Managing arms in peace processes


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Managing arms in peace processes Haiti
At head of title:
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xix, 110 p.) : maps. ;
Mendiburu, Marcos
Meek, Sarah
Martin, P
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project
United Nations
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New York
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Subjects / Keywords:
Conflict management -- Haiti   ( lcsh )
Disarmament   ( lcsh )
Désarmement -- Haïti   ( rvm )
Haïti -- Politique et gouvernement -- 1986-   ( ram )
History -- Haiti -- 1986-   ( lcsh )
Histoire -- Haïti -- 1986-   ( rvm )
Haïti -- 1994-1995 (intervention américaine)   ( ram )
Politique et gouvernement -- Haïti -- 1986-   ( ram )
international intergovernmental publication   ( marcgt )
bibliography   ( marcgt )
non-fiction   ( marcgt )


Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-47).
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Statement of Responsibility:
paper, Marcos Mendiburu and Sarah Meek ; questionnaire compilation, UNIDIR's military expert group, completed by P. Martin.
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"United Nations publication sales no. GV.E.96.0.34"--T.p. verso.

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lcc - F1928.2 .M46 1996
ddc - 972.9407/3
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disarmament and Conflict ,S
Resolution Project

, 11- I' I


United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

Disarmament and
Conflict Resolution Project

,Managing Arms in Peace Processes:


Paper: Marcos f endiburu and Sarah Meek
Questionnaire Compilation: UNIDIR's Military Expert Group
Completed by: Lt Col P. Martin

Project funded by: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the
Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria,
Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States of America.

New York and Geneva, 1996


The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this
publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the
Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country,
territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its
frontiers or boundaries.


The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.



Sales No. GV.E.96.0.34

ISBN 92-9045-120-3

Table of Contents


Previous DCR Project Publications ................................ v
Preface Sverre Lodgaard ..................................... vii
Acknowledgements ......................................... ix
Project Introduction Virginia Gamba ............................. xi
List of Acronyms ............................................. xvii
Maps ................................................. xviii

Part I: Case Study ........................................ 1

I. Introduction
Marcos Mendiburu ................................... 3

II. Evolution of the Haitian Crisis (1990-1994)
Marcos Mendiburu................................ 4

1. Implementing Regional Coercive Measures .............. 5

2. Increasing the International Pressure:
A Mandatory and Universal Embargo ................ 7

3. Authorizing the "Use of All Necessary Means":
An Armed Intervention ............................ 9

III. The Military Intervention in Haiti
Marcos Mendiburu ................................. 12

1. Towards the Intervention ......................... 12

2. The Port-au-Prince Agreement ..................... 13

3. The Mandate .................................... 15

iv Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

4. The US Doctrine for Peace Operations ................ 16

5. Operation "Uphold Democracy" ..................... 17

IV. The Disarmament
Sarah Meek ......................................... 21

1. Establishment of a Secure and Stable Environment ...... 21

2. The Gun Buy-Back Program ...................... 24

3. Other Disarmament Activities ....................... 25

4. Disarmament during UNMIH ..................... 26

V. Demobilization
Sarah Meek ......................................... 26

VI. The Transfer of Authority
Marcos Mendiburu .................. ................ 28

VII. Conclusion
Marcos Mendiburu ................................. 31

Biographical Notes ........................................... 37

Part II: Bibliography ......... .................. ...... 39

Part III: Questionnaire Analysis ....................... 49

Previous DCR Project Publications

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique

Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Psychological Operations and Intelligence

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues


Under the heading of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major
project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the
utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to
resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the
demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective
security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role
that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of
internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and
UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (El
Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ
(Mozambique), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNMIH (Haiti), and the 1979
Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.
Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking
independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political
actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the
independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time,
being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR
naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the
Secretary-General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and
Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era,"' the DCR Project also relates to a great
many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional
auspices. Last but not least, comprehensive networks of communication and
cooperation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.
Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light
weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many
armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (Small Arms
andIntra-State Conflicts, UNIDIR Paper No. 34, 1995). The Secretary-General's
appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms to promote "micro
disarmament"2 is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework
of the DCR Project.

SDocument A/C.1/47/7, No. 31, 23 October 1992.
2 Document 50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

This volume examines the UN intervention in Haiti, which constitutes a
significant example of collective intervention in an internal conflict. The case
study was co-authored by Sarah Meek and Marcos Mendiburu. Specifically, the
authors of this volume detail the evolution of the Haitian crisis (1990-1994),
outline the response of the UN to this crisis in the guise of the Multinational Force
(MNF) and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and address the role
that disarmament and demobilization played in the process. The report is the
seventh in a series of UNIDIR publications on the disarmament dimension of
peace operations. There will be a report on each of the cases mentioned above.
The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and
assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They
were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt.
Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for their
invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions and
problems we put before them.
I would like to thank the staff at UNIDIR who assisted in the publication
process: Virginia Gamba, for leading the DCR project until the end of March
1996; Lara Bernini, Claudia Querner, Alessandra Fabrello, and Steve Tulliu, for
editing this volume; and our Specialized Publications Secretary, Anita Bl6try, for
designing and producing the camera-ready copy.
UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this
report. They are that of Ms. Meek and Mr. Mendiburu. I am grateful to them for
their contribution: UNIDIR has been happy to have such resourceful and dedicated

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR


The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and
governments who have contributed financially and with personnel to the
establishment and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among
our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep
appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the
Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil,
Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centered on the
maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network
of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the
global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into
world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent
policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with
immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage
in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.
The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern,
generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of
alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak
states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic
tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by
situations of violent intra-state conflict.
Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive
movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on
human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.
Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international
community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of
stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the
main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the international
arena, whereas now it is to stabilize domestic situations. The international
community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by
facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal
armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and
by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.'
The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been
requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the

James S. Sutterlin, "Military Force in the Service of Peace," Aurora Papers, No. 18
(Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993), p. 13.

xii Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and
trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of
peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace
operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of
democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement
of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These
achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon,
Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.
Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number
of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also
been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly
explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial,
personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive
short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure
long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus
from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and
international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing
humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as
longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-
state conflict will remain in question.
This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the
international community. More and more organizations and governments are
linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict
society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are
national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the
final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the
existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and
non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of
internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus
of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are
viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to
disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as
well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere
existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the
reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-
conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and

Project Introduction

does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected
by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.
There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's
approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the
international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal
conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development
and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who do focus on long-
term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of
development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e.,

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during
Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace
operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term
stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of
weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more
than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-
reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the
management and control of arms could become an important component for the
settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and
deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in
post-conflict societies.
Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example,
instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis
include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the
control of illegal weapons transfers across borders.2 Likewise, during conflict
situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations
conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the
establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors.
Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required
for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be

2 Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict," Project on Rethinking Arms Control,
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective
disarmament, demobilization and defining.
Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have
cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most
cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not
generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations
necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are
often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It
could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally
different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have
attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to
manageable levels even if achieved tend to be soon devalued, since most of the
ensuing activities center on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction
processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes
for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in
turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential
to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass
movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former
warring parties.
The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons
has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges
to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent
strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the
effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term
national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.
The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of
recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons
during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the
establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and
problems concerned with the lack of coordination of efforts among the various
groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated
if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a
secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to
agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at
weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international
community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements
and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more

Project Introduction xv

difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was
The coordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the
components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed
if there is cooperation and coordination between the international effort and the
nations which immediately neighbor the stricken country. But coordination must
not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace
operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be coordinated
among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which
comprise a peace operation. A minimum of coordination must also be achieved
between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military
components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid
organizations working in the field; these components must cooperate with each
other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission
coordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided,
including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and
population protection mechanisms.
Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement
peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources
of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the
material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the
implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society
and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and
regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are
not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring
countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable
stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to
intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive,
systematic disarmamentprogram as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the
establishment of an arms management program that continues into national
post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close
cooperation on weapons control and management programs between countries
in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.
In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into
four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and
interpretation of a Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control,
Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the
development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the
organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of
policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of
arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.
The first case study examined the way in which three international peace
processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of
controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia. The second volume focused
on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia, the third on the
complex missions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), the fourth
study looked at the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), the fifth examined the
UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the sixth volume addressed the
United Nations observer mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). This study is concerned
with the combined efforts of the Multinational Force (MNF) and United Nations
mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to manage the restoration of the democratically elected
Aristide government in Haiti. The paper is presented with a summary of the
responses regarding this mission which were obtained through the Project's own
Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and
Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
Geneva, March 1996


List of Acronyms

Air Force Special Operations Command
Caribbean Community
Civil Military Operations Center
Forces Arm6es d'Haiti
Front pour 1'Avancement et le Progr6s Haitien
Haitian National Police
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
International Organization for Migration
Interim Public Security Force
International Civilian Mission in Haiti
Military Intelligence Support Team
Multinational Force
Organization of American States
Presidential Decision Directive
Private Voluntary Organizations
Rules of Engagement
Special Forces
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Mission to Haiti
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
United Nations Security Council


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Part I:

Case Study

I. Introduction'

Ever since the end of the Cold War, democracy has become a widely shared
value in the world community.2 Hence, the US-UN intervention in Haiti has
assumed a particularly important significance in the context of recent global
security and political transformations. For the first time, a collective initiative has
taken place to re-establish a democratically elected regime, ousted by military
In fact, the Haitian operation constitutes an example of collective
intervention in an internal conflict in the name of democratic values. As the
Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, stated: "There have been
dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of the United Nations
activities in the field...One is the fact that so many of today's conflicts are within
States rather than between States."3
Many factors can explain the outbreak of the Haitian conflict. Some of them
are related to Haiti's history as, for instance, the prominence of a minority that
exerted power with the help of the military's complicity. Others are external, such
as the US engagement in Haitian politics which began nearly a century ago as a
consequence of the US interest in the Caribbean. However, this paper analyzes
only the most recent and immediate causes of the crisis that started when the
Haitian military toppled President Aristide. Some of the roots of this conflict can
be found in a more distant past.
Consequently, this paper shall briefly, at first, describe the three-year
negotiating process, with its many set backs and unfulfilled agreements. This
negotiating process was accompanied by an escalation in the use of sanctions
aimed at isolating the military rulers and getting them to the negotiating table. The
shift from the use of coercive measures imposed by the Organization of American
States (OAS) to UN sanctions, will be also examined.

I am very grateful to Monica Hirst, Col. Roberto Bendini and Donald Daniel for their
comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank Col. Cecil Bailey and Gen. Richard Potter
for providing information on the military operation.
2 For details, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative,"
Global Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 3-11.
3 See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations," Document
A/50/60 S/199511, 3 January 1995, p. 18.

4 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

II. Evolution of the Haitian Crisis (1990-1994)

In 1990, there were great expectations for political change in Haiti. The
country became one of the last states to join the re-democratization wave of Latin
America which had begun in the early eighties. In the first democratic elections in
the history of Haiti, held on 16 December 1990, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was
elected President with around 67% of the vote. It was hoped that the election
would put an end to the long period of dictatorship and political instability under
the Duvalier Era first, and then, for five years under five different rulers.
During his seven-month tenure, Aristide's administration made numerous
enemies who conspired against the President inside and outside the island.
Aristide's previous proposals to reform the armed forces and create a separate
police force, as well as his decisions to punish human rights abuses and his will
to fight drug-trafficking, stimulated growing opposition from the military. His
differences with the upper segments of the Catholic Church (he professed many
of the dogmas of liberation theology) contributed to strengthening the ties between
the military and the Church. His proposal to raise the minimum wage from $3 to
$5 angered the business sector, especially the assembly industry in Haiti.
Moreover, external support for Aristide was constrained by his outspoken anti-
American sentiments and his complaints against the Dominican Republic's
immigration policy which affected Haitian citizens.
Once Aristide took office, he lost the backing of many members of the
coalition that had supported his candidacy. The selection of close friends such as
Ren6 Preval for Prime Minister and his unwillingness to accept criticism affected
the ruling coalition, increasingly isolating Aristide. It is also important to mention
that the political sectors supportive of Aristide were relatively weak among the
Haitian community. In fact, the lowest segments of society were the ones which
made up his democratic government constituency. The isolation of the President
from the ruling class became even more pronounced after Aristide supporters
attacked parliamentarians, including some among the ruling coalition, who refused
to vote in favor of Aristide's measures.
It is in this context that the Haitian situation evolved towards its 1994
denouement. Between 1990 and 1994 three different phases to the crisis can be
clearly defined: (1) the overthrow of Aristide and the OAS sanctions; (2) the
increasing regional pressure and the UN's actions; and (3) the US involvement.
The first phase began with the overthrow of the constitutional President,
Aristide, on 30 September 1991 by the armed forces. During this period, the OAS
became the main supporter of Aristide's restoration. The diplomatic and economic

Case Study

sanctions against the defacto government and the creation of the OAS/DEMOC
Mission were the most relevant measures adopted by the regional organization.
The second phase began in December 1992 and ended in late 1993.
Throughout this period, an increasing engagement of the UN was observed. After
a first step in the cooperation between the OAS and the UN, with both
participating in the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), the
Governors Island Accord led to the creation of the UN Mission to Haiti (UNMIH).
The third phase began in early 1994 and was characterized by a major
involvement of the US. On various occasions, the US attempted to break the
impasse caused by the failure of the Governors Island Accord, and eventually
constituted a Multinational Force (MNF) to remove the Cedras regime.

