to rebuild their country, and they will also
see to it that the democratically elected leader is returned to Haiti
without harm, that is if there are peacekeepers there.
Mr. Goss. They are going to guarantee the personal safety of
Aristide?
Mrs. MEEK. They could not guarantee it, no, I don't think anyone
could do that.
Mr. Goss. But you think we would go back unless he had such
a guarantee?
Mrs. MEEK. I don't know. I am sure if I were President Aristide
I would not go back to Haiti unless I had some assurance that
there would be some peacekeepers there.







Mr. Goss. Why don't we get just three more people like Cedras
and Biamby and Francois, wouldn't we just get more of those peo-
ple?
Mrs. MEEK. I don't think so.
Mr. Goss. What would stop them?
Mrs. MEEK. I don't think so. I think what would stop them if
Aristide were there, that the multitudes there-you know, he was
not appointed, he was elected by over 67 percent of the Haitian
public. So that means that there are people there who want him
in office.
Mr. Goss. Well, then he should go back today.
Mrs. MEEK. Well, that is conjecture, too.
Mr. Goss. We just heard that he could be restored. This is a res-
toration, I believe the distinguished gentleman from New York
said. If this is a restoration, then why doesn't he just go back
today?
Mrs. MEIEK. I guess we are going around sort of in a circle here.
Mr. Goss. I am trying to point out that the invasion doesn't get
us anything.
Mrs. MEEK. I think it does. I think it gets us a democratically
elected leader who has a capacity to lead the people of Haiti in a
democracy. I think that is what it gets us, and I think that is cru-
cial to the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
Mr. Goss. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have taken a lot of time.
You have been very generous.
Thank you.
Mr. ToIRICKEL.L. Good having you back, Mr. Goss. Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry
that I missed most of the-or all of the testimony, other than this
last exchange, and I would concur with the lady from Florida that
it seems to me that if we leave the status quo, and I might want
to ask Representative Smith, I understand you are, from what I
have been able to understand, proposing a commission to study-
how long would the study last and what would it be intending to
do?
Mr. SMITH. The commission would have a 45-day lease of life; it
would be made up of the leadership of the appropriate committees
of jurisdictions like the Armed Services, Appropriations Committee,
the Intelligence Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the
Majority Leader, Minority Leader, the Speaker of the House or
their designee. In total, approximately 20 people would be a part
of this commission.
The commission would look at the political, the economic, the hu-
manitarian implications of our standing policy; they would deter-
mine where we have been, where we are going, and hopefully it
would very quickly undertake a mission, a CODEL, if you will, to
Haiti to open up lines of communications with virtually everyone
responsible, and perhaps those who are even irresponsible if you
are talking about the ranking leadership. Communication lines
would be open with those who have power to talk about a nego-
tiated settlement or whatever else those commissioners want to
bring to the table. I think it would enhance the President's posi-
tion.







The President has tried a myriad of ways to try to resolve this
very vexing problem but to no avail. As we spoke about earlier,
many, many children are suffering and dying.
I know if I put my children in that situation, and I am sure you
would feel the same way, I would question the wisdom of the pol-
icy. If I saw my 6-year-old or 8-year-old or 10-year-old dying of mal-
nutrition or dying of some preventable disease that can be directly
linked to the sanctions, I would reconsider the policy. Now, there
is absolutely no solace whatsoever in the dictatorship in Port-au-
Prince. They have acted absolutely irresponsibly.
But, the hope is that we will continually reassess whether or not
the tools we are using would bring about democracy and a humani-
tarian Haiti. I think it behooves us not to stay in one place, no, we
should not just sit back and wait. I do think we need to be con-
stantly reassessing our policy.
This commission would bring Congress into the forefront, work-
ing as a partner with the President. It does not preclude any option
that the President might want to undertake, including if he feels
that U.S. lives or some other national vital interest would warrant
an invasion. It would not preclude that. The President still has cer-
tain prerogatives that obviously accrue only to the Commander in
Chief.
But I think we talked tangentially about this issue over and
over. I think this would give us an opportunity to develop a consen-
sus. The policy in Haiti is not going to be resolved within 6 months.
There are long-term problems, and I think the commission would
become a springboard for a consensus that will be sustainable. We
are talking about the infusion of 15,000-plus peacekeepers after
perhaps the peacemakers leave. There needs to be a sustainable
policy there that will last not just months, but many, many years.
The Commission would have 45 days to do its job, but again it does
not tie the President's hands at all, it offers additional hands which
I think need to be added to this equation.
Mr. PAYNE. I think that-thank you very much. I think that
when that proposal was made by Senator Dole, I think it was over-
whelmingly endorsed by General Cedras, which of course helped its
immediate defeat in the Senate. It appears to me that the Gov-
ernors Island accord gave those same responsibilities. It was a
broadening of the government. President Aristide made concessions
that he did not want to do and initially was unwilling to do. Cedras
said he would leave by October 15 and Francois Michael was going
to be sacked and that the army would be retrained and the police
would be retrained. But we found that Cedras and Francois and
others who were in control said no.
What would make you feel that a 45-day commission would
change these fellows? They have made agreements in the past and
they have reneged on them.
Mr. SMITH. In response, let me just ask you, because you did
bring up the possibility that General Cedras supported the Dole
initiative and perhaps is supporting this. Didn't he also support the
Governors Island agreement?
Mr. PAYNE. Yes. And I think that is the reason-
Mr. SMITH. And signed it. We would agree that it was a very
good agreement. His support of this, I would say to my friend,







should in no way be used as a negative, as it was manipulated in
the Senate.
Mr. PAYNE. You asked me a question. Let me answer my good
friend from New Jersey, we are New Jerseyans here and Floridians
it seems, it is interesting. But to have such different views from
two different places. Because General Cedras proved with the Gov-
ernors Island Accord, I think you sort of answered my question,
evidently his word means very little. And secondly, that it is very
clear he has no intention, in spite of-I didn't hear Mr. Richardson,
but he had a nice lunch with him or dinner and was impressed be-
cause he is an impressive person, educated, well-trained, well-
schooled, much by our intelligence people in the past. And so if you
meet him for the first time, you know, you become impressed.
I think there was a Governor Rodney from Michigan that went
over to the Far East and he was brainwashed. He fought-it was
one thing after he came back and fought through it and time
proved that he was wrong, and I wish Mr. Richardson was here so
we could explore his 5-hour meeting with Mr. Cedras to find out
what convinced him that this person was ready to be fair. But I
just believe that these military leaders are not willing or interested
in turning over power.
Secondly, I don't know where these numbers of 15,000 for several
years of peacekeepers come from, because it would appear to me
that a retrained military, although downsized, would be able to
take over any kind of responsibility or the creation of a police de-
partment throughout the island of Haiti, would be able to maintain
law and order. And I personally don't buy the need for 5-year occu-
pational force of 15,000 people staying in Haiti.
I think that this is-I don't know where the numbers come from.
I have no idea how people justify that. And as a matter of fact, I
think that the majority of the persons really in the military, actu-
ally the rank and file, are supporters of Aristide. And that the lead-
ership is what have led them in the direction of allowing brutality
and murder and corruption to be the way of the army.
So I just was interested in the rationale that Cedras would, after
the 45-day commission gave its report, would then abide by what-
ever they came up with.
Mr. SMITH. That is not what the commission intends on doing;
it doesn't have that capability. The commission would study, review
and hopefully make a site visit with Members of the House and
Senate; it would review policy options vis-a-vis Haiti, hopefully
make recommendations that will be in the best interests of the
children who are suffering so cruelly in Haiti; the commission
would meet with all key players and hopefully a dialogue would
emerge that could lead to a solution. No one knows and can pre-
judge that in advance.
I would agree with you and agree with many others that General
Cedras is waiting this out. But, as Mr. Richardson did in his con-
versations with General Cedras, if avenues and links are estab-
lished between other sectors in that country, we might be able to
find some resolution short of additional bloodshed. And that is part
of what I am trying to resolve here.
I also think the crisis would get many more responsible eyes.
Congress, as you know, has used commissions in the past both for







foreign and domestic policy when a problem seemed to have no real
solution. The commission may prove to go nowhere if it were to be
configured, but it might open up opportunities. You know, just re-
cently we had another breakthrough in the Middle East process.
And I think dialogue is preferable to conflict.
We all remember the day when mere contact with Yassar Arafat
was construed to be a crime of some sort, and the breakthroughs
that occurred through dialogue has now led to a very fragile peace
in the Middle East. Perhaps a commission could help ratchet to-
ward a peaceful resolution. That is my hope.
Again, the Chairman has articulated his view on this, as have
Mr. Goss and others, and I think the untold suffering visited upon
the children of Haiti has to rank high on our list of concerns. I
have spent my 14 years in Congress fighting for child survival
funds and fighting for more money to immunize or rehydrate kids
and to protect them from preventable diseases. The record is clear.
I have offered amendment after amendment, in our Foreign Affairs
Committee and on the floor, to get higher levels of funding for
those kinds of programs because children are the most precious of
all in our society. And I know you share this concern, to see so
many kids dying, the morbidity and the mortality of these kids is
frightening. This is not to give solace to Cedras and others. We
have to look at the means and try to bring democracy to that coun-
try.
Mr. PAYNE. I asked the Chairman to yield for another minute to
just say that I would like to commend you for your consistency.
There is no question that you are probably one of the only Mem-
bers of Congress that I know who is consistent on your stand on
the right to life, but also opposition to death penalty and you have
a consistency in your position. Although I disagree philosophically
with it, I have to commend you for the fact that you don't say one
thing on one hand and then say just the opposite.
You know, some of the biggest proponents of right to life like you
are the strongest supporters of the death penalty. You know them
well. And so I just say that I do have to commend you on that.
And the final point is that I too feel that the children must be
saved. I just think that the way to save the children is to remove
the tyrants, to remove them quickly. I don't think that they should
continue to suffer. That is why I support a military intervention,
and to hold these military criminals on trial.
They should be told for the last time either leave or stay and face
war crimes or other kinds of crimes against humanity that should
be brought to bear. Cedras stays, then he stands trial, period.
Mr. ToRilCEILLl. Mr. Gilman, do you have anything you would
like to add for the committee?
Mr. GILMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I regret I was delayed, we had
other meetings this afternoon. I want to commend you for conduct-
ing the hearing at this time.
It is such a troublesome problem to all of us, that I think we
need to fully explore whatever initiatives can be undertaken before
we embark on any hostile action, and a number of us have written
to the President. I just would like to remind my colleagues that a
majority of the parliamentarians in Haiti wrote to us recently re-
minding us that they would like to see a bipartisan commission ap-






36
pointed to go down and take a good hard look at the issues on all
sides and come back and make recommendations. And I for one
think that is worthwhile exploring, if it is not going to unduly
delay whatever has to be done to bring about a full resolution of
this issue.
Mr. TomiUCEimu. Thank you, Mr. Gilman, very much.
That, of course, is the substance of Mr. Smith's proposal. Mrs.
Meek also has legislation before the committee, as does Mr. Del-
lums. The committee is, of course, open to considering any and all
of those legislative proposals.
I would invite their authors to attempt to construct a majority
on this subcommittee, given any evidence whatsoever that that is
possible, I would be glad to proceed with any and all.
I thank our witnesses for their testimony, and for their patience
today, the members for their attendance. The committee is ad-
journed.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.















