U.S. policy toward Haiti

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U.S. policy toward Haiti hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, second session, June 8, 1994
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US policy toward Haiti
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U.S. POUCY TOWARD HAITI





HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JUNE 8, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


ALUjMBiA L'U\VERs,
LAW L!Fta y
'J. p. '.














U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-462 CC WASHINGTON : 1994


For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-045822-6

























COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman


SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois


BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California


MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Chief of Staff
RICHARD J. GARON, Minority Chief of Staff














CONTENTS


WITNESSES
Page
Hon. William H. Gray III, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary
of State on H aiti ......................................................................... ....................... 6
PREPARED STATEMENTS
H on. W illiam H Gray III ........................................................................................ 51
Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, a Representative in Congress from the State of
F lorida ................................................................................................................... 63
APPENDIXES
1. Questions for the record submitted to Hon. Strobe Talbott, Deputy Sec-
retary of State, and responses thereto, during April 28, 1994, briefing
on H aiti ................................................................................................................. 64
2. Questions submitted for the record to Hon. William H. Gray III and
responses th ereto ...................................................................... ........................ 76


(III)












U.S. POLICY TOWARD HAITI

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1994
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2172,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman)
presiding.
Chairman HAMILTON. The Committee on Foreign Affairs will
come to order.
The committee meets today in open session to receive testimony
on U.S. policy toward Haiti.
It is a very special pleasure to have with us the Honorable Wil-
liam H. Gray III, our very distinguished and former colleague who
recently was named Special Adviser to the President on Haiti.
Obviously, as you know, Mr. Gray, there is a great deal of inter-
est in the Congress and in the country with respect to U.S. policy
toward Haiti. Today's hearing will help us better understand where
we are headed with respect to that policy and our efforts to restore
democracy and return President Aristide to office.
The committee is interested in your testimony on U.S. policy on
a political strategy for President Aristide's return; sanctions and
enforcement; refugee policy; the role of the U.N. and the OAS; and,
of course, U.S. policy concerning possible military intervention.
Mr. Gray, we welcome you back to this committee and we appre-
ciate very much your appearance today. We look forward to your
opening statement. Your statement, of course, will be included in
the record in full.
Let me turn to Mr. Gilman first. Mr. Gilman.
STATEMENT OF MR. GILMAN
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding this hearing
on U.S. policy toward Haiti at a very appropriate and critical time.
Our Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere has been following
events in Haiti closely, but given current circumstances I believe
an airing of the issues at full committee level is extremely impor-
tant.
I also want to welcome our former colleague and good friend, Bill
Gray. I think the President's choice of a new emissary to Haiti was
a wise one. Mr. Gray has a tough task before him and we wish him
success in resolving the current impasse through diplomatic means.
Mr. Chairman, we have a long-term interest in supporting the
democratic process in this hemisphere, even when it produces peo-







ple with whom we may disagree philosophically. Haiti should be no
exception to that rule.
For this reason, since the September 1991 coup against President
Aristide, I have favored a strong diplomatic response to support the
return of the constitutional rule to Haiti, along with many of our
colleagues.
I believe I reflect the views of many of my Republican colleagues
particularly when I say that we should continue to pursue diplo-
matic and political avenues to resolve this situation.
At the same time, we need to support the development of a
democratic center in Haiti, as small and as beleaguered as it is;
and we must recognize that any ultimate solution lies with the
Haitians themselves. We cannot impose a long-term solution to'
Haiti's problems from the outside. It is going to have to be done
internally.
I want to voice my support for the recently expanded targeted.
U.N. sanctions and President Balaguer's stated willingness to en-
force the embargo from the Dominican Republic is encouraging,
though we must ensure the Dominican Army carries out his orders.
We welcome the initiatives by Ambassador Gray as he went down
to the Dominican Republic to try to tighten up that process.
However, I am concerned that the Haitian people are the ones
taking the brunt of the sanctions, not the military or its allies.
There are loopholes in the current sanctions policy that penalizes
those most in need while not covering certain wealthy families.
For example, our Nation has already frozen the assets and re-
voked the visas of the 600 military officials and their immediate
families. However, to be fully effective, the freeze must be extended
to include all prominent families with close ties to the military.
Some of those wealthy families hold virtual monopolies on corn-
mercial food imports that are exempted from the sanctions and are
profiting enormously from that kind of business. These families, ac-
cording to public accounts, retain their visas and freely travel back
and forth to our country.
If that loophole is not closed, the embargo will reward a small
group of wealthy whose support for democracy has been question-
able.
The second area of concern is the impact of the ban on all non-
commercial flights. While the intent is to penalize sanction-busters,
the effect has been to worsen the hardships of the Haitian people.
Two major flight organizations essential to humanitarian assist-
ance programs have been prohibited from flying medical and other.
supplies to Haiti. Missionary Flights International, MFI, and
Agape support the missionary network that provides many essen-
tial services to the poor Haitians.
Five of the six hospitals in Haiti are run by American mission-
aries supported by MFI and the Agape. Since the ban on non-
commercial flights, over 45,000 pounds of material, including medi-
cal supplies, have not been able to get through to Haiti. As I under-
stand it, no procedures have yet been approved for these mission-
ary flights to be resumed. I would hope that Ambassador Gray is
going to be able to take on that problem.
Another victim of the comprehensive sanctions has been the
American business community, many of whom initiated invest-







ments in Haiti at the urging of our own country. I have received
continuing reports that some American businesses have not been
allowed to remove their equipment and assets as they were origi-
nally informed. These kind of restrictions only hurt our own citi-
zens and in that situation should also be remedied and we hope
Mr. Gray will be able to address that problem.
Meanwhile, our own Nation needs to look for a vehicle that will
provide an objective assessment to the situation in Haiti and help
shape our future policy there. So I would strongly encourage the
administration to implement the recommendation made by Senator
Dole and endorsed by the House Republican Policy Committee to
create a bipartisan fact-finding commission, similar to the Kissin-
ger Commission for Central America. Such a commission could
greatly help to coalesce a bipartisan consensus on Haiti, both for
the short and long term.
Finally, I encourage the administration to strongly consider the
proposal of our colleague from Florida, Porter Goss, and endorsed
by the full House on May 24, to establish a temporary safe haven
on the island of Gonave. This option seems all the more attractive
given the President's recent reversal on the return of Haitian boat
people. This policy change has increased the flow of boat migrants
and it is probably safe to say the shipboard and land processing
soon to be implemented will further increase their numbers.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for holding this hearing and look
forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.
We are very pleased to have with us today the distinguished gen-
tleman from New York, Mr. Rangel. Mr. Rangel.
STATEMENT OF MR. RANGEL
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for extending,
and the committee members, for extending this courtesy to me. I
don't know whether to call Mr. Gray Ambassador, reverend, Con-
gressman or chairman, but I know one thing that I never under-
stood the saying that nobody can turn down a President's request
until you accepted this mission and now I really understand what
they meant.
But realizing, too, that you have never undertaken anything that
you have not brought a brilliance and success to, so my prayers are
with you. In the past, I don't even know what our policy was. Every
time I was beginning to understand it, it shifted, and the high
point and being proud to be an American was at Governors Island.
And I thought then we pretty much outlined our responsibility to
the world, to fragile democracies in this hemisphere, and it was a
very no-nonsense approach.
The speedy retreat of the U.S.S. Harlan County because of a con-
frontation with some Haitians with some broomsticks, I will never
understand, and why we seem to be able to have more of a compas-
sion and understanding for the military and the wealthy than for
the poor who elected a democratic President, I don't know, except
I have learned from their experience that the CIA is not always on
our side.
But having said that, we really want to work with you because
what you have brought to the table is your own credibility. And we







know how sacredly you guard that because it has given America
the opportunity to really be the recipients of your brilliance and
your leadership and we don't want that to stop here.
And I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the
opportunity to hear where we are now and I look forward that it
will be the same policy at least in the next couple of weeks.
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you Mr. Rangel. We also have with
us Mr. Goss of Florida.
STATEMENT OF MR. GOSS
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I very much appreciate the courtesy of being allowed to come
back to my home committee this morning for this important hear-
ing and I want to congratulate you and Mr. Gilman on holding this
hearing. This is an issue that has certainly caught the media s at-
tention for the past several months. It has certainly caught the
constituents' attention. I am delighted we are going to have an air-
ing today.
I heard Bill Gray this morning, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Reverend,
the honorable, I will say this: I echo Mr. Rangel's comments. He
gave us a lot of good news on Fox News this morning. I think it
was very upbeat. He also left some areas for questions. I have 16
of those questions prepared and I hope I will have the opportunity
to ask them. If not, I will submit them and, I am sure, get an an-
swer in good time because I, too, believe there is nobody more high-
ly regarded or more capable right now to work out a negotiated set-
tlement in Haiti than Bill Gray, and I am absolutely delighted he
is in that spot.
Just the amount of energy, and dollar movement that we have
seen in the last 2 or 3 weeks since we previously met and since you
have been out there doing this job is extremely impressive. Unfor-
tunately, on the down side we have had an increase in the misery
level as well. The flights that Ben Gilman referred to being stuck
on the ground in Florida are a fact and so is the humanitarian re-
lief which should be going to the critical needs of food, medication,
for people whose survival depends on this.
We are not just talking about a policy question. We are talking
about actual people living and dying. That relief material, for really
undisclosed and unfathomable reasons, just is not getting through.
I tend to feel that there is a good deal to be done in this hearing
today and I thank you very much the opportunity to be here.
One of the questions that has got to start coming up is the ques-
tion of costs. We are dealing with five or six different expenditure
channels in this operation that we have not previously had by my
counting, and I am sure I don't know them all. To be absolutely
candid, we have not had good cooperation from the Department of
State or the administration ih getting the costs so far. And I hope
that this hearing will lead to further cooperation in that area.
The other area I had hoped to ask for cooperation on, I know that
it was perhaps an oversight, but a letter from Secretary of State
to Chairman Hamilton with a copy to Mr. Gilman, or however it
worked, discussing my proposal for a safe haven somehow or other
did not get copied to me. I think it is only fair that when there is
discussion going on of proposals that we are bringing forward on







the floor to resolution, properly handled through the Rules Com-
mittee and through the normal processes, that it be appropriate
that the authors be included in the discussions, for cooperation
sake.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. And the distinguished chairman of the
subcommittee, Mr. Torricelli.
STATEMENT OF MR. TORRICELLI
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to welcome our
former colleague, Mr. Gray. The President is to be congratulated in
the quality of his choice. Even Mr. Gray is to be congratulated on
his wisdom in accepting.
It is a pleasure to have him and it makes us all feel considerably
better knowing that the policy is in his hands. That is not to say
that I do not have great concerns about the policy and the commit-
ments that the United States may soon be accepting. It is not the
first time in this century that some have proposed that the prob-
lems of our neighboring countries can be solved by the interdiction
of American military forces. We have been down that road in Haiti.
And we did not come back for over 20 years.
The American military was going to make a difference in Guate-
mala and Nicaragua and a host of the other countries. The sad leg-
acy is that American military intervention usually only succeeds in
compromising national sovereignty and weakening the very institu-
tions that we would strengthen. It is all of our purpose-indeed, it
should be our national policy, that President Aristide return to of-
fice. He was the democratically elected President of Haiti and he
belongs in Port-au-Prince exercising those responsibilities.
It is in my mind, however, a compromise with the very notion of
democratic institutions that a foreign military force can ever play
a positive role in having a democracy function properly. We have,
by our policy, equated democratic institutions with an individual
and while indeed President Aristide is the legitimately elected
President, I believe that a policy of supporting democracy through
economic and diplomatic means, as we have done in Eastern Eu-
rope, as we pursued successfully in South Africa, and as we are
pursuing now I hope successfully in Cuba is, indeed, the better
course.
Finally, I want to add that in addition to my great hesitation
about the involvement of American military forces, I hope the ad-
ministration pursues this policy with some sense of balance. It is
our policy to support democracy for the Haitian people. But democ-
racy is not all that we want for the Haitian people.
This is the most desperately poor nation in our hemisphere. Pre-
sumably, it is also our policy to support a better quality of life, the
eradication of contagious disease, and the elimination of hunger.
Indeed, in our vigilance to support a democratically elected Presi-
dent, I hope we do not make the poorest elements of Haitian soci-
ety our victims.
This is not an unusual choice for the United States. We faced it
in South Africa. We face it now in Cuba. But balance must always
be remembered lest we destroy the very people that we are at-
tempting to assist with democratic institutions.








Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli. Mr. Gray we are
now prepared to hear your statement. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY III, SPECIAL ADVISER
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON HAITI
Mr. GRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted to the
committee a full statement that is rather lengthy. I hope it will 1 6d
entered into the record and I will be allowed to summarize my r- 9
marks.
Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection, so ordered and we a
preciate that.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguish I'
committee, it is good to be here. As you will recall, Mr. Chairman ,
I began my career in Congress on this very same committee. The ,
as today, I was following my mother's admonition to keep goi I
company. Thus I welcome the opportunity to return to the Foreif i
Affairs Committee to testify before you today to work with old cc
leagues and new partners as we confront the difficult issues facii
us in Haiti.
CHANGE IN HAITI POLICY
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, on May 8, Pre,
dent Clinton announced a change in our policy on Haiti. Like mai
of you, he felt the continued intransigence of the military junta
Haiti left us no choice but to step up our efforts to bring down HE
ti's dictators and to extend every consideration to those fleeii
their oppressive rule. Since the President's announcement, we ha'
achieved significant progress.
Our efforts have been distinguished by three characteristic
They have multilateral participation, they are tough on the de fac
regime and its supporters and compassionate toward the regime
victims. To appreciate these characteristics one need only review
what has been accomplished since May 8.
SANCTIONS POLICY
Let me talk for a moment about progress in implementing tl
President's new policy on sanctions.
On May 21, as a consequence of U.S. leadership, United Natiorji
Security Council Resolution 917 imposing stringent new sanctior'
on Haiti went into effect.
On May 26, the special representative of the Secretaries Gener
of the United Nations and of the Organization of American State
Mr. Dante Caputo, and I met with President Balaguer and reach(
agreement on a plan to seal the border between the Dominican R
public and Haiti, and to send 60 international technical advisors
the Dominican Republic to help in that effort.
On June 3, the representatives of the Friends of the Secretai
General of the United Nations on Haiti which include Argentin
Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela, decided, amor
other things, to consider on a national basis expanded sanctior
that would cutoff commercial air flights to and from Haiti and ban i
international financial transactions with that country. The Friene c
also expressed their determination to promote the full redeploy-







ment of a strengthened and reconfigured United Nations Missior
in Haiti.
REFUGEE POLICY
On the issue of refugees, on May 19, the United Nations Hig-
Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, and I were pleased to an-
nounce agreement on a plan for cooperation between the Unitec
Nations and the United States in the processing of Haitian appli-
cants for refugee status, and in locating countries of resettlement
for Haitian refugees.
On June 1, the Governments of Jamaica and of the United States
announced jointly a plan for shipboard processing of Haitian mi-
grants in Jamaican ports.
On June 3, the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islanc
agreed to the United States' proposals for a land-based processing
center on Grand Turk Island, and on multilateral support.
On June 6, Deputy Secretary Talbott and I attended the meeting
of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States or
Haiti in Belem, Brazil. A strong resolution was enacted which in-
cludes a call upon all member States to assist in the resettlement
of Haitian refugees, to support measures by the United Nations t(
strengthen the United Nations police and military mission in Haiti
and to support and reinforce existing and additional sanctions
against the military regime and their supporters.
U.S. INTERESTS IN HAITI
While much remains to be done, I believe we have established
the basis for a successful conclusion to the Haitian crisis. Allow mi
to explain why these steps are important and how they fit into thE
administration's overall strategy.
U.S. interests are at stake in Haiti.
President Clinton is committed to the prompt return of democ
racy and of President Aristide to Haiti.
Why are we so committed to this task? Why does Haiti matter
this much to the United States? How does Haiti differ from othei
troubled countries around the globe? President Clinton has recently
explained our interests quite clearly.
First, Haiti is a close neighbor.
Second, there are approximately 1 million persons of Haitian de
scent resident in the United States.
Third several thousand American citizens live in Haiti.
Fourth, we believe drugs are coming to the United States frorr
Haiti.
Fifth, we face the continuous possibility of a massive outflow o
Haitian refugees to the United States because of conditions ir
Haiti.
Finally, Haiti and Cuba are the only two nondemocracies left ir
our hemisphere. And in Haiti the results of a democratic election
that were judged free and fair were overturned by unconstitutional
and antidemocratic means.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, let me be as cleal
as I can. President Clinton has determined that our interests re
quire the restoration of the democratic process in Haiti and the re
turn of the duly elected leadership, President Aristide.







We are embarked on a new path toward this goal. Much has
been achieved since President Clinton's announcement on May 8.
However, further steps will be taken in the coming days and
weeks. No options have been excluded. Democracy in Haiti will pre-
vail. Neither we nor the Haitian people can long wait for this
event.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will be glad to take
your questions at this time. You have my full statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gray appears at the conclusion
of the hearing.]
PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
Chairman HAMILTON. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray.
Is a military intervention in Haiti imminent?
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, the President has not ruled out any
option. Our policy right now is to continue to press with the inter-
national community on the sanctions that have only been in place
for a little under 4 weeks and to look at options along with the
OAS and the Four Friends to strengthen and increase those eco-
nomic restrictions and target them. It is not imminent at this time
that any action is being planned other than those diplomatic ac-
tions which have been stated.
PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS POLICY
Chairman HAMILTON. How much confidence do you have that the
sanction policy that you have laid out in your statement will work?
Mr. GRAY. I had a great-
Chairman HAMILTON. How long will it take it to work?
Mr. GRAY. I have confidence, Mr. Chair, and members of the
committee, that sanctions can create an environment where people
come to their senses. We have seen that throughout the history of
world diplomacy. It has happened in many cases; some cases it has
not happened. But certainly we have a responsibility to try every
arrow in the diplomatic quiver to make sure that the coup leaders
step down.
We do not have a time estimate for how long it will take. But
I can tell you from my meetings with leaders in the OAS,
CARICOM nations, and the Four Friends that they want these eco-
nomic restrictions to work. They want them to work immediately
and that is why they are considering and passing resolutions call-
ing on nations bilaterally to establish further economic restrictions
so that we do not allow the coup leaders to stay in place for a
longer period of time than they have stayed already.
Chairman HAMILTON. What is the reasonable length of time for
us to test sanctions?
Suppose you get them into place and you are reasonably satisfied
with the enforcement of the sanctions, what is a reasonable test
time for them? Is it 1 month? Is it 6 months? Is it a year?
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I don't
think you can put an exact date as to a period of testing or exam-
ination. I think what you have to see is what takes place as a re-
sult of those economic sanctions. One of the things that we have
seen take place, especially since the visit with the Dominican Re-
public President, is that there has been an attempt to close that







border. That is a very important beginning to seal off the back door
to the Haitian coup leaders.
There are still additional things that can be done. I think the
world community, our allies in this, will be looking at the impacts
and to try to determine whether or not we see some movement on
the part of those who are supporting the coup leaders to force them
down, to have them reconsider their position. Otherwise, Mr.
Chairman, and members of the committee, there is no specific time
period other than a day-to-day, week-to-week look at reality and
whether or not these sanctions are changing that reality.
Chairman HAMILTON. In any event, at this point your frame of
mind is that the policy is in place? You think the sanctions will
work if they are properly implemented and that they will bring
about the removal of the military leadership of Haiti and the res-
toration of Aristide?
Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We hope that these
sanctions and the stiffened sanctions that will be coming from indi-
vidual nations will have that impact, but it will have to be judged
day-to-day, week-to-week as to whether or not it is having that im-
pact.
Chairman HAMILTON. Now, I presume you have very solid sup-
port in the OAS and in the hemisphere for the sanctions and the
enforcement of the sanctions at this point; is that correct?
Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
Chairman HAMILTON. What kind of support do you have at this
point in the hemisphere-or worldwide-for military intervention?
Mr. GRAY. Well, I like to use an analogy that comes out of my
old congressional district of north Philadelphia, which is an urban
row house district. If your house is located next to the house that
is on fire, on fire because of a military dictatorship, on fire because
of outflow of asylum seekers, then you have one point of view. If
your house is across the street, you have another point of view. If
your house is in the block, you have a third point of view. If, on
the other hand, your house is on the other side of town, you have
even another point of view.
When you look at the countries in the Organization of American
States, you will find a variety of viewpoints on the subject. Those
whose house is adjoined, next to Haiti, are very concerned and
don't want to debate how many buckets of water will be thrown on
the fire per minute.
Chairman HAMILTON. Are you suggesting-
Mr. GRAY. Those across the street have a different point of view.
Chairman HAMILTON. Are you suggesting, Mr. Gray, that there
are a number of the members of the OAS who favor military inter-
vention?
Mr. GRAY. I am suggesting to you that there are some in the
OAS who do favor military intervention. There are some who only
favor such intervention under certain conditions. And then there
are those who say under no circumstances would they favor mili-
tary intervention. And again, I go back to my analogy, it depends
on how close your house is to the fire.








