Roundtable on Haiti--October 1993

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Roundtable on Haiti--October 1993 briefing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, October 20, 1993
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Roundtable on Haiti, October 1993
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ROUNDTABLE 7ON HAITI-CTOBER 19932/9

ROUNDTABLE ON HAITI-OCTOBER 1993


BRIEFING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 20, 1993


Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs













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74-650 CC


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1993


For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-043356-8















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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana, Chairman


SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ERIC FINGERHUT, Ohio
PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
DON EDWARDS, California
FRANK MCCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
(Vacancy)


BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DAVID A. LEVY, New York
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California


MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, Chief of Staff
RICHARD J. GARON, Minority Chief of Staff

(II)














CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES
Hon. Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Departm ent of State ............................................................................................ 2
Hon. Frank Wisner, Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense .......... 6
PREPARED STATEMENT
H on. Frank W isner ...................................................... ...................................... 25
APPENDIX
U.S. Treasury Department documents regarding blocked U.S. assets of 34
Haitian entities and 41 individuals who have obstructed the restoration
of dem ocracy in H aiti ........................................................................................ 30











ROUNDTABLE BRIEFING ON HAITI-OCTOBER
1993


WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1993
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 3:50 p.m. in room 2172,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman)
presiding.
Chairman HAMILTON. The House Foreign Affairs Committee will
come to order.
The committee meets today in open session to receive a briefing
on the situation in Haiti. We will hear from the Hon. Alexander F.
Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
and Hon. Frank Wisner, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
We are delighted to have you. Presiding today will be the distin-
guished chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Af-
fairs, Mr. Torricelli.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN TORRICELLI
Mr. TORRICELLI. [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for joining us today.
Before inviting your comments, let me begin today's discussion
by saying I think whatever issues may divide us in our approach
to Haiti, we also hold many things in common. We all want to see
constitutional government restored to Haiti and justice done.
I am concerned, however, that while the restoration of democracy
in Haiti is important, it is not the only issue that is important to
the United States. I continue to be concerned about the impact of
the embargo on the people of Haiti; about whether it is properly
crafted to ensure that medicines, food and material; about whether
those who are responsible for the interruption of constitutional gov-
ernment will pay the price rather than those who already find
themselves in desperate economic straits. This is true for the peo-
ple of Haiti and for the land of Haiti.
I have concerns that the previous embargo has accelerated defor-
estation and may lead to permanent ecological damage. These are
my concerns for Haiti.
Many would probably agree with my concerns for our own people
and personnel. While we want constitutional democracy restored in
Haiti, we also want to avoid the painful legacy in this hemisphere
of impressions of American involvement and our dictation in the af-
fairs of other peoples.







Therefore, the policy that is crafted in these next few days is im-
portant not only for restoring proper government in Haiti, but also
dealing with the legacy of American involvement in the area and
the welfare of the people of that country beyond the question of
their political order.
I hope today's briefing can lead all of us to renewed confidence
that a proper balance is being struck to achieve these objectives
while avoiding potentially serious problems.
Mr. Watson, if you would like to proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER FLETCHER WATSON, AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTER.AMERICAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. WATSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Hamilton, Mr.
Torricelli, members of the committee. I know I speak for Under
Secretary Wisner when I express appreciation to you for organizing
this opportunity to discuss with you this very complex and impor-
tant issue.
U.S. INTERESTS IN HAITI
I thought if I might begin by describing briefly how I see U.S.
interests in Haiti, describing why the administration's policy is a
good one in my view, talk a little bit about the congressional in-
volvement in the process until now, describe the Governor's Island
Agreement, and get into a chronology of the most recent events to
make sure we are all talking from the same background and talk
a little bit about the various kinds of sanctions that are being ap-
plied.
The United States has vital interests in Haiti. Among those, in
sum, are: the protection of the lives of approximately 10,000 Amer-
ican citizens, nearly 9,000 of whom are dual nationals, and 1,000
of whom are U.S. citizens only; to prevent the outflow of thousands
of boat people to the United States from Haiti, many of whom
would die in the attempt to flee; to reinforce political stability in
a country which shares its small island with the Dominican Repub-
lic, a country which is itself struggling to preserve democratic prac-
tices; to fulfill the Governor's Island Agreement restoring civilian
elected government to Haiti, and ending wanton violence which is
destroying the fabric of Haitian society; to comply with the manda-
tory U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Haiti;
to honor the U.S. and hemispheric commitment to democracy and
the protection of human rights, and to discourage other violent
challenges to civilian governments in the region; and to enhance
U.S. influence and credibility internationally by demonstrating
U.S. resolve in a region with strong historical, cultural, economic
and political ties to the United States.
We believe real U.S. interests are at stake here. The United
States is acting in defense of democracy with the support and col-
laboration of Haiti's elected President and of the U.N., the Organi-
zation of American States and individual countries of the region.
We are not acting alone.








U.S. AID DESIGNED TO SUPPORT POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
Haiti's problems must be solved in Haiti in the final analysis, or
they will be exported to the United States. They cannot be ignored.
Strong action now of the kind proposed by the President is a
course of action likely to produce fulfillment of the Governor's Is-
land Agreement with the least commitment of U.S. forces and risk
to American lives.
The only long-term solution to Haiti's ongoing crisis is an agree-
ment among Haitians to resolve their problems through peaceful
means. The President's approach emphasizes this necessity for
compromise and reconciliation among Haiti's bitterly divided politi-
cal factions.
This issue has been brought before the Congress in a variety of
ways, but most importantly the fiscal year 1994 foreign operations
appropriations bill passed by a majority vote of both Houses explic-
itly endorsed the Governor's Island Agreement. It conditioned U.S.
assistance for military-related civic action programs, police training
or military training for Haiti on the U.N.-sponsored multilateral
initiative implementing the Governor's Island Agreement.
The same appropriations bill required the concurrence of the
duly elected President of Haiti in efforts involving the United
States to strengthen civilian control over the military and to estab-
lish an independent civilian police force.
In May of this year, Congress was notified through the normal
reprogramming mechanisms of the administration's intention to ex-
ercise its 614(a) authority to reprogram more than $37.5 million in
U.S. assistance to Haiti to further the implementation of the Gov-
ernor's Island Agreement. The accompanying justification informed
the Congress of the police and military training and
professionalization activities to be supported.
SPECIFICS OF GOVERNOR'S ISLAND AGREEMENT
I would like to touch on what the agreement says. The agree-
ment reached on July 3 on Governor's Island pledged President
Aristide and Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Cedras to cooper-
ate to end the Haitian crisis.
Among arrangements and pledges made by both parties were or-
ganization of a political dialogue under U.N. and OAS auspices to
resolve conflicts in the Haitian Parliament, elect a Prime Minister,
and facilitate a peaceful transition; nomination of a Prime Minister
by the President; suspension of the U.N. and OAS sanctions
against Haiti; implementation of international cooperation for eco-
nomic development, administrative and judicial reform, and mod-
ernization of the armed forces and establishment of a new police
force with the presence of U.N. personnel; granting of a Presi-
dential amnesty; adoption of a law establishing a new police force
and the appointment of a new police commander by the President;
early retirement of Commander-in-Chief Cedras; the return to
Haiti of President Aristide by October 30; and verification by the
U.N. and the OAS of these commitments by both parties.
President Aristide and General Cedras agreed that, "these ar-
rangements constitute a satisfactory solution of the Haitian crisis
and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation." They






4
pledged to cooperate fully in the "peaceful transition to a stable
and lasting democratic society in which all Haitians will be able to
live in a climate of freedom, justice, security and respect for human
rights."
CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS
If I may run through a chronology of the events in the last week
or so.
On Monday, October 11, implementation of the Governor's Island
Agreement, the USS Harlan County with U.S. and Canadian Sea-
bees and heavy construction equipment on board arrived off Port-
au-Prince in anticipation of beginning a project jointly with the
Haitian armed forces to engage in humanitarian civic action pro-
grams working on hospitals, schools, barracks, et cetera.
The Harlan County found that the berth that it was to occupy,
the only berth in the harbor that it could occupy, had been filled
by another ship which we were aware of, but which we had been
promised would be removed by the time we arrived. It was not re-
moved, and the port was locked and the Port Commander, Mr. Max
Paul, was nowhere to be found.
Simultaneously, there were demonstrations by a relatively small
number of-I can only call them thugs-at the harbor in front of
the TV cameras protesting the arrival of the ship. Those thugs
were not terribly important, but what underlay them was, that is
to say, the failure of will of the armed forces to comply with their
invitation-it was their idea for these people to come, the Seabees
to come and work with them on these projects. So there was no
point in having the ship remain.
There was never thought of having a forced landing. These gen-
tlemen were there to provide technical assistance to the Haitians.
They did not want it, so the ship withdrew on October 12.
On October 13, Wednesday, the U.N. Security Council deter-
mines that actions of the Haitian military area threat to regional
peace and security and reimposes sanctions.
On October 14, Thursday, the tragic assassination of Justice
Minister Malary took place.
On October 15, Friday, President Clinton held a press conference
announcing that he had ordered six warships to patrol the waters
off Haiti to enforce the U.N. sanctions when they came into effect;
that he had ordered an infantry company on standby at Guanta-
namo Naval Base in Cuba.
The purpose of these actions according to the President was "to
ensure the safety of the Americans in Haiti and to press for the
restoration of democracy there through the strongest possible en-
forcement of the sanctions."
The President also called on the Haitian military to restore order
and security to Haiti, to protect Haitian and U.S. citizens, and to
comply with the Governor s Island Agreement.
He announced that we were developing our own unilateral sanc-
tions to encourage compliance with the Governor's Island Agree-
ment and many suggested that we consider taking appropriate
measures to safeguard embassy personnel.
Also on Friday the 15th, the new U.S. Ambassador, William
Swing, arrived in Haiti.