APPENDIX



OPENING STATEMENT
REP. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
HEARING ON HAITI: VIEWS FROM CONGRESS

JULY 27, 1994

With planning already underway for a military invasion of
Haiti and with the Clinton Administration already seeking approval
for such an invasion in the United Nations, the time is at hand for
the U.S. Congress to express its opinion.

Today, we have called together several Members of this body
who have strong views on Haiti and who have offered different
legislative approaches to the crisis. It is our sincere hope that
the Clinton Administration will be listening.

It is my belief that a United States military invasion of
Haiti cannot be justified unless we are prepared to step in and run
the government until democracy has fully taken hold -- a process
that could take a decade or more. I do not believe that the
American public is ready for that responsibility, and I further
believe that American parents are not prepared to send their
children into battle over an island that holds no great strategic
importance to the United States.

We are all frustrated and angered by the actions of the
illegitimate military leaders who rule Haiti. But we cannot allow
our frustration to cloud our good judgement. Just because we
support democracy and oppose totalitarianism does mean that we can
simply invade every country that fails to meet our high standards.
According to such logic, we would already have invaded Cuba, North
Korea and Iraq.

We cannot overlook the fact that while we can help, the
ultimate responsibility for restoring democratic rule to Haiti
rests with the Haitians themselves. We can provide training, we
can provide economic assistance and we can isolate the military
regime, but it is the Haitian people who must restore democracy and
make it work. That is not to say that the task facing the Haitian
people is not difficult, or indeed, in the near term, impossible.
But at some point we must recognize that the United States cannot
do for Haiti what the Haitians are not willing to do for
themselves.

Finally, while we will hear different approaches to the
Haitian crisis today, let the military leaders who are occupying
Haiti make no mistake: the American people and their elected
representatives are united in their refusal to accept the illegal
coup. We will not rest until democracy is restored to Haiti.

I thank my colleagues for appearing before us today. I look
forward to your testimony.










BUILDING CONGRESSIONAL CONSENSUS ON HAITI
Statement of
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
July 28, 1994

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your scheduling today's hearing, as requested,
about congressional legislative initiatives dealing with the crisis in Haiti. A number of
legislative proposals addressing the wide range issues affecting U.S. policy towards Haiti
have been sponsored by our colleagues, and I am hopeful that beginning today, we will have
a full airing of the issues dealing with this vexing crisis.

I would also request that the Subcommittee move forward on my -- our -- initiative,
Mr. Chairman, to help build a congressional consensus on Haiti. Frankly, all the other
policy questions and respective pieces of legislation would be predicated on such findings.
The Haitian crisis demands our full attention.

Introduction of Resolution

Mr. Chairman, as fellow sponsor of H.Con.Res 264, you know the resolution we
introduced would establish a congressional commission for the purpose of thoroughly
assessing the humanitarian, political and diplomatic conditions in Haiti, as well as presenting
alternative options for U.S. policy. Such policy options could help forge an informed,
sustainable consensus within the Congress, and possibly among the American people, on
what action the United States should take.

The proposed Commission would be bipartisan, and would be representative of the
Committees which have legislative jurisdiction in carrying out such options. In addition to
actually seeing the conditions in Haiti and meeting with a broad section of Haitian political,
religious and civic leaders, the Commission would receive testimony from experts on Haiti
and Haitian culture, human rights, health needs and social welfare, as well as individuals
who are experienced in political institution building, and diplomatic processes and
negotiations. We would envision a CODEL to Haiti would include meetings with non-
governmental organizations which have been providing humanitarian assistance to millions
of Haitians, church leaders, including the Papal Nuncio Archbishop Lorenzo Baldisseri, top
government leaders including members of the Chamber of Deputies, labor unions,
educators, journalists, U.S. Embassy personnel, and others who have been in the political
arena.

You may be interested to know that several years ago, I was joined by our colleague,
Representative Tony Hall, and others in being appointed by the Speaker of the House to
a ad hoc commission to assess the needs of the Kurds fleeing their communities in Northern
Iraq. In that case, the report from our delegation played a pivotal role in focusing U.S.
policy towards the humanitarian needs of the Kurdish population fleeing northern Iraq into
Turkey. While the Haiti Commission's mandate would be significantly larger in scope,
serious, thorough and bipartisan efforts to identify possible solutions have proven to be
productive and consensus-building. I do believe we need to build a consensus on Haiti.









Mr. Chairman, I believe the President should not treat the public's opposition to an
invasion as frivolous. The latest polls indicate that Americans are strongly opposed to
military intervention in Haiti. Public opinion polls can serve as a barometer of how the
American people are reacting to policy decisions and actions by their government. On the
other hand, Mr. Chairman, polls cannot lead policy decision making, that can only be done
on the basis of informed consensus. I believe that a bipartisan, broad-based commission of
Members whose committee assignments thrust them into the middle of such issues can play
a key role in building that necessary, bipartisan, and informed consensus within Congress.

Invasion, What is the Consensus Today?

From Haiti, we have received the clear message from 48 members of the Chamber
of Deputies in their July 1st letter to leaders in the House and Senate: "The dire
consequences of Haiti's political crisis in addition to the sanctions for our society and
economy are increasingly evident. We are certain, however, that foreign military
intervention cannot provide a foundation for a lasting solution to Haiti's problems. It must
be noted that as Parliamentarians we firmly oppose the very idea of a military intervention
which is, in any case, reproved by the different sectors comprising Haitian society."

One of the signers, Chamber of Deputies Member Duly Brutus, recently wrote in an
Op-Ed, "It would be ironic -- as well as tragic -- if the United States, in the name of
democracy, were to intervene militarily to achieve the return of President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide to Haiti. It is hard to think of anything that would do more damage to democracy.
No reputable political leader or party in all of Haiti -- including Aristide -- welcomes the
use of military force to achieve his return."

Charles Schomaker, President of American University of the Caribbean, located in
Les Caves, Haiti, wrote in a June 20th letter, '"The proposal of an invasion is not the answer.
I have talked with pro-Aristide supporters and pro-military supporters and both HATE the
idea of American troops on the soil of Haiti. I truly believe many [of] Aristide's supporters
will oppose American troops on Haitian soil."

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams has
warned, "Sending U.S. soldiers into Haiti as Mr. Aristide's private army would be a terrible
mistake. U.S. policy should no longer be based on Mr. Aristide."

In their May 20th pastoral message, the bishops of the Haitian Episcopal Conference
[Catholic Bishops] proclaimed, "Our people are dying, our country is on the brink of ruin.
Our nation is threatened with destruction by an armed intervention from abroad. We want
to express our profound sorrow and rejection of all that may bloody our land. We wish also
to sound a cry of alarm at the real danger of our losing our sovereignty."

According to the July 20th USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll, 84 percent of Americans
oppose U.S. military intervention in Haiti.

Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and former NSC staff member
Eric Melhy, warned in their Op-Ed: "If the Administration orders an invasion to restore










President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, it will be making a grave mistake...Even if, given our
superior forces, Father Aristide were back in office within a few days, in the long run an
occupation would immerse us in the morass of Haitian nation-building -- a futile exercise,
surely Haiti has struggled unsuccessfully with this task for nearly two centuries."

President Aristide himself recently remarked on a National Public Radio, "I am
against a military invasion."

Humanitarian Concerns

The state of malnutrition, disease and morbidity in Haiti is appalling. The statistics
of Haiti have always ranked the country very low in comparison with other countries in the
region. U.S. AID's Monitoring Report from last November was comprehensive, with
monthly updates since then. According to these reports, over the last two and one-half
years, third degree malnutrition (which is the most severe of the malnutrition rankings) for
children ages 0 to 5 years is abnormally high in the southern part of Haiti, a part of Haiti
which historically has had relatively better nutrition rates. With respect to morbidity,
reported cases of diarrhea, malaria, and acute respiratory infections have all risen over the
past several months. Low birth weight babies, in the northwest of Haiti have risen from
6.25% to a stunning 16.7%. In Port-au- Prince, the rate rose within one year from 10% to
15% in November 1993. By February, the report indicated that the upward trend reflects
a "precarious and worsening nutritional status of pregnant women."

According to CARE which is working in northwest Haiti, the price of food has risen
more than 100% over the last year. These statistics are particularly detrimental because of
the long-term effects. Families are divesting their assets, selling their income-producing
capital simply to feed their families, and further degradation of the environment for fuel.
These disturbing trends are not only of concern in the short-term, but sadly are creating
more of a welfare state which takes many more years to overcome.

The President has Flip-flopped Too Many Times

As a candidate, Mr. Clinton criticized President Bush's decision to repatriate Haitian
refugees. On May 27, 1992, Candidate Clinton said, "I am appalled by the decision of the
Bush administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them
to Haiti before considering their claim to political asylum...This policy must not stand. It
is a blow to the principle of first asylum and to America's moral authority in defending
refugees around the world...[and] is another sad example of the administration's callous
response to a terrible human tragedy...if I were president, I would -- in the absence of clear
and compelling evidence that they weren't political refugees -- give them temporary asylum
until ve restored the elected government of Haiti."

