Update on the situation in Haiti

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Update on the situation in Haiti hearing before the Subcommittee Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, October 31, 1991
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UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN HAITI






HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1 ^HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 31, 1991

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs





.OLUMBIA UNIVERSII n
S LAW LIBRARY
DEC 2 1 1992

U.S. DEPOSITORY
COPY



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-605 WASHINGTON : 1992
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-039279-9

















COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman


LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
Samoa
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
AUSTIN J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
THOMAS M. FOGLIETTA, Pennsylvania
FRANK McCLOSKEY, Indiana
THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
BILL ORTON, Utah
(Vacancy)


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
BEN BLAZ, Guam
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida


JOHN J. BRADY, JR., Chief of Staff
ADAM C. CRAIN, Staff Assistant


SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, JR., Michigan, Chairman
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York PORTER J. GOSS, Florida
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
TED WEISS, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York JAN MEYERS, Kansas,
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
VICTOR C. JOHNSON, Subcommittee Staff Director
TABOR E. DUNMAN, JR., Minority Staff Consultant
RICHARD NUCCIO, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
PATRICIA WEIR, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
RICHARD M. FROST, Subcommittee Staff Consultant

(II)













CONTENTS


WITNESS


The Honorable Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs, Departm ent of State .............................. ................................................












UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN HAITI


THURSDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1991
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert G. Torricelli
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The committee will please come to order.
We meet today to take testimony on the situation in Haiti, and
the actions our government has taken in concert with the interna-
tional community to restore President Aristide to office to which
he was freely elected by the Haitian people.
INEVITABLE CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRATIC TREND
During the past decade an unprecedented tide of democracy has
swept the Western Hemisphere. More Latin American and Caribbe-
an countries live under free, duly elected governments today than
at any point in history.
It was, however, inevitable that at some point, sometime, some-
where, there was going to be a challenge to this democratic trend.
When that happened, it remained imperative that the democratic
community close ranks and respond as one.
The community did not so act. There was and now remains the
danger that the entire democratic trend could unravel as quickly
and as decisively as it was assembled.
One month ago, the inevitable happened. The test has arrived,
and it is in Haiti. It tests the entire proposition of whether there is
an inevitability to democracy in our hemisphere and whether this
point of common democracy throughout the hemisphere shall
indeed remain permanent.
THE U.S. TAKES ACTION IN RESPONSE TO COUP
I believe that we are passing the test. We have made it clear to
the people of Haiti, to the generals that now purport to rule that
country, and to the world that this coup will not be allowed to
stand.
We have suspended all direct assistance to Haiti.
We have suspended all exports to the Haitian police and their
military.







We have frozen Haitian Government assets in this country, and
prohibited payments by any U.S. person to the de facto government
that rules today in Port-a-Prince.
Two days ago President Bush issued an executive order barring
all trade with Haiti except for basic food staples, essential medi-
cines and, for 30 days, imports of goods assembled or processed in
Haiti from American parts or materials.
Our country spearheaded an effort in the Organization of Ameri-
can States that resulted in a resolution calling on the member
states to adopt similar sanctions.
PLEDGE TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF HAITI
This coup is, in short, a tragedy that the long-suffering people of
Haiti should not have had to endure. They fought for their democ-
racy through years of suffering. They have earned it, and they are
entitled to it.
And today we make this pledge: It is a tragedy that they will not
have to endure much longer.
We are going to isolate this military regime. Peacefully, but very
forcefully, we are going to help Haiti's legitimate elected president
and Haiti's democratic leaders reverse this coup.
PRAISE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARONSON'S ROLE IN HEMISPHERIC
POLICY
Leading our country's efforts in this endeavor has been Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the Honorable Ber-
nard Aronson.
I have often been a critic of the administration in other efforts in
the hemisphere, to the credit of this administration and to the As-
sistant Secretary that we have led international efforts in this
crisis.
We are putting to rest the reputation our country had in the
past of being lukewarm in our support for democracy in this hemi-
sphere. We are proudly leading efforts to restore democracy. It is
important for not only the people of Haiti; it is important for the
future of the entire hemisphere.
And so, Mr. Aronson, I congratulate you. We close ranks behind
you and welcome you to this committee. We appreciate your being
here today. More than that, we appreciate your leadership on this
issue.
And before asking for your testimony, I would like to call upon
Mr. Lagomarsino for any comments he might like to offer.
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CONVEY STRONG MESSAGE TO COUP LEADERS
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, those of us who encouraged and supported the
difficult transition to democracy in Haiti are deeply dismayed, as
you pointed out, that once again military force in that nation has
been used to thwart the will of the people. The prompt action by
the Bush administration, the Congress and the Organization of
American States, in vigorously condemning the overthrow of Presi-
dent Aristide, demonstrates our commitment to restoring demo-
cratic government in Haiti.








The economic sanctions that have been ordered by the Bush ad-
ministration, in cooperation with our allies, should convey to the
military government in Haiti and its supporters that there will be
severe economic and social costs if democracy is not restored. As
the poorest nation in the hemisphere, Haiti cannot long stand the
type of economic pressure it faces with the OAS-mandated sanc-
tions and U.S. economic embargo.
So, I look forward to hearing the testimony today of Assistant
Secretary Aronson, and I am anxious to learn more about the
degree of cooperation among our allies in bringing joint pressure
against the military regime in Haiti.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you very much, Mr. Lagomarsino.
Mr. Fuster, Mr. Solarz, any opening comments you would like to
make?
Mr. Solarz.
Mr. SOLARZ. You have said it all, Mr. Chairman. I have nothing
to add.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Solarz.
Mr. Johnston.
I would also like to welcome Mr. Rangel of New York to this sub-
committee. Mr. Rangel, would you like to make any opening com-
ments before we proceed with the testimony?
Mr. RANGEL. I would like to be associated with the opening re-
marks by the chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Rangel, and welcome. It's a
pleasure to have you here.
Mr. Aronson, if you would proceed, please.
STATEMENT OF BERNARD ARONSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and Mem-
bers of the subcommittee.
COMMENDING COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO HAITI
Before I begin, I would just like to say that I think the Congress
and the administration and both parties cooperated in an unprece-
dented way to support the electoral process in Haiti that permitted
the first free and fair elections there, and I very much appreciate
the strong bipartisan support for our country's current efforts to
restore democracy there. I think that is a very useful signal to
those who seized power in Haiti that this Congress and the admin-
istration are united in defense of President Aristide's government.
PRESENTATION TO CHAIRMAN TORRICELLI
I have a brief opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and then I
know you want to get on with questions.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Aronson, if you would yield for just a minute.
Mr. ARONSON. I would be happy to.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, before Secretary Aronson begins his
testimony, having just returned from a trip to South America
which he led, I would like to make a brief presentation on behalf of
Mr. Lagomarsino, Mr. Rangel and myself to you for having provid-








ed such spectacular leadership to us during the course of our fact-
finding mission to Peru and Colombia. This is designed to make
sure that you are accorded the same respect back home which you
clearly received south of the border.
Mr. TORRICELLI. You guys are already regretting you did not
make the trip.
Mr. ARONSON. Deeply, I would like to see what he gave you
before I make a definitive statement on that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. TORRICELLI. My appropriate title.
[Laughter.]
Mr. TORRICELLI. It says "el jefe". However, knowing of Mr. So-
larz's considerable modesty and knowing that the record of this
committee will be preserved forever, it might have been even more
appropriate had he given me the congressional chess championship
since I played Mr. Solarz on the way home, and I am certain he
would be glad to have entered into the committee record the re-
sults of the game.
[Laughter.]
Mr. SOLARZ. I consider it a fluke.
[Laughter.]
Mr. TORRICELLI. I am very grateful, however, to my colleagues for
this great honor.
Mr. ARONSON. I would just like to say in response that if the next
time I come before the committee you are wearing four stars on
your chest, I will suggest you took Mr. Solarz's message too strong-
ly.
[Laughter.]
Mr. TORRICELLI. Please proceed.
Mr. ARONSON. And the OAS might have a strong response.
UNPRECEDENTED ELECTIONS
Mr. Chairman, as you said, the United States was one of the
prime movers in promoting and supporting the first free and fair
elections in Haiti's history. And as I noted, that was done in strong
cooperation with the Congress in a bipartisan manner. We set as
our goal not only elections but elections free of violence, and we
made a continuing persistent and determined effort to help the
Haitian Government and people reach that historic achievement.
And I think we all had in our minds a memory of what happened
in 1987, when the Haitian people voted and were literally slaugh-
tered in the voting booths.
The United States sponsored the resolution that committed the
OAS to oversee the Haitian elections. The United States was one of
the principal supporters of the U.S. General Assembly's decision to
send an observer mission to Haiti as well.
With the support of the Congress, U.S. assistance helped pay for
and equipped the Haitian Supreme Electoral Council. Strong, de-
termined U.S. political and diplomatic efforts helped to keep the
Haitian electoral process on track. The Vice President traveled to
Haiti during the electoral period to emphasize U.S. instance on a
free and fair vote in a secure climate. President Bush welcomed
provisional President Ertha Trouillot, to show our support for her