1. Implementing Regional Coercive Measures

On 30 September 1991, the Haitian military, headed by Lt.-Gen. Cedras,
ousted the democratic administration of Aristide. Cedras then became the
strongman of the country, and President Aristide was forced into exile, leaving the
island with the help of the French Ambassador. On the same day, the Permanent
Council of the OAS adopted a resolution condemning the coup d'etat and
demanding respect for the Constitution and the legitimate government.4 Three days
later, an ad hoc Meeting of the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs passed a
resolution demanding the reinstatement of constitutional rule in' Haiti and
recommending the adoption of diplomatic and economic sanctions in order to
isolate the defacto authorities.5 The OAS Ministers also decided to dispatch to
Haiti a mission of eight OAS Foreign Ministers, headed by Secretary-General
Baena Soares for a two-day meeting.
On 7 October 1991, the two Chambers of the Haitian Parliament nominated
the aging judge Joseph Nerette as provisional President who, in turn, appointed
Jean-Jacques Honorat as his Prime Minister. In the meantime, the OAS Ministers
passed a second resolution, urging OAS member States to freeze the financial
assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, from which
humanitarian relief was exempt.6 Furthermore, at the request of Aristide, a
resolution authorized the constitution of a civilian mission, known as Resolution

4 See OAS Document CP/RES. 567 (870/91) (30 September 1991).
5 See OAS Document MRE/RES. 1/91 (3 October 1991).
6 See OAS Document MRE/RES. 2/91 (8 October 1991).

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

OAS/DEMOC, to re-establish and strengthen democracy in Haiti, and asked the
member States of the UN to adopt the same measures. From November 1991 to
February 1992 a series of negotiations between Aristide's Presidential
Commission and a Haitian parliamentary delegation took place respectively in
Caracas, Cartagena, Port-au-Prince and Washington, under the auspices of the
OAS mediator, former Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Ramirez
In early 1992 Aristide and the leaders of the Senate and of the Chamber of
Deputies signed the "Protocol of Washington," under the auspices of the OAS.
The agreement called for the nomination of a Prime Minister, a general amnesty
for the coup plotters, the preservation of the post-coup legislation, the removal of
the OAS sanctions, and the restoration of President Aristide. The agreement was
to be ratified by the Haitian Parliament. Aristide finally accepted Ren6 Th&odore
as Prime Minister but refused to grant amnesty to Cedras. For this reason the
agreement was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice and not
ratified by the Parliament.
Throughout this first phase, the UN kept a low-profile attitude vis-d-vis
Haiti. This period coincided with the end of Secretary-General P&rez de Cullar's
tenure and the election of the new UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The UN's
stance limited itself to supporting OAS efforts in defense of democracy in Haiti.
On 3 October 1991, after Aristide addressed the UN Security Council (UNSC),
the President of the UNSC made a statement condemning the coup, calling for the
restoration of the legitimate government and supporting the efforts of the OAS.
Eight days later, the General Assembly of the UN passed a resolution in which it
condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti, the use
of police and military violence and the violation of human rights in the country. It
also urged the members of the UN to take measures in support of OAS efforts,
requesting the UN Secretary-General to cooperate with the OAS Secretary-General
in the implementation of the OAS resolutions.
While the negotiations between the exiled President and the illegal authorities
remained interrupted, the army, the de facto executive power in Haiti, and the
presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament signed the "Villa d' Accueil
Agreement," calling for a "government of consensus." As a result, Marc Bazin was
appointed new Prime Minister and took office on 19 June 1992. The defacto
President, Joseph Nerette, then resigned according to the conditions established
by the tripartite agreement. In the meantime, Aristide named a ten-member
Presidential Commission to represent his government in Haiti.

Case Study 7

In May 1992, an OAS ad hoc Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers
passed a resolution urging its member States to adopt all necessary actions for the
greater effectiveness of the measures approved against the military rule in earlier
resolutions.7 This new resolution requested OAS member States to deny access to
port facilities to any vessel that violated the embargo, and to monitor compliance
with the embargo, as well as to deny visas to perpetrators and supporters of the
coup and to freeze their assets.
In July 1992, newly elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
accepted the offer of the Secretary-General of the OAS, Joao Clemente Baena
Soares, to include UN participation in a mission to Haiti. On 24 November 1992,
the General Assembly adopted another resolution reaffirming its support of

2. Increasing the International Pressure:
A Mandatory and Universal Embargo

By the end of December 1992, Boutros-Ghali appointed a Special Envoy for
Haiti, Dante Caputo, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, who
also became the OAS Special Representative one month later. Caputo held a series
of consultations in Washington with Aristide; and with the members of the
Presidential Commission, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed
Forces, with the de facto Prime Minister, and with the leaders of the two
Chambers of Parliament in Port-au-Prince to pave the way for Aristide's return to
In January 1993, Aristide sent a letter to the UN and another to the OAS
Secretary-Generals, requesting the following: (a) the deployment by the UN and
OAS of an international civilian mission to monitor respect for human rights and
the elimination of all forms of violence in Haiti; and (b) the initiation of a process
of dialogue among all Haitian parties, under the auspices of the Special Envoy, in
order to reach an agreement to solve the political crisis. The defacto government
accepted both requests and MICIVIH was established in March 1993.8 In the
meantime, further consultations were held by Caputo with the UN and OAS
Secretary-Generals concerning the mandate and implementation of the MICIVIH.
The UN component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff

7 See OAS Document MRE/RES. 3/92 (17 May 1992).
8 See Document A/RES/47/20 B (20 April 1993).

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

members, including 133 human rights observers. The OAS would provide another
133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component.
The OAS sanctions were not effective in isolating the Cedras regime which
continued to obstruct all pro-democratic initiatives. By the end of 1992, the OAS
had lost the power of initiative vis-a-vis the UN in solving the Haitian crisis, and
the UN assumed diplomatic and coercive measures. As the negotiating process
undertaken by Dante Caputo was completely boycotted by the military, the UN
decided to increase the pressure on the regime by tightening the embargo.
On 8 June 1993, the defacto Prime Minister Marc Bazin, a World Bank
official with several US supporters, resigned. A week later, the UNSC, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, unanimously adopted Resolution 841,
creating universal and mandatory sanctions on Haiti.9 According to this
Resolution, the UN imposed on Haiti an oil and arms embargo. The President of
the UNSC justified the measure with the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti,
remarking that this measure should not be regarded as a precedent. Two days
before the sanctions were enforced, Lt.-Gen. Cedras agreed to initiate a dialogue
with President Aristide. A delegation headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Haitian Armed Forces left the country to begin negotiations in New York.
The negotiations were held on Governors Island in New York City Harbor
in order to avoid massive demonstrations of Haitian-Americans at the UN. After
almost a week of talks, overseen by Dante Caputo, the delegations of Aristide and
Cedras reached an agreement. The ten-point agreement, best-known as the
"Governors Island Accord," was signed on 3 July 1993 by Aristide and Cedras and
called for the selection of a Prime Minister by President Aristide; defined a series
of reforms under the UN supervision affecting the Parliament, the police and the
army; promised a general amnesty for the coup plotters and coup supporters; and
anticipated the voluntary retirement of Cedras at some point prior to Aristide's
return, at the end of October.o1 After the legally-reconstituted Parliament ratified
the appointment of the new Prime Minister, Robert Malval, the UNSC, in
accordance with the Governors Island Agreement, suspended the sanctions to
facilitate a peaceful transition.
Meanwhile, the UNSC passed Resolution 867, authorizing the establishment
and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months to assist in
modernizing the Haitian armed forces and establishing the new police force

9 See Document S/RES/841 (16 June 1993).
10 See Document A/47/975 S/26063, The Governors Island Agreement, New York (3 July

Case Study

indicated in the Agreement." UNMIH would comprise 567 police monitors and
a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700 men, as well as
60 military trainers.
Contrary to general international expectations, the Governors Island Accord
was torpedoed by the Haitian military and by the defacto authorities. When the
ship, the USS Harlan County, carrying personnel of the UNMIH military
contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993, armed civilians from the
Front pour Avancement et le Progrds Haitien (FRAPH) reacted with violent
disturbances in the seaport and prevented the ship from casting anchor. The
FRAPH supporters threatened local and international press professionals and
diplomats that were waiting for the UN troops at the harbor. After this incident,
the USS Harlan County was requested to return to the naval base of Guantanamo
under the US administration.
In the following days, the majority of the UNMIH and MICIVIH personnel,
as well as diplomats and international agencies' staff left the country in the midst
of a growing wave of violence. At that stage, the return to power of Aristide
appeared to be almost impossible. The agreement was not fulfilled, and as a
consequence, on 15 October 1993, the UNSC reimposed the embargo in
accordance with Resolution 873.

3. Authorizing the "Use of All Necessary Means":
An Armed Intervention

During the first months of 1994, the Clinton administration became more
actively involved as various initiatives were launched to break the impasse of the
Haiti crisis. At this point, pro-democratic initiatives began to originate more in the
White House than in the UN Headquarters. The International Conference on Haiti,
held in Miami in mid-January, with Aristide's presence together with many Haitian
parliamentarians, is an illustrative case of the American initiative. The
"Parliamentarians' Plan" (19 February 1994), calling for a "broad" coalition
government composed of representatives from all Haitian parties,12 and the Gore

See Document S/RES/867 (23 September 1993). The military component would be
provided by Argentina, Canada and the US while the police personnel would be provided by Algeria,
Austria, Canada, France, Indonesia, Madagascar, Russia, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and
12 See Document S/1994/203, Letter from a delegation of Haitian Parliamentarians
addressed to the Secretary-General (19 February 1994).

10 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Plan (24 March 1994), both rejected by President Aristide, were planned in
The migration flows became the salient issue for the Clinton administration,
to the extent of altering Clinton's policy toward Haiti. The more the refugee flows
increased, the more the US got involved. In order to stem the flow of refugees
toward Florida, the US requested Western countries and the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to cooperate in the resettlement of Haitian
refugees. President Clinton urged the Haitian population to apply for refugee
status at US offices or refugee processing centers within Haiti, as the safest way
of seeking refuge. At the same time, off-shore processing centers were opened for
people who were interdicted at sea in Jamaica (1 June 1994) and on the Turks and
Caicos Islands (3 June 1994). By mid-1994, the refugee problem had become
unmanageable and threatened to overwhelm the US. In addition to the Haitians,
Cuban refugees were arriving in large numbers in late August and early September
1994. The US government feared that the refugee crisis could have an impact on
the US mid-term elections of November 1994.
In Haiti on 11 April 1994, the defacto Parliament appointed the Supreme
Court President, Judge Emile Jonaissant, as the new President of the country.
Jonaissant requested MICIVIH to end its activities and leave the island. The
MICIVIH staff was immediately evacuated. At the same time, the human rights
conditions continued to deteriorate: there were arbitrary arrests, rapes, and
disappearances, as well as beatings, and other forms of torture. Within the context
of the escalation of human rights violations, the refugee flow, and the expulsion
of the MICIVIH staff, the UNSC passed Resolution 940 authorizing the
constitution of a multinational force to remove the Cedras regime. The UNSC
recognized that the "unique character" of Haiti's situation and its "deteriorating,
complex and extraordinary nature" required an "exceptional response.""
Unlike previous decisions regarding the Haitian crisis Resolution 940 did not
receive the unanimous approval within the UNSC for its adoption. Whereas out
of the 15 members, 12 of them voted for the resolution, Brazil and China
abstained.14 At the same time, the authorization of the use of force to restore
democracy led to an important debate among the Western Hemisphere countries.
Several States requested the President of the UNSC that they be invited to

13 See Document S/RES/940 (31 July 1994).
4 The following member states voted for the Resolution 940: Argentina, the Czech
Republic, Djibouti, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the US Rwanda was absent.

Case Study 11

participate as observers in the UNSC discussions regarding the draft resolution,
authorizing the use of military force in Haiti. Many Latin American countries
favored diplomatic efforts or the use of economic sanctions. States such as Cuba,
Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela opposed the intervention, arguing that the de
facto government in Haiti did not threaten the international peace and security, in
accordance with article 42 of the UN Charter, and that the use of force was not the
most appropriate means to reinstate democracy. On the other hand, Argentina,
Canada and the Caribbean, together with Haiti and the US, supported a
multilateral military intervention. The Haitian representative stated that the
resolution did not violate the principle of national sovereignty, because the de
facto authorities did not represent the will of the people. Further, the principles of
national sovereignty and of self-determination were complementary. The US
representative argued that there had been enough time for a peaceful settlement,
pointing to the rejection by the US administration of the idea of a military
intervention several months before, but that the international community's patience
had run thin since the Cedras regime had reaffirmed its unwillingness to cooperate
with the UN. In accordance to this approach, the US Permanent Representative
before the UNSC, Mrs. Madeleine Albright stated the following:

This Council has pursued patiently a peaceful and just end to the Haitian crisis. The
Organization of American States has pursued a parallel effort. Member states, including
my own, have taken steps independently to encourage the illegitimate leaders to leave.
Together, we -the international community- have tried condemnation, persuasion, isolation
and negotiation. At Governors Island, we helped broker an agreement that the military's
leader signed but refused to implement. We have imposed sanctions, suspended them and
strengthened them. We have provided every opportunity for the defacto leaders in Haiti
to meet their obligations. But patience is an exhaustible commodity...The status quo in
Haiti is neither tenable nor acceptable.5

On the other side, the Chinese Permanent Representative considered that
there was still room to explore other peaceful means. Brazil's abstention was
justified on the ground that there had been a lack of consensus among Latin
American and Caribbean countries represented by Brazil in the UNSC.