On January 14, 1993, before he even took his oath of office, President-elect Clinton
reversed his stance and announced his continuation of the Bush refugee policy. He said in
a radio address, "the practice of returning those who fled Haiti by boat will continue, for the
time being, after I become President. Those who do leave Haiti...by boat will be stopped
and directilv returned by the United States Coast Guard."






41


President Clinton announced in May 1994, that the repatriation policy would change,
and on June 16th refugees picked up at sea would have asylum hearings aboard Navy ships.
The magnet of the refugee policy encouraged thousands upon thousands of Haitians to set
out to sea. The floundering President again changed his policy on July 5, allowing only
refugees who apply at processing centers in Haiti to relocate in the U.S., if qualified, and
all other refugees found at sea would be relocated in safe havens. And, even with the safe
haven policy, poor diplomatic communication has led to embarrassing international
misunderstandings.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I am certain there is unanimity among Members of Congress on this
point: One realm of leadership in which no President should be ambivalent or unclear in
his policy is in the commitment of U.S. troops.

It is essential, Mr. Chairman, that the United States not be tempted to pursue an
expedient policy in Haiti which would likely include military intervention, but we must make
the right decision on U.S. policy. Rather than slide into a military invasion of Haiti, I firmly
believe that we in the Congress must seek out the best alternative policy for the United
States.








103D CONGRESS
103D CONGRESS H. CON. RES. 264

Establishing a congressional commission for the purpose of assessing the
humanitarian, political, and diplomatic conditions in Haiti and reporting
to the Congress on the appropriate policy options available to the United
States with respect to Haiti.




IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 30, 1994
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (for himself Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. GILMAX, Mr.
IIYDE, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. Goss, and Mr. EMER-
SON) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred
to the Committee on Foreign Affairs




CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Establishing a congressional commission for the purpose of
assessing the humanitarian, political, and diplomatic con-
ditions in Haiti and reporting to the Congress on the
appropriate policy options available to the United States
with respect to Haiti.

Whereas the American people eagerly support a peaceful
transition to a democratic and representative government
in Haiti;
Whereas Haiti's elected President who is in exile and the de
facto ruling junta in Haiti have reached an impasse in
their negotiations for the reinstitution of civilian govern-
ment;








Whereas the extensive economic sanctions imposed by the
United Nations and United States against the de facto
rulers are causing grave harm to innocent Haitians;

Whereas private businesses and other sources of employment
are being shut down, and the continuation of the com-
prehensive economic sanctions are causing massive star-
vation, the spread of disease at epidemic proportions, and
widespread environmental degradation; and

Whereas an armed invasion of Haiti by forces of the United
States, the United Nations, and the Organization of
American States would endanger the lives of troops sent
to Haiti as well as thousands of Haitians, especially civil-
ians: Now, therefore, be it
1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate

2 concurring),

3 SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT AND DUTIES.
4 There is established a congressional commission to

5 assess the humanitarian, political, and diplomatic condi-
6 tions in Haiti and to present to the Congress a report of-

7 fering appropriate policy options available to the United

8 States with respect to Haiti. The Commission shall call

9 upon recognized experts on Haiti and Haitian culture, as

10 well as experts on health and social welfare, political insti-

11 tution building, and diplomatic processes and negotiations.

12 SEC. 2. COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.

13 The Commission shall consist of the following Mem-

14 bcrs of Congress (or their designees):








1 (1) The Speaker of the House of Representa-
2 tives.

3 (2) The minority leader of the House of Rep-
4 resentatives.

5 (3) The chairman and ranking Member of the
6 following committees of the House of Representa-
7 tives:

8 (A) The Committee on Appropriations.

9 (B) The Committee on Foreign Affairs.
10 (C) The Permanent Select Committee on
11 Intelligence.

12 (D) The Committee on Armed Services.
13 (4) The majority leader of the Senate.
14 (5) The minority leader of the Senate.

15 (6) The chairman and ranking Member of the
16 following committees of the Senate:

17 (A) The Committee on Appropriations.
18 (B) The Committee on Foreign Relations.
19 (C) The Select Committee on Intelligence.
20 (D) The Committee on Armed Services.
21 (7) The chairman and vice-chairman of the
22 Congressional Hunger Caucus.
23 SEC. 3. REPORT OF COMMISSION.
24 Not later than 45 days after passage of this concur-
25 rent resolution, the Commission shall submit to the Con-






45


1 gress a report on the Commission's analysis and assess-

2 ment of appropriate policy options available to the United

3 States with respect to Haiti.










MAJOR R OWENS --i0c.rao. -2
COMIrTEE ON i r1 "-
EDUCATION AND LABORs .CCCIS
COMM rTEE ON -* ," '2c *ov*
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 0 l i I t, 1 nited itatts-
C..ongress of the 'nit states .. .-,
Rouse of 'RtprtsEntatieou
IDashingtln, BC 20515-3211
Statement of Congressman Major R. Owens
Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs July 27, 1994

THE OFFICIAL HAITI POSITION OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS


With respect to Haiti policy it is important to note that very lengthy past deliberations have
produced CBC policy positions which are consistent with the principles and priorities of the CBC
and with their understanding of the urgent life and death nature of the Haitian crisis. Although
no actions have been taken to rescind any previously adopted positions, the highly charged
current atmosphere has led to the generation of statements which unnecessarily present a
distorted view of CBC solidarity. Some commentators, Congressmen and Senators are
projecting the image of an arrogant, rabid, solidly unified CBC dictating U.S. policy on Haiti.
This is a blatant, racist attempt to sabotage the new Clinton initiative. On the other hand some
CBC members are stating that the CBC has no position on military intervention. At this point
in this escalating situation it is important to review the record and provide the opportunity for
an official restatement of the CBC position.

In the Spnng of this year, 1994, the CBC set forth a "Serious Sanctions Initiative". This
initiative was first expressed in a letter to President Clinton. The contents of the letter were
later incorporated into HR 4114, as a legislative expression of the CBC position. Some of the
mandates contained in HR 4114 have been implemented. Following the dismissal of Mr.
Pezzulo and the appointment of Bill Gray, the Clinton administration has undertaken for the first
time a "Serious Sanctions Initiative". The one important segment of HR 4114 that has not been
adopted is the section demanding that the Haitian asylum policy be administered in the same way
that asylum for all other refugees is handled. We called for an end to the racist double standard
being applied to Haitian refugee cases.

The Congressional Black Caucus reaffirms its position as clearly set forth in HR 4114. We fully
support the administration in its implementation of certain of the mandates proposed in HR 4114
-- strict sanctions, freezing of assets, denial of visas, etc. We deplore the fact that the
administration has refused to implement the provisions of HR 4114 which relate to the end of
the double standard with respect to asylum cases. While we applaud the ending of the forced
return of refugees to the killer regime in Haiti, we are fearful that the foreign soil safe-haven
approach presently being utilized sets an outrageous precedent. A recent suggestion that some
of the Haitian refugees be shipped "back to Africa" will open the door to a new dimension of
the evil of applying a double standard for people of African descent. It remains the strong











position of the CBC that HR 4114 should be implemented in its entirety.

HR 4114 did not rescind any previous CBC positions. At the meeting where this "Serious
Sanctions Initiative" was adopted we stated that the previous policy was not being rescinded but
was being placed on a "back burner" while we emphasized the fact that "all had not been done
that could be done" with respect to the full application of non-violent pressure on the criminal
regime in Haiti. Following the dismissal of Mr. Pezzulo the administration chose to pursue a
parallel strategy of serious sanctions and a highly visible military option. The media and
national leaders have chosen to focus intensely on the "invasion" possibility. The question of
military intervention has been catapulted onto a "front burner" and the CBC is now in a position
where it must answer the bombardment of questions about its position. On the record our
official position stands as adopted on October 27, 1993 with only one dissenting vote. For
purposes of clarification the following section of the statement of our October 27th position is
quoted:

"Therefore Be It Resolved:

That for all of the reasons stated and findings listed above, President Clinton
should reaffirm that the strengthening of democracy in Haiti and the establishment
of stability and economic development in Haiti based on self determination is a
vital interest of the United States; and,

That all necessary means, including protective military force, should be utilized
to complete the objectives of the Governor's Island Agreement on schedule; and,

That immediate, emergency steps should be taken to provide protection for all
elected officials of the constitutional government of Haiti and their families; and,

That whatever steps are necessary should be taken immediately to provide the
constitutionally elected government of President Aristide with the necessary
facilities and resources to train an army of Haitian Freedom Fighters to serve as
a counter force to the existing army of drug smugglers and killers; and,

That a campaign led by the President and the leaders of Congress be initiated to
inform the American people of the historic vital interest position assumed by the
United States with respect to all political and military events occurring within the
Western Hemisphere generally, and specifically in Haiti; and,

That the Clinton Administration should enunciate and declare an updated positive
policy version of the Monroe Doctrine which declares that the United States will
do everything in its power to promote democracy and economic development
within this hemisphere."








STATEMENT BY

HONORABLE BILL RICHARDSON

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

July 27, 1994



Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the

Subcommittee to present my views on Haiti. I recently concluded a visit

to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Grand Turks Island, the Dominican Republic,

and Haiti as part of a comprehensive examination of Issues surrounding

Haiti. I undertook this fact-finding mission in my individual capacity as a

Member of Congress and a Member of the House Intelligence Committee.

Contrary to press reports, I did not undertake this mission at the behest

of the Administration, nor was I acting as a secret envoy. I did not deliver

any message on behalf of the White House, nor did I deliver any

ultimatum to General Cedras. Likewise, upon my return to Washington, I

was not carrying any message from General Cedras for delivery to

President Clinton.








Approximately eight weeks ago, I joined two of my colleagues,

Congressmen Julian Dixon and Jack Reed, on a congressional delegation

to Haiti. While in Haiti, we met with human rights officials, Aristide

supporters, and a range of Haitian political and business leaders.

Regrettably, General Cedras refused to meet with the delegation despite

the intense efforts of the U.S. Embassy to arrange such a meeting. Upon

my return to Washington, I voiced my displeasure at not having had an

opportunity to speak with General Cedras. I was subsequently informed

by Cedras' representative that a meeting with General Cedras might be

facilitated if I desired. No American official had met with General Cedras

since March, and I viewed the offer of such a meeting as a unique

opportunity to solicit General Cedras' views on the Haitian crisis and to

underscore U.S. resolve toward the restoration of democracy in Haiti.

