Transition to Democracy in Haiti, house hearring, iii+60p

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Transition to Democracy in Haiti, house hearring, iii+60p
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TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
UPCOMING ELECTIONS IN HAITI






HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 18, 1987

Printed for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs





FEDERAL DEPOSITORY
0335-A

FEB 9.q 1988

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY
LAW LIBRARY



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-182 WASHINGTON : 1988
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

















COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman


LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAN MICA, Florida
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
CHESTER G. ATKINS, Massachusetts
JAMES McCLURE CLARKE, North Carolina
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
FOFO I.F. SUNIA, American Samoa


WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio
BEN BLAZ, Guam


JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff
PETER A. QUILTER, Staff Assistant


SUBCOMMrITEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan, Chairman
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
TED WEISS, New York CONNIE MACK, Florida
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico MICHAEL DEWINE, Ohio
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
* VICTOR JOHNSON, Subcommittee Staff Director
TABOR E. DUNMAN, Jr., Minority Staff Consultant
NANCY A. AGRIS, Subcommittee Staff Consultant
LORNA E. WATSON, Subcommittee Staff Consultant






o. 71
y-^r^
^$.%-t -


* F"?


CONTENTS


WITNESSES


Hon. Robert Graham, a U.S. Senator in Congress from the State of Florida......
Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy, a delegate in Congress from the District of Colum-
bia.................................................................................... ..........................................
J. Brian Atwood, president, National Democratic Institute for International
A ffairs................................................................. ......................................................
Michael S. Hooper, director, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, and on
behalf of the America's Watch...................................................................
APPENDIX
Letter from the subcommittee chairman, Hon. George W. Crockett, Jr., to the
chairman of the full committee, Hon. Dante B. Fascell, on the Department
of State's unwillingness to provide a witness for testimony before the sub-
com m ittee ..................................................................................................................











TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: UPCOMING
ELECTIONS IN HAITI


WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1987
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, at 10:15 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn
House Office Building, Hon. George W. Crockett (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. CROCKETT. The meeting will come to order. Several things
have intervened, not the least of which is that the foreign aid bill
is on the Floor this morning, and most of the members of the For-
eign Affairs Committee feel the necessity of being over on the
Floor, but I am very pleased to greet the Senator from Florida and
the delegate from the District of Columbia.
The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs meets today
to discuss the situation in Haiti. This is a hearing that I personally
had hoped would not be necessary. I had hoped, and I know that
all of the members of this subcommittee share that hope, that the
electoral process in Haiti would go forward, and that your Admin-
istration would support it.
Escalating violence, however, threatens to make a mockery of
the Haitian elections. The National Governing Council, the NGC, is
either unable or unwilling to provide protection to the candidates
and to the Provisional Electoral Council.
Those who seek through violence and intimidation to thwart the
electoral process in order to reimpose the old order in Haiti are
thus able to operate with virtual impunity. Meanwhile, funds to fi-
nance the elections, including millions of American dollars, appar-
ently are failing to get through to their intended recipients. And
this Administration says nothing.
I will leave it to our witnesses to further describe and assess the
situation in Haiti. However, before proceeding to our witnesses, I
do want to express my concern over the refusal of the Department
of State to provide a witness for this hearing. In the seven years
that I have been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I can
only recall one occasion when the Department has refused to testi-
fy at the request of this subcommittee, and that was last year when
the Department was engaged in a cover-up of the diversion of hu-
manitarian assistance funds for the contras for unauthorized pur-
poses.


_~I_








While we hope that there is no question with respect to the Hai-
tian situation, it is nevertheless an insult to all members of this
subcommittee for the Department to refuse the cooperation on
these vital issues that we are to examine today.
It is both shortsighted and a dangerous precedent for the Depart-
ment of State to refuse to provide testimony to this committee with
respect to the policies and programs under the jurisdiction of this
committee. Knowing how such actions are viewed by members of
this body, I would expect that the State Department's record of co-
operation or non-cooperation will be remembered when the Depart-
ment's funding request next comes before us.
We have written to Chairman Fascell concerning this matter,
and I would ask the subcommittee's consent that the letter to the
Chairman be made part of this record.1
Mr. CROCKETT. Now let me say that we continue to seek the De-
partment's point of view and we remain ready to schedule a hear-
ing anytime before the Haitian elections in order to hear that point
of view.
Mr. CROCKETr. We have been joined by the member of the minor-
ity, Congressman Gilmnan, from the State of New York, and a
member of the Haitian Caucus.
Do you wish to have some comment now or later on?
Mr. GILMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I regret that I have a few
other meetings going on. I did want to come to hear testimony on
some of the relevant issues however. Mr. Fauntroy and I have been
designated as monitors of the election in Haiti, and we certainly
want to know whether that election will be held on time and what
some of the underlying issues are. So I look forward to hearing
from our panelists, and it is good to see the former Governor here
with us also. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CROCKETT. Our first two witnesses are well-known to all of us
as having a long-standing interest in Haiti. They are our col-
leagues, Senator Robert Graham of Florida; and Representative
Walter Fauntroy of the District of Columbia, who is also Chairman
of the Congressional Task Force on Haiti. And I wish to welcome
each of you.
I would note also that Congressman Owens of New York has sub-
mitted a statement, which without objection will be included in the
record.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Owens follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MAJOR R. OWENS
The elections for President and congress in Haiti, scheduled for November twenty-
ninth, are only twelve days away, and those for local and regional officials, sched-
uled for December twentieth, are now thirty-three days away. Yet there has been so
much elections-related violence in recent months, including the assassination of two
Presidential candidates and the torching of the headquarters and printing office of
the Provisional Electoral Council, that it's doubtful that these elections will be
either free or fair, unless the U.S. Government peacefully intervenes on the side of
democracy in Haiti.
I define peaceful intervention as our Government doing whatever it can to assist
the Haitian people in carrying out their first elections in nearly thirty years. For
instance, I suggested in legislation I introduced in the House this August (H. Con.
Res. 181) that our President suspend immediately all military assistance and all

See appendix.







nonemergency economic assistance provided to the ruling military junta. I also sug-
gested in the measure that the President use every nonmilitary means at his dispos-
al, including the provision of technical and financial assistance to the Provisional
Electoral Council, to ensure that the elections take place without further obstruc-
tion or interference. We know that the Electoral Council is in desperate need of hel-
icopters and jeeps to transport elections materials to the more remote and hard to
reach areas of the island. It needs computers, voter ballots, and a printing press to
replace the one destroyed recently by arsonists. To its credit, our Government has
provided nearly five million dollars to assist with the elections, but the Finance
Ministry reportedly held up the money, and did not release most or all of it until
last weekend.
Surely the U.S. Government could provide such election-related materials to the
Provisional Electoral Council directly, bypassing the ruling military junta.
There are precedents for such peaceful intervention; after all, it was pressure
from the administration and its envoys, coupled with the "people power" movement
in the Philippines that resulted in dictator Ferdinand Marcos' decision to relinquish
his rule and leave the country. The same holds true for Jean-Claude Duvalier,
Haiti's former "President-for-Life" who was persuaded to leave Haiti on a U.S. Air
Force plane by administration officials.
The administration could call upon the Organization of American States and the
United Nations to send observers, not only to witness the elections, but the activity
currently underway leading up to the elections, such as the campaigns, the estab-
lishment of polling places, and whether voters and candidates are receiving ade-
quate protection from threats and intimidation by Duvalierist forces.
The administration cannot continue following its hypocritical policy of closing its
eyes to violations of human rights, to the daily reign of terror in Haiti, while insist-
ing that it is interested in freedom, human rights and democracy in the rest of the
world.
Haiti is only ninety miles from our shores. Its people hunger for democracy, as
evidenced by the fact that ninety percent of the island's six million people voted for
a new and democratic constitution, and staged massive street demonstrations this
summer when the military junta violated that constitution by attempting to take
over and destroy the elections process.
The Haitian people are determined to have a democratically elected government
even if it kills them-literally. There is a need for immediate, peaceful intervention
in Haiti. It is the least we can do to help a people who are standing up for their
freedom at all costs.
I am in complete agreement with a New York Times editorial on Haiti which was
published in the Friday, November sixth edition. The editorial, entitled "Rescue De-
mocracy in Haiti" says in part, "It's urgent now for the State Department to orga-
nize an inter-American effort to rescue the Haitian election process."
Mr. CROCKETT. Senator Graham, I am especially happy to greet
you, since we are both from the same state. Florida was my home
state before I deserted to go to the University of Michigan. We will
hear from you first, and welcome to the subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT GRAHAM, A U.S. SENATOR IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate
your invitation to participate here today with your distinguished
colleague, Congressman Fauntroy, and the other members of your
committee. And I would like you to welcome you to return home at
any time that you are able to do so.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you.
Senator GRAHAM. Congressman Fauntroy and I returned from
Haiti just before the Election Council disqualified some of the best
known former Duvalierists from the November 29th ballot. I might
say, Mr. Chairman, that this was done after very considerable anal-
ysis on an individual basis of those who had presented themselves
as potential candidates, and who were being judged against the
new Haitian constitution standards as to previous corrupt activi-







ties, activities involving torture, and activities of excessive zeal and
support of the former government.
The night that the announcement was made of the disqualifica-
tion, the main election headquarters which the Congressman and I
had visited just three days earlier was ransacked and torched. So
was the Regional Election Bureau which we had also visited, and
the business property of a member of the Electoral Council.
Several candidates and election workers reported automatic
weapons fire or attempted fire bombings directed at their homes.
Three days later, a printing plant which housed tens of thousands
of ballots and other election materials went up in smoke. That
could be blowing up in smoke what is happening to the cherished
dreams of democracy of the Haitian people.
The Congressman and I went to Haiti because in July the mili-
tary opened fire on demonstrators who were protesting the attempt
of the Governing Council to derail the electoral effort. We went be-
cause random assassinations terrorized the people in the cities and
the rural areas and scores of Haitians have been killed.
We went because-those in plain clothes had come out of and re-
turned to the Port-ail-Prince police station and shot a presidential
candidate, Yves Volel, as he spoke on journalists about conditions
inside the jail. We went to Haiti because we had spoken out forc-
ibly again and again in support of these elections, and voices which
seemed to grow faint and inaudible by the time that they reached
the ears of those in control of the transitional government.
In Haiti, we found real hope and great danger. After the long
dark night of the Duvaliers, the Haitian people seized the chance
for democracy by voting overwhelmingly for free, and fair, and
open presidential elections to be held on November 29th of this
year.
The Haitian people paid for this chance with generations of
blood and suffering. Fear which shadowed the Haitian landscape
seemed about to lift with the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier,
but his loyalists stayed behind. We heard over and over the state-
ment that while you might have cut off the head that the body
stayed in Haiti.
His Tontons Macoutes stayed behind. We have seen tragically in
the events of recent months that power in Haiti is not lightly relin-
quished. The murders, and mayhem, and the disregard for the or-
derly process of law in absence of peace which must precede eco-
nomic growth are chilling.
We had only the time to grasp the briefest sense of the frustra-
tions and the dogged optimism of those Haitians working to put the
election together, but those impressions were lasting ones. An elec-
tion supervisor was negotiating the purchase of three mules to
transport sacks of ballots to a remote rural providence. He was
elated because he had managed to find good mules at $300 a piece.
The people who will get their ballots by mule courier live only
about 65 miles outside of the capital, but there are no roads to the
village. They have no potable water, no electricity, and no tele-
phones. They make less than the national per capital income which
is just over $300 a year, slightly more than the price of a good
mule.