15 See Document S/PV.3413 (31 July 1994), p. 12.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

III. The Military Intervention in Haiti16

This section focuses on the moments prior to the US-led intervention and to
the last-minute diplomacy that led to the Port-au-Prince agreement. It also
examines the mandates of the MNF and the UNMIH which provide the
international legal authority. Finally, it includes a brief description of the US
doctrine for peace operations and the tasks carried out by the US-led military
coalition during the seven-month occupation.

1. Towards the Intervention

Together with the lack of unanimous approval of Resolution 940 among the
UNSC members, disagreement also existed among different agencies of the US
government over an American military intervention to Haiti. An important debate
divided the Clinton administration during August between the Defense
Department, on one side, and the State Department, on the other." The Secretary
of Defense, Willliam Perry, and a large part of the US military wanted to avoid an
invasion and were willing to offer a comfortable exile to the military leaders once
they had stepped down. According to the Pentagon's plan, the US would arrange
the departure of the three strongmen of Haiti (Raoul Cedras, Philipe Biamby and
Michel Frangois), helping them recover their assets from frozen bank accounts and
keep their properties. The US would also guarantee that the coup plotters would
not be prosecuted either in Haiti or abroad.
On the other hand, US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, favored an
early intervention. Talbott, who emerged as the State Department's chief
policymaker on Haiti, considered the Pentagon's plan morally repugnant. He
supported the idea of delivering an ultimatum to the Cedras regime to leave power
or risk an invasion without offering any incentive for their departure. These two
stances were to coexist in the Democratic administration until the very last
moment. While the US organized a MNF and delivered an ultimatum to the
Haitian military leaders, Clinton sent a US delegation to convince the Cedras
regime to relinquish power.

16 In this section, the concept "intervention" is used with a more strict meaning and refers
to the presence of foreign military forces in the territory of another state.
17 See Elaine Sciolino, "Top US Officials are Divided in the Debate on Invading Haiti to
Remove Junta," The New York Times, 4 August 1994, p. 1.

Case Study

As the US-UN collective intervention was being carried out in mid-
September, the US tried to convince many countries to collaborate toward the
constitution of a multinational force. Yet various governments refused to send
troops to participate in a military operation to remove the Cedras regime from
power. They agreed, however, to participate in the "peacekeeping stage" of the
operation, in which international police monitors would train the new Haitian
civilian police force and help guarantee public order. Thus, the multinational force
sent to Haiti was only composed of US and Caribbean soldiers."8 A meeting
between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states and
representatives of the US government had already been held in Kingston, Jamaica,
on 30 August 1994 to coordinate the participation in the MNF.
As President Clinton delivered an ultimatum on 15 July 1994, demanding
that the Cedras regime step down, Washington made one last attempt to make
peace with the regime. Even though various polls indicated that an intervention
would be very unpopular with the American population, the US President
addressed the nation to explain the reasons for the imminent intervention. In face
of the absence of a response from the defacto authorities, the US administration
sent a mission to Port-au-Prince led by American former President Carter, joined
by Senator Sam Nunn and Gen. Colin Powell. They were critical of an intervention
and hoped for an agreement between the US delegation and the defacto authorities
which was finally reached on 18 September 1994. This last minute agreement
altered the original strategy and permitted a peaceful disembarking in Haiti of the
multinational force led by US Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton. Jimmy Carter prevented an
invasion and the multinational force was invited to enter Haiti without resistance
opposing it. Thus the international "intervasion" had begun. Under the new
political and military conditions created by the US-UN intervention, and after a
three-year exile, President Aristide could return to Haiti.

2. The Port-au-Prince Agreement

The text of the Port-au-Prince agreement was considered very vague. This
did not however create a problem for the US administration because the presence
of American troops in Haiti left the Haitian armed forces little power, allowing US

18 The MNF was made up of the US (20,00), Bangladesh (1,250), Guatemala (125), Nepal
(860), CARICOM I (260) and CARICOM II (250). CARICOM I and CARICOM II consisted of the
following countries: Antigua/Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad
& Tobago.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

officials to interpret the terms of the agreement according to their will. The
agreement established that, "In order to contribute to the success of the agreement,
certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces are willing to consent to an
early and honorable retirement in accordance with UN resolution 917 and 940
when a general amnesty will be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or
October 15, 1994, whichever is earlier."'9
The Port-au-Prince Agreement included the stepping-down of the military
junta and a peaceful deployment of the American troops. The three military
leaders were to leave power, after an amnesty law had been approved, or before
15 October 1994, and President Aristide would return to Haiti once the defacto
authorities had abandoned office.
To implement this agreement, the Haitian military and police forces would
work in close cooperation with the US military mission. The activities of the MNF
would be coordinated with the Haitian military high command. The embargo and
the other sanctions would also be lifted.
There were significant differences between the first and the second
agreement. The Governors Island Accord had been signed by President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide and the chief commander of the Haitian armed forces, Raoul
Cedras, under the auspices of the two international organizations. The second was
signed by former American President Carter and Lt.-Gen. Cedras, without the
consent of President Aristide or the Special Envoy of the UN/OAS Secretary-
Generals for Haiti, Dante Caputo.20
President Clinton and Gen. Cedras each had their own reasons for reaching
an agreement. On the US side, the US administration feared that potential US
casualties could embarrass President Clinton and the Democratic Party before the
mid-term elections in November. Cedras' position within the Haitian military had
deteriorated to such a degree that he had no choice but to resign and go into exile.
His lack of field experience and contact with the troops reduced the support he
received from the Forces Armies d'Haiti (FAd'H). Unlike Franqois Michel,
Cedras had always been perceived as a bureaucrat, serving either at the military
academy or at headquarters. Many high-ranking military officers also blamed
Cedras for misjudging the situation to the point that an invasion seemed imminent.

19 See The Port-au-Prince Agreement, Port-au-Prince, (18 September 1994).
20 The UN/OAS Special Envoy for Haiti, Dante Caputo was neither consulted nor informed
by the US about the deal between the Carter Mission and the dictatorial rule, forcing him to resign
and to be replaced by the former Minister of Algeria, Brahimi Lakdhar. Indeed, in the last months
before the collective intervention, the US initiatives to reach an agreement could be considered as
a parallel diplomacy to Caputo's efforts.

Case Study 15

The officers particularly resented his decision not to have had Father Aristide
killed during the military coup in September 1991, allowing the deposed President
to go into exile and obtain international support for his restoration. General
Cedras' authority had also been eroded by the military's lack of professionalism
and cohesion.

3. The Mandate

Resolution 940 of the UNSC previewed two phases in the international
efforts to restore democracy in Haiti. The first phase, under the responsibility of
the US-led multinational force, would last from September 1994 until March
1995. The second phase, in charge of the UNMIH, would begin in April 1995 and
is scheduled to end in May 1996.
Regarding the first phase, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, authorized member States to constitute a multinational force. This force
was allowed to "use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of
the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the
prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the
legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti."2 Besides the removal of the
illegal authorities, the multinational force would "establish and maintain a secure
and stable environment that [would] permit implementation of the Governors
Island Agreement."
The UNSC also approved the establishment of "an advance team of UNMIH,
of not more than sixty personnel, including a group of observers to establish the
appropriate means of coordination with the multinational force, to carry out the
monitoring of the operations of the multinational force and other functions (such
as) to assess requirements and to prepare for the deployment of UNMIH upon
completion of the mission of the multinational force."
With respect to the transfer of authority from the MNF to the UNMIH, the
MNF withdrawal and the UNMIH deployment would occur "when a secure and
stable environment had been established and UNMIH had adequate force
capability and structure to assume its functions. The date of the transfer from the
MNF to UNMIH would be adopted by the Security Council, taking into account
recommendations from the member States of the MNF, which would be based on
the assessment of the multinational force commander and from the Secretary

21 See Document S/RES/940 (31 July 1994).

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

The terms of the mandate of UNMIH being under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter, are different and involve the following three main tasks: (a) to sustain the
secure and stable environment established during the MNF phase and protect
international personnel and key installations; (b) to professionalize the Haitian
armed forces and create a separate police force; and (c) to assist in providing an
environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections and
monitored by the UN, in cooperation with the OAS. To this end, the UNSC agreed
on an increase of the number of UNMIH troops to 6,000.

4. The US Doctrine for Peace Operations

The US-UN intervention in Haiti, especially the planning and evolution of
the MNF intervention, took place in the midst of a major debate concerning US
participation in UN peace operations. The operation in Somalia forced a new
approach onto US involvement in multilateral peace missions. The Somalia
incident had a big impact on military thinking in the White House and led the US
to adopt clearer rules for American participation in UN peace operations. It also
encouraged the armed forces to develop new doctrines and tactics.
The US-led intervention in Haiti was preceded by President Clinton's review
of the US policy concerning multilateral peace operations. This review that
resulted in the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) which contains the
criteria to be applied by the White House in deciding whether and how to support
UN peace missions. According to this document, the US considers the disruption
of a democratic process a reason to support the establishment of a multilateral
peace operation. Three causes are mentioned as generating a threat to, or a breach
in international peace and security: (a) an international aggression, (b) an urgent
humanitarian disaster coupled with violence and (c) a sudden interruption of an
established democracy or gross human rights abuses coupled with violence or the
threat of violence.
PDD-25 enumerates a list of issues to be taken into account before any US
engagement in multilateral peace operations. PDD 25 sets the conditions for the
participation in UN peace operations as follows: an acceptable command and
control, a clear mandate and objectives, and an exit date. The command of the US
troops has been a key issue regarding its involvement in this kind of operations
and the document restates the US policy of American command for the US troops.
A mandate with clear objectives and a timetable for the withdrawal of the forces
are other issues that need be considered by the US, prior to any decision regarding
a possible American involvement.

Case Study

Apart from the command of the American troops, the US military doctrine
emphasizes the level of the use of force and force protection. The use of
overwhelming force to guarantee victory is a prerequisite of the US military since
the presence of such force tends to diminish the confidence of a would-be
aggressor. Force protection is related to the minimal loss of personnel and
represents a major concern for US political and military officials due to the impact
on the public opinion.

5. Operation "Uphold Democracy"

The arrangement reached by Cedras-Jonaissant and the Carter mission
allowed the US-led military coalition to enter Haiti without bloodshed and
violence. Upon his arrival in Haiti on 19 September 1994, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton,
the Commander of the multinational force, also known as the Combined Joint
Task Force-180, coordinated the entry of the force with Haiti's military leaders. A
battalion task force of the US 10th Mountain Division was the first to arrive in
Port-au-Prince. The immediate goals were the protection of the airport and seaport
of the capital. By the end of the first day, after these two key transportation
facilities were under control, additional forces, totalling approximately 3,000
soldiers, entered Haiti.
Throughout the intervention, the rules of engagement (ROE's) were designed
to allow a maximum flexibility to act.2 The ROE's were written by the MNF and

22 ROE's are directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations within which force may be applied to achieve a mission or an objective.
In the case of a UN conducted operation, it is the responsibility of the UN to set the parameters
within which UN forces will operate. ROE's are the means by which the UN can provide
commanders, at all levels, with specific guidance on the use of force by UN personnel. ROE's are
drafted by the Force Commander, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN
authority. The right of self-defense is recognized under ROE's of UN operations at all times. A
summary of the MNF ROE's includes: (a) all necessary and appropriate action for self-defense are
authorized; (b) no forces have been declared hostile; (c) persons may be stopped and detained if they
appear to threaten essential civic order; (d) necessary and proportional force is authorized to control
civilian disturbances; (e) persons observed committing serious criminal acts may be detained using
force (serious criminal acts include homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson and robbery); (f) civilian
vehicles may be stopped and their occupants identities checked for security purposes. Vehicles not
stopping on order may be disabled by weapons fire; (g) deadly force is not authorized to disarm
Haitians, enforce crews curfews, or stop looting, unless those individuals involved engage in hostile
acts or demonstrate hostile intent.
A summary of UNMIH ROE's includes: (a) use of force, up to and including deadly force, is
authorized to defend oneself and other UNMIH military or civilian personnel against a hostile act or

18 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

the Atlantic Command, and approved by the UN. The ROE's for the MNF in Haiti
provided authority for the use of any necessary force. The original ROE's went
through several changes after violent acts required the MNF involvement. To this
end, the ROE's were modified to allow the use of deadly force to prevent people
from committing serious criminal acts. Serious criminal acts were defined as
homicide, aggravated assault, arson, rape and robbery. The MNF could also
prevent people from committing less serious acts, such as burglary, larceny, etc.,
but in these cases the MNF was limited to the use of non-lethal force.
On the next day following the intervention, US marines entered the city of
Cap Haitien without meeting any resistance and subsequently expanded their
activities to the countryside with the deployment of Special Forces (SF) units. The
SF, which usually ensure the advance ground work before the regular troops'
arrival, were responsible for checking 27 towns in the first week while the US
military was initially concentrated exclusively in the capital and Cap Haitien, the
two largest cities. Working in groups of about a dozen, the SF units met with town
leaders and Haitian military officials to inform them exactly on what the troops
would do, once they had reached their towns. The US Coast Guard provided
resources to enable the multinational force to reach areas which were not
accessible by land.
Major units of the US-led coalition included the command ship Mount
Whitney, the aircraft carriers Eisenhower and America, elements of the 82nd
Airborne Division, the 10th Mountain Division, the 2nd Marine Regiment, the Air
Mobility Command and the Air Combat Command. The Task Force also included
a Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC), whose 190 staff members coordinated
civilian and military activities in Haiti.. The CMOC helped US AID and the
private voluntary organizations (PVO's) to provide humanitarian assistance.
By the end of October 1994, at the request of US Ambassador in Haiti, W.
Lacy Swing, 37 Civil Affairs Reservists were deployed in the Caribbean nation to
work in different cabinet offices. Their task consisted-of assisting the Haitian
government to lay down the basic functions of its civil administration.

hostile intent; (b) use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to defend international
personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent; (c) interventions to prevent death or previous bodily
harm at the hands of a hostile group, will only be authorized by the Force Commander in order to
defend the mandate of the mission; (d) use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized
to protect key installations which have been designated by the Force Commander; (e) search,
apprehension, and disarmament is authorized when acting in self-defense, or to enforce other rules
of engagement.