key role in overseeing the electoral process. I believe you received
her here as well. I myself made three separate trips to Haiti to pro-
mote free elections and an orderly transition.
U.S. SUPPORT IN HAITIAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Our Ambassador, Al Adams, played a personal and decisive role
in supporting this electoral process. And when the votes were
counted, the United States was the first country to voice strong
support for President Aristide as the clear and overriding choice of
the Haitian people on December 16.
Following the election, working with the Congress and this com-
mittee, the administration helped mobilize strong bilateral and
multilateral support for the new Government of Haiti. We have
provided immediate balance of payment support and helped rally
generous international and multilateral economic assistance for
the fledgling government. Literally on the day before the coup, I
handed the Haitian Ambassador a letter announcing that the ad-
ministration had decided to forgive all of Haiti's bilateral debt with
the United States, approximately $99 million.
When Haiti held its first democratic elections, it was not only a
proud moment in that nation's history, it also marked, as you said
in your remarks, Mr. Chairman, another decisive step in the con-
solidation of democracy in this hemisphere. That is why the United
States is not the only government that has a deep stake in the sur-
vival and consolidation of democracy in Haiti. So do the govern-
ment throughout the Caribbean and Latin America.
RESOLUTION OF THE OAS
At the OAS General Assembly Meeting in Santiago, Chile, in
June of this year, the 34 members of the OAS adopted by unani-
mous vote a new mechanism to defend democracy when it is
threatened in the hemisphere. That resolution empowered the Sec-
retary General to convene an emergency meeting of foreign minis-
ters when a democratic government is threatened or overthrown.
That resolution was borne out of the OAS's failed experience in
Panama and its recognition of the December 1990 coup in Surinam
proved that violent antidemocratic forces remain in many nations,
threatening the stability and survival of elected governments.
When President Aristide was forced to leave Haiti on September
30, the OAS mobilized in record time to defend his government. So
too did the United States.
U.S. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO COUP
On October 2, President Bush suspended all direct assistance to
Haiti. On October 3, the administration blocked the export of all
arms and ammunition to the Haitian police and military. On Octo-
ber 4, President Bush met with President Aristide in the oval office
and signed an executive order freezing the assets of the Haitian
Government and prohibiting any American citizens or companies
from financial transfers to the illegal authorities. Those assets are
available to President Aristide to carry on the business of his gov-
ernment.







These steps were taken in consultation with and in support of
our partners in the OAS. Secretary Baker represented the United
States at the meeting held on October 2 and 3. He called upon the
delegates to pass the strongest possible resolution, and in fact the
OAS enacted the toughest sanctions in its history by unanimous
vote.
The OAS at that meeting also delegated a commission of foreign
ministers to travel to Haiti to try to negotiate a settlement. The
United States was part of that mission, and I traveled to Haiti with
that commission October 4, 5 and 7, in an effort to find a settle-
ment.
The United States supported the follow-up OAS resolution of Oc-
tober 8, which called for a trade embargo. President Bush issued an
executive order, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, formalizing that em-
bargo earlier this week. But in the essential, critical areas of fuel,
arms, ammunition and financial transfers the United States al-
ready had acted and blocked any such transfers to Haiti in the first
days following the coup.
The State Department has also ordered the departure of all non-
essential personnel from Haiti and recommended that American
citizens there depart as quickly as possible. Of the 8300 Americans
registered with the embassy, our best estimate is that some 3,500
have left Haiti since the events of September 30.
UNITED EFFORTS OF OAS MEMBER STATES
The 34 members of the Organization of American States, includ-
ing our own country, are united in their determination to support
the restoration of President Aristide's government in Haiti. The
tough sanctions which have been levied against Haiti are designed
to convince those who have seized and hold power illegally to
resume negotiations to achieve that goal.
The OAS, in both its resolutions, and the United States, in de-
signing these sanctions, have tried to protect ordinary Haitians by
exempting food staples and medicines. The U.S. foreign assistance
continues for humanitarian purposes through nongovernmental
and international organizations.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these sanctions have had
and will have in the future a severe effect on this impoverished
nation. No one wants more suffering for Haiti, nor damage to its
vulnerable economy. Your strong hope is that those who hold
power in Haiti will recognize that there is no alternative to a nego-
tiated settlement.
OAS CIVILIAN MISSION
The OAS recognizes that this is a complex crisis with many
roots, and that many groups and individuals in Haiti have legiti-
mate concerns about their own constitutional protections. In both
its resolutions the OAS has taken on a responsibility, not only to
see President Aristide's authority restored, but also to protect the
human rights of all Haitians and create conditions in which consti-
tutional guarantees can be respected.
To achieve that purpose, the OAS has authorized creation of a
civilian mission that would travel to Haiti to help create the neces-







sary conditions for a successful negotiation. The mission would
remain in Haiti at the request of the parties there to help provide
the necessary guarantee that a negotiated settlement would be re-
spected by all sides.
President Aristide has formally invited this mission to go to
Haiti. This past week, the President of the Haiti Senate, Dejean
Belizaire, formally invited the Secretary General to send this mis-
sion to Haiti also. Secretary General Baena Soares has appointed a
distinguished former foreign minister of Colombia, Augusto Rami-
rez Ocampo, to head the mission. I understand from my conversa-
tions with the Secretary General that they hope to send the initial
contingent to Haiti in a matter of days.
There is no guarantee that this crisis will be resolved through
these diplomatic efforts. There is a real threat that order and au-
thority will simply break down in Haiti. That is one reason why we
strongly urge those holding power in Haiti to begin a serious proc-
ess of negotiation as quickly as possible. It is also one of the rea-
sons why we have ordered departure of our personnel in Haiti and
recommend that all American citizens there leave.
Commercial airlines are currently flying into Haiti on a regular
basis, including U.S. carriers, and we believe Haitians and U.S. citi-
zens have opportunities to depart.
U.S. OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT DEMOCRACY IN HAITI
Mr. Chairman, we face many difficult choices in our policy
toward Haiti, none attractive; all fraught with difficulty and risk.
But the one choice that the democratic community of the Organiza-
tion of American States never contemplated was to stand by and do
nothing when Haiti's first democratically elected government was
violently overthrown.
The international community has a deep interest in defending
the December elections because its presence in Haiti helped to
guarantee that the process could and did succeed. We have a re-
sponsibility also because the unanimous decision in Santiago to
defend democracy is being tested and watched by others through-
out this hemisphere who might harbor similar designs.
Finally, we have an obligation to act because after 200 years of
waiting the Haitian people need and deserve the solidarity of the
democratic community to defend their hard won, fragile and new
democratic liberties.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Aronson, very much for your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aronson follows:]







8


EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY

STATEMENT OF

BERNARD ARONSON

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OCTOBER 31, 1991





I want to thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity

to testify on the crisis in Haiti and U.S. policy to help

restore democracy there.



The United States was one of the prime movers in

promoting and supporting the first free and fair elections

in Haiti's history. This Administration set as its goal,

not only elections, but elections free of violence and made

a continuing, persistent, and determined effort to help the

Haitian Government and people reach that historic

achievement. The U.S. sponsored the resolution that

committed the OAS to oversee the Haitian elections. The

United States was the principal supporter of the U.N.

General Assembly's decision to send an observer mission to









Haiti as well. With the support of the Congress, U.S.

assistance helped pay for and equip the Haitian Supreme

Electoral Council. Strong, determined U.S. political and

diplomatic efforts helped to keep the Haitian electoral

process on track.



Vice President Quayle travelled to Haiti during the

electoral period to emphasize U.S. insistence on a free and

fair vote in a secure climate. President Bush welcomed

provisional President Ertha Trouillot to show our support

for her key role in overseeing the electoral process. I,

myself, made three separate trips to Haiti to promote fair

elections and an orderly transition. Our Ambassador there,

Al Adams, played a personal and decisive role in supporting

this electoral process. When the votes were counted, the

United States was the first country to voice strong support

for President Aristide as the clear and overriding choice of

the Haitian people on December 16.



Following the election, working with the Congress and

this Committee, the Administration helped mobilize strong

bilateral and multilateral support for the new government

for Haiti. We provided immediate balance of payments

support and helped rally generous international and

multilateral economic assistance for the fledgling

government. On the day before the coup, the United States

forgave virtually all of Haiti's official bilateral

debt--$99 million.


58-605 0 92 2










When Haiti held its first democratic elections, it was

not only a proud moment in Haiti's history, it also marked

another decisive step in the consolidation of democracy in

this hemisphere. Indeed, until the violent coup of

September 30, every nation in this hemisphere, with the sole

exception of Cuba, was led by a government that had come to

office through an electoral process.