They are mostly illiterate, so their ballots, as all of the ballots in
the country, will display the name of the candidate as well as his
photograph, his campaign sign which is a symbol such as a rain-
bow, and a number. It is hoped that by identifying one of these
identifying marks that people who cannot read will be able to vote
for who they want to. That is if enough of the ballots destroyed by
the fire can be reprinted in time to make the mule run.
The Provisional Electoral Council has asked the United States
AID for a total of $4 million in additional funds to pay for the
printing of more ballots, to pay poll workers' salaries, to pay for
transportation. AID has offered $1.5 million. It is less than two
weeks to go before the election.
We should stop quibbling about the relatively minor sum that
Haiti needs to keep things on track. We have no experience with
such daunting obstacles to free elections. We cannot hope to under-
stand the determination and the desperation which drives the cam-
paign workers to brave death threats which inspire villagers who
may be sick or starving to register to vote.
This election is a beginning for Haiti. It is the only chance at sal-
vation that the Haitian people have ever had. They will not give
up that chance in the face of any difficulty, but it could be
wrenched away from them. Daily as we receive reports of increas-
ing violence, the hopes of Haiti are slipping away. Clearly we must
speak with a louder and clearer voice. The transitional govern-
ment, the military, and those with a taste for anarchy and repres-
sion must be made to hear our message, because it is the message
of the Haitian people.
The elections must take place. The killing and the intimidation
must stop. The National Governing Council must respond to the
need for security, so that these last ten days do not integrate and
deteriorate into chaos.
And I would urge an even stronger message for our government.
President Reagan should suspend all further military aid to the
regime until we can certify that the transitional government is
aiding rather than undermining the electoral process by providing
candidate protection and the necessary logistical support for the
Electoral Council.
The history of Haiti's land and people has been written in blood.
The present and future must be written in the measured cadence
of law, and constitutional guarantees, and fairly elected leadership.
In spite of the burdens that would crush a lesser people, the Hai-
tians held to their dream of democracy and of a better life. Today
it is within their grasp. Our responsibility to democracy in our
hemisphere mandates our continued attention to support of free
elections in Haiti. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Senator Graham follows:]







6



PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRAHAM

MR. CHAIRMAN, DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:


Congressman Fauntroy and I returned from Haiti just before
the Provisional Electoral Council disqualified some well-known
Duvalieristes from the November 29 ballot. The night of the
announcement the main election headquarters was ransacked and
torched. So was a regional election bureau and the business
property of a member of the Electoral Council. Several candidates
and elections workers reported automatic weapons fire or attempted
firebombings directed at their homes. Three days later a printing
plant which housed tens of thousands of ballots went up in smoke.
That could be what is happening to the cherished dreams of
democracy of the Haitian people.
We went to Haiti because in July the military opened fire on
demonstrators who were protesting the attempt of the governing
council to derail the election effort. We went because random
assassinations have terrorized the people in the cities and in the
rural areas and scores of Haitians have died. We went because
armed men in plainclothes who came out of and returned to the
Port-au-Prince police station shot presidential candidate, Yves
Volel to death as he spoke to journalists about conditions inside
the jail.
We went to Haiti because we have spoken out forcefully again
and again in support of these elections in voices which seemed to
grow faint and inaudible by the time they reached the ears of
General Namphy and his transitional government.
In Haiti we found real hope and great danger. After the long,
dark night of the Duvaliers, the Haitian people seized the chance
for democracy by voting overwhelmingly for free and fair and open
presidential elections to be held on November 29 of this year.











They paid for this chance with generations of blood and suffering.
The fear which shadowed the Haitian landscape seemed about to lift
with the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier. But his loyalists
stayed behind. His TonTons Macoutes stayed behind. And we have
seen, tragically, in the events of recent months, that power in
Haiti is not lightly relinquished. The murders and the mayhem and
the disregard for the orderly process of law and the absence of
the peace which must precede economic growth are chilling.
We had only time to grasp the briefest sense of the
frustration and the dogged optimism of those Haitians working to
put the election together. But those impressions were lasting
ones. An election supervisor was negotiating the purchase of three
mules to transport sacks of ballots to a remote rural province. He
was elated because he had managed to find "good" ones for $300
apiece. The people who will get their ballots by mule courier live
only about 65 miles outside the capital but there are no roads to
their village. They have no potable water. No electricity. No
telephones. They make less than the national per capital income
which is just over $300 a year, slightly more than the price of a
"good" mule.
They are mostly illiterate so their ballots, as all the
ballots for the country, will display the name of the candidate as
well as his photograph, his campaign sign (a symbol such as a
rainbow) and a number. It is hoped that by recognizing one of
these identifying marks, people who can't read will be able to
vote for who they want. That is, if enough of the ballots
destroyed by fire can be reprinted in time to make the mule run.
The Provisional Electoral Council has asked USAID for a total
of $4.0 million in additional funds to pay for the printing of
more ballots, to pay pollworkers' salaries, to pay for
transportation (mules and the automated kind.) AID has offered
only $1.5 million. With less than two weeks to go until the







8


election, we should stop quibbling about the relatively minor sum
Haiti needs to keep things on track.
We have no experience with such daunting obstacles to free
elections. We cannot hope to understand the determination the
desperation which drives campaign workers to brave death
threats, which inspires villagers who may be sick or starving to
register to vote. This election is a beginning for Haiti. It is
the only chance at salvation the Haitian people have ever had.
They will not give up that chance in the face of any difficulty.
But it could be wrenched away from them.
Daily, as we receive reports of increasing violence, the
hopes of Haiti are slipping away. Clearly we must speak with a
louder voice. The transitional government, the military, those
with a taste for anarchy and repression must be made to hear our
message because it is the message of the Haitian people:
The elections must take place.
The killing, the intimidation must stop.
The National Governing Council must respond to the need for
security so that these last ten days don't degenerate into chaos.
And I would urge an even stronger message from our
government. President Reagan should suspend all further military
aid to the Namphy regime until we can certify that the
transitional government is aiding rather than undermining the
electoral process by providing candidate protection and the
necessary logistical support for the electoral council.
The history of Haiti's land and people has been written in
blood; the present and future must be written in the measured
cadence of law and constitutional guarantees and fairly elected
leadership.
In spite of burdens that would crush a lesser people, the
Haitians held on to their dream of democracy and of a better life.
And today it is within their grasp.
Our own responsibility to democracy in our hemisphere
mandates our continued attention to and support of free elections
in Haiti.







Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. Con-
gressman Fauntroy.
STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER E. FAUNTROY, A DELEGATE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. I do so
appreciate you kindly offering me an opportunity to again testify
before the subcommittee. And particularly I am pleased that we
are joined by Senator Bob Graham of Florida. Senator Graham
brings to the U.S. Senate a rich background not only on this sub-
ject in particular, but as the Governor of Florida he had the occa-
sion to develop a great sensitivity to our neighbors in Haiti. And he
is a welcome addition to the fine group of members on a bipartisan
basis who have addressed this issue for many years.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I last testified at a hearing here
held on March 4, 1987 on the fiscal year 1988 and 1989 authoriza-
tion for Haiti submitted by the Administration, and which hopeful-
ly will be voted upon today.
At that time, I referenced the fact that the overthrow of the Du-
valier dictatorship on February 7, 1986 was a revolt but not a revo-
lution. I pointed out that the infrastructure of the Duvalier dicta-
torship had remained intact, particularly within the military com-
mand and control structure.
That situation led me to state my strong opposition to even a
small program of non-lethal military assistance. I also stated that
our programs of economic assistance should be targeted to those
working for bottom up development, the empowerment of the poor,
and the institutionalization of democratic processes.
Shortly thereafter, the Haitian people overwhelmingly and en-
thusiastically passed a praiseworthy constitution that would set up
a civilian government based on the separation of powers, and re-
quiring the accountability necessary for economic development and
democracy.
Additionally, the Haitian people bravely defended that constitu-
tion against an assault when on June 22, 1987 the interim National
Council of Government, the CNG, sought to invoke its own elector-
al decree in violation of that document. The Haitian people with
the support of the world community and particularly of our govern-
ment defeated the attempt of the CNG to strip the Provisional
Electoral Council of its constitutional authority.
In the face of a campaign of violence and intimidation by the Du-
valierists, which Senator Graham has just outlined, including at-
tacks by elements of the security forces on demonstrators and jour-
nalists, the murder of two presidential candidates, the massacre of
several hundred people at Jean Rabel, the nighttime death squad
activity, attacks on the facilities of the candidates and the Provi-
sional Electoral Commission itself, in spite of all of this, the Hai-
tian people have continued to demonstrate their commitment to a
genuinely free, fair and open election on November 29th and
beyond.
Reports are that more than 1.5 million Haitians have registered
to vote in the upcoming elections. This is a remarkable achieve-






10
ment under normal conditions, but it is especially noteworthy
when the lives of the CEP members are under real threat.
It is also amazing when one considers that the CEP has monu-
mental problems of logistics, communication, and manpower. The
Provisional Electoral Commission has stated its determination to
carry out the elections in accordance with its constitutional man-
date, and they are living up to that mandate.
Mr. Chairman, the role of the United States of America should
and must be clear and articulate. We should be openly and force-
fully on the side of the Haitian people. We should be in determined
opposition to the thugs and their patrons who through terrorism
are seeking to retain the old extractive system of corruption and
privileges.
I think that it is extremely important that now the United
States do at least three things. First, take every appropriate action
to support the Provisional Electoral Council in its effort to carry
out the elections that the Duvalierists are trying to desperately
and viciously to prevent.
To date our government has provided $4.9 million of the CEP's
$6 million budget. I am informed that the CEP will require an ad-
ditional $4 million to complete its election schedule. U.S. AID has
identified $1.5 million in local currency that can be utilized to meet
this need. That leaves a gap of $2.5 million. This gap must be filled,
and others should and can help.
One might normally expect a transitional government like the
CNG whose primary purpose is to support the electoral process to
provide a respectable portion of necessary resources. However,
given the hands off policy of the CNG, it may be unrealistic to
expect such an allocation. One might, therefore, urge our govern-
ment to supply the outstanding balance or to leverage other coun-
tries with significant interests in Haiti to do their share. The Japa-
nese, the French, and the West German governments come readily
to mind.
There are also very pressing needs in transport and security
which may require extraordinary contributions. And I hope that
during the course of this next few weeks or two weeks that our
government will fill that need should it arise.
Second, we need to call upon the CNG in the strongest possible
:erms to work cooperatively in the days remaining with the CEP in
both apprehending the criminals and their patrons and providing
the security necessary for open, free and fair elections.
As a caretaker interim government, the CNG has a responsibility
to do all in its power to create and maintain a stable environment
in which free, fair and open elections can take place. In this
regard, I have a number of concerns, but I will in the interest of
time focus on just three.
The first, Mr. Chairman, involves reliable information that
seems to imply that some of those identified as participating in
recent acts of terrorism are associated with the Casernes Dessa-
lines Battalion and the command at Fort Dimanche.
The second has to do with the implications for a constitutional
and civilian government of General Henri Namphy's self-promo-
tion to commander in chief of the armed forces for a three year
period. This event which took place on November 6, 1987 appears







to Haitian legal scholars as a violation of Article 141 which stipu-
lates that, "With the approval of the senate, the president ap-
points, by a decree issued in the council of ministers, the command-
er in chief of the armed forces, the commander in chief of the
police, ambassadors and consul generals."
Obviously, therefore, the designation of commander in chief at
this time and for a period of three years usurps the constitutional
right of the newly elected president to be installed on February 7,
1988 to appoint with the approval of the newly elected senate a
commander in chief of the armed forces.
The third emanates from the fact that with all of the recent acts
of terrorism in the last few months that not one person has been
charged, detained, or brought to trial. Therefore, I would hope that
our government is making it crystal clear that we are capable of
remembering who helped and who did not in furthering a demo-
cratic transition in Haiti. If people in authority are either unwill-
ing or unable to protect life and property, then that should be reg-
istered when policy options and assistance are considered by this
Congress.
One additional and lingering concern is the need of the CEP for
helicopter and other transportation capability to conduct the elec-
tions.
Finally, our government must come up quickly with ways to
make it clear to the Duvalierists that they will not be allowed to
hijack the Haitian nation and its courageous people on the eve of
these pivotal elections, and that there could be serious conse-
quences for them to the continued provocations.
For example, I have been briefed and have passed on to the Ad-
ministration information regarding the possible involvement of Du-
valierists supporting the violence from the safe haven of our coun-
try. This should be vigorously investigated; and if accurate, visas
should be rescinded.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging my rather long state-
ment.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Fauntroy follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER E. FAUNTROY
Mr. Chairman, please accept my appreciation for your kind offer to again submit
testimony before the subcommittee. As you know, I last provided testimony at the
hearing held on March 4, 1987 on the fiscal year 1988-1989 authorization for Haiti
submitted by the administration. At that time I referenced the fact that the over-
throw of the Duvalier dictatorship on February 7, 1986 was a revolt but not a revo-
lution. I pointed out that the infrastructure of the Duvalier dictatorship had re-
mained intact, particularly, within the military command and control structure.
That situation led me to state my strong opposition to even a small program of non-
lethal military assistance. I also stated that our programs of economic assistance
should be targeted to those working for bottom up development, the empowerment
of the poor, and the institutionalization of democratic processes.
Shortly, thereafter, the Haitian people overwhelmingly and enthusiastically
passed a praiseworthy constitution that would set up a civilian government based
on the separation of powers, and requiring the accountability necessary for econom-
ic development and democracy. Additionally, the Haitian people bravely defended
that constitution against assault when on June 22, 1987 the interim National Coun-
cil of Government (CNG) sought to invoke its own electoral decree in violation of
that document. The Haitian people, with the support of the world community, par-
ticularly, our Government, defeated the attempt of the CNG to strip the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP) of its constitutional authority. In the face of a campaign of
violence and intimidation by Duvalierists including:








Attacks by elements of the security forces on demonstrators and journalists,
The murder of two Presidential candidates,
The massacre of several hundred people at Jean Rabel,
Night time death squad activity,
Attacks on the facilities of candidates and the Provisional Electoral Commission
itself,
The Haitian people have continued to demonstrate their commitment to genuine-
ly free, fair, and open elections. Reports are that more than 1.5 million Haitians
have registered to vote in the upcoming elections. This is a remarkable achievement
under normal conditions, but it is, especially, noteworthy when the lives of CEP
members are under real threat. It is also amazing when one considers that the CEP
has monumental problems of logistics, communication, and manpower. The provi-
sional election commission has stated its determination to carry out the elections in
accordance with its constitutional mandate. They are living up to that mandate.
Mr. Chairman, the role of the United States of America should and must be clear
and articulate. We should be openly and forcefully on the side of the Haitian people.
We should be in determined opposition to the thugs and their patrons who through
terrorism are seeking to retain the old extractive system of corruption and privi-
leges.
I think it's extremely important now that the United States do at least three
things:
First, take every appropriate action to support the Provisional Electoral Council
in its effort to carry out the elections that the Duvalierists are trying so desperately
and viciously to prevent. To date our Government has provided $4.9 million of the
CEP's $6.0 million budget. I am informed that the CEP will require an additional
$4.0 million to complete its election schedule U.S. A.I.D. has identified $1.5 million
in local current that can be utilized to meet this need. That leaves a gap of $2.5
million. This gap must be filled. Others should and can help. One might normally
expect a transitional government. Whose primary purpose is to support the electoral
process, to provide a respectable portion of necessary resources. However, given the
hands off policy of the CNG. It may be unrealistic to expect such an allocation. One
might, therefore, urge our Government to supply the outstanding balance or to le-
verage other countries with significant interests in Haiti to do their share. The Jap-
anese, French, and West German Governments come readily to mind.
There are also very pressing needs in transport and security which may require
extraordinary contributions.
Second, call upon the CNG in the strongest possible terms to work cooperatively
in the days remaining with the CEP in both apprehending the criminals and their
patrons and providing the security necessary for open. Free, and fair elections. As a
caretaker, interim government the CNG has a responsibility to do all in its power to
create and maintain a stable environment in which free, fair, and open elections
can take place.
In this regard, I have a number of concern. But I will in the interest of time focus
on just three:
The first involves reliable information that seems to imply that some of those
identified as participating in recent acts of terrorism are associated with the Ca-
sernes Dessalines battalion and the command at Fort Dimanche.
The second has to do with the implications for constitutional and civilian govern-
ment of General Henri Namphy's self promotion to commander in chief of the
Armed Forces for a three year period. This event which took place on November 6,
1987 appears to Haitian legal scholars as a violation of article 141 which stipulates
that, "With the approval of the senate, the President appoints. By a decree issued in
the council of ministers, the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, the com-
mander in chief of the police ambassadors and consul generals."
Obviously, therefore the designation of commander in chief, at this time, and for a
period of three years usurps the constitutional right of the new elected President to
be installed on February 7, 1988 to appoint with the approval of the newly elected
senate a commander in chief of the Armed Forces.
The third emanates from the fact that with all of the recent acts of terrorism in
the last new months not one person has been charged, detained, or brought to trial.
Therefore, I would.hope that our Government is making it crystal clear that we
are capable of remembering who helped and who did not in furthering a democratic
transition in Haiti. If people in authority are either unwilling or unable to protect
life and property, then that should be registered when policy options and assistance
are considered.
One additional and lingering concern is the need of the CEP for helicopter and
other transport capability to conduct the elections.








Finally, our Government must come up quickly with ways to make it clear to the
Duvalierists that they will not be allowed to hijack the Haitian nation and its coura-
geous people on the eve of these pivotal elections and that there could be serious
consequences for them to the continued provocation. For example, I have been
briefed, and have passed on to the administration, information regarding the possi-
ble involvement of Duvalierists supporting the violence from the safe haven of our
country. This should be vigorously investigated, and if accurate visas should be re-
scinded.
Thank you.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Congressman Fauntroy.
Since Congressman Gilman has to leave us shortly, we will let
him lead off with the questions.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend both
Mr. Fauntroy and our good Senator for having taken the time to
address this this morning with regard to this issue.
Let me ask both of you, are you still under the impression that
the elections will go forward without any problem?
Senator GRAHAM. My impression is that the elections will go for-
ward, but they will not go forward without problems. You are deal-
ing with a country with an 80 percent rate of illiteracy, where the
last credible elections took place more than a generation ago, and
that has tremendous communication and transportation problems,
and in that environment within a schism between the transitional
government which controls most of the security apparatus and the
Elections Commission which has the responsibility for the conduct
of the election. The elections will go forward, but they will do so
under most severe circumstances.
Mr. GILMAN. The date for the election is?
Senator GRAHAM. November 29th.
Mr. GILMAN. The 29th, a Sunday.
What is it that our nation could do in the interim, in such a brief
period of time, to be of help?
Mr. FAUNTROY. Let me say that I agree that the elections will go
forth. The people of Haiti are determined to have a selection on
November 29. There will be problems. And you asked the right
question, what can we do to alleviate those problems? And I think
that there are several things that we ought to do.
The first is to apply appropriate pressure to see to it that the
CNG sits down with the CEP, the Electoral Commission, to discuss
their needs and what needs can be met by the CNG.
Secondly, obviously, and as I indicated in testimony, there are
going to be additional financial resources necessary to conduct
these elections, particularly in light of the damage done to the elec-
toral process by the thugs who reacted last week to the decision of
the CEP to abide by the constitution and not allow certain candi-
dates to be on the ballot.
A third thing which seems to me to be of great importance to
this effort is the provision of communications and transportation
capabilities, capabilities that I do not think that the CNG has, and
that quite frankly only the United States can provide.
As a case in point, Congressman Gilman, we were at one of the
registration points in Port-au-Prince where the person responsible
there had the responsibility of handling eighteen jurisdictions. He
told us of one that was hardly 120 kilometers away from his office,


81-182 0 88 2








but which would take seven hours driving by jeep to carry equip-
ment and necessary ballots and the like to a site for the election.
I looked, as did Senator Graham, out of the window, and there is
a nice little yard that I could envision a U.S. helicopter landing
and conveying the equipment up the mountain, that 120 kilome-
ters, in about five minutes. And of course, getting it back to the
polling place without having to ride the donkeys or to risk some-
thing happening to the ballots on the way to the polling place for
counting.
And I would hope that we would urge our Administration to look
very seriously at providing those transportation and communica-
tion capabilities to the Electoral Commission.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Fauntroy and Senator Graham, have either one
of you consulted with the State Department to see if some of these
things could be accomplished?
Senator GRAHAM. Yes. I have met, as the Congressman did, with
representatives of the State Department both here in Washington
and in Port-au-Prince. We have made by far the greatest effort in
the international community in support of the election in Haiti.
And I want to put my comments and joining in the comments that
have just been made by the Congressman in that context.
We also have the greatest stake in the successful conduct of
these elections, and the subsequent actions both in a political and
economic context that will flow from these elections.
I would like to add to the remarks of the Congressman, one addi-
tional area that I know he and you share, and that is the impor-
tance of individual Americans and organizations which have con-
cern for Haiti being personally present in Haiti during these days
before and on the election day itself. As we found in the Philip-
pines, the personal presence of international observers is in and of
itself a very powerful anecdote to violence and other actions which
would disrupt or intimidate the election process.
And so I would like to commend you for your interest and your
personal participation, and encourage other Americans to follow
your lead.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Senator.
Who in the State Department have you been addressing these re-
quests to?
Mr. FAUNTROY. Of course, we have been addressing it to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Caribbean Affairs for Haiti,
Mr. Holwill. And I have not talked personally to Mr. Abrams. He
has been involved in some other things of late. And I just hope that
Mr. Holwill has gotten the message to everyone involved over
there.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that our com-
mittee, and I would be pleased to join with you, that we make a
direct request today, a joint request, to Mr. Abrams and to the desk
to try to expedite whatever assistance might be appropriate to
make certain that the election process is not eroded.
And I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that you might consider re-
porting out of this committee an appropriate resolution expressing
the sense of Congress our concerns with regard to the electoral
process proceeding further. And again, I would be pleased to join
with you in that effort.








Mr. CROCKETT. Well, we have had conferences with Mr. Holwill.
As a matter of fact, let us face it. The State Department for some
reason does not want to go public with respect to Haiti and with
respect to what it is or is not doing in Haiti. So the effort has been
to prevent the holding of hearings such as this.
It was suggested to the State Department that if the White
House would issue a clear cut statement of condemnation with re-
spect to the violence going on in Haiti and express the determina-
tion to see to it that the elections are conducted in a fair manner
and also made it clear that there would be no support whatever for
any candidate who was elected as a result of fear and intimidation,
if such a statement came from the White House or indeed if it
came from Secretary Shultz, then we felt that there would be no
necessity for having this hearing.
We were promised that an effort would be made to get such a
statement. This was two weeks ago. We have not had that state-
ment yet. Now I expect to sit down with Mr. Holwill within the
next two to three days, and I will be mindful of your suggestion,
and we will see if we cannot bring about such a clear cut state-
ment.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I am sure that our
colleagues will be pleased to join with you in a joint request again
in writing to the State Department reminding them of your prior
request and the urgency of trying to do something before the elec-
tion date.
Mr. CROCKETT. I would hope that we would have the assistance of
your side of the aisle.
Mr. GILMAN. We will be pleased to try to help in that direction,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CROCKETT. And also with respect to your suggested sense of
Congress resolution.
Let me ask you, Senator Graham, what are the chances of get-
ting a sense of Congress resolution through the Senate with respect
to the forthcoming election?
Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have been working with the
Congressman. And I believe that a resolution similar to if not ver-
batim to the one that is currently being considered by your com-
mittee is being circulated in the Senate, and I would hope soon.
And I believe that means ideally before the end of this week that
the Congress will have spoken on this matter recognizing that the
election is going to be a week from Sunday.
And if we are to have an influence, particularly an influence on
the transitional government's level of cooperation and participation
with the Elections Commission, that the time to have that influ-
ence is now and is urgent.
Mr. CROCKETT. Let me make one or two comments, and then I
would like each of you to react to them. I have the feeling that the
media is doing an excellent job in informing the American people
with respect to developments in Haiti. You had some excellent re-
porting in the Washington Post and in the New York Times, and
the program Nightline has done I think a credible job in that
regard.
To what extent is that reporting reliable based on what each of
you have observed as a result of your visits to Haiti?