Chairman HAMILTON. The closer they are to Haiti, the more like-
ly they are to support military intervention?
Mr. GRAY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI
Chairman HAMILTON. Now, the papers are reporting this morn-
ing about the formation of a 3,000 soldier task force and I want to
get clear in my mind just what we are doing there. Under what cir-
cumstances does that task force move into Haiti?
Does that come about as a result of U.S. military intervention
and then we hand off responsibilities to the task force or does that
task force go into Haiti only if the military steps aside? Tell me
how that task force gets into Haiti.
Mr. GRAY. I am not familiar, Mr. Chairman, with the article that
you are commenting on, but I assume it is referencing UNMIH, the
United Nations Mission in Haiti, which is presently in the process
of being reconfigured, reconstituted and strengthened. The Five
Friends and the OAS and President Aristide have all come to
agreement that the original United Nations mission envisioned in
the Governors Island accord is insufficient. That Governors Island
accord viewed a situation where the United Nations mission in
Haiti would go in with the cooperation of the coup leaders who
would have stepped down voluntarily in accordance with that ac-
cord.
Since that has not occurred, it is clear that there needs to be a
broader mandate and a significantly different kind of UNMIH.
That is what is being discussed now in OAS and among the Five
Friends. The United Nations will make a decision this month on
that issue because the mandate runs out. With regard to your
question-
Chairman HAMILTON. That task force would be ready to go into
Haiti when the military steps aside; is that right?
Mr. GRAY. That task force has as its mission-UNMIH, the Unit-
ed Nations Mission in Haiti, has as its mission the role of going
into Haiti the moment the coup leaders step down.
FUNCTIONS OF UNMIH
Chairman HAMILTON. And their task at this point becomes what?
Mr. GRAY. Their task at this point becomes-
Chairman HAMILTON. Let me run through some functions for you
to see if we are thinking along the same lines. They would have
the responsibility of disarming the military; reinstating Aristide;
preventing violence; securing the area; creating a civilian police;
keeping order; providing civil order; getting economic assistance
there and getting it distributed. Are those the kind of functions
they would be taking on?
Mr. GRAY. I would say generally you have described essentially
what the United Nations Mission in Haiti is to do. It should be
ready to deploy once the current military leadership in Haiti has
departed. We envision this as a permissive operation. The mission
should have a mandate and a composition, however, which would
permit it to deal with such challenges as it is likely to encounter
in the course of its deployment.







We believe that in addition to responsibilities for training and
professionalization of the army and police, UNMIH, the United Na-
tions Mission in Haiti, should also be given the mandate and the
capability to support the democratic Government of Haiti in provid-
ing security to the international presence and to senior Haitian
Government personnel and key installations and helping assure
basic civil order.
U.S. POLICY ON BROADENING HAITIAN GOVERNMENT
Chairman HAMILTON. Finally, is it U.S. policy today to encourage
President Aristide to broaden his political base?
Mr. GRAY. It is U.S. policy to support the return of democracy,
the duly elected leader of that nation, which is President Aristide,
and I think after my conversations with President Aristide, that he
is well aware of the political realities and needs very little prompt-
ing from us to understand those needs of base broadening and
using a message of reconciliation.
Chairman HAMILTON. So it is our policy, then, to encourage
President Aristide to broaden his political base?
Mr. GRAY. I believe my answer, Mr. Chairman, is that President
Aristide already recognizes his own political needs. In fact, at the
Belem conference on Monday, he gave a very pointed address
where he talked about reconciliation, and his proposal, politically
and economically which included elements of base broadening.
Chairman HAMILTON. So then you would expect him, then, to
work with, for example, the Haitian parliamentarians who are also
elected and with other political forces in the country?
Mr. GRAY. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think that he clearly un-
derstands his responsibilities and the constitution of his country
under which he was elected and I think if you look at his speech
in Belem, this past Monday, it is very clear that he has a very
pointed plan for political reconciliation, as well as economic rec-
onciliation.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gray, the Netherlands has agreed to the resettlement of five
Haitians who qualify for asylum. Does the decision of Canada and
Venezuela to take political refugees consist of similar marginal
numbers? Have other countries said they will take refugees, and if
so, how many are they willing to accept?
Mr. GRAY. We don't have the exact number Mr. Gilman, that
have been approved by individual nations. We do know that while
we are in conversation with these nations, the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees has agreed to take the leadership on this issue,
and we know that there are several countries that have agreed to
resettle Haitian refugees who are granted political asylum through
a process of fair hearings.
Secondly, there are a number of countries who have said they
will consider it, have not responded. So I cannot at this time, Con-
gressman, give you an exact number for each country other than
when that country makes that announcement.
Mr. GILMAN. Are you in contact with some of those nations?







Mr. GRAY. Yes. We are in contact with a long list of nations seek-
ing to know what they will do on resettlement, but that issue is
being led by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
as the partner that has come on board in this issue recognizing the
international implications of the refugee problem.
IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON HAITIAN BUSINESS ELITE
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Gray, most Haitian businessmen indicate that
they are determined to ride out the sanctions. In your opinion, are
current international efforts eroding the support of the business
community and to what extent are the prominent families with
close ties to the military, whose assets have not been frozen and
whose visas have not been revoked, buffering the effects of the
sanctions under the military?
Mr. GRAY. It is my view, Congressman, that the statements that
you are hearing from business elite who have been supporters of
the coup leaders are not real indications of what is happening. Our
intelligence tells us that there are many who are beginning to feel
already after only 3 weeks the bite of these sanctions. And at the
same time when you look at the statement coming from the Five
Friends calling for additional prohibitions on commercial airline
traffic and financial transactions between Haiti and other coun-
tries, we are being told that there is an increasing awareness that
this business elite that has supported the coup leaders will not be
able to sit back and wait 6, 8, months or 1 year before they feel
the pain. It will be fairly immediate.
There are also discussions going on in various governments
about broadening the list of those who are going to be denied visas.
Right now those who are denied visas are the coup leaders, the
front government that was put in place and their relatives, but
many nations are looking at the possibilities of broadening that as
they look to find who are the coup leaders' supporters.
POST-INTERVENTION POLICY
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Gray, there has been a lot of talk about inter-
vention-and in the event that becomes a final option and we do
intervene-what would be your assessment of the follow-up mission
and exit policy? Have you looked at that aspect?
Mr. GRAY. Well, there has not been, from my point of view, any
strategy discussions with regard to intervention by the United
States. Our policy is to work multilaterally with the OAS, with the
United Nations, as we have done throughout this process, to ensure
that we are acting with the support of others in the region and in
the world community. Let me just simply say that the issue of
strategies for going in, who goes in under what circumstances,
those discussions have not occurred. The President has just made
it very, very clear that he has not ruled out any option whatsoever.
EXPECTED DURATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATION
Mr. GILMAN. One last question.
The press today reported that there is some talk of a multi-
national peacekeeping force. If we were to engage in that effort,
and I assume we would make up a good portion of that peacekeep-








ing role, what sort of length or period would it necessitate for an
intervention of that nature?
Mr. GRAY. The UNMIH, the United Nations Mission in Haiti,
which is being reformed and will be by the United Nations this
month, and which has found support from President Aristide, from
the Five Friends and also from the OAS, does not give a specific
time limit for it to be there. Under the old Governors Island agree-
ment, it was to be there for 6 months.
Clearly, if the coup leaders step down in adversarial cir-
cumstances, no matter how they came down, UNMIH's role would
have to be reevaluated in terms of the duration of the expanded
mandate.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Torricelli.
PRECEDENT SET BY INTERVENTION
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, let me say at the outset that my questions and
comments are directed toward the possibility of an American-
armed incursion into Haiti, not in us playing a responsible role in
a multilateral force after the dictatorship has ended. Such a role
for the United States would be appropriate based on historic prece-
dence, and I think a source of pride for every American.
I am obviously not as convinced about the possibility of an Amer-
ican-armed invasion of Haiti. Not because I don't share every mem-
bers' desire to see the Haitian military removed, because I have a
number of questions of precedent and the large impact that it
might have. Indeed, it is my own belief that American foreign pol-
icy is best directed when it is based on doctrine and not anecdotally
applied. My concern would be that if indeed we are to involve our-
selves in Haiti in an armed incursion, is the United States estab-
lishing that in each democracy in the hemisphere, if it were to be
interrupted by the armed forces of that nation, we would use the
American Armed Forces to restore the democratic-elected govern-
ments?
In the last year alone, there has been a considerable and continu-
ing threat of the Venezuelan Armed Forces interrupting democratic
government. Indeed, in the year preceding in Guatemala and in
Peru, such constitutional interruptions actually occurred.
I wonder, Mr. Gray, whether you or the administration is con-
cerned about the precedent being established and whether you are
prepared to say that this possibility arises now only with Haiti or
indeed there is some new doctrine in the making?
INTERVENTION DECIDED ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS
Mr. GRAY. I would say, Congressman, that the President has
given reasons which I stated today. If you look at those reasons
that he has articulated, they are unique reasons that focus upon
Haiti. They would not necessarily apply throughout the region.
Certainly a threat to democracy anywhere is a threat to democ-
racy everywhere. The question really becomes what can we do
about it and what is the best way of going about doing it?








In places where we have the opportunity to do something about
it, providing leadership in making the change and having the abil-
ity to do it become questions that are central to determining what
the policy ought to be, and also with that working within the
framework of the community of nations. This policy has attempted
to be guided by the thoughts, decisions of the community, the
broader community and also very specifically the Western Hemi-
spheric community, the OAS, in making determinations as to what
we can and cannot do. But when I look at the question of military
intervention, one has to look at each situation, look at what our in-
terests are in that, and then ask the question not only of those
things, but also whether or not you can make a difference in inter-
vention and whether or not there will be community support for
that intervention.
IMPLICATIONS OF INTERVENTION IN HAITI
Mr. TORRICELLI. It would, however, be extraordinarily naive for
the administration to believe it can militarily intervene in Haiti
and not have an enormous impact or raise the specter in a variety
of other nations that we might pursue exactly the same policy. In-
deed, Venezuela is infinitely more important to the United States
economically than Haiti. There are a variety of nations in Central
America that have as many or more citizens residing in the United
States than Haiti.
It is unclear to me where this line would be drawn. What is I
think is a real threat is that there is in the making an American
corollary of a Brezhnev doctrine. In 1968 Leonid Brezhnev declared
that socialism was irreversible in the world.
Are we now to declare that any state in the Western Hemisphere
that has become democratic and chosen a democratic leader will
not defend that choice without the threat of American-armed inter-
vention to reverse it? Indeed, it is my belief that historically the
United States has used all of its economic and diplomatic means,
even on occasion lending training and military support to those
who wanted to defend or establish their own democracies. But I am
unaware of any precedent in this hemisphere where the United
States went beyond those means to actually use our own forces to
defend and to help establish democratic institutions in another na-
tion, and I appreciate your response to that.
THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE INTERVENTION
Mr. GRAY. Again, Congressman, I think you raise a very impor-
tant point.
Again, I would respond by saying obviously the United States, as
the world's perhaps only superpower at this time, has a moral
stake in promoting democracy and human rights throughout the
world. At the same time, our capacity to influence events varies
from place to place. We may not be able to right every wrong. We
may not be able to be everywhere every time.
But there is not a valid argument against taking actions in
places where our interests are heavily engaged and at times where
and when we have the ability to do so. Indeed, there are times
when the ability to influence events in the right direction gives us








the responsibility to do so. There are some places where we may
not be able to influence events in the right direction.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray-
Mr. GRAY. But in some places there are. So this is, in my esti-
mation, one of the places where we are working multilaterally with
the CARICOM nations, the OAS community, and the U.N. having
the capacity to influence events in the right direction. So thus, you
have to look at it I believe in that context and thus if you said to
me what would happen in Venezuela if there was a coup d'etat, a
dictatorship, again, I would pose to you the same kind of questions.
LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERVENTION
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me for a final
point?
Chairman HAMILTON. Certainly.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The last time this Congress was asked to con-
sider the question of American military intervention abroad in the
Persian Gulf, we were very careful to establish the legal founda-
tion. It was our hope that in this new world when nations use force
of arms, they would do so only after having a clear foundation in
international law.
I wonder if you could for us first establish in either the U.N.
charter or the OAS where there would be a legal foundation for a
American military intervention in Haiti. Whether, indeed, it rises
to the threshold created in the U.N. charter of there being a seri-
ous threat to international peace and security, that being the only
instance that I know in the U.N. charter that would permit such
an operation.
And second, I wonder if you would also address to me the legal
point that if, indeed, U.S. military forces were to intervene in Haiti
and President Aristide were returned to the Presidency, which he
admittedly deserves, does President Aristide then retain under his
constitution the legal right to decide when those forces leave, how
they would operate, and whether they would be there and their op-
erations would be at his discretion and direction since almost cer-
tainly under the constitution of Haiti that would remain his legal
prerogative.
DECISION ON INTERVENTION RESTS WITH PRESIDENT
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, with regard to the first issue, I would
advise the President of the United States that even though we are
participants in the U.N. and the OAS, and we work very closely
with them and we are trying to develop multilateral initiatives dip-
lomatically to solve this crisis, that ultimately the decision to use
a military option must be made by the President of the United
States, not by an international body for the President of the United
States. And he would have to determine what our interests were.
So from a legal point of view the ultimate decision of whether or
not to use the military option would be up to the President of the
United States of America based upon what he believes are the best
interests of the United States.








AUTHORITY OVER PEACEKEEPING MISSION
With regard to the second issue which is if there was, and I
would like to use two possible scenarios, one, the coup leaders left
voluntarily or involuntarily under any one of those circumstances,
you do have a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, how long that peace
mission would be in Haiti would be determined by the mandate
that is given by the United Nations.
Could President Aristide order that peacekeeping mission to
leave and under what circumstances? I do not know all of the legal
ramifications of that, but I can tell you based on the speech that
I heard from President Aristide in Belem, as well as his comments
that I heard printed in the news media and his comments to me,
he is supportive of a peacekeeping force that would maintain an in-
creased mandate as we have talked about earlier in these hearings
and so I would be very surprised if there ended up being any con-
flict on that issue.
But, of course, the issue of democracy, the people of Haiti, chang-
ing their constitution, having a different vote on the Parliament,
having a different vote. That is what democracy is about. That is
what we are fighting for, so I cannot predict what might happen
in the Parliament of Haiti 8 or 10 months from now.
What we are fighting for with the world community in terms of
sanctions is to allow that democracy to grow so that they can have
that choice, whether or not we may agree with all of its ramifica-
tions.
Chairman HAMILTON. The Chair will recognize Mr. Ballenger,
but before that, I understand Mr. Rangel has an important meeting
at the Ways and Means Committee, so I will recognize Mr. Rangel
first.
PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF EMBARGO
Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the com-
mittee. I really appreciate this courtesy you've extended.
I just have one question before I leave. Ambassador, could you
share with me why you have any optimism at all that the embargo
will be successful?
I recognize that you cutoff the general's credit cards in Miami.
I know that he will no longer be able to dance and drink cham-
pagne in Miami. I understand that the assets of the very wealthy
we may try to seize but we do have a problem right now in doing
that. And it is just my opinion that when the embargo is finally
analyzed, the people that are going to have the food, the money
from drug trafficking, the money from shaking down the wealthy
and the guns are the military.
I just cannot see, no matter how severe the sanctions get, that
the military will leave voluntarily. And so if you have any sugges-
tion that you can allow me to adopt as to why they would leave
based on the sanctions, I wish, Ambassador, you would share it
with me.
Mr. GRAY. I think that is an excellent question by the Congress-
man from New York and the answer that I give when people ask
me that is that even though there have been a series of sanctions
over the last couple of years, they really have not been very signifi-








cant. They were voluntary under the OAS and it was just arms and
oil. You really have not had a real set of sanctions with teeth in
them until those that took effect on May 21.
And I don't believe that in 3 weeks or 3V2 weeks we ought to dis-
count their potential effect. Particularly when there is a possibility,
as we have seen from the Four Friends and the OAS, that new
sanctions may be coming forward that will target the wealthy sup-
porters of the military and also the upper echelons that have been
backing the coup leadership.
I believe that we must try these, we must try every possible
thing to bring that pressure which will create a situation where the
supporters of the coup leaders go to General Cedras, to General
Biamby, to Lieutenant Colonel Francois, and say you must leave.
We do not want this country totally wrecked. We are talking about
the coup leaders. We are not talking about the entire military leav-
ing.
Mr. RANGEL. The coup leaders would leave because it is the right
thing to do?
Mr. GRAY. They would leave, I believe, because it suddenly would
no longer be in their interests to stay.
Mr. RANGEL. They would be moved because of the pain that the
Haitians are suffering?
Mr. GRAY. No, the pain that they will suffer, the pain that they
are suffering.
Mr. RANGEL. That is my only point. My only point is what pain?
What inconvenience will they suffer?
Mr. GRAY. Well, Congressman, if you isolate them through inabil-
ity to travel, if you also take away their liquidity of their assets,
and as you well know-
Mr. RANGEL. If they haven't pulled the money out yet, then they
are dumber than I thought they were.
Mr. GRAY. As you know, Congressman, from the Ways and
Means experience, world trade in the business community is not
necessarily done in Haitian currency but in other currency and
thus if other nations join with you in not only freezing the coup
leaders' assets but stopping third party transfers, also affecting the
liquidity of the business classes, then you have a tough choice. No,
I don't expect them out of the goodness of their hearts to step
down. They have signed agreements at Governors Island and then
refused to step down.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXAMPLE
I agree with you in that assessment but I do believe that with
enough economic pressure, finely tuned and targeted, there is a
possibility that forces inside of Haiti will force them down. Let me
give an example that you played a very important role in. Back in
the 1980's, people said that there was no possibility, and I admit
that comparisons are always dangerous and situations are fot the
same, but people said that under no circumstances would sanctions
have any impact on a first world country in Africa that was indus-
trialized, South Africa.
But I also remember, Congressman, when you and a couple of
other members through Ways and Means Committee, passed legis-
lation affecting the International Monetary Fund credit, tax re-








bates for South Africa. We saw the South African economy take a
dip of 40 to 50 percent in 1 week and I do believe that sanctions
had a role in creating an environment where leadership like Mr.
de Klerk could emerge from P.W. Botha, supported by the business
community who decided that it was not in their interests to lose
everything. My viewpoint is that if we finely tune these sanctions,
if we target them, if we ratchet them up immediately, and not
allow people to sit there, the wealthy for 6 months to a year, that
you may see the same kind of process take place where the truly
wealthy who have been the supporters of this coup will come for-
ward and say I am not prepared to lose everything, it is time for
the coup leaders to go. I think we have got to try that and I think
we have got to watch it carefully week-to-week to determine wheth-
er there is an effect before looking at other options.
Mr. RANGEL. You have my support and my prayers. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Rangel.
Mr. Ballenger.
IMPACT OF EMBARGO ON HUMANITARIAN AID FLIGHTS
Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gray, because my wife some years ago got together with
Liddy Dole and tried to help build a hospital in Haiti; she devel-
oped a very strong friendship with Dr. David McKneeler who runs
the hospital and he has been calling us on a regular basis describ-
ing the difficulties that he has had. The May 6 resolution, indicat-
ing that they were going to cutoff all commercial flights, has cre-
ated a situation where everything is getting terribly low in his hos-
pital. He was getting no medical supplies, nothing. On May 25, you
said that the administration would be addressing this loophole and
I know that the airline, Agape Airline, has got 45,000 pounds of
medical supplies in Florida ready to go at any time, but because
of the technicalities or paperwork, it doesn't seem to be able to
move. I just wonder if you could give us an answer about what is
going on about freeing the humanitarian airlines which could get
supplies into Haiti.
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, we share that concern. As you know,
the Resolution 917 in the U.N. said everything but commercial air-
lines, and thus one of the problems that arose out of those sanc-
tions is the fact that many humanitarian flights are caught up in
a process where they have to apply for individual clearance for
each flight. That process is very lengthy and we share your con-
cerns that there needs to be something done to speed up the possi-
bility of humanitarian aid getting in.
The United Nations Security Council Haiti Sanctions Committee
has not yet adopted guidelines for a case-by-case review and ap-
proval of such flights. However, the United States has adopted in-
terim procedures for reviewing and seeking approval of humani-
tarian flights in accordance with U.N. requirements.
We were prepared to process expeditiously that request with
U.N. requirements for humanitarian flights to Haiti and we are
working with humanitarian agencies and charter carriers providing
service to Haiti to ensure that they understand these requirements
and to obtain for them the specific information we need to obtain








