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Title:
Money laundering a practical analysis
Physical Description:
Mixed Material
Language:
English
Creator:
Bain, John.
Publisher:
Security Policy Group International

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords:
Money laundering   ( mets )
Genre:
Non-fiction

Notes

Summary:
This publication discusses the issue of money laundering as not just a problem in the Caribbean; it indicates that all countries are potential targets for the money launderer.
Statement of Responsibility:
John Bain
Funding:
Support for the development of the technical infrastructure and partner training provided by the United States Department of Education TICFIA program.

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Source Institution:
The College of The Bahamas
Holding Location:
The College of The Bahamas Harry C. Moore Library
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All rights reserved by the source institution.
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System ID:
AA00000027:00001

Table of Contents
    Introduction
        Page 1
        Page 2
        Page 3
    Money laundering -- towards a definition
        Page 4
        Page 5
        Page 6
    The electronic dimension
        Page 7
        Page 8
    The role of the international community
        Page 9
        Page 10
        Page 11
        Page 12
    The Bahamian efforts to curb money laundering
        Page 13
        Page 14
        Page 15
        Page 16
        Page 17
    Money laundering and corruption - two sides of the same coin
        Page 18
        Page 19
        Page 20
    Some difficulties enforcing the law
        Page 21
        Page 22
        Page 23
        Page 24
        Page 25
        Page 26
        Page 27
        Page 28
    Summary, discussion & conclusions
        Page 29
        Page 30
        Page 31
        Page 32
        Page 33
        Page 34
        Page 35
        Page 36
        Page 37
        Page 38
        Page 39
        Page 40
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Money Laundering: A Practical Analysis With Particular
Reference To Bahamian And Caribbean Offshore
Institutions
John S. Bain
FOREWORD
PDF version
CHAPTER 1 AN INTRODUCTION
Money laundering, the cleansing or disguising of money earned from an illegal
business to appear to be a product of a lawful business, is not a new activity. Indeed,
it exists as long as criminals have need to disguise the illicit origin of their funds;
most economically-motivated criminals have always wanted to appear
legitimate.What is new, at least in The Bahamas, the U.K. and the USA, is the
criminalization of money laundering. The process of money laundering itself is now a
crime separate from the crime that produced the money.[1] Prompted initially by
concern at the scale of drug trafficking and the laundering of its proceeds, the last
few years have seen an enormous increase in the international efforts to combat the
problem.The Bahamas, having a well-developed offshore financial sector and
heavily dependent on the offshore business, was not to be left out of these new
international developments. In 1996, the government of The Bahamas passed the
Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1996 which went into effect on
December 16, 1996.

As we can all appreciate, money laundering is not just a problem in the Caribbean,
but all countries are potential targets for the money launderer. The challenge facing
The Bahamas is to bring itself into the fight, along with the more developed financial
centers, against money laundering. The crime of money laundering has been
compared to a balloon.When it is squeezed in one section, it bulges in another.[2]
The fight against the money launderer is a long-term task which will require
continuing attention if progress is to be sustained.
Upcoming
article
SPGI in the
news
Tosti on
terrorism
debate.
The greater knowledge we have gained about money laundering over the past few
years has confirmed that it is a dynamic activity, conducted with increasing
sophistication and deceptive reasoning.This knowledge has also confirmed that
money laundering is not concerned with drug trafficking alone, but with any crime
that generates significant proceeds, particularly when organized crime is
involved.Money launderers have shown that they are responsive to counter-
measures and are always searching for new laundering routes. This is why money
laundering is not confined to the banking sector but can embrace the whole range of
the financial sector and indeed spread into non-financial businesses of all sorts.
Indeed, we should remind ourselves that money laundering not only poses a threat
to financial institutions, it is also part of a process that endangers the economy,
society and eventually the state itself.


It is unrealistic to expect that money laundering can be eradicated. What can and is
being done, with the help of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and others, is to make money
laundering more difficult and to increase the chance of money laundering being
detected and caught if it is carried out.Putting in place an effective legal framework is
an essential precondition for this.[3]

The Offshore Havens of the Caribbean

The Caribbean is literally a sea of developing countries offering special tax
incentives, free trade zones, tax holidays and, in many cases, complete freedom
from the imposition of income, estate, gift and most other taxes.The countries of the
region are the setting for a broad spectrum of international financial institutions and
transactions which make use of sophisticated global technology.[4]

The "no-tax" havens in the region are The Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands,
and the Turks and Caicos Islands; they impose no income, estate or gift taxes on
either residents or non-residents.The "low-tax" havens include most of the other
countries in the region (such as Barbados), which offer tax incentives for offshore
banks, international business companies (IBC's), foreign sales corporations and
exempt insurance companies.The absence of such taxes is usually part of a formal
policy to attract offshore banks and other corporate business to the countries
concerned specifically, and to the region generally.For example, in the Cayman
Islands, offshore companies are entitled to a tax-free guarantee up to 30 years from
the date of formation, although they are normally granted a 20-year guarantee.[5]

Some features of the financial culture of the Caribbean include strict confidentiality,
non-disclosure requirements, minimal annual reporting requirements, a dual
currency control system that distinguishes between residents and non-residents and
between local and foreign currency, extremely low and competitive fees for company
and investment transactions, tax treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties and
exchange of informafion agreements. While some tax havens maintain an extensive
network of tax and other treaties, most Caribbean tax havens have not entered into
such treafies at all.[6]

The Bahamas and Its People We Mix Business with Pleasure

Many terms and expressions have been used to describe The Bahamas.Some call it
a wondrous, sun-drenched string of tropical islands set like pearls in sparkling blue
waters.Some call it an internafional playground and some call it a land of unmatched
beauty. Even George Washington was once moved to refer to the islands as the
"isles of perpetual June." The Bahamas has also been called "The Switzerland of the
West."[7]

With modern, internationally known hotel and banking institutions. The Bahamas
today maintains a reputafion both as one of the world's finest resort areas and also a
leading tax haven and financial center.The natural beauty of the islands attracts
millions of visitors for sun-swept sandy beaches. At the same time, freedom from
taxafion, together with political stability, favorable trust and banking laws, proximity
to the United States and excellent communicafions facilities combine to make The
Bahamas a major offshore banking center.
Restoring a Tarnished Reputation


In the 1980's, with the image of drug trafficking and money laundering. The
Bahamas gained a tarnished reputafion.Articles appeared in The Miami Herald and
London's Sunday Times calling The Bahamas "A Nation for Sale."[8] The Pindling
Government had little choice but to appoint a "Blue Ribbon" Commission of Inquiry
to investigate the use of The Bahamas as a transshipment point for drugs desfined
for the United States. Unfil the present day. The Bahamas is struggling to shed the
reputafion as a drug transit point and a center for money laundering and is sfill
categorized as a Drug Transit Location by the USA State Department.[9]

The change of government in 1992 was significant for The Bahamas.After having
been led by the same political leader for 25 years, most Bahamians were anxious
about what to expect from the Ingraham administration, especially as it related to law
and order and the restorafion of the reputafion of The Bahamas to what it was before
the scourge of drugs took its toll on the small population.Indeed, beginning in the
early 90's, quotes that are more favorable began to appear in the international press
concerning The Bahamas' effort to combat money laundering. To quote a financial
reporter, "The Bahamas, a long-reputed and still acfive drug money laundering
nation, has taken counter-measures to combat the legitimizing of illicit funds. The
Bahamian government and banking industry adopted operating and reporting
regulafions which make money laundering more difficult."[10]

According to Dr. Peter Maynard, former Bahamian Ambassador to the United
Nations, a number of events occurred in the past three decades, which negatively
affected the image of The Bahamas.These included:[11]

Early 1970's, the presence of Robert Vesco (international financial swindler
wanted by the United States authorities) residing in The Bahamas;
1982, the crash of the Vatican's Banco Ambrosiano with its branches in The
Bahamas and strong Bahamian fies;
1983, NBC's report on Norman's Cay, the island stronghold of Carlos
Enrique "Joe" Lehder, leader of the Medellin Cartel, a Colombian Drug
organization;
1984, Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking;
1987, re-election of the PLP;
In the late 1980's, U.S. Coast Guard patrol of Bahamian waters with
Bahamian Defense Force officers to make arrest;
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents, already based in Nassau, the
capital of The Bahamas, could directly contact their opposite numbers in
the Police Force without the red tape of referrals to the U.S. Embassy and
Bahamian Attorney General;
The Drug Enforcement Unit was set up within the Royal Bahamas Police
Force;
A joint task force from both countries now meet semi-annually for frank
discussions of money laundering and other law enforcement issues;
Radar observation balloons manned by U.S. technicians fioated over three
Bahamian islands to detect drug ships and aircraft;
The 1990 Central Bank's closure of BCCI Nassau;
The 1992 extradition of Nigel Bowe, Lehder's Bahamian lawyer and
allegedly a close confidant of Sir Lynden Pindling;
The 1992 elecfion of the FNM government in a fiagging and weak economy;
and
The 1994 Commission of Inquiry on the affairs of three government
corporafions.


One of the methods used in an attempt to restore the damaged reputation was the
enactment of the Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1996. This Act was
recentty enacted and was designed to combat the laundering of proceeds derived
from illegal activity including drug trafficking. Although there were already a number
of laws on the books detailing the willingness of The Bahamas to cooperate with
other jurisdicfions in halting the spread of money laundering, money laundering was
never specifically identified as a crime. The government moved to close that
loophole by the passage of this bill. Additionally, in recent years, banks in The
Bahamas have implemented stringent policies to ensure that their facilities are not
used to launder proceeds of crime. Their efforts are considered to have been
successful, for in some instances when offshore centers of money laundering are
menfioned. The Bahamas is not included. The Money Laundering Act is intended to
put "beyond any reasonable doubt, this country's seriousness in dealing with the
whole question of money laundering" (the Honorable Brent Symonette, former
Attorney General).[12] Nevertheless, the question of enforceability still needs to be
addressed.


CHAPTER 2- MONEY LAUNDERING -- TOWARDS A
DEFINITION

Different Definitions of Money Laundering

Money laundering has been given many definitions. One definition is that money
laundering is the act of converting money gained from illegal activity, such as drug
smuggling, into money that appears legitimate and in which the source cannot be
traced to the illegal acfivity.[13]Another author defines it as follows: "The phrase
'money laundering' covers all procedures to change the identity of illegally obtained
money so that it appears to have originated from a legitimate source."[14]The official
definition by The Central Bank of The Bahamas is, "Money laundering is the process
by which criminals attempt to conceal the true origin and ownership of the processes
of their criminal acfivities. If undertaken successfully, it also allows them to maintain
control over those proceeds and, ultimately, to provide a legifimate cover for their
source of income." [15]

An acceptable definifion of money laundering, and one which will be used in this
paper, is that money laundering is a process by which the proceeds of crime are
hidden from investigators, moved around financial and economic systems in order to
make tracing them more difficult and then spent as if they are legitimate funds.lt is
very important at this stage to note that money laundering not only refers to the
proceeds of drug trafficking, but to any crime that results in the proceeds being
laundered or cleansed, although early money laundering control efforts focused on
drug proceeds.

Money laundering is, in essence, the process of concealing the nature, source or
location of criminal proceeds.In a recent article,[16] the author attempts to quantify
the money amount of the money laundering industry and the effects on the world's
economy of this industry. The authorstates that it is estimated that global money
laundering involves as much as three hundred billion United States dollars annually
and that the infiuence wielded by criminal groups controlling such incredible wealth
has led world leaders to deem money laundering a geopolitical problem, which, if
unchecked, threatens the polifical fabric of fragile democracies and democrafic
institufions everywhere.[17] In another article, money laundering was referred to as
the third largest industry globally:


Money laundering is said to be the third largest industry by value worldwide.
Research in the United States has shown that 90% of currency bills in circulafion are
contaminated with narcotics. In the United Kingdom, similar research showed 40%
to be contaminated.Other research in the United Kingdom has shown that 80% of
property related crime is committed to fund a drug habit.A single user ~ shooting one
shot of heroin a day ~ needs to spend £28,500 each year just to feed his personal
consumpfion.ln order to fund that amount, he will turn to robbery, dealing in drugs,
prostitution and theft.In the United Kingdom, stolen household and office goods
realize approximately one-third of their new value. [18]

Profile of the Money Launderer Past and Present

It is not uncommon to find indictments by politicians, law enforcement officers and
the media, of those who are thought to be involved in money laundering. The term
money launderer is pejorative and the pracfice of money laundering conjures up a
shady world of men in pinstriped suits claiming to be "bankers" and acting for ill-
defined customers and vague offshore enterprises.[19] The fact that many of the
cases that have become known involve exactly such scenarios has tended to
reinforce such percepfions.[20] It is perhaps a useful device for those engaged in
fighting serious crime to persuade, at least the professional financial managers, trust
officers, attorneys and bankers (those who fit the profile of the modern money
launderer), that those who are prepared to assist criminals and terrorists to retain
their ill-gotten gains and further their illicit enterprises are no better than the crooks
they serve. When the money is the product of drug trafficking or even a bank
robbery, then the shame that can attach to those who assist in the laundering
process is justly deserved. It is very important to remember, however, that those
most actively involved in providing such services may never transgress the law; in
many cases, the laundering may well involve funds that are not referable to a crime
or other form of misconduct.This is a point that is hardly mentioned in the popular
press when criticizing the apparent failure of regulatory authorities to take effective
steps to interdict what are assumed to be money laundering operafions.[21]

Laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking is one thing, but merely assisting a
leader of a developing country to retain his wealth on a confidenfial basis outside his
country may be a very different issue.[22] To say that even the knowing facilitation of
such an individual's acquisition of wealth, by covert movements of substantial
amounts of wealth, where no specific crime is involved, is an unsound banking
practice is a statement that few central bankers, especially in offshore centers such
as The Bahamas, would be prepared to support.Responsible banking is a vague
concept, even in a wholly domestic environment. In an international context, it is
nebulous and is an entirely different issue than that of soundness.[23]

The Stages of Money Laundering

There is no one method of laundering money.Methods can range from the purchase
and resale of luxury items to passing money through a complex internafional web of
legifimate businesses and 'shell' companies. [24] In the case of drug trafficking and
some other serious crimes, such as robbery, the proceeds usually take the form of
cash, which needs to enter the financial system by some means. Indeed, street
level purchases of drugs are almost always made with cash, although some form of
barter is not uncommon in the purchase of drugs, and according to the value of the
items being traded, has substituted in some ways for cash transactions.

