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THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN HAITI


HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MARCH 8 AND 23, 1988

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1988


88-454


For sale by the Superintenden' of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402















COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman


LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAN MICA, Florida
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
CHESTER G. ATKINS, Massachusetts
JAMES McCLURE CLARKE, North Carolina
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
FOFO I.F. SUNIA, American Samoa


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio
BEN BLAZ, Guam


JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff
PETER QUILTER, Staff Assistant


SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan, Chairman
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
TED WEISS, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
VICTOR C. JOHNSON, Subcommittee Staff Director
TABOR E. DUNMAN, Jr., Minority Staff Consultant
NANCY A. AGRIS, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
-.. LORNA E. WATSON, Subcommittee Staff Consultant








,\") //





CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 8, 1988: Page
Hon. Walter Edward Fauntroy, Delegate in Congress from the District of
Columbia, and chairman, Congressional Task Force on Haiti................. 2
Ray Joseph, Editor and Publisher, Haitian Observateur.............................. 4
Dr. Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, professor, department of Afro-American
Studies, Univeristy of Wisconsin-Milwaukee......................................... 8
Michael Hooper, Executive Director, National Coalition for Haitian Refu-
gees......................................................................................................................... 22
Dr. Georges Fauriol, Senior Fellow and Director, Latin American Studies,
Center for Strategic and International Studies........................................ 50
Hon. James L. Oberstar, Representative in Congress from the State of
M inn esota .............................................................................................................. 88
Wednesday, March 23, 1988:
Hon. Major R. Owens, Representative in Congress from the State of New
Y ork ........ ........................................................................................................... 107
Richard Holwill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
A ffairs.... ...................................... 133
MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
1. Statement of the Manigat government and the continuing rule of terror
and illegality in Haiti by the Washington Office on Haiti................................ 91
2. Statement of the Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy, Chairman of the Congressional
Task Force on Haiti ........................... 110
3. Statement of Nina Shea and Leslie Hunter of the Puebla Institute................. 111
4. Copy of H.R. 4152, a bill to support democracy and human rights in Haiti.... 120
5. Letter from the Hon. George W. Crockett, Jr., Chairman, Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs to Secretary of State George P. Shultz ............... 148
6. Letter from the Department of State to the Hon. Geo. W. Crockett, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs............................... 149

APPENDIXES
Biographies of witnesses:
1. Raym ond A lcide Joseph...................................................................................... 171
2. Patrick Bellegard-Sm ith ..................................................................................... 172
3. G eorges A Fauriol............................................................................................... 173











THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN HAITI


TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1988
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met at 2:07 p.m., room 2172, Rayburn House
Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. George W. Crockett, Jr.,
presiding.
Mr. CROCKETT. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
The subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs meets today
to discuss the current situation in Haiti and the prospects for
future U.S.-Haitian relations.
We meet in difficult times for the Haitian people. Despite their
best efforts to establish a democratic government, the Haitians are
faced with a declared president; one not elected according to their
constitution, but selected by, and subservient to powerful military
leaders.
The United States government contributed to the current situa-
tion by placing its confidence in the assurances of the military that
the Army would support and protect the original November elec-
tions.
In addition, our government declined to make its position abun-
dantly and publicly clear that we would not recognize a govern-
ment unless it was elected in free and fair elections pursuant to
the Haitian constitution.
In effect, we continued to contribute to the current political crisis
in Haiti by the confusion surrounding our current relationship
with the Manigat government. On the one hand we have suspended
all assistance to the government of Haiti, but on the other hand we
send our Ambassador to the inauguration.
It seems to me we must not make the same mistake we made in
November. We need to make our position clear that the United
States government will use every diplomatic, political and econom-
ic means at our disposal to help accomplish a free and fair election
in Haiti. If, as we have made clear in Panama, it is possible to deny
recognition to a president selected by a military leader, and to
refuse to have any contact with that government, then we must do
the same in Haiti.
In that light, there are many steps we might consider including:
continued suspension of economic assistance; additional trade and
economic sanctions; the use of our influence and international fi-
nancial institutions to prevent loans to the government of Haiti;
the involvement of international and regional organizations such







as the United Nations and the Organization of American States in
diplomatic efforts to bring about free and fair elections in Haiti;
and finally, calling on our friends and allies throughout the world
to support our efforts to establish a transition to democracy in
Haiti.
These are just some of the many issues we hope to cover today
and in a second hearing which we have scheduled for March 23rd.
Today we look forward to hearing from a panel of expert wit-
nesses who will discuss the current situation in Haiti; and we also
look forward to having them share with us their views on the
future of U.S.-Haitian relations.
But before introducing our witnesses, I wonder, Mr. Lagomar-
sino, have you an opening statement?
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman, a very brief one.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased the subcommittee is holding hear-
ings on the Political Crisis in Haiti. The tragedies of violence and
disruption of the democratic process have affected not only the
people of Haiti, but also the United States interest as well, and in
addition to that, of course, the interest of many people in many
lands in the area.
Efforts by both the Administration and the Congress to promote
and strengthen democratic governments in the region have met a
painful setback. How to deal with that setback constructively is
challenging us today.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to hearing our witnesses
and the insights they can provide on the political developments in
Haiti and what they can mean for the future.
The Congress is faced with a number of competing recommenda-
tions on how best to proceed to further the cause of democracy, re-
spect for human rights, and protection for the Haitian people. And
I hope that the witnesses can give us some useful guidance here.
I am confident that with the testimony of these witnesses and
that of the Administration in a few weeks we will be better
equipped to determine the course of U.S. policy towards Haiti.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Lagomarsino.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiss.
Mr. WEISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no comment to
make.
Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Solarz.
Mr. SOLARZ. I have no comments.
Mr. CROCKETT. We are delighted to have sitting with our subcom-
mittee the Chairman of the Task Force on Haiti, Congressman
Fauntroy from the District of Columbia.
Have you an opening statement, Mr. Fauntroy?
STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER EDWARD FAUNTROY, A
DELEGATE IN CONGRESS FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. FAUNTROY. I do, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you, first of
all, for inviting me in my capacity as Chairman of the Congression-
al Task Force on Haiti to sit with the Subcommittee as it explores
the current situation in Haiti, and the prospects and recommenda-
tions for U.S.-Haitian relations.







Mr. Chairman, today's hearings and the one that you will be
having on March 22nd are very important because they provide a
significant forum for expressing the concern of the Congress over
the state of U.S. relations with Haiti.
CONGRESS MUST DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT
It is very important to U.S. national interests in Haiti, both
short term and long term, that those of us serving in the Congress
demonstrate that we are supportive of the hopes and aspirations of
the Haitian people for a constitutional government, human rights,
justice and bottom up economic development.
These hopes, as you know, received a severe blow and have been
crushed for the moment by cynical elements of the military allied
with the remnants of the Tontons-Macoute leadership. Credible re-
ports indicate that elements of the Tontons-Macoutes have re-
turned to power and that Duvalier forces have a significant pres-
ence within the legislature selected on January the 17th.
The military's selection of President Leslie Francois Manigat, a
distinguished academic, is being used by those coordinating a so-
phisticated public relations campaign to put a respectable face on
government imposed by the gun upon the Haitian people. The guns
which were unleashed on the Haitian people on November the
29th, 1987 to abort constitutional elections were the instruments of
state sanctioned terror designed to perpetuate an economic and
social system which benefits a few wealthy families at the expense
of a majority of hard working and resilient people.
The present situation in Haiti is also defined by the increasing
utilization of Haiti by the narcotics cartel, as a transshipment
point for illicit substances into the United States. Evidence indi-
cates that senior military officers are involved in this drug traffick-
ing.
THE U.S. MUST NOT FORGET
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Congressional Task Force on
Haiti has been working with you and the Chairman of the Full
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chairman Fascell, to develop a leg-
islative initiative that will concretely place our nation on the side
of democracy and constitutional government in Haiti.
Implicit in this legislation is the importance of remembering the
present Manigat/military regime was placed into power through
murderous violence inflicted on the Haitian people and recognizing
the violent and unconstitutional origin of the present regime in
Haiti.
Congressman James Oberstar has shared with us a dramatic
creole proverb reminding us of our nation's obligation not to forget,
"God's pencil has no eraser." Therefore, I urge that we join Chair-
man Dante Fascell in promising that the United States Congress
will not conduct business as usual with the Manigat/military
regime.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to share this
with you.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Fauntroy.







All of our witnesses today are nongovernment people. At our
second hearing on March 23rd we will hear from the State Depart-
ment and other individual members of the Congress.
I would like to welcome today, Mr. Ray Joseph of the Haitian
Observateur; Professor Patrick Bellegarde-Smith of the University
of Wisconsin; Mr. Michael Hooper, Executive Director of the Na-
tional Coalition for Haitian Refugees; and Mr. Georges Fauriol of
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We are delight-
ed to have each of you.
I would suggest that you try to confine your presentation to 10
minutes. You will, if you have not already done so, leave with the
committee copies of your remarks and they will be included in the
record.
We will have questions from Members of the committee follow-
ing the last presentation.
Mr. Ray Joseph, you may begin. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF RAY JOSEPH, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER, HAITIAN
OBSERVATEUR
Mr. JOSEPH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, members of Congress, ladies and gentleman, I
want to give a brief historical overview of the situation in Haiti.
From 1957 to 1971, Francois Duvalier, who is called Papa Doc
Duvalier, ruled Haiti with iron fist and caused havoc in the land.
Thousands were jailed, exiled and killed as Papa Doc went about
his business, only 600 miles from U.S. shores.
Except for a short period under President Kennedy, the United
States supported Duvalier, who boasted of his power against the
vacillating Yankee giant. The late dictator even claimed the death
of President Kennedy, his arch-enemy, on November 22, 1963. Du-
valier did everything on the 22nd of the month: he was elected Sep-
tember 22nd; took his oath for office on October 22nd; named him-
self President-for-Life on April 22nd; and died, people say, on April
'22nd, 1971. In a country where superstitions run rampant, Duva-
lier's claims of the U.S. doing whatever he wants have not gone un-
noticed>
The United States, as Duvalier always said, would eventually
embrace whomever holds power, especially since it is not Commu-
nist power. Duvalier claimed to be the bastion against Communism
in the Caribbean.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR DUVALIER
The United States acquiesced. In 1969, President Nixon sent the
late Nelson Rockefeller on a Latin American goodwill tour.
Snubbed in many capitals, Governor Rockefeller received his
warmest welcome in Duvalier's Haiti. His photo with Duvalier
arm-in-arm on Duvalier's balcony sent the message around the
world that the U.S. was ready to embrace the murderous dictator.
The rest is history.
Duvalier claimed that he was creating a "Taiwan" in the Carib-
bean for the U.S., and American businesses were very pleased.







The Haitian constitution was modified in 1964 to make Duvalier
President-for-Life. In 1971, when Duvalier was dying he again
modified it and named his then 19 year old son as President-for-
Life. We all sat around and accepted that.
The U.S. Ambassador, Clinton Knox, served as the Godfather for
this transfer of power from father to son. The U.S. helped Baby
Doc consolidate his power, and provided economic and military aid.
With U.S. expertise, a new repressive corps, the Leopards, was cre-
ated to replace the Tontons-Manigat, the Gestapo-like police of
Papa Doc. However, both corps remained throughout the Baby Doc
years.
Yes, subtle changes did occur. Corpses of rebels were no longer
displayed on street corners in broad daylight to deter would be op-
ponents. The victims disappeared at midnight. The effect was the
same, and the mission was kept in check.
SECURITY A FIRST PRIORITY
A slogan made famous by Papa Doc, "Despite our social needs,
security shall always be given priority," remained through the
years.
Under the Duvaliers, Haiti has become almost a desert. In prac-
ticing security, 75 percent of the land was left a desert. Only 10 to
25 percent is now wooded, compared to 75 percent when Duvalier
took over. And you know, a policy of Duvalier was to weed out the
rebels on the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. A
piece of land three kilometers was destroyed so much so that now
you can fly over and see when you leave Haiti and go to the Do-
minican Republic.
Baby Doc had his own slogan, "My father made the political rev-
olution, and I will make the economic revolution." Few of us un-
derstood what he meant, but when he left on February 7, 1986, we
found out that his wealth was between $500 million and $1 billion.
A lot of it was provided by the U.S., and a lot of it hidden in for-
eign banks. We went along with that.
PERIOD OF IMPROVED RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
At least one U.S. President, Mr. Carter, who is often derided for
his weak presidency, did something about Haiti. His Ambassador to
the United Nations, the Honorable Andrew Young, on a visit to
Port-au-Prince didn't flinch when he delivered his public message
to Baby Doc. "Mr. President," he said, "stop jailing the voices of
freedom."
Moreover, the U.S. made it very clear that it demanded respect
for human rights. The prison doors of Haiti swung open and people
that we thought had been dead for years came out for the first
time.
Timidly at first, then with more boldness, opposition to Duvalier-
ists showed its head. Civil rights organizations, radio stations, and
certain publications dared to challenge the order of the day, but all
came to a screeching halt in November, 1980, when President
Reagan was elected President of the United States.







Somehow, the Duvalierists thought they had a clear signal to re-
introduce repression in Haiti. The crackdown began: journalists
were jailed; unionists were exiled; and political leaders kicked out.
However, the seed of freedom had already been sown. And five
years later, on February 7, 1986, we had the explosion.
The king is dead; long live the king. Apparently that was what
happened in Haiti. After Baby Doc's departure he was allowed to
put his military friends in power. We backed it, and the U.S.
backed it.
I don't want to go into testimony of others, because I am quite
sure they will mention what the military has done in the past two
years. However, nobody can forget November 29, 1987, armed with
bayonets, Uzzi submachine guns, machetes and what not, they
wrecked havoc in Haiti.
MANIGAT, THE ARMY'S PUPPET
Democracy was assassinated in Haiti as the U.S. stood by, appar-
ently, helpless. The same guns which caused the wanton slaughter
on November 29, 1987, now stand behind President Leslie Manigat.
An erudite professor of international relations, selected by the
Army, he'll be there to hide behind while the Army carries out
business as usual.
Personally, I have no animosity toward Leslie Manigat who,
until recently, I could have called a friend. Nor do I have any per-
sonal grudge against the Army, they haven't done anything to me
personally. But I abhor the kind of democracy that has been
rammed down our throats. I do not believe we can continue re-
warding illegality and brutality and not expect it to come back to
haunt us.
The friends of President Manigat now assert that the Reagan Ad-
ministration is willing to help their government. But Congress,
they say, must be convinced to go along. If Congress were to agree,
what kind of message would it send the 95 percent of Haitian
voters who boycotted the electoral farce of January 17? What
would the Duvalierist diehards conclude? That, indeed, the U.S.
will eventually come around to do business as usual, no matter
who is president and how he got there.
Mr. CROCKETT. See if you can conclude in one minute, Mr.
Joseph.
Mr. JOSEPH. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I see that this Congress, and
this Congressional committee have a heavy duty; the duty of stop-
ping business as usual. And I would say, if you want to help, ask
Mr. Manigat to conduct elections for various levels of government
again, order investigations into the killings, and carry out a reorga-
nization of the State apparatus in the country.
I submit that to gain support, Mr. Manigat should first give indi-
cations that he can do something. I don't think he can do a thing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joseph follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAYMOND A. JOSEPH
From 1957 to 1971, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier ruled Haiti with iron fist and
caused havoc in the land. Thousands were jailed, exiled and killed as Papa Doc went
about his business-only 600 miles from U.S. shores. Except for a short period under
President Kennedy, the United Staters supported Duvalier, who boasted about his








power against the vacillating Yankee giant. The late dictator even claimed that his
power caused the death of his arch-enemy John F. Kennedy on Nov. 22, 1963. (Duva-
lier's magical number was 22. He managed to do everything on a 22nd, including
being elected September 22, taking the oath of office October 22, being declared
president-for-life on April 22 and having his death announced on April 22, 1971.) In
a country where superstitions are rampant, Duvalier's claim did not go unnoticed.
The United States, as Duvalier always said, would eventually embrace whoever
holds power. Especially since it's not Communist power. And Duvalier claimed to be
the "Bastion against Communism in the Caribbean."
The United States acquiesced. In 1969, President Nixon sent the late Nelson
Rockefeller on a Latin American goodwill tour. Snubbed in many capitals, Governor
Rockefeller got his warmest welcome in Duvalier's Haiti. The photo of the two lead-
ers arm-in-arm on Duvalier's palace balcony sent the message around the world: the
U.S. has embraced the murderous dictator. Support for the anti-Duvalier struggle
dwindled as U.S. businesses obtained big breaks in their long term program to turn
Haiti into what Duvalier called "The Taiwan of the Caribbean." The dictator died
before he could see his dream come true. But his followers continued with business
as usual.
The Haitian Constitution, which was modified in 1964 by the dictator to give him-
self the life-presidency, was again amended in 1970 to anoint his then 19-year-old
son president for life. The U.S. ambassador, Clinton Knox, served as god-father
while power was transferred from father to son. The U.S. helped Jean-Claude "Baby
Doc" Duvalier consolidate his power. Economic and military aid was provided. With
U.S. expertise a new repressive corps-the Leopards-was created ostensibly to re-
place the Tontons-Macoute gestapo-like police of Papa Doc. Both corps remained
throughout the Baby Doc years.
Subtle changes occurred in Haiti under the new dictator. Corpses of rebels were
no longer displayed at street corners in broad day light to deter would-be opponents.
The victims disappeared at midnight. The effect was the same: the nation was kept
in check. A slogan made famous by Papa Doc remained the cornerstone of the
regime: "Despite our social needs security shall always be given to security." Under
the Duvaliers, Haiti has become almost a desert. A country which was 75% wooded
in the 1950s when Papa Doc grabbed power is about 10% wooded today. In great
part this explains the boat-people exodus from Haiti with its attending calamities.
Baby Doc had his own slogan: "My father made the political revolution," he said,
"and I will make the economic revolution." Few understood what he meant. Howev-
er, on his flight from Haiti aboard a U.S.-provided jet, it became public knowledge
that the young dictator was worth between $500 million and $1 billion, all of it se-
creted in foreign banks, mostly in those countries which provide shelter for officially
stolen wealth. It is obvious to Haitians that if the United States government
wanted, it would have done something about the stealing and the denial of human
rights in Haiti.
At least President Carter, who is derided by some for his weak presidency, did
something about Haiti. His ambassador to the United Nations, the Honorable
Andrew Young, on a visit to Port-au-Prince, didn't flinch when he delivered his
public message to Baby Doc: "Mr. President," he said, "stop jailing the voices of
freedom." Moreover, the U.S. made it clear that aid would depend on respect for
human rights. The prison doors swung open and those who had been languishing in
fetid cells again saw the light of day.
Timidly at first, then with more boldness, opposition to Duvalierists might reared
its head. Civil rights organizations, radio stations and certain publications dared to
challenge the order of the day. But all came to a screeching halt in November 1980
when President Reagan was elected in America. Somehow, the Duvalierists thought
they had a clear signal to reintroduce repression in the land. The crackdown began.
Scores of journalists, union organizers, political leaders and human rights activists
were either deported or jailed. But the seed of freedom already had been sown. The
explosion, which was delayed, finally took place on February 7, 1986 after two years
of economic, social and political turmoil.
"The King is dead, Long live the King!" Apparently that's what happened in
Haiti on the departure of Baby Doc. He was allowed to make a farewell speech in
which he announced the National Council of Government, or CNG, that will replace
him. The rest is current history. For the past two years, the Duvalier holdovers
have successfully outmaneuvered the democratic forces. With bayonets, Uzzi subma-
chine guns, machetes and whatnot, they wreaked havoc in Haiti. It all culminated
in last November 29 massacre in the presence of hundreds of foreign observers and
journalists who chronicled the events for a horrified world.