U.N. approval for these flights. In a word, we are trying to short-
circuit the red tape and come up with a procedure so that these
worthy humanitarian flights are not delayed for weeks because
they have to go through various channels.
On Monday we submitted two requests on behalf of two different
humanitarian flight organizations to the U.N. Sanctions Commit-
tee. We will continue to work closely with these organizations to
prepare requests which can move through the process expedi-
tiously. And so there is a problem, I agree with you. We are trying
to work with the U.N. so that we can come up with an expedited
procedure so that these worthy efforts can be continued, food, medi-
cine, those groups working and having a long-time history.
URGING EXPEDITED APPROVAL FOR HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS
Mr. BALLENGER. Let me just say, it now has been 2 weeks since
something was going to be done and I understand from my co-
worker right next to me here, Mr. Goss, that these airlines have
been feeding 1 million people in Haiti with their supplies. It ap-
pears to me that since we seem to be the leader and the
decisionmaker taking charge of what is going on in Haiti, that to
sit back and wait for some red tape from the United Nations just
doesn't float-can we not make things move in the United Nations
to help mankind?
Mr. GRAY. Yes, we can, Mr. Congressman, and we are going to
do that. We are trying to work out an expedited procedure for U.S.
charter flights that are carrying food and medicine. Let me also
agree with you, we have had ongoing humanitarian efforts in there
for some time and those efforts are actually going to be expanded
so that the masses do not suffer. We are increasing our feeding pro-
grams and our care programs significantly now and in the future.
So I would say to you, Congressman, we are working with the
U.N. right now to get through that red tape. It was a problem that
arose and we are trying to solve it so that we can get those human-
itarian flights in right away.
Mr. BALLENGER. It seems to me that the United Nations has
asked us to do various and sundry wonderful things in humani-
tarian aid for the last couple of years and we follow through every
time. It seems pathetic to say that it takes 2 weeks or 3 weeks to
figure things out. I mean people could starve to death in 2 weeks
or 3 weeks. It seems if the United Nations can't come around with
the paperwork, we could. I wish you luck in your efforts there.
Mr. GRAY. Let me just say, Congressman, we already have about
1 million people that we feed right now in Haiti. We are negotiat-
ing an increase in the authorized levels to 300,000 more Haitians,
bringing our authorized total to 1.34 million beneficiaries. So those
who are saying that we are not interested in the poor, the children,
the hungry, that is not the case.
But we do recognize that these sanctions have caused problems
which have to be addressed individually and be resolved and when
we have systems that keep an airplane or food or medicine in stor-
age, it is important, we have got to resolve that. You are absolutely
right we are committed to doing that with the United Nations, but
we cannot have a sanctions policy that simply says someone can
show up and says I have humanitarian aid, I have medicine, let me








bring it in. There has to be a procedure, there has to be, as you
point out, a shortened procedure so that these groups that have
been there for a good time with a proven track record have the
ability to cut through the tape.
Mr. BALLENGER. It seems the answer is: using American tax-
payers' money, we can get it through, but people want to volun-
tarily give, we can't get it through.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Johnston.
LACK OF DEBATE PRIOR TO PREVIOUS INTERVENTIONS
Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador for coming today. Just an observa-
tion first and then two quick questions.
For precedence in Central and South America, there was never
any debate before we invaded Panama. There was never any de-
bate before we invaded Grenada. There was never any debate be-
fore we bombed Libya.
There were 500,000 troops in Saudi Arabia before we had any de-
bate whatsoever on Kuwait. There were 20,000 troops in Somalia
before we ever had any debate. So there is a lot of precedent. For
my friend from New Jersey, there is another instance for the Unit-
ed Nations to invade, and that is genocide. That has not been the
occurrence here, but there is the occurrence in Rwanda.
Two questions. The U.S. drug-
Mr. TORRICELLI. Since the gentleman invoked my name, I as-
sume he wouldn't mind yielding. My point was whether there was
a precedence that the U.S. Government would invade another coun-
try to reinstitute a democratic government.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I reclaim my time.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The gentleman has still not cited the precedent.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I invoked your name on the United Nations ques-
tion, not on your position on Central and South America.
DRUGS IN HAITI
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration seems to be in con-
tact with certain colonels in Cedras' Army. They are in communica-
tions back and forth. Do you know about it? And if it is continuing,
why has it not been terminated?
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, the answer that I give you, the situa-
tion with regard to drugs in Haiti, what type of traffic it is, the size
of that traffic, who are involved, that traffic is currently under re-
view. I have not had access to that information, but we expect
when a review is completed that the answer to those questions will
be available. Unfortunately, that is the only answer that I can give
to you at this time, is that the drug trafficking, the size, who is in-
volved, the extent is under review by our appropriate department.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I would like to follow up on that.
Mr. GRAY. I would be glad to come to you as soon as a review
is completed by the appropriate agency and that information is
shared. We certainly will share it with you, Congressman.








IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SOUTH FLORIDA
Mr. JOHNSTON. Congressman Hastings and I are both from south
Florida, as you well know. And in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach
County we have approximately 100,000 Haitians, 750,000 Cubans
in the last three decades, 50,000 Guatemalans, 50,000 Nica-
raguans. We are at a point of total absorption now and can't take
too many more. Jamaica has agreed to process some of the Hai-
tians.
The ranking member mentioned Holland, the Netherlands taking
in five or something like that. Is there any very strong effort on
behalf of your special envoy in charge to find other countries or
other areas of the United States, like they did with the Vietnamese
boat people, to absorb these immigrants, legal or illegal, coming in
from the Caribbean basin?
Mr. GRAY. My charge, Congressman, has been to help develop a
policy that deals not only with the deeper political structural prob-
lems caused by the coup but also deals with the refugee situation.
What I have tried to say in my testimony is that we have made
some significant progress.
First, it is not simply the United States involved in it any longer;
it is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Second, we have gotten two countries involved with us in proc-
essing.
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO REFUGEE PROBLEM
Third, we are in the process of working with the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees in looking at countries for resettlement.
There are some who have said that they would. There are others
from whom we are waiting to hear.
Other than those that you have read about in the newspaper, we
are not at liberty to talk about the numbers but, yes, we are work-
ing on an international approach to the refugee problem both in
processing and in resettlement and the reason, Congressman, is be-
cause the refugee problem is not simply a problem of south Florida
or the United States. It is a hemispheric problem. It is a problem
that is created by the lack of democracy and the coup leadership
that is there violating human rights, and so therefore we have got
to approach that problem that way and what we have tried to do
in the last 3 weeks, Congressman, is do just that. I think we are
making progress on it. And we are seeking other nations to be in-
volved in the resettlement.
I am not, however, involved in talking to states or cities, in the
United States with regard to resettlement. We are talking to other
nations to be a part of an international strategy just as we are try-
ing to develop international strategies diplomatically through sanc-
tions and pressure against this regime.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Just in closing, to use your analogy, a house that
is burning down is next door to Florida.
Thank you, Mr. Gray.
Mr. GRAY. I understand that. I didn't use Florida but Florida
would be a place just like the Bahamas, just like the Turks and
Caicos, just like Barbados and just like Jamaica so it does depend








on where you sit as to how you analyze the fire and how rapidly
you want to move in terms of putting it out.
Chairman HAMILTON. My understanding that Mr. Hyde is willing
to have Mr. Goss precede him. Mr. Goss, we are delighted to have
you back to the committee and we welcome you.
MEDIA REPORTS OF UNILATERAL INTERVENTION
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I really appre-
ciate the courtesy and so I ask that my questions be included in
the record because I know I am not going to get through all of
them.
Chairman HAMILTON. Yes, indeed. We will be submitting some
additional questions to you, Mr. Gray. We will certainly include
Mr. Goss' questions.1
Mr. Goss. Thank you sir.
Mr. Gray, I started off by saying I had some questions after lis-
tening to you on Fox this morning. I still have even more now and
that is a good sign that this has been a good use of time.
Media reports have suggested, in response to your comment that
our mission is to bring down Haiti's dictators, that a multinational
peacekeeping force will not be put in place if U.S. military inter-
vention is used to remove Cedras, et al. Is this true and if-
Mr. GRAY. No.
Mr. Goss. That is not true?
Mr. GRAY. No.
Mr. Goss. So the media reports are incorrect?
Mr. GRAY. The report I believe that you read out of one particu-
lar newspaper-
Mr. Goss. It was the Post, wasn't it?
Mr. GRAY [continuing]. Is not accurate, that suggests that
UNMIH will not be reconfigured if there is a military intervention.
I believe that is the statement. The answer is no.
Mr. Goss. This statement says that only if Haiti military rulers
give up power peaceably. I believe "peaceably" is the operative
word and you are saying that is incorrect.
Mr. GRAY. That is incorrect.
Mr. Goss. So therefore that doesn't effectively rule out unilateral
U.S. military intervention as far as the OAS and U.N. are con-
cerned.
Mr. GRAY. The U.S. Government, the President has said that all
options are on the table-
Mr. Goss. I wasn't speaking to what the President said. I was
speaking to what the U.N./OAS motion is and I understood the mo-
tion they took in Brazil yesterday, in fact, did rule out unilateral
U.S. intervention as a precursor to the peacekeeping accords going
into effect from Governors Island.
Mr. GRAY. No, that is not correct.
Mr. Goss. Thank you. This paper was wrong.
Mr. GRAY. In fact, that was not what the OAS statement out of
Belem said at all.
Mr. Goss. Good. If that situation changes, we would like to
know. It is very important. As you know, Congress has expressed
'All questions submitted for the record and responses thereto appear in the appendix.








an opinion on that. As my colleague from Florida has suggested, we
are a house next door, but as far as I know nobody in Florida is
calling for invasion, or very few.
COMPOSITION OF PROSPECTIVE U.N. MISSION
Second question, in the event that the process which-I said
very few. I qualified that when I saw your hand go up, Alcee.
In the event that there was success and Cedras left and things
came to pass and Aristide returned with this peacekeeping force,
who would be providing the security of the country? Not the na-
tional security but the stability? The domestic stability and further
to that, who would be providing for Aristide's personal safety?
Mr. GRAY. The United Nations Mission in Haiti.
Mr. Goss. Would that include U.S. military personnel?
Mr. GRAY. We expect that if there is a United Nations mission
in Haiti, that there would be some U.S. participation.
Mr. Goss. So it would be possible to foresee that we would have
U.S. military personnel providing personal security for President
Aristide in Haiti?
Mr. GRAY. There is a possibility that U.S. troops will be part of
the United Nations Mission in Haiti for peacekeeping purposes.
What role they would serve such as specific security for President
Aristide is yet to be determined. Each country's contribution will
be determined based on what that country's specialties are.
There are some countries that would provide, Congressman, law
enforcement because they have French-speaking people who could
provide for civil law enforcement in the streets. There will be oth-
ers that will provide for logistical support, transporting of goods
and services. There will be others that will be involved in retrain-
ing the military. So it is not a correct assumption to say that be-
cause the United States participates in UNMIH we will be provid-
ing personal security for President Aristide.
COST OF U.N. MISSION
Mr. Goss. Right. But we can't rule it out. Now, the things you
have outlined sound to me very expensive. I do want to get to the
cost factor.
I was just going through some of the things. We have got costs
involved in the administration's policy of enforcing sanctions. We
know there are a great number of ships running around down
there. Providing reimbursement to Jamaica and Turks and Caicos,
and we don't know all the deals. We read millions of dollars for the
use of their premises or facilities or whatever of running processing
centers and cruise ships cost. The cost of sustaining Aristide's gov-
ernment in exile in D.C. and of course humanitarian relief efforts
that you spoke to in response to Mr. Ballenger's questions.
These are just some of the costs. I don't know what they are, but
they are beginning to mount up, and I think a time is going to
come very shortly where we would like to have not only an esti-
mate of what the cost is today, but what we can expect in the rea-
sonable future. And, under the assumption that the policy prevails,
how much is it going to cost the United States of America tax-
payers to provide our share of whatever the peacekeeping mission
is going to be under the Governor's Island accord.








Mr. GRAY. Those are very good questions, Congressman, and the
response that I have is that we are calculating the costs for the
processing centers because they haven't gone on line yet. We are
also concluding arrangements with regional governments with re-
gard to UNMIH, that has to be a reconstituted, strengthened, new
mandate by the U.N. And the size of the force, its mandate, will
also help to determine its costs.
And we will be consulting with Congress as soon as we can de-
velop a reasonable and reliable cost.
The costs of President Aristide which you mentioned are being
borne by Haitian funds, not by the U.S. taxpayer.
CONTACTS WITH COUP LEADERS
Mr. Goss. May I ask a follow-up on that last question? Have
there been any direct or indirect negotiations with General Cedras,
inducements or threats offered to excuse himself from his present
position that you can talk about in this hearing?
Mr. GRAY. I am not able, Congressman, to talk about those
hypothetical at this point. We are just committed to seeing that
the coup leaders leave. There have been negotiations already on at
least two occasions where those coup leaders came to agreements.
Aristide and the democratic forces agreed and then it was the coup
leader who reneged on those agreements, broke those agreements,
and that is why the OAS and the United Nations and all of our
allies in the hemisphere are united in condemning the coup leader-
ship and asking for their removal.
Mr. Goss. It is good, and I think that there is opportunity for ne-
gotiated settlement, and I thank you.
REQUEST FOR COST ESTIMATES
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Goss, I think you raise a good point
with respect to the costs. And, Mr. Gray, we will ask you to furnish
as soon as you can cost estimates of just how much Haiti is costing
everyone.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, we will provide those costs as soon as
we have them because many of the items I mentioned have not ac-
tually gone into implementation and the cost estimates are chang-
ing.
Chairman HAMILTON. OK. Mr. Hastings and then Mr. Hyde. Mr.
Hastings.
HISTORY OF.CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO INTERVENTION
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, because of time constraints, we were unable to
get all opening statements. With your permission, I would like
unanimous consent to include the opening statement I would have
made in the record.
Chairman HAMILTON. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hastings appears at the conclu-
sion of the hearing.]
Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Gray. Following and invoking my colleague, Mr.
Goss talked about Floridians and military intervention, their views








with reference to that. Senator Graham also feels that we have
reached a stage where military intervention at least ought to re-
main an option and a credible threat should be maintained.
I was very interested in my colleague's, Mr. Torricelli, the chair-
man of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, comments
and I use the opportunity not so much to ask the question but to
say to you that when we think in terms of the reasons for U.S.
intervention in foreign crises, the United States has since the in-
ception of the Union used our armed forces abroad 234 times in sit-
uations of conflict or potential conflict. There is no formula into
which civilian and military planners plug numbers to see if we
should engage and there is no concrete theorem that remains con-
stant and true. Every instance has been decided individually. The
same will likely be maintained with reference to Haiti in the event
that option is used.
My colleague, Mr. Johnston, cited Panama and Grenada and the
Persian Gulf. He left out Nicaragua where there also was surrep-
titious involvement of the United States and lots of precedents
exist for our having been involved in various engagements in the
Western Hemisphere.
CONSIDERING FUTURE COMMONWEALTH STATUS FOR HAITI
I want to ask a question. I always want to do something that I
think is positive. Mr. Gray, because of you, I am constrained to
hold my fire on the Clinton administration because I have great
confidence that you, as well as all of us, are about the business of
trying to resolve the problem of Haiti. But I would look beyond the
resolution to what must transpire.
Somewhere along the line there has to be a method whereby we
may be able to engage all forces of opposition in Haiti. The adver-
saries need to come to some understanding. I put on the table a
little more controversy. It might be wise for the United States to
look at Puerto Rico and how it came to commonwealth status and
to consider their identity, that Haiti might be in a position where
all forces might very well want to look at that as a possibility.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Hyde.
THE FOUR FRIENDS AND THE MILITARY OPTION
Mr. HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I congratulate Presi-
dent Clinton on selecting Bill Gray for this very delicate job, and
I am glad that you are still available to be dragooned into service
when your country needs you when this is such an issue. So I am
very happy that you are in place.
I note that the administration is very reluctant to lift the embar-
go on Bosnia because of the other members of the U.N. whp have
an interest in that region. I am speaking of Great Britain and
France and until they are willing, despite the fact that our Presi-
dent said he is willing, we are not going to do it unilaterally or at
least that is what my understanding of present policy is. So I
would ask if in Haiti the Four Friends-Canada, France, ourselves
and Venezuela-I don't think any of those people are in favor of
military intervention.








Would we go it alone, I guess, is what I am asking, Mr. Gray.
And what is your answer to that?
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, and it is certainly good to see you be-
cause I remember our service together on this committee now
many, many years ago. I think the answer to that is that the Presi-
dent has not ruled out any option, including a military option. And
I think this administration's policy, however, that has been formu-
lated here today by me-and I have been continuing to work with
the President on refugees as well as in other areas-has been pri-
marily multilateral in approach.
However, I do not think it would be appropriate for the President
of the United States of America to rule out any possibility. To do
so would send an inappropriate signal to the dictators, the coup
leaders there, and could also potentially jeopardize American lives,
because there could be a variety of scenarios where American life
could be under threat, as you well know. Based on some of the
mention of earlier situations by another member of this distin-
guished committee, the President of the United States, and cor-
rectly so, had to make decisions that sometimes are very painful
and very tough.
So I would say to you, Mr. Congressman, that the President's
viewpoint is that he has not ruled out any option.
HAITI AND GRENADA
Mr. HYDE. So he is prepared to go along since that is an option.
OK. I won't press you further on that.
I must say I am taken by the ability of some people to switch
from dove to hawk in rapid succession. For example, I am sure you
remember back in 1983 you were vice chair of the Black Caucus
when a resolution was circulated, October 28 to be exact, calling for
the withdrawal of our forces from Grenada. Back then it was called
gun boat diplomacy. And I have a press clipping from that Wash-
ington Post that was quoted earlier dated October 29, 1983, where
some pretty harsh things were said about the invasion of Grenada.
One of the prominent members who is now Chairman of a very
important committee told the President in a letter that the inva-
sion was a clear violation of international law. Another gentleman
from California said that Grenada posed no clear threat to other
Caribbean nations or to American students there and U.S. troops
weren't defending anyone. They were the aggressors.
And yet many of those same people, as I say, are all for invading
Haiti. Why don't we invade Cuba? As long as we are in the neigh-
borhood and we are going to reestablish democracy, why pass up
Cuba, Mr. Gray?
Mr. GRAY. Well, first of all, you have asked about five or six
questions.
One, I don't think that that newspaper article quotes me. I don't
need to defend the Congressional Black Caucus, even though at one
point as a member who happens to be black I served in that very
distinguished body just as I served in this one. And yes, I was also
the Secretary-Treasurer and Vice Chairman of that, but I was also
the Majority Whip, Caucus Chair and Chairman of the Budget
Committee, that went beyond the Black Caucus.