General Cedras confirmed the invitation in a fax to my office I received

July 15.



On Monday, July 18, I met with General Cedras and the rest of the

military high command at General Cedras' home. The meeting lasted for

approximately five hours. During that time, I took the opportunity to

advise General Cedras that I supported President Clinton's Haiti policy. I

specifically informed the General that the Governors Island Agreement

had to be resuscitated and that he must resign his position and permit








the restoration of President Aristide's government. I further informed

General Cedras that I was personally opposed to any unilateral military

intervention. However, I advised the General, in no uncertain terms, that

if the President ordered a military intervention, I would support the

President In his decision. I underscored the need for General Cedras to

act immediately, as time was running out and a growing consensus was

building in the Congress for more affirmative action to restore Aristide to

power.



Having visited Haiti two months ago, provided me with an excellent

framework from which to judge the effectiveness of the sanctions. Two

months ago, based on the number of gasoline vendors on the streets of

Port-au-Prince, it was hard to fathom that any embargo existed. Today,

however, the numbers of gasoline vendors are substantially less than

eight weeks ago, and traffic on the streets is significantly reduced.



Occasional power outages which affect every sector of the

population continue to occur in Port-au-Prince. During my meeting with

General Cedras, he acknowledged that the sanctions were biting and that

they were, in fact, hurting the military. As an example, General Cedras








cited a situation where a soldier was shot, transported to the hospital, but

could not be operated on because no electricity existed. That soldier

subsequently died.



Despite the obvious impact of the sanctions, there continues to be

significant leakage along the Haiti-Dominican Republic border. I

personally witnessed border violations during my visit to Haiti. I crossed

the border area from the Dominican Republican at Jamini. This region is

most popularly referred to as "Kuwait City," due to the large volume of

fuel that moves through the area. While being processed by Haiti

Customs officers, I saw small boats loaded with barrels, apparently used

for transporting fuel, transversing the river between Haiti and the

Dominican Republic. I might add that this activity took place during

daylight hours and apparently with little or no concern shown by both the

Haitian and Dominican authorities posted along the border.



It-Is my understanding that the United Nations monitoring team will

arrive in the Dominican Republic within a couple of weeks to assist In

monitoring the border. Additionally, I am aware that President Clinton

recently approved a transfer of equipment, including helicopters, to the

Dominican Republic to further assist In its enforcement efforts.

Nevertheless, I remain skeptical of the Dominicans' ability to seal the








border and thus give the sanctions the strongest teeth possible. My

skepticism is based upon my belief that resolve on the part of the

Dominican military is lacking. This lackadaisical attitude is fueled by the

financial gains that can be made through trafficking contraband along the

border region. Despite this view, I am confident that some improvements

will be made and that the impact of sanctions will continue to be felt by

all Haitians.



Mr. Chairman, I also had the opportunity to visit Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba and Grand Turks Island in the Turks and Caicos. While there, I

reviewed the refugee processing operations. Brigadier General Mike

Williams is Commander at Joint Task Force 160, which is responsible for

the refugee processing operation. Presently, there are approximately

16,000 Haitian refugees at Guantanamo Bay. Our men and women of the

Armed Forces assigned to JTF-160 are doing a fantastic job. The refugee

camps are sanitary and well organized. Within the camps, specific areas

have been designated for housing of single men, single women, families,

and children. Additionally, a quarantine area has been established, as

well as an area to house individuals accused of violent crimes in Haiti,

and persons who pose a disciplinary and security threat to other

refugees.








The refugees at Guantanamo Bay are provided two hot meals a day

and one MRE at lunch. Contrary to press reports citing disorganization

and long-feeding lines, I personally witnessed a very organized and

structured operation of providing lunch to the refugees. Additionally, the

lines, while somewhat long, moved at a rapid pace, and there appeared to

be little, if any, discontent on the part of the refugees.



I took the opportunity to speak with several of the refugees while at

Guantanamo Bay. I asked them how they were being treated, and all of

them responded "well." I also asked them what complaints they had, and

the only complaints I heard was the fact that they had not yet been

permitted to go to the United States. In responding to a question

concerning how many wanted to go to the United States as opposed to

any safe haven, approximately 50 percent of the refugees responded that

they wanted to go to the United States, and the other 50 percent

responded that they would go to any safe haven as opposed to returning

to Haiti. My ability to communicate with the Haitians was facilitated by

Gunnery Sergeant Erns E. Rinuil who served as my translator. The

military has very few linguists who speak French Creole, and Gunnery

Sergeant Rinuil's mastery of the language was apparent. The ability to








communicate with the refugees is indispensable to maintaining discipline

and order as well as tending to their needs. Gunnery Sergeant Rinuil

serves an important role in bridging the gap of understanding.



The 16,000 refugees being housed at Guantanamo Bay are not yet

impacting upon the base's infrastructure. In fact, Brigadier General

Williams informed us that up to 28,000 refugees could be accommodated

at Guantanamo Bay, but that number would Impose severe restraints and

limitations on the infrastructure, most specifically, the water supply.



The refugee processing center on Grand Turks Island is a replica of

the Guantanamo Bay facility. The commanding officer of the operation on

Grand Turks Island is Colonel Doug Redllch. As you know, Grand Turks

Island will serve a maximum of 2,000 refugees who must be processed

within seven days. The camps have been constructed and the military is

anxious to begin processing refugees. All that remains are the final

signatures on the Memorandum of Understanding to permit operations to

begin. I see no reason why the Grand Turks Island facility would not

duplicate the organization and efficiency of the refugee processing

operations at Guantanamo Bay. I support the Administration's policy,

and based upon my visit, I am confident that the refugees are well cared

and provided for.








In summation, Mr. Chairman, I support the Administration's Haiti

policy. However, the military option should be the last resort. Prior to

initiating any military action, all diplomatic tools should be explored and

exhausted. I support the efforts for multilateral support at the U.N. I

maintain a glimmer of hope that this crisis can be resolved peacefully

without the need for military intervention. I reiterate my position that

Aristide must be restored to his presidency, and General Cedras, General

Biamby, and Colonel Francois must resign and leave the country. I found

President Aristide to be enormously popular with the Haitian people.



Lastly, Mr. Chairman, an aid package that would assist in the re-

development and re-building of Haiti needs to be considered. The U.S.

and the entire international community owes Haiti a multilateral aid

package from all nations and international aid groups to include food,

medicine, agricultural assistance and budget support to correct the

destruction that has been wrought In that Caribbean island nation. We

should begin to focus attention on this now so that when Aristide returns

to Haiti, a massive influx of assistance can be provided to help relieve the

people of their pain and suffering.



I appreciate having the opportunity to testify before you, and am

prepared to answer any questions you might have.






56


TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN JACK REED
HEARING ON U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN HAITI
WESTERN HEMISPHERE SUBCOMMITTEE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
JULY 27, 1994

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for this
opportunity to discuss American policy with regard to Haiti.

On May 27th, I had the opportunity to travel to Haiti with our
colleagues, Bill Richardson and Julian Dixon. As you know, Bill
Richardson has just returned from a follow-up trip. During our
visit in May, we had the chance to talk with a broad spectrum of
political figures as well as our Enbassy staff. My comments are
based upon this trip and consideration of our policy over many
months.

American policy must address three critical issues; the departure
of the illegal Cedras regime, the-establishment in Haiti of the
democratically elected government of President Aristide under
conditions that will not require the commitment of American
milicar-y forces, and the prevention of the un-controlled entry of
Haitian nationals into the United States.

Removal of the illegal Cedras regime continues to be a frustrating
and. to date, unsuccessful effort. nevertheless, resorting to the
expecient as= j Ameri--i military forces to resolve the situation
would, I feel, be a mistake. There is no doubt that American
military forces would quickly overwhelm any organized resistance.
fHwever, these short rn-- gains would be rapidly dissipated. Few
pli--.ker-s have to be romindec .hat we spent 19 years in Haiti
trving to fac-litate the develc-i:='.t of a functioning democracy
witcn ain-- A-y z--;-- to show for it. Moreover, our visit to
Haiti demonstrated that an American "invasion" would quickly
engender local opposition. We found no significant support for such
a policy among civilian political leaders. In fact, the impression
was left that most would have to reflexively condemn such an
invasion in order to maintain their standing within domestic
political circles. In sum, we woulti find ourselves in the awkward
position of risking American forces to eject Cedras and then find
ourselves as unwelcome "guests" 'y those we thought we were
helping.

Inextricably bound up in efforts tn expel the Cedras regime is the
attitude and activities of the Aristide government. Aristide's
brief rule over Haiti has raised considerable controversy over his
cc=-mutment to the Constitutional principles that we would be
presumably supporting. Within Haiti, he is a figure that commands
great respect among many and great suspicion among many others. At
this junction, it is essential that his government play a more
ccnstructive and Cooperative role in resolving this crisis. As a
first step, a Prime Minister should be appointed immediately. This
individual should represent a broadening of his government and
manifest a sincere attempt to be inclusive of responsible civilian






57



elements within Haiti. In this way, there is a possibility of
further weakening the hold of the Cedras regime while beginning to
establish a government that can function immediately upon the
departure of the Cedras regime.

With regard to our policy towards Haitian refugees, the various
attempts to provide off-shore processing have been abandoned and
with good reason. The activation and reactivation of these
facilities outside Haiti invariably starts a wholesale exodus
which imperils the refugees and undermines attempts to offer asylum
to politically active Haitians. During our trip to Haiti, we
visited the Refugee Processing Center in Port au Prince. There are
additional centers in the southern city of Les Cayes and the
northern city of Cap Haitian. These centers continue to operate and
process Haitians who seek entry into the United States. The
criteria for entry is consistent with our policy of offering asylum
for political refugees. According to Embassy personnel, these
centers have operated with little or no interference from the
Cedras regime. In sum, we should continue to operate these centers
and refrain from the establishment of centers outside of Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, we all recognize that there are few easy answers to
this crisis. I appreciate your effort and the efforts of this
Ccr=ittee to search for a principled resolution of the situation.
I thank you for this opportunity to share my thoughts.
























PREPARED STATEMENT OF CONGRESSWOMAN CARRIE P. MEEK
before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
July 27, 1994









Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for your Invitation
to testify this afternoon on behalf of H.R. 3663, the Haitian Refugee Fairness Act.