Democracy was assassinated in Haiti as the U.S. stood by, apparently helpless.
The same guns which caused the wanton slaughter of November 29, 1987 now stand
behind President Leslie Manigat, an erudite professor of international relations se-
lected by the Army to be the puppet behind whom they will hide to carry out busi-
ness as usual.
Personally I have no animosity toward Mr. Manigat who, until recently, I could
have called a friend. Neither do I have any personal grudge against the Haitian
military. But I abhor the kind of democracy that has been rammed down our throat.
I think that we can't afford to continue rewarding illegality and brutality.
The friends of President Manigat assert that the Reagan Administration is willing
to help their government. But Congress must be convinced to go along. If Congress
were to agree, what kind of message would it be sending to the 95% of Haitian
voters who boycotted the electoral farce of January 17? What would the Duvalierist
diehards conclude? That, indeed, the U.S. will always come around to do business as
usual, no matter who is president and how he got there.
Consequently, a President Manigat has no guarantee. He could be discarded any
day, if he were to step on the wrong toes. After all, his party had only four of its
"d6put6s" (Congressmen) selected among the 77 in the Lower House. The sole sena-
tor of the Party-the president's wife Mirlande Hyppolite Manigat-has been
named only for two years. She can hardly be counted upon to sway her 26 col-
leagues when the chips are down. Meanwhile, the group constitutionally barred
from holding elective office for the next 10 years-the Duvalierists-reign supreme
in Haiti. And so, from his golden exile in France Baby Doc exuberantly told Paris-
Match, the French monthly, that his partisans hold 50% of Parliament.
If President Manigat wants history to remember him favorably, he should: 1. Con-
duct new elections at various levels, beginning with the CASECs, the equivalent of
ward elections. They should be conducted under the auspices of a truly free elector-
al council. With his wealth of international contacts, he could call on friendly coun-
tries for help with impartial observers. 2. Order investigations in various killings,
including those of Louis Eugene Athis, Yves Volel and of the Nov. 29, 1987 massa-
cre, and in a relatively short period proceed with some punishment for those respon-
sible. 3. Carry out a reorganization of the State apparatus to modernize the adminis-
tration and weed out corruption.
I submit that support for President Manigat should be made subject to what he
can deliver. No longer should U.S. legislators support illegality and State terrorism
with our hard earned dollars under the guise of fighting communism, while protect-
ing those who would turn Haiti into a safe haven for drug traffickers.
Thank you.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Joseph. Professor Bel-
legarde-Smith.

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR PATRICK BELLEGARDE-SMITH, DE-
PARTMENT OF AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF WIS-
CONSIN
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the Members of the Subcommittee for inviting me here
today. The circumstances that bring us here today are of critical
importance to me. I know that the media's attention has refocused
its sights to more alluring hot spots such as Panama.
But to me, a United States citizen who is culturally Haitian,
nothing looms larger than the struggle taking place in Port-au-
Prince and in every hamlet of Haiti. Nothing less than the future
of a nation is at stake.
Similarly, nothing less than the future of United States-Haiti re-
lations hangs in the balance. The question this Congress is asked to
resolve concerns the future direction and the quality of the interac-
tion between the Western Hemisphere's two oldest republics, Haiti
and the United States.
I take note of the fact that United States Secretary of State
George Shultz has found the scholarship of President Leslie Fran-
cois Manigat most impressive. I only hope that he finds mine as







equally impressive, although I have not been chosen by the Haitian
military to appear to govern Haiti for the next five years.
PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION
The elections of January 17, 1988 represented the end of a flawed
process set in motion with Jean-Claude Duvalier's overthrow by
peaceful means in February 1986. Duvalier's ouster was the result
of the exercise of people power. Nearly 30 years of dictatorship had
taken their toll.
What did occur with the selection of Leslie Manigat as President
was the reversal of the process whereby the Haitian people, with
great unanimity, had struggled long and hard for the establish-
ment of democratic structures and institutions in Haiti.
The first phase of the lengthy process of democratization was the
ouster of Duvalier. The second phase was to have been the de-Ma-
coutization of Haiti; it never occurred. The third phase, the selec-
tion of the National Constitutional Assembly which would write in
less than half a year one of the world's most democratic constitu-
tions.
The third phase ended with a massive popular approval of the
constitution in March 29, 1987. More than half the electorate
voted, "yes," by a rate approaching 100 percent.
The referendum occurred with the orderliness and decorum befit-
ting the historical moment, tempered by unabashed joy. The Duva-
lierists alone had asked for a "no" vote and got less than 0.2 per-
cent of the votes cast. The voting was honest and sincere. No other
document had gotten as much coverage in the context of Haitian
history. An illiteracy rate approaching 80 percent had not damp-
ened the debates. Haiti had demonstrated it's political maturity.
THE ROLE OF THE U.S.
I must note with great sadness that the removal of Jean-Claude
Duvalier by U.S. military air transport is now seen by all sectors in
Haiti, as having robbed Haiti of a true victory. The New York
Times tells us that a deal was struck between the United States
and Duvalier; that he would not be prosecuted, nor would he lose
his hundreds of millions of dollars.
The paper tells us that the U.S. is searching for a Duvalier solu-
tion to the Panamanian crisis, quote, "The arrangement that per-
mitted the Haitian dictator to go into exile in 1986 with his person-
al fortune intact and no criminal charges pending," end quote.
And Haitians believe, with some evidence, that Jean-Claude Du-
valier and the United States government hand-picked Duvalier suc-
cessors; Generals Henri Namphy and Williams Regala. Haitians be-
lieve further, that Leslie Francois Manigat was a compromise be-
tween the Haitian military and the United States government.
On December 3rd, 1987 the New York Times reported that, quote,
"At the heart of the plan advanced by the government," it does not
say which government, "is a series of compromises in which candi-
dates identified with the deposed Duvalier dictatorship as well as
candidates feared by the Army would forsake election bids in the
interest of national unity," end quote.







In the interest of national unity the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for the Caribbean, Richard Holwill, had offered Haiti an
unconstitutional and undemocratic formula, which I dub the failed
Korean formula, unite behind one candidate and compete head-on
with one Duvalierist candidate. The Duvalierists had been banned
by the constitution from holding office until 1997.
QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. POLICY
If what Haitians know to be true is revealed to be true, United
States policy towards Haiti raises the most profound fundamental
questions which, I hope, this subcommittee will want to resolve.
Is it true that the United States helped select the man who con-
trolled the KNG? Is it true that the United States helped choose
Manigat?
There is evidence that the United States helped select Francois
Duvalier in 1957 and helped Jean-Claude Duvalier's position in
1971 as well.
The first such effort from the part of the U.S. occurred in 1915
when the U.S. helped select President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.
If these things are revealed to be true, the damage to Haitian-
American relations will not suffer any more than they already
have. As a United States citizen my desire is to see this country do
the honorable thing.
THE HAITIAN ELECTIONS
The elections of November 29, promised to draw record crowds as
had the constitutional referendum of March 29. As many as 200
men and women may have died, been shot, beaten to death, hacked
to death; hundreds more injured by men in Army uniforms and ci-
vilian clothes. A dozen died at the National School Argentine Belle-
garde, named after my great great great aunt. A few blocks away
from the National Palace, grenades were thrown. The elections sus-
pended. The constitution violated.
The mock elections held on January 17th, under Army control,
were similar to those held regularly by the Duvalier dictatorship.
President Manigat was selected that day in an election in which
approximately two to five percent of the electorate voted, and 98
percent to 95 percent did not.
Children voted by the handful. Young girls were transported
from polling station to polling station, voting each time. Young
men hid at a distance, rushing to vote every time someone white
walked by.
In fact, these irregularities tell us that fewer than two percent
voted. The Haitian regime said 35 percent voted because the U.S.
previously stated that it would accept a 35 percent participation
rate. The Army did precisely what it planned to do all along, avoid
holding a fair and honest election.
MANIGAT IDEAL FOR THE ARMY
In many ways, Manigat is ideal. Having no popular support,
having no base, and fewer than five members in Parliament, most
others are said to be Duvalierists, he stands to do what his mentors
ask.







Manigat will, I think unfortunately, try to show himself as a
Haitian Noriega, as a nationalist. Patriotism, in this case, is the
last refuge of scoundrels.
The national unity Manigat spoke about in his inaugural ad-
dress, boycotted by the Haitian people, said little about democracy
and popular will, but spoke millions about how not to upset Macou-
tism and Duvalierism as a system.
The Haitian constitution, still an infant almost 12 months old,
has been trampled to death. Haitian democracy stillborn. The Hai-
tian Army controls a weak president with no popular base.
There are higher considerations to be taken into account than
the personal qualities and the scholarship of President Manigat. In
November, Mr. Manigat failed to place among the top four who
were said to account for 80 percent of the electorate.
The election boycott of January 17, tells us that he was not the
resounding choice of Haiti. The world is full of distinguished aca-
demics, and thank God, they don't all end up in presidential pal-
aces.
Mr. Manigat is seen by the people as a westernized man, hope-
lessly out of touch with the Afro-Haitian masses. Ideologically,
Leslie Manigat represents Duvalierism sans Duvalier.
STEPS FOR THE U.S. CONGRESS TO TAKE
Meanwhile, the Haitian people cry out for justice. I respectfully
suggest that the following steps be considered by the U.S. House of
Representatives and through it, the United States Congress:
(1) suspend all U.S. assistance to the government of Haiti and
maintain that suspension;
(2) that the United States use its vote to oppose any loans and
any other forms of assistance to Haiti in international financial in-
stitutions;
(3) that trade privileges such as those under CBI, the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act, be withdrawn;
(4) that an arms embargo be imposed and maintained;
(5) that action be taken to ensure that Haiti cooperates in the
war against drugs, and stops being a transit point on the way to
the United States;
(6) that Haitians be allowed to develop their own democratic in-
stitutions in accordance with their culture, their traditions and
their history as any free and independent state should;
(7) that all instances of collusion between Duvalierists, the Hai-
tian Army, the KNG and the United States be revealed fully.
What transpires from this brief expose, is that we, in the U.S.,
have been involved in Haitian internal affairs all along. I am
asking you to get involved once more, but this time, on the side of
democracy and against dictatorship. In point of fact, I am not talk-
ing about a new intervention, but to counteract past interventions.
Then again, if we don't intervene that is also intervening.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellegarde-Smith follows:]









March 8, 1988

Patrick BELLEGARDE-SMITH

Testimony, House Foreign Affairs Committee,

Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,

U.S. House of Representatives.



Personal Data.

I thank the members of the Subcammittee for inviting me here

today. The circumstances that bring us here today are of critical

importance to ne. I know that the media's attention has refocused its

sights to more alluring "hot spots." But to me, a United States citizen

who is culturally Haitian, nothing looms larger than the struggle taking

place in Port-au-Prince and in every hamlet of Haiti. Nothing less than

the future of a nation is at stake. Similarly, nothing less than the

future of United States/Haiti relations hangs in the balance. The

question this Congress is asked to resolve concerns the future direction

and the quality of the interaction between the Western Hemisphere's two

oldest republics, Haiti and the United States.



I take note of the fact that United States Secretary of State

George Schultz has found the scholarship of President Leslie F. Manigat

most impressive. I only hope that he finds mine as equally impressive,

although I have not been chosen by the Haitian military to appear to

govern Haiti for the next five years.



I have a doctorate in international studies, with a geographic









emphasis on the Caribbean area and Latin America. I have produced

numerous articles and two books on Haiti. The first, In the Shadow of

Powers, (Humanities Press, 1985), addresses the questions one may have as

to why Haiti is the way it is today. The second, The Breached Citadel, is

an overall analysis of the Haitian condition, past and present, to be

published later this year by Westview Press.



I have lived in Haiti all my early life, with my Haitian family. I

have attended Haitian schools until college. Kreyol and French are my

native tongues, and I am a late camer to the English language, so forgive

me ahead of time for any difficulty in this regard.



Thus, I feel immensely qualified to address this august body

today. And I know that, if Secretary of State Schultz had read my books,

he might think so too.



Introduction.

The elections of January 17, 1988 represented the end of a flawed

process set in motion with Jean-Claude Duvalier's overthrow by peaceful

means in February 1986. Duvalier's ouster was the result of the exercise

of "people power." Nearly thirty years of dictatorship the most brutal

in all of Haiti's history had taken their toll. What did occur with

the selection of Leslie F. Manigat as President, was the reversal of a

process whereby the Haitian people, with great unanimity, had struggled

long and hard for the establishment of democratic structures and

institutions in Haiti.










Background.

The story starts in 1915, 1957, 1980, or 1984 depending on how

thorough one intends to be. I am one of those social scientists who

thinks that the past illuminates the stage of the present, and presents us

our options for the future. The year 1915 saw the overthrow of President

Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, selected with the assistance of the United States.

It is also the year in which the nineteen-year military occupation of

Haiti by the United States began, followed shortly thereafter by the

creation of the Gendarmerie or Garde d Haiti, Haiti's army, by the United

States Marine Corps. The year 1957 saw the selection of Francois Duvalier

to the presidency by the Haitian army, and, it is said with some evidence

to support that claim, the support of the United States.



Nineteen-eighty, saw heightened repression in Haiti. Journalists,

labor union organizers, political party activists, writers, members of the

clergy and others, were brutally repressed. The spark? The Cayo Lobo

incident, where a hundred Haitians had been starved then beaten by

Bahamian authorities. But also the belief that the United States

government no longer cared about human rights violations.



And 1984, when the peasantry and the urban poor, fed up with

increasing poverty and increasing ostentation by Duvalierists; having lost

all their pigs, killed by the government at the urging of the United

States government on account of an outbreak of African swine fever, in

1981-83, rebelled. The native pig represented Haiti's "savings capacity,"









a sort of literal "piggy bank." The pig had also supplied about half of

the country's protein intake. The town of Gonaives, as it had done almost

two hundred years ago with independence, started a rebellion, and the rest

of the country eagerly followed.



What transpires from this brief expose, is that we, in the United

States, have been involved in Haitian affairs all along. I am asking you

to get involved once more, but this time, on the side of democracy, and

against dictatorship.



The Contemporary Stage.

The first phase of the lengthy process of democratization was the

ouster of Duvalier. The second phase was to have been the demacoutization

of Haiti; it never occurred. The third phase, the selection of a national

constitutional assembly which would write, in less than half a year, one

of the world's most democratic constitution. The third phase ended with

the massive popular approval of the constitution in March 1987. More than

half the electorate voted "yes" by a rate approaching 100 percent. The

referendum occurred with the orderliness and decorum befitting the

historical moment, tampered by unabashed joy. The Duvalierists alone, had

asked for a "no" vote, and got less than 0.2 percent of the votes cast.

The voting was honest and sincere. No other document had gotten as much

coverage in the context of Haitian history. An illiteracy rate

approaching 80 percent had not dampened the debates. Haiti had

demonstrated its political maturity.










The National Council of Government, (KNG), the military junta, was

furious. It delayed the promulgation of the Constitution. It delayed the

formation of the constitutionally-mandated Provisional Electoral Council,

(KEP), thus damaging the mechanism that would allow for phase four's

implementation, the holding of national elections. In June 1987, the KNG

tried to override the KEP by taking control of the electoral machinery. A

turning point had been January 1987, when the KNG dismissed anti-Duvalier

cabinet ministers under pressure from Duvalierists who had not been

prosecuted, and not left the country as hoped by the population. And

despite its strength in the military and the government, a Duvalierist

party was as popular in Haiti as an avowed Nazi party in Israel.



Between September 1957 and February 1986, about 20,000 Haitians are

said to have died at the hands of Duvalierists, particularly through the

agency of the Tontons Macoutes, the "Volunteers for National Security."

Between February 1986 and January 1988, between 1,000 and 2,000 have died

at the hand of same. The Macoutes were formally disbanded, but this

proved a mere ... formality. Had things changed in Haiti?



I must note with great sadness, that the removal of Jean-Claude

Duvalier by U.S. military air transport is now seen by all sectors in

Haiti, as having robbed Haiti of a true victory. The New York Times tells

us that a deal was struck between the United States and Duvalier, that he

would not be prosecuted, nor would he lose his hundreds of millions. The

paper tells us that the U.S. is searching for a "Duvalier solution" to the









Panamanian crisis, "the arrangement that permitted the Haitian dictator...

to go into exile in 1986 with his personal fortune intact and no criminal

charges pending." [NYT 2/7/88 p.l].



And Haitians believe, with some evidence, that Jean-Claude Duvalier

and the United States government hand-picked Duvalier's successors,

Generals Henri Namphy and Williams Regala. Haitians believe further, that

Leslie F. Manigat was a compromise between the Haitian military and the

United States government. On December 3, 1987, the New York Times

reported that: "At the heart of the plan advanced by the Government [it

does not say which] is a series of compromises in which candidates

identified with the deposed Duvalier dictatorship as well as candidates

feared by the army would forsake election bids in the interest of national

unity." [NYT 12/3/87]. In the interest of "national unity," the Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for the Caribbean, Richard Holwill, had

offered Haiti an unconstitional and undemocratic formula which I dub

the "failed" Korean formula unite behind one candidate, and compete

head-on with one Duvalierist candidate. [NPR 1/7/88]. The Duvalierists

had been banned by the constitution from holding office until 1997.



If what Haitians know to be true is revealed to be true, United

States policy towards Haiti raises the most profound fundamental questions

which, I hope, this subcommittee will want to resolve. Is it true that

the United States helped select the men who controlled the KNG? Is it

true that the United States helped chooseManigat? If these actions were










revealed to be true, the damage to Haitian-American relations will not

suffer any more than they already have. As a United States citizen, my

desire is to see this country do the honorable thing.





The Elections of November, 1987 and January, 1988.



The American and international media gave generally excellent

coverage of the November 29, 1987 failed elections. These elections were

proceeded by what were governmental conspiracies notably in the deaths of

presidential candidates Louis-Eugene Athis (July 1987) and Yves Volel

(October 1987), and violent intimidation of the media, of party

headquarters, of peaceful demonstrators, and death squad activity. The

KNG denied the KEP necessary funding, and other forms of assistance, and

their headquarters, the nerve-center for all electoral operations,

torched.



The level of government terrorism increased once more, a week

before the elections set for November 29. Once more, radio stations were

attacked and destroyed. An urban market located a short distance from a

police station was set ablaze. A slum neighborhood with a police station

in its midst, attacked. Churches were sacked, and their parishioners

brutalized. Voting headquarters, set on fire. Army units were seen

crisscrossing the streets while those acts were committed. Many

witnesses, including Americans, saw the soldiers' involvement in the

rampage. That rampage would soon become a carnage.