27

I think, as you well know, Mr. Hyde, members of the Black Cau-
cus have their own individual viewpoints on the issue of Grenada,
as well as this issue. I don't know what all their viewpoints are,
but the last time I served in the caucus, there were always a vari-
ety of viewpoints expressed in meetings, and so people sometimes
have a tendency to lump them all together and don't make distinc-
tions because we are called the Black Caucus, and because of other
things.
My own viewpoint was not the same as you just read. If my
name was not associated that with viewpoint in the Washington
Post-
Mr. HYDE. No, you are not quoted and I didn't quote you.
Mr. GRAY. Secondly, I cannot, I don't really want to get into a
comment about liberals, conservatives, moderates, because I have
always had problems with those labels even when I served in this
body, because I found them to be very misleading. People who are
supposed to be liberal sometimes do very conservative things, peo-
ple who are supposed to be conservative sometimes do liberal
things, so I can't comment really on where every member of this
body stands in his, quote, political affiliation.
My past experience when I was Budget Committee chairman and
majority whip was most members of this body try to accurately re-
flect what their constituency feels and what they think is right,
and that often when we get to it, we make a big mistake and don't
give them the benefit of the doubt of why they are saying what
they are saying. I always try to avoid that, to listen very carefully
to people regardless of whether or not I agree with them.
CUBA
Finally, the last point that you make is the point about Cuba. I
think as you look back in our history, we did do some things about
Cuba. I think there was sort of a semi-invasion with America back
then. I think it was called the Bay of Pigs. I think also we had a
huge crisis that almost took us to the brink of nuclear war.
Mr. HYDE. Some say we promised not to invade Cuba as part of
the deal.
Mr. GRAY. I don't know. I wasn't around in those days at all. I
was just graduating from college and I think clearly that there has
been a series of confrontations over the Cuba issue and there was
also something unique in that situation that is not in this situa-
tion, and that was the struggle between two world superpowers,
and that is why we almost went to the brink of nuclear disaster
over Cuba.
That has changed today. Communism is in the dustpan of his-
tory. Democracy is on the rise and it seems to me that is exactly
why we ought to be where we are now in terms of supporting de-
mocracy.
For the first time in this hemisphere, other than in Cuba, there
is democracy except in Haiti. And that was a fledgling democracy,
yes, a fledgling democracy. It wasn't a perfect democracy, it did not
have a 300-year history of democracy, but the flowering of democ-
racy must start somewhere. This was a fledgling democracy where
all the nations of the world said there was a free and fair election.
Nearly 70 percent of the people who participated in that election








voted for a government and then a group of people decided to throw
out the result of that election by gunpoint.
I believe that is a profound difference between what existed in
Cuba back in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. There are those who
probably would argue, well, you don't need-Cuba is moving to free
markets and democracy despite what Castro is doing and probably
very shortly will be there, but clearly I think as a result of my con-
versations with leaders in the OAS, they are deeply disturbed that
this has happened and they feel very strongly, just as I am sure
there were those who felt very strongly that when American lives
and interests were threatened in Grenada that an American Presi-
dent had to do something about it, and they feel very strongly that
the community needs to do something about, that it should not
stand and to feave it there. And to walk away and simply say let
it stand sends the wrong signal to the democracies that are on the
rise in the last few years in this hemisphere and the democratic
movement that we are trying to foster around the world.
CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH TO INTERVENTION
Again, yes, each place must be looked at individually. There are
places in the world we cannot influence. We cannot be the deter-
miner. There are places where even if we want to do something
there is not clear support. So when you talk about Bosnia and Ser-
bia, that conflict and the Eastern European conflict, it is a much
more complex situation there where our ability to influence events
is limited by a host of things, including differences in the world
community.
But here in Haiti, Congressman, you have got the OAS and the
United Nations in agreement that there must be something done
to prevent this stealing of democracy even in its flower. What we
have decided multilaterally, working together, is to move to tough
sanctions. Those sanctions have only been in place for about 32
weeks and so it is our hope that these diplomatic efforts would
bring some sense to the coup leaders.
CONGRESSIONAL VOTE ON GRENADA INTERVENTION
Mr. HYDE. I appreciate everything you have said, Ambassador
Gray, and I know my time is up, but I just want to make one more
statement. I think it is fair to comment from those of us who were
here during the Grenada situation and who also felt democracy was
at bay in Grenada and when the President did something about it,
that was strenuously resisted by people who today are advocating
the invasion of Haiti.
And one of them was yourself because H. Con. Res. 199, you
were a cosponsor of that and that on November 14 called upon the
President to withdraw armed forces from Grenada, seek ways to re-
store stability to Grenada, and allow the Grenadan people to deter-
mine their future government.
Mr. GRAY. Well, Congressman, I would like to look at that record
that-
Mr. HYDE. You may be right now, but you will forgive me for re-
membering that.
Mr. GRAY. No, no. That is appropriate. The record stands for it-
self. I would like to look at that vote because the President eventu-








ally did that. He withdrew troops from Grenada. He got an inter-
national force composed of the Barbadians, the Jamaicans, and the
CARICOM countries to go in and act as the civil law authority. So
I would like to look at the date of that because apparently Presi-
dent Reagan did listen to those who voted for it and he did with-
draw U.S. troops after intervening, after he perceived a threat to
American lives that were involved there, the students at the medi-
cal school, and also as a result of the overflow of democracy there
at gun barrel when the duly elected leader of that country, Mr.
Bishop, was assassinated.
I think, if my memory serves me correctly, that vote was to get
out as quickly as possible, which eventually they did, and a multi-
national force went in and provided force.
I would also say to you, Congressman, all of us in this democ-
racy, that is the wonderful thing about being American and being
in the world as democracy: We do have the ability to change our
minds. And we would like to provide that to the people of Haiti.
SAFETY OF U.S. CITIZENS IN HAITI
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Gray, do you see any threat at the mo-
ment to the lives of any Americans in Haiti?
Mr. GRAY. At this point, I do not, but I could imagine that there
could be a threat to American lives. There are tens of thousands
of Americans, not only American citizens who live there, but there
are those there involved in missionary work, humanitarian work,
our own embassy people who are there. I would hope-
Chairman HAMILTON. At the present time, there is no threat to
them?
Mr. GRAY. I do not see one.
Chairman HAMILTON. OK I have Mr. Payne next. Then Mr.
Roth, Mr. Wynn, Mr. Leach, and then Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. Payne.
HISTORY OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN CUBA
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I, too, am very pleased you
have taken on this assignment. I have been one of the strong critics
of the Clinton policy on Haiti and I hope that you will help with
straightening the policy out.
I was listening to the discussion about Cuba and I think it was
a little bit before that Bay of Pigs that we decided to get involved-
I guess it was back in 1898 when the Hearst Publications were
talking about a threat and the MAINE was put on fire and a war
began due to the yellow journalism, I think they called it, so our
involvement in Cuba has certainly been a very rocky one so far as
military force is concerned.
COST OF EMBARGO ENFORCEMENT
Also just a comment, I guess when you start tallying up the costs
of the U.S. Government as relates to Haiti, I don't know how-I
don't know what those ships that are around Haiti enforcing the
embargo would be doing. I don't know if they would be on the land
somewhere sitting around, I assume that they would be riding
around somewhere. So I get confused when we look at the cost of


82-462 0 94 3








an activity when that activity, if it wasn't that, it was no more
than just floating around, the cost of those sailors and engineers
and ships and fuel would be ongoing anyhow.
U.S. POLICY ON AMNESTY
So let me just ask a quick question. So there has been some criti-
cism of your predecessor of a number of things, but one was that
he was promoting a broad amnesty which would pardon human
rights violations over and above the amnesty for political crimes al-
ready decreed by President Aristide in compliance with the Gov-
ernors Island Accord. What is your current position on such am-
nesty dealings?
Should they be broadened more and open ended?
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, that is a very difficult issue to deal
with. I am not sure that the United States or the community of na-
tions have the right to override the constitution of the people of
Haiti. There is a constitution. Those who are guilty of wrongdoing,
murders, assassination, maiming, are provided for in law and I am
not sure that the United States can tell President Aristide, even if
we wanted to, to do something which would be in violation of his
constitution and an abrogation of his responsibilities as President.
However, I do believe that if you look back at the Governors Is-
land Accord, President Aristide has agreed in principle that with
regard to nonviolent crimes there ought to be some kind of rec-
onciliation that involves amnesty for those who participated in this
government led by the coup leaders. My own position is that is
something we have to look at with regard to the Constitution of
Haiti, what is the desire of the duly elected leadership, the Par-
liament and the President and the restored democracy.
I think it would be very difficult for us to dictate that, and to do
so would perhaps raise questions about whether we really are com-
mitted to the democratic process.
Mr. PAYNE. I see that it was reported that the South African
Government, Mr. Mandela, has decreed amnesty for prior crimes
with one proviso, that individuals admit that they perpetrated a
crime, that they committed a crime. And that might be something
to look at. There is another-
Mr. GRAY. I am sure, by the way, Congressman Payne, that Mr.
Aristide is aware of that precedent, and I know based on the
speech he gave in Belem at the OAS meeting he talked extensively
about reconciliation and the need to put retribution and vengeance
behind them if there was to be a movement to prosperity.
BROADENING THE GOVERNMENT
Mr. PAYNE. OK. Also on the question of broadening the govern-
ment, I know that some time ago there was an attempt to broaden
the government, but to put actual opponents-I mean, military peo-
ple perhaps, General Cedras as a member of the cabinet-but not
Cedras as they are suggesting Cedras leave, but they are suggest-
ing maybe Francois, Michel Francois should stay and serve in some
capacity.
I would hope that with the broadening of the government that
we don't go overboard in-I could see other elected parliamentar-
ians, but to select coup leaders, persons who attempted to murder







President Aristide when he was trying to flee the country, I would
hope that the question of broadening the government does not in-
clude a guy who the last time you saw had a gun pointed at your
head and I think the last Ambassador was really attempting to get
everybody involved.
IMMIGRATION QUOTAS
But I just will wind down on the question that you feel the U.N.
being involved there was some criticism about the U.S. and the im-
migration policy because, as you know, it has been stated by some
of the national security people that they felt that about maybe 2
percent of the people coming out were political refugees, which I
assume there was going to be a quota imposed and 1,400 people
came out last month, which means that if they were doing a 2 per-
cent quota, that means that 70 people would have been classified
as political refugees.
It seems kind of rough to come up with a system where you are
going to predetermine that, but since time is running out, the other
question is the FRAHP organization, which is murdering people
throughout Haiti and so forth, have people who are right here in
the United States. They have offices and so forth.
Have you considered anything about requesting that that organi-
zation be sent-their visas be removed and those people sent back
to Haiti?
Mr. GRAY. On the question of quotas, I want to make it very,
very clear that our policy does not involve any quotas on refugees
whatsoever. The process that we are putting in place will seek to
provide fair hearings so that those who seek asylum and are under
threat are granted that asylum. There will not be a quota under
this policy.
SUPPORT FOR HAITIAN SELF-DETERMINATION
Secondly, broad-based coalition governments. I think it is very
easy for us in the United States to sit back and tinker with other
countries as to what we would like them to be like in their democ-
racy. I believe that democracy means exactly democracy. It means
allowing the people to vote, to have a choice to correct their mis-
takes, change their viewpoints, just as we do in this country, and
it would be a terrible mistake for people in this country or in the
world community, to try to put together some theoretical govern-
ment which might work well in the U.K or Canada or the United
States but be against the wishes of those who voted. Therefore, you
would be undercutting democracy because what you would be say-
ing is that all you have to do is take over the democracy at any
point and then someone could be forced into changing election re-
sults simply because you put a gun to his head.
I don't think that that is the signal we want to send, and it is
certainly not the signal I want to send. I think President Aristide
is aware of the need for reconciliation. I think he is an astute
enough political leader to understand that means encompassing
elements that not only voted for him, but also if you are going to
govern, you have to have working relationships with other ele-
ments. And I will leave that to the people of Haiti, rather than try







to impose some concept of democracy that has been flourishing
here and that overturns their vote.
With regard to the FRAHP organization, I am not aware of that.
If you will give me the information, we will look into that. No, I
am not aware of that.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
Mr. TORRICELLI [presiding.] Mr. Roth.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR ARISTIDE
Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gray, it is nice to see you again and I want to join my other
colleagues who have complimented you for your commitment to this
problem and we wish you all the very best because I think there
has been here on Capitol Hill a feeling that we have not had a
steady hand in this particular policy and that it has vacillated
somewhat. And with you, I think there is a sense that we are going
to have more of a definite policy and I think that is a good sign.
In this commitment to restoring democracy, and that is what we
want to do, restore democracy in Haiti; would that mean restoring
Aristide absolutely or can we have a restoration of democracy with-
out Aristide? In other words, could we have some sort of agreement
where we say, OK, let's set up a new election and let a new govern-
ment be formed?
Mr. GRAY. I don't believe you can do that because essentially if
do you that, what you have done is you have allowed the coup lead-
ers to take over the country, throw out a free and fair election that
everyone in the world judged as free and fair, and then what you
will be doing is sending a signal not only in that country that you
will allow the democratic process to be overthrown at the barrel of
a gun. No, I don't believe you can do that.
I believe that if you are going to be true to the goal of restoring
democracy, you cannot sit here or somewhere else and say but for-
get that two-thirds of the people voted for him. I think in our own
country we have got some pretty strong feeling even though I may
or you may not like the viewpoints of a certain elected official if
that person goes through the process and wins fairly and freely,
you have got a right to work hard to put him out of office, but you
do not have a right, except under very limited circumstances, you
know, criminal behavior, to say to the people that doesn't count.
My viewpoint is that if you say we are going to restore democ-
racy, but, oh, we want you to have another election, that does not
mean the restoration of the person who received two-thirds of the
votes that all the world judged free and fair, I think what you
would then be doing is sending a signal, Congressman, that any-
body who wants to overthrow an election that he didn't agree with,
get a gun and you can do it.
PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION
Mr. ROTH. But you know, here we are at an impasse. I mean we
got sanctions. We are trying various options and so on. Couldn't we
come to a resolution where internally this could be resolved? I re-
member a number of years ago you and I were working with Ethio-
pia and having this amendment we were going through all these







gyrations and doing this policy and that policy. I mean our Govern-
ment was.
And then in the end the Ethiopian solution came from within
Ethiopia and I think that has to happen in Haiti, too. So rather
than being absolutely committed to saying Aristide has got to be
returned, otherwise we can't have democracy, couldn't we have a
solution where we bring both groups together and try to work it
out that way?
Mr. GRAY. I remember our working together and that was a very
significant accomplishment. I would say two things Ethiopia is dif-
ferent from Haiti in the fact that we were not trying to replace the
Communist government with a democratic government nor had
there been a democratic election judged by the world where the
leader had been elected by a two-thirds majority and thrown out
by a Communist government. If you remember what we were try-
ing was to stop that Communist government, the Menjistu govern-
ment, from oppressing its people.
They had been going through literally slaughter of dissident
voices. And what you and I did was we came up with a sanction
bill, a bill that would attack the commodities that they exported
and we said if you continue this behavior of killing people and vio-
lating human rights, you will pay a very stiff price. Because you
and I wrote that bill, a Democrat, a Republican, we sent a signal
and that signal was change the behavior or else this bill may be-
come law.
And if you remember, before that bill became law, I think it even
got out of the subcommittee-I don't even remember if it got out
of this full committee, but before that happened, Menjistu came to
his senses and stopped the human rights violations and the slaugh-
ter and began to release people who he had imprisoned for political
reasons. We were not trying to force the Communist government
out. We were trying to force the end of the human rights slaughter
that was going on.
And in this situation, there is a similarity. If we in this country
bipartisanly-Democrats, Republicans, conservatives, moderates
and liberals-began to say to these coup leaders who have stolen
democracy, you must step down and you must allow the govern-
ment to resume its activity, the duly elected government which is
not only Aristide but also the Parliament to continue its activity.
And by the way, Mr. Aristide did not win all of the seats in that
Parliament and so there are balances there.
If we begin to say that loud and clear as well as these sanctions
that have only been in place 3 weeks, and send a set of credibly
strong signals and not a policy or a set of signals that go from left
to right, up, down, I believe that these people will come to their
senses just as Menjistu, so in a way there is a similarity.
COST OF SHIP RENTALS
Mr. ROTH. My time is up but I was going to mention before there
was a big question here about the cost, and many people are asking
us-for example, we have all these ships in the U.S. Navy. Why did
we have to rent a Ukrainian ship to help us with the processing
of these people, the people that are refugees?








Mr. GRAY. Well, the reason, Congressman, as I understand it, is
that ships that we have that are in service are in use. Those that
are not are mothballed. The cost of getting them prepared to go to
sea would have been more exorbitant than renting a Ukrainian
oceangoing vessel. That is the reason. We are using-by the way,
one Navy ship is a hospital ship that was available did not have
to go through a de-mothballing refurbishing and as a result the
cost factor-but I will be glad to give you that.
Mr. ROTH. Again my time is up, but it seems almost inconceiv-
able with all the ships we have in the U.S. Navy there isn't a sin-
gle ship we couldn't use. We had to go out and rent another coun-
try's ship to process people. It is hard for people to understand
that.
Mr. GRAY. I understand.
[The information follows:]
On May 8, the Clinton administration initiated the policy of immediate processing
for Haitians fleeing their country. It was also decided to conduct processing close
to Haiti to be more convenient and less costly, first to transport the Haitians to a
processing center and, for those not approved for status, back to Haiti.
The U.S. military explored various options to meet this need. The U.S. Navy has
only two passenger ships ("troop ships"): one was in the United Kingdom and the
other would have run up costs ($45,000 per day) significantly higher than the vessel
chosen. Other possibilities were determined to be unfit because they could not meet
availability, capacity, cost, proximity, technical suitability or other requisites.
Ultimately, the best bid offered two vessels, the "Gruziya" and "Ivan Franco," for
$34,000 and $29,000 per day, respectively, plus approximately $30,000 per day for
food, fuel, and port charges. The "Gruziya was available first, and was replaced
several weeks later by the "Ivan Franco."
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Wynn.
GRADITUDE TO GOVERNMENTS OF JAMAICA AND TURKS AND CAICOS
Mr. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and also, Mr. Gray, thank
you. We appreciate the hard work you have already invested in
this project and I must say that I, too, have had my confidence in
the administration restored based upon your appointment. Don't
fall over on us, though.
I want to note for the record, Mr. Chairman, that we all owe a
great debt of gratitude to the Government of Jamaica and also to
the Government of the Turks and Caicos for their assistance in this
effort, and I would hope that when we discuss foreign aid, as well
as trade, that we would duly note the efforts and repay their sup-
port in kind.
FEAR OF RETRIBUTION AMONG MILITARY
Mr. Gray, I would like to pursue three questions. First, a sce-
nario has been described to me under which the fear of retribution
on the part of the military rank and file is so great that even if
the military coup leaders were inclined to step down as a result of
sanctions that they would be likely subjects of assassination and
that the rank and file military's role is also a major impediment
to a peaceful resolution.
If that were in fact the case, and please correct me if I am wrong,
does this indicate that a precondition of some sort of peaceful set-
tlement would require the broadening of the Aristide government?








Mr. GRAY. I am not sure that that scenario is correct, Congress-
man, because in order for President Aristide to receive the kind of
mandate that he got from the people in a free and fair election, ob-
viously a lot of those in the military must have voted for him, espe-
cially the rank and file. Also you have to remember that many of
those in the rank and file, as well as the security force, police
forces, had the responsibility of providing protection. They also had
access to weapons.
If they wanted to, there might have been an attempt to assas-
sinate him prior to the election or after the election. So the view-
point that the entire military, all of the security forces, police and
military are opposed to the return of President Aristide because of
fear seems not to really connect when you look at the election and
the overwhelming mandate. I suspect that there were a lot of en-
listed, low level, noncommissioned officers who voted for Aristide.
The fact of the matter is-
Mr. WYNN. I don't doubt that they voted for Aristide. The infor-
mation that I get from persons on the scene is that they are fearful
that by virtue of association with the military they would be the
subject of a retribution, but if you believe that is not the case, I
am certainly encouraged.
Mr. GRAY. I don't think that is the case for two reasons. One, I
think some of them supported Aristide. That is my first point.
The second point is if you have listened to what President
Aristide has said about reconciliation and about the Governors Is-
land Accord, there was a general amnesty agreed to with which the
military leaders refused to comply by not stepping down last Octo-
ber. So I am not sure that is a correct scenario.
I think that, one, President Aristide has said on a number of oc-
casions to me privately, but also publicly, the latest being his Mon-
day speech at the OAS meeting where he has talked about rec-
onciliation and understands very clearly that you cannot run a gov-
ernment if what your first duty is is to go out and try and lead a
mob or retribution against certain elements of that country. I think
he understands that.
U.N. POST-INTERVENTION ROLE
Mr. WYNN. I think he probably does. I am not sure that elements
of the military understand that or at least feel comforted suffi-
ciently in that. But at any rate, the second question I have is if
there is a-whether there is a firm commitment from the U.N. mis-
sion to move in and perform the long-term peacekeeping function,
policing function that I think most of us believe is required. The
sentiment seems to be that one of the reasons we ought not to in-
tervene militarily is because we could not get out.
Is it your statement that we have the commitment from the U.N.
to perform that role so that in the event of a U.S. intervention we
would not have to also perform the follow-up functions?
NO DECISION MADE ABOUT MILITARY ACTION
Mr. GRAY. I think for me to comment on that question would
lead one to believe that a decision has been made about a U.S.
military action. There has not been any such decision. The Presi-








dent simply said that all the options are on the table, including
that possibility.
However, I would again refer you to where the policy has been
and where it continues to be. It has been a policy that has commit-
ted to return democracy, to use diplomacy, and sanctions, and has
moved multilaterally in every aspect at every instance, whether in
dealing with the refugees or in dealing with sanctions.
PRECONDITIONS FOR INTERVENTION
Mr. WYNN. My time is running short. I want to pursue one other
question. There has been a lot of debate this morning about what
would be the precondition for military intervention. Some have
raised the question of sufficient strategic importance, others have
raised the question of vital military interest, others have said there
is precedence in the past with Grenada.
The question I have for you recognizes that the United States
and the administration is not committed to military intervention
and is committed to sanctions. Has a decision been made that the
conditions, circumstances you related here were sufficient to war-
rant military intervention, if they chose to pursue it?
Mr. GRAY. My position here, my advice to the President, is let
us continue to push these sanctions on all diplomatic avenues, but
you made-in your question you made a statement that implied the
military option is off the table. It is not.
Mr. WYNN. I am assuming it is on the table. I am wondering
whether the preconditions have been agreed to.
Mr. GRAY. I would simply say to you that the President would
have to be the judge of when and where and under what cir-
cumstances. I would not be prepared at this public hearing to tell
the dictators what such a time and occasion would be. My message
to the coup leaders is they must step down, and the faster the bet-
ter.
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Leach.
U.S. PUBLIC UNPREPARED FOR MILITARY OPTION
Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me also welcome you,
Ambassador Gray. To say that you embellish your office is an un-
derstatement. We appreciate it.
It strikes me that if there is any aspect of this whole issue that
has been understated is the human suffering in Haiti.
We also have a circumstance where we are obviously involved.
We have got 1 million Haitians in this country and of a unique-
ness, most of these residents have really adopted a work ethic.
My concern is that I am not convinced we are getting a total
frankness from our Government. I think the military option is not
only on the table, but it is right at the front of the desk and that
the American people have not been prepared.
One reason that it is unfortunately at the front of the desk is not
that our policy has made significant progress as has been implied
today, but we have had a series of failures. The Harlen County in-
cident where American military engineers were turned back by
thugs is not something that did anything except impair the reputa-
tion of the United States in Haiti.