The following Saturday, October 16, the U.S. ships arrived at
station off Haiti and 30 U.S. Marines are sent to reinforce the secu-
rity detachment of the U.S. Embassy. Later that day, the U.N. Se-
curity Council passed the enforcement resolution for the sanctions.
On Monday, October 18, the OAS Permanent Council endorses
the recommendations of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to reim-
pose OAS sanctions on Haiti and the President signed the Execu-
tive Order establishing U.S. sanctions. Ships from Canada and
France joined the enforcement fleet off Haiti.
Tuesday, October 19 the U.N. sanctions entered into force and
our Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Ambassador
Quainton, arrived for an official visit to assess security needs of the
embassy and to consult with Prime Minister Malval's cabinet.
CURRENT SITUATION IN HAITI
The situation in Haiti right now has been relatively calm. Some
Haitians are leaving the capital for rural areas where they believe
there may be greater safety or access to food and other provisions.
Others from the countryside are arriving in the capital from areas
where there could be violence perpetrated by local police and mili-
tary authorities.
Both the government of Prime Minister Malval and the military
authorities continue to declare their willingness to see the Gov-
ernor's Island go forward.
DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS
I would like to describe the various kinds of sanctions. The U.N.
sanctions are the reimposition of mandatory sanctions on petro-
leum, petroleum products, arms and related material. The United
States, along with Canada, France, and Argentina and other coun-
tries will contribute naval forces to enforce these mandatory sanc-
tions by stopping and inspecting ships entering Haitian waters.
Ships containing items prohibited by U.N. sanctions will not be
permitted to deliver their cargo. The multinational forces inspect-
ing the ships will report violations of the broader OAS sanctions
discussed below to the OAS Sanctions Committee for review and
possible action.
The OAS recommended-these are not mandatory sanctions-
recommended to member states that they suspend economic, finan-
cial and commercial ties with Haiti and further urged member
states to freeze assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade
embargo, except for humanitarian aid.
This OAS action assumes the voluntary compliance of member
states. Violations of these recommendations are reviewed by an
OAS Sanctions Committee for possible action.
The OAS had suspended those sanctions and then reimposed
them on October 18.
With regard to unilateral action by the United States, following
the U.N. Security Council determination, the failure of the Haitian
military authorities to fulfill obligations under the Governor's Is-
land Agreement constituted a threat to peace and security in the
region. Thus, the United States reimposed certain U.S. sanctions
against Haiti.







These sanctions include trade restrictions against Haiti and pro-
hibit unlicensed financial and other transactions with the Govern-
ment of Haiti or with individuals who are supporting violence or
blocking implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement. Prop-
erty of the Government of Haiti that is located in the United States
or within the possession or control of U.S. persons is now blocked.
Specific targeted steps are being taken by the United States in-
cluding prohibiting entry into the United States of those persons
who have taken illegitimate steps to oppose implementation of the
Governor's Island Agreement and blocking assets of those seeking
to promote violence in Haiti.
Chairman Hamilton, Chairman Torricelli, that is my summary of
where things stand at this stage of the game. I would be delighted
to hear your views and counsel and advice and be able to answer
any questions you may have.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Do you have a statement, Secretary Wisner?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK WISNER, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. WISNER. Thank you. I was very pleased that you allowed me
to join today my colleague Mr. Watson appearing before this com-
mittee to add a word from the perspective of Defense.
U.S. INTERESTS IN HAITI
This has been all of us need to remember a long crisis, the Hai-
tian crisis. Since President Aristide was removed from office, there
has been a very heavy commitment of the U.S. Armed Forces to
protecting our national interests during this period. Many Ameri-
cans, many American vessels, have sailed the waters off of Haitian
shores.
There is no other part of the government that is as vitally con-
cerned with a successful outcome of the Haitian matter than are
those who serve in the uniforms of-the United States. We are con-
cerned because, as the Assistant Secretary correctly pointed out,
we have as a nation a commitment to democracy, a commitment to
the stability of this hemisphere, but most of all, we have the de-
fense of American interests to consider, for without stability in
Haiti and without democracy, there is no way that nation can pros-
per and join the rest of the Caribbean. It will forever be a problem
to itself, to us, and to the rest of the area.
Therefore, we have been pleased to watch the attempts to secure
a negotiated settlement, the objectives of which would restore de-
mocracy to Haiti, to take its constitutionally elected ruler and put
him back in office for the balance of his term, albeit relatively
short, and to get on with the job of getting Haiti to return to the
family of reasonable nations.
The Governor's Island Agreement was negotiated and produced
a balance of interests between the two sides, between the Haitian
authorities in Haiti and President Aristide and his people in exile.
Each undertook agreements. It was a fair agreement that we put
our shoulder behind to try to make certain could be implemented.
But as we in the Department of Defense looked at our commit-
ments under the Governor's Island Agreement, we made certain as-
sumptions.








MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO HAITI
Congressman Torricelli, you mentioned one, that the United
States could not intervene unilaterally to solve the Haitian prob-
lem. It had to be within a multilateral environment. That Latin
American opinion would not permit a unilateral intervention, that
our domestic opinion would have held that up and found it want-
ing, and that worldwide we would not have been able to carry the
day.
We have to keep a weather eye as well, cocked on areas like the
Caucasus and parts of the former Soviet Union where unilateral
peacekeeping would end up being extremely destabilizing. So the
United States is part of an effort to restore the very basic prin-
ciples of democracy and stability to Haiti, but within an inter-
national context.
LIMITED NATURE OF U.S. MISSION
The Assistant Secretary correctly pointed out the very limited
nature of the mission that we agreed to undertake. We were not
sending peacekeepers to Haiti. That was not the purpose of the
mission. The mission was to help the two sides implement an
agreement that they themselves had agreed to, to agree to assist
them in a way that would permit the military forces to be sepa-
rated from politics, to be professionalized, to take the police and
the military and bring them apart and use Americans and other
outsiders to assist in the training and the restructuring that would
permit those objectives to be accomplished.
It was not-let me repeat-a mission of peacekeeping, let me re-
peat.
So therefore it rested on the assumption that those forces could
and should not land except with the permission and the under-
standing of the parties involved. We followed each step taken to
implement the Governor's Island Agreement, and recognizing what
was at stake for the United States, took the calculated risk, after
considerable debate, after a careful reading of the intelligence, in-
telligence that told us throughout that the conditions would be un-
certain in Haiti, even if there would not be the sort of direct threat
to American military personnel that would give us final cause for
further reflection.
The process broke down as the Assistant Secretary has described
on 11 October, and we are faced now with a new situation. We
haven't solved the problem and we have to return to a political di-
rection to bring the parties inside of Haiti to agree that proceeding
ahead with the restoration of democracy is an imperative.
CURRENT U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS
The U.S. military is again involved in two ways, with the six
ships that are off the coast of Haiti, within the 12-mile limit that
is surrounding that country, enforcing a U.N. Security Council em-
bargo, and with a reinforced marine company stationed in Guanta-
namo Bay that is in a position to intervene militarily if there is a
direct threat to either our Embassy or the lives of American citi-
zens in Haiti.








This is not what we want to end up with, in a sanctions regime.
We want to see Haiti returned to a settlement that will restore de-
mocracy and settle the problems we have had with the island
which constitute a threat to American interests. We remain com-
mitted to seeking that sort of settlement, a settlement that will
achieve the very best of American interests.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wisner appears at the conclusion
of the briefing.]
Chairman Hamilton.
NO PLANS FOR U.S. COMBAT TROOPS IN HAITI
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli.
Do we have any plans to send American combat troops to Haiti?
Mr. WISNER. Mr. Chairman, the President has not ruled out op-
tions, but that option is not one that we are considering. The pur-
pose of our presence in Haiti was very strictly defined under the
Governor's Island Agreement, it was a military professionalization
mission. Presently the disposition of American forces is for the pur-
pose of sanctions enforcement and for the protection of American
citizens on the island should they be put in harm's way.
ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNOR'S ISLAND ACCORD
Chairman HAMILTON. In your view, did Cedras and Francois re-
nege on their commitments under the Governor's Island Agree-
ment?
Mr. WATSON. Yes.
Chairman HAMILTON. They agreed to resign, did they not?
Mr. WATSON. General Cedras explicitly agreed to resign on Octo-
ber 15. Colonel Francois was to be removed from his command of
the police force and be returned to the military upon passage of the
legislation creating a new police force.
Chairman HAMILTON. In your judgment, did President Aristide
fulfill his commitments in all respects under the Governor's Island
Accord?
Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir. President Aristide has fulfilled his commit-
ment.
Chairman HAMILTON. The amnesty was sufficiently broad that
he fulfilled his commitment?
Mr. WATSON. In our view, yes, sir. That is a point of debate in
Port-au-Prince. The general says this decree must be com-
plemented by legislation, but the language of the Governor's Island
Accord requires him to issue the decree according to article 147 of
the Haitian Constitution and to support any legislation which may
be passed on this subject. It does not require that this legislation
be passed.
PROSPECTS FOR PARLIAMENTARY ACTION
Chairman HAMILTON. Apparently, parliament has not moved on
the question of amnesty?
Mr. WATSON. That is correct, sir.
Chairman HAMILTON. Are they expected to?