The elections of November 29, promised to draw record crowds as had

the constitutional referendum of March 29. As nany as 200 men and women

may have died, shot, beaten or hacked to death, hundreds more injured by

men in army uniforms and civilian clothes. [NYT 12/22/87 p. 3]. A dozen

died at the National School Argentine Bellegarde, named after my great

great great aunt. A few blocks away from the National Palace, grenades

were thrown. The elections suspended. The Constitution violated.



The mock elections held on January 17th, under Army control, were

similar to those held regularly by the Duvalier dictatorship. President

Manigat was selected that day in an "election" in which approximately 2

percent of the electorate voted and 98 percent did not. Children voted by

the handful. 'Young girls were transported from polling station to polling

station, voting each time. Young men hid at a distance, rushing to vote

everytime someone white happened by. In fact, these irregularities tell

us that that fewer than 2 percent voted. The Haitian regime said 35

percent voted, because the United States, previously stated that it would

accept a 35 percent participation rate. The Army did precisely what it

planned to do all along.



In many ways, Manigat is ideal. Having no popular support, having

no base, and fewer than 5 members in Parliament most others are said to

be Duvalierists he stands to do what his mentors ask. The "national

unity" Manigat spoke about in his inaugural address boycotted by the

Haitian people, said little about democracy and popular will, but spoke

millions about how not to upset macoutism and Duvalierism as a system.










What to do?

The Haitian constitution, still an infant less than twelve months

old, has been trampled to death. Haitian democracy stillborn. The

Haitian army is in control of a weak president with no base. These are

higher considerations to be taken into account than the personal qualities

and the scholarship of President Manigat. In November, Mr. Manigat failed

to place among the top four who were said to account for 80 percent of the

electorate. The election boycott of January 17, tells us that he was not

the resounding choice of Haiti. The world is full of distinguished

academics, and thank God, they don't all end up in presidential palaces!

Mr. Manigat is seen by the people, as a westernized man, hopelessly out of

touch with the Afro-Haitian population. Ideologically, Leslie F. Manigat

represents Duvalierism sans Duvalier. Meanwhile, the Haitian people cries

out for justice. I respectfully suggest that the following steps be

considered by the U.S. House of Representatives and through it, the United

States Congress:



1. suspend all U.S. assistance to the Government of Haiti;

2. that the United States use it vote to oppose any loan and other

forms of assistance to Haiti in international financial

institutions;

3. that trade privileges such as those under CBI (the Caribbean

Basin Economic Recovery Act) be withdrawn;

4. that an arms embargo be imposed;





21


5. that action be taken to insure that Haiti cooperates in the

war against drugs, and stops being a transit point on the way

to this country;

6. that Haitians be allowed to develop their own democratic

institutions, in accordance with their culture, traditions and

history as any free and independent state should;

7. that all instances of collusion between Duvalierists, the

Haitian Amy, the KNG and the United States be revealed fully.







Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Professor Smith. Mr. Hooper.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL HOOPER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES
Mr. HOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing
and for your personal commitment to finding a solution to this
crisis that seems to be continuing, continuing and deepening.
Through the blood bath and the military coup d'etat on election
day, November 29th, the National Governing Council, the CNG,
combined with former Tontons-Macoutes to demonstrate precisely
what Haitians had been telling the international community for
two years.
The U.S.-supported CNG was not dismantling the Duvalier
legacy of terror and lawlessness; and the U.S.-supported Army was
doing much of the killing and was actively complicit in the rest.
HAITIANS HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY
Since February 7, 1986 Haitian democrats have worked hard and
hoped fervently for an irreversible break with the Duvalier legacy.
They have insisted on free and fair elections as a necessary first
step toward this goal. But just as they placed their hopes and their
trust in this election, so the military and some civilian thugs came
to focus their desire to maintain power on the elections and on ter-
rorizing the general population around the elections. Even though
the new constitution established election procedures in independ-
ent institutions, the Army, and the CNG campaigned to obstruct
every effort to carry out real elections under truly independent ci-
vilian control.
Haitians still hope for democracy, Mr. Chairman. They still hope
for a respect for human rights and a rule of law. At the very least
we owe them an honest evaluation of what has happened and the
United States' role in the last two years. An honest evaluation of
the way that the CNG has used murder, arson, and terror to defeat
the democratic majority and to install a compromised puppet presi-
dent who is incapable of interfering in the continuation of the
futile politics in Haiti.
AN ELECTION ALONE DOES NOT MAKE A DEMOCRACY
Perhaps, the first lesson we can draw from this disaster is that a
violent and corrupt system managed by a military elite can never
be expected to mystically champion freedom to somehow give birth
to democracy and real elections on its own.
The Manigat Presidency, the result of two years of horror, stands
as a memorial to the fact that an election event does not make a
democracy, and in. some circumstances, it may be part of the re-
pression itself.
The United States shares responsibility for the crisis in Haiti.
The United States has given virtually unequivocal support to the
Haitian military during the past two years, despite clear signs that
they were trying to reimpose the old system. Unfortunately, very
often our policy has been divorced from the reality of Haiti, and
has hence been weak.






The United States has repeatedly and often undercut the orga-
nizing attempts and the accomplishments of Haitian democrats,
and it has consistently reenforced the political alliance that is
stronger, ever stronger between the Officer Corp of the Haitian
Army and a small clique of far-right Duvalierists.
ARMY INTERVENED IN ELECTIONS
Now, General Namphy has almost admitted as much. He has
publicly acknowledged and has told journalists, that the Army had
to interrupt the elections. The Army had to stop this process. The
Army had to intervene to save the country, he says, from Commu-
nists and the Catholic Church. The original elections had to be
stopped because they were financed and dominated by foreigners,
he means the United States, intent upon facilitating a victory of
the left. This is certainly the first time that the Reagan Adminis-
tration has been so accused.
The fundamental character of the current Haitian regime, the
Manigat presidency, is not revealed by looking at President Mani-
gat, it is revealed by looking at the track record of the CNG that
installed him. What have they done in the last two years? How this
military dominated government has, while paying lip service to
guiding Haiti toward democracy, simply stepped in to reassert its
dominance every time the democratic forces threatened even the
slightest reform.
The Army has assaulted the population. It has assaulted repeat-
edly the constitutionally mandated CEP and the independence of
the Electorate Commission.
The United States has always spoken with good intentions ini-
tially, but has unfailingly equivocated the follow through.
In June and July, as the Army went on a full offensive, the
United States' response became one of growing silence, weaker and
weaker. This emboldened the very alliance that brought us what
we have seen this fall and this winter.
U.S. WAS CONTENT IN DEALING WITH GOVERNMENT
The United States went so far in August as to certify human
rights improvement just weeks after some of the most horrendous
killings of demonstrators and peaceful marchers. The wave of kill-
ings at the end of June and then again at the end of July contin-
ued to increase and the general population became more and more
terrified.
The United States increasingly seemed content to talk about the
fact that the election timetable was being kept, the fact that, yes,
there are many problems; yes, this is terrible, but basically we are
moving toward an election and that after all will bring us what we
want.
I don't comment on the intentions of that policy, I comment only
that its result was to encourage the alliance between the far-right
and the Army hierarchy platitudes about an election timetable are
not enough. D S


L OCT 2 988 A
U W
0335-A







INSTALLATION OF A PUPPET PRESIDENT
Following the election day massacre, Mr. Chairman, the CNG
turned blatantly, toward installing a puppet president. The month
of December was perhaps the most terrifying for people in Haiti.
We had a project there throughout these months and we conducted
interviews with scores of people throughout December and Janu-
ary.
If I might simply refer to what Professor Bellegarde-Smith has
said regarding the elections, we toured the capital that day, and
what we found was ridiculous-there was no election, by any crite-
ria. I invite questions regarding this, there was no election. It was
a farce. Nobody was there, in most cases, and when they were
there nobody took it seriously. The election existed in the story of
international journalists and in our conversations. The election did
not exist in Haiti. There was no election. There was a selection, a
installation.
U.S. MUST SET STRICT STANDARDS FOR AID
Unfortunately, the United States has frequently refused to see
the bloody handwriting on the wall in Haiti. The United States has
been reluctant to act firmly, and must do so now. The United
States cutback in aid early in December was very important; it was
initially effective.
Each time that we equivocate, each time that we indicate that
this aid could be started up quickly again, that we are hoping for
progress, each time that we qualify certain industrial projects as
humanitarian aid, each time that we hedge on a strong position,
we encourage the same people that brought us November, Decem-
ber and January of this year.
The Administration must, and we ask the committee's help in
urging them, set specific and strong standards for assistance to
Haiti. These standards must demand and not result in any aid
until specific things occur.
Again, we have seen history in recent years of how hopes will
not be translated into reality unless our position is strong, unless
our position is clear.
ASK FOR FREE ELECTIONS
We must ask for free elections. We must still insist on free elec-
tions under an independent CEP. It must be the bottom line. We
must insist upon the right of the Haitian democratic opposition to
function, to stop being terrorized. We must insist on their right; we
can begin doing that by having contact with them. We can begin
doing that by insisting that the United States government speak
with them, treat them as legitimate, and not continue to isolate
them, not continue to divide them. We can do that by simply recog-
nizing the reality in Haiti for what it is.
We must assure, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, that the United
States does not continue to support the undemocratic process by
which Professor Manigat has been imposed on Haiti, and we are
uniquely situated to do so. We must not, any longer, give in to the
black male or give in to convenience and allow the situation in
Haiti to simply continue, to continue to grind on.





25

FAIR ELECTIONS BEFORE RESUMPTION OF AID
I agree with the recommendations of Professor Bellegarde-
Smith, and in respect for the committee's time I will simply add
one specific recommendation of my own and that is, we must set a
bottom line, and that bottom line must be that a democratic elec-
tion under independent civilian control, and independent CEP
must occur before discussions can be picked up again with this gov-
ernment regarding the resumption of aid.
If this does not occur, cuts and real cuts should continue to be
made including all those mentioned by Professor Bellegarde-Smith
on a basis which makes it clear to the Haitian government once
and for all that we know their game; that we will not play it any-
more; that we will not allow U.S. taxpayer money in the spirit of
democracy to be used in the service of corruption, terror and hope-
lessness.
Mr. Chairman, the Haitian democrats will do the work, but we
must refuse to ever again, either knowingly or unknowingly, be
used in the service of perpetuating the old regime in Haiti.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hooper follows:]








PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. HOOPER, ESQ.

Thank you Mr Chairman for holding this timely and critical

hearing to review the deteriorating human rights and political

situation in Haiti. My name is Michael S. Hooper. I am an

attorney and the Executive-Director of the National Coalition for

Haitian Refugees. I also appear today on behalf of Americas

Watch. I have conducted nine fact-finding missions to Haiti

during 1987 alone, and have published 17 reports and numerous

articles on human rights in Haiti since 1979. During the months

of November and December 1987, and again in January 1988, I

directed an "Election Watch" project in Haiti that was co-

sponsored by Americas Watch. I have conducted scores of inter-

views in Haiti concerning the November 29, 1987 elections, which

were drowned in blood by the Haitian military and paramilitary

death squads, and concerning the sham elections on January 17,

1988 which were held under the boot of the military-controlled

National Governing Council (CNG).

INTRODUCTION

To confront the current crisis in Haiti and the options for

United States policy, it is essential to understand the human

rights and political events of this past year. Perhaps the

paramount lesson is that there is a terrible danger in assuming

that a transition to democracy can be successful before promoting

firm civilian control of the military. The recent events in Haiti

show all too well that a violent and corrupt system headed by a

military elite cannot be trusted to champion freedom. These





27


tragic developments confirm what Haitians and international human

rights groups have been repeating: an "election event" does not a

democracy make and in some circumstances it may be part of the

repression itself.

Army-sponsored and condoned violence throughout 1987 crushed

the hopes of most Haitians that democracy and respect for human

rights and the rule of law might come to their country after

three long decades of dictatorship and corruption. Even after the

CNG attempted to seize control of the electoral process in June

1987, many harbored cautious optimism.

But just as the prospect of free and fair elections was the

source of hope for many Haitian democrats seeking a clean and

irreversible break with the Duvalier legacy, so the elections

became the focus of efforts by the military and civilian thugs to

manipulate and derail that process. After initially allowing a

public referendum on a new constitution to take place without

incident on March 29, 1987 the Constitution was endorsed by an

overwhelming majority (98.99%) of Haitian voters the military

launched a campaign to obstruct every effort to carry out

elections under independent civilian control in accordance with

that Constitution.

By February 7, 1988, the CNG had used arbitrary arrests,

arson and murder to terrorize democratic forces in Haiti and to

ensure that the election that finally was held produced a

compromised puppet president who could not interfere with the

military's dominance of Haitian society, and who would not










threaten significant reforms or meaningful investigations of past

abuses. Since February 7, 1986, human rights violations have been

of such seriousness and persistence that only an unambiguous U.S.

policy tied directly to the holding of free and fair elections

under an independent electoral commission has any hope of

breaking the cycle of military-directed violence that has

developed.

The United States shares responsibility for the intractable

crisis because of two years of virtually unequivocal support for

the Haitian military despite clear evidence that the military was

stubbornly trying to re-impose its brand of authoritarian terror.

The U.S. government expressed satisfaction with the flight of

President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier from power in February

1986, and it pressed for some election event to take place in

Haiti. However the Administration's actions have consistently

been equivocal and often counterproductive. Despite the declared

intentions of policy statements, the Administration has fre-

quently undercut the work of Haitian democrats who sought to in-

augurate a civilian government under the rule of law rather than

mere windowdressing for ongoing military dominance.

Repeated U.S. policy miscalculations emboldened the Haitian

Army to cement a political alliance with a small clique of far-

right "Duvalierists" in order to maintain by force its systematic

corruption and privilege. Indeed the Haitian military has

demonstrated to the world exactly what the Haitian people and

Haitian human rights organizations have been imploring the







29


international community to understand for two years: that the CNG

was managing, not dismantling, the Duvalier legacy of terror and

cronyism, and that the U.S.-supported Haitian Army was doing much

of the killing and was actively complicit in the rest.

General Henri Namphy himself, presently Commander-in-Chief

of the Haitian Armed Forces and formerly President of the CNG,

has publicly acknowledged the Army's role in the systematic war

against independent elections and democracy. For two years,

Namphy was championed by the United States as truly independent

and intent on safeguarding a transition to democracy, yet the

same General Namphy has repeatedly told foreign journalists and

observers that the Army had to "intervene" on November 29 to save

the country from "communists" and the Catholic Church.

Speaking on behalf of the same CNG that rigged the elections

to install Leslie Manigat on February 7, 1988, Namphy also

stressed that the original elections had to be stopped because

the independent electoral council had been "financed and domi-

nated by foreigners" intent on facilitating a victory of the

left. The United States provided the CEP virtually all of its

operating funds ($7.5 million) and an assertion that the arch-

conservative Reagan Administration had supported the Haitian left

can only give the American people an idea of how desperate the

Haitian people feel to be saddled with the current military-

civilian government.

After the collapse of the November 29 elections, the Reagan

Administration moved quickly to order the suspension of military


88-454 0 88 2







30


aid and non-humanitarian economic assistance to Haiti. That was a

constructive first step, but we should not forget that it was

only a first step, not a policy in itself for helping to promote

genuine democratic change. The very survival of Haiti demands

that the Administration not ignore the lessons of the tragic

events of last November 29 and of January 17. We must not be

fooled again and embrace, or be perceived as embracing, the

discredited Manigat regime by renewing economic aid to Haiti. The

CNG and the Haitian military have continually worked to retain

power by engaging in a pattern of human rights violations,

political manipulation and deception of the international

community. Any "normalization", however guarded, would constitute

another victory for the military officers who engineered the

electoral coup against the fragile Haitian democracy, and it

would further encourage them to continue trying to dominate

Haitian politics and to manipulate U.S. policymakers. Most

importantly, if the Reagan Administration moves to embrace the

civilian appendage of the Haitian military, it will strike a hard

blow against hopes for democratic elections in the near future

and condemn Haiti to many more years of military dictatorship,

albeit under a civilian facade.

The United States government and people have a unique

opportunity to support unequivocally democratic progress in

Haiti. Congress must act affirmatively now by insisting that the

Administration maintain the suspension of aid and by imposing

specific trade and financial sanctions until a democratic










government is elected through free and fair elections as provided

by the Haitian Constitution. If Haitians are to be able to

salvage even a glimmer of hope of establishing democracy, we must

cooperate to ensure that the U.S. government's policy miscalcula-

tions of the past are not repeated in the future.



"DEMOCRACY" THROUGH TERROR: THE RECORD OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNING

COUNCIL (CNG)

As the hand-picked successor to the Duvalier regime, the

military-dominated CNG, inherited a system of vast corruption

enforced by arrest and murder. While the CNG paid lip service to

the laudable goal of moving Haiti toward democracy, it stepped in

to reassert its dominance any time that democratic forces

threatened even the slightest reform of that system, and it did

little to erase the Duvalier legacy.

The CNG made no meaningful attempt to investigate the human

rights abuses that occurred during the Duvalier period, despite

repeated Congressional mandates that they do so as a condition

for receiving economic assistance. There was no effort made to

determine the extent of past abuses, the identity of those who

committed them, or the role of the security forces in these

abuses. Although the CNG formally disbanded the Tontons Macoutes

shortly after Duvalier's departure, it took only token steps to

disarm these paramilitary forces; only approximately 3,500

weapons were confiscated despite wide acknowledgement that there

were 22,000 armed Macoutes at the time of Duvalier's departure;











most Macoutes retained their weapons and ammunition, and were

allowed to circulate with impunity.

Army violence against peaceful demonstrations resulted in an

escalating number of deaths. On March 19, 1986 five civilians

were killed and at least 15 wounded when the elite Leopard troops

dispersed with machine-gun fire a crowd of peaceful demonstrators

protesting the arrest by the Army of a bus driver. The next

month, on April 26, Army troops stationed at the Fort Dimanche

prison and police barracks fired without warning on a crowd of

civilians in front of'this symbol of the cruelty of the old

regime, killing six and wounding 50.

Since then, not only have those responsible for these

killings not been prosecuted, but Army violence considerably

increased in late June 1987, after the CNG was beaten back in its

attempt to seize control of the electoral process and of the

independent Provisional Electoral Council, which the March 1987

Constitution had mandated to carry out what could have been

Haiti's first genuinely free elections.

The March Constitution had gained the respect and the

support of the public because of its provisions entrusting

control of the elections to this independent civilian body and

barring from public office anyone who the CEP determined had been

an "architect" of the Duvalier dictatorship or had participated

in the embezzlement of public funds or the assassination and

torture of political prisoners. The Constitution and the elec-

toral process that it prescribed provided the only real oppor-







33


tunity for a radical break with the Duvalierist past.

The Constitution mandated that the CEP be composed of nine

representatives, each chosen by a different sector of Haitian

society. By according only one of the nine seats to the CNG, the

Constitution thus ensured that the CEP would remain independent

of military manipulation, thus instilling confidence among

Haitians that free and fair elections might be conducted.