According to the customary concept of money laundering, the three stages of money


laundering are known as placement, integrafion and layering, during which there
may be numerous transactions made by launderers that could indicate criminal
activity. The traditional, and somewhat simplisfic, definitions are given below:

1. Placement ~ the physical disposal of cash proceeds derived from illegal
activity.
2. Layering ~ separating illicit proceeds from their source by creating complex
layers of financial transactions designed to disguise the audit trail and
provide anonymity.
3. Integration ~ the provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived
wealth. If the layering process has succeeded, integration schemes place
the laundered proceeds back into the economy in such a way that they
reenter the financial system appearing to be normal business funds.

While the definitions and the stages of money laundering as described above were
simple, the definitions will form a basis for further discussion into the enforceability of
the legislation in The Bahamas.The definitions and the associated diagrams will form
the foundation of the arguments to be presented in this paper.

The efforts to combat money laundering as it pertains to offshore institufions largely
focus on those points in the process where the launderer's activities are more
susceptible to recognition and have therefore largely concentrated on the deposit-
taking procedures of financial institufions, or the placement stage. There are,
however, many sophisticated crimes where cash is not involved.

According to The Guidance Notes issued by The Central Bank, the most common
form of money laundering that financial institutions will encounter on a day-to-day
basis in respect of their mainstream banking business takes the form of accumulated
cash transacfions which will be deposited in the banking system or exchanged for
value items.[25] Electronic fund transfer systems increase the vulnerability by
enabling the cash deposits to be switched rapidly between accounts in different
names and different jurisdictions. Banks and Trust companies, as providers of a
wide range of services, are vulnerable to being used in the layering and integration
stages where mortgage and other loan accounts may be used as part of this process
to create complex layers of transactions. [26]

Layering An Opportunity for Financial Institutions

The transacfions, which are used to obscure the source of the relevant funds, will be
structured in such a manner as to render it almost impossible for evidence to be
obtained which would allow a court to establish the derivafion of the money. This
process is referred to as layering, but this implies that with diligence the truth may be
uncovered through a progressive investigation.While there have been cases where
dedicated, extremely lucky, and well-resourced investigators have been able to peel-
off a series of layers to reveal what in fact took place, in the case of the more
sophisticated structures, the concept of layering is too simplistic.Certain operations
are structured in a manner, which resembles a mosaic or kaleidoscope rather than a
layer cake.[27] Transactions will not be progressive but parallel, establishing mutual
obligations which can be married or crossed, often on a contingent basis, and which
would not be substantiated to the satisfacfion of a court applying conventional legal
rules. It is, however, true that insofar as the notion of layering is often used to
conjure up a picture of a stone gradually dropping to the bottom of a pond, the
longer money remains in the system the more difficult it is to follow and identify it.[28]
Furthermore, such an analogy makes the important point that the money in fiight


will be most noticeable when it "splashes" first into the pool. It is at this point of entry
into the conventional banking system that regulafions designed to create an "audit
trail" are likely to be most effective.[29] Indeed, the metaphor of dropping a stone
into a pool is appropriate: when the dirty money is first deposited, it creates a
noticeable ripple, but if unnoficed then it may well remain undiscovered.This stage
necessarily involves the participafion of banks or other deposit-taking bodies. It is
therefore very important for banks to be vigilant in detecfing unusual transacfions at
the point at which the launderer is most vulnerable to exposure.


CHAPTER 3 THE ELECTRONIC DIMENSION

The Computer Criminal and Economic Crimes

It has always been the goal of criminals, especially those involved in the so called
'white collar' crimes, to escape the consequences of their actions by putting as much
distance as possible between themselves and the governmental authorities. During
this century, however, we have witnessed a dramafic increase in the number of
cases that have a foreign dimension, apparently by design.This is no more so
apparent than in the case of economic crimes, especially the crime of money
laundering.Criminals seeking to undermine and destabilize our financial and
commercial institutions have every incenfive to ensure that another jurisdicfion is
involved in the concepfion, realization or drawing down of their crime. Indeed, if the
law has not been able to keep up with the international nature of crime, in either its
reach or its resources, the prospects of criminals, and in particular organized crime,
moving into cyberspace is fundamentally more threatening. It is this htmlect of the
crime of money laundering that will be, in the opinion of this author, the greatest
challenge to the Bahamian authorifies in enforcing the recent money laundering
legislafion.

The Global Nature of Business

Many htmlects of business, whether financial or otherwise, are today global in
character. This is true not only as a result of the conscious policies of deregulafion
and attempts to facilitate the mobility of capital and to foster global operations, but
also, and more profoundly, recent developments in technology have in effect created
a 'global business community.' Indeed technological innovations already being
implemented, such as cyber banking and smart cards (that is, cards with high
security chips that enable the holder to pay bills, gain access to premises, and stores
data on health, and so forth) require more than ever vigorously enforced traditional
anti-laundering control efforts to guard against abuse by money launderers.[30]
Traditional anti-laundering controls, which hinge on cash transaction reporting and
knowing a bank's customers, are littte help in identifying money laundering among
cyberspace's electronic transfers and faceless customers.[31]

Sophisticated criminals, especially money launderers, have followed suit and in
some instances, because of their vast financial and other resources, outstripped
their law-abiding competitors and the less equipped governmental authorities.
Added to this is the threat of destabilizafion of systems and the integrity of data for
subversive or belligerent purposes.lt may be safe to say that the prospect of crime
and warfare in the realm of cyberspace is today a reality.As with many other areas of
sophisticated criminal and subversive activity, the risks may not always be apparent,
although one can be assured that they are real and in their implicafions, for all those
who are concerned with the safety and integrity of our financial and trade systems,
are of fundamental importance. Indeed, the developed countries and economies of


the West are at risk, but more so, the small developing offshore centers like The
Bahamas face an enemy of profound proportions, probably greater than any threat
since the era of colonizafion. The modern economic criminal will prey upon the
weak as well as the strong, and cyberspace recognizes no barriers.[32]

The Effects on Offshore Banking

These innovafions promise to have a profound impact on offshore banking. Without
increased commitment, offshore centers will suffer even harsher criticism than they
have in the past. In the world of offshore banking, the speed and increased
anonymity of cyber banking multiply the lure for money laundering. This author
believes that it is only a matter of time before electronic commerce is accepted by
the average consumer as a viable substitution for cash, checks and credit cards.
This acceptance factor and the transfer of funds that it represents both nationally
and globally, will motivate the cyber crook to devise schemes or series of schemes
that will allow him/her to contaminate the electronic commerce system. It has been
promulgated by the National White Collar Crime Center, based in the USA, that
every cyber crook is motivated by a simplistic goal that has mission statement
qualifies: "beat the system" and "get rich in the process."[33]

As a result, electronic commerce, especially the transfer of cash, is at risk. While the
various components of this new age monetary exchange system (a matrix of old
hardware protocols and new software paradigms) have been designed with security
in mind from the ground up, the likelihood that they will be probed thousands of
times a day, for any weakness, is a given, and common sense dictates that
eventually a means of manipulafing the system for money laundering purposes is
highly likely. At what level this manipulation will occur and the impact it may or may
not have on the integrity of the system as we now understand it is open to
speculation.Nevertheless, if past high-tech compromises of other "secure" financial
systems are any indication, losses to providers and users of this proposed system
will be significant.[34]

The Future of Offshore Banking

Despite growing pressures from international groups and the resulting proliferation of
money laundering laws, successful money laundering controls in offshore centers as
in all nations, rely on political will to make money laundering controls a national
priority.Even those countries leading the war on money laundering, such as the
USA, U.K., and Australia, are losing ground against money launderers in today's
rapidly changing financial landscape.[35] This is due in part to the changing
htmlects of cyberspace and cyber banking.

This threat is apparently being assisted by some actions of offshore institutions in
this region.The European Union Bank (EUB), based in Antigua in the Caribbean, is
one such offshore cyber bank that brings the challenges of money laundering
controls in cyberspace to the fore. Calling itself "the first offshore bank of the
Internet," the EUB invites customers to "discover the many tax-advantaged financial
services that (it) can offer to savvy individuals and corporations" from the privacy of
their personal computer.[36]

Through its site on the Internet, launched in September, 1995, EUB allows
customers access to a full range of offshore private banking services from any
country, destroying the problems posed by theremote locations of most offshore
centers through the borderless reach of cyberspace. EUB operates under Antigua's


strict bank secrecy laws, which reportedly make its offshore accounts "a perfect
vehicle...for the client who prizes discrefion or who wishes to make investments in
other countries without his name becoming known.EUB's customers can open
numbered accounts, in which the customer's identity is known only by an EUB
private banker, or coded accounts, which are numbered accounts that operate by
pass code rather than signature. The methods used by the bank to verify identity
are unclear. Once phone or fax contact is made with the customer and a minimum
deposit of US$2,500 is made, the account is opened. Both the Bank of England and
the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporafion have issued warnings to their
nations' banks advising increased due diligence when handling transactions
involving EUB.Still EUB confinues to operate.[37]

EUB's President Ken Suhandron is quoted as saying, "To think that this is not the
future of banking is unrealistic."[38] Indeed, it may also be the future of money
laundering law enforcement to bring heightened internafional pressure to those
banking centers that offer a safe haven to "questionable" customers in the anonymity
of cyberspace.

When questioned on the risk of the electronic system to the money laundering efforts
of The Bahamas during a recent interview, Mr. Colin Archer, a Central Bank of The
Bahamas official, indicated:[39]

Obviously, we have been trying to attract quality, clean, good business but
invariably, given the volume of business which is channeled throughout The
Bahamas which comes to our shores and goes to other shores, there is a possibility,
as a major money center maintaining a very sophisticated financial
telecommunicafions network, there is a possibility of [the telecommunicafions
network] being exploited. Those persons who engage in [money laundering]
activities are very sophisticated people themselves; they are not people who have [a]
limited education or limited resources.They have substanfial technical resources
available to them and therefore they would make the most of those resources.The
Bahamas, as a major money center and major international offshore center, is at risk
to money laundering because we are connected to the rest of the world in terms of
our banking system or bank network in terms of funds being channeled through The
Bahamas, millions upon millions of dollars every day from one jurisdicfion to the
next, so we are at risk but that's all the more reason if we want to continue our level
of prosperity, then we have to maintain a center which has the necessary controls in
place to protect it.

Despite these sentiments, whether the legislafion, as it is currently drafted, is wide
enough to encompass cyber crimes can only be speculated about at this point. This
concern will be discussed in greater detail in successive chapters.From Mr. Archer's
statements, it is apparent that the officials at the Central Bank of The Bahamas are
at least aware of the wide resources and expertise available to the money
launderer.He is of the opinion that the controls implemented so far can adequately
control the severity of money laundering in The Bahamas.


CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY

Private Banking in the Caribbean Confidentiality for Sale

In October 1986, the United States became the first country in the world to
criminalize money laundering.In the next decade, each of the world's leading


financial centers followed suit, enacting anti-laundering laws and enlisting the aid of
financial institufions in detecfing and preventing money laundering activities. Forced
by these efforts to find new avenues for laundering illicit proceeds, money launderers
turned to the privacy, confidentiality, minimal regulation and security of offshore
banking. [40]

For many of the small nations of the Caribbean, internafional banking is an important
segment oftheireconomicwell-being.lt provides jobs, internafional exposure and
much needed revenue for their treasuries. It is a clean, desirable industry. In order
to attract money offshore, banks in the small countries must offer a more favorable
banking environment. This translates to minimum taxes and maximum
confidentiality, which in turn lead to a higher risk of infiltration by criminally-derived
money seeking to be laundered.

The service offered always includes confidentiality.This is especially true for the
wealthy from other Third World countries seeking a safe haven for their capital.Some
of these countries, most notably Colombia, continue to be plagued by political
instability and violence including kidnappings for ransom in their home countries. [41]
As a consequence, international bankers in

The Caribbean commonly assists their clientele in achieving their confidentiality
goals through such legal vehicles as corporations and trust.These vehicles are used
for legifimate reasons, notably tax and estate planning. Indeed, avoidance of tax
liability and estate complicafions in a foreign country are certainly understandable
and lawful goals, which are preferably obtained from tax preferential jurisdicfions.

This type of environment offers opportunities for certain forms of money laundering.
This generally excludes the cruder and more blatant form of money laundering -
mainly the structuring of cash deposits to avoid the currency reporting laws,
commonly called 'smurfing'[42] simply because international banking is not a cash-
oriented business. By its very nature, internafional banking lends itself to large, non-
cash deposits and to more sophisticated forms of financial transactions using
electronic methods to transfer large sums of money to both offshore and onshore
destinations.

Steps Taken by the United Kingdom to Curb Money Laundering

In Britain, the laundering of the proceeds of drug related crimes was made an
offense by the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986. The Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 also made it an offense to launder the funds of
terrorist organizations. However, now that the European Community's Directive on
Money Laundering has been adopted and brought into law by the Criminal Justice
Act 1993, laundering of the proceeds of all serious offenses is now a specific
criminal offense under English law.

The Importance of the UK's Financial Markets

The United Kingdom authorities have recognized that London's financial markets are
of great importance, not only in relafion to the U.K. economy, but also in relation to
global financial markets.They have also seen the need to protect the financial and
operational integrity of those markets. The provisions relating to the laundering of the
proceeds of drug trafficking have been consolidated and re-enacted in the Drug
Trafficking Act 1994. The 1994 Act provides that it is an offense for anyone to assist
drug traffickers to launder money by assisting them to retain or control the benefits of


their criminal activity, even if this merely amounts to providing advice.