Mr. WATSON. At this time, it does not look promising for par-
liamentary action on either legislation for an amnesty or for legis-
lation creating a new police force.
DATE FOR RETURN OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE
Chairman HAMILTON. Do you expect President Aristide to return
to Haiti on October 30?
Mr. WATSON. That is certainly the intention of the international
community, including the United States, sir.
Chairman HAMILTON. As far as you know at this time, that will
happen?
Mr. WATSON. I don't want to speculate too deeply into the future,
but the intention is that the Governors Island Accord, which stipu-
lates that he should be back on October 30 should be implemented
fully.
FUTURE OF GENERAL CEDRAS AND COLONEL FRANCOIS
Chairman HAMILTON. If President Aristide returns, do you think
that General Cedras and Colonel Francois are under any danger
with respect to their personal safety?
Mr. WATSON. I think that General Cedras and Francois should
be removed from the positions that they are holding now. General
Cedras should be removed from the armed forces by resigning be-
fore President Aristide returns.
One of the reasons for having the deployment of the police mon-
itors and trainers, chiefly Canadians and French and from other
countries, and military Seabees and trainers, was to create an at-
mosphere in which all parties in Haiti would feel more comfortable
and would not perpetrate violence against each other.
PURPOSE OF SANCTIONS
Chairman HAMILTON. The theory behind the imposition of sanc-
tions is that they will bring the parties back to the negotiating
table; is that your hope here?
Mr. WATSON. I would put it slightly differently. I would say the
purpose of the sanctions is to persuade General Cedras and Colonel
Francois and other members of the high command to comply with
their obligations under the Governor's Island Agreement.
Chairman HAMILTON. You are hopeful and you believe that that
will be sufficient, these sanctions, to achieve such compliance?
Mr. WATSON. We certainly are hopeful. The last time sanctions
were imposed it was only a matter of days before the armed forces
leadership sought out the U.N./OAS representative, Mr. Caputo, to
begin the process which resulted in the Governor's Island Accord.
Chairman HAMILTON. Do you have any concern that the sanc-
tions will trigger a mass exodus from Haiti?
Mr. WATSON. Of course, we have concerns. There are exceptions
to the sanctions for humanitarian assistance. Under the U.N. sanc-
tions, the mandatory sanctions only affect petroleum and petro-
leum products and arms and related material; there is a specific
explicit exception for propane in small containers for use in house-
hold heating and cooking.







The OAS sanctions, which are broader although only rec-
ommendatory, include exceptions for humanitarian assistance and
our own humanitarian assistance programs on a bilateral basis will
continue.
TARGETING OF SANCTIONS
Chairman HAMILTON. Mr. Torricelli mentioned targeting the
sanctions. Have you devised these sanctions in such a way that
they will alleviate hardship as much as possible and target the
penalties on those responsible?
Mr. WATSON. We are doing that in cooperation with the govern-
ment of President Aristide and Prime Minister Malval. Not all the
people that were targeted the first time around will necessarily be
targeted this time at the request of Aristide and Malval.
There is another provision in the United Nations sanctions which
allows for exceptions to be made if the President or the Prime Min-
ister so requests. There is concern on the part of many of the hu-
manitarian assistance organizations that even though food stuffs
and medicines will be able to come in that the shortage of fuel may
handicap their ability to deliver those to people.
The last time sanctions were imposed, ways were found to obvi-
ate that problem. We are confident that can be done this time as
well.
Chairman HAMILTON. Thank you.
GUIDING PHILOSOPHY BEHIND HAITI POLICY
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The American people tend to give this government broad latitude
in the conduct of foreign policy, generally trusting the judgments
made in lending its support when required. But rather than con-
ducting policy anecdotally, it is usually part of a broader philoso-
phy, from the containment of communism to assuring in the Per-
sian Gulf that aggression not be rewarded.
This is an unusual opportunity in a moment of crisis for adminis-
tration officials to communicate with the Congress and American
people about the nature of our policy in Haiti. Please describe what
the guiding philosophy toward Haiti is and what it signals to other
leaders and people of other potential crises about what guides the
foreign policy of this administration.
Mr. WATSON. Let me take a crack at that. I think our objectives
here and our basic philosophy are pretty clear. We are trying to de-
fend and protect what we perceive to be real and legitimate U.S.
interests, as I tried to outline in my presentation, in a multilateral
context which will bring as much pressure to bear as possible in
the situation at the least risk to U.S. citizens, either civilians or
military, and at the least possibility of any sort of direct interven-
tion, military intervention by anybody in Haitian affairs. So there-
fore the principal instruments have been the sanctions which, as
you noted, are a blunt instrument and need to be refined in order
to be focused on the appropriate people and to protect the others,
and also a strenuous diplomatic and political effort to bring about
a Haitian solution to a Haitian problem.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Those are the tools, not the philosophy. The phi-
losophy is that this was done pursuant to national interest. Na-







tional interest in this instance is defined as the preservation of de-
mocracy.
Mr. WATSON. That is one of the interests, sir. Certainly preserva-
tion of democracy in Haiti and throughout the hemisphere and
throughout the world is in our interest; it is to protect the lives and
the welfare of 1,000 American citizens and 9,000 dual nationals. It
is to try to prevent a situation so desperate in Haiti that people
flee in a massive outmigration.
Mr. TORRICELLI. So the philosophy that is guiding the adminis-
tration in its foreign policy is that we will seek sanctions or apply
extraordinary pressures if democracy is interrupted or American
nationals are threatened anywhere in the world? That is the foun-
dation of the policy?
Mr. WATSON. I would like to address Haiti and say that, yes-
Mr. TORRICELLI. That is what I was trying to get you not to do,
because it is the impression I think of many people in this country
that policy is being designed as situations evolve. Foreign policy
should be conducted with some guiding philosophy. It is that which
I was asking you to enunciate.
CONCERN ABOUT IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
Let me address the question of tools. You describe the sanctions
as a bit of a blunt instrument. It appears to me that they actually
have the subtlety of a shotgun. My concern with this is that there
is an internal contradiction. We are engaging in contradictions
against Haiti because we rightfully believe that the military leader-
ship has total disregard for the Haitian people and yet the philoso-
phy of the sanctions is that the military leaders will reverse their
course because of the punishment these sanctions cause to the Hai-
tian people.
I believe that the military leadership of Haiti has absolutely no
concern for the impact of sanctions on the Haitian people. Sanc-
tions make sense to the extent that they seize assets or deny visas
or otherwise punish the oligarchs of military leadership. But to the
extent they have an impact on the broader Haitian people, causing
epidemics, enormous suffering and famine and encouraging people
to flee to the sea where they may lose their lives, sanctions are not
only ineffective, but they shock consciousness in other national ob-
jectives.
DEFENSE OF SANCTIONS REGIME
Mr. WATSON. I think that our overall objectives are restoration
of democracy, respect for human rights in the hemisphere and the
protection of U.S. national interests in terms of the migration, in
terms of protection of U.S. citizens and enhancing the credibility of
the United States in defense of these interests. I think those are
legitimate interests.
We are trying to do that in a way that is least likely to put our
people in harm's way, to try to find a lasting and local solution, not
something you impose from the outside. On the sanctions, we are
trying to target the sanctions as sharply as possible on the individ-
uals that we think are responsible for the current situation.
We are trying to find, and we think we have been reasonably
successful at this in the past, ways to have humanitarian excep-







tions for the mass of the Haitian people so that the damage done
to them will be minimal while the sanctions are targeted at other
people.
NEED FOR COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RESPONSE
Mr. WISNER. Congressman, I would adjust a couple of thoughts
to what Mr. Watson has just said. Coming back to your core ques-
tion, is there an overall context for American policy in this regard,
and I would say, yes, that the U.S. interests are affected when de-
mocracy fails in the world and when instability ensues in its wake.
This does not mean, however, that we use the same means to
deal with each situation. Each situation is different. The degree of
immediate threat to the United States is different, and that will
call into question, that will define to an important degree just how
we react.
In the Haitian situation, I would argue that we have an obliga-
tion to respond on the basis of broad principle, but we have an obli-
gation to respond on the basis of very practical necessity. I am
struck, as I am certain that you are, that the Caribbean today is
a group of independent democracies with two exceptions. We have
an interest in seeing that they make available to their citizens the
access to prosperity and that they are not exporting their citizens
in desperate circumstances at great loss of life toward American
shores.
Therefore, we ought to try to seek that in our own interests and
the interests of the people who are suffering. There is a point at
which U.S. broad interest and principal and practical interests cer-
tainly come together. In terms of the way this is being pursued, I
can only add to Secretary Watson's views that we have chosen very
careful, limited measures to respond to the crisis.
POLITICAL MESSAGE OF SANCTIONS
We have chosen military means that are not violent ones. We are
not, as I said earlier, peacekeepers and we have been extremely
careful in the way we have designed the sanctions. The purpose of
those sanctions has an economic purpose and I suggest it also has
a political one.
The political purpose that it has is to underscore to the authori-
ties in Haiti that they are generally isolated in the world, that the
world takes their circumstances seriously enough that a number of
nations are not only prepared to limit trade and economic contact,
but many others are prepared to send vessels forward to enforce
that sanction.
The British have added a ship, the Canadians and French are in-
volved, ourselves, others in the hemisphere have offered to come
forward. There must be weight in that message.
FREEZING OF HAITIAN ASSETS
Mr. TORRICELLI. You should know that the Associated Press has
reported that Prime Minister Malval has said that he is going to
resign in 10 days if the plan is not implemented by that point.