Widespread protests and a general strike forced the CNG to

relent in this attempt to take over the electoral process, but in

the months that followed, the military forces and paramilitary

death squads retaliated with a widespread terror campaign on the

civilian population.

Killings by the Haitian Army and paramilitary death squads

continued throughout the summer and resulted in at least 53

deaths and more than 153 wounded in the capital alone. Bodies

riddled with bullets routinely turned up in the morning in the

streets of Port-au-Prince's slums. The Army responded to demons-

trations against the CNG with bullets. Many Haitian and foreign

journalists covering the demonstrations were also directly fired

upon by Army troops, and several were seriously wounded. I

witnessed one of these massacres on July 29, 1987 when at least 8

demonstrators were killed, and can assure the Committee that the

regular Army simply fired into a peaceful march and apparently

targeted some of the march leaders who miraculously escaped.

This military violence helped create an environment of

lawlessness in which murder became an acceptable tool for











resolving political grievances. On July 23, 1987 near Jean-Rabel

in Northwestern Haiti, 320 members of the Tet Ansanm religious

cooperative were slaughtered in an apparent land dispute by

peasants loyal to landowners and former tontons macoutes in their

employ. No one has been arrested or prosecuted for this massacre.

Similarly during August, troops from the 32nd Tactical Battalion

of the Casernes Dessalines terrorized and detained scores of

people in the Grande Anse region, killing several whom it accused

of aiding Bernard Sansaricq, a political leader who it alleged

was stockpiling weapons to overthrow the government. A similar

scenario was repeated a few weeks later in the Raboteau slum of

Gonaives, a center of opposition to the policies of the CNG when

troops from the 32nd battalion of the Casernes Dessalines

terrorized the slum purportedly to arrest a particular protest

leader.

Human rights monitors and priests who protested Army abuses

were also the subjects of attacks. On August 23, shortly after a

mass they had given for the victims of the Jean-Rabel massacre

was disrupted by gunfire, four prominent catholic priests and

their driver were badly beaten by a paramilitary group immediate-

ly after passing an Army checkpoint at Freycineau in Central

Haiti.

Two presidential candidates were killed in August and in

October 1987; one, Yves Volel, in front of police headquarters in

Port-au-Prince by two plainclothes police detectives and in full

view of several Haitian and foreign journalists. Violence







35



increased on November 2, 1987 following the CEP's decision to

disqualify 12 of the 35 announced candidates under the constitu-

tional provision barring Duvalierists from office. The Army and

police allowed armed gangs of "civilians" to burn the CEP head-

quarters and the trading company of a CEP member. The homes and

offices of leading presidential candidates and CEP members were

also sprayed with bullets, forcing candidates to campaign under

the constant threat of assassination. I directed an "Election

Watch" project in Haiti throughout this period and the details of

these assaults and their terrorizing results are beyond question.

The CNG tried everything to block the holding of elections.

It held up considerable U.S. and international financial assis-

tance that had been donated to the CEP. The CNG repeatedly

refused to provide logistical assistance or protection to CEP

members and offices, and it denied flight clearances to CEP

helicopters attempting to distribute ballots.

The violence accelerated in the week before the election and

reached a crescendo on the eve of the scheduled elections. Army

troops destroyed the transmitter of the Catholic Church's Radio

Soleil, and all but one independent radio station was shut down

after being sprayed by machine-gun fire.

On the morning of the elections, November 29, when, despite

the terror, Haitians lined up outside polling places, gangs of

thugs roamed the streets of Port-au-Prince shooting at lines of

voters. Often trucks of Army soldiers followed closely behind as

cars of "civilians" did the shooting. At times the Army itself











did the shooting. When 14 people at a polling place were mas-

sacred by a gang of men wielding machetes and automatic weapons,

at least one Army soldier shot at foreign journalists arriving to

report on the killings. Faced with this brazen military violence,

the CEP called off the elections after three hours of voting. In

total the election day violence left at least 34 Haitians

murdered and 75 wounded.

The pervasive and well coordinated nature of the electoral

sabotage made clear that these efforts were staged from the top

of the military hierarchy. From the unsuccessful attempt to take

over the CEP in June to the refusal to provide security in

November, from the withholding of international assistance to the

denial of flight clearances to CEP helicopters and planes leased

by official observer delegations, these actions could not have

been taken without the direct approval of the CNG and other top

military commanders.

ELECTIONS THROUGH TERROR

In the weeks following the election day massacre, the

Haitian Army and the CNG tightened their noose on democracy with

a campaign marked by official intimidation of the populace and

flouting of the rule of law. Army and paramilitary units violent-

ly harassed political parties, trade unions, peasant organiza-

tions and church groups. Haitian human rights groups reported

arrests of supporters of the broad-based National Front for

Cooperation and the Committee for Democratic Agreement (CED)

which had been formed by the four leading presidential candidates







37


running in the aborted elections: Marc Bazin, Gerard Gourgue,

Sylvio Claude and Louis Dejoie, who together would have gathered

more than 80% of the anticipated popular vote. On December 21,

1987 three gunmen fired into a crowd of mourners coming out of a

memorial service for the victims of the November 29 bloodbath,

killing one man and wounding at least four others.

These abuses were accompanied by the growing indifference of

the CNG to any semblance of legality, so long as it could produce

an election event to placate the international donors who

supported the Haitian economy and its attendant corruption.

Although the Haitian Constitution provides the CNG with no

authority to dissolve the CEP or to appoint any but its single

representative, the CNG insisted that the remaining eight civic

and religious organizations represented on the CEP appoint new

members. When the seven independent organizations refused to

comply with this lawless demand, the CNG hand-picked its own CEP,

composed of nine political unknowns, most of whom learned of

their sudden notoriety only after the official announcement of

their appointment.

But the CNG did not even pretend to accord the new CEP a

modicum of independent authority. Before new CEP members had even

been named, the CNG selected a date for the elections and

announced a date for enactment of a new election law which, once

published, made a mockery of the electoral process. Under the

CNG's law, poll workers and soldiers maintained the right to

inspect a voter's preference before a ballot was cast; candidates











were burdened with printing and distributing their own ballots.

This provided a substantial advantage to any candidate whom the

Army, with its considerable distribution facilities chose to

favor. To ensure complete control of the electoral charade, the

military-dominated Supreme Court was given the right to review

any CEP decision to bar former Duvalierists from running for

public office. Under the law, a fine or a jail term could be

imposed on anyone who "mistakenly" urged people not to vote and

on anyone who challenged a candidate if the challenge proved

"unjustified". The Army quickly made good on these provisions by

rounding up scores of activists in the countryside as well in the

capital who supported the call for a boycott of the elections

that had been put forth by the CED, and supported by the "Civil

Society", a remarkable coalition of over 72 human rights, civic,

religious, business and trade union organizations.

The most noteworthy aspect of the January 17, 1988 "election

exercise" was the tremendously successful boycott of the entire

affair and the comical nature of the proceedings that did take

place. During our visit of polling places in Port-au-Prince we

were struck by the degree of abstention that occurred. We

visited polling places where less than five people had voted as

of 1:00 PM. The streets of the capital were literally deserted

except for journalists, the occasional government employee, and

the omnipresent army patrolling in jeeps, trucks and tanks. Five

of the six largest polling places in central Port-au-Prince never

opened at all, and even the employees of the election bureaus







39


didn't seem to take the job seriously.

Overall, we visited 19 locations and a total of 44 polling

stations. We took statements from children who admitted to being

14 or 15 and who had already voted three or four times. We had

scores of discussions with other young adults who admitted having

voted more than once. We observed buses being loaded from in

front of one polling place in Cite Soleil and being driven to the

Hotel de Ville where these same persons voted again. We inter-

viewed the employees parking and organizing these buses who

openly told us that the transport operation was organized by "le

magistrat", Frank Romain, a former Colonel and Chief of Police

who has been implicated in a series of human rights abuses under

Duvalier. Remain was running for Mayor of Port-au-Prince. Many

of the kids being transported told us that they were being paid

$1 or $2 for each location in which they were able to vote. We

saw voting-place officials allowing voters to deposit multiple

ballots for the same Presidential candidate (always Manigat). At

some polling places so many voters had washed the "indelible" ink

off their fingers in puddles that the water had become a deep

scarlet.

The best indication that the vote was being manipulated was

that officially registered journalists were physically thrown out

of the offices of the CNG's Provisional Electoral Council after

the ballot boxes were collected, and no monitoring of the vote

tallying procedures was allowed. Moreover, based on our sys-

tematic analysis of voter turnout in Port-au-Prince, the CNG's







40


allegation of a turnout of over one million voters nationwide was

absurd. Two days before it announced the final tally, the

military-dominated CEP announced having counted only 23,000

ballots. No explanation was given for the sudden jump in the vote

count. All the above-mentioned Romain workers were also handing

out Presidential ballots for Leslie Manigat and his wife Mir-

lande, candidate for a seat in the Senate, and only for them.

Indeed, even the poll workers themselves would hand Manigat and

Romain ballots to prospective voters who didn't already have a

candidate. In sum what.took place in Haiti was by no stretch of

the imagination an election. It was a selection.

The days that followed saw increasing attempts by the Army

to silence the opposition. Scores of people circulating a

petition protesting the elections were briefly detained and

brutalized. Priests were the subjects of threats and intimida-

tion. At least one of them, Father Estime, rector of the local

parish of La Victoire in the Central Plateau, was arrested by the

local commanding officer while officiating at a mass. He was

released only after the inhabitants of the locality led a protest

demonstration in front of the police station. The most notable

example of Army abuse was the arrest on January 20 of Louis

Dejoie, one of the four leading candidates from the aborted

November elections, upon his return from Puerto Rico and a trip

abroad in which he had lobbied against the substitute elections.

After being held for four hours at the airport, Dejoie was taken

out in handcuffs by plainclothes police officers accompanied by










truckloads of uniformed troops from the 32nd battalion under the

command of Jean-Claude Paul. Dejoie was pushed and shoved into a

waiting pick-up truck, when he attempted to speak to assembled

supporters. On the day of his arrest, Dejoie was presented with

no warrant, was not informed of any charge, and was denied access

to an attorney. Dejoie gained his release two days later only

after pressure from human rights and civil rights organizations

and from the leading political figures in Haiti forced the

government to back off its attempts to intimidate the opposition.



U.S. POLICY TOWARDS HAITI: REWARDING DUVALIERISM AND SUBVERTING

DEMOCRACY

From February 1986 on, the U.S. provided unswerving politi-

cal and economic support to the CNG, virtually until the very

moment that the military crushed the electoral process that it

purportedly championed. Although in the weeks following Duva-

lier's ouster the CNG vowed to bring democracy to Haiti, the

United States failed to see the writing on the wall when the

CNG's only respected civilian member, Gerard Gourgue, Justice

Minister and head of the Haitian League for Human Rights,

resigned less than two months after his appointment, in protest

over the military's continuing human rights violations and the

failure of the government to restrain the troops.

So long as the CNG maintained the position that it would

hand over the reigns of government to a civilian-elected govern-

ment at the end of its two-year mandate, the Administration







42


seemed satisfied with persistent military dominance and showed

great complacency towards the snail's pace of purported efforts

to demilitarize Haitian life. The Administration actively and

successfully lobbied for the renewal of military aid and periodi-

cally certified to Congress that the CNG was making progress on

human rights, despite the lack of demonstrated efforts to

investigate and prosecute abusers.

In September 1986, Congress explicitly authorized military

aid to Haiti, but attached to it a set of strict human rights

conditions. These conditions included requirements that specific

abuses by the armed forces cease, that past abuses be inves-

tigated, that the rights to free speech and assembly be protect-

ed, and that the tontons macoutes be demobilized. Notwithstanding

the CNG's failure to even take meaningful steps to fulfill these

conditions, a certification of human rights improvement was

issued in March 1987 which warmly endorsed the government. In

August 1987, in the midst of army killings and the resurgence of

paramilitary gangs terrorizing the population, the Administration

re-issued the certification and a follow-up progress report

required by law which allowed military aid to continue flowing to

the CNG. This official U.S. material and symbolic support for the

marauding CNG was viewed with complete dismay by the Haitian

public.

The Administration's policy toward Haiti has been molded by

its overriding concern with stemming the flow of Haitian refugees

to the Florida Coast and with preserving "stability" within










Haiti. Because it perceives the military as the most effective

vehicle to promote these goals, the Administration has been

unwilling to apply firm and consistent pressure on the military

to allow free and fair elections to go forward. One particularly

damaging example of the policy was the lukewarm support that the

Administration gave the original CEP in the face of the repeated

attacks by the CNG, and in its paralyzing reluctance to directly

criticize the CNG or the military.

When the CNG attempted its unconstitutional takeover of the

electoral process on June 22, 1987, the Administration quickly

established a policy of public silence and equivocation. In an

official statement by the State Department on June 29, 1987,

repeated by the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince on June 30, the

Administration spoke generally about the need for elections under

an independent electoral council, but then undercut the CEP's

constitutionally mandated stature by announcing that the dispute

over its electoral role was "complex" and under discussion. Then,

in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

July 23, 1987, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Caribbean Affairs, Richard Holwill, actually praised the CNG for

having "consistently stressed its commitment to the democratic

transition" and for having, "on balance", fulfilled its "contract

with the Haitian people to deliver elections." And on August 26,

1987, after the Army had killed scores of peaceful demonstrators,

the Administration continued to insist that the Haitian govern-

ment had satisfied the human rights conditions for U.S. aid,







44


thereby placing a seal of approval on the ongoing abuses of the

military.

In August and October 1987, the Administration deplored the

killings of two presidential candidates, but never publicly

criticized the CNG for refusing to heed the CEP's repeated calls

for protection of the electoral process. When the CEP was

attacked by arsonists and thugs with machine-guns in November,

the Administration once more condemned the violence but not the

CNG's refusal to provide protection. Predictably the CNG per-

sisted in this refusal and apparently felt free to move even more

systematically against the elections.

The Administration reacted decisively only after the

election day massacre and rampant violence forced the cancella-

tion of the elections, and the CNG dissolved the CEP in direct

violation of the Constitution. However even this Administration

response was too little too late. It announced a halt in all aid

to Haiti except for humanitarian aid sent through non-governmen-

tal organizations, but almost immediately began to back off from

this strong position and never forcefully articulated specific

conditions for the resumption of aid, such as the reinstatement

of the CEP as the sole body constitutionally empowered to run the

elections.

When the CNG took its cue from this careful ambiguity in

United States policy and appointed a substitute electoral

council, the Administration failed to condemn this breach of the

constitutionally mandated election procedures and then failed to










give support to the impressive refusal of the four leading

presidential candidates to become parties to this electoral coup.

Instead, the Administration equivocated, first testing the waters

to see if anyone with credibility could be encouraged to par-

ticipate in the rigged elections and, when that didn't happen, by

working behind the scenes to encourage the four contenders to

enter the race behind a single candidate.

While State Department spokesman Charles Redman acknowledged

on January 14 that the voting procedures were "flawed" and inade-

quate to meet the congressional requirements for the resumption

of aid, the Administration has never called on the CNG or the

Manigat regime to hold new elections under an independent CEP

that are free and fair. Instead, despite the bloody and lawless

policies of the last two years, it has indicated that it can work

with the Manigat regime.

It would be tragic for the Administration to further

sanction the undemocratic process through which Manigat was

imposed on the impoverished Haitians, particularly because the

United States is uniquely situated to pressure the Haitian

military to change its dictatorial course. Before the recent cut-

back, U.S. aid represented approximately one-third of Haiti's

national budget; when U.S. aid is combined with aid from France,

Canada, West Germany and the multilateral lending institutions,

it accounts for at least half of the national budget. With much

of this aid now stopped (approximately $130 million has been

suspended), the Haitian government is cutting back on the







46


salaries of government employees, and if economic sanctions

continue, its ability to pay the military will be in doubt.

Haitians are determined to continue fighting for democracy

through free and fair elections. If the Reagan Administration

moves to embrace the product of the farcical elections of January

17, it will act to extinguish this hope and condemn Haiti to many

more years of military dictatorship, albeit under a civilian

facade. It is true that Haiti's economy is a disaster slowly

becoming a Sahel, and that any aid restriction hurts the coun-

try's poor. First and foremost Haitians want the chance to have

their own democracy and most strongly believe that no economic

infrastructure can be constructed and little international aid

absorbed effectively without this democratic foundation. For two

years, the criminals dominating Haiti have been allowed to work

their will. The United States Congress and the Reagan Administra-

tion must stand with the Haitian people and resist the temptation

to revert to doing business as usual.



THE U.S. CAN ACT TO SAVE DEMOCRACY IN HAITI

The democratic future of Haiti now depends greatly on the

character of the international support forthcoming from those

interested in establishing true democracy in Haiti. The U.S. must

adopt a policy that refuses to submit to the blackmail of the

Haitian generals and which acts to support unequivocally the

restoration of the democratic electoral process spelled out in

the Haitian Constitution. If we equivocate on this score, the











Haitian military will understand us to be signaling that it

ultimately will be permitted to get away with their draconian

scheme.

U.S. policy responses must be crafted not only to promote

the restoration of the democratic process, but also to comple-

ment, not undermine, existing developments among the true demo-

cratic forces in Haiti. These forces span the spectrum of

organizations from the Movement to Root Democracy in Haiti of

economist Marc Bazin to the center-left coalition commonly called

the National Front for Cooperation and the impressive coalition

of 72 religious, civil, human rights, trade union and business

organizations known as civil Society. Their popular support was

vividly demonstrated when a vast majority of the Haitian elec-

torate heeded their call to boycott military-dominated elections

of January 17, 1988. I toured the capital and suburbs all day and

the overall emptiness resembled an eerie moonscape.

For too long, U.S. policy has relegated Haiti to the abyss

of neglect and indifference. Let's start to make amends to

Haitians by supporting the kind of democracy that we are supposed

to champion: a democracy where Haitians will begin to feel

protected from arbitrary terror by the rule of law and where they

begin to control their destiny.

1. The United States should maintain the cut-off of aid

and tell the Generals and President Manigat today that

we will not compromise our insistence that the indepen-

dent, constitutionally-mandated CEP be restored, and we







48


must immediately pledge our principal political and

financial support to this body.

2. We must insist on new elections based on a timetable to

be promulgated by the reinstated CEP.

3. The Haitian military must pledge its full support to

the restored CEP and demonstrate that it will provide

security and protection to the electoral and democratic

process. We must insist on respect for the rule of law,

an end to human rights violations and prosecution of

human rights abusers. Additionally those who committed

the atrocities on November 29 should be investigated

and brought to justice with due process of law.

4. The U.S. should immediately institute and recommend a

complete arms embargo and an end to all bilateral

assistance that frees up domestic resources allowing

the government to sustain the growing Army. The United

States should end all preferences under the Caribbean

Basin Initiative and abrogate the Textile Agreement

with Haiti.

5. The United States must act to encourage a freezing of

all programs of the multinational lenders. These

financial institutions will act more decisively when

and only when the U.S. encourages it.

6. The United States must impose a cumulative yet com-

prehensive regime of financial and trade sanctions

against Haiti, including a corporate campaign aimed at











enlightening those U.S. corporations doing business in

Haiti.