The United States is not the only government that has a

deep stake in the survival and consolidation of democracy in

Haiti. So do governments throughout the Caribbean and Latin

America. At the OAS General Assembly meeting in Santiago,

Chile, in June of this year the 34 members of the OAS

adopted by unanimous vote, a new mechanism to defend

democracy when it is threatened in this hemisphere. That

resolution empowered the Secretary General to convene an

emergency meeting of foreign ministers when a democratic

government is threatened or overthrown.



That resolution was born out of the OAS's failed

experience in Panama and its recognition, as the December

1990 coup in Suriname proved, that violent anti-democratic

forces remain in many nations, threatening the stability and

survival of elected governments.










When President Aristide was forced to leave Haiti on

September 30, the OAS mobilized in record time to defend his

go-ernment. So too, did the United States. On October 2,

President Bush suspended all direct assistance to Haiti. On

October 3, the Administration blocked the export of all arms

and ammunition to the Haitian police and military. On

October 4, President Bush signed an Executive Order freezing

the assets of the Haitian Government and prohibiting any

American citizen or company from financial transfers to the

illegal authorities.



These steps were taken in consultation with, and in

support of, our partners in the OAS. Secretary Baker-

represented the United States at the first emergency OAS

meeting held on October 3. He called upon the delegates to

pass the strongest possible resolution, and the OAS enacted

the toughest sanctions in its history by unanimous vote.

The OAS at that meeting also delegated a commission of

foreign ministers to travel to Haiti to try to negotiate a

settlement. The United States was a part of that mission,

and I travelled to Haiti with that commission on October 4,

5, and 7 in an effort to find a settlement.



The United States supported the follow-up OAS

resolution of October 8 which called for a trade embargo.

President Bush issued an Executive Order formalizing such an









embargo earlier this week. But in the essential areas of

fuel, arms, ammunition, and financial transfers, the United

States already had acted and blocked any such transfers to

Haiti in the first days following the coup.



The State Department has ordered the departure of all

non-essential personnel from Haiti and recommended that

American citizens there depart as quickly as possible. Of

the 8300 Americans registered with the Embassy, our best

estimate is some 3500 have left Haiti since the events of

September 30.



The 34 members of the Organization of American States,

including the United States, are united in their

determination to support the restoration of President

Aristide's government in Haiti. The tough sanctions which

have been levied against Haiti are designed to convince

those who have seized and hold power illegally to resume

negotiations to achieve that goal.



The OAS, in both its resolutions, and the U.S. in

designing these sanctions, have tried to protect ordinary

Haitians by exempting food staples and medicines. U.S.

assistance continues for humanitarian purposes through

non-governmental and international organizations.









Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these sanctions have

had, and will have in the future, a severe impact on this

impoverished nation. No one wants more suffering for Haiti

nor damage to its vulnerable economy. Our strong hope is

that those who hold power in Haiti will recognize that there

is no alternative to a negotiated settlement.



The OAS recognizes that this is a complex crisis with

many roots, and that many groups and individuals in Haiti

have legitimate concerns about their own constitutional

protections. In both its resolutions, the OAS has taken on

a responsibility, not only to see President Aristide's

authority restored, but also to protect the human rights of

all Haitians and create conditions in which constitutional

guarantees can be respected. To achieve that purpose, the

OAS has authorized creation of a civilian mission that would

travel to Haiti to help create the necessary conditions for

a successful negotiation. The mission would remain in Haiti

at the request of the parties there to help provide the

necessary guarantee that a negotiated settlement would be

respected by all sides.



President Aristide has formally invited this mission to

go to Haiti. This past week, the President of the Haitian

Senate, Dejean Belizaire, formally invited the Secretary









General to send this mission to Haiti. Secretary General

Baena Soares has appointed a distinguished former Foreign

Minister of Colombia, Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, to head the

mission. I understand from my conversations with the

Secretary General that they hope to send the initial

contingent to Haiti in a matter of days.



There is no guarantee that this crisis will be resolved

through these diplomatic efforts. There is a real threat

that order and authority will simply break down in Haiti.

That is one reason why we strongly urge those holding power

in Haiti to begin a serious process of negotiation as

quickly as possible. It is also one of the reasons why we

have ordered departure of our personnel in Haiti and

recommended that all American citizens leave. Commercial

airlines are currently flying into Haiti on a regular basis,

including U.S. carriers, and we believe Haitians and U.S.

citizens have opportunities to depart.



We face many difficult choices in our policy in

Haiti--none attractive, all fraught with difficulty and

risk. But the one choice that the democratic community of

the Organization of American States never contemplated was

to stand by and do nothing when Haiti's first democratically

elected government was violently overthrown. The

international community has a deep interest in defending the






15


December elections because its presence in Haiti helped to

guarantee that the process could, and did, succeed. We have

a responsibility also because the unanimous decision in

Santiago to defend democracy is being tested and watched by

others throughout this hemisphere who might harbor similar

designs. Finally, we have an obligation to act because

after 200 years of waiting, the Haitian people need and

deserve the solidarity of the democratic community to defend

their hard-won, fragile and new democratic liberties.







IMPACT OF EMBARGO ON RANK-AND-FILE MILITARY
Mr. TORRICELLI. The Washington Post reported yesterday, if I
could paraphrase, that it appeared that much of the military lead-
ership might be prepared for a settlement, but that many of the
rank-and-file troops were not, and might be beyond control.
If you combine this allegation with the embargo, the embargo
could only succeed if indeed those rank-and-file soldiers are going
to be severely impacted. The administration argued that the em-
bargo would not be effective against Saddam Hussein because he
would respond with no particular urgency to the suffering of
people in his country. It would be my assumption that that would
also be true of the rank-and-file Haitian military.
Is the administration, therefore, following the same logic, assum-
ing that the embargo will disproportionately and significantly
impact on the life of those rank-and-file soldiers?
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, it is a good question and an impor-
tant question, and it points to one of the complexities in this crisis.
COUP OF THE MID TO LOW RANKS
This coup was far more a mutiny from the mid ranks and the
lower ranks up than it was a carefully designed plot from the high
command. And one of the realities that we discovered when we
were in Haiti on those three trips was that, even if the individuals
in positions of authority might come together behind a negotiated
solution, the soldiers in the streets have a capacity to thwart such
a settlement.
And, in fact, the day we were at the airport negotiating what I
think might have emerged as a solution the soldiers burst into the
parliament, shouted out, demanded that a new president be named.
And, in fact, came out to the airport itself while we were there,
and I know that they were well aware of the nature of the discus-
sions we were having. So that is part of the problem.
MEASURES TO IDENTIFY WEALTHY HAITIANS FINANCING TO COUP
One of the ways in which we are trying to target those individ-
uals indirectly, indirectly through the embargo, is to identify
wealthy individuals in Haiti who may be helping to finance the sol-
diers, and freezing their assets as we did during the Panama em-
bargo, and we are compiling names of such people. We also have
the legal authority to deny them visas.
Mr. TORRICELLI. This has not happened, but it is something that
you are preparing?
Mr. ARONSON. We are preparing. And under the President's exec-
utive order, we have the authority to do so. We have to go through
a fair process to be sure the people we so designate deserve that.
EMBARGO ON WEAPONRY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Secondly, as you noted and as I noted, we have joined with the
OAS to call for an embargo on any arms or ammunition to the
military. And I think those soldiers have to begin to think that
over time they are going to face a very unhappy, restive and bitter
population with dwindling supplies of ammunition and fuel.






Mr. TORRICELU. Are there any exceptions to cooperation to that
request?
Mr. ARONSON. Are there any governments that are violating?
Mr. TORRICELLI. Yes.
Mr. ARONSON. To our knowledge, no, though clearly, as you
know, borders are porous and contraband can come in. But I think
that there are no governments that we know of that are violating
those prohibitions.
Mr. TORRICELU. Outside of the OAS, are you generally pleased
with levels of cooperation from Europe?
Mr. ARONSON. The EC is debating whether to impose a similar
trade embargo. They politically are committed to defend President
Aristide's government. There seems to be an internal debate about
whether such a trade embargo might violate certain provisions of
the Lomei Convention. I hope that they will settle that in favor of
a trade embargo. But by and large, I think this has had universal
and very strong support around the world.
POSSIBILITIES FOR MULTILATERAL FORCE
Mr. TORRICELLI. Governments in Latin America that have offered
to participate in a multilateral military force, first, do you consider
those offers to still be available or were they made and no longer
available?
Mr. ARONSON. I would not want to speak for any other govern-
ment.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Well, you have heard expressions at the OAS.
Mr. ARONSON. Yes.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The governments said this. Do you consider
those to have been offers that were made and are no longer avail-
able? Or, are they still there if at a future time there is a change of
policy?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, I know of certain governments that are com-
mitted to participate in such a multilateral force should it ever be
established. Some governments voiced public commitment, but as I
say I would not want to say whether or not those commitments
remain because I would not want to speak for those governments.
But I think there were a number of governments around the
hemisphere who were very serious about that, and I believe that
many still are.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Let me ask a final question and then I will allow
Mr. Lagomarsino to continue. I will reserve to do another round of
questioning when my colleagues have concluded.
POTENTIAL DEVASTATING EFFECTS OF EMBARGO ON HAITIAN PEOPLE
The adoption of a program of an embargo rather than a military
intervention is no doubt based on the assumption and the belief
that it will result in less loss of human life. We do, however, live
with the possibility that an embargo where oil supplies will dwin-
dle in a matter of days, electricity will stop, and living conditions
will further deteriorate, could result in widespread disease. The
loss of life could not be less. It could be more.
I say this because of my own willingness to see the United States
participate in a multilateral force led by other nations in the hemi-