Mr. FAUNTROY. I would certainly agree with the Chairman that
news coverage has been good from Haiti by our United States
media. If there were anything that I thought may have been mis-
leading was the strength and potency of the Duvalierists.
I was not able to see Sixty Minutes and nor was the Senator be-
cause we were on our way back from Haiti at the time. But I think
that the relative strength of those who would return Haiti to the
old days is much weaker than the bombast of such persons as
Clovis Desinor, who has been quite vocal and has been amply
quoted in the United States as leading the opposition to free, fair
and open elections.
Senator GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with those com-
ments with this addition. The focus has been, as it should be, on
the election itself. Assuming that the election is conducted and
meets standards that will create a sense of confidence both within
the country and in the international community, that is not going
to be the end of our need for close attention to Haiti and a good
neighbor policy towards that country.
In fact, in many ways, it is just the beginning. There will be tre-
mendous expectation within the Haitian as to the consequences of
democracy, particularly as it relates to greater economic opportuni-
ties, a sense of hope and a vision for a better future for their chil-
dren and grandchildren.
It will be incumbent upon the international community, and I
use that term particularly as it relates to the nations mentioned by
the Congressman and other nations, such as Canada which has had
a long-time interest in Haiti as well as the United States to come
together with the newly elected government in Haiti for a very
constructive long-term program of international assistance and the
opening up of opportunities within our respective countries.
As you know, there is currently pending before both the House
and the Senate legislation which would reform the Caribbean
Basin Initiative in order to make it a greater entity of economic
enhancement within the region. That would be of particular value
to Haiti which has already demonstrated under the same distressed
economic conditions, as we have outlined, and the distressed politi-
cal conditions its work ethic and desire of the people through their
own means tr seek personal improvement and improvement for
their families and their communities.
So the news attention on the election process I think has been
both accurate and highly constructive. Now we need to rest assured
that we will not forget Haiti after the successful election, but will
continue to focus in the new chapter of building on the benefits of
democracy.
Mr. Chairman, I apologize. It is my responsibility of presiding
over the Senate at 11:00, and I must ask to be released to those
responsibilities. I thank you very much for the opportunity of being
here, and particularly to have shared with my good friend and
your colleague, the Congressman.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Senator.
Congressman Fauntroy, I get the impression that the people of
Haiti do not have too much confidence in the National Governing
Council with respect to the forthcoming election. And that is occa-
sioned in part by the attempt on the part of the National Govern-







ing Council to take over the election, and by the Council's failure
to provide the requested protection to the Election Commission.
I also am aware that the personnel of the National Governing
Council was selected and installed in office before Duvalier left.
And that in each case, referring to the two dominant members of
that Council, both of them achieved the rank of general under Du-
valier.
So I sense that our State Department is to some extent in the
middle. They may have had something to do with the selection of
this National Governing Council. I do not know about that, and we
do not have anyone here from the State Department, so I could ask
them.
At the same time, they do not want to antagonize that Council
by giving the impression that in their judgment that the Council is
not protecting the interests of the people, and really is not sincere-
ly trying to bring about free and open elections.
So the State Department is in the middle, and that probably ex-
plains why they did not want to have this hearing, and why they
have been reluctant to make any public statement identifying
themselves on the side of the people of Haiti with respect to this
election.
Do you wish to comment on that?
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that one
of the most disappointing developments for me since the historical
dechoukage of February 7, 1986 has been the performance of the
CNG. Many of us looking back over that period remember the fine
statements made by General Henri Namphy committing himself
and his interim government totally to overseeing a process of tran-
sition to a genuine democracy in Haiti.
And I must admit that with the coup attempt of June 22, 1987
that the level of confidence in the CNG has diminished not only
with respect to persons like myself who had great hope that they
would fulfill the role of a transition government, but also among
the masses of people in Haiti. It has not improved since. It has
gotten worse.
Certainly recent events and the refusal to cooperate, to even sit
down with the CEP at this late hour to assure that the elections
are carried out in a proper manner, suggest that there is a low
level of confidence among a great many people including yours
truly in this CNG at this time.
Having said that, I would quickly add that in my view therefore
our government is not in the middle. It is very much over to the
right when it refuses to take a clear and decisive position on behalf
of the people of Haiti. And in spite of that, I think that the masses
of people of Haiti have confidence in the American people and in
the hope that our government will be more forthright in lending
what assistance it can to the conduct of these elections and the de-
velopment that we all want.
I am very much sensitive to the desire of the Haitian people to
work out their own destiny and not to be interfered with or be per-
ceived to be in any way subject to the whims and wishes of the
United States Government and I understand that.
But I think that at this point that the confidence of the Haitian
people in the genuine desire of the American people to get good







neighbors and to assist them into a meaningful transition is at
such a level that our being more forthcoming with offers of assist-
ance and warnings to the Duvalierists and those in the CNG who
appear to be frustrating the effort for the transition, that that kind
of sentiment would be readily accepted by the Haitian people as
not being interference but as being genuine good neighbors who
want to defend them from the thugs.
Mr. CROCKETr. We have been joined by Congressman Gejdenson.
Congressman.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first com-
mend you for holding this hearing, and express my outrage at the
Department of State's failure to come here and make a clear state-
ment about the situation in Haiti. I believe that the Senator from
Florida and the gentleman from Washington are clearly two of the
leaders in the Congress on this issue, and they deserve to be com-
mended as well.
It seems that if a nation can scrape up a handful of leftist guer-
rillas, the voice of America comes very clear and very loud. But all
too sadly when they are simply hungry people and people striving
for their own freedom and democracy, we have a hard time getting
the State Department here to make a clear statement in favor of
democracy and free elections.
It is a sad day when we cannot get the Administration to come
forward and make more than simply a small statement about vio-
lence, rather than having them lead the charge in favor of free
elections for a people who are really striving to regain their free-
dom. And I commend the gentleman from Washington for his work
and the Chairman for holding these hearings, and I would just
repeat my outrage at the Administration.
Maybe the Chairman ought to begin negotiating with the various
factions in Haiti and that might induce the State Department to
see its need to fulfill some of its responsibilities in the region.
Thank you.
Mr. CROCKETT. Congressman Berman of California.
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both for holding the
hearing and for allowing me as a non-member of the Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee to sit in. Let me also say to my friend,
Mr. Fauntroy, that both he and Senator Graham are really doing
God's work in terms of their personal involvement in the situation
in Haiti.
And perhaps carrying on the reference of the gentleman from
Connecticut, the Administration publicly decries congressional
meddling in foreign affairs. In every private conversation that I
have had with them about this subject, I have acknowledged very
specifically the work, and the help, and the contribution that the
two of you have made in this area.
My general interest in this subject has been activated to some
extent because of a friend and constituent who is from Haiti whose
father was a very.distinguished jurist there before he left hastily a
number of years ago, and who is very concerned about the circum-
stances there. As a result of that, I have had great help from your
office in getting more involved and interested in this subject.
As you mentioned, back in February of 1986, we had a revolt and
not a revolution. As Senator Graham mentioned, the head may







have left, but the body is still there. And in the course of that, and
with reference to the critical importance of this upcoming election
to making this revolt the peaceful democratic revolution that we
want it to be, I would be interested in your comments on a couple
of concerns that I have.
One is the question-well, maybe I will just mention two or three
of them, and you could respond. They are the question of: the Ad-
ministration's statements with respect to the role of the CNG in
protecting the Elections Council in providing and transferring the
funds that were intended to go to the Elections Council for the con-
duct of the election; and the question of its own public statements
that the kinds of incidents that have occurred during this cam-
paign up to the most recent events that the two of you have de-
scribed-the burning of the headquarters, the harassment of Elec-
toral Council members-whether those statements have been as
clear as we would like them to be.
I am aware of the general concern in the Administration that it
not look like the United States be running the Haitian govern-
ment. But I am also aware of the role that this country has taken
in the past, in Haiti for good and at times for bad, in many other
countries in Latin America, its participation in the Salvadorian
election that elected President Duarte.
And I am wondering about your feeling about the extent to
which at this critical time that they are letting the people who
have the potential to interfere with a free election or to ensure a
free election, know their view; and also whether there was adequa-
cy of funding of the Haitian elections?
Mr. FAUNTROY. First of all, Mr. Berman, I want to thank you for
your interest and support of the initiatives that we have taken in
the Congress to assist Haiti. It is my view that the Administration
has been in recent weeks far too respectful of the legitimate sensi-
tivity of the Haitian people to our intervention. And I have always
respected that, but the CNG have released us in my view to be
much more vigorous in our pursuit of what we know that the
masses of Haitian people want, and that is free, fair and open elec-
tions and a democratic process that results in bottom-up develop-
ment.
I think that the performance of the CNG in recent weeks has
made it clear to, in my view, the masses of Haitian people that the
U.S. Government is sincere in wishing to assure their protection
and freedom from intimidation in conducting these elections. And
that, therefore, we need not be as sensitive to resentments that will
be expressed by the CNG and by the Duvalierists to our being
much more specific as to what we would like to see done in prepa-
ration for November 29th.
So while I am pleased that the visits of President Carter, and
Senator Graham, and I a couple of weeks ago and statements by
our Embassy were well-received by the Haitian people, that they
have not been as sharp as they ought to be. And I would like to see
it be made very clear to the CNG and to the Duvalierists what I
recommended in my statement, namely that it will not be without
cost to them in terms of support from the United States if they
continue to be uncooperative in this effort.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you, Mr. Berman.







And thanks again, Congressman Fauntroy. Perhaps you can have
someone on your staff work with our committee staff in drafting
the kind of resolution that might reflect some of your recommenda-
tions. I will undertake to try to get it through our subcommittee
and through the full committee.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman. May I
also add that among the things that we might do at this point is
pray. The fact is that the Haitian people are a courageous people
and have not been deterred from bringing about miracles. They did
so on February 7, 1956. They did so after June 22, 1987. And in
spite of all of the opposition that they have encountered since, it is
with our help and our prayers.
And we are having a press conference today at noon with the
heads of an interfaith group of leaders across this nation calling
upon religious people on the weekend of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd to
observe a national day of prayer for Haiti. And that next week
that our Administration may move to offer the kind of assistance
that will make those elections what we call want them to be, free,
open and fair. Thank you.
Mr. CROCKErr. Thank you again.
Our next witnesses both preside over organizations that have
considerable experience in Haiti. The Honorable J. Brian Atwood,
president of the National Democratic Institute for International
Affairs; and Mr. Michael Hooper, the executive director of the
National Coalition for Haitian Refugees.
Mr. Atwood, I understand that you have to leave at 11:30 to keep
a prior commitment. So why do you not go first, and then Mr.
Hooper. And then we will go as far as we can with questions before
Mr. Atwood has to leave.
STATEMENT OF J. BRIAN ATWOOD, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Mr. ATWOOD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will try to
summarize my statement to save time; I ask that my full state-
ment be made a part of the record.
I want before beginning to say also that our vice president for
programs, Vivian Derryck, who three weeks ago accompanied
President Carter to Haiti, is here with me. She would be available
to answer questions after I leave. I appreciate you accommodating
my schedule.
In addition, our senior consultant for electoral processes, Larry
Garber, who just came back from Haiti two days ago is also here.
As you may know, the National Democratic Institute has worked
in Haiti since March of 1986 just after Duvalier's departure. Haiti
today offers a great opportunity and yet a great challenge to propo-
nents of the democratic system. It is a poor nation with a high
degree of illiteracy and one many people believe cannot achieve de-
mocracy. Such a.judgment is not only an insult to the Haitian
people, but it fundamentally underestimates the merit of a demo-
cratic system in dealing with social and economic problems.
It is easy for outsiders who read about political assassinations,
violent demonstrations and systematic intimidation to acquire a
sense of hopelessness about Haiti. But each act of violence has been


I_ _








met with renewed and passionate resolve by those who want this
transition to work.
The advocates of democracy, whether they be candidates for
office, members of the Election Council, church representatives, or
ordinary citizens, have not yielded to the pressure. They and Haiti
deserve to succeed.
The upcoming elections will not be the culmination of the transi-
tion to democracy, rather they will be the beginning of the process.
They are likely to be messy, as democracy often is, even in coun-
tries that have practiced it for years. It is not easy to manage an
election in the best of circumstances, and those who are trying to
do this job in Haiti are operating under the most difficult of cir-
cumstances.
You will hear today and have heard and from Haiti as well a
great deal of blame being assessed. You will hear that the U.S.
Government is not doing enough; that the temporary military gov-
ernment, the CNG, is failing in its self-described mission to facili-
tate democracy; and even that the Election Council has not per-
formed well.
I subscribe to some of these views, and I believe that it is impor-
tant to be candid with this subcommittee. But ten days before a na-
tional election in Haiti, it is equally important that those who
want the transition to succeed operate under the assumption that
it will succeed. The finger pointing, I fear, has already taken on
the characteristics of a negative self-fulfilling prophecy. Haiti does
not need that now.
The Haitian people have already overcome a great deal to get to
this stage in their transition. They overthrew Duvalier. They have
formed political parties. They have drafted and ratified a democrat-
ic constitution, a constitution that calls for an independent Elec-
tion Council which has since been created. Determinations have
been made as to who is eligible to run for president. And candi-
dates are now conducting campaigns for public offices at all levels.
That in itself is a major accomplishment in the face of the dedi-
cated and violent opposition to democracy that exists in Haiti. Two
candidates have been murdered, and those who continue the pur-
suit of their democratic dream do so with the constant reminder
that the quest may cost them their lives.
Who are we to doubt that their courageous efforts will success?
Who are we to assume that Haiti does not deserve democracy? Our
task as outsiders ten days before an election should not be to assess
blame for a potential failure, but rather to offer support, advice, re-
sources and a sense of a wider democratic community pulling to-
gether for a positive outcome.
This is what we at NDI have attempted to do in Haiti from the
first days of our involvement. Our activities have been designed to
help Haitians prepare for the transition to democracy. We have op-
erated without illusions, but with a sense of optimism, inspired by
Haitians who are committed to succeed.
My written testimony details many of our activities including a
very important initial meeting with democratic leaders from Haiti
that was attended by Congressman Gejdenson in Puerto Rico in
August of 1986. What I would like to do, however, is to highlight
one recent contribution I believe was very significant.