The U.K. is also an attracfive target for money launderers. The attraction for the
money launderer lies in the fact that London's financial markets have the necessary
breadth, depth and openness to be useful at all stages of the money laundering
process, whether it is placement, layering or integration.This attracfion has been
increased by the introduction of the European Union's single market in banking,
investment services and insurance and the lowering of controls and barriers to free
movement of goods, services, people and capital around Europe.

Steps Taken by the United States to Curb Money Laundering

The first time in the world that any nation enacted a specific law against money
laundering was in the fall of 1986 when President Ronald Reagan signed the Money
Laundering Control Act.[43] This Act has subsequently been expanded in each
election year (including elections for Congress 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994), which
suggests at the very least some political consideration for the implementafion and
strengthening of money laundering laws. The law was broader than the common
usage of the phrase money laundering.lt is not limited to cash, but includes all
monetary instruments and all financial transactions.Indeed, in the United States, dirty
money never loses it taint and is never cleansed. In essence, the law criminalizes
banking services to crooks.Each movement of dirty money is a separate crime.

Declaration of War

The United States had effectively declared war on drug trafficking and the
consequential money laundering htmlect which is an almost inevitable by-
product.Equipped with recent legislation and new and powerful law enforcement
weapons, the modus operandi of the USA will undoubtedly have serious
ramifications for many countries of the world, Caribbean neighbours to the south
being no exception. The power of the United States to indict a foreign financial
institufion and to seize its assets world-wide for conducting banking business outside
of the United States is a power to destroy a financial institufion.This can have a
devastafing impact to the financial institution itself, but also on the financial sector of
the home country if the home country is small and dependent, a descripfion which
fits the Caribbean countries all too well.

Casualties of War

As with any war, the major combatants are driven by personal interests.
Consequenfiy, a certain amount of injury to non-combatants or smaller allies is
expected and even inevitable as the adversaries fight among themselves.Indeed, as
each side pushes for victory, the weapons targeted against the enemy at times
cause significant damage to friends and non-combatants. As a consequence to all
of this action, a great risk exists that the fragile economies of the Caribbean nations
may be harmed irreparably because of the unintended harm caused by the United
States when it utilises the extraterritorial jurisdiction of its criminal justice system
against foreign financial institutions of small nafions.

The United States money laundering law specifically provides for extraterritorial
jurisdiction when (a) the conduct is by a U.S. cifizen anywhere in the world or, if by a
non-US. citizen, the conduct occurs, at least in part, in the United States and (b) the
transaction, or a series of related transactions, exceeds $10,000.[44] This means
that the United States asserts its own jurisdiction and will bring money laundering


criminal cases to the United States when at least part of the transaction occurred in
the United States.[45]

Are United States Laws Applicable Outside the USA_

It is true that the Americans have had far more experience in attempfing to deal with
problems such as racketeering and money laundering than any one else. It is also
true that in some respect this experience has not always been impressive in terms of
the results that it has achieved.lt is not surprising, however, that other countries have
turned to the United States for advice. While this is understandable, some countries
have followed United States precedents in a rather unthinking fashion, forgetting the
deficiencies of the American legislation[46] and in particular, the very special
situations that it was designed to confront.The United States law has been more or
less expertly crafted to address specific crime problems which exist or did exist in
the United States; the laws therefore refiectthe social, polifical and constitufional
circumstances of that country.[47] Such laws and their derivative enforcement
policies are not always obviously applicable to different sociefies. Laws that
contemplate the structure and operafions of the Cosa Nostra may have little practical
relevance to the Triads or Yakuza organizations in the Far East.[48] Nonetheless,
many countries have simply ignored this and enacted laws modeled on only a partial
percepfion of the reality in the United States.The inappropriateness of essentially
Western laws which presuppose Western structures and financial systems is clearly
shown in regard to underground banking systems which were developed mainly in
ethnic subcultures because of a natural distrust of the host country's institutions and
nationals.

The United States The Caribbean's Big Brother

Additionally, the United States has used the "speak softly and carry a big stick"
policy promulgated by a former United States president where it literally threatened
neighboring countries to conform to its policies or face isolation or political and
economic suicide.The Bahamas is no stranger to this type of threat from its northerly
neighbor or the apparent disrespect for the sovereignty of The Bahamas. Indeed,
during the Commission of Inquiry in 1984, testimony was given by the then Attorney
General of this belief. The Commissioners concluded:

The government of The Bahamas has obviously resented the fact that the
United States, through its agencies, had been involved in undercover acfivity in The
Bahamas without the knowledge of the Bahamian government.The Attorney General
expressed the view that the undercover tactics employed in Operafion Grouper
without the consent of The Bahamas government constituted a calculated evil use of
The Bahamas for a two-and-a-half-year period by the Drug Enforcement
Administrafion.ln the opinion of the Attorney General, this conduct was but another
example of the lack of respect for the sovereignty of The Bahamas on the part of the
law enforcement agents of the United States.[49]

The policy of the present-day United States government has changed little towards
its Caribbean and Latin American neighbors.During a recent address to the United
Nations, President Bill Clinton promised to clean up tax havens that do not conform
to the United States' request for stronger anti-money laundering laws.Addressing the
United Nations, President Clinton stated: "First, the steps we will take.Yesterday, I
directed our government to identify and put on notice nafions that tolerate money
laundering. Criminal enterprises are moving vast sums of ill-gotten gains through
the internafional financial system with absolute impunity.We must not allow them to


wash the blood of profits from the sale of drugs, from terror or organized
crimes.Nations should bring their banks and financial systems in conformity with the
international anti-money laundering standards.We will work to help them to do
so.And if they refuse, we will consider appropriate sancfions."[50] President Clinton
also directed the United States intelligence agencies to identify companies believed
to be laundering money for the Cali cartel and freeze its assets, thereby "cuffing off
its economic lifelines and stopping our own people from dealing unknowingly with its
companies.

The Americans are even suspicious of the British.A recent report mentioned "deep
suspicion" on Capital Hill on what they perceive to be a lack of British willingness
and ability to provide the requisite degree of regulatory oversight of banking and
financial institufions in territories over which the British could be expected to exercise
a degree of influence.[51] Despite periodic reminders of the UK's special powers of
infiuence, there is not a great deal of regard for the actions of the British in
Washington and New York law enforcement circles; they look upon the effectiveness
of the British with skepficism.

The fallout from the BCCI affair fueled this suspicion and led to a mind-set in certain
quarters of the United States that far from providing a lead in the development of
international anti-money laundering legislafion, the United Kingdom is really a part of
the problem.lt is this perception, among others, that has led to the positive
identification of various offshore financial areas as facilitating the interests of
international organized crime, and these areas will now be targeted and become the
subject of sancfions, among which will be the prohibition of the provision of
electronic fund transfer and dollar clearing services to financial institutions in the
suspected jurisdicfions.[52] If such sancfions were ever imposed on Bahamian
institufions, it may be the beginning of the end for an industry that derives at least
80% of its banking revenue from the United States.


CHAPTER 4 THE BAHAMIAN EFFORTS TO CURB
MONEY LAUNDERING

The Bahamas, a Leading Offshore Center

The Bahamas' standing as an internafional banking and financial center has
spanned more than sixty years, making it one of the world's longest established and
leading offshore centers.[53] Mr. Julian Francis, the Governor of the Central Bank
of The Bahamas, is quoted as saying:

One of the critical factors contributing to the center's attractiveness is its
credibility and integrity. The cultivafion of the center's repute, however, has not
occurred by chance. It has involved a series of calculated policy initiatives refiecting
coloration on the part of the government of The Bahamas, the private sector and the
Central Bank of The Bahamas. One of the most significant steps in this concerted
approach has been the recent enactment of tough money laundering legislation.The
Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act, 1996 and accompanying regulation
have come to be regarded as pioneering legislafion and a blueprint for other
countries contemplating the implementation of anti-money laundering measures.[54]

The Responsibilities of Handling Other People's Money

The legislation included in the Bahamian Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act


1996, together with subsidiary legislation, has imposed a considerable burden on all
those who handle other people's money.Added to this is the development of the law
of restitufion which is increasingly imposing potentially crushing civil liability on those
who receive the proceeds of crime or who knowingly assist in the laundering of such
funds.lt is this author's view that it is this area of law that is likely to place the most
significant burden on those responsible for creating and operating compliance
systems in the financial sector.This is all more significant given the now clear
strategy of many law enforcement agencies to place financial intermediaries in the
front line in the fight against enterprise and organized crime. Those who are
prepared to facilitate financial transacfions for others are required to 'police' the
probity of such services where the possibility exists for the facilitators to experience
the personal pain of civil and possible criminal liability themselves. They are in effect
the gatekeepers of the financial system and have all the traditional responsibilities of
such office.[55]

The Global Nature of the International Criminal

Most cases of money laundering, however, will involve two or more jurisdictions. It
has been claimed that international cooperation between law enforcement agencies
is limited to conferences, visits and intelligence sharing. There is no global law
designed to combat money laundering. Interpol and Europol have no authority to
arrest or prosecute.[56] As a result, criminals who operate internationally are able
to operate if not with impunity, certainly with far less likelihood of capture than if they
were to find that there was a unified system of laws.For this reason, several
jurisdictions, led by the United States, are beginning to reach out beyond their own
geographical borders. This is one of the approaches being advocated that can
begin to put a significant dent in the world of the money launderer. International
cooperation and the strengthening of the international bodies such as Interpol are
other suggested ways of fighting the international criminal.

As previously mentioned, discussion of the processes involved in money laundering
has been limited and derivative outside the United States. The Bahamas
government, like other countries, has often failed to appreciate the complexity of
money laundering in terms of its both character and objectives.The government has
taken for granted a somewhat traditional crime model, which rarely conforms to
reality.This model bases its premise on property and possession ~ a foundafion that
has been made obsolete by the electronic dimension, especially as it relates to
economic crimes. Indeed, given the nature, expertise, and resources of those
involved in the industry of money laundering, there is every incentive for their
services to be adapted to take full account of any new threat ~ including legislation.

The Caribbean Sunny Money Jurisdictions

The Caribbean is seen as an important element in the international financial system,
with major offshore centers such as Curacao, Aruba, the Cayman Islands, and The
Bahamas, directly involved in servicing wholly legitimate businesses on a
considerable scale.Inevitably, some of these centers and others in the region will be
used to launder funds from illegal acfivities, with or without the knowledge of local
professionals or regulatory bodies.

One feature which makes the region particularly attractive is the widespread use of
the United States dollar.Tourism and trade both generate and require United States
currency; the dollar is in widespread circulafion and is readily accepted throughout
the region. Infiow of illicit cash in United States dollars can therefore be readily


absorbed into the local economy, being commingled with American currency from
legitimate activities.Another attractive feature is that some jurisdictions lack all forms
of direct taxation. In The Bahamas, for instance, there are no income taxes,
corporation taxes, inheritance taxes, value added taxes or capital gains taxes.The
government derives its income from license fees and import duty on consumer
items. While this is good for the financial institution, it is also good for the money
launderer because the lack of a structured taxafion system denies the government
the ability of using the tax laws and facilities as a method of investigafing possible
money laundering.

Offshore banking facilifies are attractive to money launderers and despite the efforts
over the last few years to tighten procedures in many offshore jurisdictions in the
Caribbean, some regulatory gaps remain.Some jurisdictions allow offshore bank
licenses despite the lack of a home country supervisor.Standards of regulation vary
sharply across the region and many countries confuse anti-money laundering
regulatory procedures with an anti-investment stance which might inhibit
development capital in-fiows.A similar confusion exists with regard to exchange
control regulations which are being rapidly removed throughout the region. A
country which removes exchange control regulations could still require banks and
business houses to report transacfions which are "unusual" or "suspicious".There is
no real confiict.Governments can retain an interest in knowing the source or origins
of the funds without having any concern about the currency or the denomination of
the bills.

The Power of the Money Launderers and Its Economic Effects

The recent trends identified above have increased the vulnerability of the Caribbean
region to the dangers of money laundering.Consider the consequences of greater
use of local businesses and small local and regional banks and other financial
institutions. These enterprises effectively share in the profits of the drug trafficker,
for they receive a "fee" for a cheap facility. The businesses and financial institutions
concerned are usually significant local concerns in small islands orterritories.Their
principals are often well-connected in the local political scene. In some instances,
the financial institutions have a significant element of public ownership with
government ministers on the board.[57] The criminal proceeds laundered through
such businesses are therefore far more corrosive of local political structures than
they ever were when transiting the international banking community in the form of
cash in suitcases.

Inevitably money laundering on any scale will undermine the financial structure and
the judicial process, buy political protection and will neutralize any local or
international law enforcement effort. Small islands and territories in the Caribbean
slip easily under the control of criminal elements, usually fronted by rich and
apparently successful local businessmen who exercise a degree of political infiuence
through their contribution to the political parties. Increasingly in the region, political
infiuence is determined by the funds available as old polifical dogma tends to
become irrelevant as the costs of polifical campaigns rise.