sphere, and disproportionately staffed by others in the hemisphere,
because I believe it might, given the terrible poverty and suffering
in Haiti, be for the Haitian people the less dangerous alternative.
That is not the route that has been taken to this point. My ques-
tion, therefore, is: If indeed in the coming days or weeks should
this persist there is wide-scale suffering, contamination of water or
food, or other disease that might result in massive suffering, that I
hope and I trust, though this is in the form of a question, that
there are contingency plans to deal with that in the context of this
embargo.
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, let me make a few comments in
response to your statement and question.
CONSIDERATION ONLY OF MULTILATERAL FORCE
As you know, President Aristide himself was invited to address
the first OAS meeting, which was October 2. And in his remarks
and in private comments, he did not request a multilateral mili-
tary force, and in fact said at that time that was not what he fa-
vored at that time. And I think that that was taken very seriously
by a number of the member states there who were prepared to sup-
port such a proposal. It certainly did not rule out reconsideration
in the future.
Secondly, I think everyone who considered a trade embargo did
so with a heavy heart, recognizing that there is real danger of suf-
fering and the breakdown of order as you talked about, though I
think it needs to be pointed out that hundreds of Haitians have
been shot to death in the streets and in their homes because of this
violent coup, not because of an embargo. So it is not as if the situa-
tion there is stable and peaceful and there is not suffering.
EMBARGO VS. MILITARY INTERVENTION
Mr. TORRICELLI. Well, that means we are not arguing different
sides of the proposition. I am only pointing out to you the irony of
the assumption that the embargo and current policy might, in the
long run, result in less suffering or less of a loss of human life than
making the judgment for a multilateral force.
You may at some point in the future find that to be the better
alternative given the suffering in what is a remarkably poor land.
If I could yield to Mr. Lagomarsino who might want to just use
these few minutes before we go to the floor.
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to finish the point.
I do not disagree with that statement, and I think one reason we
urged those who hold power in Haiti to move quickly is that should
conditions there deteriorate a number of governments are going to
have to consider what are the next steps. We strongly hope that
the current policies will succeed, obviously, but the OAS has taken
on a responsibility here that I think they take seriously.
Mr. TORRICELL. Mr. Lagomarsino.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes. Mr. Aronson, let me ask you one ques-
tion and I will ask it in a way that might be considered a little bit
leading, but we do not have much time.






LEGITIMATE CONCERNS THAT LED TO THE COUP
I take it for granted that some people in Haiti think or thought
that they had legitimate concerns and that led at least in part to
the overthrow of President Aristide.
Mr. ARONSON. Well, I would put it slightly differently, Congress-
man. I think the soldiers acted illegally and improperly and uncon-
stitionally, whatever their grievances.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Oh, no, I agree with that. But what I am
saying is that some people feel they have grievances leading up
to--can these concerns be resolved, do you think, and still permit
his return?
Mr. ARONSON. There are concerns among different sectors of
Haiti who had nothing to do with the coup about human rights,
about respect for their constitutional prerogatives. And one of the
reasons that the OAS voted to create this new civilian mission was
it recognized that if this crisis is going to be resolved, it will prob-
ably require a significant presence of the international community
for some time, precisely to give confidence to the parties that a set-
tlement will be respected on all sides.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Aronson, we are going to proceed to vote.
Mr. Fuster is going to continue with questioning, and then we will
return and continue when he is concluded.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Yes.
Mr. RANGEL. I will not be able to return, but I do want to take
this opportunity to thank the Secretary for the leadership that he
has provided in this international crises, and say that it makes us
all feel proud to be partners in government when our nation re-
sponds in such a way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Chairman Rangel.
Mr. FUSTER. Well, I guess one of the advantages of not having a
vote on the floor is that I get to chair meetings every now and
then, even though I am also the vice-chair of this subcommittee. So
I am doing it on a dual character.
PUERTO RICO'S INTEREST IN HAITI
Mr. Secretary, let me just begin by making some comments on
one of your responses, and this might lead to some questions. As
you probably know, in Puerto Rico there is a very substantial com-
munity of Haitian exiles that have come to Puerto Rico over the
years: people have been involved in prior struggles against the
regime, the old regime, and people that generally speaking have
been supportive of President Aristide. In fact, some of the persons I
have in mind are well known scholars in different universities in
Puerto Rico and they are people that I know fairly well.
RANK AND FILE OR WEALTHY HAITIANS POWER BEHIND COUP
The reason I preface my question in this way is because my con-
versations with them lead me to believe that is not the rank-and-
file soldiers in the Haitian army that are being rebellious about
President Aristide coming back.







It is very hard for me to believe that because of what they tell
me about the nature of the rank and file in the Haitian army. I
mean, such soldiers are not people that can take that kind of lead-
ership in any coordinated way.
On the other hand, they do believe, and there is some other evi-
dence in addition to what these very knowledgeable people tell me,
that there are officers-majors, some colonels-other officers cer-
tainly not Cedry, but other officers who are saying and that have
been expressed in public that there is no way they will allow Aris-
tide to come back, no matter what anybody says, OAS, the United
States, whoever. These are officers and politicians who are in very
close contact with some of the small group of wealthy people in
Haiti.
I was just thinking about that regarding your response to one of
the chairman's questions, the first question, as to the situation in
Haiti and whether these sanctions are going to work.
RANK-AND-FILE SOLDIERS INSTRUMENTAL IN COUP
Mr. ARONSON. Let me clarify what I said, Congressman, because
I agree with everything that you just said, and I didn't mean to
suggest a different view.
What I said was the rank-and-file soldiers and mid-level officers,
and there are clearly mid-level officers who are directly involved in
it. Major Francois is clearly one of the leaders of this coup. And I
was making the same distinction you were making.
What I am saying is I think the coup was not totally from the
top down, starting in the high command with orders being given
and being carried out. There was real discontent in at least one
and probably two of the companies in the Haitian army, and cer-
tainly mid level officers have been directly involved.
And you are correct that I think wealthy individuals, some of
whom have ties or inclinations with the Duvalier Regime, and
some of whom may have worst connections, are helping to finance
this.
The basic problem that we are all talking about remains, which
is how do you convince these individuals to yield power, and it is
one of the reasons why this crisis is so difficult to resolve. There
are no easy answers.
I think if they have any sense, they had better think about
weeks passing and them having to maintain power totally isolated
from fuel and ammunition and resupply and dollars. That may not
be such an inviting prospect as time goes by. The individuals are
going to have to face the sanctions that I referred to.
OPTIMISM FOR OAS CIVILIAN MISSION
But, third, I would hope that this OAS civilian mission that goes
to Haiti can begin to open a dialogue with some of the individuals
that have influence with this group, and hopefully walk them back
from the extreme position that they took.
I have heard different accounts of the coup itself, including from
some officers who were there at the time, and at least some of the
accounts suggest that in the early hours of the coup the soldiers
were demanding that certain grievances be addressed, and then the







momentum got going and passions got going, and eventually they
said Aristide has to leave.
Sc, a question is can you walk them back to focus on the griev-
ances with respect for President Aristide's authority. Right now
that is not the case. That's the diplomatic task, but it is a very dif-
ficult one.
Mr. FUSTER. Good. Well, I am glad that you cleared that up be-
cause I was not sure whether I had fully understood your answer.
And I have no quarrel with what you have expressed now.
DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR ARISTIDE WITHIN HAITI
I realize the complexity of the problem and there is no way one
can minimize that. It is really very difficult and there are no easy
answers in part because Aristide is certainly not-except with the
masses-not a very popular individual for what he has represented
to the elite. And I think what he has been attempting to do he is a
real threat to whatever power bases there might be in Haiti, gener-
ally speaking, power sectors.
I think that his main threat comes from the fact that he is an
honest man, and in the Government of Haiti that is a pretty rare
occurrence.
MEASURES NECESSARY IF SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK
One of the things that, of course, is in the minds of all of us that
are interested in this is what is going to happen if the sanctions
put in place do not work. As you know, this is not the first time
that sanctions have been imposed in Haiti, and they have not been
that successful in the past. We were just talking about this before.
In the long run, they tend to hurt most the people that are least
responsible for what is going on.
And some-I am not saying all of them-but some of the people
in the military, in the past at least, have been associated with drug
trafficking and they might have some independent funding sources
of their own.
My concern is whether the time has not come for us to think se-
riously about military intervention, and I surprise myself saying
something like that because I, long before I was in Congress, had
befriended the notion of strict nonintervention in the tradition of
Latin American political thinking that I share with them. The
notion of military intervention is certainly not part of my scheme
of values. But this is one occasion that I think a justification might
be found for it.
NO DEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN HAITI
When you look at Haiti objectively, there is really no power
structure there other than the army and the people that have
arms. Even the Catholic Church is weak there. There is no strong
middle class. There is no kind of strong democratic tradition. And
when you start looking for the elements that may allow for a
change, as we have seen in other societies, you surely do not find
them in Haiti.
I asked Aristide when he was here a few weeks ago, even if he
was put back in power, did he have any guarantee that an incident