The sanctions policy is one that I am told is working to the bene-
fit of the government and enriching those in power because they
control the fewer goods that become available. It is actually becom-
ing an instrument of governmental policy rather than one that
seems to restrict the government. Then you have in place the pros-
pect of what I am told from the military is almost a ready-made
prescription for disaster, the idea of using a cruise ship for a ship-
board processing. That concept is so certain to cause an exodus of
people that will be of unmanageable dimensions that the necessity
of a military intervention becomes that much more likely either be-
fore it is put in place as people think it through or after a disas-
trous or an unmanageable circumstance develops.
And so my only concern is that the administration be frank. Its
policies have not worked. It is not all its fault. Some of these as-
pects of the problem are fairly intractable. But that to the degree
we are close to military action, I think the American people ought
to be prepared for it. And I am wondering if you want to address
that subject.
DEFENSE OF HAITI POLICY
Mr. GRAY. Yes, Congressman. I would like to address it. The
three points that you have raised.
One is U.S. policy is not working and has not worked. Let me-
and I am not here to defend what has transpired over two adminis-
trations, not simply the Clinton administration but also the Bush
administration. And I think it would be a waste of your time and
my time to go back to the Bush administration, the early days of
the Clinton administration, and look at what each administration
over the last 3 years has done incorrectly or sent mixed signals.
I think what I would rather do, Congressman, is talk about what
we are trying to do at this point and where we are. I think that
we are beginning to very clearly send a set of very strong signals
not only to the allies who are involved with us, because now you
have got more support in the community of nations in this hemi-
sphere and the world community than ever before. The United Na-
tions Security Council does not often take such steps as it has
taken in U.N. Resolution 917. You have not seen the kind of state-
ments coming from the OAS as you saw coming out of Belem just
this past weekend.
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO REFUGEE ISSUE
You now have the United Nations High Commission on Refugees
involved in a partnership where we are recognizing that the refu-
gee issue is an international issue. It is not a south Florida issue.
It is not a U.S. issue. If you go and visit with the foreign minister
of the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos and some of the CARICOM
countries, if you think there is a problem in Florida, you should see
in those countries where their economic systems, their social serv-
ice systems are being deluged with the numbers of refugees that
are going there.
In fact, someone pointed out to me in one of my conversations
with the foreign minister of the Bahamas that the number of Hai-
tians there, refugees who have come in the last few years, would
be the same as if 40 million to 50 million refugees came from any








country to the United States in the last 5 to 10 years. And you can
imagine what that would to do your whole infrastructure.
There are those in the eastern Caribbean who are living this on
a daily basis. And what we have been able to do is get recognition
that this is an international problem, that the solution of the refu-
gees as well as the political problem is going to take international
cooperation.
DEFENSE OF SANCTIONS REGIME
We have had these sanctions. Tough sanctions. Not the voluntary
sanctions of over a year-and-a-half ago, not the limited sanctions
of arms embargo. I mean, Haiti doesn't need any arms.
There is no threat of an invading Army last year, so you had an
arms and oil embargo. For the first time you have got real teeth
in a sanction. Those sanctions have only been in place since May
21.
You already have countries in the world, the Four Friends, OAS,
saying let's move a notch higher. Let's look at financial trans-
actions that do affect the wealthy. Let's not wait for 6 months for
the sanctions to be felt by the wealthy. Let's do something now for
them to feel it. Let's cut out commercial airline traffic so they can't
go to Paris or New York on shopping trips and return while there
is misery and suffering.
So I think you are beginning to see a series of very strong credi-
ble messages being sent. The United States is in the lead with it
but also we have got the OAS. You have seen the Dominican Re-
public border begin to be sealed. You also are seeing the United
Nations and OAS talking about a reconstituted United Nations
mission in Haiti which recognizes a bigger role, a bigger mandate,
which I think clearly sends a strong signal.
In fact, I had one diplomat tell me that the most important thing
we could do was seal the Dominican Republican border and get
them involved because the military leaders thought that they
would never have to worry: There was always a back door.
So I guess what I am saying to you is that this is a policy that
has changed in the last month. I think we have made progress.
FALLOUT FROM IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
Mr. LEACH. Ambassador, I appreciate that very much, and my
time is expired, but I would only like to stress that when you rach-
et up sanctions, you also impel massive increases not only in pov-
erty but in exodus of people. So ironically, some of the aspects of
our policy exacerbate the problem from the United States' perspec-
tive. In my judgment unless the message the Ambassador Gray is
putting forth is heeded in the next few weeks, not months, the like-
lihood that the policy will be run by a man with stars on his shoul-
der instead of a diplomat's stripes is very, very large.
And it is partly the case because our policies impel exacerbation
of problems and some of our policies themselves have not worked.
And it is a sad, unfortunate circumstance but I personally think
that this administration is going to be confronted with choices that
none of us would like it to be confronted with on an earlier time-
frame and that kind of frankness ought to be expressed as strongly
as possible.








Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Oberstar.
Mr. GRAY. I appreciate that.
CALL FOR MILITARY ACTION
Mr. OBERSTAR. [Initial comments spoken in the Creole language.]
I am just going to say, welcome, when you were working on
Haiti. When you were here among us, you were an important man.
Now you are the important man for Haiti. And I just recited a Cre-
ole expression, "monbourik charge." That means you are a loaded
mule. But there is a balance to that: "Mana chose charge polieu",
many hands make light work. You haven't had your charge light-
ened by the advice you have been given today.
We have heard talk about consistency and about doctrine and
about what happened in the past in other countries and my very,
very sympathetic colleague just a moment ago, Mr. Leach, saying
that on the one hand, sanctions are of a way of bringing pressure
but they create pressures for us by putting pressure on people.
That is all true.
I lived in Haiti 31/2 years, as you may know. I love Haiti. I love
the people of Haiti. I think I know that country. I traveled all
through it. By foot. By jeep. I know Jacmel. I know Cap-Haitien.
I know east to west. I know the Haitian people. I was in Haiti dur-
ing the Bay of Pigs when the Haitians expected Americans to in-
vade Haiti and rid them of Duvalier. Haitians have long looked to
the United States, perhaps for leadership but also for salvation.
Haitians fought in the war of revolution for the United States.
They were the second Republic in this hemisphere. They tried.
They have not succeeded well. They didn't have a good example
under colonial rule by the French. They tried to establish govern-
ment and it hasn't worked. For 200 years of independence, they
have only had one opportunity for democracy and that was in the
election of December 1990.
And as I went as part of the observer team along with our col-
league, Mr. Goss, from voting place to voting place and asked the
people as they left, some of whom stood in line for hours and hours
to vote, what did you vote for? Why did you vote? "Nous voutons
pour liberte." "We voted for freedom." "We didn't vote for a job."
They didn't say we voted to get a better deal on the International
Monetary Fund. They voted for one thing. Get rid of Ton-tons
Macoutes. Get rid of Duvalierists. And live a decent life, free from
fear. And that freedom was snatched from them by the military, by
Aristide's own mistakes. He was the one who put Cedras in place
and replaced my student, General Abraham, who made the election
happen.
The only way we are going to establish democracy and give it a
chance, give it a breath, is to wipe out that nest of vipers by mili-
tary action. It is a job over a morning or an afternoon. A plan to
get in and a plan to get out. I have said it since that action hap-
pened in September 1991. I know it takes some thought to go in
and it takes some thought to stay and it takes some thought about
how we get out. That is not hard.
But meanwhile, the very sanctions that have been imposed on
this country have caused the most severe deterioration in Haiti in
its entire history. There is no longer poverty; there is destitution.









There was erosion before we were beginning to make some progress
in the last few years after the ouster of Baby Doc. Now that
progress has been reversed.
Your report says that electricity is on for only a few hours. That
was the case when I lived in Haiti 35 years ago. That wasn't new.
What is new is that we returned to that condition after making
some progress.
And talk about whether we can go in or whether we need to do
this or do that, if our principle, if our doctrine is oil, and we go in
and help a country, then that is the universal principle. But if our
doctrine is self-determination of people, if our doctrine is to avoid
suffering and pain and misery, starvation, abject destitution of peo-
ple, then we have to do something. That crowd in the carte de
general in Port-au-Prince is going to listen and laugh while we
monkey around with sanctions. The only policy that is going to
work to relieve the yoke of oppression is U.S. force.
We have been involved in Haiti for 200 years. We have an inter-
est there. We have an interest in seeing the people live decent,
healthy lives. They don't ask to be rich. They don't even ask for a
really great way of life. They ask to be rid of the oppression, the
misery that has dogged them. Yes, they are economic refugees
when they leave Haiti but they are political refugees when they
come back. You have a heavy load.
I have only one advice: Don't wait too long. The Haitian people
can't wait that long. They are long-suffering. They are good, caring,
wonderful people. They are now being turned into a nation of des-
titution and of crime and of violence and that has never happened
in their whole history.
Do your job well. But don't be afraid and don't listen to the
handwringers and the critics of the past. This is an opportunity to
do something good and lasting for a people, for a whole people.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar.
There are, Mr. Gray, three of us remaining, with your indul-
gence. I don't know whether Mr. Wynn or Mr. Payne have addi-
tional questions they would like to ask.
Did you want to respond?
ALL OPTIONS REMAIN OPEN
Mr. GRAY. I just wanted to say to the distinguished gentleman
from Minnesota, Mr. Oberstar, that I share your deep concern for
the Haitian people even though I have not had the unique experi-
ence that you have had by your service and time spent in that
country.
We hope that these sanctions will work, but we are also very
clear, the President is very clear, that other options are open and
we are looking for appropriate advice such as that given by mem-
bers of this committee.
OPPOSITION TO MILITARY ACTION
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray, I, for one, hope that a military inva-
sion of Haiti is no more than an option. But I am somewhat fearful
that it is more of a decision that has already been made.
And I fear that as I have tried to make clear, not because I don't
want to see the military leadership of Haiti removed, but because








indeed I would hope that the new Haiti can indeed be democratic
and not have to live in the shadow of having been restored to office
on the wings of a foreign military force.
It appears to me that we are entering into some new age of pa-
ternalism here. People try to make the argument that Haiti is dif-
ferent, that there are different circumstances. That, in fact, the
U.S. Government is not simply some other force, some different ele-
ment in world politics. When we do things, we establish patterns.
When we take actions, they become precedents. It has served no
other purpose here today, and I know amused more than a few, to
hear some argue strenuously for the sovereignty of Grenada and
the self-determination of Nicaragua, now to argue for an invasion
of Haiti.
I was against each of those invasions, because I do not.want to
see the United States as a paternalistic power in this hemisphere.
I argue again for the same consideration for the Haitian people.
Contrary to what might have been said-and I know, Mr. Gray,
that you understand, Haiti does have a democratic experience. As
Mr. Oberstar suggested, it was the second Republic in this hemi-
sphere. It had a thriving democracy in much of the 19th century.
The invasion of the United States and our occupation of Haiti in
this hemisphere did not contribute to that democratic experience.
During our occupation, and the years after we left, Haiti was not
freer or more democratic. And I see no reason to believe that an
American incursion now at this point in history will indeed
strengthen those democratic institutions.
Somehow, the responsibility for gaining freedom in Haiti and es-
tablishing democratic institutions has become as much of an Amer-
ican responsibility as a Haitian responsibility. The United States
can assist, but we cannot substitute for any nation in their fight
to establish a democratic institution. Indeed, I think that lesson
has probably been lost.
During this discussion today, I posed the question of whether or
not there were any OAS or United Nations charter legal basis for
what we might be about to undertake. People have addressed the
point, others have raised the question, but indeed I think it is in-
structive that no member of this committee nor the administration
is even attempting to provide a legal foundation for a military in-
cursion in Haiti.
Some think it is good policy. Others think it makes sense. But
in the U.S. Congress, under the leadership of an American admin-
istration, which are the successors to the authors of the United Na-
tions charter, the nation which claims to be ruled by laws, not be-
lieved to be led by men, we make no such argument.
ASSURANCE SOUGHT ON COMPLIANCE WITH WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Finally, for my part, I would only like to pose the following ques-
tions. First, is it the intention of the administration, to your knowl-
edge, Mr. Gray, to return to this Congress before or simultaneously
with the military invasion of Haiti to seek legal authorization?
Mr. GRAY. It is the intention of the President to carry out his role
as President of the United States and the protection of American
interests, property and lives, and to remain in consultation with
this Congress.








Mr. TORRICELLI. Is that consistent with the War Powers Resolu-
tion?
Mr. GRAY. It is to be expected it will be consistent with the War
Powers Resolution.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I would interpret that to mean then there would
be a vote in the U.S. Congress consistent with that act. I assume
that is both of our interpretations.
Mr. GRAY. That is not what I said, Congressman. I said it is his
responsibility to protect the interests and lives of the American
people, and to consult with Congress.
Mr. TORRICELLI. But not consistent with the War Powers Resolu-
tion?
Mr. GRAY. Consistent with the War Powers Resolution.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The War Powers Resolution does require a vote.
Mr. GRAY. Under every circumstance?
Mr. TORRICELLI. The War Powers Resolution requires a vote
if--
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, would you want any President of the
United States of America to come and have a vote, a debate, as one
who has been in this body and knows how that process works,
while American lives are being threatened?
Mr. TORRICELLI. The War Powers Resolution doesn't require that,
Mr. Gray. It requires that after forces are introduced, the President
comes to Congress and asks for a vote of authorization.
Mr. GRAY. I understood your question to mean you would want
a vote before any kind of action take place.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I am seeking assurances that the War Powers
Resolution would be enacted. The War Powers Resolution does not
require a prior vote. It requires a vote after forces have been placed
into harm's way.
What I am seeking is assurances that the law will be followed,
much as you and I for many years in a variety of instances asked
President Reagan and President Bush to invoke that act.
Mr. GRAY. My answer stands as it was stated at the beginning.
APPEALS PROCESS SOUGHT BY UNHCR
Mr. TORRICELLI. There is a story in the Washington Post today
on the resistance of the UNHCR to reaching an agreement about
processing. Indeed, part of that UNHCR, according to the article,
is requiring that there be an appeals process in the processing of
refugees.
I wonder if you .can speak to whether or not that is accurate.
Mr. GRAY. I am sorry, Congressman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The UNHCR, according to the Washington Post,
is resisting full participation in the processing of refugees pending
the providing of an appeals process by the United States.
Mr. GRAY. I am not aware of anything such as that at all. I am
familiar with that story. I saw it briefly this morning. We are
working on a number of questions with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in an MOU to clarify what the partner-
ship is.
There are a number of questions that have to be answered, in-
cluding how we are going to work out the appeal. To imply that the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the U.S. Gov-








ernment, and this administration, are at a fundamental disagree-
ment, it is not the case at all.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I am glad to hear that, and indeed would urge
that the U.S. Government does not need guidance and determina-
tion of American law from the UNHCR. The U.S. Government is
fully capable of providing rights to those who seek access to our
country and implementing our laws without the United Nations'
advice.
Considering the recent record of the UNHCR in meeting its own
responsibilities, one would think they would hesitate to be making
recommendations to the United States.
REPORT OF VIOLENCE ON DOMINICAN BORDER
Finally, I would hope that we could be providing some distance,
in fact disassociating ourselves, from the use of deadly force as re-
cently occurred in the Dominican Republic to enforce the embargo.
While indeed I think we legitimately asked the Dominican Republic
to enforce the embargo, shooting unarmed Haitians attempting to
smuggle into their country is not consistent, I think, with the poli-
cies of our country, or indeed our best interests.
Could we use this occasion to disassociate ourselves from these
actions taken against Haitian citizens which resulted in the loss of
life?
The United States does not have a death penalty in our own
country for people who smuggle products into this country. I don't
see why we would have one in Haiti.
Mr. GRAY. Congressman, I am not familiar with the details of the
incident you are describing. I do not take press reports as being ac-
curate with regard to that. I have not seen any communique with
regard to what you were talking about. And before I do that, I will
not pass judgment, nor will this administration, on what occurred
or did not occur.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The report, as I understand it, is of border
guards in the Dominican Republic fired on a Haitian-
Mr. GRAY. I understand what the report is. I do not know if it
is accurate. And so to report on it--
U.S. HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS
Mr. TORRICELLI. Finally, is there guidance that you could give us
as to at what point the embargo on Haiti causes a loss of life or
degree of suffering, that if so, shocks the conscience, that it be-
comes morally reprehensible. Is there a point of which you are
aware that the policy must be changed because it simply becomes
unacceptable?
The Harvard University study, for example, which I know some
dispute, cites that the loss of life could be 1,000 a month due to
the inability to treat infants; other numbers are far less. Could you
give some guidance on when you think in fact this has gone too
far?
Mr. GRAY. First of all, Congressman, let me again reiterate what
I said in my statement, and also in answer to an earlier question.
The image that the United States and this administration does not
care about hungry children suffering in Haiti is inaccurate. In the
U.N. sanctions as well as in our programs currently going on which








this committee authorizes and another appropriates, we are still
carrying out feeding programs. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, we
are preparing to expand those feeding programs right now, as a re-
sult of the economic sanctions.
We also are carrying out other humanitarian efforts with non-
governmental organizations. There was a question earlier by Mr.
Ballenger about getting through the red tape. This government,
this administration, wants the sanctions to bite those who need to
be bitten, but to try not to exacerbate the suffering of children or
the very poor. And that is why we have the humanitarian efforts
that are going on now that involve millions of U.S. aid dollars cur-
rently, and we are talking about increasing that.
So those who paint a portrait of somehow these sanctions are
going g to cause thousands of Haitian children to die, no. What is
causing death in that country is oppression, thuggery, the lack of
democracy.
And let me point out that we are serious about bringing a
change. We have to remember something that some of us said. Yes,
sanctions may hurt, but dictatorships kill. And so we are in the
process, this administration, of providing food right now. Nearly 1
million people being fed. We are going to be asking for 300,000
more. We are also reviewing the $15 million Title III food program
that will help provide food and help fund an additional 75,000 jobs.
So there is not a neglect, Congressman.
I don't know what the Harvard study is based on. I don't know
if they Aave ever been to Port-au-Prince or how they come to that
conclusion. But if you look at the facts, we are currently spending
millions of dollars to feed the hungry, to provide for the poor, medi-
7?ntion, and as we pointed out in the questions earlier, we are try-
ing'to make sure that even the requirements of the U.N. are
changed in such a way so that medicine can get in.
SANCTIONS TARGETED TO SPECIFIC POPULATION
And we are hoping that as we look at these sanctions and what
the Four Friends and the OAS said this week in terms of targeting,
racheting them up with regard to financial transactions and com-
mercial airlines, we believe that they will affect those who need to
be affected.
How long that will take, Congressman, we don't have a clear
deadline. We are going to be evaluating them daily, weekly, in
terms of what the options are and what the next steps are.
I would also remind you that the actions the United States has
taken have been taken not unilaterally, but multilaterally, the
OAS, the United Nations. So those who see our policy as somehow
being done by ourselves, that is not accurate.
So we would continue to work in that same way, Congressman,
no matter what additional steps and options we follow, and what-
ever may come. We are hoping-
Mr. TORRICELLI. I am glad to hear that because of course that
has been the entire thrust of my comments. I hope the policy not
only is multilateral but will remain multilateral. Of course, that
means working with institutions based on their own charters and
laws.
Mr. Payne, do you have any questions?