Concerning those parts of the sanctions which I do favor-the
freezing of assets at this point-have other countries in fact frozen
the assets of Haitian military leaders?
Mr. WATSON. I am not sure whether they have.
Mr. TORRICELLI. With all this talk about freezing assets, if a Hai-
tian military leader still has assets in U.S. banks, they are not only
despots, but stupid. It is hard for me to believe that they would re-
tain money in American institutions.
Do these principal military leaders in fact still have U.S. bank
accounts?
Mr. WATSON. I would have to check. I don't know.'
Mr. TORRICELLI. As of this date, you do not know whether other
allied nations have frozen the assets?
Mr. WATSON. I don't know. We have approached them and asked
them to take similar actions to ours.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Would you let the committee know that tomor-
row, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. WATSON. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]
Under the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 841 and 873 all states are required
to freeze the funds of Haiti's de facto authorities. This resolution, however, does not
name specific individuals.
The Resolutions of the OAS Foreign Ministers, beginning in October 1991, and
which came back into effect on October 18, also recommend the freezing of assets
of such individuals. The Government of Canada, which has implemented regulations
to freeze the assets of such individuals, has also recommended that OAS member
states share information on those individuals which each state has deemed to fall
into the category of impeding the restoration of democracy, with a view to establish-
ing a joint OAS list. This matter will be considered in the OAS Embargo Committee.
The United States has shared the Treasury's list of targeted Haitian leaders with
all OAS members.
On November 3 the Department of State cabled the eight nations having the most
significant financial ties with Haiti requesting that they freeze the assets of the
Haitian leaders whose assets have been blocked by Treasury's Office of Foreign As-
sets Control. These include the most prominent military leaders. Attached is a copy
of this list. To date, the Swiss Banking Commission has ordered the freezing of Gen-
eral Cedras' assets and has distributed the list of targeted individuals to Swiss
banks. The Government of the Bahamas has stated that it never unfroze the assets
blocked during the previous round of sanctions. We are awaiting responses from
other nations, and the Department will take appropriate measures to ensure the
broadest possible support for our policy of targeted sanctions.
PROBLEMS AT PORT WERE PREDICTABLE
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Hastings was in Haiti only 2 days ago. He
reported that in his judgment there was some predictability to the
problems at the port, that in fact on his trip, it was somewhat evi-
dent that there were going to be problems.
Should we not be concerned that in the planning of this oper-
ation, either from an intelligence or diplomatic perspective, we
were left wanting and therefore these problems were inevitable?
Mr. WATSON. Let me comment if I may.
As I mentioned in rmy opening remarks, we are aware that the
man that runs the port, Max Paul, had moved another ship into
the berth where the Harlan County was to go when it came in with
its construction equipment and the Seabees. He promised us that
it would be out by the time our ship came.

'The information appears in the appendix.


74-650 0 94 2







The judgment was made that we should proceed on the basis
that this would happen and to not go simply because the berth was
filled, we should move ahead and we should test them. When they
arrived there and the port was locked and Max Paul was nowhere
to be found and the other ship was in the berth, it became appar-
ent it wasn't just Max Paul, but the military leadership with whom
he has very close alliance were not going to cooperate with our
ship.
This was confirmed by sending the thugs out to shoot guns in the
air and demonstrate there. We always knew there was a possibility
of this, but throughout this entire process, we have always had to
test, test and push the parties, particularly the military leadership,
into meeting their obligations, and that is what we were trying to
do this time. We were disappointed but not overly surprised when
this occurred.
Mr. WISNER. I think Mr. Watson has covered the point that I
would have made. I make just one additional comment; throughout,
our assessments, and they were current right up to the moment
the vessel was in sight of land, were that the situation, particularly
as it moved from that day forward to the end of the month when
President Aristide was due to return, was going to be very unset-
tled.
There was no way to assume it would have been otherwise. But
the threat to American military personnel was not a substantial
threat and the risk of pressing the case and bringing the military
to face their commitments under the Governor's Island Agreement
was a risk well worth running if we were ever going to achieve the
basic objective, the restoration of democracy in Haiti.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Smith.
PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD
Mr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of ques-
tions and I will submit additional ones for the record.
As we all know, President Aristide received an overwhelming
majority, something like 67 percent of the vote. The effort to re-
store democracy and to reinstate him certainly covers both the
Bush and now the Clinton administration. But there have been
some concerns and let me also say that there is no doubt that
human rights abuses have escalated and have markedly increased
since the coup.
No one would dispute that; it is a tragic fact of life. There were
concerns that we had.
Secretary Watson, you testified in May in answer to the question
would you agree with human rights activists that Aristide incited
popular violence when he was in power, your answer was that
there was ample evidence that President Aristide incited intimidat-
ing or violent behavior among his followers. Then you pointed out
that our Ambassador and others have pointed out that that is re-
pugnant and that we abhor those tactics.
In light of the amnesty that has been issued, although it has not
been ratified by the legislature and maybe it doesn't have to be, are
we at all concerned or do we have concrete assurances, and how
can we convey that to those who might use some of that past be-
havior as a rationale to justify their abominable behavior in Haiti?







Do we have the assurances from the President that when he gets
back he will adhere to these human rights principles?
Mr. WATSON. Yes. We have assurances from President Aristide
in all of his conversations with us and including his excellent
speech this afternoon at the Inter-American Development Bank, he
has talked about reconciliation and eschewed revenge. He has tried
to say that we should move the country forward again.
In addition to that, Congressman Smith, one of the central ideas
throughout the entire process was to have the international human
rights monitors there. Unfortunately they were withdrawn last
week. They are now sitting in Santo Domingo. They could be rede-
ployed if a decision was made to do that. They serve an invaluable
purpose keeping an eye on human rights around the country. It is
widely believed that they had a major impact.
They were never bothered or threatened until very recently. They
had a major impact on the human rights situation and we would
anticipate that they would remain there even after President
Aristide returned. The presence of the police monitors and trainers
and military Seabees and the trainers is also designed to have an
international presence which we hoped would have a stabilizing ef-
fect on all parties in the region.
As Secretary Wisner said, this is a difficult situation. There are
always going to be risks, but in our judgment, the risks as we see
them are worth taking.
ASSESSING INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF HAITI
Mr. SMITH. Secretary Wisner, did we have in your opinion ade-
quate intelligence assets deployed to ascertain whether the threat
might exist when the Harlan County would have docked?
Mr. WISNER. Yes, in my judgment our intelligence coverage of
Haiti throughout these months has been first rate. We have de-
ployed adequate assets. We have a good reading of the situation.
That doesn't mean we have a perfect reading.
We did not predict that there would be a demonstration in the
port at the time. We knew there was going to be an unsettled envi-
ronment that we were coming into.
CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ARRIVING U.S. MILITARY
Mr. SMITH. Was there a contingency plan to protect engineers
and others who might off-load?
Mr. WISNER. Of course. We operated on an assumption that the
Haitian military who were to be the hosts of the American military
were obviously not candidates to turn around and deal in a hostile
manner with the arriving American military. They nevertheless
had all the necessary precautions including the right rules of en-
gagement.
We had in our mind contingencies not only of how they could be
evacuated rapidly, but if they came into harm's way, how we could
reinforce. Those dispositions have been strengthened since the ves-
sel was turned back.
We are in a stronger position today to move in to protect citizens
who might or our Embassy that might be in the way of a threat.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Oberstar.







POLICY ON U.S. TROOPS IN HAITI
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Watson, is it the administration's policy 'today as ex-
pressed last week that the United States has no intention of using
U.S. troops in Haiti?
Mr. WATSON. It is the intention of the administration to see what
we can do to get the Governor's Island Agreement implemented,
and that includes, to my knowledge, some presence of both police
and military, in Seabee form if the conditions appropriate for their
deployment exist. That is my understanding of where we stand at
this point.
Mr. OBERSTAR. It is my conclusion from your statement that the
United States has no intention of using military force to invade
Haiti and defeat the army and do something decisive; correct?
Mr. WISNER. I made an earlier statement when Congressman
Hamilton was here that the President has not ruled out any op-
tions. The plans of the United States are as Secretary Watson ar-
ticulated them with the addition that American naval vessels are
deployed around the Haitian coast for reinforcement purposes if
American lives are threatened, but there is no plan to go beyond
that.
THE CASE FOR U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
Mr. OBERSTAR. Clearly Haiti presents a unique dilemma for the
United States. Our conscience will not let us walk away, or as the
Haitians would say, do a Pontius Pilate washing our hands of
Haiti.
On the other hand, our domestic politics and our strategic assess-
ment will not allow us to go into Haiti and do anything interven-
tionist that would be decisive. I would say that this is a policy
doomed to failure. It is a dance of death for the Haitians.
One reality overshadows all that happens in Haiti. I can say this
born of my years of living there, being associated with Haiti, that
the Duvalierists and the Macoutes that they spawned will never
allow economic and military power to slip from their grasp in Haiti.
The only way it will happen under these circumstances and from
what we have seen is for the United States to have the resolve to
go in and defeat the army, disarm the Ton-Tons Macoutes, estab-
lish the only elected President this country has had in its history
and then your statement will have some validity that we want a
Haitian solution to a Haitian problem.
There cannot be a Haitian solution to a Haitian problem under
these circumstances. Either we intervene militarily and do some-
thing decisive or the sanctions that are being imposed will have the
most pernicious effect upon those whom we wish to help and the
least effect upon those whom we wish to influence. This is the
same Haitian military that in 1987 allowed an intervention in the
election to massacre people standing in line innocently waiting to
vote, the same Haitian military that later installed their own Presi-
dent, the same Haitian military that installed another regime.
There was one brief moment of opportunity for Haiti when in De-
cember of 1990 there was an election, and for me it was a great
experience to talk to Haitians, to say, why did you vote? They said,