like this would not happen again 3 months down the line, and he
told me, well, my hope is that I be able to work in creating condi-
tions to avoid that, but he surely was not hopeful that that is not
going to happen.
I am wondering whether the time has not come for us, perhaps
through OAS, to assume a position of some kind of joint interna-
tional force, not only to restore Aristide, but to help develop some
conditions there, long-range conditions that will allow Aristide or
anybody else who is democratically elected to really be able to
move forward with their government, given the very dismal reali-
ties of that country.
I do not know if such considerations, you have been discussed in
your own department, or you are free to tell us anything about
that. But I hope you would consider them because some of us are
very pessimistic that the economic sanctions are going to work. I
doubt that is going to happen. And I know of the divisions within
the OAS. In the OAS, there are people that for very different rea-
sons, and you know what I am talking about when I say very dif-
ferent reasons, do not care to consider seriously the military inter-
vention. Some of them are not so happy about Aristide being in
power in any case.
CHALLENGE EXISTS TO STRENGTHEN DEMOCRATIC TRADITION
So, how do we get out of this dilemma?
Mr. ARONSON. That is the $64,000 question, Mr. Chairman. I
agree with you, and I think the OAS has already committed itself
to try to send a presence there precisely to achieve the goal you
enunciated: to create the conditions not only to allow President
Aristide to return, but to allow democracy to consolidate, and his
security to be protected because you are correct that the challenge
here is not simply arrange for President Aristide to get on the
plane and go back to Haiti. The challenge is to see that once he
goes back the country does not repeat the same tragedy or a differ-
ent version of the same tragedy. That is going to take a commit-
ment by the international community for a significant period of
time.
The OAS, at President Aristide's personal request, has attempted
initially to make that a civilian presence, and I think it remains to
be seen whether or not the sanctions can work.
HAITI'S FIRST EXPERIENCE OF UNIVERSAL EMBARGO
I would say that Haiti has never been placed under the kind of
universal sanctions that it is currently under. Various countries
have cut off assistance, but there has never been an international
trade embargo levied on this country, and it is a country that is
particularly susceptible to such an embargo given its heavy de-
pendence on imported goods. It has no capacity to produce fuel, for
instance. It has no capacity to refine fuel.
There are individuals who may be willing to use their own dol-
lars for a short period of time to try to buy oil, but those dollars
are not going to last very long, and there is not anyone around in
the world market, I suspect, that is going to provide credit.







So, I would not minimize the impact of the sanctions. You are
correct, and one of the problems is how do you use sanctions as a
tool of diplomacy without also doing damage to innocent people,
and that is a terrible dilemma, and it is impossible to solve entire-
ly. We have tried as best as possible to carve out humanitarian ex-
ceptions. But I would tell you honestly that there are no such guar-
antees and this is not a scalpel. It is much more like a sledge
hammer.
As far as the question of what might come next, I think we
should concentrate on making the current policy work, if possible.
But I would agree with you that, if those who hold power in Haiti
do not take advantage of this opportunity to negotiate a solution,
then they will have to consider what the international community
might choose as a next step. And I do not want to speculate about
that, obviously, but they ought to be thinking about it.
DETERMINING CURRENT SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS
Mr. FUSTER. Well, talking about the sanctions, have you been
able-in the administration have you been able to pinpoint some of
the persons that finance the coup and made efforts to apply the
sanctions directly to them, some of the merchants or whatever?
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, we are in the process of doing just
that. We have already received a number of names from our em-
bassy. We have sent them over to the Treasury Department. We
are vetting them now, and under the authority the President estab-
lished through this executive order we intend to freeze their assets
and possibly deny them visas as well, as we did during the Panama
embargo. I think that is an important step, but I think we have a
responsibility to do that with some measure of care to ensure that
we do not so cite an innocent individual, but we intend to do that.
Mr. FUSTER. I believe that would be particularly effective here
precisely because of the relationship between some of these middle
rank officers and some of the wealthy people there.
OAS CIVILIAN TASK FORCE AND ITS VISIT TO HAITI
Regarding the visit of the civilian task force of the OAS, could
you tell us some more about it? I mean, do they have already a
schedule and is it going to be done in stages, and what precisely
are they going to be looking into?
I take it that for some of the people in Haiti, some of the mili-
tary, this civilian task force is really not welcomed. And I wonder
how effective they might be able to be.
Mr. ARONSON. The Secretary General has already chosen his per-
sonal representative to head up the task force, the former Foreign
Minister of Colombia, August Ramirez Ocampo, who is a very re-
spected diplomat. I will have breakfast with him and the Secretary
General tomorrow. Actually, I think it is lunch.
I do not want to speak for the OAS, but my best understanding
of their plans is to send down an initial contingent of somewhere
around 10 or a dozen people just to begin the mission there. But I
know that if the process is working, then the Secretary General
and the OAS would expand the size of the mission considerably,







and that I think will probably depend on the initial reports that
Mr. Ramirez Ocampo brings back.
I think what they will be looking for in conversations with all of
the various sectors in Haiti is a will to find a negotiated solution
that is consistent with the OAS mandate, which is that President
Aristide's government must be reestablished. And clearly, one of
the groups they have to find a way to at least determine the opin-
ion of, if not begin to promote a dialogue with, are members of the
military because they do hold effective power.
This is a very delicate process that they are carrying out because
there are people in Haiti who will kill anyone who they think is
intending to bring back President Aristide. We got a little sample
of that when we were at the airport the last day. So, this has to be
done with some care, but that is the purpose.
PROTECTION FOR PRESIDENT ARISTIDE
Mr. FUSTER. Well, that brings me to another point. Have you
been thinking about plans to protect Aristide, because I have been
reading about death threats. Some of the military-I think one offi-
cer there has even gone public saying that if Aristide goes back, he
will be killed.
Mr. ARONSON. Well, clearly, his security and the security of
others is one of the issues that has to be resolved in order to find a
negotiated solution, and President Aristide himself is quite mindful
of that.
I think if this works, and I would stress that it may not work,
the OAS would expand its presence in Haiti for a period of time
and would try to create conditions while the security issues can be
addressed.
The United States, during President Aristide's presidency, pro-
vided some training for presidential security personnel, but that
issue obviously would have to be addressed, and it is a very diffi-
cult issue.
RELIABILITY OF SECURITY FORCES IN HAITI
Mr. FUSTER. I remember a couple of years ago when the first
elections were going to be held after the Duvalier government was
deposed, the Reagan administration was sending a group of observ-
ers down, and they asked Congressman Ben Gilman and myself to
go down there as observers. We eventually did not go because just
before we left we were declared personas non grata by the junta.
But in preparing to go down there, we checked with some of the
people in the State Department and asked them what kind of secu-
rity we were going to have. And they told us, well, the Haitian
Army is going to provide it. And we said we probably would not go
if that was all of the security we were going to be getting, because
we thought that the army was part of the problem. And eventually
things were arranged to have our own security coming with us.
But I am very concerned about Aristide going back and not being
able to survive. From the things I hear from Haitians in Puerto
Rico, it is going to be very, very risky for him to do that. I do not
know anybody can guarantee his security.