If money laundering is not curbed, it will destabilize a country's financial systems,
distort market forces to the detriment of legitimate banks and businesses and allow
the criminal to enjoy the proceeds of their unethical actions.[58] The distortion of
the natural market occurs by institutions benefiting from criminal funds attracted at
below market rates (as the criminal is only concerned about entering the legitimate
banking system, not with value for money).Once money laundering becomes prolific,
however, market distortions may become such that normal business planning is


impossible and institufions rapidly begin to become unstable.Because criminal
organizafions typically seek to quickly expand operafions in any area, weaknesses in
financial institufions' systems or procedures can be exploited to the maximum.[59]

The Purpose of the Legislation

It is very interesting that out of the three persons interviewed, two felt that money
laundering was not widespread in The Bahamas. When asked the question: "How
widespread do you thing money laundering is in The Bahamas," Mr. Archer
responded that even though he does not know exactly because of the clandestine
nature of the activity, he reasoned that money laundering is not a major problem in
our banking system and is not widespread.[60] Janis McDougal in answer to the
same question stated categorically that money laundering is not widespread in The
Bahamas.[61]

This led to the question of why this legislation is being introduced in The Bahamas at
this time.The stated reason in the Act itself is to "....facilitate the combating of the
laundering of proceeds derived from illegal acfivity including drug trafficking and for
that purpose to impose upon certain financial institufions regulatory
requirements.[62] McDougal believes that the Act itself is more preventative. She
stated that as a result of the damaging effects of money laundering throughout the
world, including the USA and South America, The Bahamas is aware of the serious
negative effect it has had on the economies of those countries, so The Bahamas
passed the legislation more as a precautionary measure.[63] Archer believes that
the strength of the legislation is its value in terns of its deterrence.[64]

Some Comments on the Bahamian Legislation

A report published in the United States has praised The Bahamas' initiative in money
laundering.The passage of new money laundering legislafion in The Bahamas
reflects an increased emphasis by the government of The Bahamas to combat
money laundering, concluded an international report.And this new legislation should
signiflcantly strengthen money laundering controls said the report released by the
United States Department of State in March, 1996.[65]

However, The Bahamas will need to enforce its new legislation vigorously advised
the report, especially the requirements for recording and reporting transactions.
Further, The Bahamas will need to undergo evaluafion of its money laundering
controls by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force so that it is ensured that
appropriate implemenfing regulations are enacted; this acfion has been postponed
until after implementafion of the new money laundering law, the report added.[66]

The report evaluates the counter-narcotics situation in major drug source and transit
countries around the world.lt concluded that The Bahamas will remain a major transit
country for United States-bound Colombian cocaine and Jamaican marijuana,
despite signiflcant reduction over the past ten years of the volume of drugs moving
through the country.However, if The Bahamas continues to cooperate fully with the
United States government to fight international narcotic cartels, the report stated,
then it will be able to more efflciently carry out its counter narcotics efforts.[67]

The report concludes that "The Bahamas remains a dynamic flnancial services
center and tax haven with bank secrecy laws, conditions conducive to money
laundering. During 1995, the government of The Bahamas extended its efforts to
fulflll the objectives of the 1988 United Nafions Convenfion by adopting stronger


money laundering legislation and moving to strengthen its justice system...but the
Bahamian government has delayed enacfing this legislafion unfil implementing
regulafions are ready and flnancial institutions can be educated on the provisions of
the new law. We expect the government of The Bahamasto enforce this legislation
vigorously," continued the international report on narcofic control strategies, "but it
has only a limited capacity to conduct complex counter-narcofics investigations." [68]

Professor Barry Rider Comments

Professor Barry Rider, Director of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the
University of London, and the author of several books on the subject of money
laundering and the control of financial crimes, crificized The Bahamas government's
new Money Laundering Act."My criticism of your legislafion is that it doesn't go
anywhere far enough. Your cutoff with offenses other than drugs is an offense that
carries five years' imprisonment. Well, that's a pretty serious crime. Most other
jurisdictions that have money laundering legislation, it is usually deflned as any crime
that's indictable," stated Rider.[69] He told the members of The Bahamas Institute
of Bankers that money laundering is a multifaceted problem. Terrorist organizations,
governments and criminal organizations have just as much need to launder money.
"So laundering is not concerned simply just with drug money and that is a very big
mistake that a number of governments make."[70]

Analysis and Opinion

It is important that the United States report noted that The Bahamas only has a
limited capacity to conduct complex counter-narcotics investigations. It is the lack of
sophistication, certainly compared to the well-flnanced money launderer, which is a
major cause of concern.

There will always be someone somewhere who will be prepared to prostitute his or
her integrity and profession by receiving orfacilitafing the transmission of funds from
illicit sources.Indeed, it is more or less a safe bet that there will always be
governments or at least agencies of government that are equally prepared to
compromise. The ultimate solufion in terms of such countries and administrations
must be political, but while we await the arrival of Utopia, the appropriate strategy for
The Bahamas would appear to be to make it so uncomfortable, tiresome and
expensive for the crooks to wash their ill-gotten gains through our banks or flnancial
institufions, they will flnd another more 'attractive' venue.As a consequence of this
strategy, even quite proper and acceptable business will be disadvantaged and
required to submit itself to additional regulatory burdens, risks and expenses.There
is the risk that there will be at least a perception that the system has become
uncompetitive and unattractive to business that has the ability to relocate or at least
move its money through some other channel.

Our goal, at this point should be to make it as difflcult and uncomfortable as possible
for the money launderer.We must accept that we cannot hope to completely
eradicate money laundering. Indeed, none other than the Governor of the Central
Bank of The Bahamas stated: "Of course it will be foolhardy to believe that this
legislafion guarantees that The Bahamas' flnancial industry is now invulnerable to
money laundering activities."[71] As will be noted in successive chapters, this does
not appear to be the view of some of the leaders of The Bahamas who have been
known to make statements that imply that the passing of the money laundering
legislafion is enough to discourage completely the money launderers from ever
attempfing to use the banks and flnancial institutions in The Bahamas to launder


dirty money.
CHAPTER 5 MONEY LAUNDERING AND CORRUPTION -
TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN

Corruption Some Background

The Bahamas, with its history of alleged high level corrupfion and questionable
persons in leadership positions, must deal with the issue of offlcial corruption if it
ever hopes to deal effectively with money laundering, notwithstanding the
legislafion. The enforcement of the Act will be based, in the flnal analysis, on the
polifical will of the country's leaders. If they themselves benefit from corrupfion, it will
make the enforcement of the money laundering legislation ever so difflcult.The
involvement of major international figures in various money laundering schemes is
evolving into an even greater problem than the flnancial crime itself. The bigger
concern being recognized internationally is the connection between money
laundering and offlcial corruption. Once considered a dirty word even to discuss,
corruption now seems to be considered complementary to money laundering.[72]

From the late 1970's and early 1980's, prosecution of drug-money laundering was
tied to aiding and abetting the crime of drug trafflcking.ln later years, with the
passage of the Money Laundering Control Act in the USA, certain "Specifled
Unlawful Acts" were listed as predicate offenses. Banking institutions were
introduced to the term 'willful blindness' and both banks and other businesses were
scrutinized more closely regarding those on behalf of whom they were transacting
business.

Indeed, most banking organizations have become extremely diligent in combating
any hint of money laundering under their 'know your customer' directives. It is clear
that presently the players of major internafional money laundering are not primarily
drug trafflckers.[73] Banking institutions are no longer the main perpetrators of
money laundering schemes. While the arenaof businesses involved in illegal
transactions has expanded, nothing has grown more rapidly that international
corruption activities. The signiflcant other side of the drug-money laundering coin is
corruption and the role played by a host of individuals in an array of corrupt acfivifies.

Corrupfion is nothing new, but in the late 1990's, with privatizafion expanding in
newly democratized governments all over the world, the age-old practice of payoffs
will get even more widespread media attention.Open markets are exposing a variety
of corrupt practices, including bribe-taking by public offlcials.Of even more concern
to banking organizations is that private banking is being used by those who benefit
from corrupt acfivities. Indeed, banks themselves are being identifled as the
surrogate investors of some of the proceeds of crime. Corruption payments, like
dirty money, need to be covered up and money laundering techniques are often the
solution for those involved in corrupt activities.

Transparency in Business

The revelafions of internafional corruption are described as multitudinous in
scope.There is presentty a demand for transparency in business transacfions, as the
standard way that business should be conducted.In the call for transparency,
however, and the moves by many countries to pass laws prohibiting corruption, there
are few examples of punishment for the well-heeled purveyors of payoffs who did not


perform above board. Indeed, Professor B. K. Rider gave several examples of
British flnancial criminals who while admitfing their crimes, were given no more than
what appeared to be a slap on the wrist for laundering millions of pounds.[74] In
recent years, there was very little if any enforcement of the transparency
requirements or similar laws in those countries that passed such laws.

As the stories of high level corruption are discovered and publicized, we see some of
the methods used by perpetrators to legitimize their kickback and bribe money.
Some spectacular examples have occurred throughout the world, demonstrafing
money laundering activities on behalf of some of the most prominent politicians and
businessmen. Very little has been done to address these matters in any substantial
way.

Recent Examples of International High Level Political Corruption

No area of the world is exempt from this type of involvement in money laundering.
Listed below are some recent examples of money laundering and high level political
corruption:[75]

In Mexico, former president Carlos Salinas' brother Raul was arrested and
accused of taking money from both drug trafflckers and foreign companies
wanting to do business in Mexico.
Colombian president Ernesto Samper was accused of accepting $6.5M in
drug money for his election campaign. His Minister of Defense went to
prison. Part of the signiflcant evidence of his crime centered on
internafional banking transactions used to launder these proceeds which
were said to have originated from the Cali cartel.
Within the last three years, presidents have been forced out of offlce in
Brazil and Venezuela because of massive charges of corrupfion and money
laundering.
In South Korea, two former presidents have been convicted of bribery along
with top business leaders.
In India, several former cabinet members have been indicted on money
laundering and corruption charges. In most of these cases, large amounts
of money were sent through various legitimate financial institutions in an
effort to show the funds as originating from legal sources.
Former Indian communicafions minister Sukh Ram was in London receiving
medical treatment when police raided his New Delhi home in August 1995
and found more that $1M cash stuffed in suitcases, plastic bags and
bedding.Ram, who had presided over India's $26 billion telecom
privatization program had been suspected of taking bribes and kickbacks.
The head of Dai-lchi Kangyo Bank Limited in Japan, Kuniji Miyazaki,
committed suicide in June 1997, after two days of questioning about his
role in payoffs to "sokaiya" corporate extortionist Ryuichi Koike.Koike is
suspected of having extorted funds from Nomura Securities Company
Limited.

Political Corruption in The Bahamas

As menfioned previously. The Bahamas has had its share of high-level corruption.
On summarizing the evidence given before the 1984 Commission of Inquiry
appointed to invesfigate allegations of drug trafflcking through The Bahamas, the
Commissioners made certain observafions concerning Kendal Nottage, lawyer and a


senior Cabinet Minister in the Pindling Government:

It may well be that Mr. Nottage did not know of Caruana's (a convicted fraudster and
felon) criminal record and his association with an organized crime family.
Nevertheless, a prudent man, such as we would assume Mr. Nottage to be, would
make inquiries of the character of the person with whom he was dealing behind the
corporate veil and thus avoid the risk of entering into a joint venture with an apparent
criminal and the consequent effect upon the reputation of a person of Mr. Nottage's
standing as a Cabinet Minister.Mr. Nottage now realizes the position and is anxious
to divest himself of his interest in the Islander Hotel.But in the meanfime, the fact is,
whether he realized it or not, [that] (sic) he has been fronting for Caruana. [76]

In another Commission of Inquiry into the operafions of Bahamasair (the national
flag carrier, where politically appointed chairmen were always high level senior
Cabinet Ministers), the Commissioners concluded that two Cabinet Ministers were in
receipt of large kickbacks on the purchase of airplanes from a Canadian
company.[77] The Commissioners recommended that prosecution should be
instituted into the conduct of Darrell Rolle and Philip Bethel (both former Chairmen of
the airline) in respect of the disposifion of the commission paid by Boeing De
Havilland on the sale of Dash-8 aircraft to Bahamasair.[78]

High-level corruption in The Bahamas has been clearly documented. Although the
government has recently changed, the present Prime Minister is himself a former
Cabinet Minister of the PLP. Indeed, most of the FNM are former PLP's who, at one
time or another, broke ranks with the party. Note also that corrupfion, by its very
nature, is mostty brought to light years after the event.The normal course of events,
at least as it pertains to The Bahamas (and indeed other third world countries as
well), is that when a government is changed, a Commission of Inquiry is called to
investigate the wrongdoing of the previous government.

This is to say that such high level corruption could be occurring as this paper is
being written, but because of the nature of the crime, it most likely will remain
uncovered for years.Like money laundering, sometimes other financial crimes set
out to deliberately confuse investigators.Those charged with the detecfion and
investigation of such matters need to be alerted to the implicafions of a process that
has been carefully designed and structured with the objective of minimizing
exposure and thus, the risk of interference. Sadly, Bahamian legislators have,
knowingly or unknowingly, failed to appreciate the complexity of money laundering
and high-level corruption in terms of their both character and objectives. Legislators
have taken for granted a somewhat stylized model that rarely conforms to reality.
Indeed, given the nature and expertise (not to menfion resources) of those involved
in this industry, there is every incentive for their services to be adapted to take full
account of any new threat, including legislation. Their culture is one of evasion and
adaptation.

Analysis and Opinion

Leading political figures have long been the ones to drag their feet in implementing
meaningful laws against money laundering.In my opinion, corruption has slowed
down the legislative train and clouded the true intenfions of government offlcials at
the highest level in many countries, including The Bahamas.While corruption in
international business is commonplace if not widely accepted, the same should not
hold true for legitimate democrafic governments, which were elected, hopefully, for
moral as well as economic reasons. Given the glare of publicity indicating that top


polifical leaders are themselves mired in corruption, these events will certainly not
endorse the principle that laws should be obeyed by all. There is a need for more
laws with teeth.The only effective judge that can objectively assess the correlation of
corruption and money laundering is a discerning vofing public, who should have zero
tolerance when it comes to corrupfion of public offlcials.