Three weeks ago, former President Jimmy Carter visited Haiti.
He was invited by the Institute for Haitian Research and Develop-
ment and sponsored by NDI. He visited there with former Prime
Minister George Price of Balize. Their visit representing the Coun-
cil of Current and Former Freely Elected Heads of Government of
the Americas demonstrated strong international support for the de-
mocratization process.
In a meeting with the CNG, the two leaders expressed concern
about investigations of the murders of Louis Eugene Athis and
Yves Volel. They encouraged renewed dialogue with the CEP and
expressed hope that Haiti would soon take its rightful place among
the democracies of the hemisphere.
In discussions with members of the Electoral Council, President
Carter and Prime Minister Price expressed admiration for their
courage and assured the CEP of strong international support and
close observation of events in Haiti. The two leaders also met with
church leaders and presidential candidates who shared their views
of the upcoming elections.
As I have indicated, a major theme of NDI's work in promoting
democratic development in Haiti has been the need for the estab-
lishment of an independent commission to administer elections in
Haiti. The call for such a commission by seventeen Haitian politi-
cal leaders was the most significant outcome of the NDI organized
conference in Puerto Rico.
I think that it is important to focus briefly on this Provisional
Electoral Council, because it is a historically unique institution op-
erating in uncharted waters. The constitution requires that the
Council be composed of nine individuals, with each member ap-
pointed by a different sector of Haitian society.
The Council (CEP) is given the exclusive authority to administer
the elections prior to the installation of a new government. The
CEP is also given jurisdiction to decide which candidates are ineli-
gible to participate, and they have made that decision with respect
to presidential candidates. And of course, just after the decisions
were made, they paid a price.
The CEP was dealt a very serious blow on November 3 when its
offices were burned. The arson occurred following the release by
the CEP of the list of those candidates which were ineligible. They
made these decisions-and it is important to emphasize this-pur-
suant to their explicit mandate under the constitution.
As have been widely reported, the attack occurred despite the
fact that there are two police stations very near these CEP offices.
The refusal of the CNG to provide security to the CEP and its
members only increased what have turned out to be very bitter re-
lations between the CEP and the CNG. This is an issue that Presi-
dent Carter sought to raise with the CNG, and I hope that some
progress will be made. There was a meeting between the CNG and
the CEP scheduled for yesterday; I understand that it did not take
place. But the sooner that such a meeting can take place, the
better for all involved.
Despite the fire and the threats, the CEP is determined to con-
duct the presidential and legislative elections on November 29. The
registration process appears to have been a success. The printing of


LQI- -I-l--L-~ --







ballots is ahead of schedule despite ballots that were burned in
these incidents.
And most important, there is a determination throughout Haiti
even where tensions are high to have the elections succeed. If there
are no further major incidents which would disrupt the process, we
expect that there will be presidential and legislative elections as
scheduled.
At this point in my written testimony, I describe the machinery
that has been put in place to conduct this election. I am not going
to go into detail here. All I will say is that it is going to be ex-
tremely difficult to carry this off, and it is likely to appear very
chaotic to observers. Security in particular is going to be a prob-
lem, especially if the CNP does not change its modus operandi.
For the November 29th elections, NDI is going to organize an
international delegation of 26 persons. The delegation will include
nationals from Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, Jamaica, the Philip-
pines, St. Lucia, Senegal, the United States, and Venezuela. Most
of the individuals invited to participate have worked with NDI pre-
viously in Haiti and U.S. delegates will be from both the Democrat-
ic and Republican parties.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to remember that November 29 is
the first in a series of elections scheduled in Haiti during the next
six weeks. Assuming the problems are overcome to the satisfaction
of most Haitians, a big assumption, attention will then focus on a
second round of presidential elections now tentatively scheduled
for December 27. This is the run-off.
On this date, Haitians will vote for one of two candidates who
receive the most votes on November 29. This period between No-
vember 29 and December 27 will be critical. If the candidates who
do not make the run-off denounce the process, the prospect of es-
tablishing an elected government with institutional legitimacy will
be in grave danger.
On the other hand, if the losers accept the results and engage in
the type of coalition building and compromise that characterize
these other functioning democracies, Haiti's prospects for moving
forward will be greatly enhanced.
We believe that Haitian politicians recognize both the dangers
and the possibilities and will act in a responsible manner following
the elections. These politicians recognize the challenges facing the
CEP, and therefore do not expect electoral perfection. They also re-
alize that only if the second round of elections succeed will the in-
terim government be replaced on February 7 in accordance with
the constitution.
I might add, Mr. Chairman, that those of us who are charged
with observing this election as an international delegation also un-
derstands that electoral perfection is going to be difficult to
achieve. I think that therefore all people who go down to observe
this election must be very, very cautious about the statements that
they make and their judgments about the success of the election.
Ultimately the Haitian people will decide whether or not the result
is a true reflection of their views.
Many Haitians have been working toward the goal of democracy
for a long time. While they seek support from friends abroad, Hai-
tians know that the burden of forging a new begiriap& pri-

S L
L FEB 29'88 A
u w







marily on their shoulders. In determining the success of the proc-
ess, the key issue is legitimacy, and only the Haitian people can
make this determination.
By its own admission, the current government of Haiti has only
a temporary mandate. It was given its powers by a constitution
that was ratified by the people. But its principal purpose is to fa-
cilitate a transition to democracy. There should be no doubt that, if
the CNG does not fulfill this mandate by protecting the electoral
process and the peaceful transition, it will quickly lose all author-
ity and legitimacy.
It is our hope and expectation that the upcoming elections will
produce a constitutional government with the legitimacy necessary
to confront and overcome the daunting economic and social prob-
lems facing Haiti. We firmly believe that the Haitian people even
after years of suffering under brutal dictatorships have the capac-
ity to construct such a political system.
Mr. Chairman, I compliment you on holding these hearings. Con-
gress has a major role to play in supporting democracy in this cru-
cial period before the election. Haiti has for years succeeded in
maintaining its dictatorships and its brutal human rights record as
a result of being terribly isolated in the hemisphere.
That is why I, too, express regret that the State Department is
not here. It is an indication of a lack of confidence in our democra-
cy. Yes, there are sensitivities about speaking out at this moment,
but our State Department has chosen to do a disservice to the most
representive body in the world, the U.S. Congress, by not appearing
here. That is not an expression of confidence in open, democratic
institutions.
I would also suggest that a congressional resolution be drafted
and adopted to show our friends in Haiti that we support them. It
is extremely important to support the CEP, to call upon the CNG
to provide security, and to call upon other friendly nations to offer
support.
We must reinforce the idea that the United States is deeply con-
cerned with developments in Haiti and that we are not going to
ignore the effort to try to thwart the Haitian people's desire to
bring about democratic change.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Atwood follows:]


- Yr-JII bl-'ci-" r --r-r-~--.--m








PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. BRIAN ATWOOD

Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me this opportunity to

offer my views on the transition to democracy in Haiti. As

you may know, the National Democratic Institute has worked in

this important country since March 1986, just after Duvalier's

departure.



Haiti today offers a great opportunity and yet a great

challenge to proponents of the democratic system. It is a

poor and largely illiterate nation and one many people believe

cannot achieve democracy. Such a judgement is not only an

insult to the Haitian people, it fundamentally underestimates

the merit of a democratic system in dealing with social and

economic problems.



It is easy for outsiders who read about political

assassinations, violent demonstrations and systematic

intimidation to acquire a sense of hopelessness about Haiti.

But each act of violence has been met with renewed and

passionate resolve by those who want this transition to work.




, -- -~ ----.111 -Y-.-<- '" *--'-----L--"-- --

26


The advocates of democracy, whether they be candidates for

office, members of the election council, church

representatives or ordinary citizens, have not yielded to the

pressure. They and Haiti deserve to succeed.



The upcoming elections are not the culmination of the

transition to democracy; rather they will be the beginning of

the process. They are likely to be messy, as democracy often

is, even in countries that have practiced it for years. It is

not easy to manage an election in the best of circumstances,

and those who are trying to do this job in Haiti are operating

under the most difficult of circumstances.



You will hear today in this hearing roan-and frao

Haiti-a great deal of blame. You will hear that the U.S.

Government is not doing enough; that the temporary military

government, the CNG, is failing in its self-described mission

to facilitate democracy; and even that the election council

has not performed well.



I may subscribe to sane of these views and I believe it is

important to be candid with this subcamnittee. But ten








days before a national election, it is equally important that

those who want the transition to succeed operate under the

assumption that it will succeed. The fingerprinting has

already taken on the characteristics of a negative

self-fulfilling prophecy. Haiti doesn't need that now.


The Haitian people have already overcame a great deal to

get to this stage in their transition. They overthrew

Duvalier. They have formed political parties. They have

drafted and ratified a democratic constitution a

constitution that calls for an independent election council

which has since been created. Ihey have made determinations

as to who is eligible to run for president. And candidates

are now conducting campaigns for public offices at all levels.



That in itself is a major accomplishment in the face of

the dedicated and violent opposition to democracy that exists

in Haiti. Two candidates have been murdered and those who

continue the pursuit of their democratic dream do so with the

constant reminder that the quest may also cost them their

lives.



Who are we to doubt that their courageous efforts will

succeed? Who are we to assume that Haiti does not deserve








democracy? Our task as outsiders ten days before an election

should not be to assess blame for a potential failure, but

rather to offer support, advice, resources and a sense of a

wider democratic camunity pulling together for a positive

outcome.



Tmis is what we at NDI have attempted to do in Haiti from

the first days of our involvement. Our activities have been

designed to help Haitians prepare for the transition to

democracy. We have operated without illusions, but with a

sense of optimism, inspired by Haitians who are o mnitted to

succeed.



--NDI brought together Haitian leaders in Puerto Rico in

August 1986 to discuss the roles of political parties in a

transitional state. We discussed the practical side of party

activity, the need for coalition politics and the importance

of open and civil debate.



-We also encouraged the formation of an independent

election cacmission. At the Puerto Rico meeting, the Haitian

leaders called for the creation of an interim electoral

commission comprised of a variety of leading citizens. That

ccumission, later enshrined in the constitution, was the

precursor of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and the


_ I_








Permanent Electoral Cuncil which will be established by the

first duly elected government.



-We followed up the Puerto Rico seminar with a December

1986 visit by international political leaders and technical

experts who surveyed the Haitian electoral process. In

addition to a series of techdmical reMcmrendations, our

comprehensive report called for better communication among

democratic groups, stranger parties and a massive civic

education campaign.



-NDI returned in March to observe the constitutional

referendum with an inte ratienal-delegation-of-party leaders.

While we pointed out certain technical problems, none of these

affected the credibility of the .esult-an overwhelming

endorsement of the constitution.



-NDI sponsored its second party-building seminar in

June 1987, as a crisis erupted over the CNG's electoral decree

which excluded the election council. The seminar offered

political party leaders an important forum in which to discuss

the apprriate responses to the apparent usurpation of the

responsibility of a constitutionally designated independent

body. We concluded that while parties were growing stronger,








coalitions had yet to be built; and that the divisions between

the COG and the Electoral Council had to be bridged for the

good of the country.


-Perhaps the highlight of our efforts was the visit of

former U.S. President Jimny Carter. Invited to Haiti by the

Institute for Haitian Research and Development (IHRED) and

sponsored by the NDI, President Carter and former Prime

Minister George Price of Belize traveled to Haiti October

22-23. Their visit, representing the Council of Current and

Former Freely Elected Heads of Government of the Americas,

demonstrated strong international sport for the

democratization process in Haiti. In a meeting with the CNG,

the two leaders expressed concern about investigations of the

murders of Louis Eugene Athis ax- Yves Volel, encouraged

renewed dialogue with the CEP and expressed hope that Haiti

would soon take its rightful place among the democracies of

the hemisphere. In discussions with members of the Electoral

Council, President Carter and Prime Minister Price expressed

admiration for their courage and assured the CEP of strong

international support and close observation of events in

Haiti. The two leaders also met with Church leaders and

presidential candidates who shared their views of the upcoming

elections and hopes for a geniune democratic transition.








As I have indicted, a major theme of NDI's work in

promoting democratic development in Haiti has been the need

for the establishment of an independent comnissian to

administer elections in Haiti both before and after the

transitional government leaves office. The call for such a

commission by the 17 Haitian political leaders was the most

significant outcome of the NDI-organized conference in Puerto

Rico. However, it was only with the approval of the new

constitution in Mardc 1987, that the establishment of an

independent, Provisional Electoral Council known by its

accrinym CEP became a fact.