Again, it is a very complex problem because I do not see sending
an international force, a small force just to protect him, but it is
another dilemma that makes it even more complicated, this whole
distressing picture.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH SANCTIONS
What about the international cooperation regarding the sanc-
tions? Are you working closely with countries not only in the OAS
but in the European Community to make sure that the sanctions
are as effective as they can be, the economic sanctions?
Mr. ARONSON. Congressman, the Secretary General of the OAS
has asked every member country to report back to him the meas-
ures they are taking to comply with the sanctions, precisely to
ensure that there is as strong a concerted action as possible.
My impression is is that the reports he is receiving are very, very
positive, and that governments around the hemisphere are taking
steps as necessary to comply. I would note that Venezuela and
Mexico, which had supplied oil to Haiti under the San Jose facility,
which provides oil at subsidized rates to countries in the Caribbean
Basin, has severed any further supplies of oil. Panama has frozen
assets of the Haitian Government. Spain and France are moving to
do the same.
The United States supplies somewhere between 60 and 65 per-
cent of Haiti's imports, and receives about 85 percent of Haiti's ex-
ports. So, the comprehensive embargo that the President has im-
posed alone will be extremely strongly felt there.
A number of countries in the hemisphere really have minimal
trade with Haiti, but I have never seen the international communi-
ty in this hemisphere unit more quickly and more strongly and
with more unanimity than it has around this Haitian problem. The
first OAS meeting was convened literally 2V2 days after this coup,
and it was a meeting of foreign ministers.
The OAS then designated a commission which included six for-
eign ministers who scrapped their schedules for a week in order to
go to Haiti. The Canadian Government provided an aircraft. The
foreign ministers reconvened on October 8, all of this within 8 or 9
days of the coup.
So I think there is very strong and committed agreement among
the nations of the hemisphere and beyond to try to make these
sanctions work.
CONCERNS ABOUT PRESIDENT ARISTIDE BEFORE THE COUP
Mr. FUSTER. In your dealings with representatives from other
governments regarding Haiti, have you found any kind of substan-
tial concern about some of these allegations made about Aristide's
behavior before he was deposed?
I am concerned because in one briefing we had some time ago
somebody from your office expressed what appeared to me to be
somewhat shocking views and condemnation of some of the things
that Aristide has been alleged to have done. I have read the speech
that has become so famous, and I would not advocate a person of
the United States, or someone for Puerto Rico, for that matter, to







make a speech like that. But in the Haitian context, I did not find
it as shocking as it appears to be to other people.
Is there a concern in other countries that there might be prob-
lems with Aristide's strong kind of government as it is perceived by
some?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, let me make a distinction between what
might be legitimate concerns and the basic principle that is at
issue here.
CONDEMNATION OF COUP
There is nothing that justifies the seizure of an elected president
by soldier in the night, tying him up with his necktie, threatening
him, forcing him to go to an airport and leave his country. And I
want to make that clear before I respond to your question, because
I do not want an honest answer to that question in any way to sug-
gest that this coup was justified. It was not. It is illegal, the United
States and every government in this hemisphere has said so. We
will not recognize this or any other illegal government that
emerges. And to quote Secretary Baker from the first meeting of
the OAS, "Until President Aristide's government is restored, this
junta will be treated as a piranha throughout this hemisphere
without assistance, without friends and without a future."
VISITS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
On the three visits of the foreign ministers, who traveled to
Haiti, these included the foreign ministers of Argentina, Venezu-
ela, Bolivia, Jamaica, Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and myself, we
met with a wide variety of Haitians, including elected members of
the parliament from many different political parties, including par-
ties that had supported President Aristide for the election. We met
with human rights representatives. We met with business repre-
sentatives. We met with individuals from the church, President
Aristide's prime minister and members of his cabinet who had
come out of hiding to meet with us, as well as with General Sidrus
and the high command.
In some of those conversations, the foreign ministers did hear
strong concerns about speeches that President Aristide had made,
not only the one that you cited but other speeches which, in their
opinion, countenanced, if not encouraged, street and vigilante vio-
lence against political opponents. And there have been such inci-
dents in Haiti.
The foreign ministers discussed this with President Aristide
when they returned. President Aristide left that meeting at the
OAS and condemned such street violence and mob violence, and
promised to do so if he returned as well. But part of the challenge
in Haiti is to address the fears that exist, and one of the important
reasons the OAS established this mission and offered to send a siza-
ble civilian presence was to give some confidence to all sides that if
and when legitimate constitutional authority is restored, that
human rights will be respected universally. And the OAS, in par-
ticular, offered to send the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights to Haiti to help provide such guarantees.







If you are going to convince some of the political sectors in Haiti
to support a negotiated settlement, including many who had no
role in the coup and did not support it initially, you have to ad-
dress those legitimate concerns. And I think there have been ex-
cesses and abuses that are unacceptable, but they certainly do not
justify the coup.
APPARENT DIMINISHED SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT ARISTIDE
Mr. FUSTER. Well, I have been somewhat surprised by the fact
that some of the people that supported him-I am talking about
political leaders who in the past have been involved in the strug-
gles against the regime there, and some of the people that are well
respected generally, have not been overly supportive of him after
the coup, and that has drawn my attention, as a sign that some
balance was needed and that it was disappearing fast. But that is
one thing, as I think you yourself recognize, and something else is
to justify the coup against Aristide.
And I have been surprised, in talking with some of the ambassa-
dors to the OAS, by the position of some of them, I am not saying
that there are even a lot of them, but some of them easily to con-
demn Aristide for his behavior, and it has planted some seeds of
doubts in my mind as to how willing they are to do more if the
economic sanctions are not successful.
But I guess you do not have any quarrel with that? I mean your
position is very definite as to the need to restore Aristide.
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN HAITI AND ENTIRE HEMISPHERE AT STAKE
Mr. ARONSON. There are two issues here. One is the future of
Haiti and the other is the future of democracy in the hemisphere.
The Haitian people elected President Aristide by 67 percent on De-
cember 16. It was the first free and fair election in their history. If
it does not stand, if it is overthrown by violence, that is a terrible
blow to their aspirations and opportunities to join the democratic
community and enjoy elementary political rights.
And, secondly, there are other actors in the hemisphere who are
watching events in Haiti, and it is very important that they receive
a very clear message from the democratic community, and that is
that there is a terrible price to be paid for overthrowing a demo-
cratic elected president. And I think that message has been deliv-
ered.
CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
But to resolve the problem, the realities in Haiti have to be ad-
dressed, and human rights and fear of abuses is one of those reali-
ties that have to be addressed. And I would note that in the first
days of the coup a Haitian political leaders, Sylvio Claude, who had
been jailed by Duvalier, who had been exiled by Duvalier, was
necklaced in the streets. He had nothing to do with the coups, but
he was seen as having a different view than the Aristide govern-
ment. That obviously is unacceptable and intolerable, and that
kind of practice has to be addressed if you are going to heal this
country.







Mr. FUSTER. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. I am trying to find out
what is going on with the vote.
Mr. Secretary, I do not have any more questions of my own to
ask, but I suppose I should then declare a recess if you care to stay
until the rest of the members come back.
Mr. ARONSON. OK, I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FUSTER. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. TORRICELLI. The committee will please resume.
Mr. Aronson, I want to apologize to you for the lengthy interrup-
tion. I believe it is the last time it will happen, but I appreciate
your indulging the committee as we begin to return.
I note too there is a considerable risk that we can duplicate ques-
tions asked by Mr. Fuster. But just for a few minutes I would like
to pursue a number of what might appear to be obvious issues.
U.S. CITIZENS IN HAITI AND EVACUATION PROCESS
Could you tell me at the moment the number of Americans who
you believe remain in Haiti?
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, there were about 8,300 Americans
officially registered with our embassy before this coup, but there
are probably several thousand others, at least, who have dual citi-
zenship. And of that 8300 we estimate, and this is very roughly,
that perhaps as many as 3000 have left since the coup.
There are additional flights now back into Haiti. Two American
carriers are going in there, so I think that number is probably de-
creasing, but somewhere around 5,000 are probably still there.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Can you yet tell how many people are respond-
ing and in what magnitude to your call of yesterday for complete
evacuation?
Mr. ARONSON. Hard to tell. American and Pan Am are both
flying into Haiti, but even their flights are not full when they
leave, though people are leaving. I think a number of Americans
are leaving. But oftentimes, as you know in a situation like this,
you have people who have lived in the country for decades and that
is their home, and they choose to stay there.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Can we assume if an emergency arises, however,
where there is an increased level of threat to them, that contingen-
cy plans exist to deal with that number of people on an extremely
short notice basis for immediate evacuation?
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, we strongly encourage Americans
there to leave now and to leave in an orderly way under the oppor-
tunities they have. Clearly, we do have such contingency plans if
they should become necessary.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Let me return to the political situation in Haiti.
QUESTIONABLE ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT ARISTIDE'S GOVERNMENT
All of our commitment to the democratic process in the restora-
tion of constitutional government I assume to be clear. It is also
clear, however, in the weeks since the coup that we have learned
that there are aspects to Mr. Aristide's government that are less
than all true democrats would hope in the conduct of his office and
perhaps the tone of his remarks.