"We voted for freedom." For them that meant to get out from under
the thumb of oppression, the Ton-Tons Macoutes.
They didn't vote to better their economic condition, to have a bet-
ter Haiti. They voted to get rid of the Macoutes and Aristide of-
fered them that opportunity. The Macoutes and the Duvalierists
understood that.
That is not to say that Aristide is spotless. I think he made some
very serious misjudgments in the way he handled the military after
assuming office. After all, it was he who put Cedras in the position
that he occupies now. But he is duly elected and the only way we
are going to have a continuity of democracy and a hope for some-
thing of democratic tradition in Haiti is to restore that democracy,
and I tell you that unless we are prepared to take military action
against the army, it will not happen.
There will be nothing but a series of repeats, and that is my
judgment, and I say it in sadness, and I know the reservations that
the Defense Department has and that you and the State Depart-
ment have about a protracted military engagement that will result
in guerrilla warfare and a war of attrition against the Americans,
and we know something of that with the U.S. military intervention
in 1915. It took 6 or 7 years for us to suppress that, but we did
not leave a very substantial legacy either.
Roads and bridges are not enough. We needed to leave something
more than that, a tradition of democracy, and we didn't. That was
perhaps beyond our perspective at that time, but now we do have
an opportunity, and I tell you that a very small, but well planned
contingent of American forces in Haiti would dissolve that army in
a very short period of time, and I think they have the resources to
know where the guns are in the Ton-Tons Macoutes and to disarm
them and to put them out of commission.
Then we don't need a battalion of Seabees to rebuild roads and
build a water system for Port-au-Prince. The Haitians are capable
of doing that if we give them the money and technical guidance
and bring back the thousands of Haitians who are gifted and tal-
ented and trained, working for the U.N. and for the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund and all around the world,. and
give them assurance that there will be security if they come back
to Haiti, they will see that the job is done.
That is my prescription for returning democracy, stability and
economic opportunity to Haiti. I don't expect you to respond.
I thank you.
REPORTS ON RESIGNATION OF PRIME MINISTER MALVAL
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Oberstar.
Gentleman, I suggested to you that there were announcements
out of Port-au-Prince by the prime minister concerning his decision
to resign in 10 days, I did not ask you to comment or otherwise
confirm the information.
Could you do that, and then I will yield to Ms. Snowe?
Mr. WATSON. I have seen the same press reports you have. I
have no further information than you have. I didn't have time to
call our Embassy to confirm that. If I may say that all those who
have been dealing with Prime Minister Malval say that he has
been extraordinary, his performance has been extraordinary in this







most difficult circumstance. He has been a rock of firmness and
good judgment and resolve and patriotism.
Mr. TORRICELLI. His judgment comes as something of a surprise.
Is this not a grand plan unfolding; is this an individual judgment
he has made and his contribution to resolving the crisis?
Mr. WATSON. That is how I interpret it.
Yes, this is a personal judgment. He had always planned not to
stay on for too much longer beyond President Aristide's return,
maybe a couple of months or so. He wanted to get back to his regu-
lar life. Recently his resolve had stiffened, but I can't tell you ex-
actly why he made the remark.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you. Ms. Snowe.
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN HAITI
Ms. SNOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, getting back to the issue of intelligence, there is
something that is still not clear. Did we anticipate there would be
a possibility that we would not be able to dock at the port?
Mr. WISNER. Congresswoman, indeed we did. There was a risk
and we calculated it was a risk worth running. As I said earlier,
the intelligence assessments going back to the beginning of the
year always were very clear that the accord would be hard to put
into effect. If you could negotiate it, it would be hard to put into
effect, and as it was put into effect, there would be the possibility
of increased levels of violence.
As we got closer to October, the community's warnings were spe-
cific that an unsettled condition would take place. At no point did
we find ourselves thinking that the American forces per se would
be at risk.
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ATTEMPTED DOCKING
Ms. SNOWE. What advance communications did we have with the
military to ensure that security would be provided at the port? I
guess what I don't understand is did you anticipate that this would
be the scenario in the event they didn't provide the security, that
we would be forced into retreat? That wasn't exactly the kind of
scenario that provided us with any advantages or benefits.
Mr. WISNER. We knew that there was a risk to be run, that if
the military authorities in Haiti refused to live by their word and
complete their commitments under the agreement, then we would
not be engaged as peacekeepers; we would pull back because it was
not a peacekeeping mission. It was a mission to facilitate the im-
plementation of Governor's Island.
Ms. SNOWE. I understand that, but did we have any communica-
tions with anybody prior to docking?
Mr. WISNER. Yes, indeed.
Ms. SNOWE. So we were aware there was no one there to provide
security-at what point did we know that they are not prepared to
provide the security?
Mr. WISNER. The first signal was the vessel parked in the bay
and then the arrival of the thugs.
Ms. SNOWE. We didn't have advance intelligence to tell us there
was another vessel blocking our entry?






19

Mr. WATSON. Yes. We raised that with the Director of Port, Max
Paul, and he acknowledged that had happened, but promised it
would be out of there by the time the Harlan County came and
that there wouldn't be any problem.
We weren't sure whether to believe him or not. He is not a sa-
vory character by any means. We had to test that because you have
to keep pushing these people or they will backslide. So there was
no choice, but to bring the Harlan County in there on the assump-
tion they would keep their word.
The demonstration was not the reason the ship withdrew. The
point was they were there to support the professionalization of the
armed forces and the police which was included in the Governor's
Island Accord. Our people were deployed to Haiti as technicians to
assist in this effort. When it was clear from their behavior-allow-
ing the port to be locked and allowing the thugs to dance around
without any action by the armed forces-that they were not willing
to go along with their own invitation, there was no point in having
our people there and they departed.
Ms. SNOWE. Did the embassy have any forewarning that there
would be a hostile reaction to our arrival?
Mr. WATSON. I don't think the embassy had a specific forewarn-
ing that those thugs would be out there. It was a relatively small
number of them at the time when they left the embassy to go
there.
But I want to stress that there was not a major security problem.
That was not the issue. The issue was basically the failure or will
on the part of the military to comply with their own obligations
under their own invitation.
Ms. SNOWE. Unfortunately, the end result did not create that.
That may have been the intentions but it certainly looked dif-
ferently. I don't think it put us in the most positive light.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Ms. Snowe, we have two problems. Firstly, there
is a vote. Secondly, Secretary Watson has to go to the Senate. Four
Members have not yet asked questions. In the few minutes we
have left, I wonder whether we could go as quickly as possible.
I am sorry, Ms. Snowe, but I think it is the only way to get this
done.
Ms. SNOWE. That could have been held to the previous ones as
well.
Mr. TORRICELLI. We didn't know there was going to be a vote or
that the Secretary had to leave.
Ms. McKinney.
U.S. TRAINING OF HAITIAN MILITARY
Ms. McKINNEY. Do you know if members of the Haitian military
have received training in Fort Benning, Georgia since the coup?
Mr. WATSON. To my knowledge, no.
Mr. WISNER. No, we don't know that.
Ms. McKINNEY. It is my understanding that that has been the
case.
Mr. WISNER. If you could give us the information you have, I
would be delighted to double check it. We have no record of it at
the moment.
Ms. McKINNEY. I will.








[The information follows:]
Since the coup in 1991, no Haitians have been brought to the United States for
military training. At the time of the coup, however, 12 Haitian noncommissioned of-
ficers were in the United States taking technical courses under the IMET program.
These Haitians have since returned to Haiti.
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN HAITI
Ms. McKINNEY. What specific findings does the United States
have with respect to drug trafficking in Haiti and could you provide
me with a copy of any reports that have been done?
Mr. WISNER. There is drug trafficking, but our best estimate is
that it is substantially below that which takes place in other tran-
sit nations in the area.
LIST OF HAITIANS SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS
Ms. McKINNEY. Are we willing to add to the list of people who
will be subject to sanctions?
Mr. WATSON. The list is being compiled right now, and I be-
lieve-I would have to check. I believe there are some names on
this list of sanctions that were not on the previous list.
As I mentioned previously, there are some names that were on
the previous list that are not on this list, largely at the request of
the Government of Haiti.2
CONTROL OF PORT
Ms. McKINNEY. Two additional points. Does Michel Francois con-
trol the port and is it true that there are reported 3,000 people on
his payroll there at the port?
Mr. WATSON. Our understanding is that Max Paul as the Direc-
tor of the Port is a confederate of Michel Francois and they are in
cahoots on this. He is really an unsavory character.
Who controls whom in this den of spiders I am not sure, but they
are in cahoots with each other.
Ms. McKINNEY. What is Plan B? How does the United States
plan to help Francois and Cedras leave Haiti, or at least their posi-
tions? Is there a Plan B?
Mr. WATSON. The plan, the intention of the international commu-
nity and clearly that of the United States is to continue to try to
press them to honor their commitments under the Governor's Is-
land Accords.
Ms. McKINNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have additional questions. Is it
OK if we submit-
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH EMBARGO
Mr. TORRICELLI. I have also asked Secretary Watson to provide
information tomorrow on international compliance with the embar-
go. Given the nature of the crisis unfolding, if you would try to pro-
vide all requested information as quickly as possible.
Mr. Hastings.


2The information appears in the appendix.







QUESTIONING PROSPECTS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH ACCORD
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, briefly, Secretary Watson, if the
agreement has been breached, why are we seeking to enforce it?
Mr. WATSON. We are trying-
Mr. HASTINGS. Do you agree that the Governor's Island Accords
have been breached by Cedras and Francois?
Mr. WATSON. Yes.
Mr. HASTINGS. Why are we exercising a policy to suggest that
these are the people that we are going to ask to live up to an agree-
ment that has already been breached?
Mr. WATSON. Because we want to persuade them that they
should honor it. General Cedras for what this is worth, continues
to maintain that he respects and wants to fulfill the Governor's Is-
land Accord.
He has a different interpretation of it, but we are pushing him
to meet those-
Mr. HASTINGS. Let me share with you a conversation between
Senator Graham and myself that took place with Mr. Cedras and
Charge Mickey Hubbleson at the instance of Mr. Pezzullo calling
on Tuesday of last week and seeking to have him to agree to let
the Harlan County come in and provide the necessary protection
for it and to sign an agreement with General Cedras.
Cedras' reply was "Charg6, you always come with sanctions," and
he laughed. That is what he is going to continue to do.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Payne.
SECURITY FOR PRIME MINISTER MALVAL
Mr. PAYNE We met several weeks ago with Prime Minister
Malval. I would not be surprised if he is interested in resigning be-
cause there is virtually no security. Is there any way to provide
adequate security for him?
Mr. WATSON. We have been in close touch with him on this on
several occasions. We have discussed with him various possibilities.
We are providing some armored vehicles for him which the Hai-
tians have purchased. They should be there shortly.
Our Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security arrived
there yesterday to look at the security of our own mission there,
the embassy and other components of the mission, but he also will
be in touch with members of Mr. Malval's cabinet to see what else
we might be able to do.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMNESTY
Mr. PAYNE. Does amnesty go to October 30 when wanton killings
could happen, or was there a date certain that amnesty would
apply from before that date?
We don't have time to discuss the question of whether amnesty
was agreed to or not by Aristide.
ATTEMPTS TO DISCREDIT PRESIDENT ARISTIDE
The other question that I was happy to hear the administration
say was a lot of hogwash, as you know, was that the CIA has been
spreading rumors about the mental stability of President Aristide.
They used the fact that 7 or 8 years ago when he was a parish