I would also like to acknowledge the support for the Haitian refugees by
Members of the Subcommittee. Several Members, including Mr. Menendez, Ms.
McKinney and Ms. Ros-Lehtinen are among the more than 80 cosponsors of H.R.
3663.

H.R. 3663 seeks to address three specific refugee problems: nonrefoulement
or forced repatriation; the status of Haitian nationals here in the United States; and
federal funds to lessen the impact to state and local governments of admission of
Haitian refugees in their states.

Nonrefoulement

On May 24, 1992, the United States put into place a policy of returning to Haiti
those Haitians we had encountered on the high seas without first assessing whether
they were fleeing persecution at the hands of the military junta that has seized control
there. Since that time, these diverted refugees have been routinely fingerprinted,
photographed, and interrogated by Haitian authorities upon their return. Human rights
observers have reported that a number of returnees have been imprisoned or beaten
upon their return. Others have disappeared or have been forced into hiding for fear
for their lives.

Unfortunately, the current administration took repatriation a step further by
extending it to Haitians encountered within Haiti's territorial waters. For more than
17 months and except in the past few weeks, the current Administration actively
searched out, interdicted, and returned all Haitians to Haiti, regardless of their
intendedd destination. For more than 17 months, this Administration, in effect, erected
and maintained a floating Berlin Wall around Haiti to keep anyone seeking to flee
persecution from escaping from their tormenters.

Mr. Chairman, I introduced H.R. 3663, the Haitian Refugee Fairness Act, as a
result of my concern for the injustices and suffering faced by the Haitian people as
well as the lack of response and indifference by the U.S. I introduced H.R. 3663
because it is the moral and humanitarian responsibility of the U.S. to protect those






60


Haitians who have sought refuge in this country and to treat them fairly compared to
the way we treat other groups.

As I have repeatedly heard from my constituents in the area of Miami called
"Little Haiti," and as the Administration has finally acknowledged, there is a human
rights nightmare -- a holocaust -- a killing field -- occurring in Haiti. It is a consistent
campaign of terror against the Haitian people by the ruthless military regime. It is a
campaign of terror against the supporters of President Aristide that has intensified in
recent weeks. It is a campaign of terror that is being carried out in all areas of the
country, from Port-au-Prince to the remotest hamlet. Yet, we refused the Haitian
people sanctuary.

Men, women, and children are being tortured, murdered, and mutilated. Killings
have become commonplace for the Haitian people. Their bodies, disfigured,
dismembered and unrecognizable to friends and family, are dumped in the streets to
be scavenged by dogs and pigs. Yet, we refused the Haitian people sanctuary.

Human rights advocates rate Haiti as one of the worst violators of human rights
in the world. And the reports confirm that one of the most hideous crimes, the rape
of women and young girls, is being committed by the de facto regime.

In Haiti, naked boys are often a common sight -- a way to endure the
oppressive heat. But the genitals of girls are covered. Why? Because Haitian culture
honors the "birth part" of females as the "pathway of life." This custom once kept
rape to a minimum. But now rape is becoming a frequent tool of political repression
by the military. The gang rape of women and young girls whose husbands, fathers,
brothers and sons are politically active are being reported at an alarming rate. Yet we
refused the Haitian people sanctuary because, we say, they are only fleeing economic
deprivation and not political repression.

Just this past weekend, the Washington Post reported on the use of rape by
the authorities in Haiti as a means of controlling dissent. I ask unanimous consent to
have this article printed at this point in the record.

Disfigurement is also being used in Haiti as a means of stifling dissent. A case
in point is that of Alette Belance. Miraculously, Ms. Belance survived a machete
at:a3k by a pro-military terrorists. According to Ms. Belance, the attack left her with









her right arm severed below the elbow. A slash across her face took out her upper
palate. A deep gash dents the back of her neck and scars cover her body. Doctors
were able to sew back her severed right ear. The front half of her tongue was
recovered and reattached. Ms. Belance's story is just one of many examples of the
unmerciful treatment being inflicted on the Haitian people by the military.

As a candidate, President Clinton criticized the previous administration for not
giving Haitian refugees an opportunity to apply for political asylum after being
intercepted at sea by U.S. Coast Guard cutters. He hit a responsive cord in many
Americans who were appalled at the unfairness of our policy toward Haitians. On
May 8, 1994, the President made a step towards fulfilling his promise. However, we
must not forget that it is just that, a step.

I applauded the President's decision to interview all Haitian nationals fleeing the
brutal regime that is in power in Haiti to determine if they have a legitimate claim for
political asylum. I was also encouraged by the Administration's decision to offer most
of the refugees fleeing Haiti an opportunity to go to a refugee camp set up outside of
the U.S. However, we must ensure that the conditions of these camps are set up to
afford these individuals their dignity.

As we all know, Mr. Chairman, thousands of refugees have tried to escape the
horrors of the increasing human rights abuses in Haiti. They would rather face the
danger at sea and try to make it to America where they believe that we "Americans
have a respect for human life."

Section 2 of H.R. 3663 would make our policy conform to international law by
requiring the United States to determine the legitimacy of an individual's claim and
prohibiting the United States from returning people to their country of persecution if
we determine that they are refugees. For the record, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
submit a copy of the letter I received from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees regarding the "U.S. practice of interdicting Haitian refugees on the high seas
and summarily returning them to their country of origin."

The nonrefoulement provision in H.R. 3663 is not Haiti-specific. It would apply
to anyone encountered outside U.S. territory or within the territorial waters of another
nation.


84-497 0 94 3









The Bush/Clinton repatriation policy did not meet this requirement. Under the
Bush/Clinton policy, Haitians were held hostage in their own country. The blockade
by the U.S. Coast Guard surrounding Haiti was an unprecedented denial to Haitians
of the most basic human right, the right to flee persecution in their country in search
of safety in a country of first asylum. This policy was not just a violation of
international law; it was a violation of the most basic code of humanity. The
Administration's announcement on May 8 was clearly an admission that its policy was
patently wrong.

While the legislation would prohibit the return of individuals deemed to be
refugees to their country of persecution, it would not require that they be brought to
the United States.



Temporary Protected Status

Section 3 of H.R. 3663 would designate Haiti for Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), thereby
protecting Haitians currently in the U.S. from return to Haiti while there is a human
rights crisis there.

It is imperative now, more than ever, Mr. Chairman, that we provide Temporary
Protected Status to Haitian nationals. H.R. 3663 would permit Haitians already in this
country as of November 17, 1993 to apply for Temporary Protected Status.

Under the provisions of TPS enacted as part of the Immigration Act of 1990,
the Attorney General is authorized to designate any nation or part of a nation TPS if
she finds that there is an ongoing armed conflict within that nation. TPS would allow
Haitians to remain in the U.S. until the Attorney General determines that conditions
in Haiti are safe for their return. Meanwhile, they would be granted work
authorization.

By granting Haitians TPS we achieve two objectives: undocumented Haitians
can live and work in safety without fear of being deported, and the INS would know
where they reside so that it can facilitate their return once conditions in Haiti are safe.







63


Certainly there is ample evidence that Haitians here in the U.S. would be in
grave harm if sent back to Haiti under current conditions.

* Roving bands of government-sponsored thugs, known as zenglendoes, are
terrorizing and maiming Church officials, political activists, elected and
appointed officials loyal to Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's democratically-elected
president, and Aristide supporters;
* Officials and activists loyal to the democratically-elected government have been
dragged from churches, murdered in the streets, kidnapped from their homes,
and jailed;
* Just last week two United Nations and the Organization of American States
observer teams were stopped, their possessions were confiscated and they
were threatened imprisonment if U.S. military or multinational forces took
action against Haiti.

This Administration's unwillingnessto designate TPS for Haitians is inexplicable.
During his May 8 announcement of the Administration's change in policy, President
Clinton said, "the repression and bloodshed in Haiti have reached alarming
proportions. Supporters of President Aristide. and many other Haitians, are being
killed and mutilated." On May 3, the President stated "they [the military] have begun
to clearly kill more innocent civilians --- people not even directly involved in the
political life of the country."

These events and the endless number like them, as well as the numerous
statements about the generalized violence in Haiti made by the Administration, clearly
makes Haiti eligible for TPS.

TPS is a status that has been granted by the Attorney General to nationals of
other nations, such as Kuwait, Somalia, Bosnia and most recently Rwanda during
conflict in their countries. Under the circumstances, Mr. Chairman, Congress is left
with no alternative but to legislate TPS as it did in 1990 when it designated TPS
status for El Salvador nationals by an Act of Congress.

I would like to bring to the Subcommittee's attention a technical adjustment
that should be made to the TPS section of my bill. I would like to clarify that Haitian
parolees who have been resettled in the U.S. through the Community Relations










Service of the Department of Justice and who are consequently deemed PRUCOL not
lose this status if they avail themselves of TPS.



Impact on State and Local Governments

Sections 4, 5, and 6 of H.R. 3663 deal with the impact on state government
of the federal government's decision to admit Haitians and Cubans into the U.S.
More specifically:
Immigration Emergency Fund
Section 4 explicitly permits use of the Immigration Emergency fund
created by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) for this
purpose.

Cuban/Haitian Primary/Secondary Migration Program
Section 5 assures adequate funding for the Cuban Haitian Primary
Secondary Program, operated by the Community Relations Service (CRS) of the
Department of Justice. My bill authorizes $6 million for that purpose.
However, many more Cubans and Haitians have come to the United States in
recent months than the Justice Department had originally estimated. I would
ask that this amount be increased to $10.8 million which reflects the latest
estimates of the cost of this program, when the Subcommittee marks up this
legislation.

The number of Cubans and Haitians who are now expected to reach our
shores in the remainder of this and the coming fiscal year is dramatically higher
than in recent years and increasing almost every day. Adequate funding for
this program is of enormous importance to the state of Florida which has borne
the expense of caring for Cubans and Haitians entering the U.S.

Year after year, CRS has been underfunded. With the recent dramatic
increase in the number of Cuban and Haitian arrivals needing resettlement, the
program needs additional funds from within the Department of Justice to
maintain current resettlement operations for the current fiscal year. Moreover,
all indications are that in fiscal year 1995, arrivals will far exceed those
anticipated by the Department's original request of $7 million.