Is it your belief that Mr. Aristide can be returned to office fully
in accord with the constitution of Haiti under which people in the
country can be assured that their safety and the functioning of the
lawful government is peaceful and nonthreatening?
Mr. ARONSON. That is a tall order, Mr. Chairman. That is clearly
the challenge we face. There are decent democrats, democrats in
Haiti who did not support this coup and did not participate in it,
who have concerns about Mr. Aristide's return. They are afraid of
mob violence and clearly one of the challenges is not only to return
him physically, but to create conditions as you describe where
order can be restored and human rights can be respected.
SUCCESS OF OBSERVER MISSIONS TO ELECTIONS REASON FOR HOPE
That is one of the principal reasons why the OAS has created
this civilian mission, and it is patterned after the success of the ob-
server mission during the elections.
What was amazing about those elections was that throughout the
country there was peace and not really a single instance of vio-
lence, and there were many reasons, but one of the reasons was
that the world community was watching and the world community
was there, and something approaching that, though not necessary
at the same numbers, has to be recreated in Haiti if the situation
is going to be stabilized and a long-term solution is going to be
reached.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Solarz, would you like to ask questions at
this point?
Mr. SOLARZ. Gracias el jefe.
POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS
Mr. Secretary, how confident are you that the sanctions which
have been imposed, I gather not just by us, but by virtually every
country in the hemisphere, of a fairly comprehensive character, in-
cluding just about everything except, I gather, food and medicine
and air transport, will succeed in bringing about the restoration of
President Aristide?
Mr. ARONSON. It is clear that Haiti will feel the effects of the
sanctions. But whether or not those who hold de facto power and
those who hold the guns will respond by agreeing to negotiate
President Aristide's return is not clear.
As I said earlier, I think that a number of the elites and people
in positions of political authority and military authority recognize
that Haiti cannot withstand this kind of sanction. But whether
they can convince these soldiers and some of the officers, I do not
know.
CHANCES GIVEN AS BETTER THAN EVER THAT ARISTIDE WILL BE
RESTORED
Mr. SOLARZ. Well, say on a scale of zero to 10, with 10 being a
certainty that within say 2 months Aristide will have been re-
stored, and zero being a certainty that he will not be restored,
where would you put it, just so I get a sense of what you consider
the probabilities or possibilities to be?








Mr. ARONSON. When you say restored, you mean physically back
in the country within 2 months?
Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, and in his capacity as president of the country.
Mr. ARONSON. I do not know how quickly he will go back phys-
ically because he himself wants to make sure that conditions exist
that he can go back with some security, and that is going to take
some extra effort.
I do not think the status quo can prevail down there for 2
months, and I hate to answers questions like this. I guess I would
say it would be somewhere around six.
Mr. SOLARZ. OK, so it is slightly better than 50/50.
Mr. ARONSON. Perhaps.
Mr. SOLARZ. But it easily could fail.
Now, has Aristide changed his position at all about the use of
multinational force to reinstate his government?
Mr. ARONSON. Not that I know of.
Mr. SOLARZ. So as far as you know he is opposed to that?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, I do not want to say he is opposed to it. But
when asked, he said he wanted to see some other effort tried at
this time.
CONSIDERATION OF FORCE IF SANCTIONS FAIL
Mr. SOLARZ. Well, if it looks, after a month of the full application
of sanctions, that they are not producing a change in the situation
in terms of a willingness on the part of the key people who wield
power to let Aristide come back-or let us say 2 months--
Mr. ARONSON. Yes, fair trial.
Mr. SOLARZ. In other words, if at some point, whenever that
period ends, it looks like this strategy is not working, what would
be our attitude toward the possible establishment under the OAS
of a multinational force to restore him?
Mr. ARONSON. That is a decision that the President would obvi-
ously have to make, so I cannot give you a yes or no answer. But
that would clearly be one of the options that would have to be
looked at very seriously, and I think the United States would have
to consider it seriously.
CONSEQUENCES OF USE OF FORCE
Mr. SOLARZ. Well, I assume that you have at least looked into
the logistical feasibilities of such an option. Assuming this were to
be done, would you anticipate a prolonged resistance and massive
casualties? Or, would you think that it could be brought to a suc-
cessful conclusion fairly quickly given the relatively minimal size
of the Haitian Armed Forces?
Mr. ARONSON. Obviously, that would depend on the size of a mul-
tilateral force and how quickly it could be deployed. The Haitian
army does not have much of a history of fighting opposing armies,
and these are very poorly trained and equipped soldiers. And I
think they would be quite in awe of such a force, should it come
into Haiti.
However, that does not mean that some remnants could not go
into the hills and continue some kind of guerrilla war.







PREDICTING HAITIAN RESPONSE TO MILITARY INTERVENTION
Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any sense of how the people of Haiti
would feel about this?
Mr. ARONSON. I think the most fervent supporters of President
Aristide would welcome it, but I would note, from having spent a
lot of time in this country, that this is a very proud people. As you
know, they were the first country outside the United States to
achieve their independence, and some people who have surprising
views about this who might fervently want Aristide come back, but
might not welcome what they would see as an intrusion on their
sovereignty.
Mr. SOLARZ. How does the Haitian exile community in the
United States feel about that option?
Mr. ARONSON. I honestly do not know.
Mr. SOLARZ. Have any of them met with you?
Mr. ARONSON. I met with a group from Miami that included
some Haitians, but that was not the subject of the conversation.
PREDICTING OAS SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL FORCE
Mr. SOLARZ. To get the OAS to adopt a resolution authorizing the
establishment and use of such a force, would a majority vote of the
OAS be sufficient, or do you need two-thirds?
Mr. ARONSON. I think you would need two-thirds, but there is a
question that we have already begun to discuss within the OAS
about that. There are some members of the OAS who question
whether the charter permits the creation of such a force.
There are some legal questions that have been raised and that
have to be addressed, and I have to say that there are some
member states of the OAS who have strong feelings in the other
direction, as you know.
Mr. SOLARZ. Well, can you tell us which members of the OAS
would be most disposed toward the establishment of a multination-
al force, particularly if that looks necessary, and which ones would
be most opposed to it?
Mr. ARONSON. I would rather answer that question in closed ses-
sion, just because some of those would take offense at my charac-
terization.
CHARGES OF ARISTIDE SUPPORTERS' USE OF PERE LEBRUN
Mr. SOLARZ. Now, what can you tell us about the truth or accura-
cy of the allegations that President Aristide has publicly and re-
peatedly encouraged his supporters in Haiti to use this technique
of Pere Lebrun against those who are perceived to be enemies of
his government?
Has has he in fact done that? If he did, was it once or on several
occasions? And have we discussed this with him? And if so, what
does he say?
Mr. ARONSON. When the Commission of Foreign Ministers went
to Haiti between the October 2 meeting and October 8 meeting, we
heard an awful lot of concern about this from Haitians, many of
whom were not supporters of the coup, elected officials, et cetera.
And there is a enormous fear of President Aristide's ability to mo-
bilize the masses.






32

He gave two speeches, one on August 3 and one on September 27,
in which he certainly appeared to countenance, if not encourage,
the use of this technique. And the foreign ministers raised this
with President Aristide upon their return from the first two visits.
He said that he would denounce this practice and did so at the
OAS, and said he would denounce it once he returns to Haiti.
And it is a legitimate problem down there, and it is part of the
problem.
Mr. SOLARZ. Are you satisfied with his assurance?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, he did leave the meeting and denounced this
practice. We would certainly hope and expect him to do so once he
returned to Haiti as well.
Mr. SOLARZ. Did he deny that he had encouraged it?
Mr. ARONSON. He suggested that his remarks were misunder-
stood and that that is not what he intended.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do you believe that?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, I do not like to question the motives of
heads of state, and so I will put it this way. He came out of a move-
ment that faced harsh violence and a brutal dictatorship, and he
felt the need in those years to mobilize opposition. Those kind of
practices cannot be carried out once you are head of government,
and I think that is an important lesson to be learned.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE EMBARGO
Mr. SOLARZ. How dependent is Haiti on foreign trade? What
would be the economic consequences of this embargo?
Mr. ARONSON. Haiti, as most islands are, is heavily dependent on
foreign trade, and particularly on trade with the United States.
They import about 62 percent of all goods and services from the
United States. They export about 85 percent of their exports to the
United States.
Mr. SOLARZ. But how important is their foreign trade in their
overall economy?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, it is largely an agricultural and subsistence
economy. So, in one sense, it is not important. But to run the
macro economy-fuel, basic food staples and the like-to employ-
ment people, it is virtually totally dependent.
Mr. SOLARZ. So what will happen once this embargo takes effect?
Mr. ARONSON. I think the formal economy will begin to suffer
severe constrictions. They will not be able to generate power at the
same levels. They will run out of and have to ration gasoline. The
part of the economy which depends on exports, the assembly sector
which employs about 35,000 Haitians, will be subject to the embar-
go. All kinds of consumer goods will be unavailable. So, I think
that there will be a severe impact. An awful lot of Haitians in
Port-Au-Prince have already begun to leave for the countryside
where I guess they can subsist at some bare minimum, but I think
the cash economy will be contracting very severely.
CONCERNS OF MILITARY OF RETRIBUTION SHOULD ARISTIDE RETURN
Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you finally, I gather from what you said
that this was sort of a coup that emanated from below; that some
of the members of the military, who I gather were fearful of what