I would like to focus on the Provisional Electoral Council

because it is an historically unique institution operating in

unchartered waters. The constitution requires that the.

Council be ceaposed of nine individuals, with each member

appointed by a different sector of Haitian society. The CEP

is given the exclusive authority to administer the elections

prior to the installation of a new government, at which time a

permanent electoral council will be appointed. The CEP also

is given jurisdiction to decide which candidates are









ineligible to participate in the upcoming elections under

Article 291. This provision of the new constitution prohibits

former Duvalierists from holding public office for ten years.



As was noted in NDI's report on the constitutional

referendum, "the (CEP) has a complicated task before it and a

limited time period in whid to accomplish its work. Ihe CEP

will need to have the support of all sectors of the

comunity... creating a process for the elections that will

allow them to be democratic, fair, secret, and credible". At

the same time, the NDI report stated that the "possibility of

tension between the CEP and the ministry [of Interior] cannot

be ignored".



Concern over the possibletension became a reality in June

when the CNG attempted to usurp the CEP's constitutional

function. I will not review this action by the QG in great

detail because I am sure you are familiar with these events.

Suffice it to say that whatever possibility there had been of

developing a working relationship between the CEP and the OCG

were dashed by the OC's decree, the ensuing protests and the

violent crackdown by the military.


L YLY1~YT*~~I~-YIY-- -- --sl









Once the transitional goerrment withdrew its decree, the

CEP was able to begin preparing for the elections in August

with the promulgation of its election law. Technical staff

was hired in September and preparations for the election began

in earnest. In late September, the CEP issued its electoral

calendar, with the key dates as follows: October 19-31 -

registration of voters; November 15 local elections;

Novenmer 29 presidential and legislative elections; December

20 run-off elections; and January 3 second round of

run-off elections for legislative candidates.



To most observers, the CEP's calendar was overly

ambitious. It required four elections throm~ hout the country

in a period of seven weeks. Ihe CEP argued, however, that

given the dates specified in the constitution for the

assumption of office by the president and the legislature, it

had no viable alternatives. Nonetheless, it was not

surprising when the local elections were postponed from

November 15 to sometime in December.









The CEP was dealt a serious blow on November 3 when its

offices were burned. The arson occurred following the release

by the CEP of a list of those candidates ineligible to run for

president, pursuant to the explicit mandate of the

constitution. As has been widely reported, the attack

occurred despite the fact that there are two police stations

near the offices. The refusal of the CNG to provide security

to CEP offices and members only increased the bitter relations

between the CEP and the OCG.



Despite the fire and threats, the CEP is determined to

conduct the presidential and legislative election on November

29. The registration process appears to have been a success.

The printing of ballots is ahead of schedule. Most important,

there is a determination throughout Haiti, even where tensions

are high, such as the Artibone Valley, to have the elections

succeed. If there are no further major incidents which would

disrupt the process, we expect that there will be presidential

and legislative elections as scheduled.


bsa.r~-L;b..li LL~--Y1









I want to emphasize, once again, the unique circumstances

under which these elections are occurring. An independent

election commission has been tasked with the responsibility of

creating in short order an entire electoral process. The

interim government has been at times hostile and other times

disinterested in the work of the carmissicn.


The registration process which the CEP insisted on also

was subject to same criticism. In NDI's view, the criticism

was based on a misunderstanding of the purpose of the

registration process. Registration is not an adequate

safeguard against double voting that will be addressed by

use of indelible ink. In-addition,-the registration process

undoubtedly will result in sane disenfranchisement of eligible

voters both those who failed to register and those who

cannot find the proper polling site.



However, in Haiti, as elsewhere, registration serves three

other purposes: First, it provides election officials with a

list which can be used in determining which votes are









eligible to vote in which constituency. This is essential

where elections are for local offices. Second, a registration

list helps the development of political parties by allowing

them to target potential voters. Third, registration allows

the CEP to know how many ballots are necessary for each

polling site. The CEP has established that a maximum of 500

voters can be registered at each polling site.



Although exact numbers of registered voters are not yet

available, it appears that the registration process was a

success. NDI representatives visiting Halt last week observed

regional election officials preparing the registration books so

as to have them ready for use on election day.



On election day, voters will arrive at pre-designated

polling sites between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. They will be

required to bring their registration card which will be

checked against the registration book. They will then proceed

to a table where individual ballots, with the name and picture








of every candidate, will be sitting. The voter will pick up

the ballots and be instructed to place one ballot for

president, three ballots for senator and one ballot for deputy

in an envelope which will then be placed in a ballot box.

Before leaving the polling site, the voter's finger will be

marked with indelible ink.



After the closing of the polls at 1:00 p.m., the ballots

will be counted, in many places by flashlight. Copies of the

results will be given to members of the polling site board and

sent to the ccmmunal electoral board (BEC). After most or all

of the results from a particular city or town have been

received by the BEC, the kiilfs wilrbe -sent to the

Departmental Electoral Board where they will be cumulated and

then transmitted to the CEP in Port-Au-Prince. Official

results should not be expected in less than five days, and

more likely the process will take closer to ten days.



there are a number of administrative hurdles that must be

overcame. First, the requisite number of ballots-estimated

at close to 100 million individual ballots-must be prepared.

Although the CEP indicate that the printing plants are ahead








of schedule, any disruption-whether intentional or

unintentional will make it difficult for the ballots to be

ready for timely distribution.


Second, once the ballots are prepared, they mist be sorted

so that each polling site receives the proper ballots i.e., an

adequate number of presidential ballots, as well the

appropriate ballots for those senators and deputies ocmpeting

in that area. Ihe-logistics involved in distributing the

ballots is acknowledged by all Haitians as being a major

potential problem. Many Departmental and communal electoral

boards have few official vehicles at their disposal; private

transport is unreliable and raises the risk that ballots can

be stolen. Resolution of this problem will require a large

degree of ingenuity.



Third, polling sites need to be established. Following a

rash of intimidation during the past two weeks, individuals

who had volunteered their property for the registration

process are no longer willing to have their property used as

polling sites. The recent decision by the Ministry of








Education to allow the use of schools as polling sites should

alleviate the problem, nonetheless the prospective voters must

be informed as to where they should vote.


Fourth, voters mist be informed as to how to cast their

ballots. Civic education programs on the television and radio

are underway, but additional information must be provided to

the voter at the polling site. It is at this point that there

may develop a conflict between a desire to ensure that voters

cast their ballots so that they can be counted versus

guaranting secrecy.



The secret ballot is an important guard against

intimidation, and exists, at least in theory, in every

democracy. However, if the referendum is a valid indicator,

secrecy for the Haitian voter is not critically important; as

is the actual act of casting a ballot. While NDI expects that

those Haitians who prefer to vote in secrecy will have an

opportunity to do so, realistically, we expect that many will

simply cast their ballots in a public roan.







Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Atwood. In keeping
with your suggestion, I assure you that we are going to get to work
on the drafting of that resolution. We are going to be handicapped
to some extent by the intervention of the holiday recess, but I am
optimistic.
Let me ask you this, your organization is funded primarily by
the National Endowment for Democracy, is that right?
Mr. ATWOOD. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CROCKETT. That means that it is funded by a grant from the
Congress, is that correct?
Mr. ATWOOD. That is right exactly, that is right.
Mr. CROCKETT. I was not aware of what you have just related to
us, the extent to which you have been influential in helping the
Haitian situation in planning for this election. You have a corol-
lary organization on the Republican side. Have they been doing
anything with respect to the Haitian situation, to your knowledge?
Mr. ATWOOD. Mr. Chairman, when the referendum on the consti-
tution was held, they joined us in sending a delegation to observe
that process. We then put out a joint report. I believe that is the
extent of their participation.
Mr. CROCKETT. Now you plan to take a plane load of observers
down for the election.
Mr. ATWOOD. I wish that we had a single plane. That implies
that we are going to have the U.S Air Force fly us in. We will all
be taking commercial airliners from various places around the
world.
Mr. CROCKETT. In that case, you are more fortunate than our sub-
committee. We have not been able to get the Air Force or any
other agency of the government to fly us down there. We are still
working on it.'
Now for my $64 question, Mr. Atwood. It seems that one of the
most immediate needs of the Election Commission down there is
for a helicopter to get the ballots to the place where they are being
counted and to eliminate the possibility of them being intercepted
on some of those dilapidated country roads and destroyed.
How is your treasury, do you have enough money to lease a heli-
copter and make it available to that Election Commission?
Mr. ATWOOD. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons that I have
to leave early today is we are having our annual fund raiser, pre-
senting the Harriman Award to President Alfonsin and to Senator
Cranston, and we have done very well. We will have to assess that
once again in the light of our success. I think that it is an impor-
tant thing, and we will have to look at that.
Mr. CROCKETT. Well, you work on that. You know, I am not over-
enthusiastic about the National Endowment for Democracy, but
you could earn a few brownie points if you can get a helicopter
down there. Thank you very much.
Mr. ATWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CROCKETT. Now Mr. Hooper.





41
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. HOOPER, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CO-
ALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, AND ON BEHALF OF THE
AMERICAS WATCH
Mr. HOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
having the hearing at a time when there has been silence from the
State Department and partial silence from Congress. I came back
from Haiti last night, and I have some impressions to communicate
to you. The formal written testimony has summarized a lengthy
report that we published just last Friday, the relevant sections of
which I hope can be included in the record. So I would like in these
few remarks this morning, Mr. Chairman--
Mr. CROCKETT. Well, let me interrupt long enough to say that all
of the prepared statements that have been filed with the commit-
tee will be included in the record.
Mr. HOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to make
just a series of emergency remarks if I might this morning in the
context of what has already been said and not duplicating what
has been said and endorsing it in some places, but trying to com-
municate the urgency of a situation that is in some ways rapidly
deteriorating, and certainly that needs some specific support right
away.
The environment in which these elections are taking place and
the climate of these elections has been eloquently described. I will
not repeat it, but I will only endorse the comments that have been
made.
The situation of terror that exists and has existed in Haiti since
this summer has been referred to. The degree to which this places
the elections in crisis has been indirectly addressed as has been the
position of the Administration, of the Reagan Administration.
I would like to mention in the beginning the fact that the Ad-
ministration's reluctance and failure to not act publicly to save
these elections given their own priority that has been placed on
these elections is extremely disappointing. I think that frankly
their absence here today is just part of a continuation of a policy of
silence, it would be benign to say silence, on this issue on the emer-
gency that exists in Haiti and on the actions of the Governing Na-
tional Council that they have supported seemingly totally since its
coming to power in February of 1986.
I would have hoped that the State Department would be here to
say three things. I would have hoped that this Administration
would have been here to say three things, and they would have
been this. That publicly perhaps for the first time, but in any case
strongly and clearly now, the United States would support the im-
mediate and essential protection of everyone participating in the
electoral process in Haiti. Now that is first and foremost obviously.
The people running the process, it is very significantly the Haitian
citizens and voters themselves.
I will not dwell on the importance of it. I think that it is obvious.
I would like to underline several things. There have been repeated
statements by employees of the United States Embassy, and since I
have been in Haiti, I do not really know what has been said here,
that they were unaware of this problem of protection for the Elec-
toral Commission members, the Regional Bureau members, and








members of the registration and voting places throughout the coun-
try.
This causes great concern on my part for one of two possible rea-
sons. I say that because letters from the CEP from the Electoral
Commission, a series of letters, have existed going back over a
period of two months. The copies are not only in the public domain
in Haiti, but the copies were in the Haitian newspapers the day
after they were released on each of the cases.
So it raises a problem, Mr. Chairman, that is either a problem of
bad faith or an indication of the fact that the Embassy does not
read the Haitian newspapers, one of the two.
On supporting the security of the electoral process, nothing has
been done. The Haitian government has refused every request to
provide meaningful protection that the Electoral Commission can
depend on.
I stress two things there. They have until today, after two
months, they have still refused to sit down with the Electoral Com-
mission and even talk about the issues, number one. Number two,
meaningful protection means that they do not want the "protec-
tion" from certain elements in the police forces and from the most
retrograde of the military units who the Electoral Commission
members fear more than they fear the Tontons Macoutes them-
selves.
They want protection from the regular army, and they have
made that protection request very clear. That protection request
has been repeated on numerous occasions in Haiti, and it has been
repeated to many governments, and it has been repeated to the
United States Government.
Secondly, and the same issue, Mr. Chairman, again briefly sum-
marizing the .issue of the release of monies to make this electoral
process work. It has been correctly pointed out, and I think that
everybody should be duly appreciative, that $4.9 million finally, all
of it, every penny of it, from U.S. AID has been released. Up until
two weeks ago, it was only $2.6 million.
The first point that I would like to make about that, Mr. Chair-
man, is that these monies were tremendously long overdue. They
should have been released long before the CEP and the regional or-
ganizations have had to fight to get dribs and drabs of the money
that they were supposed to have had long, long ago.
The other comment that I would like to make, Mr. Chairman,
just to introduce this problem to the committee is that not one
gourde and not one penny of Haitian government money has been
released to date for this entire electoral process. Nothing has been
given by the Haitian government to this process. And yet our State
Department insists on repeating that the CNG is doing everything
in its power to move the electoral process forward, to move the
elections to conclusion, to install and root democracy in Haiti.
I would hope that the Administration would have come here, Mr.
Chairman, and .also made this strong statement that is perhaps
overdue but is necessary now and made it in a public way. Because
we have two responsibilities. There is a responsibility of results,
and there is a responsibility of letting the Haitian people know
that the world is not simply lined up behind the guns of the Army
and the CNG.