The existing Cuban/Haitian Primary Secondary Migration Program's
budget is inadequate to resettle anticipated arrivals. In order to avoid chaos
and disruption to the program and local communities that uncertain funding
brings, $10.8 million is needed in FY 1995



Cuban/Haitian Entrant Emergency Fund
Section 6 creates an emergency fund of $5 million to take care of future
large, unexpected flows of Cubans and Haitians. The intent of this fund is to
make funds available to CRS for primary and secondary resettlement of Cubans
and Haitians if, as in this year, the regularly appropriated funds are insufficient
in the face of a large, unexpected flow of Cubans and Haitians. Such a fund
would shield CRS from the obligation of scurrying to find funds to provide
services for Cubans and Haitians in an emergency situation.



Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I am well aware of the fact that the U.S. cannot possibly accept
all the people who would like to come here, but we must have a standard that treats
all nationality groups equally and procedures that are applied to all with fairness.

No one wishes to provoke a mass exodus of desperate people onto dangerous
seas. Unfortunately, that is what happened when the Administration announced a
more humane policy. Nevertheless, we cannot use that concern to justify
discrimination and inequity of treatment. We must act in the most just and humane
way possible to ensure the safety and well-being of those who seek the protection of
our country.

Fifty-five years ago, just before World War II, nearly 1000 German Jewish boat
people aboard the ship St. Louis were denied refuge by U.S. immigration officials. Not
allowed to dock at U.S. ports -- including Miami -- or at ports in any other country, the
St. Louis returned to Europe, where many of its unwanted and unwelcome passengers
died on the killing fields and in the gas chambers of the Third Reich.

Despite the embargo, the public posturing and the behind the scenes diplomatic
efforts. Haiti remains a very dangerous place for its citizens. As a nation, we refused






66


to protect desperate Jews seeking refuge from Nazi Germany. If we fail to protect
Haitians today, we will have learned nothing from our mistakes of the past.

Mr. Chairman, the ultimate solution to the problem of refugee flight from Haiti
is to restore democracy there. But until that happens, we must correct the injustices
of current law and respond to the pleas of the Haitian people. It is imperative that we
reform our Haitian refugee policies to remove the blanket presumption that all Haitian
asylum seekers are economic refugees. This is our opportunity to regain the moral
high ground. We cannot ignore the Haitian people in their time of need.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I am
pleased that your subcommittee is meeting to discuss this very important issue. I look
forward to working with you and the Congress in an effort to ensure justice for all
who are seeking asylum.








103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H 3663


To reaffirm the obligation of the United States to refrain from the involuntary
return of refugees outside the United States, designate Haiti under
Temporary Protected Status, and for other purposes.




IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOVEMBER 22, 1993
Mrs. MEEK (for herself, Mr. GILMAN, Ms. BROWN of Florida, Mr. OWENS,
Mr. MFUME, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. RUSH, Mrs. CLAYTON, Mr. SCOTT, Mr.
LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. WATT, Mr. HILLIARD, Mr. ROMERO-BARCELO,
Miss COLLINS of Michigan, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. TUCKER, Ms. WATERS, Mr.
JEFFERSON, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Mr. RANGEL, Ms. PELOSI, Mr.
WYNN, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE
JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Ms.
McKINNEY, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. WASHINGTON, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr.
CLYBURN, Mr. ENGEL, and Mr. DELLUMS) introduced the following bill;
which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and the
Judiciary




A BILL
To reaffirm the obligation of the United States to refrain
from the involuntary return of refugees outside the Unit-
ed States, designate Haiti under Temporary Protected
Status, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 ties of the United States of America in Congress assembled,








1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the "Haitian Refugee Fair-

3 ness Act".

4 SEC. 2. ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW REQUIRE-

5 MENT OF NONREFOULEMENT.

6 (a) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT.-It is the sense of
7 the Congress that Article 33 of the Convention Relating

8 to the Status of Refugees (done at Geneva, July 28,

9 1951), as applied under Article I of the Protocol Relating

10 to the Status of Refugees (done at New York, January
11 31, 1967), imposes an obligation upon states which are

12 party to the Protocol that applies wherever the states act

13 and without territorial limitation, and Congress reaffirms
14 that this Article 33 obligation applies to actions of the

15 United States with respect to individuals within and with-

16 out the territorial boundaries of the United States.

17 (b) OBLIGATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.-
18 The United States Government shall not return, cause to
19 be returned, or affect the movement in any manner which
20 results in returning, a national or habitual resident of a
21 country, who is outside the territorial boundaries of the

22 country of nationality or residence to the territory where
23 the individual's life or freedom would be threatened, and
24 no funds may be expended without respect to any such
25 return, unless the United States Government first deter-
26 mines in a manner that incorporates procedural safe-








1 guards consistent with internationally endorsed standards

2 and guidelines that such individual is not a refugee of such

3 country under Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the
4 Status of Refugees (done at Geneva July 28, 1951) as
5 applied under Article I of the United Nations Protocol Re-
6 lating to the Status of Refugees (done at New York, Janu-
7 ary 31, 1967) or a person designated under Article 33

8 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

9 (c) OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WA-
10 TERS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY.-The United States Gov-
11 ernment shall not return, cause to be returned, or affect
12 the movement in any manner which results in returning,
13 a national or habitual resident of a country, who is within
14 the territorial waters of his or her country of nationality
15 or habitual residence, to the land frontier or territorial
16 land of the country of nationality or residence where the
17 individual's life or freedom would be threatened, and no
18 funds may be expended with respect to any such return,
19 unless the United States Government first determines in
20 a manner that incorporates procedural safeguards consist-
21 ent'with internationally endorsed standards and guidelines
22 that if that individual were outside the territory of the
23 country of nationality or habitual residence such individ-
24 ual would not be a refugee of such country under Article
25 I of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees









I (done at Geneva, July 28, 1951) as applied under Article
2 I of the United National Protocol Relating to the Status
3 of Refugees (done at New York), January 31, 1967) or
4 a person designated under Article 33 of the Convention

5 Relating to the Status of Refugees. This subsection shall

6 not constitute authority for conducting operations by the
7 United States Government within the territorial waters of
8 another country.
9 (d) LIMITATIONS.-The provisions of this section do
10 not apply to an individual if-
11 (1) such individual ordered, incited, assisted, or

12 otherwise participated in the persecution of any per-
13 son on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
14 bership in a particular social group or political opin-

15 ion; or
16 (2) such individual, having been convicted by a

17 final judgment of an aggravated felony (as defined
18 in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Na-
19 tionality Act), constitutes a danger to the commu-
20 nity of the United States.
21 (e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this sec-
22 tion shall be construed to impose new obligations on the
23 Government of the United States in its treatment of na-
24 tionals and habitual residents of a country at United

25 States diplomatic and consular missions in that country.







1 SEC. 3. TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HAITIANS.
2 (a) DESIGNATION.-
3 (1) IN GENERAL.-Haiti is hereby designated
4 under section 244A(b) of the Immigration and Na-
5 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)), subject to the
6 provisions of this section.
7 (2) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.-Such designa-
8 tion shall take effect on the date of the enactment
9 of this Act and shall remain in effect for a period
10 of 24 months from the date of enactment of this Act
11 or until such time as the President certifies to Con-
12 gress that a democratically elected government is se-
13 curely in place in Haiti, whichever occurs later.
14 (b) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.-In applying section 244A of
15 the Immigration and Nationality Act pursuant to the des-
16 ignation under this section, subject to section 244A(c)(3)
17 of such Act, an alien who is a national of Haiti meets
18 the requirement of section 244A(c)(1) of such Act only
19 if-
20 (1) the alien has been continuously physically
21 present in the United States since November 17,
22 1993;
23 (2) the alien is admissible as an immigrant, ex-
24 cept as otherwise provided under section
25 244A(c)(2)(A) of such Act and is not ineligible for








1 temporary protected status under section
2 244A(c)(2)(B) of such Act; and

3 (3) the alien registers for temporary protected
4 status in a manner which the Attorney General shall
5 establish.
6 (c) REGISTRATION FEE.-Subject to section
7 244A(c)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the
8 Attorney General may provide for the payment of a fee
9 as a condition of registering an alien under subsection (b)
10 of this section.
11 SEC. 4. REIMBURSEMENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
12 MENT COSTS.
13 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the At-
14 torney General shall reimburse from funds authorized
15 under section 404(b)(1) of the Immigration and National-
16 ity Act, State and local governments for incremental costs
17 associated with Haitian nationals who are paroled into the
18 United States by the Immigration and Naturalization
19 Service under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and
20 Nationality Act.








1 SEC. 5. FUNDING FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE OF
2 THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
3 TICE AND CUBAN/HAITIAN PRIMARY SECOND-
4 ARY MIGRATION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL
5 YEARS 1994, 1995 AND 1996.

6 (a) COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE.-Of the funds

7 appropriated for the United States Department of Justice
8 for fiscal years 1994, 1995, and 1996, not less than
9 $27,000,000 shall be made available in each fiscal year
10 to the Community Relations Service.
11 (b) CUBAN/HAITIAN PRIMARY SECONDARY MIGRA-
12 TION PROGRAM.-Of the funds referred to in subsection

13 (a), not less than $6,000,000 in each of fiscal years 1994,
14 1995, and 1996 shall be used to provide primary and sec-
15 ondary resettlement services for Cubans and Haitians pa-
16 rolled into the United States by the Immigration and Nat-
17 uralization Service under section 212(d)(5) of the Immi-
18 gration and Nationality Act.
19 SEC. 6. CUBAN/HAITIAN ENTRANT EMERGENCY FUND.
20 Section 404 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
21 (8 U.S.C. 1101, note.) is amended by adding at the end
22 the following new subsection:
23 "(c) CUBAN/HAITIAN ENTRANT EMERGENCY FUND.
24 "(1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.-
25 There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal

26 year 1994 and any subsequent fiscal year to a


84-497 4








1 Cuban/Haitian Entrant Emergency Fund to be es-
2 tablished in the Treasury, an amount sufficient to

3 provide for a balance of $5,000,000 in such fund, to

4 be used to carry out the purposes described in para-

5 graph (3).
6 "(2) CONDITIONS FOR USE OF FUND.-Funds
7 which are authorized to be appropriated by para-

8 graph (1) shall be available whenever-
9 "(A) the number of Cubans and Haitians
10 paroled into the United States by the Immigra-