priest, the Macoutes came in and shot up his church, killed a
bunch of parishioners as he was giving mass. A group surrounded
the priest and got him out of the church and saved his life. The
CIA said he was depressed for a week or so and therefore he is
emotionally unstable.
I don't know how I would react. I probably would still be de-
pressed.
I don't need a comment. It is just that when we hear these ob-
noxious stories that are spread to discredit, I think that it is the
responsibility of the administration to talk about what cir-
cumstances surrounded a particular incident and where the rumors
start.
Thank you.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Menendez.
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, first I want to say that I am dis-
tressed that we have to conduct hearings in a manner in which we
have to rush to judgment in order to get answers. I personally hope
we can have these gentlemen back-
Mr. TORRICELLI. Given the nature of this crisis, I assume we are
going to hold similar meetings until this is resolved.
THE NEXT STEP IN HAITI
Mr. MENENDEZ. I certainly hope so. I am going to lay my ques-
tions out and maybe we can get a detailed answer afterwards.
One is on purely an informational basis for us to know how we
are operating. I understand that Colonel Francois's brother Evans
is actually the one who controls Haitian ports, not Max Paul. If
that is the case, how could we have expected, when we are seeking
his departure, to have had an expectation that we would not have
problems?
Two, why are we going through this charade again? If in fact we
are expecting voluntary departure and if we get some promises
that voluntary departure will take place and it does not, what are
we ready to do and what is our expectation if there is no voluntary
departure? Are we expecting popular uprising to take place in
order for us to accomplish the democratic goals?
What are we prepared to do if either voluntary departure does
not take place, and popular uprising is another possibility-if we
are asked by President Aristide is it the administration position
that they are ready to send a military force if we are asked by the
United Nations? Is it the United States' position that we are ready
to send a military force or are we going to wait and see for ever
and ever or are we going to have a plan?
That is what I would like to know.
Mr. WATSON. To answer your first question-
Mr. MENENDEZ. I have a problem. I don't want to lose my vote,
but I would love to hear your answer. If we can get it in writing,
I would love to see what those answers are.
Mr. WATSON. I will be glad to give you a call or give it to you
in writing.
Mr. MENENDEZ. I prefer in writing.
[The information follows:]








QUESTIONS SUBMrrrED FOR THE RECORD BY CONGRESSMAN MENENDEZ AND
RESPONSES THERETO
Question 1. I understand that Colonel Francois' brother Evans is actually the one
who controls the Haitian ports, not Max Paul. If that is indeed the case, how could
we not have expected to have problems with the authorities at the port as we have
stated our objective of seeing that Col. Francois leaves Haiti?
Answer. The port is controlled by the National Port Authority, which is headed
by Max Paul. However, we do hold Lt. Col. Francois, chief of police for Port au
Prince, responsible for security in all of Port au Prince, including security at the
port.
Question 2. Why are we going through this charade? We talk about the voluntary
departure of Cedras and Francois, but what is our expectation if there is no vol-
untary departure?
Answer. Our policy is aimed at resolving the crisis in Haiti through the continued
pressure of sanctions levied against those Haitians who continue to block the return
of democracy to Haiti and the reinstatement of President Aristide to Office. We an-
ticipate that the oil embargo complemented by unilateral sanctions imposed by the
United States and others will force the recalcitrant military leaders to comply with
their obligations under the Governors Island Accord. When sanctions were imposed
in June, they did succeed in bringing the Haitian military to the negotiating table.
Question 3. If we are asked to do so by President Aristide, is it the position of
the administration that we are ready to send in military force, if we are asked to
do so by the United Nations?
Answer. Early in his administration, President Clinton clearly established his pol-
icy goal in Haiti and the means he would actively pursue to achieve it: the return
of democracy and President Aristide through a negotiated process. He committed
the United States to take the lead in developing a strong international coalition
under U.NJOAS leadership to bring both parties to the negotiating table. The result
of this broad based international effort was the Governor's Island Accord and the
Pact of New York, which committed the Haitian parties to adhere to a schedule of
steps for restoration of constitutional government and the return of Aristide. The
first four steps in the process were taken, albeit with some delay, including the as-
sumption of power by a constitutionally empowered Prime Minister and the suspen-
sion of U.N. sanctions.
When the military did not live up to their commitments under the accords, the
United States supported the reimposition of U.N. sanctions on Haiti. Our policy is
to see the terms of the Governor's Island Accord fulfilled by all parties.
President Clinton is firmly committed to the return of democracy to Haiti through
a negotiated process. The President, however, has not ruled out any options in the
event that a threat to the safety of U.S. citizens in Haiti arises.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you for being with us. We look forward
to seeing you in a few days unless and until this crisis is resolved.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

















PREPARED STATEMENT


UNDER SECRETARY FRANK WISNER'S STATEMENT FOR
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
20 October 1993


Thank you. Mr. Chairman for this opportunity to provide a description
of the Defense Department's activities as we work to implement the
President's Haiti policy.

In 1990, as the Committee is well aware, Reverend Aristide was
elected President in Haiti by two out of every three votes cast. A short
seven months later, he was ousted by a military coup.

It has been the clear policy of this Administration, as it was with the
previous one, to return President Aristide to his rightful office.

These are the compelling reasons for doing so:

Protecting constitutional democracy is of fundamental importance to
our country and its citizens.

* The overall maintenance of stability in our hemisphere is of critical
importance to the President and to this government.

* Establishment of constitutional democracy in Haiti is crucial to long-
term stability which will prevent migration and its attendant loss of
life at sea from occurring.

* Restoration of Aristide is an important step in this process since he was
elected by a popular vote of 67% and is the constitutional head of state.
The Haitian people want him to return.

* Stabilizing Haiti and improving its government is a first and necessary
step toward creating conditions for respect of human rights and
democracy to flourish.

Foreign investment and economic growth, necessary for the
survival of any democracy, would only be possible in a stable
situation.

As touched on above, this is also necessary for dealing with
fundamental weaknesses in the Haitian economy that spur










migration. Migration can have a direct and very negative impact
on the U.S., in addition to leading to loss of life at sea.

And let us not forget that there still are several thousand Americans
living in Haiti. It is our job to protect them from harm.

As Secretary Watson explained, the Governor's Island agreement set
the framework achieving President Aristide's return. Among its
unambiguous guidelines are:

restoration of a legitimate Parliament (done);
nomination of a pri-ne minister by Aristide (done);
confirmation of prime minister by Parliament (done);
suspension of UN embargo (done);
foreign aid and police/military professionalization assistance
(suspended);
amnesty granted for political misdeeds associated with the coup
(done);
creation of a new police force and appointment of a new police
chief (awaiting Parliament action and Francois departure);
Cedras retires, appointment of successor by Aristide (not done);
and,
Aristide's return to Haiti (Oct 30).

The driving force behind the Governor's Island agreement is the
international community's complete rejection of the naked, anti-democratic
grab for power by the military. The Governor's Island agreement was the
best diplomatic accord possible.

DoD's mission is to support the UN's military professionalization effort
as called for in the Governor's Island agreement. It is not a combat or a
security mission. Our mission is not configured for that role.

We are to provide Sea-Bee construction engineers to renovate military
and civilian clinics, build new barracks outside of Port-au-Prince for the
military and other related civic action construction projects. The trainers are
to provide basic, non-lethal training and teach respect for human rights and
civilian authority.

This professionalization program is totally dependent upon the Haitian
government and military actively cooperating with us. It is designed to
performed in concert with a willing and receptive Haitian military. It will











not work under any other circumstances. For example, the Haitian military
and police are to provide our personnel with security.

Those circumstances changed abruptly on 11 October, the day the USS
Harlan County was to arrive. The Haitian military had promised to provide
dockside security for the arrival of personnel. This proved untrue. First, a
cargo vessel blocked the pier, despite earlier assurances that the pier would
be reserved for our use. Second, a crowd of thugs appeared at the main gate,
demonstrating in a hostile manner and blocking our Charge from access to
the port facility to greet the ship. The USS Harlan County, blocked from
docking, was ordered to depart the next day when it became apparent that
access was not going to be granted and that the military was not going to
cooperate with our mission and follow through on its commitments to the
Governor's Island agreement.

Despite early progress in moving the accords forward, the process is
now off-track. The military has failed to maintain its part of the agreement.
But while we have moved the Harlan County from Haitian waters into port at
Guantanamo Bay, our efforts to revive the Governors Island agreement
continue.

In reaction to the military's failure to follow through on its
commitment, the UN has imposed an embargo on weapons and oil (small
quantities of oil for cooking are exempt) to force the military into compliance
with the Governor's Island agreement. The OAS has also imposed trade
restrictions. President Clinton has, in turn, imposed unilateral sanctions (e.g.,
freezing of financial assets, suspension of visas)against selected individuals
who support the military. In short, the international community and the U.S.
Government have reacted very strongly to the military's failure to comply
with the Governor's Island agreement.

I would like to report on several actions the Administration has
undertaken in recent days to support the UN in its efforts to save the
agreement.

Let me be clear on the principals which define our current military
involvement.

* As noted above, we are fully committed to helping enforce the UN
sanctions which became effective earlier this week in order to gain the
military's compliance with the agreement.











Our vessels are there only to enforce the sanctions and are not to
intervene in the internal affairs of Haiti. This deployment of
Navy ships is not an invasion force.

Use of our military assets in a high-profile effort to support the
sanctions sends a strong signal that the Administration is intent on
restoration of Haiti's fledgling democracy through the UN effort.