CHAPTER 6 -SOME DIFFICULTIES ENFORCING THE LAW

Introduction

This chapter will discuss some of the reasons why The Bahamas may have some
difflculty enforcing its recently enacted money laundering legislation. The difflculties
of explaining a highly complex technical matter to the jury and the difflculfies of the
prosecution and the judges in understanding and applying customary law to cyber
crimes are noted. The tradifionally high levels of alleged corrupfion in the Bahamian
society, and especially in the financial institutions, are also noted. The dependence
of the police on the flnancial institutions to provide flrst-hand information and the
correspondent dependence of the flnancial institutions on their customers (some of
whom will be money launderers) are discussed in this chapter. Educafion may be
the key to informing the population on the societal dangers of money laundering.
This chapter also lists a chart on successful money laundering prosecutions from
several European countries and addresses some fundamental quesfions, including
the main thesis quesfion: Is the money laundering legislation in The Bahamas
enforceable_ Did The Bahamas come under political pressure to pass some money
laundering legislafion_

Organized Crime in The Bahamas

Organized crime constitutes any enterprise, or group of persons, engaged in
continuing illegal activity, which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits
irrespecfive of nafional boundaries.[79] Whether or not the Bahamian police
authorities recognize that organized criminal elements may be operating in The
Bahamas is still unknown.As an entity, there is no speciflc branch on the police force
that deals with organized crime per se, regardless of how it is deflned. Indeed, it
was not until recently (in the 1980's) that the British police (with whom the Bahamian
police identify and mimic as far as possible) flnally developed and organized a
speciflc unit to deal with crime of what is referred to as "the North American
pattern."[80] It was said that senior police offlcers resolutely refused to accept that
there was an organized crime problem in the U.K. until relafively recently.[81]

Although the two sociefies are different, the situation in the U.K. is important for
several reasons, not least that the Bahamian authorities receive most of their training
in the United Kingdom, as have most Commonwealth countries police force
personnel.Some other reasons include the lack of (until recently in Britain) a
centralized intelligence and investigatory capability to assess and interdict organized
crime, very similar legal traditions and laws, and the importance of economic related
activity.[82] Indeed, when quesfioned on the extent of money laundering in The
Bahamas, Detective Inspector Neely of the DEU was quick to point out that "....it is
hard to believe that in a country with a financial center as big as ours that no money
is being laundered."[83] This contradicts the claims of the Central Bank offlcial and
the representative from the Office of the Attorney General who claim that money
laundering is not "a problem in The Bahamas." To date, however, the DEU,
preliminarily set up to deal with drug trafflcking, is the unit of the Royal Bahamas
Police force that has been given the task of invesfigating reports of money


laundering. There is still no speciflc unit to deal with financial crimes such as money
laundering.

The Investigators

The Royal Bahamas Police Force consists of approximately 1,500 individuals, and
the Royal Bahamas Defense Force is manned by 800 persons, who are all
concerned with crimes of violence, illegal alien smuggling, drug trafflcking and a
crime rate that appeared higher in 1997 than ever before in the history of The
Bahamas. The Defense Force is constitufionally limited to the protection of the
country's coastal areas, and although it would arrest drug trafflckers if they were
found on the open seas, the Defense Force would not be involved in the correlating
economic crimes such as money laundering .

The Bahamas is a small developing nation, with a national budget of only
$968M.[84] Of that amount, $61 M[85] is allocated for law enforcement, which
includes salaries, provision of vehicles, housing, maintenance of patrol boats,
maintenance of the air fleet, maintenance of buildings, provision of sub-stations on
the widely dispersed family of islands, armory andtravel expenses.! estimate that at
least 5 percent ofthe police force are used to carry out non-traditional duties, for
example, guarding polificians, chauffeuring the Chief Justice and posing in the front
of historical buildings for the benefit of tourists.Another 10 percent are used to
perform clerical duties, including general offlce duties like payroll, kitchen personnel,
persons manning the police criminal records offlce, traffic police, the Royal Bahamas
Police Band, and other civic and ceremonial duties.With vacations, training, and sick
days in this equation, and the fact that The Bahamas is an archipelago spread over
more than 100,000 square miles with over 700 islands and cays, we effectively have
approximately 1,000 police offlcers on duty at any particular fime.Out of that amount,
the number of them who are even computer literate is anyone's guess. [86]

Money laundering crimes can be very sophisficated, are tedious by nature and may
take a long time to solve.The modern criminal interested in economic crimes may be
using technology to transfer funds to an offshore environment.The police authorifies
must be up-to -date and proflcient with the use ofthe electronic commerce system, if
they are to stand any chance against the experienced cyber crooks.

Added to this is the fight for budgetary allocation.When there is a problem with
violent crime in a society where polificians are after the popular vote, the community
would opt for additional police cars, bulletproof vests and advanced radios, as
opposed to computer training, or the training of cyber cops.Indeed, given the state of
violent crime in The Bahamas, it is likely that the police department will be unable to
justify funding high-tech crime units and more tangible things that the voter can "see
and touch"(for example, police cars and bullet proof vests) will probably get the lion's
share ofthe budget.

The technology used in the force will most likely not be the latest technology
available. When it comes to computer technology, law enforcement management
historically has demonstrated an aversion to being a market leader.[87] To quote a
recent paper:

If computer technology is purchased, it must flrst be proven in the private sector as a
workable solution.Hence, exposure to advancements in this type of technology is
delayed by a mindset only comfortable with proven (that is obsolete)
products.Needless to say, it is difflcult to keep up with a criminal fleeing the scene of


a crime driving the latest model Porsche, when the pursuit vehicle is the equivalent
of a reliable family car.lf this is difflcult to believe, stop by the local police station
some day and ask the desk sergeant who handles complaints about crime on the
Internet. After explaining what that means, be prepared for the following response:
'Sounds like a civil problem to me, sir.Have you contacted your corporate
attorney_'[88]

Additionally, such crimes seldom remain in a single jurisdicfion, and this issue is one
ofthe primary reasons why The Bahamas would have problems investigating this
type of crime. The Police Force is funded by taxpayers from The Bahamas, and the
polificians of today are inclined to ensure that the funds are spent on acfivities that
benefit (or appear to benefit) those who pay the taxes. Unfortunately, money
laundering crimes and investigations do not usually satisfy this philosophy and may
very easily cross geographical borders. It would not be unusual to flnd that an
investigation has spilled over into another jurisdiction because ofthe discovery of
addifional facts or vicfims or that the trail ofthe money launderer leads to some other
country. No longer is it sufflcient to understand the laws of a country; one must be
also be able to articulate the legal concepts of a dozen or more countries where
money launderers may gather because of a lack of extradition treaties or absence of
money laundering legislation.

The Prosecutors

The Office ofthe Attorney General has flnally standardized its computer equipment,
and after two years, has networked its computer systems.The prosecutors, usually
British-trained lawyers, who sfill today do not have a data processing course in their
curriculum, have tradifionally been known to be further behind the technological
curve than any law enforcement department when it comes to in-depth, hands-on
experience with computer technology.[89] Yet these prosecutors are expected to
explain to a lay jury (who on average may not be computer literate) the intricacies of
a complex money laundering operation that is spanning several borders and
involves, say, millions of dollars. Make no mistake, trials that involve sophisticated
money laundering transactions can be highly technical. Terms and phrases that
might even confuse most persons with some computer knowledge must be clarified
in detail so that no jury member walks away confused as to what happened.This is
critical because confused jurors tend to vote not guilty. So we are faced with
prosecutors trying to explain to a jury, concepts that even they do not fully
understand.[90]

Further complicating the prosecution are factors related to the lack of legal
precedent. Judges prefer following legal precedent and very little case law exists on
money laundering crimes, especially cyber crimes involving the electronic commerce
system. As a result, prosecutors and judges have few guidelines to fall back on
when attempfing to apply200-year-old laws to legal situations never envisioned by
the framers ofthe constitution.Being human, most judges are reluctant to formulate
new case law that may be reversed by a higher court because the money launderer
is most likely better able to hire the best legal brains, so most prosecutors and
judges tend to err on the side of caution in these cases and give the money
launderer a break in legal decisions that may otherwise result in prison sentences.
As indicated earlier, even when convicted, the electronic money launderer will
probably be sentenced to community service or a very short time in prison.Indeed, it
may not go as far as the judge because smart lawyers may be able to persuade the
jury that money laundering is a vicfimless crime because no overt violent act
occurred.


Corruption
The issue of high level corrupfion in The Bahamas has already been noted above.
This is another reason why The Bahamas will flnd it difflcult to enforce money
laundering legislafion, because corrupfion itself may have become contagious,
spreading like a cancer to other sectors of society because ofthe example set by
those in authority. Indeed, the history of The Bahamas, from piracy in the 19*^
Century, to rum-running during Prohibition in the USA, to drug smuggling in the
1980's would lend some credence to this. According to Detective Inspector Neely,
when asked how widespread money laundering is in The Bahamas: "Over the years
the police have instigated investigations based upon our knowledge of Bahamian
citizens or others who are alleged to be involved in drug trafflcking. And because of
their way of life, the way they live, their assets, it is reasonable for us to conclude
that they have benefited, or that they have laundered their ill gotten proceeds. And
that is the thrust of it for the time being, but we have not received any reports that A
or B has laundered money in The Bahamas.So when it comes down to how
widespread is money laundering in The Bahamas, we simply do not know. But we do
know that there are lots of people in this country who have benefited from drug
trafficking.But how much money is being laundered or how many complaints of
money laundering are going on in this country, we wouldn't know because those
reports are not coming in as yet."[91]

It is this author's opinion that even the banking institutions themselves may have
been contaminated with the desire for quick and easy money.Most Bahamian
flnancial institufions are staffed with honest persons, although some employees are
not so honest.A dishonest person who works for a flnancial institution that is able to
help launder funds is easily corrupted.A U.S. Senate Committee on Government
Affairs in 1985 noted: "Money laundering is now an extremely lucrative criminal
enterprise in its own right. The Treasury's investigations have uncovered members
of an emerging criminal class professional money launderers who aid and abet
other criminals through flnancial activities.These individuals hardly fit the stereotype
of an underworld criminal. They are accountants, attorneys...and members of other
legifimate professions.They need not become involved with the underlying criminal
activity except to conceal and transfer the proceeds that result from it... money
laundering, for them, is an easy route to almost limitless wealth."[92]

Under the new money laundering legislation, the police are dependent on the
flnancial institufions to be the first line of defense and to report the suspicious
transactions to them. Indeed, the following excerpt from my interview with Detective
Inspector Neely reveals just how dependent the police are on the financial
institufions to be the flrst line of defense in enforcing the new legislafion:[93]

Bain: So you are saying that as a front line defense, you are depending on the
banking institufions to inform you_

Inspector: Certainly! I think that when you talk about raw money laundering, that is,
a person who wants to just launder big money through our country, if it is ill gotten
money, we will have to depend a lot upon the banks and the other institufions
affected by this legislation ~ because they are required to disclose. Without them
disclosing, we the police would not know.What the police do know is that Aor B is a
drug trafflcker, A or B has lots of money, and maybe we can conclude that by the
way they live, by the things that they have, and based on that, we could then begin
our investigafion to target A or B.But what about C and D who never come to the
attenfion ofthe police_ C and D may be moving big sums of money from one bank
to another bank through our jurisdicfion to some other jurisdiction and it can be


illegal money.C and D may never step foot in our country,but may send
representafives to meet with some persons on their behalf just to pass money
through our jurisdicfion.But if the banking institufions become suspicious of these
transactions and they disclose them, it is going to give us a chance and we may get
to know something about C and D.These may very well be persons whom we were
looking for over a period of fime, but we were unable to get that information.Unless
we have sufficient information and we can go by ourselves before a court and satisfy
a magistrate that we need to pry into any person's account, we will be unable to go
into anybody's bank account to determine what is going on.

Bain: Inspector, when you speak you constantly refer to the local money launderer.
What about the sophisticated foreign money launderer coming into The Bahamas or
using electronic mailing systems transferring funds wherever, using our institufions
to transfer money and launder money without coming here, using SWIFT or other
forms of electronic transfer payment systems to do it_What do you have in place to
combat that type of launderer_

Inspector: Well, I have indicated that htmlect of it would not be known to the police
offlcers. That will never come to our attention, unless the institufions through whom
those funds are passing become suspicious of these transactions and make a
disclosure. Without that, we would never know of these persons.

The police obviously are placing a lot of responsibility on the flnancial institufions to
disclose what they (the bankers) see as "suspicious activities." But if the flnancial
institufions themselves have been corrupted, or because of their desire to receive
above average earnings on their activities, this dependence may not prove fruitful or
may not work the way it was designed to work.Financial institutions themselves must
put systems in place to ensure that corrupt staff members arenot secretly using the
institufions to assist the money launderer.One ofthe first steps is training of staff in
the flnancial institutions, because it appears that the front line staff are not
adequately trained. For instance, it was noted at a recent money laundering
conference that most businesses train their senior offlcers and board members, but
the people who are in a much better position to spot money laundering problems are
the people on the front level such as tellers and those in sales.The training that
trickles down to them is not always ofthe highest caliber. Yet it is the people on the
shop floor who will keep the directors out of prison.[94]

Places like The Bahamas also face another problem, which has been noted above
but not dealt with speciflcally. Offshore flnancial centers such as The Bahamas face
the problem that money laundering legislafion may tend to drive away good business
along with the bad. Any organization that complies with the strict letter ofthe
regulations may flnd it very hard to retain and attract clients. If an organization is
known to be making reports to the authorities,[95] then that organization may flnd
that people may not want to use its services.The persons attracted to offshore
centers are those that are very private in their dealings and they may perceive that
the institutions in quesfion may be too free with their personal information. The trick
is for legislators to flnd the right balance between not attracfing the illegal money
launderer, while making the legitimate customer feel at ease with his desired level of
confldentiality.The legislation must not be so restrictive that it paralyses a
blossoming offshore banking industry.

The Bahamas -Arrogant Authorities_

Another thing that stands in the way of enforcing the money laundering legislafion is


the arrogance ofthe Bahamian authorifies, especially those in the government, who
seem to display very little understanding ofthe complexities of a money laundering
operation.This was demonstrated recently when the United States Ambassador to
The Bahamas, Sidney Williams, told a meeting ofthe Joint Task Force (a
USA/Bahamas counter narcotics group) that the United States government is
"disturbed" that criminal organizafions from Russia are attempfing to use certain
Caribbean jurisdictions for money laundering.[96] He also said that the USA is
looking forward to an impartial evaluation ofthe Bahamian money laundering
controls by the Caribbean Financial Actions Task Force later this year. [97] This led
to a very defensive response from the government, when the Deputy Prime Minister
and Acting Prime Minister quickly issued a statement that "The Bahamas
government is not aware of any attempt by criminal organizafions from Russia or
Eastern Europe to inflltrate The Bahamas."[98] He dismissed the Ambassador's
claims in a very non-diplomatic and insulfing way as "nonsense."[99] He went on to
refer to the Money Laundering Act, which he claims has been effective in cutting
money laundering activities[100] (this has never been quantifled by the
government). In the opinion of this author. The Bahamas should welcome the
remarks by the U.S. Ambassador.As the Ambassador serves as his country's offlcial
representafive in The Bahamas, he is unlikely to have made such a statement
without the calculated intent of conveying a very speciflc message to the Bahamian
government. Indeed, with the kind of sophisficated intelligence and security
equipment that has been and is being developed ~ much by the United States ~ it
would come as no great surprise to flnd that the Americans may be tracking and
monitoring the course of illegal activity to and from The Bahamas and the
Caribbean. The editor of The Tribune wrote in response to The Bahamas
government's statement that we should not be surprised by the Ambassador's
comments.[101] She stated that we are just minnows daring to swim from our out
island fish pond into a global ocean and shortly we will flnd our new environment
fliled with "unsavory predators capable of swallowing minnows in a single gulp. [102]
We should be fully aware ofthe dangers, instead of presenfing an "it-can't-possibly-
happen-here" attitude. We should understand that it could happen here
notwithstanding the new money laundering legislafion.