11 tion and Naturalization Service under section
12 212(d)5 of the Immigration and Nationality
13 Act in a single fiscal year has exceeded the esti-
14 mate made by the Attorney General as required
15 in paragraph (4), and
16 "(B) funds appropriated for the Cuban/

17 Haitian Primary/Secondary Resettlement Pro-
18 gram are inadequate to provide primary and
19 secondary resettlement services at the fiscal
20 year 1993 funding and service level.
21 "(3) Funds which are authorized to be
22 appropriated by paragraph (1) shall be available
23 solely for the purpose of assisting with the process-
24 ing, placement and reception of Cubans and Hai-
25 tians paroled into the United States by the Immigra-







1 tion and Naturalization Service under section
2 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
3 "(4) ANNUAL ESTIMATION OF CUBAN AND HAI-
4 TIAN PAROLEES.
5 "(A) The Attorney General of the United
6 States shall submit each year, concurrent with
7 the President's annual budget request, an esti-
8 mate of the number of Cubans and Haitians

9 who are expected to be paroled into the United
10 States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigra-
11 tion and Nationality Act in the next fiscal year.
12 Such estimate shall be made independently
13 from the budget request for any programs for
14 Cuban and Haitian parolees.
15 "(B) In determining the estimate required
16 by paragraph (4)(A), the Attorney General shall
17 take into consideration a number of factors, in-
18 eluding but not limited to-
19 "(i) previous experience and current
20 trends in the number of Cubans and Hai-
21 tians paroled into the United States under
22 section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and
23 Nationality Act, and
24 "(ii) political circumstances and
25 trends in Cuba and Haiti.".







103D CONGRESS
1ST SESSION H.R. 1942

To provide for a program established by a nongovernmental organization
under which Haitian Americans would help the people of Haiti recover
from the destruction caused by the coup of December 1991.




IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APRIL 29, 1993
.Mr. RANGEL introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs




A BILL
To provide for a program established by a nongovernmental
organization under which Haitian Americans would help
the people of Haiti recover from the destruction caused
by the coup of December 1991.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tires of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. GRANT BY AID.
4 (a) GRANT FOR PROGRAtM.-The Administrator of
5 tlihe Agency for International Development shall use funds
6 available for development assistance for each of fiscal
7 years 1994 through 1998 to provide a grant for each such
8 fiscal year to an appropriate nongovernmental organiza-








1 tion that has established a program under which Haitian

2 Americans would engage in activities in Haiti designed to

3 help the people of that country in meeting their needs for

4 trained manpower in recovering from the destruction

5 caused by the military coup that occurred in Haiti in De-

6 cember 1991. Any such grant may be used only for such

7 program.

8 (b) REQUIREMENTS OF PROGRAMI.-The Adminis-

9 trator of the Agency for International Development shall
10 ensure that the activities engaged in by Haitian Americans

11 in Haiti under a program for which a grant is provided

12 under subsection (a) are similar to those activities that

13 would be engaged in by Peace Corps volunteers under the

14 Peace Corps Act.

15 (c) TRAINING.-The Director of the Peace Corps

16 shall provide to Haitian Americans participating in a pro-

17 gram for which a grant is provided under subsection (a)

18 appropriate training in preparation for their activities in

19 Haiti under the program. The costs of such training shall

20 be reimbursed, from amounts provided in the grant, by

21 the nongovernmental organization administering the pro-

22 gram.
23 SEC. 2. DEFINITION.

24 As used in this Act, the term "Haitian American"
25 means an individual residing in the United States who is





78


1 of Haitian ancestry and whose citizenship or immigration

2 status would make such individual eligible to be a Peace

3 Corps volunteer under the Peace Corps Act.





















TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN RONALD V. DELLtJMS


BEFORE


THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE


SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE


WEDNESDAY JULY 27, 1994








Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the crisis

in Haiti and for inviting me to testify before your subcommittee.

As you know, I, along with every single member of the

Congressional Black Caucus, introduced on March 23 of this year HR

4114, the Governors Island Reinforcement Act. This initiative was

necessitated by the policy vacuum that existed within the

administration vis-a-vis Haiti at that time and was introduced to:

register strong Congressional opposition to the derailment of

democracy in Haiti;

demonstrate Congressional awareness and condemnation of

the brutality and brutishness inflicted upon the Haitian

people by Messrs Cedras, Biamby, Francois and

their supporters; and

signal the unwavering resolve of the United States

Congress to stand with the people of Haiti.

Mr. Chairman, HR 4114 now has in excess of 100 bi-partisan

co-sponsors and many of its provisions have already been

implemented by the administration. This is due, in no small part, to

Special Envoy Bill Gray's ongoing consultation with the Congress and








his keen understanding that in this post-Cold War era, the United

States cannot and must not either coddle, excuse, or encourage the

violent overthrow of democratically elected governments, or stand by

in the face of a persistent pattern of gross violation of internationally

recognized human rights.

As we all know, Mr. Chairman, at this time the United States is

appropriately relying on comprehensive economic sanctions to secure

the departure of Messrs Cedras, Biamby and Francois. As we also

know, however, flagrant, ongoing cross-border trade between Haiti

and the Dominican Republic is seriously undermining international

efforts to exert maximum pressure on the Haitian military. Unless

the flow of embargoed items from the Dominican Republic to Haiti is

halted, international efforts to secure the resignation of Haiti's

military rulers will fall flat.

On July 12, 1994, President Clinton issued a declaration

outlining some $15 million in defense equipment of the Dominican

Republic to enable that country to effectively seal its border with

Haiti. In view of the fact that there are a very limited number of








transit points along that border capable of accommodating large trucks

transporting contraband, however, the challenge to the Dominican

Republic is not one of monitoring hundreds of miles of border often

along rugged terrain. The challenge is infinitely narrower to halt

the flow of contraband fuel and other items at a few strategic points

along the border.

It is my sincere hope that the Dominican Republic will be an

active and committed partner of the United States on this issue.

Sec.2(c) of the Governors Island Reinforcement Act, HR 4114, denies

"any grant, sale, loan, lease, credit, guaranty, or insurance by any

agency or instrumentality of the United States Government" to any

country that the President determines is not cooperating with sanctions

against Haiti. In addition, this section would also have the President

impose at least one other penalty which he deems appropriate under

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

I strongly urge President Clinton and Special Advisor Gray to

Adopt Sec.2(c) of HR 4114 without delay as a special incentive to

any nation anywhere that may now be violating the embargo against








Haiti. And I also urge Special Advisor Gray to again reiterate to

President Balaguer that the cooperation of his country is vital both

because its proximity to Haiti empowers it to make or break the

international sanctions effort, and because any attempt to undermine

these sanctions would place at risk its $22 million in U.S. foreign

assistance of Fiscal Year 1994, the $180 million sugar quota they had

anticipated exporting to the United States this year, and other

components of our bilateral economic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and the international

community have expended, and continues to expend, a considerable

amount of human, material, a political resources in our attempt to

cause Haiti's brutal military to step down in favor of the duly elected

government they overthrew. In the process, the international

community is not only condemning, but indeed committing itself to

actively discouraging the bloody overthrow to duly elected

governments elsewhere in the hemisphere.

There does need to be closure, however.









The intransigence of Mr. Cedras and his supporters is so costly

in human, economic, and political terms both inside as well as outside

of Haiti that the international community must now step forward with

a commitment to guarantee serious sanctions compliance both

through the adoption of measures like Sec.2(c) as well as via other

means.

On refugee policy, the administration is to be commended for

abandoning its palpably racist policy of summarily repatriating all

Haitians no questions asked back to what the Untied Nations has

described as a "reign of terror." As a result of the administrations's

post-May policy shift, some regional governments have committed to

provide fleeing Haitians safe haven.

It is my belief, however, that it is both morally untenable and

politically naive for us to continue to ask the countries of the region

to provide safe haven to Haitian refugees while we categorically

refuse to do so. If our appeals throughout the region are to have

greater political weight and moral authority, if we are to have any

hope of broader participation in this effort, and if we are to further








distance ourselves from charges that racism permeates our Haiti

refugee policy, the United States of America must agree to provide

safe haven to a reasonable percentage of Haitians intercepted at sea,

with other regional countries assuming responsibility for the

remainder.

In recent months, Mr. Chairman, the issues of "refugee flows"

and the "use of force" have, unfortunately, become inexplicably

linked.

It is vital that they be de-linked.

There are color-blind, non-discriminatory procedures and

processes established under international and domestic law to deal

with refugees from Haiti and elsewhere, and it is to these that we

must turn should the numbers of refugees fleeing Haiti again shoot

upward. We all recognize that with the military crackdown on boat-

building and the intensified police surveillance of Haiti's bays and

coves, it is becoming exceedingly difficult for refugees to leave Haiti.

However, should they in the future again find a way to flee, I must

stress, Mr. Chairman, that this gentleman finds the very notion that









the United States should invade Haiti simply to prevent black Haitians

from arriving on U.S. soil deeply unsettling.

If, on the other hand, the use of force is being contemplated not

to keep Haitians out of the United States, but to oust the coup leaders,

I wish to stress my philosophical conviction that the use of force

should always be considered in Haiti and elsewhere only as a last

resort. And I, Mr. Chairman, cannot in good conscience say that we

have reached that point.

Until we have truly sealed the border between Haiti and the

Dominican Republic, we will not be able to say that we have

exhausted all non-military options prior to considering the use of

force. However, delay after interminable delay in sealing the border

not only encourages Haiti's military to make the distinction between

our "comprehensive" rhetoric and our "less-than-comprehensive"

actions, indeed it also places the interests of the Haitian military

above our own. While they are buoyed by the knowledge that each

additional day they dig in their heels means one day less, in Aristide's

term, "small-d" democrats must assess the same period as one more





87


day that they remain saddled with a foreign policy challenge that will

not go away.

The closing of the key transit points along the border will have

significant economic and political repercussions inside Haiti and could

render current calls for the use of force moot.

We must move quickly to do this, however. And, most

importantly, U.S. policymakers must ensure that the Haitian military

understands that though some of us may disagree regarding the most

effective means of securing their departure, we are united on the fact

that they must indeed go.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say to those who suggest

that this nation has spent enough time on Haiti and that the time has

come to move on to other issues we did not tire easily in our fight

for Soviet Jewry, the oppressed in central America, or the

disenfranchised of South Africa.