Specifically, we have deployed six U.S. Navy vessels to waters
immediately around Haiti to:

enforce UN sanctions against the de facto regime within Haiti's
12-mile limit, putting pressure on the military to abide by the
terms of the Governors Island. Though the UN Security Council
has endorsed a naval presence to enforce sanctions, these U.S.
vessels will remain under U.S. command and flag;

if enforcement requires boarding foreign merchant shipping, that
task will be performed by U.S. Coast Guard personnel aboard
Navy ships, as is usually the case in counternarcotics operations.

These DoD deployments will demonstrate a strong and unwavering U.S.
commitment to the UN effort to establish constitutional democracy in
Haiti through the Governor's Island agreement.

As the President announced last Friday, we have deployed a reinforced
rifle company (Marines) with aviation assets to Guantanamo Bay Naval
base to assist in protecting American lives and interests in Haiti should
they become endangered.

* Let me be explicit that this force is to protect American lives and
property should that become necessary, not intervene in Haiti.

The amphibious assault ship USS Nassau, which is already at
Guantanamo for routine training, will provide transport for the
Marines if required as well as providing a command and control
platform for RADM Harold Gehman, who will serve as Joint Task
Force Commander reporting to CINCUSACOM. RADM Gehman's
normal assignment is Commander of Cruiser-Destroyer Group
Eight based in Norfolk.

* At this present time, there is no immediate threat to American lives or
property in Haiti. In fact, the overall security situation is quiet.







29


Nevertheless, we have deployed 26 additional Marines to the Embassy
in Port au Price to provide protection if required.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by stating that DoD is acting to support the
Administration's intent to stand firm with the UN and other members of the
international community in demanding the compliance of the Haitian
military with the Governor's Island agreement. Through our unique abilities,
we are helping enforce the embargo against Haiti, and we are prepared to
safeguard American lives and property if necessary.

We stand firm on seeing the establishment of constitutional democracy
in Haiti with the first step being the restoration of Aristide as President.
This serves both the interests of the United States and the people of Haiti:
through the establishment of constitutional democracy, respect for human
rights, and the growth of economic institutions, Haitians are less likely to
take to the high seas in unsafe craft and risk death, preventing trouble for us
here at home. We want to see the Governor's Island agreement work. It is
in the best interests of all parties to achieve stability in Haiti.







30



APPENDIX




Question: Do othe principal Haitian military leaders still
have U.S. bank accounts?

Answer: We have blocked the assets of 41 Haitians, 32 of
whom are military leaders. The list includes
General Cedras, Colonel Francois, and other
principal military leaders. The entire list is
contained in the following Department of the
Treasury documents.


















FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Peter O'Brien
October 21, 1993 (202) 622-2960

TREASURY BLOCKS ASSETS OF OPPONENTS OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

The U.S. Treasury Department has blocked the assets of 41 individuals who have
obstructed the restoration of democracy in Haiti, perpetuated or contributed to Haiti's
violence, or provided material or financial support to these activities. The list includes
many senior military and police officials, some of whom were members of the illegal
regime which seized power in 1991, and others who are involved with the "attaches" or
are their financial patrons.

This action blocks all assets of these individuals within United States jurisdiction
and effectively prohibits transactions with them. This is the first blocking action taken
under the authority of Executive Order 12872, which went into effect just before
midnight on October 18. It begins the process of identifying and blocking those
individuals who are involved in obstructing the international community's determination
to restore democracy to Haiti or are involved in the violence in Haiti.

In announcing this action, R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign
Assets Control, said "It is essential that economic sanctions against Haiti be as firm as
possible to convey to the military and police in Haiti the cost of defying the Haitian
people's choice of a democratic government, the international community's
determination to support that exercise of democracy in Haiti, and to stop the violence
that oppresses Haiti's political process."

These measures against the opponents of Haitian democracy complement the
remaining elements of U.S. sanctions which were reinstated in full on October 18. These
sanctions prohibit most trade and financial transactions with Haiti, restrict access to U.S.
ports for vessels calling in Haiti for transactions that would be prohibited by the U.S.
sanctions, and continue to block assets of the Haitian government and the de facto
regime.

Violations of the Haiti embargo carry maximum criminal penalties of $500,000
per count for corporations, $250,000 for individuals, and 10 years in prison for
individuals, including corporate officers. OFAC also may levy administrative civil
penalties of up to $10,000 per violation.

The list of blocked individuals and entities of Haiti may be expanded or amended
at any time, as new information becomes available to the Treasury Department. Persons
with information on individuals or firms violating the Haiti sanctions may call 202-622-
2430, or questions about licensing may call 622-2480. All calls will be kept confidential.











DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON


OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL
HAITIAN TRANSACTIONS REGULATIONS
31 C.F.R. Part 580

GENERAL NOTICE NO. 2

NOTIFICATION OF BLOCKED INDIVIDUALS
OF HAITI


General Notice No. 2 announces the names of 41 individuals who have
been determined by the Treasury Department to be Blocked
Individuals of Haiti. The persons identified on the attached list
are included for one or more of the following reasons:

A. They are persons who seized power illegally from the
democratically elected government of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide on September 30, 1991, or who since the
effective date of Executive Order 12775, acted or
purported to act directly or indirectly on behalf of, or
under the asserted authority of, such persons or of any
agencies, instrumentalities or entities purporting to act
on behalf of the de facto regime in Haiti or under the
asserted authority thereof, or any extra constitutional
successor thereto; or

B. They (1) have contributed to the obstruction of the
implementation of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 841 and 873, the Governors Island Agreement
of July 3, 1993, or the activities of the United Nations
Mission in Haiti, (2) have perpetuated or contributed to
the violence in Haiti, or (3) have materially or
financially supported any of-the persons listed in B.(1)
or B.(2), above.

This action by the Office of Foreign Assets Control is pursuant to
the authority of Executive Order No. 12775 of October 4, 1991,
Executive Order No. 12779 of October 28, 1991, Executive Order No.
12872 of October 18, 1993, the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and sections 580.303 and
580.307 of the Haitian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part
580.

U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with
these individuals unless the transactions are licensed by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control. Additionally, all assets within
U.S. jurisdiction owned or controlled by these individuals are
blocked. U.S. persons are not prohibited, however, from paying
funds owed to these entities or individuals into blocked Government
of Haiti Account No. 021083909 at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, or, pursuant to specific licenses issued by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, into blocked accounts held in the names of








33


the blocked parties in domestic U.S. financial institutions.

:WARNG: This list is not all-inclusive and will be updated fror
time to time. Unlicensed transactions with entities and
individuals who fall within the definition of the de facto regime
in Haiti found at section 580.303 of the Haitian Transactions
Regulations are prohibited.

aQmI: Section II ("Blocked Entities of the Do Facto Regime ir
Haiti") of Appendix A to the Haitian Transaction Regulations, as
amended on August 31, 1993 (58 Fed. Reg, 46540), remains in full
force and effect.


Issued:



R. Richard fewcomb V
Di ector
Office of Foreign Assets Control








34


DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON
BLOCKED INDIVIDUALS
OF HAITI


ATOURISTE, Antoine, Colonel; Delmas 31, Rue Verly 9, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti; 4141 N.W. 5th Avenue, Miami, FL 33127, U.S.A.;
Passport No. 79-039396; DOB 03 Jul 51.

BEAUBRUN, Mondesir, Colonel; Delmas 75, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; DOB
10 May 49.

BEAULIEU, Serge; Haiti; U.S.A.

BIAMBY, Philippe, Brigadier General; Haiti; DOB 21 Sep 52.

CAZEAU, Jean-Lucien, Lieutenant Colonel; Haiti; DOB 04 Jan 51.

CEDRAS, Raoul, Lieutenant General; Haiti; 6501 S.W. 113th Avenue,
Miami, FL 33173, U.S.A.; DOB 09 Jul 49.

CHAMBLAIN, Louis Judel; Haiti.

CLERJEUNE, Leopold, Colonel; Delmas 31, Rue E. Laforest, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti; Passport No. 90678797; DOB 24 Aug 50

CONSTANT, Emmanuel "Toto"; Haiti; DOB 27 Dec 56.

DEEB, Joel; Haiti; U.S.A.; DOB 28 Jun 54.

DORELIEN, Carl, Colonel; Haiti; Passport No. 82-57899; DOB 24 Jan
49.

DOUBY, Frant2, Colonel; Rue Cheriez 9, Rue 4 No. 8, Port-au-Prince,
Haiti; 1900 Newkirk Avenue, No. 5E, Brooklyn, NY 11226, U.S.A.; DOB
19 Jan 48.

DUERESNE, Jean Roland, Major; Haiti; DOB 11 Jun 56.

DUPERVAL, Jean-Claude, Major General; Haiti; DOB 19 Feb 47.

FRANHOIS, Evans Macfarland; Haiti; Dominican Republic; Passport No.
466-91; Diplomatic Passport No. 92-012658; DOB 06 May 52.

FRAN90IS, Joseph Miohel, Lieutenant Colonel; Route Aeroport, Rue
Bergera, Imp. Beauchamp No. 2, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; Passport No.
81151112; DOB 08 May 57.

GEDEON, Jean Evans, Lieutenant-Colonel; Haiti; DOB 11 Apr 44.

GEORGES, Reynold; Haiti; DOB 16 Oct 46.

GERMAIN, Henri P., Licutenant-Colonel; Haiti; Brooklyn, NY, U.S.A.;
DOB 06 Sep 51.











OROSHOMMB, Belony, Colonel; Haiti; 2422 Marpoc Street, Hollywood,
FL U.S.A.; Passport No. 81-161845; DOB 12 Feb 48.

GUERRIER, Derby, Lieutenant-Colonel; Drouillard Sarthe Village,
Port-au-Prince, Haiti; 71 Webster Street, Irvington, NJ 07111,
U.S.A.; Passport No. 85-271932; DOB 14 Oct 49.

JOANIS, Jackson, Captain; Ruelle Alix Roy, Imp. Telemaque No. 22,
Port-au-Prince, Haiti; 942 Barlow Road, Apt. D, Fort Belvoir, VA
22060, U.S.A.; DOB 25 Oct 58.