Case Study

During the first week of operations, the MNF took several steps to create a
secure and stable environment to enable the full implementation of Resolution
940. Firstly, the force took control of the headquarters of the heavy weapons
company of the Haitian armed forces (Camp d' Application); secondly, it initiated
a weapons control program that included a buy-back program designed to rid the
streets of as many illegally-held weapons as possible; and, finally, it conducted
mobile patrols and monitored the activities of the Haitian police.
A number of civilian programs were launched to prevent potential causes of
unrest among the local people. Several psychological operations took place to
prevent popular incidents and to obtain support for the MNF. The military
coalition also began to provide humanitarian assistance in Port-au-Prince and other
areas, through setting up basic services such as water purification, medical care,
food programs, etc. The MNF refused, however, to get involved in nation-building
operations in Haiti. As President Clinton stated, the international community
would collaborate with the Haitian government to rebuild the national economy.
The US military had carried out psychological operations even before the
landing of the MNF. A US Air National Guard unit had carried out daily radio
broadcasts to the Haitians, using specialized Lockheed C-130 Hercules
communications aircraft. The 193rd Special Operations Group, based at
Harrisburgh, a unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), had
flown several EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft from the US naval base at
Roosevelt Roads, in Puerto Rico. The aircraft, initially, broadcasted radio
messages, urging Haitians to use local emigration centers instead of fleeing the
country in precarious boats. Then, from 18 July 1994 onwards Radio Democracy
began, which included a taped message from exiled President Aristide. Airborne
broadcasts were chosen by the Pentagon, because Haiti's mountainous topography
would have prevented ground or sea-based radio transmissions from reaching large
segments of the country.
On 29 September 1994, the UNSC passed Resolution 944 for the lifting of
sanctions imposed on Haiti by Resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 917
(1994). This measure was to be implemented the day after Aristide's return to
With respect to the normalization of the institutions, the Parliament
reconvened a couple of weeks after the arrival of the MNF. The approval of an
amnesty bill authorizing President Aristide to grant amnesty to those who had
seized power in the 1991-coup was the first issue on the Parliament's agenda. At
the same time, the legitimate Mayor of Port-au-Prince returned to power. On 15
October 1994, after the departure of the militaryjunta, President Aristide resumed

20 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

office, while Prime Minister Michel and his cabinet took office on 9 November
The number of US soldiers involved in the MNF fluctuated, with a peak of
approximately 20,000. This number progressively declined. The Interim Public
Security Force (IPSF) deployments in various locations outside Port-au-Prince, the
presence of other foreign military forces, and the addition of contracted security
personnel in Port-au-Prince allowed a reduction of the US contingent's level. By
late November 1994, the MNF numbered about 10,500, half of the initial forces;
of which 4,000 were US troops.
A Bangladeshi battalion, consisting of 1,035 soldiers, assumed security
missions for the Port-au-Prince airfield, Fort Dimanche, the Haitian Sugar
Company and Camp d' Application, replacing the US forces. The Guatemalan
contingent was deployed in Cap Haitien and was immediately integrated into
security operations taking over the port security and conducting patrols. The
CARICOM battalion comprised 266 troops from Jamaica, Barbados, Belize and
Trinidad and Tobago. The CARICOM contingent maintained order at the capital's
port and supervised the repatriation of Haitians from the US Guantanamo base.
These troops had been trained at the US naval base at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto
Regarding the electoral timetable, legislative elections were to be held on 4
June 1995 when all 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 18 of 27 Senate
seats would be contested together with approximately 2,200 state and local
The MNF operated under three different US force commanders. General
Shelton, who headed the deployment of the MNF in Haiti, was succeeded by Major
General Meade, then replaced by Major General Fisher.23 Following the
withdrawal of the MNF, General Kinzer was appointed UNMIH force

3 Gen. Shelton ended his duties on 25 October 1994 and Major Gen. Meade left Haiti on
15 January 1995.
2 Major Gen. Kinzer was former chief of Army operations at the Pentagon and had
previously served abroad in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and Panama (1989).

Case Study

IV. The Disarmament

Neither the Governors Island Accord nor the Port-au-Prince Agreement
contained a mandate for the disarmament of factions in Haiti. The MNF derived
its disarmament mandate from Resolution 940, which called for the use "of all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership,
consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of
the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable
environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors Island
Under the command of US General Shelton, the MNF took responsibility for
the following disarmament activities: the disarming of the FAd'H; a voluntary
weapons collection program (gun buy-back); the confiscation of weapons found
in vehicles during routine stops, disarmament of attach6s;26 and the seizure of
weapons caches. The disarmament mandate of the MNF, such as it was, never
extended to the general disarmament of the citizenry,27 although weapons were
collected from them in an attempt to establish a secure and stable environment.

1. Establishment of a Secure and Stable Environment

The primary concern of the MNF following its deployment in Haiti was the
maintenance of civil order. The Americans feared a wave of assassinations and
reprisals between Aristide supporters and paramilitary groups that could
deteriorate the situation and force the US military to take over the administration
of public order, as had occurred in Panama and Somalia. As one American official
noted, "the issue has never been the invasion. The issue is disorder after the

25 See Document SC/RES/ 940, operative paragraph 4.
6 Note that permission was given to the MNF to disarm the attaches, however, the MNF
was under no obligation to do so.
27 See United Nations institute for Disarmament Research, "Analysis Report of Practitioners'
Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peace-keeping
Operations: Haiti," in Sarah Meek and Marcos Mendiburu, Managing Arms in Peace Processes:
Haiti, Geneva: United Nations, 1996, questionnaire number H070.
8 Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, "Looking Beyond An Invasion, U.S. Plans Haiti Police
Force," The New York Times, 10 September 1994, p. 1.

22 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

The US troops had the primary responsibility of restoring basic civil order,
as part of the mandate to establish a secure and stable environment. However, they
were opposed to performing police functions in Haiti. Instead the Interim Police
Security Force (IPSF) was created. To prevent the looting and chaos that followed
the US invasion of Panama in December 1989, the Port-au-Prince Agreement
allowed Cedras to remain in office until mid-October. This helped promote an
orderly transition of power and prevented a vacuum of authority prior to the return
of Aristide.
The MNF forces quickly deployed to multiple sites around the country to
provide security. Prior to the creation of the Haitian National Police (HNP) the US
set up the IPSF to guarantee public order. The members of the IPSF were former
military officers with clean records and Haitian residing abroad, including refugees
at the Guantanamo naval base in Cuba. Some of these people worked as
interpreters and guides for American troops. Members of President Aristide's
government and US State Department officials chose the recruits based on the
results of a literacy test and a personal interview. The recruits received six days of
training in ethics, Haitian criminal law, community relations, and basic skills, such
as traffic control. By December 1994, 2,900 men had graduated from the
introductory course and had been incorporated as members of the IPSF. The
activities of the IPSF were closely monitored by international police observers.
The international police observers were police officers from various countries
who were under the direction of Raymond W. Kelly, a former New York City
police commissioner. The training of the international police monitors began on
26 September 1994 at Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico.
During the same period, the government of Haiti, assisted by the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the
US Department of Justice, began training civilian applicants to the new police
force. ICITAP also conducted the training of judges and lawyers in rural areas.
While the US did not participate in police functions, during the same period
the MNF and US special forces were deployed around the country to increase
security and assist in activities to develop the local infrastructure.
MNF forces were deployed in the capital city of Port-au-Prince and Cap
Haitien. From these bases, the MNF expanded into the outlying areas, including
larger cities, towns and villages. The MNF undertook patrols in the cities and
market places in an effort to increase security and public safety. From these
positions, the MNF was in a good position to begin its disarmament activities.
Within three days of arriving in Haiti, the MNF met with General C6dras and
Lt. Col, Frangois to set conditions for the MNF's mission. The MNF gained

Case Study

control of 14 areas within the city, including the control of the heavy weapons of
the Haitian armed forces from Camp d'Application. Soon after the weapons kept
at the police station of Lt. Col. Francois were under MNF control. With the
departure of General C6dras and Lt. Col. Franqois, and the return of President
Aristide, the Haitian armed forces quickly collapsed, and the MNF collected
weapons from other locations. At the time of the intervention, the FAd'H was
estimated to have a standing force of 6,000 with perhaps 1,000 deployable
persons.29 In January 1995 President Aristide dismissed 43 senior officers, and
others were sent to diplomatic posts abroad, while most of the troops melted
away.3 There are an estimated 1,500 army troops currently, but there is virtually
no officers corps, rendering the army unable to operate in any but the most
rudimentary manner.3'
The collection of weapons from the FRAPH proved more difficult. It is
widely assumed that many weapons were hidden from the MNF and remain the
hands of former FRAPH members.32 The emphasis for the MNF was on collecting
large crew-served weapons, and weapons being carried on the street, as these were
thought to pose the most immediate threat to public safety. The MNF was under
no obligation to disarm the FRAPH, and chose not to take action against those not
currently committing crimes. This "don't see, don't disarm" policy and the
decision not to undertake the wide-scale disarmament created friction between the
MNF and Haitian citizens, and lessened public support for the MNF. It has also
raised concern among Haitians that following the departure of UNMIH in 1996,
these weapons may resurface.
While the disarmament of the population was not part of the mandate of the
MNF, they did implement a voluntary weapons collection program, known as a
gun buy-back program to encourage Haitians to get rid of weapons in their homes.

29 Georges A. Fauriol, Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmasfor U.S. Policy, Washington DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 152.
30 The retraining program for the FAd'H will be discussed later.
31 See Georges A. Fauriol, p. 155.
32 Allan Nairn, "Haiti Under the Gun," The Nation, 8/15 January 1996, pp. 11-15.

24 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

2. The Gun Buy-Back Program 3

The gun buy-back program was a means of collecting weapons from Haitian
citizens. Similar programs have been conducted by the US, including one in
Panama. The funding for the program was provided by the US Department of
The US Army conducted the gun buy-back program as a part of its mandate
as a member of the Multinational Force. The US Army set up several fixed sites
in Haiti, and initially operated several mobile sites.34 Each site was protected by
US troops. Weapons were collected under conditions of amnesty. Questions were
asked only to determine whether or not the visitor had been to the collection point
before and if the weapon belonged to the person turning it in. Weapons were not
tested, but were inspected for a firing pin. Any weapon deemed non-functional was
confiscated without remuneration. Cash was paid for functional weapons.
The program was run in phases, each approximately two months in duration.
During the period September 1994 through March 1995, 13,281 weapons and
munitions were bought. As of January 1995 the total paid for weapons collected
through the buy-back program was US $1,924,950.
The mobile sites were discontinued when turn-out began to wane. By
September 1995 there was a single site still in operation, at the airport in Port-au-
As of September 1995 the prices being paid for weapons were: US $100 for
handguns; US $200 for semi-automatic weapons and grenades; US $400 for fully
automatic weapons; and US $600 for heavy- and large-caliber weapons. These
prices were revised during the course of the program. Initially the prices were
lower than the black market price for weapons, and turn-out was low. These prices
were increased so that by January 1995 the prices for the weapons had been
double the September prices.

33 This section draws on work done by Neil O'Connor a researcher at the Program for Arms
Control, Disarmament and Conversion at the Monterey Institute of International Studies during a
visit to Haiti in September 1995, published in Edward J Laurance, The New Field of Micro-
Disarmament: Addressing the Prolferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Bonn,
Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996.
SMobile sites included Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, and Les Cayes. For more
information see, Dr. Hal Kelpak, "Haiti Takes its Next Step," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995,
pp. 1920.

Case Study

Types of weapons bought-back included: machine guns, assault rifles, sub-
machine guns, rifles, shotguns, handguns, pistols, flare guns, mortars, howitzers,
high explosives, and CS (tear-gas) grenades.
Many of the weapons collected were in poor condition. Modem weapons in
good condition were passed to the U.S. Department of Justice International
ICITAP program for use by the Haitian police. Weapons with historical value were
set aside as museum pieces. The remainder of the weapons were inventoried,
boxed and shipped to Pennsylvania, USA to be melted down at a destruction
facility or were destroyed in Haiti.
The goals of the program were to reduce the number of weapons, promote
stability and provide monetary incentives to Haitian citizens who supported the
program. The U.S. Army stated that these goals were achieved, and that the gun
buy-back program helped to create a safe and secure environment to hand over to
UNMIH in March 1995.
The program was continued by the US after the transition to UNMIH, but
had been stopped by the time the US withdrew its forces from Haiti in February

3. Other Disarmament Activities

In addition to the more formal disarmament tasks of gaining control of
FAd'H weapons and the gun buy-back program, other disarmament activities were
conducted by the MNF.
As part of its larger goal of ensuring a secure and stable environment
members of the MNF operated checkpoints on main roads and searched people
and vehicles for weapons. The MNF also searched police stations in Port-au-
Prince, seizing all weapons other than hand pistols. In searches of the police
stations and prisons, the MNF collected 2,010 weapons.35 The MNF also secured
control over weapons turned by the demobilized soldiers of the FAd'H.
Reports of arms caches were often given to MNF forces. These were followed up
if the informant was a reliable source or if the information could be verified.
As the Haitian Constitution permits the maintenance of arms in houses for
personal safety, house-to-house searches were not implemented. Rather, word was
put out that weapons kept in the home were safe, while those carried on the streets
were subject to confiscation.