We will not tire of Haiti.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.








103D CONGRESS
2D SESSION H. 4114

To provide for sanctions against Haiti, to halt the interdiction and return
of Haitian refugees, and for other purposes.




IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MARCH 23, 1994
Mr. DELLUMS (for himself, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Mr. OWENS, Mr. RAN-
GEL, Mr. MFUME, Mr. FRANKS of Connecticut, Ms. BROWN of Florida,
Mr. CONYERS, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of Texas, Mrs. MEEK, Mr.
BISHOP, Mr. BLACKWELL, Mr. CLAY, Mrs. CLAYTON, Mr. CLYBURN,
Miss COLLINS of Michigan, Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois, Mr. DIXoN, Mr.
FIELDS of Louisiana, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr.
HILLIARD, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Ms.
McKINNEY, Ms. NORTON, Mr. REYNOLDS, Mr. RUSH, Mr. SCOTT, Mr.
STOKES, Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi, Mr. TowNs, Mr. TUCKER, Mr.
WASHINGTON, Ms. WATERS, Mr. WATT, Mr. WHEAT, and Mr. WYNN) in-
troduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees
on Ways and Means, Foreign Affairs, Public Works and Transportation,
the Judiciary, and Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs




A BILL
To provide for sanctions against Haiti, to halt the interdic-
tion and return of Haitian refugees, and for other
purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tires of the United States of America in Congress assembled,








I SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the "Governors Island Rein-

3 forcement Act of 1994".
4 SEC. 2. SANCTIONS AGAINST HAITI.

5 (a) PROHIBITING TRADE AND CERTAIN TRANS-
6 ACTIONS INVOLVING HAITI.-The following are prohib-
7 ited:

8 (1) The import into the United States of any

9 goods or services of Haitian origin, other than publi-
10 cations and material imported for news publications
11 or news broadcast dissemination.
12 (2) The export to Haiti of any goods, tech-

13 nology (including technical data or other informa-
14 tion) or services from the United States, except pub-

15 locations, food, medicine, and medical supplies and

16 donations of articles intended to relieve human suf-
17 fering, such as clothing and temporary housing.

18 (3) The purchase by any United States person
19 of any goods for export from Haiti to any country.

20 (4) The performance by any United States per-
21 son of any contract in support of an industrial or
22 other commercial or governmental project in Haiti.
23 (5) The grant or extension of credits or loans
24 by any United States person to the unelected mili-
25 tary rulers of Haiti, its instrumentalities and con-

26 trolled entities.







1 (b) PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN AIR TRANSPORT IN-
2 VOLVING HAITI.-The following is prohibited:
3 (1) Any transaction by a United States person
4 relating to air transportation to or from Haiti.
5 (2) The provision of transportation to or from

6 the United States by aircraft of Haitian registration.
7 (3) The sale in the United States by any person
8 holding authority under the Federal Aviation Act of
9 any transportation by air which includes any stop in
10 Haiti.

11 (c) SANCTIONS AGAINST OTHER NATIONS.-

12 (1) If the President determines that a foreign
13 country is not cooperating with United States sanc-
14 tions against Haiti under this Act or with applicable
15 sanctions against Haiti imposed by the United Na-
16 tions and the Organization of American States, ef-
17 fective 60 days after such determination no United
18 States assistance may be provided to such foreign
19 country.
20 (2) If the President makes a determination
21 under paragraph (1)-
22 (A) the President shall impose at least one
23 other penalty or sanction which the President
24 considers to be appropriate under the Inter-
25 national Emergency Economic Powers Act; and







1 (B) the President may impose such other
2 sanctions and penalties under the International
3 Emergency Economic Powers-Act as the Presi-

4 dent considers appropriate.

5 (3) For the purpose of this subsection, the term

6 "United States assistance" means assistance of any

7 kind which is provided by grant, sale, loan, lease,
8 credit, guaranty, or insurance, or by any other

9 means, by any agency or instrumentality of the

10 United States Government, including-
11 (A) assistance under the Foreign Assist-

12 ance Act of 1961; and

13 (B) sales, credits, and guaranties under
14 the Arms Export Control Act.

15 (d) SANCTIONS BY OTHER COUNTRIES.-The Presi-
16 dent shall direct the United States Ambassador to the
17 United Nations to assume a leadership role within the

18 United Nations Security Council to ensure that sanctions

19 against Haiti unilaterally imposed by the United States

20 under this Act are adopted by the international commu-
21 nity.
22 (e) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.-The provisions of
23 this section shall cease to have effect on the date the Presi-

24 dent certifies to the Congress that the democratically-

25 elected President of Haiti has been reinstated and Haiti's




92


1 military high command has met its obligations under the
2 Governors Island Agreement.
3 SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT.

4 (a) HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS.-The Congress
5 strongly urges the President to take such steps as are nec-

6 essary to facilitate the return to Haiti of a full contingent
7 of human rights observers under the auspices of the
8 United Nations and/or the Organization of American
9 States.

10 (b) MULTINATIONAL BORDER PATROL.-Subject to
11 the request of the democratically-elected President of
12 Haiti Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the Congress strongly urges
13 President Clinton to take all available measures to effect
14 the deployment of a multinational border patrol between

15 the Dominican Republic and Haiti which will be fully
16 equipped in terms of personnel and equipment to halt

17 cross-border violations of sanctions against Haiti imposed
18 by the United States and other countries.
19 (c) MULTILATERAL SOCIOECONOMIC AND PEACE-
20 KEEPING ASSISTANCE.-The Congress reaffirms the un-
21 wavering commitment of the United States to support
22 multilateral socioeconomic and peacekeeping assistance to
23 Haiti upon the return to power of the democratically-elect-
24 ed President of Haiti and the removal of Haiti's military
25 high command.







1 SEC. 4. SANCTITY OF GOVERNORS ISLAND AGREEMENT.
2 (a) IN GENERAL.-Subject to subsection (b) and not-
3 withstanding any other provision of law, no officer or em-
4 ployee of the United States shall attempt, directly or indi-
. 5 rectly, to amend, reinterpret, or nullify the Governors Is-
6 land Agreement.

7 (b) EXCEPTION.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to
8 the October 30, 1993, deadline for the return to power
9 of the democratically-elected President of Haiti, Jean-
10 Bertrand Aristide.
11 SEC. 5. TERMINATION OF BILATERAL MIGRANT INTERDIC-
12 TION AGREEMENT.
13 The President shall notify the Government of Haiti
14 immediately of the intention of the United States Govern-
15 ment to terminate the agreement between the United
16 States and Haiti relating to migrant interdiction (effected
17 by the exchange of notes signed at Port-au-Prince on Sep-
18 tember 23, 1981; 33 UST 3559, TIAS 6577).
19 SEC. 6. ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW REQUIRE-
20 MENT OF NONREFOULEMENT WITH RESPECT
21 TO HAITI.
22 (a) OBLIGATIONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.-
23 The United States Government shall not return, cause to
24 be returned, or affect the movement in any manner which
25 results in returning, to Haiti a national or habitual resi-
26 (lent of Haiti, who is outside the territorial boundaries of







1 Haiti, and no funds may be expended with respect to any
2 such return, unless the United States Government first
3 determines in a manner that incorporates procedural safe-
4 guards consistent with internationally endorsed standards
5 and guidelines that such individual is not a refugee of
6 Haiti under Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the
7 Status of Refugees (done at Geneva July 28, 1951) as
8 applied under Article I of the United Nations Protocol Re-

9 lating to the Status of Refugees (done at New York, Janu-
10 ary 31, 1967) or a person designated under Article 33
11 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
12 (b) OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WA-
13 TERS OF HAITI.-The United States Government shall
14 not return, cause to be returned, or affect the movement
15 in any manner which results in returning, to Haiti a na-
16 tional or habitual resident of Haiti, who is within the terri-
17 trial waters of Haiti, and no funds may be expended with
18 respect to any such return, unless the United States Gov-

19 eminent first determines in a manner that incorporates
20 procedural safeguards consistent with internationally en-
21 dorsed standards and guidelines that if that individual
22 were outside the territorial boundaries of Haiti such indi-
23 vidual would not be a refugee of Haiti under Article I of
24 the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (done
25 at Geneva, July 28, 1951) as applied under Article I of






1 the United National Protocol Relating to the Status of
2 Refugees (done at New York, January 31, 1967) or a per-
3 son designated under Article 33 of the Convention Relat-
4 ing to the Status of Refugees. This subsection shall not
5 constitute authority for conducting operations by the
6 United States Government within the territorial waters of
7 Haiti or any other country.
8 (c) LIMITATIONS.-The provisions of this section do
9 not apply to an individual if-
10 (1) such individual ordered, incited, assisted, or
11 otherwise participated in the persecution of any per-
12 son on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
13 bership in a particular social group or political opin-
14 ion; or

15 (2) such individual, having been convicted by a
16 final judgment of an aggravated felony (as defined
17 in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Na-
18 tionality Act), constitutes a danger to the commu-
19 nity of the United States.
20 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this sec-
21 tion shall be construed to impose new obligations on the
22 Government of the United States in its treatment of na-
23 tionals and habitual residents of a country at United,
24 States diplomatic and consular missions in that country.






1 SEC. 7. TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HAITIANS.
2 (a) DESIGNATION.-During the period specified in
3 subsection (c) of this section, Haiti is hereby designated
4 under section 244A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nation-
5 ality Act (relating to temporary protected status).
6 (b) ELIGIBLE HAITIANS.-Any alien-
7 (1) who is a national of Haiti and is present in
8 the United States or in the custody or control of the
9 United States (including Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
10 and any other vessel or facility of the United States
11 Government) at any time during the period de-
12 scribed in subsection (c) of this section,
13 (2) who is not an alien designated under section
14 8(b) or 9(b) of this Act,
15 (3) who meets the requirements of section
16 244A(c)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and National-
17 ity Act, and
18 (4) who, during the period described in sub-
19 section (c) of this section, registers for temporary
20 protected status to the extent and in a manner
21 which the Attorney General establishes,
22 shall be granted temporary protected status for the dura-
23 tion of that period and section 244A(a)(1) of the Immigra-
24 tion and Nationality Act shall apply with respect to such
25 alien.