Mr. PAYNE. Yes.
IMPACT OF FLIGHT BAN ON NGO'S
Mr. TORRICELLI. There is a point I have heard raised that the
banning of international flights could cause a flight of humani-
tarian workers and human rights observers, people who fear they
won't be able to leave the country, might understandably be in dan-
ger and thereby take the last opportunity to get out.
This, ironically, could create the situation of making it easier for
the Haitian military to abuse people and exacerbate the human
rights and the humanitarian situation. Can you comment on that?
Mr. GRAY. Yes. One of the things that happens when you are
dealing with dictatorships, oppressive regimes, and trying to bring
about solutions, Congressman, they are always painful solution
that cause some problem elsewhere, such as sanctions will depress
the economy. But if you are willing to bring food in, medicine
through nongovernmental organizations, as well as through feeding
programs that you sponsor, you tend to offset some of that suffer-
ing-perhaps not all of it, but a great deal of it.
In the case of commercial airline flights, I think, as I understand
in my conversations with the Four Friends and with the OAS and
CARICOM leaders, they are concerned about having the anomalous
situation of where a wealthy person in Haiti can get on a French
plane or an American plane, go to Paris or New York for a wonder-
ful weekend of shopping and fly back, while the rest of the country
is taking these kinds of economic tough measures, beca, se their
name does not appear on the list of the coup leaders and their im-
mediate family.
And that we need to very strongly say to the supporters of t0-
coup, is that you are not going to have this kind of mobility. rinere
are those who have expressed a fear that if you ban all airlines,
what is the signal that you are sending? Well, you are sending a
signal. You are sending it to the coup leaders and their wealthy
supporters.
Will that have an effect upon nongovernmental organizations
that are working in the feeding programs, medicine programs, mis-
sionary programs? It potentially does. It means that at their leisure
they cannot go to the airport and catch an American Airlines, an
Air Canada, or an Air France, or a Dutch airline or Dominican Re-
public airline to get out.
It does not mean that if there was a need, we could not provide
very quickly transportation for Americans. We are not at this time
advising Americans or those organizations to leave. And in our con-
versations with those organizations, none of them has expressed to
us a desire to leave or this will somehow prevent them from doing
their work if commercial airlines are banned.
The big problem is the problem that Congressman Ballenger has
talked about, which is the U.N. requirement of a case-by-case re-
view on the charter flights, which are often utilized, and -we are
trying to cut through that red tape and expedite that process.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you.
Mr. OBERSTAR. If the Chairman will yield on that point, wearing
my aviation hat, the administration has enjoined a ban on charter
and cargo service but not commercial airliner service. The problem








from a competitive standpoint and also from an effect on Haiti em-
bargo standpoint, is that those commercial passenger flights carry
belly cargo, that is also creating some competitive imbalance in the
marketplace, an opportunity for material to get into Haiti. And I
would suggest, if not a complete ban on air service, then prohibit
belly cargo.
THE CASE FOR SANCTIONS
Mr. GRAY. The gentleman is absolutely correct, and that is one
of the concerns.
Let me again go back to a much more fundamental question that
is raised by the Congressman's comments and also others'. If you
are not willing to support sanctions, and if sanctions are not given
a chance to work, then you are increasingly leading toward one so-
lution, and if you don't want to use that solution, and you have
made your position very clear, Congressman, on that solution, and
then on the other, you don't want to use sanctions because you are
afraid somebody is going to get hurt under sanctions, then what is
left? What then is left?
Is America going to wipe its hands and say that a bunch of thugs
in our hemisphere can take over a country after a free and fair
election and we will sit and debate it, when all of our neighbors
in the eastern Caribbean-and I would urge members of this com-
mittee to travel there to talk to them-when those in the OAS and
even in the U.N. are saying, This cannot stand.
Because essentially, if you are not willing to do sanctions, and if
you are not willing to look at other tough measures, essentially
what you are saying to the military leaders there is, We want to
continue to talk with you. We have had talks with them, two occa-
sions, let me remind the committee. I know you are aware of this.
Compromise was reached, tough compromises, where Aristide had
to give, they had to give. And each time, when it came time to im-
plement those tough compromises, it was not the elected leader of
the people who reneged; it was the military leadership.
And finally, the world community after last fall and the Gov-
ernors Island Accord being not implemented by Cedras and Biamby
and Francois, said, That is it.
And so at this point I would simply say, if you don't want sanc-
tions, then you are creating an argument that is I think
moving-
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray, I will do my best to get this hearing
concluded, but in fairness to the committee, I know of no member
of the committee in either political party who appears to oppose
sanctions.
My question to you was, is it important in the administration's
own mind to recognize the point of suffering or potential loss of life
at which associating ourselves with sanctions is no longer morally
responsible? It is important that this be announced or made identi-
fiable to the Haitian military.
The administration needs to determine just how much suffering
is bearable, how many lives can be lost, before the sanctions option
can no longer be allowed to run its course. That can be an argu-
ment eventually for disengagement or for a military incursion. But








I think it is something important for the administration to have in
its own mind.
Mr. Payne.
OPTIMISM ON POST-INTERVENTION SCENARIO
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.
I would suspect that the administration would know when, you
know, the people have taken too much and it is more than what
they can bear.
I am one of the doves. I also have been opposed to military inter-
vention all along. But I see some other kind of feathers coming up,
because it doesn't seem like anything is working with these people
who are in charge.
I feel that if there had to be a military intervention, that I would
think that it would not-I don't see the long haul where U.S.
troops would have to be there forever. I think that there could be
the changing of the guard, if you could see in South Africa generals
who serve P.W. Botha and then looked after F.W. de Klerk, and
now is defending South Africa for President Mandela, I think that,
you know, the military has a way of being able to transform itself,
especially if we bring in the French Canadian police, as we started
to do, for the Port-au-Prince police, and get rid of Francois, and get
rid of the downsizing of the military with the Seabees of Harlan
County, which unfortunately went back and should not have.
I do think that we can go in and get out without 15 years, as
it was in the past.
EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH HAITIAN MILITARY
The other thing, though, I have a question, Mr. Ambassador. It
has been rumored that the U.S. Embassy is still a little cozy with
some of these military guys. As you know, the former Ambassador
was very cozy. From what I understand, they didn't like Mr.
Aristide very much. They thought that I guess Bazin was going to
win, and were disappointed when the parish priest won, and were
disappointed and almost somewhat not condemning the military.
As a matter of fact, one of the top-ranking officials told me that the
military is the longest-standing institution that Haiti has had and
therefore he feels "very comfortable with them," quote, unquote. Is
our embassy still cozy like they used to be?
UPDATING LIST OF INDIVIDUALS TARGETED FOR SANCTIONS
And secondly, have the list of targeted people for the visas and
the freezing of assets been updated to include people like the ille-
gitimately appointed members of the Parliament, the new de facto
government, principal backers of the de facto regime, leaders of
FRAHP and others that may not have been in on the earlier list?
Has the list been updated and made more inclusive?
Mr. GRAY. The answer to the second question is yes, the list is
updated. It is constantly being updated as we gain new information
about the supporters of the coup, the members of the falsely, ille-
gitimately appointed FRAHP government have been included, as
well as their supporters. So that list is constantly being updated
and changed, based upon the criteria that if you are a supporter








of the coup leaders, if we have such evidence, you fall into that cat-
egory.
EMBASSY COMMUNICATION WITH COUP LEADERS
Secondly, with regard to your first question, Congressman, our
U.S. Embassy personnel are empowered to talk with, and receive
messages from, those in that illegitimate government, but there is
one message that we give, and that is, Step down. That is the one
message. That is the official message. However, if any of them
want to call to start a conversation and ask our position, we will
give them our position. But our position is the government that has
been put in place by the military coup leaders is a government that
is unconstitutional, illegitimate, has not been recognized by any
country in the world, and therefore we don't consider it a govern-
ment.
Secondly, to the coup leaders, our communication has been to
them, live up to the Governors Island Accord where you promised
to allow democracy to return and to step down.
CALL FOR MORE DECISIVE U.S. ACTION
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
I am one of those who feel that we have a long-standing respon-
sibility and engagement in Haiti. I think it is a country we have
been very closely aligned to, probably more so for some of us than
others.
I think that, as it was mentioned, the battalion that fought in
Savannah against the British back in 1775 to help the independ-
ence of the United States. You had in the 1800's, right in your city
of Philadelphia, Bethel Church that runaway slaves could go
through to live in Haiti as free people. We could go on and on.
If it wasn't for the Haitians defeating Napoleon's Army, the Lou-
isiana Purchase, which, as you know, was French territory and was
a real threat to the United States-as a matter of fact, territorially
it was as large as the Continental United States at that time-and
the defeat of the great French Army under Napoleon caused France
to be in a financial bind, and therefore forced the selling of the
Louisiana area which was called the Louisiana Purchase.
And we could go on and on, to World War II. President Roosevelt
asked they denude and try to grow rubber plants because we were
cutoff from the Pacific. Of course, the denuding started erosion,
rubber plants do not grow there. We could go on and on with the
relationship between the two countries.
The bottom line is, I think we should have acted more quickly
before. I hope we will make some decisive decisions soon, and that
democracy can be restored as soon as possible.
Thank you.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Oberstar, you have the last word.
CALL FOR INTERVENTION
Mr. OBERSTAR. I promise I will say it only in English. I want to
return to the matter of passenger flights and to urge the adminis-
tration to take the next step, if it is not willing to cutoff-and there








may be some valid humanitarian reasons for not terminating pas-
senger service-at least be sure that the passenger flights do not
carry cargo.
Mr. Chairman, a moment ago you set up a very interesting cri-
terion. At what point has the suffering become so great that we
must decide that the policy isn't working, the policy of sanctions.
I would say that point has already been reached.
If you measure suffering and poverty by any American criteria,
it was reached in September, at the time of the coup. If you meas-
ure suffering and misery by Haitian standards, that point has long
been passed.
Haitians are a long-suffering people. They know how to survive.
Where our worst ghettos, our worst Indian reservations in America
turn up their nose, they have survived. They are past the point.
Haiti may be in an irreversible decline if we don't act. Don't give
the sanctions too much time.
Thank you.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Gray, thank you very much for your indul-
gence of the committee's questions today. We wish you every suc-
cess, recognizing that the only thing that might separate some
American family from a phone call that their son or daughter's life
has been lost in an invasion of Haiti may be the success of your
mission.
With that in mind, we wish you every success in your efforts to
help President Aristide return.
Mr. GRAY. Mr. Chairman, members of this distinguished commit-
tee, it is good to come back to this room and to have the oppor-
tunity to participate on this side as opposed to that side. It is an
interesting perspective, I might add.
Secondly, to let you know that the administration does and will
continue to consult with Congress as we move along on this very
complex and challenging problem, and to assure all of you that
whatever the President does will be consistent with United States
and international law on this issue. And we expect to work in a
consultive manner with you.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Gray. The President has chosen
well.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



















PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY III


MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

IT IS GOOD TO BE HERE. AS YOU WILL RECALL, MR. CHAIRMAN,
I BEGAN MY CAREER IN CONGRESS ON THIS COMMITTEE. THEN, AS
TODAY, I WAS FOLLOWING MY MOTHER'b ADMONITION TO KEEP GOOD
COMPANY. THUS, I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU
TODAY TO WORK WITH OLD COLLEAGUES AND NEW PARTNERS AS WE
CONFRONT THE DIFFICULT ISSUES FACING US IN HAITI.

MR. CHAIRMAN, ON MAY 8TH, PRESIDENT CLINTON ANNOUNCED A
CHANGE IN OUR POLICY ON HAITI. LIKE MANY OF YOU, HE FELT THE
CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE OF THE MILITARY JUNTA IN HAITI LEFT US
NO CHOICE BUT TO STEP UP OUR EFFORTS TO BRING DOWN HAITI'S
DICTATORS AND TO EXTEND EVERY CONSIDERATION TO THOSE FLEEING
THEIR OPPRESSIVE RULE.

SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, WE HAVE ACHIEVED
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DISTINGUISHED BY
THREE CHARACTERISTICS. THEY HAVE MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION.
THEY ARE TOUGH ON THE DE FACTO REGIME AND ITS SUPPORTERS, AND
THEY ARE COMPASSIONATE TOWARDS THE REGIME'S VICTIMS. TO
APPRECIATE THESE CHARACTERISTICS ONE NEED ONLY REVIEW WHAT'S
BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SINCE MAY 8.

PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT'S NEW POLICY ON
SANCTIONS

--ON MAY 21, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP,
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917, IMPOSING
STRINGENT NEW SANCTIONS ON HAITI, WENT INTO EFFECT.

--ON MAY 26, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARIES
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN STATES, MR. DANTE CAPUTO, AND I MET WITH PRESIDENT
BALAGUER AND REACHED AGREEMENT ON A PLAN TO SEAL THE BORDER
BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI, AND TO SEND 60
INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ADVISERS TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO
HELP IN THAT EFFORT.








52


--ON JUNE 3, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRIENDS OF THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON HAITI, WHICH
INCLUDE ARGENTINA, CANADA FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, AND
VENEZUELA, DECIDED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO CONSIDER ON A NATIONAL
BASIS EXPANDED SANCTIONS THAT WOULD CUT OFF COMMERCIAL AIR
FLIGHTS TO AND FROM HAITI AND BAN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY. THE FRIENDS ALSO EXPRESSED
THEIR DETERMINATION TO PROMOTE THE FULL REDEPLOYMENT OF A
STRENGTHENED AND RECONFIGURED UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI.

AND ON REFUGEES

--ON MAY 19, THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES,
MRS. OGATA, AND I WERE PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT ON A PLAN
FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE PROCESSING OF HAITIAN APPLICANTS FOR REFUGEE
STATUS, AND IN LOCATING COUNTRIES OF RESETTLEMENT FOR HAITIAN
REFUGEES.

--ON JUNE 1, THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAMAICA AND OF THE UNITED
STATES ANNOUNCED JOINTLY A PLAN FOR SHIPBOARD PROCESSING OF
HAITIAN MIGRANTS IN JAMAICAN PORTS.

--ON JUNE 3, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS
AGREED TO THE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR A LAND BASED
PROCESSING CENTER ON GRAND TURK ISLAND.

AND ON MULTILATERAL SUPPORT

--ON JUNE 6, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AND I ATTENDED THE
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES ON HAITI IN BELEM, BRAZIL. A STRONG RESOLUTION WAS
ENACTED WHICH INCLUDES A CALL UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO ASSIST
IN THE RESETTLEMENT OF HAITIAN REFUGEES, TO SUPPORT MEASURES BY
THE UNITED NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS POLICE AND
MILITARY MISSION IN HAITI, AND TO SUPPORT AND REINFORCE
EXISTING AND ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE MILITARY REGIME.

WHILE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE, I BELIEVE WE HAVE
ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE
HAITIAN CRISIS. ALLOW ME TO EXPLAIN WHY THESE STEPS ARE
IMPORTANT AND HOW THEY FIT INTO THE PRESIDENT'S OVERALL
STRATEGY.







53


UNITED STATES INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE IN HAITI

PRESIDENT CLINTON IS COMMITTED TO THE PROMPT RETURN OF
DEMOCRACY AND OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE TO HAITI.

WHY ARE WE SO COMMITTED TO THIS TASK? WHY DOES HAITI
MATTER THIS MUCH TO THE UNITED STATES? HOW DOES HAITI DIFFER
FROM OTHER TROUBLED COUNTRIES AROUND THE GLOBE? PRESIDENT
CLINTON HAS RECENTLY EXPLAINED OUR INTERESTS QUITE CLEARLY:

--FIRST, HAITI IS A CLOSE NEIGHBOR.

--SECOND, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION PERSONS OF
HAITIAN DESCENT RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

--THIRD, SEVERAL THOUSAND AMERICAN CITIZENS LIVE IN HAITI.

--FOURTH, WE BELIEVE DRUGS ARE COMING TO THE UNITED STATES
FROM HAITI.

--FIFTH, WE FACE THE CONTINUOUS POSSIBILITY OF A MASSIVE
OUTFLOW OF HAITIAN MIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF
CONDITIONS IN HAITI.

--FINALLY, HAITI AND CUBA ARE THE QNLY TWO NON-DEMOCRACIES
LEFT IN OUR HEMISPHERE, AND IN HAITI THE RESULTS OF A
DEMOCRATIC ELECTION WERE OVERTURNED BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MEANS.

THESE POINTS BEAR DISCUSSION IN GREATER DEPTH. OBVIOUSLY,
WE HAVE A MORAL STAKE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR CAPACITY TO
INFLUENCE EVENTS VARIES. WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RIGHT EVERY
WRONG, EVERYWHERE, EVERY TIME. BUT THIS IS NOT A VALID
ARGUMENT AGAINST TAKING ACTION IN PLACES WHERE ARE INTERESTS
ARE HEAVILY ENGAGED AND AT TIMES WHERE AND WHEN WE HAVE THE
ABILITY TO DO SO. INDEED, THERE ARE TIMES WHEN THE ABILITY TO
INFLUENCE EVENTS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION GIVES US THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO. THIS IS ONE OF THOSE TIMES.

HAITI IS A PLACE WHERE WE HAVE NOT ONLY A MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY, BUT A VERY PRACTICAL INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEMOCRACY. THE CORRUPT AND BRUTAL BEHAVIOR OF THE HAITIAN
MILITARY LEADERSHIP TOWARD THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND SOCIETY HAS
CAUSED HAITIANS TO TRY TO LEAVE THEIR HOMELAND TO SEEK A DECENT
LIFE ELSEWHERE--SOME BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTLY TARGETED BY THE
MILITARY, MANY MORE BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL AND
SOCIAL DESOLATION THE MILITARY'S CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT








54



HAS INFLICTED ON THE COUNTRY. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF OUR
GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND CULTURAL TIES, THE VAST MAJORITY OF
THOSE SEEKING A NEW LIFE ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE UNITED STATES.
AS WE LEARNED OVER A DECADE AGO WITH THE MARIEL BOAT LIFT FROM
CUBA, THE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR OWN SOCIETY OF A SUDDEN, MASS
INFLUX OF ASYLUM SEEKERS ARE DEVASTATING. BUT NEITHER CAN WE
ACCEPT INDEFINITELY THAT THE BURDEN OF CORRUPTION AND BRUTALITY
BE BORNE BY THE PEOPLE OF HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES RATHER
THAN BY THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT.

OUR SECOND SET OF INTERESTS IS LESS DIRECT BUT NO LESS
IMPORTANT. THE EMERGENCE OF DEMOCRACY AS THE PREVAILING FORM
OF GOVERNMENT IN THIS HEMISPHERE IS CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY IN
OUR SELF-INTEREST. DEMOCRACIES GENERATE HOPE; DICTATORSHIPS
PRODUCE REFUGEES. DEMOCRACIES WORK WITH EACH OTHER TO CREATE
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE; DICTATORSHIPS ENGAGE IN CORRUPTION
AND THEN CREATE CONFLICTS TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THEIR
PEOPLE. DEMOCRACIES TEND TOWARD POLITICAL STABILITY SINCE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES CAN CORRECT THEIR MISTAKES AT THE BALLOT
BOX; DICTATORSHIPS FREQUENTLY CHANGE COURSE ONLY AT THE POINT
OF A GUN.

A MULTILATERAL STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING UNITED STATES INTERESTS

GIVEN OUR CLEAR INTERESTS IN ENDING THE CRISIS IN HAITI,
THE PRESIDENT ADOPTED LAST MONTH A THREE PART POLICY TO ACHIEVE
THE GOALS HE HAS ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT OUR INTERESTS. FIRST
AND FOREMOST, OUR POLICY IS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT THE PROMPT
DEPARTURE FROM POWER OF THE CURRENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN
HAITI. THEY ALONE HAVE CREATED THE PROBLEM. THERE CAN BE NO
SOLUTION UNTIL THEY DEPART. SECOND, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED TO
PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS TO ASYLUM SEEKERS PENDING
RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. THIRD, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN A SERIES
OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MITIGATE HUMAN SUFFERING TO THE EXTENT
POSSIBLE EVEN AS WE WORK TO BRING A DEFINITIVE END TO THE
SITUATION THAT HAS SPAWNED IT. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAN IN
ADOPTING THIS POLICY, THE PRESIDENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE IS
DETERMINED THAT WE SHOULD ACT ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS. EACH OF
THESE THREE ELEMENTS OF POLICY ARE BEING PURSUED IN FULL
COOPERATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.










THE DEPARTURE OF THE HAITIAN MILITARY LEADERS

OUR RECENT POLICY REVIEW CONFIRMED THAT THE REAL OBSTACLE
TO PROGRESS IS THE INTRANSIGENCE OF A MILITARY LEADERSHIP THAT
HAS VIOLATED HAITI'S OWN CONSTITUTION, VIOLATED ITS OWN
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND VIOLATED THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ITS
OWN COUNTRYMEN. THESE COUP LEADERS HAD THEIR CHANCE TO CORRECT
THE ERROR OF THEIR PAST WAYS AND TO SAVE THEMSELVES, THEIR
INSTITUTION AND THEIR COUNTRY. INSTEAD, THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED
THAT THEY HAVE NO CONCERN WHATSOEVER FOR THEIR FELLOW SOLDIERS
OR THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS. THEY MUST GO.

ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO FOCUS PRESSURE
ON THESE COUP LEADERS. THE UNITED STATES TOOK THE LEAD IN THE
SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO IMPOSE ADDITIONAL COMPREHENSIVE SANCTIONS
ON HAITI. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917 DIRECTLY LINKS THE
SANCTIONS AGAINST HAITI TO THE RETIREMENT OF GENERAL CEDRAS AND
THE DEPARTURE FROM HAITI OF GENERAL BIAMBY AND LT. COLONEL
FRANCOIS. IN ADDITION TO THE WORLDWIDE EMBARGO OF ARMS AND
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND THE FREEZING OF THE ILLEGAL REGIME'S
ASSETS ALREADY IN PLACE, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 917
IMPOSES A COMPREHENSIVE TRADE EMBARGO (EXEMPTING ONLY FOOD AND
MEDICINE), A CUT OFF OF ALL BUT REGULARLY SCHEDULED PASSENGER
AIR SERVICE, A PROHIBITION AGAINST TRAVEL WORLDWIDE OF THE
HAITIAN OFFICER CORPS, MEMBERS OF THE PUPPET CIVILIAN REGIME,
AND OTHERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MILITARY COUP, AND CALLS FOR A
FREEZING OF THE PERSONAL ASSETS OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS. THE
RESOLUTION MAKES CLEAR THAT ALL OF THESE SANCTIONS WILL STAY IN
PLACE UNTIL THESE THREE GO. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DEPARTURE OF
THESE THREE AND THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW LEADERSHIP COMMITTED
TO CARRYING OUT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MILITARY INSTITUTION
UNDER THE GOVERNORS ISLAND ACCORD WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF
LIFTING THE SANCTIONS.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: THE KEY TO SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT

SECOND, SANCTIONS ARE ONLY AS GOOD AS THEIR ENFORCEMENT.
A WORLDWIDE FUEL EMBARGO WAS RE-IMPOSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
LAST FALL. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S LEADERSHIP WAS CRUCIAL NOT ONLY
IN SECURING THIS PROMPT RESPONSE TO THE MILITARY'S BREACH OF
ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE GOVERNORS ISLAND AGREEMENT, BUT IN
ESTABLISHING A MULTINATIONAL MARITIME ENFORCEMENT EFFORT TO
ENSURE IT WAS RESPECTED. THE UNITED STATES HAS MAINTAINED BOTH
NAVAL AND COAST GUARD VESSELS AROUND HAITI TO ENFORCE THE
EMBARGO, AND WE HAVE BEEN JOINED BY NAVAL VESSELS FROM FRANCE,
CANADA, ARGENTINA AND THE NETHERLANDS. THESE EFFORTS HAVE HAD
A TREMENDOUS EFFECT ON THE HAITIAN ECONOMY. WE ESTIMATED THAT
BETWEEN 65 AND 70 PERCENT OF HAITI'S NORMAL PETROLEUM
REQUIREMENTS WERE NOT BEING MET. THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ROSE AS
HIGH AS $10 PER GALLON. ELECTRICITY WAS AVAILABLE IN THE
CAPITAL FOR ONLY A FEW HOURS A DAY. SCORES OF BUSINESSES HAVE
SHUT DOWN OR ARE OPERATING AT MINIMAL CAPACITY.