43
And we have not done a very good job of letting the Haitian
people know that our government takes a position that is in any
way different from the position of the CNG.
I think that your comment about requests for .helicopters is a
very important one, Mr. Chairman. And I would only add that
there have been calculations made and provided to the Haitian
government for sometime now and to many Embassies of the way
that private helicopters can be provided from Miami at the cost of
$40,000 for a helicopter for one week plus a pilot. For the three hel-
icopters that they would need in Haiti to do this job perfectly, it
would be $120,000.
I am sure that more money has been spent on public statements
about Haiti than that $120,000. Everyone involved knows that this
is a necessity, and there simply has not been to date significant
action on this issue. I think that any one of these points is symbolic
of the quicksand that this myopic policy has pushed us into.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, this. Everybody has eloquently re-
ferred to the horror of the immediate electoral environment, the
army killings, the paramilitary squad killings, and the terrorizing
of human rights monitors. They have referred to the fact that it is
only the Haitian people's insistence on something better, on getting
rid of what they have been carrying on their backs for so long, that
has gotten this process as far as it is.
It is a process that is in continual jeopardy, and a process in jeop-
ardy is often resuscitate by the simplest of symbolic actions. You do
not have to have answers for all aspects of all of these problems.
We have to indicate certain good faith and certain concrete actions.
And it is particularly frustrating for the Haitian people, for Hai-
tian human rights organizations, and for all of us in this room, I
am sure, that it seems particularly difficult to drag even the sim-
plest symbolic action out of the Administration.
The unfortunate result of this is not only that the elections are
continually pushed into further and further jeopardy, but it is that
the relationships between Haiti and the United States are being
jeopardized each day. There is this resurgent anti-Americanism.
And this will, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, continue until certain
good faith public actions are made.
I would make two brief points in closing in respect for your time,
Mr. Chairman. At the time when the election headquarters, when
the regional headquarters, and when the business of Election Com-
mission members were torched, at the time when the party head-
quarters of several parties were machine gunned, and at the time
that there was an attempt to burn them down just two weeks ago,
at the time that all of these things were going on, at the time that
the night riders were running about the capital during this same
period shooting off into the air for everybody and for all of us to
hear, there was a phenomenon that has not been brought up, and I
just would like to underline it for your consideration.
The burnings of the electoral headquarters took place two blocks
from two of the largest central police stations in the capital. They
took place very close to a large military barracks. The continual
nighttime shootings take place in areas that are heavily fortified
areas. Not once ironically has a policeman or anyone from the
army ever appeared to investigate any of the situation.








It has almost gone to a comical degree. When alarms were sent
in about the fires slightly before midnight, the fire trucks arrived
at 6:00 a.m. This is not a situation where you have a small military
government that cannot control right wing forces. It is a situation
where the military government is increasingly indistinguishable
from these right wing forces.
And our government must make their understanding of this
clear if the Haitian people are going to continue to have some faith
in the perceptions of our government and of Americans.
I would say one more thing about United States policy, because I
think that there is still something that can be done about it at this
late date, Mr. Chairman. For good or for bad, it had been a policy
of elections at any cost. Whatever else happens in the country
since the flight of the Duvaliers, we are going to pull off an elec-
tion somehow. There is going to be an election, and anything can
be justified as long as the election will be held.
That policy has been demonstrated in the repeated certifications
of human rights improvement and the unjustifiable provision of
military aid to the 'people who are doing the killings, et cetera, et
cetera.
There is, however, a flip side of that. We can simply today in
your resolution and the resolution in the Senate indicate amongst
the other things that must occur that military aid will not be pro-
vided at least until this election takes place. There is an opportuni-
ty that this committee has to simply call a halt to the provision of
military aid to these guys.
And should there be a dramatic change in the immediate future
that we would all be grateful for, then a reprogramming would be
possible if at that time that the Congress wished to support the
Haitian military.
Again I would just like to stress the issue of protection. It is a
simple issue. It is an issue that can be met. It is not one of these
imponderables like the devastated economic situation in Haiti. It is
not an imponderable like how hard it is to root democracy any-
where. Protection for the electoral process is already to a degree
being provided by what they call committees of vigilance, commit-
tees from each little town, and each little hamlet, and each little
neighborhood to look out for the process.
The entire election process is being run by volunteers, not by
law. The law provides that the people who have been doing the reg-
istrations and have been setting up these procedures will all be
paid, and the CNG has not paid them. They have continued for the
entire period in most areas to work without pay. This is going to
succeed despite the actions of the CNG and despite the actions of
those who unequivocally support the CNG.
But the money issue is an absolutely crucial issue, and it is small
and a minimal amount of money that can make a huge difference.
If the transfer could not occur, Mr. Chairman, before the date of
the election, all that needs happen is that the CEP be able to have
credit in the case of ballots, and in the case of election information,
and in the case of election posters to get that process going and get
those things printed. They only need credit. The CNG can provide
this at the snap of the fingers.







Again they have refused to even sit down with the CEP. It is a
simple issue, just like the helicopters are a simple issue. On the re-
lease of the money again, I would like to stress that U.S. AID has I
think been exemplary. Their reluctance to provide the crucial $2.5
to $3.5 additional million dollars that is necessary is perfectly un-
derstandable in the sense that they have provided everything to
date.
However, either the United States is going to be in a position to
encourage the CNG to do its fair share, i.e. contribute something to
their own elections, or I think that it may be appropriate for U.S.
AID to go whole hog and say that $2.5 to $3.5 million will be avail-
able so that these elections can get off the ground. The cost of not
cooperating in these ways is going to be huge. And I think, Mr.
Chairman, that the pain of cooperating is extremely limited.
Just let me conclude perhaps for your questions. But it is again
our intention not to dwell on the policy mistakes of the past. It is
easy to be right, and it takes courage to be wrong. Whatever is
going wrong in this policy, and many things have gone wrong in
this policy in the last two years, we hope that we have all learned
from it. And we hope that the unambivalent support for this kind
of military government is not something that is going to occur in
the future without thinking about its implications.
But for now, we are all faced by something that is very simple
that we can all unite on and we can all agree on. And that is resus-
citating an electoral process that everybody agrees is at least a
small incremental contribution to the vast extraordinary misery of
Haiti. And to do that, we have to begin in the next several days in
a public way so at least the Haitian people know that they are not
entirely alone again in front of these goons. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Hooper follows:]










PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. HOOPER

Thank you for holding this hearing, Chairman

Crockett, and for inviting me to testify. My name is

Michael Hooper, and I am the director of the National

Coalition for Haitian Refugees. I appear today on

behalf of that organization and the Americas Watch.

In my testimony I would like to summarize the findings

of our November 1987 report, "Terror and the 1987

Elections". It is based on eight fact-finding missions

which I conducted in 1987, and on information collected

since the Americas Watch and the National Coalition for

Haitian Refugees opened an office in Port-au-Prince to

monitor the human rights environment in which the

elections are conducted.

Mr. Chairman, the Subcommittee's willingness to

hold a hearing on the situation in Haiti at this

critical time is a welcome and important development,


The Americas Watch is a Committee of the Fund for Free Expression and it is
affiliated with the Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch Committees










particularly in light of the Reagan Administration's refusal to
condemn abuses by the National Governing Council (CNG). The
State Department's failure to send a witness to this hearing is a

vivid demonstration of its failure to speak frankly about human

rights problems in Haiti since the CNG took power, and especially

throughout the current crisis. We had hoped that the State

Department might have used the occasion of this hearing as a last

opportunity to do what it has refused to do thus far: extend

U.S. support and protection to those participating in the

electoral process by publicly calling upon the CNG to prohibit

ongoing harassment and terrorism of members of the independent

Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), candidates, and local

organizers. It has not done so, and maintains the wall of silence

on gross violations of human rights which persist in Haiti,

imperiling the security of the Haitian people, the

elections, and the future of civilian government and the rule of
law in Haiti.

The Administration's silence about the repressive context of

the upcoming elections in Haiti contrasts with its approach on

elections elsewhere in the hemisphere. Secretary of State George

Shultz said in commenting on the 1984 elections in Nicaragua:

"An election just as an election doesn't really mean anything....

The important thing is that if there is to be an electoral

process, it be observed not only at the moment people vote, but

in all the preliminary aspects that make an election really mean

something." We agree with Secretary Shultz that these

"preliminary aspects" include: respect for the rule of law;











freedom from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment; freedom of

association, expression and the press; and a period of political

education and campaigning during which the personal safety of

participants is guaranteed. In addition, we believe that an

independent judiciary, independent trade unions, and independent

peasant and community organizations are essential to this

process. But these conditions do not exist in Haiti: in recent

months two presidential candidates have been assassinated; at

least 59 people have been shot dead and hundreds seriously

wounded by "hit squads" of the Haitian Army; five prominent

Catholic priests who had denounced the widespread violence and

their driver were attacked by a paramilitary group; peaceful

demonstrators and journalists have been fired upon by the Army; rural

communities and city slums, where opposition to the CNG is

concentrated, have been terrorized by paramilitary bands

affiliated with the military and by the Army itself; the

facilities of the (CEP) have been torched; and there have been

nighly shootings of the homes of presidential candidates.

Military repression, both targeted and indiscriminate, has

eliminated freedom of association and severely curtailed the

possibility of democratic popular participation.

The Reagan Administration's refusal to publicly condemn this

pattern of terrorism and violence appears to be motivated by the

State Department's fear that denouncing the CNG or withholding

assistance might result in the government's cancelling elections.

An election day event -- even one which takes place amidst wide-

spread intimidation and fear -- has become the sole object of

U.S. policy towards Haiti. For example, on June 30, 1987, during


I __










a spate of Army killings and just after the trade union

federation CATH had been banned, the Assistant Secretary of State

for Inter-American Affairs, Elliott Abrams, discussed at length

the situation in Haiti :in a speech before Washington World

Affairs Council. While he spoke eloquently of preserving the

integrity of the electoral process, he never mentioned the Army

killings, the Haitian government's terror campaign, or the

banning of a major trade union federation. The resulting message

was that the mere formality of elections would suffice to placate

United States policymakers, despite the lack of security and

freedom to make elections meaningful. That message was

reinforced on July 10, 1987, when after the Army had killed

peaceful protesters, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

Caribbean Affairs, Richard Holwill, announced in Port-au-Prince

that "elections not demonstrations are the way governments are

changed in a democracy."

Perhaps no aspect of U.S. policy towards Haiti has been as

misguided and counterproductive as the provision of military aid

to the CNG. As you know, the Congress explicitly authorized

military aid to Haiti in September 1986, but attached to it a set

of strict human rights conditions. These conditions included

requirements that specified abuses by the armed forces cease,

that past abuses be investigated, that the rights to free speech

and assembly be protected, and that the Tontons Macoutes be

demobilized. Notwithstanding the CNG's failure to take

meaningful steps to fulfill these conditions, a certification was

issued in March 1987 which warmly endorsed the government. The










certification even went so far as to commend General Williams

Regala, the military strongman of the CNG, noting that he and CNG

President Namphy "have on numerous occasions since February 1986
reiterated their firm commitment to the observance and

entrenchment of internationally-accepted human rights standards

of behaviour." (General Regala made something of a different

impression when he met with us in May 1986. He categorically

rejected investigations of past abuses by the military,

particularly in the case of the schoolchildren shot by the Army

in Gonaives, and said that the use of deadly force was

appropriate "in a country like Haiti.")
In August 1987, following the CNG's unsuccessful attempt to

take over the CEP and the military violence thereafter, the

Administration re-issued the certification and a follow-up

progress report required by the law which allowed military aid to

continue to flow to the CNG. The letter justifying the aid

stated that "a full assessment" of those responsible for the

summer's violence was "not possible at this time." The State

Department alone had difficulty making "a full assessment"; human

rights monitors and journalists actually witnessed killings, and

the U.S. press reported the summer's repression in detail. We

are informed that $1.275 million in MAP (Military Assistance

Program) funds and $275,000 in IMET (International Military

Education and Training) were provided in fiscal year 1987. U.S.

trainers, including crowd-control advisers, have been rotated

through Haiti throughout the year, and remain there today.