Is Legislation Enough_

The reaction ofthe Bahamian authorities implies that the mere passage ofthe
legislafion would be a panacea for the money laundering problems experienced thus
far. If this is so, this would be considered a simplistic interpretafion ofthe effects of
the legislation that was passed but that The Bahamas may not have the capacity to
enforce. It has already been menfioned that The Bahamas "...has only a limited
capacity to conduct complex counter-narcotics invesfigations," [103] yet this
government appears to feel as if the legislafion and a 2,000-strong police force is the
solution to a complex, global, and high tech problem. Indeed, on political platforms,
the FNM government boasts about the reduction in drug trafflcking through these
islands.Nevertheless, for some reason. The Bahamas is still being designated as "a
major transit country affecting the United States," according to the 1996 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).[104] This apparent paradox led to an
editorial by the editor of a daily newspaper calling for a simple explanation.The editor
wrote:

On the one hand. Deputy Prime Minister Frank Watson is singling praises for The
Bahamas having been successful in turning back the drug trafflckers and puffing into
effect demand reduction programs.And on the other hand. The Bahamas is sfill
being regarded by the USA as a drug transit country affecfing their fight against
drugs.Something is crossed-eyed in this picture.There needs to be an explanation, in


simple language, which all can understand. This should be an easy matter that
could be resolved without fancy footwork and with no glib remarks. This is a matter
that could lend itself to the utmost of nicefies in internafional diplomacy, a matter that
could be kept simple with the necessary question being a simple "Why." Instead of
suggesting that the U.S. authorities explain the continued designation of The
Bahamas, The Bahamas should ask the "why" question outright and demand a
"straight" answer. The Bahamian people expect as much (on all fronts) from the
government they have chosen to represent them. In the flrst place, Bahamians need
to be told the truth about illegal drugs in their country rather that conflicting reports
that change with every announcement.[105]

Without an open mind to the problems and complexifies of money laundering, the
government may be, by its own acfions, or lack of action, making it more difflcult to
conquer the money laundering problem.

Other Considerations

The civil law and in particular tax law can be used with great effect to inhibit the
operation of criminal enterprises. The courts have the power to assess and
confiscate the 'earnings' of'career criminals' under the Money Laundering (Proceeds
of Crime) Act 1996.Tax and fiscal regulations have long been ufilized against
organized crime in the United States and to a lesser extent in other countries.
Countries like The Bahamas that lack any form of direct taxes will be hard pressed to
deal effectively with the money launderer without a structured system of taxation.

One ofthe possible side effects of enhancing the enforcement potential ofthe
authorities in seizing the fruits of criminal activity is that criminal organizations are
encouraged to employ even more sophisficated processes in laundering their ill-
gotten gains. Hence, a potential reducfion has been made in the flow of information
which may be reflned into intelligence and then used to undermine or inhibit the
primary activity ofthe relevant criminal group. This has proved to be a particular
problem in regard to terrorist organizafions and the Colombian cocaine cartels.[106]
This is not to say that the intelligence value of such information is always greater or
signiflcantly more useful than an asset identiflcation and removal program. It does,
however, underline the importance of an integrated and coordinated approach to
these problems and the fact that enforcement ofthe law and the reduction of money
laundering through The Bahamas involves more than the enactment of legislation.

The Politics of Money Laundering Legislation

It was noted above how the Money laundering Control Act in the USA has been
expanded in each elecfion year (including elections for Congress) ~ 1988, 1990,
1992 and 1994 ~ which suggests at the very least some polifical considerafion for
the implementafion and strengthening of money laundering laws. It was also noted
that The Bahamas Act was passed on March 19, 1996, a few days before a well
publicized tour of Latin America to attract offshore business to this country by the
Prime Minister of The Bahamas, the Right Honorable Hubert Ingraham, indicating
that the issue of money laundering is politically sensitive at this fime in the history of
this region.

It should be obvious that the somewhat simplisfic notions of money laundering that
have been reported recentty presuppose a clear understanding of money
laundering. The recent polifical utterances in the Bahamian press after the passing
ofthe money laundering legislation, give credence to the claim by its critics that the


passing ofthe bill is nothing more than cosmetic window-dressing to appease the
uneasy political climate in Washington.According to Detective Inspector Neely, there
may have been "a little 'positive pressure' from the United States to encourage the
Bahamian government to seek some money laundering legislation."[107] When
Janis McDougal was asked the same quesfion, she responded with a cool, "No, I do
not think so,"[108] and was unresponsive to further probing by this author. This can
be understood to some degree, given the political nature of her job at the Offlce of
the Attorney General and the sensitivity ofthe successive Bahamian governments to
criticism, especially from civil servants.This quesfion was not asked to Colin Archer
during his interview, but the true extent to whether political pressure was put on the
government of The Bahamas cannot be known with certainty.We can only examine
the circumstances surrounding the legislafion, the current political climate and the
international efforts being made to 'encourage' countries, especially those with well
developed financial centers to strengthen their money laundering laws.

At present. The Bahamas lacks the expertise and resources to consider seriously
carrying out complex money laundering investigations that will place those
responsible for money laundering in a Bahamian court of law. When one considers
that The Bahamas has an annual budget of just under one billion dollars and a
police force with just two thousand men, compared to organizations that are willing
to spend a billion dollars on one drug transacfion, then the enormity ofthe task
becomes clearer. Given the resources, expertise and motivation ofthe money
launderer. The Bahamas may never have sufflcient resources to launch an effective
fight against money laundering.

Degree of Successful Money Laundering in Several European
Countries

When it comes to prosecutions of money launderers, few countries keep reliable
statistics, often because laundering was only recently deemed a separate crime.
Some experts in money laundering suggest that one ofthe reasons why launderers
are not being prosecuted more frequently is because most anfi-laundering regimes
are sfill in their infancy, but the situation is said to be improving.The tradifional
centers in the Caribbean, for example. The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, are
now moving to make it easier for bankers to report suspect transactions without
breaking bank secrecy laws, and for their flnancial institutions to cooperate with
international agencies more easily.

A report published in 1995 by AUSTRAC, Australia's flnancial intelligence unit,
concluded that between A$1 billion and A $4.5 billion (US$740m-3.3 billion) was
washed through Australia each year.[109] The best estimate was A$3.5 billion. The
report noted that if these figures are accurate, then Australian police were recouping
barely 1 % of all the dirty money that they guessed was flowing into the country a
surprisingly low figure given that Australia is widely acknowledged to have one ofthe
most comprehensive anfi-laundering regimes in the world.[110]

To complete this chapter, I would like to produce some statistics without comments
on the numbers of reported money laundering incidents in the U.K. and two
European nations. These statistics are produced to further the argument that
despite having well developed laws and means to enforce those laws, a well
developed financial sector, educated police, and an intelligence branch ofthe police,
it is still very difflcult to successfully enforce money laundering.


CHAPTER 7 -SUMMARY, DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The goal of this paper was to review the issue of money laundering and how it
relates to financial institufions in the Caribbean region generally, and more
speciflcally in The Bahamas. The complementary issues of corrupfion and electronic
cybercrimes have also been discussed, all in order to address the thesis question:
Is the money laundering legislation in The Bahamas enforceable_ While there is a
over-abundance of informafion available on money laundering, this paper aimed to
provide information from a different angle, showing a creative use ofthe material
currently available and relating it generally to the Caribbean and speciflcally,to The
Bahamas. It is hoped that this paper communicates a useful contribution to the
knowledge of money laundering, and provokes some thoughts on issues to be
addressed by further research.

Some ofthe sub-quesfions that were addressed in this paper focused on the
following:

The deflnifions of money laundering.
The relafionship between money laundering and drug trafflcking.
The modus operandi ofthe known money launderer and the stages of a
typical money laundering operafion.
The influences of computer technology in the process of and the battte
against money laundering.
The effects ofthe electronic commerce system on traditional offshore
banking.
The effect of money laundering on a country's flnancial system.
The internafional flnancial community's approach to money laundering.
The steps taken by the international community to discourage money
laundering.
The role polifical consideration played in the decision to implement or
strengthen money laundering legislation.
The effect ofthe policies ofthe USA on the developing countries ofthe
Caribbean.
The steps taken by The Bahamas to discourage money laundering.
The relafionship between money laundering and corrupfion.
The effectiveness ofthe steps taken by the international community and The
Bahamas effective to reduce money laundering.

A discussion ofthe major issues that affect money laundering in this region led to an
overview ofthe complexifies ofthe modern money launderer, the vast resources
used to cover illegal activities, and some ofthe methods developed both
internationally and regionally to deal with this problem. Included in these issues
were the issue of corruption, internationally and in The Bahamas; the power and
influence ofthe United States with its extraterritorial reach in order to fight money
laundering; and the relafive size and lack of resources and expertise in The
Bahamas.

Given the vast amount of information available on this topic and the abundant
theories as to the best method of curbing money laundering and the correlated
activity of drug trafflcking, several broad areas were used for comment to provide the


focus of this paper. These areas were:
1. money laundering as a global crime used by the sophisficated criminal with
apparently unlimited resources;
2. the issues that led to the passing ofthe legislation on money laundering in
The Bahamas;
3. the legislation itself and the resources committed to enforcing it;
4. the insights obtained from the information reported by the individuals and
institutions set up to monitor and enforce the law in respect to money
laundering; and
5. the actions taken due to those insights.

This led to the speciflc thesis question: Is the money laundering legislafion in The
Bahamas enforceable_ln an effort to address this problem, I reviewed the relevant
literature both internationally and locally, conducted interviews and as a result,
transcribed notes and recorded interview data.Addifionally, with the assistance of
those trained in the law, I also summarized and assessed practically the recent
money laundering legislation with a view of commenfing on its application and
forming an opinion on its enforceability. The major flndings are summarized below:

1. The Bahamas remains a destination of choice for offshore business which
has attracted the money launderer to these islands;
2. Drug trafflcking and money laundering are sfill appears to be prevalent
throughout the Caribbean region, and speciflcally. The Bahamas. The
Bahamas is sfill classifled by the USA State department as a drug transit
locafion, and by extension, a center for money laundering.
3. High level political corrupfion has been an integral part ofthe Bahamian
society for a signiflcant length of time.There confinue to be charges and
indictments both inside and outside The Bahamas of leading politicians and
high ranking civil servants.
4. The ramiflcations ofthe electronic commerce system may have not been
adequately addressed by the Bahamian authorities. The Bahamian police
authorifies are still overly concerned with crimes of violence and may not
have adequately addressed economic crimes.
5. The Bahamas may not have sufflcient resources, flnancial and otherwise, to
adequately enforce the new legislafion and regulations that pertain to
money laundering in The Bahamas.
6. Because case law and legal precedents are still evolving, the prosecutors
and the judges themselves may not be able to present adequately cases of
highly technical money laundering to a jury of laymen.

Discussion and Conclusion

Generally speaking, in order to succeed in reducing the instances of money
laundering in The Bahamas and the Caribbean, the following general statements,
which should be acceptable to both the offshore and onshore institufions and
governments, must hold true.There must be good cooperafion between onshore and
offshore jurisdictions for all non-tax related inquiries of a serious nature.There must
be good cooperation between most tax havens and onshore authorifies in relation to
anti-money laundering activities. There must be fair cooperation between onshore
and offshore authorities if the transactions being investigated are the proceeds of
acts, which would be a crime in both jurisdicfions.

Many ofthe larger offshore jurisdictions are signing speciflc bilateral treaties with


major onshore jurisdictions to facilitate the provision of assistance, in relation to
trans-border crimes in speciflc circumstances. It is simply in their own commercial
interest to do so. No serious offshore jurisdiction will continue to develop and
flourish if it can only do so by condoning criminal behavior.lnternational cooperafion
and the strengthening ofthe international bodies such as Interpol and Caribpol are
some ofthe suggested ways of fighting the international criminal generally and the
international money launderer speciflcally.

The processes involved in laundering money, or other forms of wealth, are not
necessarily abusive or evil in themselves. Simply keeping wealth secret may not be
objectionable in either a legal or moral sense. In certain circumstances, it might well
be prudent and beneflcial.lt is also the case that law enforcement, even in the widest
sense ofthe word, will never have sufflcient resources to police all transacfions
designed to obscure the source of funds obtained from serious criminal activity. It
must be remembered that while the proceeds of illicit trafficking in drugs are vast,
other forms of criminal activity such as terrorism, extortion, theft, art and cultural
property-related crimes, securities frauds, and counterfeiting also produce sums well
beyond comparison with many national economies. Additionally, laws and
enforcement policies which have been fashioned to address money laundering
through convenfional banking systems are of little practical relevance in the case of
cyber crimes. Thus, whatever devices the law has for detecting and controlling
money laundering must be deployed strategically to best effect. Those crimes that
are highly dependent upon the reinvestment of washed funds, which are clearly
referable to economic motives, are most suscepfible to control through interrupting
the flnancial pipeline.

It must also be recognized that it is interruption ofthe flow of funds that is likely to
achieve the most effective results. The delaying of funds in transmission so as to
cause liquidity problems for those engaged in operating a criminal enterprise is likely
to be more effective in harming the criminal activity in quesfion than in initiating
difflcult and expensive judicial proceedings which may or may not result in a
forfeiture order.