The most important single challenge demanded of the United

States is to communicate to the Haitian military and government

of simple message: "We know your game and won't play it any more.

We will no longer allow U.S. taxpayer money and the spirit of

democracy to be used in the service of corruption, terror and

hopelessness." Haitian democrats will do the work. We must

categorically refuse to wittingly or unwittingly be used any

longer in the service of perpetuating the old system in Haiti.

Mr Chairman, we appreciate your personal commitment to the

cause of human rights in Haiti since 1982, and we are grateful

that you will continue to raise your voice on behalf of the brave

people of that country.

Thank you.








Mr. CROCKEIT'. Thank you.
Mr. Fauriol.
STATEMENT OF GEORGES FAURIOL, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATE-
GIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. FAURIOL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee.
Like those who have already testified before me this afternoon, I
can make no pretense about the recent November Haitian elec-
tions. Their brutality and the apparent collusion of the Haitian
government in this process simply cannot generate any sympathy.
Likewise, it is in my opinion also clear that even had the Novem-
ber 1987 elections been more fairly managed, any government that
would have ensued from this process could not have in any event
received a blank check from the United States. The situation in
Haiti was and remains simply too severe to warrant any inatten-
tion on our part.
But is the severity of the Haitian crisis likely to be improved or
made worse by not only withholding support from the new Manigat
government, but in fact raising the specter of more U.S. sanctions?
MANIGAT GOVERNMENT DESERVES RESOURCES
Let me answer the question in the following terms. As imperfect
as the political environment in Haiti may be today, the new gov-
ernment of President Leslie Manigat deserves encouragement and
resources, rather than further sanctions and further hardship for
the Haitian people.
The latter has suffered enough, as my predecessors here on this
panel have already indicated, and may be close to a breaking point.
Haiti could be facing the cumulative results of not only political
crises but an economic and humanitarian tragedy as well.
Barring gross misjudgment and behavior on the part of the new
government, the United States, at minimum, should reinstate the
economic aid package cut off last November. Together with assist-
ance still being channelled through private or voluntary and multi-
national institutions, this should provide Haiti with the bare neces-
sities to meet immediate and basic budgetary and developmental
needs, not much else.
I need not remind the subcommittee that in the last two years of
the Duvalier era Washington provided aid packages in the $50 mil-
lion range. The assistance was provided despite the fact that the
regime at that time was making little if any progress toward de-
mocratization and improved human rights standards.
Now that Haiti has for the first time a government probably
more democratic at least in spirit than the nation has had for
three decades, is this the time for more sanctions or measured con-
structive actions on the part of the United States?
CAREFUL CULTIVATION PREFERABLE
My impression is that careful cultivation is preferable to aban-
donment of the Haitian situation, which is what a policy of sanc-
tions would imply. Clearly, without some form of American sup-







port, the fragile new government of Haiti is not likely to survive
very long.
The answer to the problem lies in part in the determination that
this subcommittee reaches regarding its own commitment to the
future of Haiti and U.S.-Haitian relations. Not resuming economic
assistance will obviously paralyze the country. Excluding Haiti
from the CBI provisions, OPIC mechanisms, and leveraging U.S. in-
fluence to prevent aid and economic flows from international lend-
ing agencies and foreign governments will also further destroy
Haiti.
On the basis of the poor record of recent electoral developments,
this may obviously be a commendable and principled policy on the
part of the United States. But it appears to assume extraordinarily
positive expectations once that policy thrust plays itself out.
LET US BE FAIR TO HAITI
Let us be fair to Haiti. Democracy does not grow out of the rheto-
ric of domestic politicians, academics, and the preferences of for-
eign governments. Democracy, as we all know, is a highly demand-
ing process that, in my opinion Haiti was in no condition to fully
deliver either in November 1987, or for that matter in January
1988.
The November experience was clearly more tragic than expected.
But ensuing from that tragic experience, the January results were
perhaps better than could have been anticipated.
Were the results free, fair and open? No, not really. But that
may be the wrong or at least half of the real question. The realistic
question to ask is whether one is comparing Haitian elections to a
model of a nation that has not known democratic elections, or is
the comparison being made with the standards of traditionally
democratic and socio-politically developed nations such as the
United States?
The recent experiences of political transitions in the Philippines,
South Korea, and Central America may be held as standards. But
the analysis then is also largely unrealistic. Haiti and South Korea
are planets apart. The latter's recent electoral experience bears
little resemblance to the very tenuous framework of political devel-
opment in Haiti today.
MANIGAT IS A SERIOUS POLITICAL LEADER
Should the new government of Haiti therefore be held entirely
responsible for the sins committed by the CNG? Should Manigat
pay the price for the political decisions of key presidential candi-
dates to withdraw after November 29?
At this juncture, in my opinion, it would appear to be preferable
to move beyond this 1986-1987 CNG rule as rapidly and realistical-
ly as possible. Few dispute the fact that Manigat is a serious politi-
cal and perhaps intellectual figure, one more likely than the aver-
age to at least attempt to address Haiti's almost intractable prob-
lems.
The political equation facing Haiti has involved tension between
the moralistic position to oppose the military and the CNG in toto








versus the tactical if somewhat uncomfortable option of playing
along with the CNG rules of the game.
Manigat chose the latter, most likely out of a sense of practical
political analysis rather than a corruptive or opportunistic charac-
ter on his part.
Although several presidential candidates appeared to take the
high road after the November 29th fiasco, this should not be con-
strued as giving them a monopoly on morality and political realism
regarding Haiti's future.
U.S. POLICY CANNOT ACCOMPLISH EVERYTHING
United States Interests
The United States policy vis-a-vis Haiti should most of all recog-
nize that there are certain things that it cannot realistically ac-
complish. The Washington policy community might temper some of
its hopes towards Haiti unless it is willing to pursue a forceful
policy towards a logical conclusion. That conclusion implies more
resources, political will, consistency, and a long-term commitment
of fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five years, a development not likely to
ensue the present framework of American politics and its foreign
policy process.
The United States preferences, however, should be clearly stated
for all to understand the values and objectives of this nation's poli-
cies. By the same token, there should also be a firm understanding
that there is a wide gap between our ideals and global realities,
particularly in Haiti.
For example, the Haitian armed forces remain a feature of the
present political environment, not likely to disappear overnight. So
are Haiti's horrible economic, social and environmental problems.
The strategic policy question may therefore be related to a deter-
mination of whether U.S. interests would be best served by either,
one, triggering a collapse of the Manigat government; or two, de-
veloping a very carefully selective cultivation of the Manigat ad-
ministration.
TRIGGER A COLLAPSE
Policy one, triggering a collapse, offers no guarantee that the po-
litical outcome will be any better or smoother than the one that we
have at present. There are no credible suggestions that any of the
other viable civilian political figures can govern Haiti that much
better-particularly that much better to the point of requiring a
U.S. policy that topples the present government. But if the U.S.
Congress decides to sustain sanctions or to impose new ones, I
think that the implications are also serious and might be worth re-
flection.
For starters, it assumes the need for a new transitional political
authority in Haiti and a new set of elections. It creates a break in
the present political development process that ensued from the
February 1986 collapse of the Duvalier government.
Although that process has obviously been marred by tragedy, a
new transitional and electoral exercise coming closely on the heels
of the recent crisis would most likely encounter enormous difficul-
ties.







As far as the role that international intervention can play in this
process, there appears to be little consensus or thorough assess-
ments of the costs and implications. Except in extraordinary cir-
cumstances, the United States should avoid that route.
In any event, it is unclear to me whether the Haitian political
environment can sustain another exhausting and possibly inconclu-
sive round of political battles in addition to external intervention.
The approach taken by other countries and other groups might
be instructive. The other major foreign actors in Haiti, France,
Canada, and the Federal Republic of Germany, have all to one
degree or another coordinated their approach with that of Wash-
ington.
I do not get the impression that there is much appetite to want
to strangle the Manigat government. This position is also shared by
most governments of the Caribbean.
A pragmatic approach is also visible in the position of the Chris-
tian Democratic (CD) parties of Latin America and Western
Europe. Manigat, although not formerly a Christian Democrat, has
nevertheless had ties to them over many years, particularly the
Venezuelan Christian Democrats.
The CD approach appears to suggest a need to confirm Haiti's
political realities, however imperfect these may be, and to build up
trust in the nation's fragile democratic institutions. Manigat is
viewed as a politically trustworthy figure. The fact that there is a
civilian president with democratic credentials is perceived as at
least a positive step, a step forward. The very fact that a transition
to a democratic and civilian figure occurred is regarded as the key
issue.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
U.S. Policy
Where does this leave U.S. policy? First, I would suggest that the
United States, as reinforced by congressional statements, should
state its very cautious support of the Manigat government in the
context of the key policy objective: namely, the establishment of a
civilian and democratic government in Haiti.
In tandem, we should also clearly underline our displeasure with
recent events and express frustration with the inability of Haitian
political leaders to come to grips with their own problems.
Second, United States assistance suspended in late 1987 should
be reinstated in tandem with similar actions from the major donor
countries working in Haiti.
Immediate consultations should be scheduled with Haitian offi-
cials and others regarding an assessment of the country's needs
over the next five years. Perhaps a small portion of the reinstated
fiscal year 1988 funds could be earmarked for this purpose.
Fiscal year 1989 appropriations for Haitian assistance should ob-
viously be conditional on this process having been executed and
agreed upon by relevant U.S. and other governmental and multina-
tional institutional actors.
Somewhere along the way, the president of Haiti should be invit-
ed to Washington to present his case and hear the deep concerns of
others.






54

Third, assistance to strengthen democracy in Haiti should be
more energetically developed. This assistance should be focused on
supporting individuals and institutions, and preferably done
through non-governmental organizations.
A comprehensive strategy should be developed in conjunction
with other countries, and reported back before the fiscal year 1989
congressional authorization. There are other points that I have sug-
gested in my written statement submitted to the committee.
To conclude, let me therefore suggest that if the new Haitian
government has any hopes of making progress so as to hand over
the keys to the national palace in a fair and orderly process, it
must be willing to accept advice and assistance in at least four crit-
ical areas.
One, a new budgetary and financial system; two, a reconstruction
of the nation's administrative system; three, a complete reorganiza-
tion of the police force, hopefully in the direct hands of the civilian
government; and four, realistically forceful measures against un-
democratic elements including old style Duvalierists, narcotics traf-
fickers and other elements in Haitian society.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[Prepared statement of Dr. Fauriol follows:]







55

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE FAURIOL, PH.D.

Haiti and the United States Today



Introduction

My name is Georges Fauriol; I am Director of Latin American

Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

here in Washington. I am here in my personal capacity. I first

went to Haiti as a graduate student in the mid-1970s. The

situation was somewhat unpleasant then, but has entered a

critical stage now (for a background analysis of U.S. policy, see

the Appendix).

I will go right to the heart of the matter and state my

position up-front regarding the issue at-hand. As imperfect as

the political environment in Haiti may be today, the new

government of President Leslie Manigat deserves encouragement and

resources--rather than further sanctions and further hardship for

the Haitian people. The latter has suffered enough and may be

close to a breaking point. Haiti could be facing the cumulative

results of not only political crises but an economic and

humanitarian tragedy as well.

Barring gross misjudgment and behavior on the part of the

new government, the United States, at minimum, should reinstate

the economic aid package cut off last November. Together with

assistance still being channelled through private/voluntary and

non-governmental institutions, this should provide Haiti with the

bare necessities to meet immediate and basic budgetary and

developmental needs. These resources, in the $ 80 million rang-,











would also allow Haiti to shift some attention to its balance of

payments problems and attempts at obtaining further IMF and World

Bank support.

In the last two years of the Duvalier era, Washington

provided aid packages in the $ 50 million range. The assistance

was provided despite the fact that the regime was making little,

if any, progress toward democratization and improved human rights

standards. Now that Haiti has for the first time a government

probably more democratic (in spirit, if not entirely in fact)

than the nation has had for three decades, is this the time for

more sanctions or measured, constructive actions? Clearly,

without some form of American support, the fragile new government

of Haiti is not likely to survive very long.

The answer to that problem lies in part in the determination

that Congress reaches regarding its own commitment to the future

of Haiti and U.S.-Haitian relations. Not resuming economic

assistance will further paralyze the country; excluding Haiti

from the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) provisions, OPIC

mechanisms, and leveraging U.S. influence to prevent aid and

economic flows from international lending agencies and foreign

governments will probably kill off the Haitian patient. This may

be a commendable and principled policy. But it appears to assume

extraordinarily positive expectations once the above policy

thrust plays itself out.

Democracy in Haiti? The nation lacks the most basic

elements for this most difficult of political regimes to take







57


root: 1) basic political consensus; 2) established and

representative political parties; 3) rule of law; and 4) some

degree of economic equity. After close to three decades of

debilitating governance by the Duvaliers, coming in the wake of

150 years of uninspired political development, one should

realistically expect only the bare minimum. In fact, that a

candidate with democratic credentials made it through Haiti's

recent convoluted and very violent electoral process to become

the nation's chief executive is to be applauded.

There is no doubt in any legitimate observer's mind that the

events surrounding the first round of elections in November 1987

were criminal. The regime of General Namphy has no excuses

behind which to hide. The United States had no choice but to

express its displeasure through the imposition of aid sanctions.

The actions of France, Canada, and West Germany, while more

reserved, suggested similar feelings of disappointments. The

neighboring Caribbean states expressed shock and concern

regarding these developments.

Regardless, the CNG (interim national council of government)

did move ahead and reconstituted an electoral council and

announced January 17, 1988 as the date for elections. That from

this point on the process became even more uncertain than before,

was inevitable and not particularly surprising. The boycott of

many from the original selection of presidential candidates, the

low voter turnout, and the questionable quality of the electoral

process itself on January 17, clearly did not generate the kind











of legitimacy that had been hoped for. But is the government of

President Manigat without any saving features? And are U.S.

interests best served by triggering a collapse of the new

government?



The Manigat government

In a development pregnant with emotional significance,

Leslie Manigat took office exactly two years after the departure

of Jean-Claude Duvalier. At this juncture, an autopsy of the

Duvalier period is unnecessary except to suggest that it left any

successor regime with an unenviable task.

The first actions of the incoming CNG, and General Henri

Namphy in particular, were very tentative, but in the context of

an exhausted national mood, encouraging. A timetable for the

return of Haiti to democratic stability was announced and

generally accepted. Barely 5% of the electorate bothered to vote

for the Constituent Assembly membership in October 1986. But for

all the difficulties, a new constitution was publicly ratified in

late March 1987. It provided for a five-year presidency, a chief

of government (in the form of a prime minister), and a armed

forces commander picked by the President. The provisional

aspects of the constitution were critical to the extent that they

called for the CNG to create a Provisional Electoral Council

(CEP) to manage the upcoming election timetable.

The first major breakdown of the process occurred in June-

July 1987. Popular dissent grew over the character and pace of






59


the CNG management of the political process. The situation was

made worse by the CNG's inadvised decision to curtail the

authority of the electoral council. Although the CNG recognized

its own error, it was too late; the credibility of the Namphy

regime, quite weak from the beginning, was severely wounded.

Unfortunately, popular discontent did not generate a viable

alternative political thrust, or at minimum, negotiable position,

to capitalize on this critical moment. Although able and free to

criticize, the opposition appeared incapable of arriving at a

practical consensus.

Instead of coalescing around a coalition of figures and key

issues, the multi-faceted opposition to the CNG continued to

manifest itself primarily by random and wavering moments of

violence, political rhetoric, and acts of purification or so-

called "dechoukage." As part of the government's law enforcement

response, concern was, in retrospect, quite correctly expressed

regarding the apparent tactical relationship between the CNG and

the armed forces; in tandem, remnants of the Duvalier period

reappeared in a violent form. Thus, the political equation began

to change dramatically to the extent that the army, generally on

the sidelines during the last hours of the Duvalier regime, now

became the enforcer of the regime; people got killed. And for

its part, the Catholic Church, lacking internal cohesion, lost

the decisive capability to push forward socio-political dynamics

in the manner it had done in 1984 and 1985.







60


In this difficult environment, the Provisional Electoral

Council pushed forward against extraordinary odds--in a country

that had for all practical purposes never experienced modern

elections. It made the recent experiences in Central America

appear as models of orderly political development. With little

public sympathy from the CNG, violence (including the killing of

candidates), and local opposition from Tontons or derivatives

thereof, the CEP claimed by early November 1987 that over 2

million (or about 75% of the estimated voting population) had

been registered. Much of this was accomplished through financial

support from the United States which contributed 8 of the $ 10

million cost of the balloting. This included some assistance

from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

The events of November 29 shook up Washington (and Paris and

other capitals with a political investment in Haiti). The

efforts of the CEP, a broad array of civilian political figures,

and foreign assistance, had been defeated in part due to the

obvious collusion between the CNG and the army leadership (Namphy

and Col. Regala in particular). The CEP's constitutionally-

mandated rejection of several Duvalier-related presidential

candidates had already touched off a month of political violence,

ultimately concluding with the sabotaging of the elections. One

should suggest that these events demonstrated the degree to which

the prospects for an orderly and democratic transition had, most

likely, been grossly inflated. The reality of Haiti's political

dynamics was finally catching up with the high hopes of policy-










making circles in Washington and elsewhere. Regardless of the

exact weight of responsibility, the suspended elections of

November 29 required a reassessment of the situation.

The search for a way out of this imbroglio surfaced in the

form of a hope that Haiti's democratic presidential candidates

could unify into a single opposition; the latter could then

effectively face the CNG and any proto-Duvalierist candidacies.

The decision of several major November 1987 candidates (Bazin,

Dejoie, Claude, Gourgue) to boycott the January 1988 ballot

doomed this or other options.

Instead, the CNG succeeded in pushing Haitian political

dynamics toward the January 17 elections. Without the

participation of four of the major candidates (coalesced around

the CED--Comite d'Entente Democratique), the process was

obviously a truncated one, at best. The results are now well-

known, and remain understandably controversial. The

reconstituted CEP (with modified and less viable electoral rules)

estimated that 35% (or less) voted out of a 3 million probable

electorate. From a numerically reduced slate of candidates,

Leslie Manigat came out on top, a result that was immediately

challenged.

Were the results "free,fair and open"? No, but that may be

the wrong or at least only half of the real question; the

realistic question to ask is whether one is comparing Haitian

elections to the model of a nation that has not known democratic

elections or is the comparison being made with the standards of


88-454 0 88 3







62



traditionally democratic (and socio-politically developed)

nations such as the United States? The recent experiences of

political transitions in the Philippines, South Korea, and

Central America may be held as standards, but the analysis is

then also largely unrealistic. Haiti and South Korea are planets

apart; even the political dynamics of a country such as

Guatemala in 1985 bears little resemblance to the very tenuous

framework of political development in Haiti today.

Let's be fair to Haiti. "Democracy" does not solely grow

out of the rhetoric of domestic politicians and the preferences

of foreign governments; democracy is a highly demanding process

that Haiti was in no condition to fully deliver either in

November 1987 or January 1988. The November experience was

clearly more tragic than expected; but ensuing from the latter,

the January results were better than could have been anticipated.