35 Report of the Secretary-General, S/1995/149 (21 February 1995), paragraph 10.

26 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

The disarmament activities carried out by the MNF were largely ad hoc, in
that they were not explicitly part of the mandate under which the MNF was
operating. However, the US commander drew on past experience and implemented
a variety of disarmament programs aimed at gaining control of the heavy weapons
in Haiti and reducing the number of weapons being carried on the streets.
The MNF did not engage in policing functions, and sought to get Haitian
officials to use existing gun-control laws to reduce the weapons in circulation. The
aim in reducing the number of weapons on the street was a "sensitive and gradual
approach to disarming Haitians not supposed to have weapons."36 As one US
official stated the US wanted to "constantly tighten it down, so that the conditions
are there not for a disarmed society but a society that frankly has less and less
capability for violence."37

4. Disarmament during UNMIH

Following the establishment of a secure and stable environment in Haiti by
the MNF, on 31 March 1995, the operation was transferred to UNMIH. As
UNMIH was operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the use of force was
only for self-defense purposes. The mandate .of UNMIH was to maintain the
secure and stable environment that the MNF had created. There was no
disarmament function to UNMIH's mandate.

V. Demobilization

As part of reducing the influence of the Haitian armed forces in political and
daily life, a demobilization program was implemented. Under the program,
members of FAd'H were to be reintegrated into civilian life once they had
registered for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reintegration
program. The program was designed to provide assistance to the Haitian
government in the design, implementation and operation of a program to
reintegrate former soldiers into civilian life by providing vocational training for the

6 Peter Grier, "Wring Violence Out of Haiti Keeps US Soldiers on Their Toes," Christian
Science Monitor, 21 September 1994, p. 6.
37 Ibid., p. 6.

Case Study

During the two enrolment process (the first from November 1994 until
January 1995, the second after the 25 January 1995 decision by President Aristide
to disband the armed forces) a total of 4,849 former FAd'H were registered. Of
these, 2,213 were discharged members of the IPSF.38
The vocational training period lasted six weeks, during which time each
soldier received a stipend from the Haitian government. Each soldier was placed
in a training program that matched his skills and for which there was a current
demand. Ten specializations were offered that could transfer to employment in
both the public and private sector. The Reintegration Program maintained nineteen
training centers. The rate of academic failure was low, with approximately 81%
of the participants completing training and receiving diplomas.39
Following completion of the training program, the demobilized soldiers could
participate in the opportunity and referral services part of the Reintegration
Program. Seminars were offered on searching for employment, tool kits are
supplied to the participants, and referrals were given to jobs in the private sector.
By April 1996 2,155 demobilized soldiers had enrolled in the service.
There was a dispute between the US and President Aristide over the future
of the FAd'H. President Aristide's decision in January 1996 to dismantle the
FAd'H was met with displeasure by the US. Of the 7,000 Haitian forces the US
Department of Defense recommended that 3,500 be kept to protect the borders and
patrol the coast. The US considered that a substantial reduction in the number of
forces could lead to instability in the country if they could not be quickly
reintegrated into civilian life.
Despite US pressure to maintain half of the Haitian armed forces, President
Aristide undertook a series of measures to reduce the power of the military, such
as reducing military expenditures. Ultimately, President Aristide announced that
forced retirement of the senior officer corps, and reduced the size of the armed
forces to 1,500 men. President Aristide's supporters recommended a constitutional
amendment to officially dissolve the armed forces, but no action was taken.

38 Communal Governance Program, Demobilization and Reintegration Program Monthly
Report, International Organization for Migration/US Agency for International Development, March
1996, p. 14.
3 Ibid., p. 17.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

VI. The Transfer of Authority

The multilateral composition of the MNF made the mission international,
although it was US-led and US-organized. This permitted the transition to
UNMIH and a consequent exit clause for the US troops. As military authority was
being transferred from the MNF to UNMIH, the US's military presence rapidly
decreased in Haiti.
Various factors stimulated the US's rapid military withdrawal from Haiti.
According to Jean-Marc Coicaud, Washington looked forward to a quick transfer
of authority from the MNF to UNMIH for three basic reasons:"4

(a) The risk of deterioration of US-Latin American relations. An extended stay
of the US troops in the Caribbean country might have revived "anti-Yankee"
sentiments in the region, as well as the perception that the MNF was an
occupation force. It is noteworthy that most Latin American countries had
opposed the idea of an armed intervention in Haiti, on the ground that past
US military interventions in the Western Hemisphere had had traumatic
(b) The risk of US casualties as had occurred in Somalia. An extended
presence of US troops could have increased the likelihood of US casualties.
The decision of the US to leave the country as soon as possible prevented a
major American involvement in Haiti's domestic politics where inter-partisan
conflicts could easily have escalated. For this reason, the US refused to
guarantee public order or get involved in an institutional reconstruction
process as had been the case in Somalia.
(c) The risk of loosening the support of the US Congress and public opinion.
The Republican majority had requested the White House to immediately
withdraw the US military contingents from Haiti, once Aristide had been
restored to power.

A broad debate took place in the days preceding the UNMIH deployment,
focusing on the capabilities of the UN military contingents to accomplish the
mission after the withdrawal of the MNF troops. As the FAd'H had a higher degree
of respect for the US military than it did for the UNMIH contingents, many feared

40 See Jean-Marc Coicaud, "La communaute international et la reprise du processus
democratique," in Le Trimestre du Monde, No. 29, 1st. Trimester, 1995, pp. 110-111.

Case Study

that the paramilitary groups could be tempted to test the readiness and fighting
ability of the new force. The presence of the American-led force had intimidated
the Haitian armed forces due to the long tradition of US intervention in the region.
The UNMIH was initially perceived as a weak mission, unable to maintain a
secure and stable environment. This perception was related to the limited mandate
and the smaller force of UNMIH. The UNMIH contingents would for instance
carry light weapons and would not be allowed to arrest people unless they were
committing criminal acts at that precise moment. In fact, Boutros-Ghali stated that
the UNMIH contingents were not going to carry out police or disarmament
activities, because their mandate, based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter did not
allow peacekeeping forces to use force except in cases self-defense.41
With respect to the ROE's, the military Commander-in-Chief of UNMIH,
Maj. Gen. Kinzer acknowledged that the UN forces were going to operate under
more restrictive rules of engagement than those of the MNF. He stated the
following: "The only difference is that I am not authorized to take unilateral
offensive action. But I believe that I've got sufficient flexibility in the rules of
engagement that if a situation arises, I've got a full range of options, including the
use of deadly force."42 In the context of the more limited mandate and the more
restrictive ROE's of UNMIH, President Aristide expressed some concern that the
UN force would be purely reactive in nature, rather than active.
However, the US military presence remained quite significant. As Hal Klepak

It is perhaps not surprising that the United States will remain active behind the scene and
indeed in the forefront of UNMIH. Not only will US logistics, as so often elsewhere in
current peacekeeping operations, be essential to keep the force deployed, but the United
States is by far the largest contributor to the UN force. Perhaps of even more importance,
UNMIH is commanded by US Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer."43

41 See Jean-Michel Caroit, "L' ONU ne fera pas regner l'ordre en Haiti," Le Monde, 1 April
1995, p. 3.
42 See Larry Rother, "UN Force Takes Up Duties in Haiti," The New York Times, 2 April
1995, p. 14.
3 See Hal Klepak, "Haiti Takes its Next Step," in Jane's Defense Weekly, 13 May 1995, p.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

The UNMIH force was made up of 6,000 military personnel and 900 civilian
police officers from several countries.44 Out of the total, 2,400 were US troops
have which remained in Haiti to form the core of UNMIH. Bangladesh and
Pakistan provided the two next largest contingents followed by Canada, Nepal and
a contingent representing a group of Caribbean nations. Approximately two thirds
of the military and one third of the civilian police components of UNMIH served
already under the MNF. Prior to the official transfer of authority to UNMIH, an
UNMIH advance team had been in Haiti for five months working with the MNF
in developing the concept of operations, force structure and deployment plans.
Prior to the transition, 70% of the military component of UNMIH had been
deployed in Haiti under the MNF. Additionally, training and meetings were
conducted prior to the transition to permit the maximum preparedness and the
least probability of a decrease in military readiness after the transfer of authority
on 31 March 1995.45
The 900 UN civilian police officers, commanded by an officer of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, Neil Pouliot, replaced the international police monitors.
The civilian police would patrol the streets of Haitian cities and towns and work
with the Haitian police to fill the vacuum left after the collapse of the security
UNMIH established its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and other sub-
headquarters in six operational sectors. The force comprised of five infantry
battalions including a US quick reaction force, a military police battalion, an
engineering unit, aviation and logistics units, a Military Intelligence Support Team
(MIST) and a civilian affairs unit.
In contrast to the American-led force, the UN would deploy some of its units
on a permanent basis in the Haitian countryside, an area of considerable political
tension in which 70% of the Haitian population lives. This deployment would give
the UNMIH more flexibility and mobility, in order to compensate for the smaller
size of the UN contingents.

44 The following countries contributed officials for the UN civilian police: Algeria, Argentina,
Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Canada, Dominica, France, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan,
Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, Phillipines, Russia, Senegal, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname and Togo. Headquarters staff: 172.
45 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, S/1995/305, 13
April 1995, paragraph 28.

Case Study 31

VII. Conclusion

Once again, the UN, in cooperation with the OAS, is to monitor presidential
elections in Haiti. Nevertheless, the consolidation of a democratic process in Haiti
will require more than periodical elections. One mistake in the past was to believe
that having experienced authoritarianism for so long, Haiti would incorporate
democratic values just by holding fair elections. Moreover, a democratic regime
is not only a question of a democratically-elected President. The success of the
UNMIH will therefore depend on whether its staff will accomplish tasks other than
electoral observation.
The idea of an intervention in favor of democracy should be carefully
considered. According to Coicaud, the military intervention in Haiti was a
watershed in defense of democracy. He states that to defend democracy, three
requirements must be fulfilled: (a) the country affected by collective intervention
must be a peripheral country in the international system; (b) the risks of human
casualties must be minimal; and (c) the target of the intervention must be within
the sphere of influence and affect the interests of the power leading the collective
William Gray seems to endorse this kind of recipe for democratic
interventions. In referring to Haiti, he stated that:

We have a moral stake in promoting democracy and human rights throughout the world.
At the same time, our capacity to influence events varies. We may not be able to right
every wrong everywhere, every time. But this is not a valid argument against taking action
in places where our interests are heavily engage and at times when we have the ability to
do so. Indeed, there are times when the ability to influence events in the right direction
gives us the responsibility to do so. This is one of those times.47

With respect to the effectiveness of the economic sanctions, one probable
mistake was that the de facto authorities' assets, as well as the assets of the
military and the coup supporters were not immediately frozen. This measure only
entered into effect in May, 1994, with the adoption of Resolution 917. The fuel
embargo was an insufficient measure because regime collaborators were able to

6 See Jean-Marc Coicaud, pp. 114-115.
47 See William Gray, "Statement by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary
of State on Haiti, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 8 June 1994," in
US Department ofState Dispatch, Vol. 5, No. 26, 27 June 1994.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

find a way around it, by smuggling. Further, they were able to afford the higher
prices on goods imposed by the sanctions. In the end, most of them became richer.
From the sender's perspective, the embargo did not impact on all countries
equally. For instance, the costs of cooperating with the embargo for the Dominican
Republic were higher than for Asian countries. Another lesson from the Haitian
crisis is that the use of economic sanctions deepens social problems, since it
accelerates a mass refugee migration, generating a boomerang effect.
Regarding the military intervention, the overwhelming military superiority
of the MNF, manifested in the greater number, the better training, technology and
experience of the US troops, easily imposed its will on the small, badly armed,
inexperienced Haitian troops (both the regular and paramilitary units). With this
tremendous "show of force," the US managed to subdue the Haitian forces without
exacting any significant political toll. Thus, the US sought to erase the "Somalia
Syndrome" and win back the confidence of the US public. By reconfirming the
public's faith in the efficiency of the US military might, support could then be
counted on for possible future military interventions, when US interests or
"international peace and security" would be threatened.
The events in Somalia on 3 October 1995, when the US forces suffered 18
casualties constrained US participation in UN peace operations, and to some
extent, US policy toward Haiti. A broad literature on the lessons of Somalia and
an extensive review of the US policy toward the UN resulted from the national
debate over the use of US forces in UN peace operations. The Congressional and
public reaction to the deaths of US soldiers in Somalia led the US adopt a
defensive position in order to avoid "another Somalia."48 The peaceful entry of the
US-led coalition did not modify the negative opinion of many sectors within the
US toward the UN operations.
The probability of success of any Haitian resistance was constrained for the
following reasons:
First, the UN embargo against Haiti prevented the Haitians from receiving
new armaments. Second, the inexistence of an effective communication system
made any coordinated operation to fight against the MNF forces almost
impossible. Third, Cedras' reflexive personality and his lack of authority among
his subordinates (since most of Cedras' military career was in academics or
bureaucracy rather than on the field discouraged any resistance and made the US
foresee the disbanding of the FAd'H. Fourth, the rivalry between the two

8 See Donald Daniel, "US Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in context,"
Research Memorandum 4-94, US Naval War College, Newport, 1994.