might happen to them if President Aristide remained in power,
thought they would lose some of their opportunities. Given what
they have done and the extent to which they have forced him into
exile, they obviously have concerns about what will happen to
them if he returns. But that also raises serious questions as to
whether you give amnesties or permit people to remain in place
who were responsible for this originally.
So, how is President Aristide and how is the OAS attempting to
deal with these concerns on the part of the people who are going to
have to agree to his return, if it is going to take place, while recog-
nizing that there may indeed be legitimate motives for disciplining
or dismissing some of these people?
Mr. ARONSON. That is clearly one of the toughest challenges in
this negotiation. Those issues began to be addressed in the conver-
sations the foreign ministers were having both in Haiti and then
with Aristide, and that was aborted by the soldiers.
I cannot tell you how they will finally resolve them. I think that
is up to President Aristide with the other elements in the Haitian
Government. He himself, President Aristide, in an Op-Ed piece ad-
dressed some of those concerns by making it clear that he respects
the institutional role of the army, that is established the constitu-
tion. He suggested that the army has to begin to develop a new
role, civic action and the like, but obviously where it will bite will
be with individuals and what their fate will be, and that, I think,
will have to be negotiated out.
Mr. SOLARZ. Muchas gracias.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Solarz.
Mr. ARONSON. You know you are going to have to also begin to
do this in Portuguese if you are going to do justice to the entire
hemisphere.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Solarz can do this in almost any language.
Mr. ARONSON. That is true. And equally eloquently.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ISSUE OF HAITIAN REFUGEES
Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you about how all of this turmoil
in Haiti reflects on U.S. immigration policy toward the Haitian ref-
ugees coming especially to the south Florida area. Recently, maybe
a week or two ago, for the first time the Coast Guard and INS, all
the other services that continually scout the border of south Flori-
da, for the first time did not perform their usual duties, which is
they routinely stop the ships coming from Haiti loaded up with
people, do their 10 minute quickly interview which determines
whether or not they might be-the refugees might be eligible for
political asylum. And in this case they allowed the shipload of refu-
gees to come to south Florida. And it was the first time that that
has happened, and there has been some concern that because of
the political turmoil, the uncertainty for the refugees, that it is fit-
ting that U.S. immigration policy then reflect the changing times,
the nondemocrat government that is on board in Haiti.
My question is has there been an official declaration on the part
of the any agency in the U.S. Government that the immigration








policies as they relate to Haitian refugees in the United States has
changed?
Was that a fluke that INS allowed the ship to come aboard? Will
those folks be eligible then for political asylum requests? And will
their pleas be heard and their applications be expedited in view of
the changing, dramatically changing events in Haiti?
Mr. ARONSON. Congresswoman, I know this is a subject of great
interest in Florida, and Miami, in particular. I would like to em-
phasize in responding to your question it is also a very sensitive
subject, and I have to be careful in answering your question. I
would rather address some of your questions privately because the
wrong signal could lead to a large increase in people at great risk
trying to come to our country, and I do not think either of us want
to send that signal.
I am not familiar with the particular incident that you just refer-
enced about a ship. Clearly, under established policy an individual
comes to this country seeking refugee status is judged according to
whether or not that individual faces a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion. And clearly, that question has to be answered in light of the
realities in Haiti today, which include significant violence and the
illegal overthrow of the government.
I know that immigration authorities, even prior to the coup, had
expanded the time in which they interview Haitians coming here
to ensure that they had a full and fair airing of their situation, to
answer that question.
As far as other matters, we certainly are looking into them and I
would rather discuss that beyond in a private session.
FATAL HAZARDS OF ATTEMPTING TO REACH THE U.S.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Aronson, would it be safe, however, to say,
so there will be no misunderstanding, that there is no announced
change in American policy, and indeed it would be both dangerous
and unwise for the general population of Haiti to embark on any
travel at this point?
Mr. ARONSON. Mr. Chairman, our best estimates are that 50 per-
cent of the Haitians who try to come here over the seas die in the
passage. It is a very dangerous trip, and we hope that individuals
do not risk their lives that way.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Indeed, there is a risk through misinterpretation
that some in Haiti believe that there has been some announced
and dramatic change in American policy with regard to immigra-
tion. Indeed, the policy is consistent, that there is no announced
change, and it would be extremely foolish if rumors were to lead
people to embark on a dangerous and ultimately unproductive jour-
ney.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, do you have anything further you wish to ask?
DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES
Finally, Mr. Aronson, the distribution of those goods that will
continue to flow to Haiti, those staple foods, is anything other than
the regular commercial outlets anticipated for distribution?
Mr. ARONSON. I think that we are going to try to operate
through nongovernmental organizations in Haiti and international







organizations as much as possible. These are institutions and
groups that work directly with poor communities, so that the right
people get it, and the government does not get it.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Is there a planned succession of the OAS that
will at some point review the embargo and the actions of the vari-
ous governments to make further judgments? Is there something
scheduled?
Mr. ARONSON. The Secretary General has asked every member
state to report to him the steps they are taking to comply with the
embargo, and those reports are coming in. My understanding is
that they show very strong compliance. So, I do not know of a
meeting scheduled in particular, but obviously when this mission
comes back to report, that is something I think the members are
going to want to look at very carefully.
POTENTIAL FOR THIRD COUNTRIES TO FILL TRADE VACUUM
Mr. TORRICELLI. And are you monitoring closely whether any of
our friends in Asia or in the European Community at any point,
corporation in those countries, begin to take advantage of the em-
bargo and become outlets for goods or sources of goods?
Mr. ARONSON. We are trying to look at that very closely. One re-
ality of the embargo is by freezing the assets of the government, it
really has no hard currency. So unless wealthy individuals are will-
ing to finance essential imports like oil-
Mr. TORRICELLI. Or, indeed, engage in barter.
Mr. ARONSON. Correct.
Mr. TORRICELLI. There are outlets for those who are unscrupu-
lous.
Mr. ARONSON. That is true. And, in fact, I mentioned while you
were gone that the EC is debating whether or not to impose a trade
embargo. I think they want to do so. There is some questions of
whether they can do that consistent with their responsibilities
under the Lomei Convention. We hope they resolve that in favor of
a strong embargo.
Mr. TORRICELLI. As you say, Mr. Aronson, where there is a will
there is a way.
Are there conditions that you would care to cite under which the
administration would lift or revise the embargo and other sanc-
tions short of complete and unconditional restoration of Mr. Aris-
tide's military at some point to announce a change? If they were to
announce changes in policy, are there any theoretical actions that
might be taken which would permit a lifting or a change short of
those that I described?
Mr. ARONSON. Well, I do not want to send any signal to Haiti
that there is some halfway measures, because there are none.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Well, that is an important message in and of
itself; that they should not live with false hope.
Mr. ARONSON. Correct. And we want to see the OAS resolutions
complied with and that means President Aristide restored to au-
thority. If and when that clearly is entrain, then the questions you
raise I think could be addressed.








U.S. TRADITION OF ASSISTING THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY
Mr. TORRICELLI. Finally, Mr. Aronson, a comment, not a ques-
tion. There are progressive forces throughout Latin America who,
when governments in their own country were threatened or re-
moved from power, appealed to the United States to help to restore
democracy. For their own sake, if not for the sake of people in
Haiti, they had best not be silent now.
They had a right to expect the United States to stand for democ-
racy in their countries when it was threatened in their lands. We
have a right and, I believe, an expectation that they not be silent.
We hear from them. That they now become a part of efforts within
their own countries to have their own governments be cooperative
with efforts to restore democracy in Haiti. Some may find it appro-
priate to be part of calling upon their governments to join in a pos-
sible future multilateral force. If they do not find it in their heart
and in their own good conscious to do so, they can at a minimum
be part of urging their governments to be part of a full and effec-
tive embargo no.
I think that is an appropriate standard for all peoples in Latin
America who through the years would have lectured the United
States about our appropriate role. Now they are part of the fami-
lies of democracies. It is not simply for the United States to have
an appropriate role to play.
Finally, I will comment on our good friends in Europe. If there
were a coup today among the family of nations in Europe, an em-
bargo would happen so quickly and so forcefully the ink would not
be dry by the time calls were made to Washington.
Well, the politics of Europe is not the only thing that is impor-
tant. So too in this hemisphere. We have a right to expect that the
nations of Europe and of Asia respond as quickly and forcefully
threats to democracy in this hemisphere as we have for 50 years
and beyond the threats to democracy in their hemisphere.
Indeed, in the future let their conduct in this crisis be a guide to
us as we continue to respond to crises in their hemisphere.
Mr. Aronson, thank you for your leadership, for the wisdom the
administration has brought to American policy in this crisis.
Thank you for your availability today as always, and for spending
this time with us.
Mr. ARONSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. TORRICELLI. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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