Of the candidates remaining in the race in January, Leslie

Manigat was probably the more democratic, moderate, and the one

most capable of governing. The well-known candidates had dropped

out in December in a calculated political move. This included

Marc Bazin (MIDH), former World Bank official and short-lived

Duvalier Finance Minister, who probably had the best developed

campaign; Louis D joie (PAIN), whose reputation was tied to that

of his father; Sylvio Claude (PDCH), the populist and battered

Duvalier opponent; and Girard Gourgue, backed by a coalition of

factions through the Front National de Concertation, and probably

representing a loose and volatile progressive electorate. They






63


ultimately refused to participate in the January 17 ballot. What

was left?

The cast of characters included: Hubert de Ronceray (PMDN),

sociologist of conservative bent who worked for the Jean-Claude

government prior to 1984; Gerard Philippe Auguste (MOP), self-

styled political descendant of the short-lived (1957) Fignole

government (and Dejoie,Sr. opponent); Eugene Gregoire (PSCH),

discredited for having played into Duvalier's belated attempts to

create a controlled party opposition; and Leslie Manigat, exiled

since 1963 after working in the early years of the Duvalier

government, and since then essentially an academic in France,

Trinidad and Venezuela. Left out of this round were the far left

(Rene Theodore's PUCH) and the various "duvalieristes" (Clovis

Desinor, Claude Raymond, and Alphonse Lahens, in particular)

candidacies rejected from the balloting by constitutional

restrictions (article 291 essentially prevented candidates with

well-known ties to the Duvalier governments from running for

office).

Ever since the electoral campaign began in earnest in 1987,

Manigat was a member of the moderate portion of the political

spectrum, even if his candidacy did not draw the kind of

attention that Bazin's or Gourgue's did. Clearly viewed as a

"democrat," Manigat's decision to participate in the January 17

election was perhaps something of a surprise, but has been

explained as an attempt on his part to resolve the political

impasse that Haiti was clearly in after the November 29 fiasco.







64


More cynical views have suggested that Manigat saw an opportunity

to claim the lead in a less than distinguished slate once key

candidates had dropped out. A more serious scenario suggests

that Manigat was the military's candidate even before the

November elections, but provided the margin of credibility needed

to pull off the January balloting. The astute politician that he

is, one has to assume that Manigat's calculations have included

portions of all of the above characterizations.

Should the new government of Haiti be held entirely

responsible for the sins committed by the CNG? And should

Manigat pay the price for the political decision of key

presidential candidates to withdraw after November 29? At this

juncture, it would appear to be preferable to move beyond the

1986-1987 CNG rule as rapidly and realistically as possible. Few

dispute the fact that Manigat is a serious political (and

intellectual) figure, one more likely than the average to

constructively attempt to address Haiti's almost intractable

problems.

The political equation facing Haiti in the last 90 days has

involved tension between the moralistic position to oppose the

military and the CNG in toto, versus the tactical, if

uncomfortable option of playing along with the CNG rules of the

game. Manigat chose the latter most likely out of a sense of

practical political analysis rather than a corruptive and

opportunistic character. Although several presidential

candidates appeared to take the high road after November 29, this






65


should not be construed as giving them a monopoly on morality and

political realism.

No one in the present Haitian political environment is above

criticism, and this includes to a degree the core group of

civilian political figures. For all of the rhetoric about

Haiti's challenges, those working the political scene spent much

time in 1986 and 1987 bickering among themselves. The decision

to pull the plug on the process following the November crisis was

understandable but, somewhat typically, did not offer a clear-

cut, simple, and therefore realistic way out of the immediate

crisis. At this point in Haiti's unhappy developments, one can

only urge those forward-looking and democratic forces in Haiti's

tired environment to join together in strengthening the little

democratic credibility that there is rather than pursuing an

open-ended cycle of political infighting.



United States Interests

United States policy vis-a-vis Haiti should most of all

recognize that there are certain things it cannot realistically

accomplish. Diplomacy does involve the art of the possible, and

as a result the Washington policy community should temper its

missionary enthusiasm toward Haiti--unless it is willing to

pursue a forceful policy to its logical conclusion. The latter

entails resources, political will, consistency, and long term

commitment (25 years?) that are not always strong points in the

present framework of American politics and foreign policy.







66


United States preferences should be clearly stated for all to

understand the values and objectives of this nation's policies;

but by the same token, there should also be a firm understanding

that there is a wide gap between our ideals and global

realities--particularly in Haiti.

United States relations with Haiti have a complicated and

close history. The latter, for all of our well-intentioned

policies, has produced the Haiti that we face today. We owe it

to ourselves to be involved but cautious. The perceived

imperfections of past U.S. involvement in Haitian affairs, or the

appealing moral quality of present policy, should not detract

attention from a basically difficult situation with no easy

solutions.

The Haitian armed forces remain a feature of the present

political environment. So are Haiti's horrible economic, social,

and environmental pressures. The strategic policy question may

therefore be related to a determination whether U.S. interests

might be better served by: 1) triggering a collapse of the

Manigat government; or 2) developing a carefully selective

cultivation of the Manigat administration.

Policy #1 offers no guarantee that the political outcome

will be any better or smoother than the present one. There are

no credible suggestions that any of the other viable civilian

political figures can govern Haiti that much better--weakening

the need to topple the present government. Credibility is a

factor, although an amorphous one at best and greatly influenced






67


by actual policies and results. Washington has an opportunity to

affect these results and provide the resource margins Manigat

needs to restore some political and economic order to the

country. But if the U.S. Congress decides to sustain sanctions,

or imposes new ones (or in the long run calls for military

intervention), the implications are serious.

For starters, it assumes the need for a new transitional

political authority in Haiti, and a new set of elections. It

creates a break in the present political development process that

ensued from the February 1986 collapse of Duvalier. Although

that process has been marred by tragedy, a new transitional and

electoral exercise coming closely on the heels of the recent

crises would most likely encounter enormous difficulties. As for

the role that international intervention can play in this

process, there appears to be little consensus or thorough

assessments of the costs and implications. Except in

extraordinary circumstances, the United States should avoid that

route. It is unclear to this observer whether the Haitian polity

can sustain another exhausting and possibly inconclusive round of

political battles. What is certain is that the above

difficulties would distract from the country's critical socio-

economic needs.

The approach taken by others might be instructive. The

other major foreign actors in Haiti (France, Canada, the Federal

Republic of Germany) have all to one degree or another

coordinated their approach with that of Washington. Much of the







68


foreign assistance programs have been put on hold, although the

two leading actors (U.S. and France) have each taken somewhat

different actions. Both Washington and Paris eventually

partially suspended aid (the U.S. more quickly), but one has the

distinct impression that, overall, France is holding off from

drastic action.

A pragmatic approach is also visible in the position of the

Christian Democratic (CD) parties of Latin America and Western

Europe. Manigat, not formerly a Christian Democrat, has

nevertheless had ties to the them over the years (particularly

Venezuela's). The CD approach appears to suggest that there is a

need to confirm Haiti's political realities, however imperfect

these may be, and to build up trust in the nation's fragile

democratic institutions. Manigat is viewed as a politically

trustworthy figure (certainly intellectually), as autonomous from

the armed forces as realistically possible and independent from

the remnants of the Duvalier regime. The fact that there is a

civilian president with democratic credentials is perceived by

the CD as a positive step forward. The irony is that Manigat's

credibility and ties to the CD as well as the Socialist

International created the favorable image the military was

desperately searching for as a viable way out of the Haitian

crisis. Obviously, no one for a moment believes that the January

1988 elections were entirely above board, but the very fact that

a transition to a democratic and civilian figure occurred is

viewed as the key issue.






69


The trauma of further political upheaval in Haiti has been a

cause for concern throughout the Caribbean. But the response of

the regional governments has been measured. Manigat is a known

quantity in many regional political and academic circles, having

spent several years at Trinidad's Institute for International

Relations. Neighboring Dominican Republic, in an historically

difficult relationship, also appears to have the basis for

positive ties (through President Balaguer) with Haiti's new

government.



U.S. Policy

1. The United States, as reinforced by congressional

statements, should state its cautious support of the Manigat

government in the context of the key policy objective: namely,

the establishment of a civilian and democratic government in

Haiti.

In tandem, Washington should clearly underline its

displeasure with recent events and express its frustration with

the inability of Haitian political leaders to come to grips with

their own problems.



2. United States assistance, suspended in late 1987, should

be reinstated, in tandem with similar actions from the major

donor countries working in Haiti.

Immediate consultations (and hearings) should be scheduled

with Haitian officials and others regarding an assessment of the







70


country's needs over the next five years. FY 1989 appropriations

for Haitian assistance should be conditional on the above having

been executed and agreed upon by relevant U.S. and other

governmental and multinational institutional actors. FY 1989

authorization should itself be dependent on U.S. executive branch

reporting to Congress regarding the above consultation process.

In conjunction with the above, the President of Haiti should

be invited to Washington to present his case and hear the deep

concerns of others.



3. Haiti clearly faces serious security and law enforcement

challenges. The latter ultimately implies a complete overhaul of

the nation's system of legal administration. There is no reason

why the United States should be the sole source of support in

this area. Our allies should be called upon to bear a share of

this difficult burden. The armed forces of Haiti should be made

to understand that obstruction or lack of progress in these areas

will lead to coordinated reactions by the foreign donor

community--namely, cut-off of all military assistance funds (MAP,

etc.).



4. Assistance to strengthen democracy in Haiti should be

more energetically developed. This assistance should be focused

on supporting individuals and institutions, and preferably

channelled through non-governmental organizations. A

comprehensive strategy should be developed in conjunction with










other countries and reported back to Congress before FY 1989

authorization.



5. As many others have stated elsewhere, Haiti's cycle of

corruption, incompetence, and government violence needs to be

arrested. If the new Haitian government has any hopes of making

progress so as to hand over the keys to the National Palace in a

fair and orderly process further down the road, it must be

willing to accept advice and assistance (including that from the

Haitian exile community) in at least four critical areas:

a. a new budgetary and financial system;

b. a reconstruction of the nation's administrative system;

c. a complete reorganization of the police force,
independent of the army command, and in the direct hands
of the civilian government;

d. realistically forceful measures against undemocratic
elements, from old-style Duvalierists, to narcotics
traffickers.











APPENDIX



FROM: Georges Fauriol, "Friendly Haitian Tyrants," manuscript
for publication, in Friendly Tyrants: A Troubled History,
edited by Daniel Pipes and Adam M. Garfinkle
(Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Project).



The following draws from the Introduction (pages 3-4) and
Conclusion (pages 61-7) of the manuscript.


Introduction


The traditional policy of the United States toward Haiti has

reflected the following basic perspective: events in Haiti are

of some interest but never of high priority. This approach has

been shaped by regional interests that have historically revolved

around ideology, the regional presence of potentially hostile

forces, and violence within the nations of the Caribbean.

Occasionally, catastrophic socio-economic and even natural forces

have provided an-important backdrop to U.S. activity. With only

two major exceptions in this century, until recently none of the

above factors had moved up sufficiently in the U.S.-Haitian

agenda to warrant a state of extreme crisis in Washington. The

parading of President Sam's torn body through the streets of

Port-au-Prince in January 1915, and the rapid downfall of the

Duvalier regime in February-1986, altered these policy

calculations and in each case led to major American actions.

The immediate aftermaths of both 1915 and 1986 have involved

a fairly determined United States action aimed at three broad and

inter-related objectives: 1) restoration of a semblance of

order; 2) attention to acute problems of economic management; 3)

a more amorphous hope of planting the seed of modern governance

in Haiti. Departing in each case from a near vacuum, the role of

the United States has therefore been difficult and prone to a

degree of well-intentioned naivete regarding the chances of

long-term success. The challenge has perhaps been made even






73


greater due to the character of American involvement preceding

these historical flash-points.

In part because of broader regional considerations --

protection of the "American Mediterranean" in the early twentieth

century or the "Caribbean Basin" in the 1980s -- the United

States has kept a distant watch on Haitian affairs. Whether it

was the violence and perceived possible European collusion df the

earlier era or simply regime decline and political embarrassment

of the recent period, Washington has episodically engaged itself

actively in the Haitian environment. This has not prevented the

collapse of Haiti's governments. Instead, Washington has been

here to administer an occasional dose of emergency economic and

political medicine. With this form of strategic oxygen, twice in

this century the United States has rescued Haiti from most

certain total chaos and likely brutal societal violence.

What has motivated America's actions in this part of the

Caribbean? What is the character of this Haitian polity that has

generated both a dismal record of governance as well as an active

record of interaction with the United States in this century?

Where do these records stand in 1987? Will Haiti once again

degenerate into a "friendly tyrant"? This essay addresses these

questions briefly.







74


Implications



If Duvalier's final departure was a relatively graceful

event, it is unclear whether American policy prior to it or

since then bears any great insights. Every case of a declining

tyrant has its own features. That is not terribly revealing

except that in the Haitian case there are perhaps some striking

elements not common elsewhere. Two cases come to mind

immediately.

The first is that by writing in the summer of 1987, the

February 1986 collapse of the Duvalier regime remains not only an

unfinished story, but one that probably has barely begun.

Building democracy in Haiti equals the challenge of putting a man

on the moon: modern political traditions are as foreign to Haiti

as man is to that planet in the sky.

A second striking element, almost pedestrian, in that unlike

the moon, or most other collapsing tyrannies of the world, Haiti

is geographically close to the United States. That immediately

elevates the challenge from a faraway Third-World trouble spot to

a strategic interest near home. This has perhaps been made more

salient by the subsidiary fact that American ties to Haiti are

old and closer than most in this country realize. When it comes

down to exercising forceful policy, the United States is the only

real actor, with distant France, neighboring Dominican Republic,

and Cuba, marginal bit-players so far.

The ethnic and racial element of U.S.-Haitian relations






75


played a unique role in catalyzing American perceptions of

Duvalier as a no-good tyrant. It is one thing to galvanize

public interest against tin horn dictators of Central America;

Haiti, however, involved more than authoritarianism and corrupt

government -- it alluded to freedom marches, the civil rights

movement and other features of recent American social history.

Thus, although Papa Doc represented primarily a foreign policy

challenge for the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s,

Baby Doc's decline initially was triggered by a humanitarian and

racial consciousness that developed within the American black

community. The latter found fertile ground in Jimmy Carter's

world-view, in which human rights were not only an adjunct to

conventional foreign policy but in effect its main driving force.

Not surprisingly, U.S. policy was not easily engaged in

changing the perceived imperfections of the Haitian regime.

Ultimately, Jean-Claude Duvalier ran afoul of U.S'. policy when

dead Haitians on Florida beaches generated public uproar and

potential embarrassment. The refugee concern had been brewing

since the mid-1970s but was given a boost politically when the

Congressional Black Caucus sensitized the problem-area after 1979

and, almost simultaneously, the Cuban Mariel mass exodus of

summer 1980 catapulted the refugee issue to crisis level. The

images and experiences of the Vietnam/Cambodian refugee crisis of

1978/79, and America's experience in Southeast Asia earlier, were

still quite fresh in public perception. A sense of public panic

overcame American diplomacy caught unprepared when events got out







76


of control in 1980 regarding both Haiti and Cuba.

Significantly, until this point Haiti was fundamentally not

viewed as a crisis arena. Although prone to some excesses and

likely to offend American values, the Haitian regime was

considered, in a strange manner, stable. Francois Duvalier had

-succeeded in driving off or killing most of his opponents while

his son's rule appeared from a distance sufficiently benign as to

warrant little attention from the United States. It was safer to

walk through the deserted streets of Port-au-Prince in the 1970s

than it was in most other Caribbean capitals. In fact, well into

the early 1980s Haiti was paradoxically attracting attention as a

safe place to manufacture apparel and electronic components

(Haiti's industrial parks employed 50,000 people) while the

country's image was suffering from the effect of the refugee

crisis, AIDS, and other calamities.

What crept into U.S.-Haitian relations was a degree of

complacence. Since the Duvalier regime had survived even a

father-son transition and appeared in the mid-70s to be on the

rebound, Haiti ranked very low on the U.S. watch list. That

would have changed had Jimmy Carter's Assistant Secretary of

State for human rights, Pat Derian, followed her instincts for

low-life like Duvalier. But not only was Carter not reelected,

but the situation in Haiti turned for the worse very quickly in

1980 while strategic considerations gained the upper hand in

American policy towards the Caribbean Basin as a whole (El

Salvador in particular) even before Carter had left the White










House.

This then raises the question of when Haiti did become a

crisis threatening American interests. The above discussion

suggests that a threshold was reached with the 1980 refugee

crisis. But it is not certain that Duvalier was clearly a threat

at that point in time. A threat to what? Although people were

fleeing by the thousands, the regime appeared no less "stable" or

on the verge of an imminent crisis. Had Washington viewed Haiti

differently, it would have moved much more harshly against

Duvalier. But the 1980 crisis was essentially viewed as a

humanitarian one and this is what shaped the American response.

If any actor began to misread the situation at this juncture

it was not really the United States but rather Haiti. What

Duvalier and his associates failed to appreciate was that the

refugee crisis cemented a coalition of Congressional,

humanitarian, and racial interests in the United States down to

the community level. The more hardline Duvalierists further made

the error of assuming (as some of their Central American

colleagues did) that Ronald Reagan's election would extinguish

American concerns for human rights. But the latter was instead

meshed into a double-barrelled threat to the Haitian regime: an

evolving concern by the new Republican administration for

"democracy" and a broadly-based Congressional consensus regarding

misuse of U.S. foreign aid. With close scrutiny growing during

1981-84, Duvalier could not escape failing in both the democracy

and the foreign-aid tests.






78


The Haitian collapse of 1986 demonstrates that not all

tyrants are equal. The dynamics of the collapse of the Duvalier

regime were uniquely dependent on the character of Jean-Claude

himself. He inherited the presidency-for-life from his father

and held the position for 15 years. During this period he

accumulated vast wealth. Analysis of his character as well as an

assessment of his statements suggest that he ultimately lacked

the passion for power like that of a Marcos or Somoza. For Papa

Doc, wealth was a way of keeping power. For his son, political

power appears to have been a way for making money and expanding

the family treasury. This can explain the degree to which

Duvalier's departure was a less than glorious one, although it

has probably made his exile more comfortable and less stressful.

He also made it relatively easy for the United States.

The Duvaliers had turned Haiti into such a strange place

that the normal tools of American pressures did not always work.

Both Papa Doc and his son were fundamentally not interested in

national economic development. U.S. foreign aid was viewed by

the National Palace as surplus funds, and when in the 1960s they

were not forthcoming, Haiti simply went on its own hungry way.

Naturally, this could not be maintained in the 1970s but Jean

Claude succeeded in spoon-feeding quite effectively American

political concerns. The 1980 crisis, compounded perhaps by the

1982 dismissal of the highly-regarded Marc Bazin as Finance

Minister, brought an end to Haitian ability to fool the United

States. But Haiti remained until the end a "poor country,"










indeed so miserable that humanitarian concerns consistently and

legitimately intruded regularly into U.S. policy designs.