JOSAPHAT, Andr& Claudel, Lieutenant Colonel; Haiti; DOB 17 Aug 56.

JUSTAFORT, Serge, Major; Haiti; DOB 12 Jun 55.

KERNI2AN, Marc, Major; Delmas 45, No. 8, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; DOB
05 Sep 55.

LABSEGUE, Pierre Philippe; Haiti; U.S.A.

LEONIDAS, Bernardo R., Lieutenant-Colonel; Rue Oscar No. 23, Port-
au-Prince, Haiti; Brooklyn, NY, U.S.A.; DOB 28 Feb 42.

LOISEAU, Joel, Major; Haiti; DOB 11 Nov 54.

MAYARD, Henry (Henri) Max, Brigadier General; Haiti; DOB 07 Feb 47.

PAUL, Max; Bourdon, Impasse Iginac No. 7, Haiti; 1019 Lenox Road,
Brooklyn, New York 11212, U.S.A.; La Saline Boulevard, P.O. Box
616, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; P.O. Box 1792, Port-au-Prince, HaXti;
Passport No. 90-705113; DOB 17 May 45.

POISSON, Bernadin, Colonel; Haiti; DOB 16 Feb 48.

PRUD'HOMME, Ernst, Colonel; Haiti; DOB 22 Sep 54.

RENAUD, Lener, Major; Haiti; DOB 22 Mar 56.

ROMAIN, Franck; Haiti; DOB 29 Jan 36.

ROMULUS, Dumarsais, Colonel; Haiti; DOB 18 Aug 48 (or) 16 Aug 48.

ROMULUS, Martial P., Colonel; Haiti; DOB 26 Feb 49.

SAINVIL, Ramus, Colonel; Delmas 68, Rue C. Henry No. 2, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti; 1040 Carroll Street, Apt. 4K, Brooklyn, NY 11225,
U.S.A.; Passport No. 84-161640; DOB 15 Sep 52.

SIMON, Estimien, Lieutenant Colonel; Haiti; DOB 03 Mar 41.

SYLVAIN, Diderot Lyonel (Lionel), Colonel; Haiti; DOB 10 Jun 50.

VALME, Marc, Major; Avenue Martin Luther King No. 152, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti; Passport No. 81-142979; DOB 05 Dec 53.

VALMOND, H6bert, Colonel; Haiti; DOB 17 May 49.












DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON



NOTE: The following is provided to alert the public that Section
II ("Blocked Entities of the De Facto Regime in Haiti") of Appendix
A to the Haitian Transaction Regulations, as amended on August 31,
1993 (58 Fed. Reg. 46540), remains in full force and effect.


27TH COMPANY, FIRE DEPARTMENT
(a.k.a. 27tME COMPAGNIE, CORPS POMPIER)
Haiti.

ACCIDENT/INSURANCE OFFICE
(a.k.a. OFFICE D'ASURiANCE MALADIE/ACCIDENT)
(a.k.a. OFATKA)
(a.k.a. WORKERS' COMPENSATION, SICKNESS AND MATERNITY
INSURANCE AGENCY)
(a.k.a. OFFICE D'ASSURANCE ACCIDENTS DU TRAVAIL, MALADIE ET
MATERNITY)
Chancerelles Cit6 Militaire, P.O. Box 1012, Port-au-Prince,
HaYti.

BANK OF THE REPUBLIC OT HAITI
(a.k.a. CENTRAL BANK OF HAITI)
(a.k.a. BANQUE DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAYTI)
(a.k.a. DRE)
(f.k.a. BANQUET NATIONAL DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI)
Angle rue du Magasin de l'ktat et rue des Miracles, BP 1570,
Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

BANQUE POPULAIRE HAITIENNE
(a.k.a. BPH)
Angle rues Eden et Quai, P.O. Box 1322, Port-au-Prince, Haiti

BUREAU OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL SERVICE
(a.k.a. BUREAU INSPECTEUR OtENRALE, GRAND QUARTER GtENRALE
(G.Q.G.))
Haiti.

CEMENT COMPANY
(a.k.a. LE CIMENT D'HAITI, SA)
(a.k.a. CDH)
office Cit6 de 1'Exposition, Port-au-Prince, Haiti;
Fond Mombin, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

ELECTRICITY COMPANY
(a.k.a. .LECTRICITE D'KAITI)
(a.k.a. ELECTRICITY OF HAITI)
(a.k.a. EDH)
Rue Dante Destouches, Port-au-Prince, Hayti;
Boulevard Harry S Truman, P.O. Box 1753, Port-au-Prince,











Halti.

FLOUR COMPANY
(a.k.a. LA MINOTERIE D'HAITI)
(a.k.a MDH)
Lafitteau, P.O. Box 404, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

HAITIAN ARMED FORCES
(a.k.a. FAD'H)
(a.k.a. FORCE ARMkE D'HAITI)
HaIti.

METROPOLITAN WATER CONCERN
(a.k.a. WATER COMPANY)
(a.k.a. CENTRAL AUTONOME MLTROPOLITAINE D'EAU POTABLE)
(a.k.a. CAMEP)
Paul VI Avenue 104, Port-au-Prince, HaIti.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT ARTIBONITE REGION
(a.k.a. DEPARTMENT MILITAIRE DE L'ARTIBONITE)
Haiti.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN ZONE
(a.k.a. DEPARTMENT MILITAIRE DE LA ZONE METROPOLITAINE)
(a.k.a. COMET)
Haiti.

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, NATURAL RESOURCES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
(a.k.a. MINISTER DE L'AGRICULTURE, DES RESOURCES NATURELLES
ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT RURAL)
(a.k.a. MARNDR)
Damien, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
Rue Legitime, Champ de Mars, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE
(a.k.a. MEF)
Palais des Ministeres, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, YOUTH AND SPORTS
(a.k.a. KENJS)
Boulevard Harry Truman, Cit6 de 1'Exposition, Port-au-Prince,
Haiti.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WORSHIP
Boulevard Harry Truman, Cit6 de 1'Exposition, Port-au-Prince,
Haiti.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH UNIT FOR POTABLE WATER
(a.k.a. COMMUNITY HEALTH AND DRINKING WATER POSTS)
(a.k.a. PROGRAMME DE SANTE DE L'EAU POTABLE)
(a.k.a. POSTES COMMUNAUTAIRES D'HYGIkNE ET D'EAU POTABLE)
(a.k.a. POCHEP)
Petite Place Cazeau, P.O. Box 2580, Port-au-Prince, Haltl.











MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COORDINATION
300 route de Delmas, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
(a.k.a. MINISTIRE DE L'INTERIEUR ZT DEFENSE NATIONAL)
Palais des Minist&res, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
Boulevard Harry Truman, Cit6 de 1'Exposition, Port-au-Prince,
Haiti.

MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND EXTERNAL COOPERATION
(a.k.a. MINISTER DE LA PLANIFICATION ET COOPERATION
EXTERNELLE)
Palais des Minist&res, Rue Monseigneur Guilloux, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH
(a.k.a. BANT9 PUBLIQUE)
(a.k.a. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND POPULATION)
(a.k.a. MINISTER DE LA SANTE PUBLIQUE ET DE LA POPULATION)
(a.k.a. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING)
Palais des Ministares, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS, TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
(a.k.a. MINISTtRB DES TRAVAUX PUBLICS, TRANSPORT ET
COMMUNICATIONS)
(a.k.a. MTPTC)
Palais des Ministeres, BP 2002, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS
Rue de la R6volution, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

NATIONAL CREDIT BANE
(a.k.a. BANQUE NATIONAL DE CREDIT)
(a.k.a. BNC)
Angle rue du Quai et rue des Miracles, BP 1320, Port-au-
Prince, Haiti.

NATIONAL INSURANCE
(a.k.a. OLD AGE INSURANCE)
(a.k.a. OFFICE NATIONAL D'ASSURANCE VIEILLESSE)
(a.k.a. ONA)
Champ de Mars, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

NATIONAL OFFICE FOR INDUSTRIAL PARKS
(a.k.a. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPANY)
(a.k.a. GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL PARK)
(a.k.a. SOCIETY NATIONAL DES PARCS INDUSTRIES)
(a.k.a. SONAPI)
Industrial Park, P.O. Box 2345, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

NATIONAL PORT AUTHORITY
(a.k.a. AUTORIT. PORTUAIRE NATIONAL)
(a.k.a. PORT AUTHORITY)
(a.k.a. AIRPORT)







39
3 5005 00478 712%

(a.k.a. APN)
La Saline Boulevard, P.O. Box 616, Port-au-Prince, HaYti;
P.O. Box 1792, Port-au-Prince, HaXti.
NATIONAL WATER SERVICE
(a.k.a. SERVICE NATIONAL D'EAU POTABLE)
(a.k.a. BNEP)
Delmas 45 Delmas Road, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
OFFICE FOR PERMANENT MAINTENANCE OF ROAD NETWORK
(a.k.a. SERVICE D'ENTRETIEN PERMANENT DU RfSEAU ROUTIER
NATIONAL)
(a.k.a. SERVICE D'ENTRETIEN DU RtSEAU ROUTIER NATIONAL)
(a.k.a. SEPRRN)
(a.k.a. OFFICE OF ROAD MAINTENANCE)
Varreux National Road, 10 Varreux Road, Port-au-Prince,
HaIti.
OFFICE OF CUSTOMS
(a.k.a. ADMINISTRATION GENERAL DES DODANES)
161 Route de Delmas, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
OFFICE OF MILITARY ATTACHES
(a.k.a. BUREAU DES ATTACHES KILITAIRES)
HaYti.
TELEPHONE COMPANY
(a.k.a. TLEtCOKMUNICATIONS D'HAXTI, SAM)
(a.k.a. TELECO)
J.J. Dessalines Boulevard, P.O. Box 814, Port-au-Prince,
Haiti.

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ISBN 0-16-043356-8
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9 780160 433566