Case Study


strongmen of the military regime and the differences within the militaryjunta,
headed by Raoul Cedras (the Commander-in-Chief) and Michel Franqois (the
Police Chief of Port-au-Prince who also controlled the paramilitary groups)
affected the decision-making process. Fifth, the starvation and repression of the
military regime reinforced the assumption of popular support for the MNF
operation. Sixth, the Haitian army's capabilities were very poor. The US did fear
the action of paramilitary groups over the course of the intervention, but as David
Isby asserts: "Many of [these groups] were opportunists rather than ideological
supporters of the (military) regime. They could act as prime instigators of
violence. Nevertheless, they were poorly trained and equipped, and were unlikely
to be able to carry out the long and highly disciplined process of organizing and
sustaining insurgency without international support.""4 Finally, the Cedras regime
did not have to face charges in international justice courts for human rights
violations as the Serbs and Aideed had.
The Somalia episode made the decision to intervene more difficult, although
the internal political conditions and difficulties of the Somalia operation were not
present in Haiti's case. Regarding the strategy and planning of the operation, there
were more similarities between the multilateral intervention in Haiti and the US
invasion of Panama (1989) than between Haiti and Somalia. From a military-
strategic view, the MNF intervention was not very significant, because the US did
not have a real enemy.
Two of the lessons learned in Somalia were present in the Haiti operation: (a)
a clear and flexible mandate (in other words, US participation required the
flexibility to change the goals but only within the framework of the mandate) and
(b) an exit strategy with a short period of occupation.50
According to Gabriel Marcella, a dignified US exit strategy required the
achievement of limited objectives, such as the establishment of security, the
restoration of Aristide, police and criminal justice training, and an emphasis on the
humanitarian dimensions of assistance, rather than pursuing the open-ended goal
of the restoration of democracy.51 In this way, President Clinton asserted that the
military intervention in Haiti was not to guarantee democracy, but to provide

49 See David Isby, "Restoring Hope Yet Again? Military Intervention in Haiti," in Jane's
Intelligence Review, August 1994, pp. 381-383.
5 See Dennis Quinn (ed.), Peace Support Operations and the US Military, Washington
DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.
51 See Gabriel Marcella, Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law,
Hand-offs and Exit, US Army War College, 20 October 1994, p. 8.

34 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

another opportunity to have a democratic regime in the country. The main goal of
the MNF was to remove the Cedras regime and facilitate President Aristide's
return. Thus, the US prevented open-ended commitments in the Caribbean nation.
The transfer of authority from the MNF to the UNMIH allowed the US not to get
involved in post-conflict reconstruction activities, and ensured an exit strategy for
the bulk of the American troops.
Even though the American administration considered the US exit strategy
from Haiti very successful, many Haitians believed that the US-led coalition left
Haiti without having accomplished the mission, due to the fact that wide-scale
disarmament had not been achieved and public security was still doubtful.
The security issue remains uncertain. The first promotions of the new Haitian
civilian police force are expected to be ready by late 1996, while the Interim Public
Security Force (IPSF), made up mostly of former military officers and repatriated
boat people from Guantanamo, suffered from a lack of credibility among the local
population and a lack of authority to enforce law. The problem of setting up a
trustful police force was accompanied by an upsurge of violence, of which Mireille
Durocher Bertin's assassination became the most significant political crime. This
fact questioned the existence of a secure and stable environment for the transition
to the UNMIH.
A few days before President Clinton and Secretary-General Boutros Ghali
arrived in Haiti to attend the ceremonies marking the formal transfer of authority
from the MNF to UNMIH, a prominent supporter of the former military regime
was killed on the streets of Port-au-Prince. This incident embarrassed President
Aristide and soured President Clinton's visit. It also put in question, whether this
was an isolated crime or part of mounting political violence.
The MNF intervention in Haiti was run according to the US military doctrine
for multilateral peace operations. The rules of this doctrine were to use American
troops under US military command, to carry out operations at low cost, especially
regarding the number of casualties among American troops, and to seek
international support in order to legitimate the military operation. The MNF
intervention reflected the US's main concerns of having clear objectives, an exit
strategy and flexibility in the ROE's, including the use of force and force
The use of force became a key issue during the operation. The magnitude of
the MNF force, totalling approximately 20,000 troops, served not only to shock
the Haitian military leadership and induce it to step down, but also as a means to
destroy any will of resistance on the part of the paramilitary groups, after
deployment of the US-led coalition.

Case Study

US political and military officials were concerned about the protection and
safety of their own troops in Haiti. Even if the American soldiers were allowed to
use force against the Haitian police and military, whenever they observed grave
abuses threatening the life of a victim, they did not act to separate pro- and anti-
Aristide factions. The most serious incident involving US and Haitian soldiers
took place on 24 September 1995, in Cap Haitien, and resulted in the death of 10
Haitians and the wounding of one marine.
In fact, the risks for the US troops in Haiti were minimal compared to those
in other multilateral peace operations. The number of US casualties, a sensitive
subject for the American public opinion, remained extremely low. During the six
months the US troops suffered fewer than 5 casualties.5z
Unlike in other cases, there was a "permissive environment" and "consensual
disarmament." The "cash-for-weapons" program was quite successful. The total
number of weapons either seized or bought back through the weapons control
programs of the multinational force totalled over 30,000."53 However, the principal
disarmament problem still remaining is the complete disarmament of the
paramilitary groups.
In sum, even if the US intervention in Haiti is considered one of the major
foreign policy successes of the Clinton administration, the situation in Haiti seems
to be still far from orderly or safe. As The New York Times editorial notes:

The US occupation has been a modest success. Mr. Aristide is back in office as Haiti's
first democratically elected president, and the refugee issue that drove two
administrations into legal contortions has been temporarily resolved. Americans troops
have avoided the kind of deadly incidents that marred the US intervention in Somalia. But
the administration stretches the truth when it declares that US forces have created the
safe and secure environment that the UN made precondition for transferring authority.
Washington is handing off to the UN now because it has no political mandate to maintain
a large troop contingent in Haiti..."54

52 Only one American soldier was killed and three soldiers were wounded by Haitians. SFC
Gregory Cardott was killed in January 1995 when two Haitians attempted to go through a toll booth
without paying it Sgt Donald Holstead was shot in October 1994. An interpreter was also wounded
during an incident at the police headquarters in Cap Haitien on 24 September 1994.
53 See Document S/1995/211, 20 March 1995.
5 See New York Times Editorial, "The Handover in Haiti," in The International Herald
Tribune, 1-2 April 1995, p. 4.


i Biographical Note

Sarah Meek is currently the Senior Researcher at the Program for Arms
Control, Disarmament and Conversion at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies. Prior to this position, she worked for the Center for Disarmament Affairs
at the United Nations in New York. She received her Master of Arts degree in
International Policy Studies from the Monterey Institute in 1994, and her Bachelor
of Arts in Slavic Languages and Literature from the University of California,
Berkeley, in 1991.

Marcos Mendiburu received his Bachelor of Arts in International Relations
from the Universidad de Belgrano (Buenos Aires, Argentina). Currently, he is a
M.A. candidate at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).
His M.A. dissertation examines the 1994 American intervention in Haiti and its
effects on US-Latin American relations. Before joining the UNIDIR Disarmament
and Conflict Resolution Project, he worked as a Teaching Assistant for the Faculty
of Law at the Universida de Belgrano and for the Department of Economics at the
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa, and also as a Research Assistant for the
Department of International Relations at FLACSO. At present, he is involved in
a research project, "The Participation of Argentine, Brazilian and Uruguayan
Armed Forces in Peace Operations and its Impact on Civil-Military Relations,"
coordinated by FLACSO and sponsored by USIP.

Part II:



ACEVEDO, Domingo, "The Haitian Crisis and the O.A.S. Response: A Test of
Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy," in DAMROSCH, Lori (ed.),
Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 119-155.
"Buy-back Program Nets Haitian Weapons," Arms Trade News, January 1995, p.
BELSIE, Laurent, "US Forces Walk a Fine Line to Disarm Haiti," Christian
Science Monitor, 5 October 1994, pp. 1, 8.
BETTS, Richard, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs, Vol.
73, No. 6, November/December 1994, pp. 20-33.
BLOOMFIELD, Richard, "Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy?
The O.A.S. Defense-of-Democracy Regime," in KAYSEN, Carl, PASTOR,
Robert and Laura REED (eds), Collective Responses to Regional Problems,
The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Cambridge, MA: The
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994, pp. 15-28.
BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros, "An Agenda For Peace. Report of the Secretary-
General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the
Security Council on January 31, 1992," in Military Technology MILTECH,
12/94, pp. 58-67.
"Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper of the
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the UN,"
Document A/50/60 S/1995/1, January 3, 1995.
"Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative," Global
Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1995, 3-11.
CARTER, Ashton, PERRY, William. and John STEINBRUNER, "A New
Concept of Security," Brookings Occasional Papers, Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1992.
COICAUD, Jean-Marc, "La communaut6 international et la reprise du processus
d6mocratique," Le Trimestre du Monde, No. 29, ler trimestre 1995.
"Les Etats Unis et la crise haitienne" (Interview with Kenneth
Maxwell), Le Trimestre du Monde, No. 29, ler trimestre 1995.
CONSTABLE, Pamela, "Dateline Haiti: Caribbean Stalemate," Foreign Policy,
No. 89, Winter 1992-1993, pp. 175-190.
COOPER, Mary, "Economic Sanctions," CQ Researcher, 28 October 1994, pp.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

CORTEN, Andr6, "Port-au-Prince, Washington et Santo Domingo. Premieres
lemons d'un embargo," Etudes Internacionales, Vol. XXV, No. 4, December
1994, pp. 671-692.
DANIEL, Donald, "US Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD-25 in
Context," Research Memorandum 3-94, Newport: US Naval War College,
"Issues and Considerations in UN Gray Area and Enforcement
Operation," Research Memorandum 4-94, Newport: US Naval War College,
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations, Department
of the Army Headquarters, 30 December 1994.
DIEHL, Paul, "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN Peacekeeping: An
Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options," Armed Forces &
Society, Vol. 19, No. 2, Winter 1993, pp. 209-230.
DOBBIE, Charles, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," Survival, Vol.
36, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 121-148.
FAURIOL, Georges (ed.), Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for US Policy,
Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995.
FISHEL John, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of
Panama, Carlisle Barracks Penn.: US Army War College, April 1992.
GAMBA, Virginia, "Justified Intervention?: AView from the South," in REED,
L. and K. CAYSEN (eds), Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention,
Cambridge, MA: The American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993.
GRIER, Peter, "Wring Violence Out of Haiti Keeps US Soldiers on Their Toes,"
Christian Science Monitor, 21 September 1994.
HARDING, James, "Haiti Gun Scheme Backfires," Financial Times, 28
September 1994, p. 12.
HOLT, Victoria, Briefing Book on Peacekeeping. The US Role in UN Peace
Operations, Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Washington DC,
December 1994.
Inter-American Dialogue, "Advancing Democracy and Human Rights in the
Americas: What role for the OAS?," A Conference Report, Washington DC,
May 1994.
International Organization for Migration, Communal Governance Programme,
Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, March 1996, Monthly
ISBY, David, "Restoring Hope Yet Again? Military Intervention in Haiti," Jane's
Intelligence Review, August 1994, pp. 381-383.


KELPAK, Hal, "Haiti Takes its Next Step," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May
1995, pp. 19-20.
LAURANCE, J. Edward (ed.), The New Field of Micro-Disarmament:
Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion,
September 1996.
LUNDHAL, Mats, "History as an Obstacle to Change: The case of Haiti,"
Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 1/2,
Spring/Summer 1989, pp. 1-21.
MARCELLA, Gabriel, "Haiti: Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule
of Law, Handoffs and Exit," Special Report, Strategic Studies Center, US
Army War College, 20 October 1994.
MARTIN, Ian, "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism," Foreign Policy, No. 95,
Summer 1994.
MILTECH, "Composition and Organization of UN Peacekeeping Operations,"
Military Technology MILTECH, 12/94, pp. 68-82.
MINTZ, Sidney, "Can Haiti Change?," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January-
February 1995.
MUNOZ, Heraldo, "El derecho a la democracia en las Americas," Estudios
Internacionales, N. 109, Santiago de Chile, January-March 1995, pp. 58-82.
NAIRN, Allan, "Haiti Under the Gun," The Nation, 8/15 January 1996, pp. 11-
NANDA, Ved, "Tradegies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti -
Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International
Law Part I," Denv. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1992, pp. 305-334.
OAKLEY, Robert and David, BENTLEY, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of
Somalia and Haiti," Strategic Forum, May 1995, pp. 1-4.
PINE, Art, "US Adopts Cautious Rules of Engagement for Mission," Los Angeles
Times, 20 September 1994, p. A6.
PRESTON, Julia, "UN, US Clash on Disarming Hatians," Washington Post, 20
October 1994, pp. A31, A38.
QUINN, Denis (ed.), Peace Support Operations and the US Military,
Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.
RICHARDSON, Laurie, "Disarmament Derailed," NACLA Report on the
Americas, May/June 1996, pp. 11-14.
RIDGEWAY, James, The Haiti Files. Decoding the Crisis, Washington DC:
Essential Books/Azul Editions, 1994.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

ROTHER, Larry, "US Force Steps Up Haiti Arms Seizures," New York Times, 27
February 1995, p. A5.
"Haiti Struggles With Both Criminals and Vigilantes," New York
Times, 28 March 1995, P. A5.
"Aristide Urges UN to Disarm Thugs in Haiti," New York Times, 29
March 1995, p. Al.
"Loose Canons," New York Times, 1 October 1994, pp. 1, 4.
SCHMITT, Eric and Michael, GORDON, "Looking Beyond an Invasion, US
Plans Haiti Police Force," New York Times, 10 September 1994, p. 1.
SCHULTZ, Richard H., In the Aftermath of War. US Supportfor Reconstruction
and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause, Alabama: Air
University Press, August 1993.
SCHULZ, Donald E. and Gabriel MARCELLA, Reconciling the Irreconcilable:
The Troubled Outlook for US Policy Toward Haiti, Strategic Studies
Institute, Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 10 March 1994.
United Nations Association, A Report on the Forth Annual Peacekeeping
Mission: 19-23 May 1995, Republic of Haiti, United Nations Mission in
Haiti, New York: United Nations Association of the United States of
America, 1995.
United Nations Department of Public Information, "United Nations Mission in
Haiti," United Nations Peacekeeping. Information Notes, DPI/1306, Rev.
3-June 1994, pp. 146-156.
von HIPPEL, Karin, "Democratisation as Foreign Policy: The Case of Haiti", The
World Today, January 1995, pp. 11-15.
WEISS, Thomas G., "Intervention: Wither the United Nations?," The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 109-128.
WILENTZ, Amy, "Lives in the Balance," The New Yorker, 26 December 1994/2
January 1995, pp. 92-105.
YAACOV, Nomi Bar, "Haiti: la lutte pour les droits de l'homme dans un conflict
entire l'Etat et la Nation," Le Trimestre du Monde, No. 29, ler trimestre


Document CP/RES. 567 (870/91), 30 September 1991.
Document MRE/RES. 1/91, 3 October 1991.
Document MRE/RES.2/91, 8 October 1991.
Document MRE/RES. 3/92, 17 May 1992.