Duvalier's opposition after the early 1960s was so

fractionalized, if not inept, as to become politically dormant

until the late 1970s. This left few actors with which Washington

could conceivably scheme to overthrow the regime. In fact, the

United States was over the years more concerned with amateurish

invasion attempts breaking U.S. neutrality laws than the real

probability of seeing Duvalier fall. The fact that many of these

invasions did take place suggests more the minor-league character

of these efforts rather than any purposeful U.S. design to

encourage Duvalier's opposition.

The lack of organized opposition groups and respected

figures was clearly brought out in the final moments of the

regime. No one was really in charge of the movement that brought

down Duvalier although the Catholic Church clearly provided a

limited degree of institutional cohesion. When it came to

developing a transition regime in February 1986, the cast of

characters was frightfully absent. This seriously limited

American policy options. Grand moral principles converged with

the reality that when Duvalier had left, there was no one or

group that appeared to be a logical or politically acceptable

successor. Nor was the Central American or Philippines

"election" alternative readily available. Secretary Shultz's

call for democracy in Haiti a week before Duvalier's collapse

covered up the fact that this mission could not be accomplished







80


in the near term. It catapulted American policy designs into the

future without defining the near-term process.

That transition process turned out to have an old-fashioned

quality to it. The immediate danger in Haiti was not that

Duvalier's archaic government would be replaced by a permanent

totalitarian regime but that Haiti would enter a total vacuum of

governance. An interim regime was patched together from the

cloth of the out-going regime to which in extremis were added a

few opposition political figures then in Haiti. This arrangement

was worked out with the American ambassador playing a decisive

role, to a background of grinding chaos throughout the country.

But the challenge was only really beginning since this interim

group (the CNG) is the one that was also entrusted with placing

Haiti on the road to democracy.

In looking at Haiti, one needs to remind the reader that

American omnipotence has its practical limits. While the above

analysis portrays varying American roles, ultimately, the

collapse of Duvalier was greatly made possible by Haitians

themselves. It is their blood that was expanded in riots, not

ours. In the end, the United States did play a key and positive

role. However, it remains unclear whether this role is fully

appreciated by Haitians themselves, nor are the implications of

that role for the future fully assessed by American decision-

makers.







Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Dr. Fauriol.
We will be following the five-minute rule.
RESUMPTION OF AID
I understand from your presentation, Mr. Fauriol, that your con-
cern for the hardships endured by the people of Haiti is given as a
justification for having the United States resume full aid to the
government of Haiti.
Is that a correct presentation of your position?
Mr. FAURIOL. My impression, Mr. Chairman, is that the situation
is reaching a point where one would have to characterize it as
almost a humanitarian problem, and that we cannot separate that
from political realities.
Mr. CROCKETT. We have cut off aid from the government of Haiti,
but we have not terminated aid to private voluntary organizations,
nor have we terminated aid in most of the instances where the
benefits go directly to the people of Haiti.
Mr. FAURIOL. I understand that.
Mr. CROCKETT. It is your argument then that we should resume
direct aid to the present government of Haiti, is that right?
Mr. FAURIOL. Yes, indeed.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you.
Now Mr. Joseph, I think that most of us agree that President
Manigat was hand-picked by the military. And when we say mili-
tary, we are really referring to General Namphy and General
Regala.
What special qualifications do you think that he possessed that
brought about his selection by the military?
MILITARY PICKED MANIGAT
Mr. JOSEPH. I think that Mr. Manigat is a very well prepared
man. He is an erudite professor. But I think that he was picked
because he agreed with them that there would not be any punish-
ment of past crimes, and that he would not touch the military es-
tablishment. And the fact that Mr. Manigat has not been able to
name certain people in key posts, the fact that he has not been
able to recover the post of the Minister of Information to give to
his minister shows that he is following the dictates of the military.
If the military does not agree with something, he says, well, that
is their area. That has happened again and again during this past
month. After naming his cabinet, he has not been able to change
the administration. Some cabinet ministers sit at home. Their
home is their office.
Mr. CROCKETT. What has been the position of the other govern-
ments in the Caribbean with respect to the Manigat presidency?
Mr. JOSEPH. The government of Mr. Seaga in Jamaica is the one
that most forcibly supports Mr. Manigat. It happened that Mr.
Seaga was the most forceful supporter of Jean-Claude Duvalier,
too. So there is nothing there. Jamaica, Dominica, and Grenada,
are three very conservative countries that form the Democratic
Union in the Caribbean. These are the three countries that truly
support Manigat.








The others do not. So I was very much appalled when I heard
Mr. Fauriol say that all of the Caribbean countries support Mr.
Manigat. Barbados has broken relations. Trinidad and Tobago are
sitting on their hands. And there are a lot of other governments
like that.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I gather that
the lifting of your eyebrows indicates that I have the floor.
Mr. CROCKETT. It indicated that you were next.
Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you.
REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE
Gentlemen, very briefly, do you think that there would be any
significant support within Haiti for the introduction of a regional
peacekeeping force that would consist of contingents contributed by
countries in the hemisphere for the purpose of, in effect, taking
temporary control of the government of Haiti, and of conducting
some kind of free and fair election in which the people in Haiti
would have an opportunity to elect a new government? Would
there be any sympathy and support for that in Haiti, or would it be
pretty much widely condemned?
Mr. JOSEPH. It would be very hard for me to answer that ques-
tion. I know that the people of Haiti remember with a lot of pain
the last intervention they had. It was from the United States 1915
to 1934. And no Haitian patriot will stand up and say, okay, we
want intervention.
However, in my going around in the country, especially after No-
vember 29th, the people, a lot of them, were looking down the sea
and saying, our salvation will come from there.
So, I think if the Haitian people had a choice to be ruled by the
Duvalierist, or have an international force take the Duvalierists
out, I am quite sure they would go with the latter.
Mr. SOLARZ. Do they consider that they have a Duvalierist Gov-
ernment now?
Mr. JOSEPH. Yes. The Duvalierists are in power; and there is no
doubt about that. But at the same time I am saying they have a
very hard choice of asking a foreign power to come in.
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. I am sure that you would be able to find
elements in Haitian society that would support such an action. I
would be most careful with it, however, because as Mr. Joseph said,
we do remember indeed what occurred several decades ago when
50,000 Haitians died at the hands of the United States.
Mr. SOLARZ. How many?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. About 50,000 died when the U.S. invaded
some years ago. So that one is most nervous about such a project
that, if not very carefully thought through, could end up in disaster
for that country.
UNILATERAL INTERVENTION
Mr. SOLARZ. If it turned out that there was no regional support
for a hemispheric peacekeeping force, and it came down to a choice
between sending in American troops by themselves without the ap-
proval of the OAS, and not sending in a peacekeeping force at all,
would the previous experience that the Haitian people had with







the American occupation render it impossible for the United States
to get any indigenous support for a unilateral intervention?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. Yes. It would make it very, very difficult;
extremely difficult to the point where I would not advise it.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Hooper?
Mr. HOOPER. I would say three things in specific response to your
question. The first is that, we have conducted many, many inter-
views and conversations and collected from many experts on Haiti,
within and without Haiti, responses to your very question.
I think secondly and generally, the temptation to talk about
intervention is the flip side of our equivocal weak policy. We do
very little of substance regarding Haiti most of the time, and then
we look immediately for some solution to the chaos and the des-
peration that we have contributed to.
I think thirdly, sir, that the reality is that there is no possibility
of an OAS or a U.N. intervention. There is no support for such a
thing in the OAS for reasons which are patently obvious given the
nature of many of the countries involved.
So what you are talking about really is, at a moment in history,
would a significant number of Haitians support this? And I can tell
you, to the best of our ability, in October, November, and Decem-
ber, speaking with leaders and the non-famous, the answer was un-
equivocal "no"; that would further disrupt and undermine the
democratic forces within Haiti and would move the attention away
from them.
Mr. SOLARZ. Well, if, as a practical matter, there is no support in
the OAS or the UN for a multilateral peacekeeping force, and if
the people of Haiti would be opposed in any case to the introduc-
tion of an American force, and there certainly does not seem to be
that much support for it here, then it would appear that the only
hope for the restoration of democracy, if I understand your testimo-
ny, would lie "in the continuation of the existing sanctions by the
United States against Haiti, and in the imposition of additional
ones."
POLITICAL RESULTS OF SANCTIONS
But my final question is, because I gather we are under the five-
minute rule here, what reason do you have to believe-from a very
hardheaded, practical, realistic point of view-that the mainte-
nance of the existing sanctions and the imposition of additional
ones could conceivably result in the establishment of democracy in
Haiti through a decision by Mr. Manigat and the military there to
agree to hold new elections under some independent auspices. How
do you get from here to there? That is not what is clear to me.
Mr. JOSEPH. If we maintain sanctions and want democratization
in Haiti-and we made this clear to Mr. Manigat, who understands
very well-we should have elections and begin at the lowest
levels-with the villages, what they call the cases. Let us have a
true election and let us have the people there choose who they
want. I am quite sure Mr. Manigat in order to get his money,
would go along with that, and we would see a non-Duvalierist elect-
ed at the village levels. But if we continue to support them in ille-
gality, they have no reason to change the system.







Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Weiss?
Mr. WEISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just following up on that, you had indicated early on in your tes-
timony that you considered President Manigat to be a puppet of
the military. If that is so, and I have no reason to disagree with
that, then why would the military allow him to undertake a democ-
ratization of any form at all?
MILITARY RELIES ON U.S. ASSISTANCE
Mr. JOSEPH. The military will also depend on U.S. aid, unless
they side with the drug cartel, which they might. President Mani-
gat was interviewed in Newsweek International yesterday and they
asked him about drugs in Haiti, and he said, we still stand ready to
cooperate with our friendly partners. He did not say friendly coun-
tries. We stand ready to cooperate on this issue with our friendly
partners, which means those who give him aid.
So there is the chance that the military or Manigat may go the
other way; then the U.S. can decide what it wants to do. However,
I still maintain that the military depends on U.S. aid, and if they
see that aid is not forthcoming, they will go the way of democracy
or drug cartel; then we know what we are dealing with.
Mr. WEISS. Professor Smith and Mr. Hooper, let me ask you, how
do you see the situation playing out? Suppose in fact the United
States were to follow the specific recommendations that you have
made in your presentations, what do you think would be the reac-
tion of the Manigat government and the military? What do you see
a year from now, for example?
And, Mr. Fauriol, suppose the government said forget it, we are
not going to meet the four conditions that you have laid down; then
what do you see for the United States?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. Well, you know Mr. Manigat was chosen
precisely because it was felt that it could turn the situation around
insofar as U.S. aid was concerned. If he can do that he might last
quite a few months as president. If he is unable to do that he be-
comes worse than useless to the Haitian military and he will be
dumped.
If he tries to move independently he will be dumped; he is gone.
And either way he has got a problem. And he does realize that. He
knows that. I think he is satisfied in being a figurehead president
with very little else coming his way because he does not expect
much; he really does not.
Now, this is not to say that he is not a brilliant scholar, but I
really do not know what it has to do with anything. I am talking
about violations of the Haitian constitution. People voted for that
constitution, and they resent the suggestion that Haiti cannot be
democratic, because voting, in the first place, is a very tough thing
to do.
We were very much on our way to democracy if we were only
left alone by the military establishment. And I have to remind the
members of this subcommittee that the Haitian Army was founded
by the U.S. Marine Corps.
Mr. WEISS. Wait a minute, how do we get them to let go?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. I'm sorry.







Mr. WEISS. How do we get them to let go, that's the question?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. Well, you see, one of the things that I
hope the subcommittee will help resolve is the suggestion, the idea
that is floating around Haiti, that the U.S. State Department had
everything to do with the selection of Leslie Manigat. And I want
to know if it is true.
And also, that the Administration had everything to do with the
selection with Jean-Claude Duvalier, of course, with the selection
of Henri Namphy and Williams Regala the first time around two
years ago. I want to know if it is true. If it is true, then much of
what is being discussed here does not really matter.
Mr. WEISs. Well, assume it is not true, okay, what happens?
Where do we go?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. Well, we will have to wait for the Hai-
tians to decide, won't we?
Mr. WEISS. Mr. Hooper?
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Mr. HOOPER. I think your question is extremely important, and
obviously, an extremely difficult one. We usually do not deal in the
realm where we are satisfied without having guarantees and sce-
narios. I am afraid that after the history that we have all agreed
upon, the recent history in Haiti, we are in a place where there are
no guarantees and no certain scenarios.
When you are talking about sanctions of whatever nature, you
are, of course, talking about something that is-something hoped to
have a cumulative effect that is virtually a random bombardment
that does not have a good cause and effect response.
But I will be as specific as I can and that is to say this, sanctions,
the program-the specific cuts that we think are minimal are im-
portant and will be important for this reason.
First of all, it removes the illusion of support that the U.S. gives.
It may seem small here. It is absolutely paramount in Haiti. People
believe the U.S. has supported and does support to this day the re-
sults of this entire tragedy.
People in positions of very significant power believe that the
United States stands behind this. That is an incredibly demobiliz-
ing thing. The first thing sanctions do is remove that.
The second thing we must recognize is that, there are many
things that we have to do that are positive. We just do not cut; we
do things, too. We are not just negative; we do things. One of the
things is, the United States has good intelligence and we know who
the true democrats are in Haiti. We know what organizations truly
represent hope for the country. The Embassy is well aware. They
have discussed it with many of us many times. The risk is working
with them without having a guarantee. The risk is beginning to
work with people that may displease the Army slightly. So we have
to do that. We have to keep up certain assistance if it is really sep-
arate from the government, really separate from the government.
That is yet to be demonstrated in the current aid allocations.
Unfortunately, the way things are cut and the way things are de-
fined do not really guarantee at this moment in time that this is








nongovernmental. In many cases this is used by the Haitian gov-
ernment in significant ways.
EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS
How does it have an effect? It already is having a huge effect.
The budget deficit in Haiti is vast. They are panicked. I assure you
from people close to the previous Finance Ministry of only two
months ago that they simply cannot meet salaries; ultimately that
leads to not paying the Army. I am not saying it necessarily leads
to not paying the Army, but it is a very significant pressure.
What it does? The hope for effect is a peeling-off effect. The best
response I can give you, sir, is that we are peeling an onion and
this pressure peels off layers of support; and you progressively peel
away people who should not be supporting this Army or who are
uncertain of their current position and who, given an option, can
see a ray of light to hold on to, who can see allies in the interna-
tional theater to work with. They will no longer continue to toler-
ate these kind of abuses and hopelessness. There is no specific re-
sponse, but I think there is a direction.
Mr. WEISS. Thank you.
Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Fuster.
Mr. WEISS. Mr. Fauriol, I think, wanted to respond, Mr. Chair-
man.
MILITARY INTERVENTION IS NOT A SOLUTION
Mr. FAURIOL. I would like to respond to the question, if I may.
There is one instance where I do share the views of my colleagues
here and that is, military intervention is not likely to be a solution
except perhaps in an extreme case.
However, I think sanctions or continuing of sanctions is likely to
result in-as one of the other gentlemen has mentioned-Haiti be-
coming a Duvalier kind of nation.
And to use the analogy of Mr. Hooper, but maybe on the flip
side, the peeling of the onion, in my opinion, is not so much peeling
away-sanctions will not so much peel away the unattractive ele-
ments of society, but in fact may simply peel away the very thin
layer of democratic elements in society, starting with perhaps the
president himself. And you will end up with, in fact, most likely
the military taking charge.
Sanctions against Haiti under Duvalier in the past did not work
particularly well. The history in the 1960s, in fact essentially sug-
gest that Haiti thumbed its nose at the United States. So I am not
so sure that is the policy we should return to at this point; maybe
something more constructive might be helpful.
Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Fuster.
Mr. FUSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My first question is to Mr. Fauriol. Are we to understand then
that it is your opinion that the military and para-military are
there, and there is really nothing we can do with them except
follow a cautious policy of guarded collaboration?
Mr. FAURIOL. Not at all. I am just stating the fact, that as of
right now, that is a reality that we need to take into account.
Anyone who is elected President of Haiti has to take that into ac-







count and so should we. It is not to suggest at all, and, in fact I
think we should make very strong statements to the opposite that
we in the long run would hope that the military would fade as
quickly away from the scene as possible.
I am simply suggesting that is not likely to happen very quickly
or very easily.
DISMANTLING ABSOLUTE POWER
Mr. FUSTER. What else can we do to make sure that some move-
ment occurs along those lines? Along the lines of dismantling the
kind of absolute power they have now in Haiti.
Mr. FAURIOL. My statement suggests that you have someone who
has been elected president, "elected" in quotes, who is not exactly,
I differ with my colleagues here, I do not think by his background
exactly a member of the Duvalierist establishment. I think provid-
ing him with limited critical support at this particular point might
provide us with the opportunity to test, realistically test whether
we can expand this democratic space in Haitian society and slowly
decrease the space that is presently occurred by either elements. I
think it is worth a try.
Mr. FUSTER. Mr. Hooper, you insist on saying the bottom line
should be holding free elections; I wonder if you would care to com-
ment. I have very good friends in Puerto Rico who are members of
the Haitian exile group and one very thoughtful one, whose name I
don't care to bring to your attention here now, told me that his
great concern, when there was a possibility of having elections in
November-was that he did not know what was going to happen
after the elections, even assuming that there were free elections in
Haiti.
What would happen three months down the line if you still keep
the military and the para-military structure that exists right now;
what is your answer to that? I mean, let us assume we could have
free elections, what happens after that if the basic military and
para-military structure we now have is still there?
THE SITUATION AFTER FREE ELECTIONS
Mr. HOOPER. Well, your -question points to something that was
stressed for two years by many people in Congress and by many
international human rights organizations and Haitians within
Haiti. Obviously, an election is not a panacea, you do not paste an
election over the social reality and expect everything to be okay.
So as your question implies, there must be a modicum of law.
There must be a modicum of democracy. There must be a number
of things to have a real election. You have got yourself in a Catch-
22 at some level, because in the middle of terror you cannot
produce a real election. And then you are saying, if you had a real
election what would happen to the terror?
Obviously, sir, it is a tremendously intractable situation. It
bears-we can look backwards at what has happened and what
mistakes we have made. We can look forward and apply a some-
what different-same analysis and come up with a different take
on it.