56


BUT WE ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH EVEN THIS LEVEL OF
EFFECTIVENESS. EVERY GALLON OF FUEL THAT LEAKS THROUGH THE
EMBARGO ALLOWS THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO PUT OFF THE DECISION
THEY MUST ULTIMATELY TAKE, AND THUS SIMPLY PROLONGS THE AGONY
FOR THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.

A KEY TO IMPROVING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE EMBARGO IS THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT FACES A
SIGNIFICANT TASK IN ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT SMUGGLING OVER A 175
MILE LONG LAND BORDER AND EXTENSIVE COASTAL SEA ROUTES. THE
BETTER THE ENFORCEMENT, THE HIGHER THE PROFIT MARGIN FOR
SMUGGLERS, AND HENCE THE INCENTIVE TO TAKE RISKS. SO IT IS NOT
AN EASY JOB.

TO REINVIGORATE OUR EFFORTS TO FACILITATE THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC'S ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE SECRETARIES GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MR. DANTE CAPUTO, AND I
VISITED PRESIDENT BALAGUER LAST MONTH. PRESIDENT BALAGUER
DESCRIBED TO US THE EFFORTS HIS GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING, AND
COMMITTED HIMSELF PERSONALLY TO ASSURE THAT THE BORDER WAS
SEALED. HE LIKEWISE UNDERTOOK TO IMPLEMENT FULLY THE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF A UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL TEAM THAT HAS
COMPLETED ITS ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

A JUNE 1 FOLLOW-UP VISIT BY MR. CAPUTO CONFIRMED THAT
PRESIDENT BALAGUER AND THE DOMINICAN MILITARY ARE WORKING TO
PUT INTO PRACTICE THE MEASURES RECOMMENDED. IT IS IN OUR
INTEREST TO ASSIST THEM IN DOING SO.

IN SUM, WE FOUND PRESIDENT BALAGUER AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO
BE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND FULLY PREPARED TO
MEET THEM. WE ARE ALREADY SEEING ENCOURAGING RESULTS ON THE
BORDER.

LET ME TAKE THIS OCCASION TO DENY CATEGORICALLY
SPECULATION IN THE PRESS THAT THE COOPERATION OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC WAS SOMEHOW LINKED TO OUR POSITION ON THE RECENT
ELECTIONS IN THAT NATION. PRESIDENT BALAGUER HAD INITIATED
COOPERATION WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE ELECTIONS (FOR EXAMPLE IN
INVITING THE U.N. TEAM) AND HAS NEVER CONNECTED THE TWO ISSUES
IN ANY OF HIS TALKS WITH US, NOR HAVE WE WITH HIM. THE U.S.
POSITIONS ON THESE TWO MATTERS ARE BASED ON THE MERITS OF
EACH. ON THE ELECTIONS, WE HAVE LAID OUT OUR CONCERNS PUBLICLY
AND PRIVATELY, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVERS. WE WILL NOT PURSUE
DEMOCRACY IN HAITI AT THE EXPENSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.






57


FURTHER SANCTIONS IN THE OFFING

EVEN AS THE NEW SANCTIONS AND NEW ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
WE HAVE ALREADY PUT INTO EFFECT BEGIN TO BITE, WE ARE
DEVELOPING NEW MEASURES TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE
MILITARY LEADERSHIP. AT A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRIENDS OF THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL ON
HAITI (UNITED STATES, FRANCE, CANADA, VENEZUELA, AND ARGENTINA)
HELD JUNE 3, WE TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING CONSIDERATION
OF A CUT-OFF OF COMMERCIAL AIR SERVICE AND OF FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS WITH HAITI. THE FRIENDS EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS
TO CONSIDER SUCH MEASURES AND ENCOURAGED OTHERS TO DO SO. THE
MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES ON HAITI YESTERDAY PASSED A RESOLUTION URGING ALL STATES
TO CONSIDER APPLYING THESE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS. WE ARE
ENCOURAGED THAT OTHERS ARE READY TO JOIN US IN PREPARING TO
MOVE TOWARD THESE ADDITIONAL MEASURES.

RECONSTITUTING THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

A RECONFIGURED UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION FOR HAITI WILL PLAY
AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ASSURING THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN HAITI.

WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD
AGREE TO RECONSTITUTE AND RECONFIGURE THE UN MISSION IN HAITI
(UNMIH).

A UNSC DECISION TO RECONSTITUTE UNMIH WILL SEND AN
IMPORTANT SIGNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DETERMINATION TO THE MILITARY
REGIME IN PORT AU PRINCE, AND AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE OF
REASSURANCE TO THE HAITIAN POPULATION.

UNMIH SHOULD BE READY TO DEPLOY, ONCE THE CURRENT MILITARY
LEADERSHIP IN HAITI HAS DEPARTED. WE ENVISAGE THIS AS A
PERMISSIVE OPERATION. THE MISSION SHOULD HAVE A MANDATE AND A
COMPOSITION, HOWEVER, WHICH WILL PERMIT IT TO DEAL WITH SUCH
CHALLENGES AS IT IS LIKELY TO ENCOUNTER IN THE COURSE OF ITS
DEPLOYMENT.







58


WE BELIEVE THAT IN ADDITION TO RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE
TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE ARMY AND POLICE, UNMIH
SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN THE MANDATE, AND THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT
THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF HAITI IN PROVIDING SECURITY TO THE
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE, SENIOR HAITIAN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL,
AND KEY INSTALLATIONS, AND HELPING ASSURE BASIC CIVIC ORDER.

WE WILL ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM MULTINATIONAL PARTICIPATION. THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A
MISSION.

WE HAVE RECEIVED SUPPORT FOR A UN MISSION FOR HAITI
RECONSTITUTED AND STRENGTHENED ALONG THESE LINES FROM THE
"FRIENDS OF HAITI" LAST FRIDAY, AND AT THE OAS MINISTERIAL THIS
WEEK. AT THAT MEETING IN BRAZIL, PRESIDENT ARISTIDE CALLED FOR
SUCH CHANGES IN UNMIH'S COMPOSITION AND MANDATE. YESTERDAY IN
THEIR COMMUNIQUE IN HAITI, THE HEMISPHERIC MINISTERS LENT THEIR
WEIGHT TO THIS CALL. IN THE COMING DAYS WE WILL BE WORKING
WITH THE UN AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS TO SECURE A STRENGTHENED
AND RECONSTITUTED MANDATE FOR UNMIH, AND TO ENCOURAGE BROAD
MULTINATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN IT.

RADIO BROADCASTING TO HAITI

FINALLY, I WOULD NOTE THAT PRESIDENT ARISTIDE HAS A ROLE
TO PLAY IN BRINGING ABOUT THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP
WE ALL SEEK. HE HAS TOLD ME THAT HE DOES NOT CONSIDER THE
ACCESS HE NOW HAS TO THE HAITIAN MEDIA TO BE ADEQUATE TO ALLOW
HIM TO CARRY HIS MESSAGE OF RECONCILIATION AND PROGRESS TO THE
HAITIAN PEOPLE. WE ARE CONSIDERING WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN
FURTHER ASSIST HIM TO BRING HIS MESSAGE OF PEACE AND
RECONCILIATION DIRECTLY TO THE HAITIAN PEOPLE.


DUE PROCESS FOR HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS

AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVIEW OF ITS
POLICY TOWARDS HAITI WAS THE TREATMENT OF HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE.
THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED ON MAY 8 THAT CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS TO
UNITED STATES' REFUGEE POLICY TOWARDS HAITI WOULD BE MADE.
SPECIFICALLY, HE STATED THAT WHILE ALL HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS
WOULD CONTINUE TO BE INTERDICTED AT SEA, A DETERMINATION OF
ELIGIBILITY FOR REFUGEE STATUS WOULD BE MADE FOR THOSE
REQUESTING ASYLUM PRIOR TO ANY REPATRIATION. THOSE PERSONS
FOUND TO BE REFUGEES WILL BE PROVIDED REFUGE. THOSE WHO ARE
NOT FOUND TO BE REFUGEES WILL BE RETURNED TO HAITI.







59


INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN PROCESSING

WE ARE NOW NEARING THE TIME WHEN WE WILL BE IN A POSITION
TO IMPLEMENT THESE CHANGES. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STROBE
TALBOTT SIGNED A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING IN KINGSTON,
JAMAICA ON JUNE 2 PERMITTING THE UNITED STATES TO PROCESS
HAITIANS ABOARD VESSELS IN JAMAICA'S TERRITORIAL WATERS. THESE
VESSELS ARE CURRENTLY EN ROUTE TO JAMAICA, AND WE ANTICIPATE
THAT REFUGEE PROCESSING WILL BE ABLE TO COMMENCE SOON.

WE HAVE ALSO REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS TO USE GRAND TURK ISLAND AS AN ON
SHORE PROCESSING LOCATION. WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE HAITIAN
REFUGEE PROBLEM IS BEING ADDRESSED IN A MULTILATERAL FASHION AS
IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM.

WE ARE ALSO EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH THE SUPPORT AND
COOPERATION THAT WE ARE RECEIVING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR). UNHCR HAS AGREED TO
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN THE REFUGEE PROCESSING OPERATION BY
COUNSELLING HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE PRIOR TO THEIR REFUGEE
INTERVIEWS, PROVIDING GUIDANCE AND TRAINING TO THE INTERVIEWING
OFFICERS, AND MONITORING THE OVERALL PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT IT
MEETS THE HIGHEST STANDARDS FOR REFUGEE DETERMINATION.


SHARING THE REFUGEE BURDEN INTERNATIONALLY

IN ADDITION TO COOPERATION IN PROCESSING, UNHCR HAS
INDICATED IT WILL ASSIST THE U.S. IN IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES
WILLING TO ACCEPT APPROVED HAITIAN REFUGEES EITHER FOR
TEMPORARY PROTECTION OR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT. FOR OUR PART,
WE HAVE APPROACHED STATES IN THE REGION, AND REQUESTED THAT
THEY ACCEPT APPROVED HAITIAN REFUGEES EITHER TEMPORARILY OR
PERMANENTLY. WE HAVE RECEIVED DEFINITIVE POSITIVE RESPONSES
FROM A FEW AND ENCOURAGING ONES FROM A NUMBER OF OTHERS. WE
WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCE COUNTRIES TO TAKE THEIR
FAIR SHARE. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN HAITI IS A SERIOUS
PROBLEM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND WE HOPE THAT IT
WILL ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN ITS RESOLUTION.

MONITORING RETURNEES

WHILE SOME HAITIAN BOAT PEOPLE WILL BE FOUND TO BE
REFUGEES, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE MAJORITY WILL NOT BE
APPROVED AND WILL BE RETURNED TO HAITI. OUR EXPERIENCE THUS
FAR INDICATES THAT REPATRIATED BOAT PEOPLE ARE NOT TARGETED FOR
RETRIBUTION BY HAITIAN AUTHORITIES; HOWEVER, AS HAS BEEN DONE
FOR OVER TWO YEARS, OUR EMBASSY IN PORT-AU-PRINCE WILL ENDEAVOR
TO MONITOR THE WELFARE OF THOSE WHO ARE REPATRIATED.












IN-COUNTRY PROCESSING IS SAFEST

AS THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED, WE BELIEVE OUR IN-COUNTRY
REFUGEE PROCESSING PROGRAM REMAINS THE BEST AND SAFEST MEANS
FOR GENUINE REFUGEES TO HAVE THEIR CLAIMS HEARD. WE HAVE THREE
IN-COUNTRY PROCESSING CENTERS THAT PERMIT PERSONS WITH A
WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION TO HAVE THEIR CLAIMS
ADJUDICATED WITHOUT HAVING TO TAKE A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SEA
JOURNEY IN UNSEAWORTHY VESSELS. WE WISH TO URGE THOSE WHO ARE
THINKING ABOUT TAKING SUCH A RISK TO CONSIDER APPLYING AT ONE
OF THE IN-COUNTRY CENTERS INSTEAD.

SINCE THE IN-COUNTRY REFUGEE PROCESSING PROGRAM BEGAN,
OVER 2,500 PERSONS HAVE BEEN ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES AS
REFUGEES. THE ADMISSION OF THESE RECENT REFUGEES, COMBINED
WITH NORMAL IMMIGRATION OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS, MAKES HAITI
ONE OF THE LARGEST SOURCES OF NEW RESIDENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES IN THE WORLD, DESPITE ITS RELATIVELY SMALL POPULATION.
THAT BEING SAID, OUR GOAL IN HAITI IS TO PUT OUR REFUGEE
PROCESSING CENTERS OUT OF BUSINESS AND DECREASE THE PRESSURES
THAT CAUSE THE REFUGEE CRISIS, BY RESTORING AND STRENGTHENING
DEMOCRACY AND REBUILDING THE HAITIAN ECONOMY. UNTIL THESE
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ARE ADDRESSED, LARGE SCALE HAITIAN ASYLUM
SEEKERS COMING TO THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO CONFRONT
US.

ALLEVIATING HUMAN SUFFERING

THE THIRD--BUT BY NO MEANS LAST--COMPONENT OF UNITED
STATES POLICY IS THAT OF ALLEVIATING HUMAN SUFFERING. THIS
ELEMENT OF OUR POLICY RESONATES MOST FULLY IN AMERICAN HEARTS
AND IS MOST BROADLY SUPPORTED IN ALL CORNERS OF THIS COUNTRY.
PRESIDENT CLINTON IS DETERMINED THAT THE MOST' VULNERABLE GROUPS
BE PROTECTED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM THE TIGHTENED EMBARGO.
FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE NOT ONLY CONTINUING BUT EXPANDING OUR
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SUPPORT TO THE HAITIAN
PEOPLE.

HUMAN RIGHTS

WE ARE WORKING TO RAPIDLY RETURN AND AUGMENT THE STAFF OF
THE JOINT UNITED NATIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN MISSION TO MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
IN HAITI. THESE COURAGEOUS INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN COMMENDED TO
US BY OUR EMBASSY AS THE ONLY PRACTICAL DETERRENT TO HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE MILITARY AND THEIR ALLIES. OUR EMBASSY
HAS RECOMMENDED AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO BUILD THE NUMBERS BACK UP
TO AT LEAST THE LEVEL THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THEIR TEMPORARY
WITHDRAWAL LAST FALL, AND WE FULLY SHARE THE EMBASSY'S VIEW.
AT THIS POINT, 69 MEMBERS HAVE RETURNED TO HAITI AND ARE BEING
DEPLOYED IN KEY LOCATIONS. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
IS MEANWHILE RECRUITING MORE OBSERVERS.








61


THE UNITED STATES ACTIVELY SUPPORTS THE INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH RECENTLY RETURNED FROM HAITI
WITH A VERY SOBERING REPORT. THE UNITED STATES FULLY SHARES
THEIR VIEWS ON THE GRAVITY AND HORROR OF THE ABUSES REPORTED.
AND WILL CAREFULLY CONSIDER THEIR CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS A LARGE HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN HAITI FUNDED BY THE AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING THAT
RESULTS FROM CALLOUS MILITARY AUTHORITARIANISM AND ECONOMIC
MISMANAGEMENT, WHICH HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL
EMBARGO. THIS PROGRAM IS OPERATED THROUGH WELL-KNOWN AND VERY
EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS
CARE, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES, ADRA AND THE PAN-AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION.

IT CONSISTS OF DAILY FEEDING WITH PL-480 TITLE II FOODS
FOR NEARLY A MILLION HAITIAN SCHOOL CHILDREN, PREGNANT AND
LACTATING MOTHERS, AND ELDERLY HAITIANS.. WE ALSO PROVIDE
ACCESS FOR NEARLY 2 MILLION OF THE MOST VULNERABLE HAITIANS TO
BASIC HEALTH CARE, SUCH AS CHILD IMMUNIZATIONS, BASIC
PHARMACEUTICALS, FAMILY PLANNING, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE,
AND LIMITED CURATIVE CARE. FINALLY, WE PROVIDE THROUGH THE
PAN-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION 16,000 TEMPORARY JOBS AIMED
AT CLEANING UP GARBAGE AND DRAINAGE CANALS, REPAIRING KEY
SECONDARY ROADS NEEDED FOR THE FEEDING PROGRAMS, AND REBUILDING
IRRIGATION CANALS.

AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MAY 8TH DECISION TO IMPOSE
STRONGER SANCTIONS, WE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO EXPANDING THESE
HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMS AS THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ARE FELT. WE
HAVE INCREASED ACTUAL FEEDING LEVELS IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS BY
320,000 PEOPLE. WE EXPECT THE JOBS PROGRAM TO PUT
FOOD-PURCHASING INCOMES INTO THE POCKETS OF AT LEAST ANOTHER
29,000 POOR HAITIANS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. WE WILL SOON
CONTRACT WITH A LOGISTICS FIRM THAT CAN ASSIST OUR VOLUNTARY
AGENCIES TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT AND DELIVERY
OBSTACLES IN HAITI.

BASIC FOODS AND MEDICINES ARE NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMERCIAL SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, WITH THE
RECENTLY STRENGTHENED COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL EMBARGO, IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE EXTRAORDINARY HUMANITARIAN TRANSPORT OF
SUCH ITEMS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. I ASSURE YOU, MR.
CHAIRMAN, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY
MEASURES TO MEET THE BASIC NEEDS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE GROUPS
IN HAITI.







62


CONCLUSION

MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME BE AS CLEAR AS I CAN BE. PRESIDENT
CLINTON HAS DETERMINED THAT OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE THE
RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN HAITI, AND THE RETURN
OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE. WE ARE EMBARKED ON A NEW PATH TOWARD
THIS GOAL. MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SINCE PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
ANNOUNCEMENT ON MAY 8. FURTHER STEPS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE
COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. NO OPTION IS EXCLUDED. DEMOCRACY IN
HAITI WILL PREVAIL. NEITHER WE, NOR THE HAITIAN PEOPLE CAN
LONG WAIT FOR THIS EVENT.







63


PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS




Mr. Chairman, I am extremely pleased that you have called this
hearing today to discuss the current situation in Haiti. I
welcome President Clinton's appointment of the Honorable William
Gray to be his Special Envoy, but let nobody assume that his
appointment will lead to my easing up on this Administration's
policy. I will not. I have in the past said that our policy, or
lack of, is an outrage, and I will continue to do so until this
government has taken some concrete steps to resolve this
situation.

I find myself in a particularly difficult position, as a
humanitarian, as an African-American, and as a Member of Congress
from South Florida. As a humanitarian and African-American, I
say the average Haitian is being tortured, brutalized, and we
must stop it, either by removing the perpetrators or helping the
victims escape. But as a South Floridian I say stop. We can't
handle anymore people. Our local social, health and educational
services cannot support the influx.

So what is the answer to my competing selves? The answer is do
whatever we can to keep them safe in their own country.











APPENDIX 1



Questions for the Record Submitted to Deputy Secretary Talbott
House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 28, 1994


Question:
What is the policy today for achieving the restoration of
President Aristide?


Answer:

Acting multilaterally, we have imposed tougher sanctions

through the UN Security Council. Our Navy is redoubling

its efforts off the coast of Haiti to intercept ships

violating the embargo. On May 25, Special Advisor Gray

travelled to the Dominican Republic and recieved a

commitment from Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer to

seal the border with Haiti. We are also considering

additional measures which will intensify the pressure on

the illegal regime. We believe such steps will convince

the Haitian military to relinquish power.


We are ruling other options neither in nor out.







65


Question:
What is different with respect to U.S. objectives
compared to what they were six months ago?


Answer:

Our objectives have not changed. The Administration

continues to be firmly committed to restoring democracy

and returning President Aristide to Haiti through a

broadly supported multilateral effort. The military

leadership who usurped power from the people must be

removed from power. All our actions are designed to

bring about this result.







66


Question:
What is different with respect to U.S. policy toward the
Haitian regime?