The situation of democracy and human rights in Haiti, A/RES/47/20 B, 20 April
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of democracy and human rights
in Haiti, A/47/975 S/26063, 3 July 1993.
Letter Dated 20 February 1994 From the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, S/1994/203, 19 February 1994.
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti,
S/1994/828, 15 July 1994.
Letter Dated 28 September 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President
of the Security Council: Report of the Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1994/1107, 28 September 1994.
Letter Dated 10 October 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Second Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1994/1148, 10 October 1994.
Letter Dated 24 October 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Third Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1994/1208, 24 October 1994.
Letter Dated 7 November 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Fourth Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1994/1258, 7 November 1994.
Letter Dated 21 November 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President
of the Security Council: Report of the Fifth Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1994/1321, 21 November 1994.
Letter Dated 5 December 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Sixth Multinational Foce in Haiti,
S/1994/1377, 5 December 1994.
Letter Dated 19 December 1994 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Seventh Multinational Force in Haiti.

46 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Letter Dated 9 January 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Eight Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1995/15, 9 January 1995.
Letter Dated 23 January 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Ninth Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1995/70, 23 January 1995.
Letter Dated 6 February 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Tenth Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1995/108, 6 February 1995.
Letter Dated 21 February 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Eleventh multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1995/149, 21 February 1995.
Letter Dated 6 March 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council: Report of the Twelfth Multinational Force in Haiti,
S/1995/183, 6 March 1995.
Letter Dated 20 March 1995 From the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations Addersses to the President of the
Security Council, S/1995/211, 20 March 1995.
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti,
S/1995/305, 13 April, 1995.
Report of the Secretary-General on the Mission in Haiti, S/1995/922, 6 November
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti,
S/1995/305, 13 April 1995.
Document S/RES/841, 16 June 1993.
Document S/RES/867, 23 September 1993.
Document S/RES/940, 31 July 1994.
Document S/PV.3413, 31 July 1994.


United Nations Institute for Disarmement Research, Analysis Report of
Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and

Bibliography 47

Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations: Haiti, Geneva: United
Nations, unpublished draft.
United Nations Institute for Disarmement Research, Analysis Report of
Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and
Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations, Nos. H070, H082, H119,
H120, H121, H122, H123, H176. Geneva: United Nations, unpublished
survey responses.

Part III:

Questionnaire Analysis

The Disarming of Warring Parties
as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement


DATE: 31 JULY 1995

Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from
the respondents' answers to the DCR Practitioner's Questionnaire. Changes, if any, have been
made only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to
maintain the integrity of the original responses. Illegible portions of the original written responses
have been indicated with ellipses.

I Reference Number:

Analysis Report Of Practitioners' Questionnaires

Number of questionnaires analyzed: 08



a. Name of operation: UNMIH

b. Location of operation: HAITI

c. Time frame covered by questionnaires:
(H070) 01/06/94 01/04/95
(H082) 01/12/94- 01/11/94
(H119) 09/11/94 09/04/95
(H120) 03/01/95 04/04/95
(H121) 09/01/95 06/04/95
(H1122) 11/01/95 08/03/95
(H123) 28/12/94 04/04/95
(H176) 01/09/94 00/10/95


a. Primary Role:

UN Civilian: 01
Chief :00
Other :01

Military Officer: 06
Commander :04
Other :02

Humanitarian Relief Operator and/or NGO personnel: 00

National Official: 00

54 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

b. Primary Function/Mission:

Military : 14
HQ Staff
Military Police

Civilian: 04
Civil Affairs

Military Observer

Staff HQ
Relief Coordinator

Other: transition programs : 01

e. Regular Activities:

Convoy Operations : 06 Convoy Security
Base Security : 06 Patrolling
Search Operations : 05 Check Point Operations
Cease Fire Monitoring : 01
Cease Fire Violation Investigation
Weapons Inspections
Weapons Inventories
Weapon Collection Voluntary
Weapons Collection Involuntary
Weapons Elimination
Cantonment Construction
Cantonment Security
Disarmament Verification
Information Collection
Police Operations (Military policemen)
Special Operations
Humanitarian Relief
Other: Policy analysis and options development
Other: Coordination with UN and other international
Other: Civil affairs


Other: Government liaison :01
Other: Quick reaction force operations :01
Other: General aviation support :01
Other: Medevac :01
Other: VIP support :01
Other: Motorcade operations :01
Other: Presidential security :01
Other: Democratic institution development :01
Other: Prison operations :01
Other: Election support :01
Other: Air assaults :01
Other: PSYOPS :01
Other: City management :01
Other: Riot control :01
Other: Crowd control :01
Other: Looting suppression :01
Other: Motorcade operations :01
Other: Anti-crime operations :01
Other: Crime targeting :01
Other: Justice case management :01
Other: Demobilization and restoring local government
outside Port-au-Prince : 01


(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the
respondents' answers to the Practitioner's Questionnaire. First, in answering
the questionnaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions
which pertained to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most
respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of
responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to the total
number of respondents. Second, respondents often provided additional
commentary for questions they should have skipped -- they may have answered
a question with "no ", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the
space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions
may contain more responses than the number expected.)

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti


Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace
agreement and/or relevant UNSC Resolution?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Q1.2 Was the disarmament component a central feature of the

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament
component vis-a-vis the peace agreement.

(H070) Disarmament of the Haitian military was dictated by the
agreement which allowed the permissive entry of the US
contingent of the MNF. Disarmament of the population was
determined to be allowed by the -'all necessary means .. to
establish a secure and stable environment'- clauses of UNSCR
940. The weapons buying program was a means to do that
developed after entry of the MNF.

(H121) Weapons buyback Get weapons off the streets.

(H082) Haiti (between September and November 94) Task force
region coming in excess of 10000 weapons. Concentration of
weapons held by FAHD.

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q1.5 If so, did it go as planned?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q1.6 If not, why? Give three reasons.

(H070) Price for weapons had to be adjusted several times in
order to attract weapons. Weapons accountability by the Haitian


military was poor. Paramilitary groups which operated in
complicity with the military were difficult to identify for

(H082) Rules for weapon security/collection continued to
change. With change in mission from forced army was confused.
With hub and spoke operation delayed.

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their
impact on the disarmament process.

(H082) Allowed for all amounts of arms to be distributed in the

Q1.8 Did, at any time, the existing agreements hinder you from
conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q1.9 If so, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

[No responses.]

1. Analyst's Comments:

During UN operations in Haiti, there was no "Peace Agreement"
because there was no war. The last minute negotiations by the former
President of the United States and the news that an Airborne Division was
inboundfor Haiti, convinced Cedras-Jonnaissant to bow to a peaceful entry of
UN forces, 98% US, and allow the return of President Aristide. As (H070)
stated, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, UN intervention into Haiti, was
authorized by UNSCR 940. This SCR authorized "the use of all necessary
means: An armed intervention... to establish and maintain a secure and stable
environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors' Islands
This was interpreted during the mission analysis by the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff that, the removal of all weapons from the Haitian military and the
demobilization of this force would be an implied task to ensure that safe and
secure environment.

58 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti


Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the
mandate part regarding disarmament?

Yes: 03 No: 03

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your
mission mandate? (Summarize.)

(H070) It was not expressed- see the 'all necessary means' clause
of UNSCR 940.

(H120) We were a log unit and we were not directly involved
with disarming. However we did dispose/destroy the weapons.

(H123) We undertook the disarmament mission as a component
of our strategy to provide a stable and secure environment.

(H082) Initial mission was a forced entry- which the resistance
was to be eliminated. All weapons seized were confiscated.
Establish a safe and secure environment. With semi-permissive
entry initial FAHD weapons was joint. All crew served weapons
were seized, official police were allowed to keep their small

Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

(H070) Exactly as it was stated.

(H122) We were to disarm the public. However, initially if an
individual was simply carrying a weapon, we could not take the
weapon away unless he acted in a threatening manner.

(H123) No mandate received.

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed
hinder or assist your disarming task?

Hindered: 00 Assisted: 02


Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your
mandate to read?

[No responses.]

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament
operations influenced by external factors other than the

Yes: 03 No: 02

Q2.7 If so, which ones?

(HO70) Some (Haitian President Aristide- and for a while, the
SYG) wanted the MNF to do more than was decided appropriate
(house -to -house searches). Meanwhile, the Haitian constitution
allowed weapons kept in the home for personal protection.

(H123) Disarmament operations were influenced by the
government of Haiti requesting that we make every effort to get
arms off the street.

(H082) Aristide government initially government position was
that some portion of the military would be retained to include
general staff. US military was used to work with Haitian GS on
reorganisation of military orders to keep a military/police
organisation in being. Aristide government changed the rules in
late November.

Analyst's Comments:

Some of the initial confusion by UNMIH came from the lack of specific
language in SCR 940. The term "safe and secure environment" as an end state,
leaves a lot to be desired. The MNF was also dealing with the pressures and
wishes of Aristide and the "CNN factor" that influenced the ROE and mission.

60 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti


Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament

Yes: 00 No: 03
(If not, go to question 4.)

Q3.2 If so, describe the agreement.

(H120) No warring factions. Army and police disarmed.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or
independent of the mandate?

Mandate-oriented: 00 Independent of mandate: 01

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between the mandate and the

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q3.5 If so, which ones?

[No responses.]

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?


Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the
UN/national operation?

Yes: 01 No: 05
(If not, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If so, what was(were) the changess? (Describe the most
important aspects.)


(H082) See 2.2 / 2.7

Q4.3 Did this(these) changes) affect your disarmament

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q4.4 If so, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to
implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon

Change: 01 Abandon: 00

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes?
(Mention the three most important ones.)

(H082) Initially joint inventory with weapons locked up in
garnison headquarters w/US. Weapons made inoperative and
confiscated, recovery of personal weapons.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes when and as they

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q4.10 If not, why? (Give the three most salient points.)

[No responses.]

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Analyst's Comments :

On 30 January 1995, the Security Council passed Resolution 975. This
resolution recognized that a secure and stable environment now exists in Haiti
and authorizes the UN CG to terminate the mission of the MNF and deploy the
UNMIH. This "Top Down Change" resulted in the withdrawal of a large number
of US Combat forces and the deployment of the remaining 30% of the UNMIH
to Haiti. Specifically this changed the ethnic make-up of the force and the ROE
was significantly altered. MNF ROE authorized:
a. Offensive military operations, if necessary
b. Use of deadly force to prevent theft of mission essential property
c. Did not require warning prior to use offorce
d. Authorized use of force, including deadly force, to prevent serious
criminal acts, such as, rape, murder, robbery.
The new DRAFT UNMIH ROE does not authorize offensive operations,
requires negotiations prior to use offorce and allows deadly force onby when
there is a risk of death orgrevious bodily harm.


Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of
disputes if and when these emerged?

Yes: 02 No: 03

Q5.2 If so, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e.,
mission, special agreement, the UN process, special
commission, etc.)?

(H119) Apply GOH [Government of Haiti] Legal System.

(H082) The mechanism of common defense by the individual
from leader on the ground.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties
and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?


(H070) None. Terms were actually instructions which the MNF
was empowered to enforce.

(H122) The multinational force in agreement with GOP was to
extract weapons off the street, confiscate weapons that
previously had belonged to the military. Selected weapons would
be returned to the developing police force; the remainder

(H082) No agreements.

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top
and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

(H070) At the top (in a Pantagon policy decision) the MNF
commander was instructed to 'demilitarize' the military heavy
weapons and then destroy all others except those considered
appropriate for re-arming the future police force.

(H122) Weapons were taken to the ASP and destroyed.

(H082) The formal regulation in Haiti was [for] all weapons to
be confiscated- old turned in.

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these new agreements and the
original agreement and/or mandate?