The reason for the bottom line position is that we must find
what we stand for. We have said that we knew what we stood for
and that was, independent civilian control, and let the Haitians
decide.
If that is the case, that must be our bottom line. If the military
powers that be in Haiti are not willing to even work with that
bottom line, which is what they have demonstrated over two years,
then I think it is obvious that we must disassociate ourselves from
their policies or we are co-participants in the continuing terror.
So, again, it is similar to the question of Congressman Weiss
which is, obviously, in a society dominated by the Army and power
military forces and economic dislocation. So, give me an election to-
morrow and how do we know that it is going to be okay? We do
not, but we have to try.
We have two choices. We have a future of hope or you have a
future of fear. You have to choose moving toward one thing. We
have to choose toward moving toward a future of hope. The future
of hope is holding elections in Haiti. We have to stand for the right
thing.
Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Oberstar.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. OBERSTAR, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to join with the committee in this very, very important
hearing.
[Speaking in Creole.]
Mr. OBERSTAR. I simply said, how are you, and are you working
hard for Haiti?
I have to ask Mr. Bellegarde if he is related to Dante S. Belle-
garde the great Haitian writer?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. He was my grandfather. And the school,
where the massacre occurred, the National School Argentine Belle-
garde was named after my great great aunt.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes. I read his writings and I have them in my
library at home.
We have here, Mr. Chairman, at least two and possibly three di-
versionary viewpoints on where we go with Haiti. From 1804 until
now Haiti has enjoyed independence. On November 29, last fall, it
had its first opportunity for democracy. The election was ambushed
by those who could have nurtured democracy and given it an op-
portunity.
But now that democracy has been crushed, and that the govern-
ment in place is illegal under Haiti's own constitution, not by our
definition, but by Haiti's own constitution, the policy question for
the United States is, where do we go from here?
OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
We have, I guess, three diversion viewpoints. One of Mr. Fauriol
who says, make peace with the government in place; accept the re-
ality, kind of a realpolitik view of things and try to make the best
of a bad situation.







I think Mr. Bellegarde suggests at least some conditions we
hoalid apply as we watch the behavior of this regime; seeing how
they behave, seeing if he can make changes in the structure within
Haiti, within the Haitian government and society and with respect
to the Army.
And Mr. Joseph and Mr. Hooper I think say, yes, maybe watch
the conditions but there are certain changes that you suggest that
realistically are not going to happen, and so stay on course.
My real concern is that, and in answer to your question, Mr. Bel-
legarde, I do not think that this Administration, much as I have
differed with it on virtually every issue, domestic and foreign, had
a hand in making the events come about. They may have stumbled
into it by stupidity or by lack of accurate information, but I do not
think they were a partner in the deception and in the repression.
But that out of genuine concern for the Haitian people, that out of
good feeling for the people of Haiti they might make the wrong
policy choice.
On the other hand, the right policy-by the wrong policy choice I
mean providing some sort of overt assistance to the government of
Haiti that would continue the repression. Because being denied of
democracy is repression.
On the other hand, the right policy without a beneficial effect
would mean that people will lose hope. People will say, yes, you did
all the things; you kept the pressure on; you denied us assistance;
you did not recognize this government. But nothing has changed
and nothing will change.
I fear for the despair that comes. And yet I know the people of
Haiti will say, we have never had things much better. They cannot
get much worse. And if you deny the Haitian spirit, and the one
thing that we want, hope for a real democracy, then it is all lost.
RECOGNIZE MANIGAT GOVERNMENT
It seems to me that the United States has no choice but to follow
a policy of not recognizing the Manigat government; keeping the
pressure on; realistically understanding that, although it was ex-
pressed at the table that the foreign exchange situation at Haiti is
such that they may not pay the Army, recognize the Army will be
the last ones to go without pay. They will be the last ones not to be
served at the table. Because that is the means by which they stay
in power. And that there is probably enough money coming in
from the drug trade to sustain the Army and the government in
whatever way it chooses. So we need to deal with the causes it
seems to me.
I just wonder if you have any-I have already used my five min-
utes, Mr. Chairman,-if you have any better approach than this for
bringing about a democratic solution?
Mr. BELLEGARDE-SMITH. Congressman, I happen to agree with
you. I did not mean to suggest that we should wait and see what
the Manigat government does. The Manigat government was al-
lowed to come to power because it agreed to the terms of the mili-
tary. It would not be there unless it had done so.
I, quite frankly, cannot see much difference between the Manigat
dictatorship, the dictatorship of the KNG, that of Jean-Claude Du-








valier and that of Francois Duvalier. At the bottom it still feels the
same to individuals, to the 6 million Haitians down at the bottom,
it still feels quite the same.
I do not suggest that we wait and see what he does. There is
nothing he can do. He either delivers U.S. economic assistance or
he goes. And if he tries to change things, he goes also. His fate is
sealed. The man will not stay in power very long.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Fauriol.
Mr. FAURIOL. I am uncomfortable with the suggestion that we
need to sort of kill off the patient before we even had given it time
to move a little bit and determine whether it is dead or alive.
My presentation is not one that is designed to suggest that we
give a blank check to the Manigat government because the circum-
stances are particularly terrible.
What I am suggesting is that we test the resolve of Manigat over
a short period of time. But in order for that to be realistic, we need
to provide that regime with the minimal amount of resources to be
able to at least test what I think Professor Bellegarde-Smith sug-
gests is not possible, and I am willing to suggest it, but I am not
willing to give it a five year lease on life. If this does not happen
over a 12 month period and does not-it involves some of the condi-
tions I laid out, then clearly this is not the road that needs to be
taken.
I think it is a bit too early to eliminate that particular option.
Mr. OBERSTAR. I appreciate your clarification, I think that is very
helpful.
Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, let me again thank you, inasmuch
as I am not a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee or of the
subcommittee and you have been kind enough to allow me to be
here at the hearing.
May I respectfully request that a statement on the continuing
rule of terror and illegality in Haiti by the Washington Office on
Haiti be considered for inclusion in the record.
Mr. CROCKETT. Without objection.
[Prepared statement by Washington Office on Haiti follows:]






91

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON HAITI
THE MANIGAT GOVERNMENT AND THE CONTINUING RULE OF
TERROR AND ILLEGALITY IN HAITI

On February 7, 1988, Mr. Leslie Francois Manigat was
inaugurated as the thirty-seventh president of Haiti. The date
of Mr. Manigat's inauguration was perhaps the only aspect of his
emergence as Haiti's newest president that was in fact in
accordance with the Haitian Constitution of March, 1987. Mr.
Manigat's path to the presidency is littered with the butchered
hopes, and bodies, of those who have been struggling for years to
realize a democratic future for the country of Haiti, a future
where the people not the army and not the private militia of
the ruling elite determine the leaders and the course of their
country. An analysis of Mr. Manigat's first month in power
provides little hope for the realization of this future.

--- THE ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 17: THE PRELUDE --

The horror of what was to be Haiti's first presidential
election in thirty years, the election of November 29, has been
well documented. It has been estimated that pro-government death
squads killed more than 100 people in Port-au-Prince alone during
the days leading up to and immediately following the
constitutionally scheduled election. The death squads, believed
to be primarily composed of ex-"Tonton Macoutes", roamed the
streets freely at night, unencumbered and in some cases
accompanied by the security forces. They left the corpses of
their victims, as many as eight one morning, lying in the streets
in an apparent attempt to intimidate the population of the
capital and discourage voter turn-out.
The people of the shantytown neighborhoods worst hit by the
death squads responded by organizing themselves into self-defense
groups. They hoped to re-establish the climate of security
necessary for the coming elections that the army and police
seemed unable, or unwilling, to provide. The Minister of the
Interior, Major General Williams Regala, immediately issued a
communique outlawing the groups. That same night, army patrols
began to circulate throughout the capital arresting at night
and without warrant anyone suspected of organizing or
participating in the neighborhood defense committees.
In perhaps the most chilling single incident of violence
realted to the abortive elections, eyewitness accounts claim that
at least 46 young people were summarily executed, shot and
bayonetted to death, at Fort Dimanche (a military prison
purported to be the scene of the most violent torture and
political executions under the Duvaliers). A witness, her own
life spared when she was recognized by one of the exectuioners,
described the murderers as uniformed and plainclothed security
personnel. Many of those reported executed were believed to be
people arrested in raids by the security forces on the
neighborhood sel-defense groups.
The November 29 election never had a chance. At least thirty
- four people were killed on the morning of November 29 in Port-
au-Prince, shot and hacked to death by armed thugs that operated
as police and military forces looked on. Yet, so firm was the










people's resolve to vote that one foreign observer reports
witnessing voters regrouping into an orderly line at a voting
place that had moments before been sprayed with machine gun fire.
They stood fast in their line, even as news spread of the
horrible murders at another nearby polling place.
The active role of the military and police in the derailment
of the November 29 elections is undeniable and well documented.
Outside the capital, away from the eyes of the foreign
journalists, uniformed army personnel acted in concert with the
members of the local Duvalierist militia to disrupt the election
process, blocking the delivery of ballots and closing polling
places by force. The final coup came as the CNG officially
disbanded the constitutionally mandated independent electoral
council after the council was forced to cancel the elections to
avoid further bloodshed. The CNG was now free to take the
electoral process into its own hands.

-- THE ELECTIONS OF JANUARY 17 ---

The CNG immediately set about fixing a date for the new
elections, January 17, 1988, and appointed a new electoral
council, in violation of the Constitution. Their appointed
council was comprised of close allies of the Minister of the
Interior Major General Regala and the CNG. The electoral
law produced by the council provided no provisions for secret
ballot, disallowed the presence of foreign observers, made the
candidates themselves responsible for distributing the ballots,
and determined the penalties and jail sentences for those people
who might organize to boycott the elections.
This final provision did not discourage those who wished to
see the rule of law in Haiti from organizing a nation-wide
opposition to the January 17 elections. They paid a price,
however, for their efforts.
The army unleashed a wave of repression arbitrary arrests,
beatings, and intimidation aimed at the opposition that was
operating at both the grassroots and national level to denounce
the coming elections. In the Central Plateau, over 50 people
were arrested for suspicion of organizing a boycott of the
January elections. Most, though not all, were eventually
released. Many were reported to be ill-treated or tortured
while in custody according to Amnesty International.
The Haitian Center for the Defense of Public Liberties
described the southern peninsula town of Jeremie as being under
"military occupation" during the days leading up to January 17.
They reported mass arrests and the arbitrary searching of houses.
The repression was so violent in Jeremie that the Bishop Willy
Romelus was obliged to call for calm and an end to the climate of
terror created in his diocese by the army and police. He also
called for the release of those arrested. His call went unheeded.
Cayes Jacmel, an area in the southeast of Haiti, was also
the scene of mass arrests, with as many as 50-60 young people
reported arrested between January 9-11. This pattern was
repeated throughout the country. Wherever people called for a
return to the rule of the constitution, the army cynically and
systematically dismantled the opposition.









In this context of state-sponsored violence and
intimidation, four of the most popular candidates from the
November election officially withdrew from the presidential race.
Marc Bazin, Louis Dejoie, Sylvio Claude, and Gerard Gourge
refused to participate in the CNG-controlled elections. They
cited the climate of fear and illegality that would make a free
and democratic election impossible. They too called for a
boycott of the January election, and made public appeals to the
governments of countries with diplomatic relations to Haiti to
not recognize the eventual winner. When Louis Dejoie returned to
Haiti from a trip that took him to both Canada and the United
States, where he called for a series of sanctions against the
future government, he was detained by airport security. They
informed him that they had a warrant for his .arrest. He was held
briefly at the airport and later transferred to the National
Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince. He was released on bail,
unharmed, the nex day.
It was in this context as well that Leslie Manigat decided
to run for the office of the President of Haiti. Ignoring the
massacre of November 29, ignoring the arrests and intimidation
leading up to January 17, and ignoring the popular opinion that
any candidate willing to participate in the unconstitutional
elections was nothing less than a traitor, Manigat and several
other presidential hopefuls made one final push to the palace.
On January 17, 1988, elections were in fact held, but the
real lessons of that day had little to do with who would be
Haiti's next president. Clearly, the army was determined to
select the president. The election was characterized by voting
fraud ranging from the stuffing of ballot boxes to voting by
minors to the buying of votes for prices starting at twenty-five
cents. Reports of fraud were so extreme as to be almost
comical. One observer reported seeing a child being asked his
age at the the voting booth by an election official. The young
boy, apparently forgetting his line, gave his correct age 12
years old. The official ignored the mistake, dutifully took his
ballot and dropped it into the box. Unfortunately, the
consequences of this particular farce make it hard to laugh.
That the election process was wrought with fraud is not in
question independent accounts of rigged voting from throughout
the country establish this fact beyond any reasonable doubt. More
importantly, the elections proved the extent of opposition to the
present regime in Haiti. Generous estimations put the popular
participation in the January vote at 5% of the electorate,
demonstrating the effectiveness of the call for a boycott. A
call for a general strike on January 16 was respected by the
entire country. From the private sector to the trade unions, the
churches and grassroots organizations, all levels of the Haitian
society rejected the January elections as undemocratic and
unconstitutional, condemned the November 29 massacre, and
demanded strict observance of the March, 1987 Constitution.

--- MANIGAT'S GOVERNMENT --

Leslie Manigat's path to the office of president was marred
by a series of constitutional and human rights violations so


88-454 0 88 4










flagrant as to make any argument for the legitimacy of his
administration an argument against democracy and the rule of law.
Legitimacy aside, the hope remains that Mr. Manigat, once in
office, would exercise his power as the chief executive of the
Haitian government to set Haiti on a course out of its history of
dictatorship and into a free and democratic future. His first
month in power, however, offers little basis for this hope.
The first 30 days of Mr. Manigat's presidency have not been
marked by any departure from the CNG's policies. The total
disregard for the Constitution and international human rights
treaties to which Haiti is a signatory that characterized Haiti's
past regimes has continued unabated.

1) The wave of political repression continues. Scores of people
have been arrested without warrant, held incommunicado, and often
disappeared without any explanation from the authorities. The
case of Gerard Murat, arrested on February 29, is just one
example. Mr. Murat was arrested at his home without warrant and
taken to the Service des Reserches Criminelles (Criminal
Investigation Department). He is still in custody, and has yet
to appear before a judge. The authorities have not given any
explanation for his arrest.

2) The death squads have resumed their activity. During the past
two weeks, the corpses of several young men have been turning up,
their bodies riddled with bullets and knife wounds, in the
streets of Port-au-Prince. On March 4, the body of an
unidentified young man was found with bullet wounds in the heart
and in the head. His hands were still tied behind his back when
they removed his body from the streets.
In another case, a young man described in an interview with
the Catholic radio station Radio Soliel how he was forced into a
jeep by armed men while he had been walking alone at night in the
capital. He reported that he was put into the back seat with two
other young men. Shortly after he was picked up, his captors
shot one of the other two men in the head and dropped his dead
body in a city sewer. His captors then released the young man,
but the other of his two companions in the back seat remained in
the jeep.
On February 23, the day after the interview was aired, the
people of Delmas, a Port-au-Prince suburb, discovered the body
of a man stuffed in the trunk of a jeep. The driver was later
identified as Frantz Cesar, a member of the security forces
attached to the Casernes Dessalines. The man had been killed by
multiple gunshot wounds to the head and chest.

3) Despite Article 41 of the Constitution that abolished the
practice of political exile, exile continues under Manigat. The
new government has recently delivered "safe passage" to two
individuals who had sought asylum in two embassies in Port-au-
Prince.
Mr. Bernard Sansaricq, persecuted by the military for his
human rights activity, took refuge in the Argentinian Embassy
since August, 1987. On February 20, 1988, he was escorted under
heavy military guard to the airport. He returned to the U.S.,










where he had lived in exile until February 7, 1986.
On February 27, 1988, Mr. Raynald Metayer landed in New York
under the same conditions. He had been at the Mexican Embassy
since July, 1987.

In the meantime, those arrested illegally under the CNG for
political activity are detained, without being brought to court.
Amnesty International cites the cases of at least 24 individuals
that are being held in secret detention cells of the Service des
Reserches Criminelles. From testimony received from the few
prisoners who have been released from Reserches Criminelles in
the past few months, conditions there are believed to be
extremely poor. Prisoners regularly die in custody as a result
of beatings and injuries or from malnutrition, dehydration, and
diarrhoea. These conditions have not changed under Mr. Manigat's
administration.
Moreover, those arrested for crimes against the people under
the Duvalier dictatorship have been released. Such is the case
of Mr. Saintange Bontemps, accused of being a principal actor in
the 1963 massacre of the Sansaricq family in Jeremie.
Beyond these violations of the basic human rights, Mr.
Manigat has shown disdain for the Constitution. Article 269 of
the Constitution stipulates that the Police forces are to be
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, effectively
breaking the bond formed between the military and the police
under the Duvaliers. But under the new arrangement of Mr.
Manigat's cabinet, the police forces come under the domain of the
Ministry of the Interior.
Mr. Manigat's appointment of Major General Regala to the
post of Minister of the Defense is also in violation of the
spirit, if not the letter, of Article 267 of the Constitution.
In summary, Mr. Manigat's first month in power offers little
prospect of any break from Haiti's violent, despotic past. In
fact, his "election" to the office of president does little more
than put a civilain face on what is essentially a military
dictatorship in Haiti. Behind the scenes, it is still the
military strong-men who wield ultimate authority in Haiti's
government. The military, effectively smothered under the
Duvaliers and their personal militia (the "Tonton Macoute"), was
placed in power as a result of the popular uprising that ended
Jean-Claude Duvalier's reign. The privileges that accompany that
power in Haiti are traditionally many and definitely compelling.
It seems the military in Haiti is not quite ready to relinquish
this position of control.


The Washington Office on Haiti
March 8, 1988







Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, I have three questions for Mr.
Fauriol.
Mr. Fauriol, first of all, have you had the occasion through your
Center for Strategic and International Studies to advise the
Reagan Administration over the past seven years on this question?
Mr. FAURIOL. On the question of Haiti?
Mr. FAUNTROY. Yes.
Mr. FAURIOL. Not directly; no, sir.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Not directly, what does that mean.
Mr. FAURIOL. The Center is an independent institution. I write
things; if people are willing to listen to them and take the advice,
then that is the way it works.
Mr. FAUNTROY. I see. Secondly, I happen to also be a member of
the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, and I
wonder if your command of scientific reliable and objective verifia-
ble data has tracked the growth of the international drug cartel in
this region, and its impact on a nation like Haiti?
IMPACT OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
Mr. FAURIOL. In the context, I am the Director of the Latin
American program at the Center, in the context of that program
the drug issue has come back to us many times; and I am very
aware, obviously not in great detail, but have been fully aware of
the impact and potential destructive impact of drug trafficking in
the Caribbean Basin region including an increasing degree of the
Haitian environment.
Mr. FAUNTROY. So that you are aware, that the public is general-
ly aware of the extent to which Haiti is becoming a transshipment
point for drugs into this country?
Mr. FAURIOL. That is why the last statement of my oral comment
made a direct reference to the issue of drug trafficking.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Given that fact and given the wealth and mili-
tary power of the cartel, as we have come to understand it in the
Select Committee, what are the implications of a statement by Mr.
Manigat that he will welcome friendly partners in the effort to
assist Haiti?
Mr. FAURIOL. If the implication is that he is referring to unsa-
vory elements in the region, I really cannot judge that. I have to
assume that he is referring to positive forces that might help the
development of Haiti including perhaps United States assistance.
Mr. FAUNTROY. You suspect he is talking about countries?
Mr. FAURIOL. Countries, and perhaps the business sector. I would
suspect he would be interested in seeing private enterprise re-
turned to Haiti. But whether he is suggesting about drug traffic,
which I think is the implication of your question, I cannot judge. I
would be very surprised if he is in fact referring to that.
Mr. FAUNTROY. You are a student of Latin American countries,
and the impact of the international cartel that has developed in
this region in recent years, and you would find it incredible that
reference might be to that kind of partner?
Mr. FAURIOL. No, sir, I did not say that.
Mr. FAUNTROY. What did you say?