The provision of U.S. military aid and advisers has been

justified by the State Department on the grounds that poorly-











trained and ill-equipped troops "running amok" were responsible

for killings over the summer, and that better training and

equipment would solve the problem. Yet there is no evidence to

suggest that troops firing upon civilians were acting against
orders. On the contrary, the fact that such acts were widespread

and sustained and occurred throughout city slums and rural areas,

and the fact that the CNG did not investigate or take

disciplinary action against a single officer or soldier for the

scores of civilian deaths in recent months confirm the official
nature of the violence.

Clearly, U.S. training and aid alone did not have the

desired effect of mitigating Army abuses. Unfortunately, the aid
did have two important consequences: 1) it sent a strong signal

of support for the CNG and the Army; particularly when additional

assistance was sent in August 1987 following a terrible summer of

military violence. Military assistance and training at such a

moment conveyed that no abuses were so great as to jeopardize

U.S. support for the military. 2) It associated the U.S. with

gross abuses of human rights and inflamed anti-American sentiment

in Haiti. (The Administration itself acknowledged the negative
consequences of military aid to a highly unpopular and repressive

regime in its 1987 certification, stating: "There has been much

advance criticism of such assistance... The United States

Government will undertake active public outreach efforts to

ensure that distortions of the scope or intent of our program

gain no currency and that Haitians are informed of its limits.")










Perhaps the most dramatic indication of the failure of the

Administration's policy of providing military aid and training

has been the CNG's refusal to provide security to the members and

facilities of the CEP. Following its ruling, in accordance with

the constitution, that twelve Duvalierist candidates would be

ineligible to participate in the elections, a group of twelve

armed men blocked off the street where the CEP headquarters were

located, fired rounds of ammunition to scare off bystanders,

chiseled through heavy metal shutters to enter the premises, and

set the building on fire, destroying the headquarters and most of

its records, as well as thousands of copies of the electoral law,

voter-education leaflets, and posters urging people to vote. The

mob also broke into and burned a trading company owned by

Emmanuel Ambroise, the 75-year-old representative of Haitian

human rights organizations on the CEP and attempted to burn his

home and car. Meanwhile, gangs of men drove through the streets

of Port-au-Prince spraying gunfire in all directions. The CEP's

Departmental Election Bureau, which is responsible for conducting

elections and supervising local election bureaus in western

Haiti, was attacked by rounds of machine gun fire. The

headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party was machine-gunned.

Following a desperate appeal by Emmanuel Ambroise, the Army

responded by posting a single uniformed policeman with an M-l

rifle outside the church officers where the CEP had temporarily

set up quarters. Four other soldiers later joined him, but no

protection was accorded any of the CEP members or the

presidential candidates. With this meager CNG response, violence

accelerated. During the night of November 3, 1987, Ambroise's










home was the target of an arson attempt and his urgent calls to
the police were unanswered. The Christian Democratic Party's

facility was attacked again, by a group of men throwing

firebombs and firing rounds of ammunition into the offices. On

November 4th, arsonists set fire to the facility being used to

print election material, destroying tons of ballot paper, voter-

registration cards and voter-education leaflets in the process.

A voter registration bureau in central Port-au-Prince was riddled

with gunfire, and its president, Antoine Caldet, was wounded. On

November 6th, machine-gun fire was directed against the

headquarters of the party of presidential candidate Marc Bazin

and at the headquarters of presidential candidate Leslie Manigat.

The home of presidential candidate Gregoire Eugene was also

attacked. Where were the U.S.-trained and equipped troops when

members of the CEP and candidates requested protection?

The United States' policy of unwavering support for the CNG

in the hopes that it will allow some form of election to take

place has had the unintended consequence of diminishing whatever

chance the new government had to impose civilian rule and end

abuses of human rights. For example, there has been no

indication that the CNG investigated the human rights abuses that

occurred during the Duvalier period, including during the week

preceding Duvalier's flight, when troops and Tonton Macoutes

killed more than 200 Haitian citizens. There has been no attempt

to determine the extent of past abuses, the identity of those who

committed them, or the role of the security forces in those

abuses. Nor has the Army high command made any public






54


announcement that security force personnel will be prosecuted for

further abuses. The Administration's refusal to require the CNG
to take actions which would have bolstered the rule of law in

Haiti not only violated the terms of assistance in U.S. law, it

squandered the opportunity of using U.S. aid to encourage the

development of civilian institutions. Today, nearly two years

after Duvalier's ouster, there still is virtually no independent

judicial system. Judges who had been wholly subservient to

Duvalier remain in office, and new appointments to the bench have

tended to be judges willing to take their cues from their senior

colleagues. Accordingly, the judiciary remains subservient to

the very members of the military who would be the target of any

human rights investigation.

Another condition of U.S. aid which has not been met has been

the Congress' requirement that the Tontons Macoutes be disbanded.

Though a proclamation was issued which disbanded the Macoutes,

they were not effectively disarmed, nor did the government issue

orders to prosecute those members who refused to give up their

arms. Today the Macoutes continue to abuse civilians with

impunity, often with the Army's blessing. Well-known Macoutes

personally involved in torture and political killings have been

allowed to circulate freely in the capital and the provinces,

many of them continuing to carry arms. Our interviews with

Justice Ministers Gourgue and Latorture indicate that a maximum

of 3,500 weapons were retrieved from the Macoutes, and that the

majority of the houses raided did not even belong to Macoutes.

The amount is token when considered in light of former United

States Ambassador Clayton McManaway's estimate that, at the time







55


of Duvalier's departure, there were 22,000 full-time Macoutes,
many of whom were armed with pistols, rifles and Uzi sub-machine

guns. The Reagan Administration would have inestimably

strengthened the possibility of civilian rule in Haiti if it had

refused to provide military aid until the Tontons Macoutes had
been disbanded in fact as well as name.

The Reagan Administration has ignored congressional

conditions on aid, just as it did during the Duvalier regime.

(The Administration regularly certified that the Duvalier
Government was complying with human rights conditions in the law;

only at the end, when Haitians took to the streets by the

thousands to demand Duvalier's ouster, did the executive branch

withhold assistance.) The Administration also ignores

congressional requests that the law be respected: in July, 1987

Members of this Committee, including Chairman Fascell and

Chairman Crockett, asked the Administration not to provide

additional military aid. The request was ignored. Given this

experience, we would urge the Congress not to authorize and

appropriate military aid for Haiti. No matter how specific your

conditions are, they will not prevent the Administration from

providing the aid, whether or not the conditions have been met.

If miraculous human rights improvements occur and a credible case

for military assistance can be made, the Administration should

come to the Committee with a reprogramming request which might be

considered if and only if the human rights situation at the time

justifies it.







56


The Reagan Administration has been very generous in
providing financial assistance to the CEP, and should be

commended for it. But money alone is not enough when CEP members

and candidates fear for their very lives. The full Congress'

consideration of the foreign aid authorization this week provides

an opportunity for you and other members of the Committee to call

upon the CNG to take immediate action to provide protection to

members of the CEP, candidates, and voters, and to protect the

country's electoral facilities. If it were possible to pass a

Congressional resolution to this effect, it would be very helpful

to democrats in Haiti.

I have provided members of the Committee a copy of our new

report, and would respectfully request that as much of it as

possible be included in the hearing record, along with this

testimony.

Thank you.







Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Hooper.
Do I understand that no other foreign government has made any
contribution to the cost of the elections?
Mr. HOOPER. Well, that is essentially correct in terms of direct
monetary contributions, all of which must go through the CNG.
Mr. CROCKETT. I am talking about monetary contributions.
Mr. HOOPER. The French government and the Canadian govern-
ment have contributed considerable amounts of material. The Ca-
nadian government through paper for ballots, et cetera, et cetera.
The French government, I do not remember all of the ways, but
including some technical assistance teams. I think that they have
done something. But it would be absolutely correct to say that in
terms of cash contribution to make this election work that it has
been entirely a United States operation.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, in fairness to the foreign govern-
ments, if that is necessary, that this election was seen as a United
States operation from the beginning. And part of the reluctance on
the part of foreign governments is that this was seen as something
of an election at all costs run from Washington in many cases in
any case. And I think that their attitude, has been somewhat my-
opically and somewhat naively, that well, if they wanted this, then
they can pay for it.
But you are absolutely right in your implication that that is not
an appropriate attitude, and that they absolutely should be making
a fair share contribution, as should some inter-regional organiza-
tions like the Organization of American States, et cetera.
Mr. CROCKETT. What is the difference between the Tontons Ma-
coutes today and what they were under Duvalier?
Mr. HOOPER. Well, they are the same guys with the same guns,
and in many areas with the same effective power. Obviously, there
is no such organization existing at this point in time formally.
There is outstanding an order that they were disbanded, and that
they are supposed to turn in their weapons. In the early months
when Gourgue and Latortue were justice ministers, there were cer-
tain attempts to collect some of the weapons.
The estimates are that about 3000 weapons were collected. There
were about 22,000 Tontons Macoutes with several weapons each,
i.e. a pistol, a rifle, or a uzi. So there are a large number of weap-
ons out there. And there is an expectation and proof in many in-
stances that these guys are the night riders in cooperation with
their former friends. So in terms of their effect, I suppose that it is
less formal and just as terrifying.
I was handed a clarifying note. And just for the record, I would
like to add, because my answer to your previous question was not
complete, that France also contributed some computers, and that is
going to be very essential both in terms of keeping track of regis-
tration and keeping track of the vote totals, and getting the vote
totals out earlier. And that Venezuela did make a contribution in
terms of the printing of the registration materials.
Mr. CROCKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Hooper. Your pre-
pared statement will be made part of the record. I see that we have
the first bell, so the House will go in session. So we will adjourn
the hearing.







Mr. HOOPER. Thank you for your interest over the years. It has
made a big difference.
Mr. CROCKErr. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee was recessed, subject to
the call of the Chair.]




























7765-10
5-47
C
BT















APPENDIX

Letter from the subcommittee chairman, Hon. Geo. W. Crockett,
Jr., to the chairman of the full committee, Hon. Dante B. Fascell, on
the Department of State's unwillingness to provide a witness for
testimony before the subcommittee.

November 17, 1987


The Honorable Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to express my concern over the failure of the
Department of State to provide a witness for a hearing of the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on the subject of
the upcoming elections in Haiti. The hearing is scheduled
for tomorrow, November 18, 1987.

I have discussed such a hearing on numerous occasions with
representatives of the Department. On each such occasion, I
acceded to the Department's request that the hearing not be
held. However, I continued to push for a strong statement of
the Administration with respect to electoral violence in
Haiti, a statement that could be given in a forum of the
Department's own choosing if the Department did not wish to
appear at a hearing.

On October 28, I met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Richard N. Holwill and was assured that a statement by the
President would be forthcoming within two weeks. However,
the violence in Haiti continued, and the Administration
continued its virtual silence. Accordingly, on November 10,
I determined that a hearing could no longer be postponed, and
wrote to Mr. Holwill requesting his appearance on November
18. The Department's response was to decline to provide a
witness for the hearing.

In my view, the Department of State has an obligation to
provide testimony to the Committee, at the convenience of the
Committee, with respect to policies and programs under the
jurisdiction of the Committee. In the exercise of its
oversight responsibilities, the Committee has both a right
and a responsibility to require testimony on those programs
for which it has authorized funds. The Department simply
does not have the option of refusing to appear.

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Fasoell
Nov. 17, 1987




I know that we all support a strong diplomatic establishment
for the United States. But this support cannot be a one-way
street. The Department cannot expect the Committee to defend
its funding requests, and then refuse to be accountable to
the Committee for its conduct of foreign policy.

I hope you will bear this concern in mind as you continue to
confront the issue of funding for the Department of State.


sincerely,



------Geo. W. rocket r.
Chairman
Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs
GWC:vj

cc: The Honorable George P. Schulz
The Honorable Dan Mica
Mr. Richard N. Holwill

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