Answer:

The policy toward the illegal regime remains unchanged.

We do not recognize the "Provisional President," Emile

Jonassaint's claim of legitimacy, nor do we recognize the

military leadership that supports his bogus regime.



We recognize President Aristide as the legitimate head of

the Haitian state, and those officials he has named, such

as acting Prime Minister Robert Malval, who now function

in an "acting" capacity.









Question:
What is different with respect to tactics?


Answer:

We have imposed tougher sanctions through the UN and our

Navy is redoubling its efforts off the coast of Haiti to

intercept ships violating the embargo. On May 25,

Special Advisor Gray travelled to the Dominican Republic

and recieved a commitment from Dominican President

Joaquin Balaguer to seal the border with Haiti. We

believe that steps such as these will enhance the

effectiveness of the international sanctions and will

convince the Haitian military to relinquish power.



We are also considering additional measures which will

intensify the pressure on the illegal regime.



The sanctions which had been in place had not produced

the desired result. As a result of our recent policy

review, the President decided on pursuing a six-point

framework to attempt to achieve our objectives:



We have pressed for and achieved a resolution at the UN

for comprehensive sanctions that will bar all trade with

Haiti except for food, medicine and very











limited other humanitarian exceptions. This will

universalize and make mandatory the voluntary sanctions

adopted by the OAS. We will also end the exemption for

assembly plants.



We also received UN Security Council approval to

multilateralize and make mandatory our current targeted

sanctions against those most responsible for maintaining

the military dictatorship.



We are working closely with the Government of the

Dominican Republic and the UN to reduce the illegal flow

of fuel across the border into Haiti. The Dominican

Republic has asked the UN for assistance to further

strengthen enforcement of the oil embargo. During the

week of May 23, a UN survey team visited the Dominican

Republic. The team will make recommendations to the

government of the Dominican Republic on stopping the

illegal flow of fuel. On May 26, President Balaguer

promised Mr. Gray that he would implement fully the

team's recommendations.



We will be augmenting our humanitarian assistance to

Haiti's poor to mitigate the impact of increased










sanctions. Specifically, we expect to increase the level

of food beneficiaries, to augment the supply of basic

health services to vulnerable groups, and to provide more

short-term jobs aimed at repairing roads needed to

deliver humanitarian goods.



We are exploring ways to reconfigure the UNMIH (UN

Mission in Haiti, temporarily abandoned in October 1993

by our decision to withdraw the USS Harlan County from

Haiti) to make it more effective.



We are working for the dispatch of more UN/OAS human

rights observers to Haiti, which we have consistently

supported. After an absence of three months, the ICM

with our strong encouragement returned in January and now

has sixty-nine monitors in Port-au-Prince. We have

contributed $16 million and have a further $13 million

appropriated in FY 1994.



Our policy puts the onus directly on the military leaders

who are responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy. It

seeks to protect innocent Haitians while increasing the

pressure on those in Haiti who are responsible. The new

sanctions are not conditioned on any action by President

Aristide, who is clearly the injured party.








70


Question:
What is different with respect to U.S. policy toward
President Aristide?


Answer:

Our objectives have not changed. The Administration

continues to be firmly committed to restoring democracy

and returning President Aristide to Haiti. The military

authorities who have usurped power from the people must

yield. All our actions are designed to bring this about.



We recognize President Aristide as the legitimate head of

the Haitian state, and those officials he has named, like

acting Prime Minister Robert Malval, who now function in

an "acting" capacity.


Question:
What is your scenario with respect to how this policy
will lead to Aristide's return?


Answer:

We believe increased pressure on the illegal regime will

result in the removal of those responsible for President

Aristide's overthrow in the near future.



If they do not leave, President Clinton has made clear

that he will not rule out more drastic measures.







71


Question:
What new policy initiatives are under consideration and
does the Administration have an overall framework devised for
the return of President Aristide?


Answer:

* We believe our increased pressure on the illegal regime

will result in the removal of those responsible for

President Aristide's overthrow in the near future.



If they do not leave, President Clinton has said that he

will not rule out more drastic steps.



We believe that the Governors Island process should be

resumed once those responsible for the initial breakdown

of that process are removed from power.



Since my testimony on April 28, and in light of the

worsening human rights situation the President decided on

May 7 to modify our procedures regarding Haitian asylum

seekers to assure due process.



President Clinton has decided that we will continue to

interdict all Haitian migrants at sea, but we will

determine -- aboard ship or in other countries -- which







72


Haitians are genuine political refugees. Those who are

not found to have genuine claims will be returned. Those

who do have genuine claims will be provided refuge.



Many people share our concern about how the Hemisphere

will respond to potential outflows of Haitian refugees.

We hope that we can work cooperatively with nations in

the region and with the UNHCR to accord fair processing

to those in need and to manage effectively this problem.










Question:
While we are trying to figure out what to do, how many
babies are dying because of sanctions?


Answer:

We deeply share your concern for Haiti's most vulnerable

population. Due to the economic mismanagement and

corruption of the Haitian military and its allies since

the September 1991 coup, Haiti's long-suffering poor

continue to suffer. USAID's ongoing humanitarian

assistance program in Haiti provides an important means

for mitigating the impact of deteriorating economic

conditions on Haiti's poor.



Since 1991, USAID has had in place a monitoring system

which collects reliable trend information on pre-school

children nutrition levels. USAID uses this data and

other more qualitative indicators to identify areas of

the country where nutrition rates indicate that increased

feeding should be specially targeted. Partly as a result

of USAID and other donor feeding programs, nutrition

levels for Haitian children have not significantly

deteriorated since the 1991 coup (particularly in terms

of the most severe malnutrition data.)











Presently, USAID-sponsored feeding programs, implemented

through CARE, ADRA and the Catholic Relief Services are

providing direct daily feeding to almost 900,000

children, women and elderly Haitians. Additionally,

almost two million Haitians (nearly one-third of the

population) are provided access to basic health services

financed by the U.S. Three-hundred thousand children

under the age of five are receiving child survival

services such as vaccinations, nutritional surveillance,

oral rehydration therapy and the treatment of acute

respiratory infections. These programs are implemented

in cooperation with international institutions such as

PAHO and with U.S. and Haitian non-governmental

organizations.



Ultimately, the only hope for alleviating the condition

of Haiti's poor is a return to democracy.










Question:
The Governors Island Accord was breached by the military
at step five; where is the Governors Island Accord as a
policy tool to return President Aristide today?


Answer:

We believe that the Governors Island process should be

resumed once those responsible.for the initial breakdown

of that process are removed from power.



We believe our increased pressure on the illegal regime

will result in the removal of those responsible for

President Aristide's overthrow in the near future.



If they do not, President Clinton has said that he will

not rule out more drastic steps.


Question:
With the current U.S. policy, what is our timetable for
the return of President Aristide?


Answer:

Ultimately the choice of when to return belongs to

President Aristide.



We believe increased pressure on the illegal regime will

result in the removal of those responsible for President

Aristide's overthrow in the near future.








76


APPENDIX 2



Questions for the Record Submitted to William H. Gray III
House Foreign Affairs Committee
June, 1994



Q. Did you discuss the issue of electoral fraud in your recent
meetings with President Balaguer?



A. No. My job is Haiti, and I did not wish to imply any

linkage between the two issues by engaging in a discussion

on the election topic. Our request for Dominican

assistance in enforcing the Haiti embargo is not

connected to our continued support for free elections

in the Dominican Republic. Our requests for

assistance on the embargo pre-date the election,

and our support for free and fair elections is a constant

of our support for democracy which pre-dates the embargo.

I will continue discussing Haiti issues with President

Balaguer. The U.S. Ambassador and Assistant Secretary

Watson will pursue the election issue vigorously.







77


Q. If not, is it possible that President Balaguer might
have interpreted your silence to imply U.S. willingness
to make the election issue secondary to sanctions
enforcement against the Haitian-military?


A. No. To the contrary, by not linking the two subjects

we have made it clear that each is of major importance to

us and must be addressed on its own merits. We have made

very clear in public statements and in private

diplomatic contacts with Dominican officials and

political leaders our support for free and fair

elections. This includes statements issued by the

Department of State on May 9, May 16 and June 15.

As those statements indicate, we have urged a full

investigation of all electoral irregularities. In

particular we have urged release of voter lists used at

polling stations on election day to allow investigators

and party representatives to address charges of

disenfranchisement of large numbers of voters who appeared

at the polls. We believe the U.S. position has been

clearly understood by Dominican authorities and they are

lis tenly carefully what we are saying.


Q. Has Ambassador Pastorino raised the election issue
with President Balaguer? How recently?


A. Ambassador Pastorino has discussed the election with

President Balaguer on several occasions, most recently

at his last meeting with the President prior to his

departure from Santo Domingo on June 28.







78


2. What message is Ambassador Pastorino communicating to the
Dominican government with respect to alleged election fraud.


>. Ambassador Pastorino has told the Dominican government

that we take seriously the findings by delegations from

the Organization of American States, the International

Foundation for Electoral Systems, and the National

Democratic Institute that irregularities occurred

in the May 16 election and that we join the

international observers in calling for a full

investigation. The Ambassador has urged that the

Central Electoral Board look into all

irregularities and take the necessary steps to

ensure the results of the election are determined in

a free and fair manner. The Ambassador has also

appealed to all parties to exercise restraint and

resolve these issues through legal means.

Q. What measures is the embassy taking to follow the
investigation of election fraud?


A. The Ambassador and his staff at Embassy Santo

Domingo have followed the election closely and are

continuing to do so. They are in close contact with

members of the Central Electoral Board (JCE)

and the investigating commission

established to address charges of electoral

irregularities, with international observer missions who

have extended their stay in the Dominican Republic to

follow developments, and with members of Dr. Pena

Gomez' Dominican Revolutionary Party as well as

Dr. Balaguer's Christian Reformist Party.







79


Q. How firm is President Balaguer's commitment to close down
the Dominican Republic border with Haiti?


A. Although President Balaguer has in the past expressed

reservations about the embargo, when Dante

Caputo, the Special Representative of the Secretaries

General of the United Nations and of the Organization

of American States, and I met with the President he

committed himself to assuring that the border was

in his terms "sealed." He likewise undertook

to implement fully the recommendations of a United

Nations technical team that has completed its

assessment of sanctions enforcement measures.


Q. Do you think Balaguer will back away from sanctions
enforcement if we push the election issue, or once the
election issue is resolved?


A. President Balaguer initiated cooperation on sanctions

well in advance of the elections (for example in inviting

the U.N. team) and has never connected the two issues in

any of his talks with us. Nor have we with him.

President Balaguer and his government are

fully conscious of their obligations on both issues and

we expect them to meet those obligations.








80


Q. What guarantees do we have, if any, that President
Balaguer will not once again loosen sanctions enforcement
efforts once the election results are finalized and
recognized by the U.S.?


A. At our meeting last month President Balaguer assured me he

was committed to "sealing" the border and keeping it

sealed. We are already seeing a very encouraging

increase in enforcement activity from his actions.

The best "guarantee" is self interest. At this stage, the

Dominican Republic has a very strong interest in bringing

about a prompt resolution of the Haiti crisis that

coincides with our own. They realize that any

easing of enforcement efforts will only prolong the

crisis.


Q. What contact have you had with Acting-Prime Minister Malval
and what role do you believe Malval can play? Has the U.S.
Government received any requests from Prime Minister Malval
for financial assistance for the de jure government in Haiti?
Has the U.S. Government provided any material support to
Prime Minister Malval and his ministers?


A. Ambassador Swing at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince is in

regular contact with Prime Minister Malval. We continue to

admire the role he is playing as a visible reminder in Haiti

of legitimacy and democracy. We have discussed with President

Aristide how the U.S. might support his de jure ministers, and

are awaiting a response.










Q. What must happen before sanctions are lifted? Will they be
lifted in phases or all at once? Is a solution to this crisis
possible with General Cedras and Col. Francois remaining in
the country? If Cedras and Francois were to step down, are
the rank and file of the Haitian military sufficiently
professional to follow the leadership of others who may allow
the return of President Aristide? What, if any, contact have
you had with the Haitian military leadership? Have you
contemplated using a senior military person from a third
country (such as France) to initiate direct contact with Gen.
Cedras and Col. Francois and explore conditions for their
departure?


A. As specified in Resolution 917, for the sanctions to be

lifted, Generals Cedras and Biamby and Lt. Col. Francois must

depart Haiti. They will not be lifted either whole or in part

before that time. The members of the armed forces could save

their institution and their country by following a leadership

committed to honoring the military's obligations. The United

Nations is exploring a strengthened United Nations Mission in

Haiti (UNMIH) to help maintain security after the departure of

the military leaders. We do not have regular contact with the

military leadership, but they are fully aware of the

international community's position. We have not considered

using military personnel from third countries to initiate

contact with Cedras.









Q. Could you provide for the record, the facts surrounding the
issuance in error of an immigrant visa to the military
officer, despite the fact that he was on the State
Department's consular lookout list in Port au Prince.


A. The Department has been aware of the fact that on March 9, the

American Embassy in Port au Prince issued an immigrant visa to

Yvon Jean-Jacques, an officer in the Haitian military, who had

been found to fall within the purview of Section 212(f) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act by authority of the

Presidential Proclamation of June 3, 1993. The Americanl

Embassy reports that it has the original computer print-out

showing that appropriate namechecks of the Consular Lookout

System (CLS) had been performed and that the results were

negative. The Department of State has the original print-out

showing that Capt. Jean-Jacques was properly entered into the

CLS on January 14, 1994. Subsequent tests have always

resulted in Capt. Jean-Jacques's name being returned by the

CLS



We are continuing to review the complete namecheck system in

an attempt to explain this incident.








Q. What is the process for Haitian refugees seeking processing t,
reach Kingston or the Turks and Caicos? Does the Coast Guar
shuttle them?


A. Haitian migrants who are interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coas

Guard are being transferred to the refugee processing site o:

the USNS Comfort which is stationed in Kingston harbor i:

Jamaica. Once a processing facility is established in th,

Turks and Caicos Islands, Haitian boat people will b,

transported there as well for adjudication of refugee claims



Those persons found to be refugees will be brought to the U.S

or referred to third countries for resettlement or temporary

refuge; those determined not to be refugees will b

repatriated to Haiti by the U.S. Coast Guard.


Q. What is the capacity of each of the processing centers?


A. 500 persons per day is the total capacity planned for thq

region.


Q. How will the 90-95% of those who are not deemed to be
political refugees return to Haiti? If they are not returned
to Haiti, where do they go?


A. We are not making any presumptions as to the percentage of

interdicted migrants that will be found to be refugees.



Those Haitians determined not to be refugees will be

repatriated to Haiti by U.S. Coast Guard vessels. I





84


Q. Has there been or will there be any change in the
qualifications for granting political refugee status?


A. Any Haitian boat person wishing to have a refugee interview

will receive one.


The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will use the

same standard for determining refugee status in this program

that is used around the world; i.e., persecution or a well-

founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.





85


Q. Where do those granted asylum go? How do they get there?
What happens to them when they get there?


A. Those persons approved for refugee status will be transferred

(normally by air) by the Department of Defense to Guantanamo

Naval Base for further processing.



Once there, those bound for the U.S. will go through expedited

post-adjudication processing. UNHCR will assist in referring

some cases to other resettlement countries.



U.S.-bound refugees will undergo normal but expedited post-

approval processing such as medical exams (currently while on

board the hospital ship USNS Comfort), sponsorship assurances

and onward travel arrangements.



Medical screening consists of obtaining a verbal history,

conducting a brief physical exam focusing on statutorily

excludable conditions, including a chest x-ray and blood test

for venereal disease and HIV. DOD doctors will conduct the

exams with supervision of the process by the Public Health

Service. Each approved refugee bound for the U.S. will be

assigned a sponsoring voluntary agency to assist in initial

resettlement. Once the medical exam and sponsorship assurance

have been completed, the approved refugees will be transported

to the U.S. and resettled in communities throughout the U.S.



We are waiting for responses from a number of countries to our

request that they accept Haitian refugees temporarily or

permanently. We hope that within the active support of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 'other

countries will respond positively to our request for

assistance.






86


Q. Are the sanctions working? How long do you anticipate Cedras
et.al. will hold out? Is there a cut-off date, a "leave or
else" deadline involved?


A. Yes, the sanctions are having an effect. Comprehensive

international sanctions were authorized by UN Security Council

Resolution 917 only about one month ago. We are seeing

efforts by individuals within Haiti to convince the coup

leaders that they should step down in order to stop the pain

and suffering they are imposing on the Haitian people,

including the other members of the armed forces. We have set

no deadline, but we have also indicated that other options are

open.


Q. Are there any efforts, direct or indirect, to negotiate a
step-down by Cedras et al.? If so, what are the inducements
offered? What are the threats involved? Are there relocation
and support offers?


A. The UN Security Council has made clear that General Cedras]

must retire and General Biamby and Lt. Col. Francois musti

leave Haiti as specified in Resolution 917. Only when this

occurs will sanctions begin to be lifted. Sanctions are

beginning to have effect, and we have seen signs of erosion in

support for the coup leaders.


Q. With all the media speculation about an OAS (or multinational)
force invasion, have you been actively promoting invasion
plans or policy in your talks with Caribbean leaders? Is the
administration willfully ignoring the sense of the Congress
rejecting U.S. military intervention in Haiti?


A. President Clinton has made clear that we cannot rule out the

use of force. To do so would only give encouragement to the

military leaders now holding Haiti hostage. Our focus now,

however, is on a strong multilateral sanctions regime to bring

pressure on the military leaders.





87


Q. What are the costs involved in the Administration's current
Haiti policy? of enforcing sanctions? of providing
reimbursement to Jamaica and Turks/Caicos? of running
processing centers (and cruise ships)? of sustaining
Aristide's government-in-exile in D.C.? of humanitarian
relief?


A. Enforcing Sanctions: We have seen DOD estimates for the

incremental cost of maritime sanctions enforcement for FY 1994

of $48.3 million. We propose, in addition, to provide

assistance to the Dominican Republic for sanctions enforcement

on the Haitian/Dominican border. We would expect the costs ol

equipment which might be provided to the Dominican Republic

for this purpose to be between $12 million and $15 million,

Jamaica and Turks/Caicos: In connection with bilateral

agreements regarding migrant processing facilities, we have

agreed, subject to the availability of appropriations, tc

reimburse Jamaica and Turks/Caicos for the costs they incui

directly attributable to this operation and, in the case ol

Turks/Caicos, for rental of a site for a land-based processing

facility. We expect equipment costs for Jamaica in this

regard to be about $1.5 million, and the rental cost ir

Turks/Caicos to be $2 million.

Processing Centers/Ships: DOD estimates the acquisition anc

operations costs for ship-based processing centers to be $3:

million in FY 1994, and construction and operations costs fol

a land-based center in Turks/Caicos, including infrastructure

improvements, to be $19 million. We estimate the actua:

processing costs to total about $10 million.

Aristide's Government: The United States does not pay costs

of sustaining the Aristide Government, these expenses are paid

for from Haitian Government resources.

Humanitarian Relief: Our humanitarian relief program in' Haiti

is funded this year at $56 million.







88


Q. In the event of an invasion, is there a guarantee that
Aristide would return (assuming the departure of Cedras et
al.)?


A. The goal of our Haiti policy is to restore democracy to Haiti,

including the return of President Aristide to Haiti so that he

may assume his duties as the duly-elected President of that

country.


Q. Who would provide security for Aristide?


A. The UN Security Council has proposed that the UN Mission in

Haiti should assist the Government of Haiti in protecting

Haitian democratic leaders.


Q. Would U.S. forces be involved in providing for the personal
security of Aristide?


A. The UN Security Council has proposed that the UN Mission in

Haiti should assist the Government of Haiti in protecting

Haitian democratic leaders.


Q. In the event of an invasion, what are the planned rules of
engagement and disengagement? Is there a timetable? Are
there clear rules about the use of deadly force? Besides
Cedras and Michel Francois, how many "elitists" have to be
neutralized or removed?


A. We cannot speculate about any hypothetical situation such as

this.







89


Q. Media reports suggest that there will be no peacekeeping force
sent to Haiti until or unless Ceas et al. step down. Is
that the understanding?


A. Yes. We support deployment of UNMIH under appropriate

circumstances, when the senior military leadership identified

in Resolution 917 (Gen. Cedras, Gen. Biamby and Lt. Col.

Francois) have departed.


Q. Media reports further suggest that a multinational
peacekeeping force will not be put in place if U.S. military
intervention is used to remove Cedras et al. Is this true?


A. The U.S. is working and intends to work multilaterally,

through the OAS, the UN and our friends in the region. These

discussions have also focused on the reconstituted UN Mission

in Haiti (UNMIH) which, as you will recall, received strong,

unanimous support from the OAS general assembly in Belem,

Brazil.


Q. Doesn't this effectively rule out unilateral U.S. military
intervention in Haiti?


A. We have joined with other members of the UN to impose

sanctions on Haiti to bring pressure to bear on the current

leadership to leave the country and allow the return of the

democratically-elected government. As far as other possible

elements of our policy are concerned, the President has not

explicitly ruled in or out any other options.


0


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