Yes: 00 No : 03

Analyst's Comments:

Concerning Q5.4, the storage of arms, all weapons taken from the Haitain
Armed Forces and the police to include the equipment of the Haitian Heavy
Weapons Company at Camp d'Appilication was either destroyed or
demiliterized by the 8th Ordance Company, US Army in Haiti. Some was
shipped to LetterKenny Army Depot, USA for destruction. Several weapons were
sent to Anniston Army Depotfor final disposition to S& T centers or museums.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti


Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when
negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q6.2. Was the protection of the population a part of your mission?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q6.3 If so, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal
to achieve this objective?

(H070) The broad interpretation of the mandate. Overwhelming
military capabilities. Public information (PSYOPS).

(H1119) Presence patrol, Information campaign, Re-inforce

(H120) As a support we were concerned with protecting the
population but not directly involved.

(H082) An excellent psychological campaign a good civil
affairs effort. A reaction force both on the USS America and
located on Port au Prince. A ROE that allowed free individual
components on the ground to take the entire action if required.

Analyst's Comments:

Initially, their was some confusion as to when, where, and how MNF
soldiers would and could get involved to protect the populus from police
brutality especially during Hatian crowd control operations. Finally, several
weeks into the operation, the MNFtook over police functions and disarmed and
defanged the military and the police.




Q7.1 Was the force composition for your mission area unilateral
or multilateral?

Unilateral: 01 Multilateral: 07

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in acting in
the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

(H070) Made the mission an international one although US
organised and led. Which set the stage for transition to UNMIH.
Not sure there was a third advantage unless you consider
opportunities we took to conduct standardization training of
MNF contributors before deployment and staff training for those
to be later included on the UNMIH staff.

(H119) Broader support base. Multinational effort/support.
Easier to deploy required manpower.

(H120) A united effort of many nations make a big statement.

(H121) Joint/multinational effort. Shows commitment to nation
in need. Spreads the demads/requirements on forces.

(H122) It gave the appearance that actions in Haiti was a united
front and set the condition for UN take over.

(H123) World community supporting the operations. No one
country over committed to supporting the operation. The ability
to bring the strength of each nation military force to bear on the

66 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

(H082) Unity of command, unity of effort. National intelligence.
Compatibility of all BOS [Battlefield Operating Systems i.e.
Command & Control, intelligence etc.].

Unilateral force composition:

[No responses.]

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting
in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

(H070) Getting contributions that match requirements (in both
units and equipment). Poor control over coordinating deployment
dates. Delays because of domestic politics of contributors.

(H119) Lack of multinational doctrine. Cultural differences in
interpreting standards. Unity of command.

(H120) Difference in equipment, diet, etc.

(H121) Difficulty in working together. Language barriers.
Conflicting agendas.

(H122) Difference in operational techniques, equipment,
compatability and language difference. Graduated responses
difficult to synchromise.

(H123) Logistic support for the different nations (especially
nation requirements). Lack of understanding of each nation's
operational procedures. Lack of common doctrine.

(H082) Unilateral in the best course of action- the inherent
difficulties of coalition warfare, operating procedures, C3I are
not prudent.

Unilateral force composition:

[No responses.]


Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was
consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the
achievement of disarmament and demobilization
components during the operation?

(H070) Not at all-consensus was high.

(H119) Important but operationally other components deferred
to US C2.

(H121) Very important.

(H122) Did not appear to be a problem since we were disarming
the entire country.

(H123) Missions (disarmament) were decided by the
multinational commander and executed by all the national forces.

(H 176) There was only consensus that local security must be a
priority and disarmament was among the priorities. This mission
counterbalanced the need to begin demobilizing.

(H082) Operation Provide comfort. All five commanders were
US.CG JTF. [Operation Provide Confort was the UN operation
to protect and feed the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq.]

Q7.5. Was adequate consideration given to the disarmament
component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 08 Inadequate: 00

Q7.6 If it was inadequate, explain how this affected your mission
(mention the three most important issues).

(H082) PIRS [Priority Intelligence Requirements] were given to
national intelligence to explain as to the number and composition
of weapons. Different forces were on good weapons
concentration areas. Distribution were used .

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to
support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 05 No: 02

Q7.8 If so, what was it?

(H120) US infantry, cavalry, mech, MP's etc.

(H121) Specific weapon buyback locations.

(H1122) Infantry unit primarily established weapons buy back

(H123) Infantry, cavalry, military police.

(H082) 10th Mtn. division was responsible for DAP ord. VTF
which I commanded was responsible for rest of the country-

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and
monitoring measures for the control of weapons and

Yes: 05 No: 01

Q7.10 If so, what were they?

(H11119) Checkpoints.

(H1 20) We maintained exact accountability by serial number of
all weapons turned in.

(H121) Light infantry.

(H123) Check point operations to search for weapons. Weapons
buy-back sites manned by infantry units.

(H082) Troops in 27 location continued earlier police or army
garisons or both, weapons were collected.


Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing
the mission?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and
equipment for the disarmament mission?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Q7.15 If so, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the
five most important ones.)

(H070) In some instances military police units did checkpoint
searches for weapons but routinely conventional uriits did it in
their own areas of operation.

(H1i22) At times, when specific locations were searched dog
teams and MP were used.

(H082) Augmented for buy back program. Augmented w/class
A agents buy back prices subsequently. Transportation units to
pick up weapons. Tracks to remove weapons.

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ's prior
to your disarming mission and before your arrival in the
area of operations?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for
weapons control and disarmament operations?

70 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.18 If not, what steps were required in order to establish and
maintain a secure environment?

[No responses.]

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures affect the
accomplishment of the disarmament operations positively
or negatively?

Positively: 05 Negatively: 00

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

(H1 19) Getting weapons off the street reduced crime, violence,
and threat to the force.

(H1120) We had so much visible presence that no one wanted to
cause a problem.

(H121) Force was respected causing locals to feel safe in turning

(H082) Civil affairs ROE- troops in the culture, active colonel
source operation.

Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures
adequate for your task?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.22 If not, mention three examples which demonstrate their

(H082) Commands well forwarded. Every day I visited 4 to 5
locations as did the Group commander. All locations had

Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and
control/operational procedures while on this mission.


(H119) Clear operational command. Daily operational and staff
coordination meetings. Use of LNO's from components. Use of
coalition support teams. Required backbriefs from every
component for every mission.

(H123) Doctrinal C2 control measures were used. Multinational
forces HQ to Bde HQ- to BNHQ-to COHQ- to Pit.

(H082) Unilateral US Cal Cnds CP on cases in PAP harbor, 10
Mtn. division -P AP, JTF.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force
multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament
mission? List the three most important ones.

(H070) Linguists-no; more money-yes, after we figured out how
much we needed;more human intelligence-no, but progressively
got better.

(H 19) Information support element. Civil affairs. Military

(H122) Dog teams when required.

(H123) PSYOPS.

(H082) Psyops campaign. Ready reaction force.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q7.26 If not, what other capabilities would you have needed to
make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

[No responses.]

Analyst's Comments:

Its clear that all the respondents felt that they had the right mix ofpersonnel
and equipment to execute their disarmament mission. Overwhelming force is a

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

US doctrinal mandatefor a forced entry mission like Uphld Democracy could
have been. One force not mentioned, Army Special Operations Task Force
(ARSOTF-HAITI), 3d Special Forces Group, played a key role in the
disarmament and weapons buy back program. The ODB and ODAs (Special
Forces 12 man A-Teams) along with Rangers became the civil authority in the
hundreds of towns that they operated in. Their discovery of many of the FRAPH,
Attache and Tom Tom Macute weapons caches was key to the initial disarming
The SF brought to UNMIH: language capability, medical specialists,
intelligence capability, foreign weapons expertise and extensive knowledge of
Civil Affairs operations. Operating with 70% of the Haitain people in rural
areas, the SF teams executed the Buy Back programs which they rated as
"marginally successful." One observation about the buy back program was that,
ex-FAD'H soldiers were selling back their issue weapons and the flow of
weapons had slowed to a "a trickle not a flood." This could be viewed as a
indicator of success.


Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of
engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of
your mission?

National: 06 UN: 01

Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance
of your task?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q8.3 If not, what other rules should you have had?

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules altered

Yes: 03 No: 02

If so, summarize the relevant changes.



(H070) We modified how the MNF would handle searches of
vehicles and under what conditions house and building searches
would be conducted. Actually, this should all be considered
mission clarification and in all clarifications the search authority
was clarified to be more liberal.

(H123) Situation did not change; used same ROE entire mission.

(H082) Chaos from force entry to some primitive environment.
Aristide's arrival in Country. Aristide's acceptance of
goveramental responsibility. Disestablishment of the military
police. Lifting of sanctions.

Analyst's Comments:

As the second phase of the UNHIH is being executed, April 95 February
96, the ROE and Operational Procedures have changed. As described earlier,
proposed ROE will be a lot less aggressive and operational procedures will
require negotiation and communications prior to demonstrating force.


Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve
the mission as mandated?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Q9.2 Judging from your experience, is it possible to use coercive
disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce
the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can: Yes: 07 No: 00
Should: Yes: 07 No: 00

74 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and
should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament
component of an agreement.

(H070) It is a given that force can be used if the mandate
provided for the use of force. It is a given that force protection
must allow disarmament when threatened. When population
protection is in the manadte or mission, force must be authorised.

(HI 19) Use of force ('all means appropriate'). Should be
authorised within definitive ROE if threat level requires, key
issue control of weapons critical to security.

(H120) Do not want a soldier in jeopardy. Do not want missions
impeded. Make sure civilian population is secure.

(H121) More respected if aggressive vs passive.

(H122) In our case the availability of weapons directly related to
the level of violence. We were building a new police force
w/basic small arms weapons.
If weapons were not removed, the police force would be in a
significant disadvantaged position.

(H123) Force has to have an option to use force. Without the
capability to escalate the use of force you may not be able to
conduct effective disarmament.

(H082) There is always an element that will not voluntarily turn
in weapons; disarmament mandates showed the rule of law.
Those elements that are in violation of the mandate showed to be
forced to turn over weapons.

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to
continue with your disarmament tasks?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q9.6 If so, describe how it was possible to continue with your
disarmament tasks.


Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations
(i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?

Yes: 00 No: 05

Q9.8 If so, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q9.9 If so, were there already arms control agreements (i.e.,
registers of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place
within the country where you were operating?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Analyst's Comments:

Unlike UN "peacekeeping" operations in Central America, (ONUCA in
Nicaragua and ONUSAL in El Salvador,) both, of which relied on voluntary
disarmament by all parties. UNMIH mandate, SCR 940, approved the use of
force and any other measures including coersive actions, to restore the
government of Haiti. Due to its use of force and coercive measures to obtain the
stated military objectives. Operation Restore Democracy was more like the
conventional Desert Storm and Operation Southern Watch (enforcing no fly
zones over Iraq), then any of the UN "peacekeeping" operations to date.



Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and
during your disarming mission?

Prior: Yes: 05 No: 01
During: Yes: 05 No: 01

Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable?

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

Yes: 04 No: 01

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior to and
during the mission? (Describe the three most important

(H119) VTC with unit that we relieved Site survey. Higher HQ's
coordination and planning.

(H123) Intelligence reporting. Coordination with the government
of Haiti and the US embassy.

(H082) National intelligence systems. Local LLSO [Low Level
Source Operations i.e. Covert collection through human
sources] Forum in the US embassy.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ's
and the units in the field?

Yes: 05 No: 00

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 04 No: 01

Q 0.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information

Yes: 02 No: 03

Q10.7 If so, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not
more than three.)

(H123) HUMINT, SIGINT, Video.


Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool
for verifying and monitoring weapons control and
disarmament operations?


Yes: 02 No: 00

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar,
photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring
the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a
peacekeeping operation?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.7.3 If so, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping
process in which such sensors could be used.

(H1122) It is difficult to hide weapons in control zones when
multi means of monitoring are used.

(H1123) Phototelsis to monitor crowds thereby picking out armed

(H082) Central 2nd generation helicopter with 3rd flds with
video camera unpubl. -helo. OPS w/NGOS border control etc.

Q 0.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational
set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional
organization, national, etc.)?

(H123) I believe most of the senior systems will be nationally

(H082) Whatever organisation.

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e.,
intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and
disarming purposes?

Yes: 05 No: 00

Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

(H070) To know how effectively you are disarming. Do
determine when force should be used (i.e. against paramilitaries).
To know when you can stop disarming.

78 Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti

(HI 19) Uses assets that we are trained with. Need to apply all
assets available to know what is going on to obtain required

(H122) Compliance must be verified. These methods seem to
work in Haiti.

(H 123) Best means of reliable information.

(H082) Intelligence is a key in these type of operations. Allows
force convergence.

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in
peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create
mutual confidence between warring parties?

Yes: 02 No: 01

QI0.13 If so, did you act as an intermediary?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission?

Yes: 05 No: 01

QI0.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of
importance during your mission?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.16 If so, give three reasons why this was so.


(H070) An example prices for weapons were advertised in the
media. Missions of MNF units were publicized to control public
alarm. Media and public information were used to control

(H119) People were hungry for information. Rumor did not
depend on fact. Most people responded favorably when they

(H120) Keep locals informed-passive. Get weapons turned in.
Stop rumours.

(H122) The people had to believe that we could enforce a safe
and secure environment before they would turn in weapons.

(H123) The primary means of getting our information and our
story out to the populace.

(H082) Accurate information communication is essential in these
types of operations, must build trust and confidence. Once trust
is established individual commander on the ground can infect
program. Intermediary and negotiations at the lowest level are
absolutely essential.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort
to support and explain your activities and mission to the
local population?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your
disarming efforts?

Hamper: 01 Benefit: 04

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.