Even in situations where it is most unlikely that judicial proceedings will be feasible
whether for evidential, jurisdictional, resource or even polifical reasons, it must never
be forgotten that the intelligence value of information relating to the funding of
enterprise and serious crime may be of crifical value, both strategically and
tacfically. As has already been pointed out, one ofthe possible side effects of
enhancing the enforcement potential ofthe authorities in seizing the fruits of criminal
activity is that criminal organizafions are encouraged to employ even more
sophisticated processes in laundering their ill-gotten gains.

The most that can be hoped for is that a combination of devices will serve to render
the objecfionable stages ofthe laundering process relatively uneconomic.There will
always be someone somewhere who will be prepared to prostitute his or her integrity
and profession by receiving orfacilitafing the transmission of funds from illicit
sources.Indeed, it is more or less a safe bet that there will always be governments or
at least agencies of government that are equally prepared to compromise. The
ultimate solufion in terms of The Bahamas must be political, and the appropriate
strategy would appear to be to make it so uncomfortable, firesome and expensive for
the crooks to wash their ill-gotten gains through Bahamian banks or flnancial
institufions, they will flnd another more 'attractive' venue. As a consequence of this
strategy, even legifimate and acceptable business will be disadvantaged and
required to submit itself to additional regulations, risks and expenses.There is the
risk that there will be at least a perception that the banking and flnancial systems in


The Bahamas have become uncompetitive and unattractive to business that has the
ability to relocate or at least move its money through some other channel.

It may be impossible to stop effectively the laundering of money in any country ofthe
world, and according to a United States report menfioned above. The Bahamas has
only a limited capacity to conduct complex counter narcofics and, by extension,
complex counter money laundering investigations. While The Bahamas should not
expect to halt money laundering and its penetrafion into the legitimate economy of
the country, it intends to make such a proposition as difflcult as possible, given its
limited resources, both in terms of expertise and flnances. The issue of whether
The Bahamas will be able to enforce the legislafion will unveil itself in time, because
the anti-laundering efforts are sfill in its infancy.At the time of writing this paper, two
cases of money laundering came before the court and were both dismissed because
of lack of evidence, which is not surprising given the lack of confidence and training
of the judiciary in dealing with matters of a highlytechnical nature. There is, at
present, no clear and unequivocal answer to the thesis quesfion: Is the money
laundering legislafion in The Bahamas enforceable_

If by luck, perseverance or some miracle, the money launderers are caught, the
lawbreakers will be dealt with under the law to the best of the ability of the law
enforcement agencies in The Bahamas. The bottom line is that it is now an offense
to launder money through banks and other flnancial institutions in The Bahamas.
The financial community in The Bahamas and Caribbean must learn to say "no"
money laundering, in the same way that people say "no" to drugs.

It is hoped that this paper provokes the interest of students studying corporate
flnance or banking to continue the research in this area, especially in regard to the
development and training of cyber cops and the real effect the recent money
laundering legislafion has had to decrease the incidence of money laundering
through this region.Another recommended research topic is to review the ways to
strengthen the CFATF and other similar bodies in the war against the modern money
launderer.

John S. Bain bio

John S. Bain is Senior Vice-President of Americas Internafional Bank Corportion.
This paper is an extracted from his Dissertafion ofthe same name submitted to the
University of Wales and the Manchester Business School as a part fulflllment for a
Master of Business Administrafion degree in 1998. Some of the issues dealt with
may have changed or been amended since that time. Some ofthe names of senior
civil service personnel are flctifious. Mr. Bain is a British and American trained
Chartered Accountant and holds professional qualiflcafions in Information Systems.

Footnotes

[1] K. W. Munroe, The Extraterritorial Reach ofthe United States Anti -Money
laundering Laws, (MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, B. Rider & M. Ashe)Sweet &
Maxwell 1996

[2] This was revealed in a speech given by Dr. Peter Maynard, attorney at law and
the former Bahamas representative to the United Nations, during a money
laundering conference by The Bahamas Institute of Bankers on March 20, 1997, in
The Bahamas.


[3] R. Parlour (Butterworth) International Guide to Money Laundering Law and
Practice (1995)p. vi.

[4] Dr. Peter D. Maynard, The Law Against Corruption and Money Laundering in the
Caribbean with Special Reference to The Bahamas (A paper submitted to the 7*^
Internafional Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, February, 21' 1997 held in
Miami, Florida),

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bahamas Business Guide A Guide to Doing Business in The Bahamas and the
Government's Economic and Financial Policies (Commonwealth Publications Ltd. -
1979 Page 2)

[8] See P. Eddy; H. Sabogal; S. Walden, The Cocaine Wars, Bantam Books
(1988) p. 94

[9] The Nassau Guardian, 2 July 1997 p. 2

[10] Steven W. Quickel, The Bahamas: On Course to the Top, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR Sept. 1991 ,at S2 [as quoted in Money Laundering Asset Forfeiture &
Internafional Financial Crimes F. N. Baldwin Jr. & R. J. Munroe Center for
Internafional Financial Crime Studies, College of Law, University of Florida.
Bahamas ~ 3(Oceana Publicafions, 1996) ]

[11] Dr. Peter D. Maynard, The Law Against Corruption and Money Laundering in
the Caribbean with Special Reference to The Bahamas. (A paper submitted to the
7*^^ Internafional Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, February, 21' 1997).

[12] The Nassau Guardian 16"" December, 1995

[13] Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts Overseas
(Letter Report 05/24/96, GOA/GDD-96-105). Comments from the Offlce ofthe
Comptroller ofthe Currency in a letter addressed to the Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, House of Representatives on 24 May, 1996.This deflnifion was
downloaded from the money laundering web site on the Internet 0-

[14] B. Rider & M. Ashe, Money Laundering Control, (1996) Sweet & Maxwell.

[15] The Central Bank of The Bahamas, Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for
Banks in The Bahamas (Revised) (1996) (Page 1, para. 3). This was issued by The
Central Bank of The Bahamas in response to the request for additional clariflcation
ofthe duties expected by flnancial institutions. This document was issued on 10
December, 1996, six days before the Act came into force.

[16] C. A. Intriago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking
Centers.OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA(Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997.

[17] Ibid.

[18] See Nigel Morris-Catterill, The Global Threat to the Banking Community.


(money laundering web site on the Internet) [1995].
[19] As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering
Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.] See generally J. Can,How to Recognize a Money
Launderer (1989) I.F.L.R.I.O.; R. Naylor, Bankers, Bagmen, andBandits{^989)
Black Rose; R. Franklin,Profffs of Dece;f(1990)) Heinemanni; and D. Francis,
Entrepreneurs (1988) Macmillan.

[20] As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering
Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. Rowan Bosworth-Davies, Money Laundering, The
Use ofthe Financial Service Market to Disguise the Proceeds of Funny Money {^ 992)
Richards Butler; R. Laccy, Little Man-Meyer Lansky and the Gangster Life (1991)
Century; and D. Henry, America's Hottest Export Funny Money Stocks, FORBES
23 September, 1985 page 38.

[21] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet
& Maxwell) 1996.

[22 ] [As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering
Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.] L. Welt, Blocked Funds (1990), Euromoney, is a
flrst rate account of how to 'unblock' funds. There are other publications speciflcally
marketed as providing expert advice on how to launder and hide money.

[23] It has been claimed that certain banking and other interests went to
considerable efforts to close down criticism ofthe BCCI's activifies during 1988 and
1989. Indeed it has been alleged that a smear campaign against journalists and
authors was sponsored on this basis; G, Modolo, La Republica 28 July 1991.

[24] The Central Bank of The Bahamas, Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for
Banks in The Bahamas (Revised)

(1996).

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet
& Maxwell) 1996.

[28] Ibid.

[29] [As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering
Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. ] Many jurisdicfions impose reporting obligations in
regard to transfers of cash or valuable securities above a certain value. See
generally US Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act (31 USC 5212 et
seq.) and section 60501 ofthe US Internal Revenue Code; The [Australian] Case
Transactions Reports Act of 1988. At the international level, attention is being given
to record keeping and monitoring of cash transactions by non-flnancial institutions
pursuant to Recommendation 11 ofthe Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering (G-7 Summit Group).
[30] C. A. Intriago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking


Centers.OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA(Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997.

[31] Ibid.

[32] As cited on the brochure introducing the Fifteenth International Symposium on
Economic Crime scheduled for 14 September, 1997 at the Jesus College,
Cambridge.

[33] W. R. Spernow, Cyber crooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will
Be Unable to Cope with Threats to the Electronic Commerce Sysfem.This paper was
presented at the 7"^ International Oceana Conference on Money Laundering,
February, 21^1997).

[34] Ibid.

[35] C. A. Intriago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking
Centers.OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA(Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Quoted from an interview with Colin Archer, Deputy Manager, Bank Supervision
Department, The Central Bank of The Bahamas on 17 December, 1996.

[40] C. A. Intiago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking
Centers,OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA (Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997.

[41] [As cited by K. Munroe The Extraterritorial Reach ofthe United States Anti
Money Laundering Laws -MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell,
1996)]"ln the mist of unprecedented improvement of economic conditions which took
place [in Columbia], signs of deep social malaise became ominously apparent;
kidnapping for ransom increased drastically, private para-military groups appeared,
the private security industry boomed, judges were frequently assassinated,
bankruptcies of large manufacturing and flnancial flrms became common, and the
general level of violence in the society increased."

[42] [As cited by K. Munroe The Extraterritorial Reach ofthe United States Anti
Money Laundering Laws -MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell,
1996)] See generally Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal
Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions (1989) p. 14. University of Florida Law
Review 287

[43] K. W. Munroe, The Extraterritorial Reach ofthe United States Anti -Money
Laundering Laws (MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, B. Rider & M. Ashe) Sweet
& Maxwell 1996.

[44] [As cited by K. Munroe]18 USC § 1956(f).

[45] On 29 March, 1989, a criminal indictment against a private Colombian bank.
Banco de Occident, SA, and its wholly owned Panamanian subsidiary Banco de


Occidente (Panama), SA, was unsealed in Attanta.The indictment accused both
banks of two conspiracy counts which alleged the laundering ofthe proceeds of drug
transactions.The indictment also included a criminal forfeiture charge.

[46] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet
& Maxwell) 1996, Page 11.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Japan Dope Dealers Delight-Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March, 1990
pg. 12 See in particular B. Rider, Organized Crime, memorandum submitted to
Home Affairs Select Committee(1994) HMSO. [As Quoted by B. A. K. Rider Ibid.]

[49] Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Bahamas Government Publications
Nassau Bahamas (1984) Pg. 353.

[50] See Clinton to Clean-up TaxHavens, The Money Laundering Bulletin No. 22
(January, 1996).

[51] See Rowan Bosworth-Davies US Demands for Offshore Cooperation,
TheMoney Laundering Bullefin No. 22 (January, 1996).

[52] Ibid.

[53] J. W. Francis, Governor of The Central Bank of The Bahamas Adoption of
Money Laundering Legislation in The Bahamas. OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA
(Vol. 2 No. 6) May/June 1997.

[54] Ibid. (Pg. 22)

[55] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime MONEY LAUNDERING
CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996, Page 11.

[56] See Nigel Morris-Cotterill, The Global Threatto the Banking Community{mor\ey
laundering web site ) [1997].

[57] See the two Bahamian Commissions of Inquiries referred to throughout this
paper.

[58] G. Coles, Crackdown on Crime, SHORE TO SHORE, the official publication of
The Offshore Institute, July 1997, Page 21.

[59] Ibid.

[60] An interview with Colin Archer, Deputy Manager, Bank Supervision
Department, The Central Bank of The Bahamas on 17 December, 1996.

[61] An interview with Debra McDougal, Senior Council Offlce ofthe Attorney
General 18 December, 1996.

[62] The Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime ) Act, 1996 (Page 1).


[63] An interview with Debra McDougal, Senior Council Offlce ofthe Attorney
General 18 December, 1996.

[64] An interview with Colin Archer, Deputy Manager, Bank Supervision
Department, The Central Bank of The Bahamas on 17 December, 1996.

[65] The Nassau Guardian, March 18, 1996 Pg. 14A..

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

[69] The Nassau Guardian, March 28, 1996 pg. 4A.

[70] Ibid.

[71] J. W. Francis, Governor ofthe Central Bank of The Bahamas, Adoption of
Money Laundering Legislation in The Bahamas.OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA
(Vol. 2 No. 6) May/June 1997 (Pg. 22).

[72] T. V. Cash, Money Laundering and Corruption in 1997 Two Intertwined
Principles (1997). A paper presented at the Oceana Conference on Money
Laundering and International Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Professor B. A. K. Rider produced newspaper articles and other excerpts to
claim that several high proflle cases involving prominent citizens ended somefimes
with 'community service' as the only punishment.Some of those who received jail
terms spent fime in 'luxury prisons' equipped with TV and ate gourmet meals.These
comments were included in a paper presented by Dr. Rider at the Oceana
Conference on Money Laundering and Internafional Financial Crimes held in Miami
in February, 1997.

[75] T. V. Cash, Money Laundering and Corruption in 1997 Two Intertwined
Principles (1997). A paper presented at the Oceana Conference on Money
Laundering and International Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997.

[76] Report of the Commission of Inquiry Vol. 1: Appointed to Inquire Into The
Illegal Use of The Bahamas for the Transshipment of Dangerous Drugs Destined for
the USA, (December, 1984).

[77] Report of Commission of Inquiry Vol. 1 (Bahamasair): Appointed to Inquire into
the Pracfices, Procedures, Policies, Systems and Mechanisms, Financial and
Otherwise of Bahamasair Holdings Limited, The Hotel Corporation of The Bahamas
and The Bahamas Telecommunicafions Corporation (August, 1995). This
Commission resulted in the two persons named above being denied running fickets
in the 1997 general elections and contributed to the defeat ofthe PLP.


[78] Ibid.
[79] G. Coles, Crackdown on Crime."SHORE TO SHORE, the offlcial publicafion of
The Offshore Institute, July 1997, Page 21. This is the NCIS deflnition of organized
crime as submitted to the U.K. government's Home Affairs Select Committee.

[80] B. A. K. Rider, The Enterprise of Crime, MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL .
Edited by B. Rider & Michael Ashe (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] An interview with InspectorChristopher Neely Detecfive Inspector Neely
heads the Drug Enforcement Unit ofthe Royal Bahamas Police Force. He was
interviewed on 18 December, 1996.

[84] The Nassau Guardian, 20 June, 1997

[85] The 1997/98 Budget.TUe Nassau Guardian, 20 June, 1997.This is the amount
budgeted for 1997/98 and the amounts for previous years was even less ($57M for
1996/97).

[86] This author was unable to get any speciflc answers on the percentage of police
offlcers who are computer literate, excepta comment by Detective Inspector Neely
to say that it was "an insigniflcant amount."

[87] W. R. Spernow Cyber crooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will
Be Unable to Cope with Threats to the Electronic Commerce System.A paper
presented at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and International
Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997.

[88] Ibid.

[89] In an attempt to alleviate this problem, new computers were recently granted to
the Office ofthe Attorney General by the U.S. Embassy.These new computers have
been given to prosecutors and to lay magistrates. They sit on the magistrate's desk,
hardly used, because no one ever showed them what to do with this new technology
or how it could assist them in their work.

[90] W. R. Spernow Cyber crooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will
Be Unable to Cope with Threats to the Electronic Commerce System.A paper
presented at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and International
Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997.

[91] An interview Inspector Christopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely heads
the Drug Enforcement Unit ofthe Royal Bahamas Police Force. He was interviewed
on 18 December, 1996.

[92] N. Clarke The Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation. MONEY
LAUNDERING CONTROL, Edited by B. Rider & Michael Ashe (Sweet & Maxwell)
1996.


[93] An interview Inspector Christopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely heads
the Drug Enforcement Unit ofthe Royal Bahamas Police Force. He was interviewed
on 18 December, 1996.

[94] Comments by Ahmed ElAmin quoting Moris-Cotterill from his book How Not to
be a Money Launderer,MONEY LAUNDERING: THE SOLUTION LIES IN
EDUCATION. (From the money laundering web site on the Internet)
(Http:/be rmudasu.org/issues/oct11 -96/moneylaunder.html).

[95] It is no doubt that eventually the word will get out as to which institutions make
reports and those who do not.This is where the high level corruption is most
prevalent in governmental departments. See the two recent Commissions of
Inquiries for further evidence of this.

[96] See The Nassau Guardian 28 June, 1997 page 1. This meeting was held at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was co-chaired by the U.S. Ambassador and the
Bahamian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janet G. Bostwick

[97] Ibid.

[98] See The Tribune 30 June, 1997 and an article in The Tribune entitled "My Turn"
by Nicki Kelly8 July, 1997.

[99] See The Punch 24 July, 1997.

[100] See The Tribune, 30 June, 1997 page 1.

[101] See The Tribune, 9 July, 1997.

[102] Ibid.

[103] See The Tribune, 30 June, 1997 page 1.

[104] See The Nassau Guardian, 28 June, 1997 page 1

[105] See The Nassau Guardian 2 July 1997 Editorial.

[106] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime, MONEY LAUNDERING
CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.

[107] An interview with InspectorChristopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely
heads the Drug Enforcement Unit ofthe Royal Bahamas Police Force.He was
interviewed on 18 December, 1996.

[108] An interview with Janis McDougal, Senior Council Offlce ofthe Attorney
General 18"" December, 1996.

[109] See Money Laundering That Infernal Washing Machine, The Economist, July
26"'1997, p.20
[110] Ibid.




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P36_SP00041 1659
P36_ST00045 1674 202 Laundering
P36_SP00042 1876
P36_ST00046 1892 130 Control
P36_SP00043 2022
P36_ST00047 2039 126 (Sweet
P36_TL00005 559 492
P36_ST00048 25 &
P36_SP00044 639 589
P36_ST00049 654 158 Maxwell)
P36_SP00045 812 597
P36_ST00050 1
P36_SP00046 842
P36_ST00051 852 996,
P36_SP00047 927 595
P36_ST00052 946 92
P36_SP00048 1038
P36_ST00053
P36_SP00049 1067
P36_ST00054 1079
P36_SP00050 1090
P36_ST00055 1102 585 4 .
P36_TL00006 665 153
P36_ST00056 [47]
P36_SP00051 703
P36_ST00057 697 71 Ibid.
P36_TL00007 771 1520
P36_ST00058 [48]
P36_SP00052 809
P36_ST00059 694 111 Japan
P36_SP00053 805
P36_ST00060 820 788 -
P36_SP00054 832 792
P36_ST00061 845 Dope
P36_SP00055 942
P36_ST00062 957 141 Dealers
P36_SP00056 1098 801
P36_ST00063 1112 Delight
P36_SP00057 1241
P36_ST00064 1252 77 -Far 0.51 0738
P36_SP00058 1329
P36_ST00065 1342 137 Eastern
P36_SP00059 1479
P36_ST00066 1497 181 Economic
P36_SP00060 1678
P36_ST00067 1692 Review,
P36_SP00061 1833 807
P36_ST00068 1852 40
P36_SP00062
P36_ST00069 1909 March,
P36_SP00063 2030
P36_ST00070 2049 86 1990
P36_TL00008 819 1442
P36_ST00071 826 51 31 pg.
P36_SP00064 666 857
P36_ST00072 685 41
P36_SP00065 726
P36_ST00073 741 70 See
P36_SP00066 811
P36_ST00074 828
P36_SP00067 854
P36_ST00075 872 169 particular
P36_SP00068 1041
P36_ST00076 1055 32
P36_SP00069 1087
P36_ST00077
P36_SP00070 1210 855
P36_ST00078 1229 191 Organized 0.99 100000000
P36_SP00071 1420
P36_ST00079 1433 116 Crime, 0.90 000006
P36_SP00072 1549
P36_ST00080 1567 252 memorandum
P36_SP00073 1819
P36_ST00081 176 submitted
P36_SP00074 2010
P36_ST00082 2025 to
P36_TL00009 867 1511
P36_ST00083 Home
P36_SP00075 897
P36_ST00084 735 Affairs
P36_SP00076 851
P36_ST00085 866 113 Select
P36_SP00077 979
P36_ST00086 993 317 Committee(1994) 000000000000000
P36_SP00078 1310 905
P36_ST00087 1327 HMSO.
P36_SP00079 1457
P36_ST00088 1475 55 [As
P36_SP00080 1530
P36_ST00089 1546 131 Quoted
P36_SP00081 1677 899
P36_ST00090 1695 by
P36_SP00082 1736
P36_ST00091 1751
P36_SP00083 1783
P36_ST00092 1799
P36_SP00084
P36_ST00093 1853
P36_SP00085 1885
P36_ST00094 1903 98 Rider
P36_SP00086
P36_ST00095 2013 884
P36_SP00087 2024 888
P36_ST00096 84 Ibid.]
P36_TL00010 1416
P36_ST00097 [49]
P36_SP00088 1011
P36_ST00098 695 125 Report
P36_SP00089
P36_ST00099 39
P36_SP00090 870 1003 6
P36_ST00100 876 57
P36_SP00091 933
P36_ST00101 949 224 Commission
P36_SP00092 1173
P36_ST00102 1188
P36_SP00093 1226 8
P36_ST00103 1234 132 Inquiry, 0.93 00000006
P36_SP00094 1366
P36_ST00104 1384 171 Bahamas
P36_SP00095 1555
P36_ST00105 1571 226 Government
P36_SP00096 1797
P36_ST00106 1812 219 Publications 000000000000
P36_TL00011 1021 621
P36_ST00107 135 Nassau
P36_SP00097 750 1051
P36_ST00108 768
P36_SP00098 939
P36_ST00109 955 114 (1984)
P36_SP00099 1059
P36_ST00110 Pg.
P36_SP00100 1143
P36_ST00111 1160 76 353.
P36_TL00012 1127 1486
P36_ST00112 [50]
P36_SP00101 1165
P36_ST00113
P36_SP00102 765 1157
P36_ST00114 783 124 Clinton
P36_SP00103 907
P36_ST00115 921
P36_SP00104
P36_ST00116 970 Clean-up
P36_SP00105 1136
P36_ST00117 1152 214 TaxHavens, 0.73 0062045403
P36_SP00106 1163
P36_ST00118 1382
P36_SP00107
P36_ST00119 1467
P36_SP00108 1589
P36_ST00120 1604
P36_SP00109 1806
P36_ST00121 1824 Bulletin
P36_SP00110 1954
P36_ST00122 No.
P36_SP00111
P36_ST00123 2058 43 22
P36_TL00013 1175 296
P36_ST00124 (January,
P36_SP00112 1213
P36_ST00125 110 1996). 000004
P36_TL00014 1281 1357
P36_ST00126 [51]
P36_SP00113 1319
P36_ST00127
P36_SP00114 1311
P36_ST00128 782 123 Rowan
P36_SP00115
P36_ST00129 923 310 Bosworth-Davies
P36_SP00116 1233
P36_ST00130 1250 US 0.54 45
P36_SP00117
P36_ST00131 1318 Demands 0.75 0520440
P36_SP00118 1494
P36_ST00132 1508 49 for 0.81 050
P36_SP00119 1557
P36_ST00133 1570 154 Offshore 0.72 70003505
P36_SP00120 1724
P36_ST00134 1741 231 Cooperation, 0.65 555350002543
P36_TL00015 613 1330 1009
P36_ST00135 196 TheMoney
P36_SP00121 1368
P36_ST00136 823
P36_SP00122 1025
P36_ST00137 1043 Bullefin 00000770
P36_SP00123 1360
P36_ST00138 1191
P36_SP00124 1249
P36_ST00139 1266
P36_SP00125 1309
P36_ST00140 1325 167
P36_SP00126 1492
P36_ST00141
P36_TL00016 1436
P36_ST00142 [52]
P36_SP00127 1474
P36_ST00143
P36_TL00017 1542
P36_ST00144 [53]
P36_SP00128 1580
P36_ST00145 J.
P36_SP00129 1572
P36_ST00146 48 W.
P36_SP00130 785
P36_ST00147 803 Francis,
P36_SP00131 944
P36_ST00148 961 173 Governor
P36_SP00132 1134
P36_ST00149 1146
P36_SP00133 1181
P36_ST00150
P36_SP00134 1260
P36_ST00151 Central
P36_SP00135 1405
P36_ST00152 1422 Bank
P36_SP00136 1514
P36_ST00153 1528
P36_SP00137
P36_ST00154 1573
P36_SP00138 1642
P36_ST00155 1658 172
P36_SP00139 1830
P36_ST00156 1856 Adoption 0.60 54530254
P36_SP00140 2019
P36_ST00157 2033 0.71 50
P36_TL00018 1513
P36_ST00158 0.56 55522
P36_SP00141 739 1627
P36_ST00159 207 0.76 0015020355
P36_SP00142
P36_ST00160 Legislation 00000000000
P36_SP00143 1166
P36_ST00161 1180
P36_SP00144 1619
P36_ST00162 1228 65
P36_SP00145 1293
P36_ST00163 1308 Bahamas. 0.96 00000003
P36_SP00146 1489
P36_ST00164 1519 228 OFFSHORE
P36_SP00147 1747
P36_ST00165 1763 179 FINANCE
P36_SP00148 1942
P36_ST00166 1957 170 CANADA
P36_TL00019 1638
P36_ST00167 (Vol.
P36_SP00149 1676
P36_ST00168 710 2
P36_SP00150 730 1668
P36_ST00169 747
P36_SP00151
P36_ST00170 821 6)
P36_SP00152
P36_ST00171 175 MayJune 0.92 00060000
P36_SP00153 1047
P36_ST00172 1065 96 1997.
P36_TL00020 1744 313
P36_ST00173 [54]
P36_SP00154 1782
P36_ST00174
P36_SP00155 1774
P36_ST00175 786 (Pg.
P36_SP00156 856
P36_ST00176 22)
P36_TL00021 1850 1354
P36_ST00177 [55]
P36_SP00157 1888
P36_ST00178
P36_SP00158 1880
P36_ST00179
P36_SP00159
P36_ST00180
P36_SP00160
P36_ST00181
P36_SP00161 1886
P36_ST00182
P36_SP00162
P36_ST00183
P36_SP00163
P36_ST00184
P36_SP00164
P36_ST00185 1286
P36_SP00165 1344
P36_ST00186
P36_SP00166
P36_ST00187
P36_SP00167
P36_ST00188 MONEY
P36_SP00168 1687
P36_ST00189 1701 268 LAUNDERING
P36_TL00022 1898 848
P36_ST00190 201 CONTROL
P36_SP00169 815 1928
P36_ST00191
P36_SP00170 956 1936
P36_ST00192
P36_SP00171 995
P36_ST00193 1010 159
P36_SP00172 1169
P36_ST00194 1996,
P36_SP00173 1284 1934
P36_ST00195 1302
P36_SP00174 1394
P36_ST00196 1412
P36_SP00175
P36_ST00197 1435
P36_SP00176 1446
P36_ST00198 1458 1924
P36_TL00023 2004
P36_ST00199 [56]
P36_SP00177
P36_ST00200 718
P36_SP00178 2034
P36_ST00201 89 Nigel
P36_SP00179 894
P36_ST00202 911 276 Morris-Cotterill, 0.97 00000000022000000
P36_SP00180 1187 2040
P36_ST00203 66
P36_SP00181 1273
P36_ST00204 1290 118 Global
P36_SP00182
P36_ST00205 Threatto
P36_SP00183
P36_ST00206 1585
P36_SP00184 1641
P36_ST00207 1656 149 Banking
P36_SP00185 1805
P36_ST00208 Community{mor\ey 0.69 0000000008876864
P36_TL00024 2052 528
P36_ST00209
P36_SP00186 2090 27
P36_ST00210 830 web
P36_SP00187 2082
P36_ST00211 919 site
P36_SP00188 980
P36_ST00212 994 )
P36_SP00189 1005
P36_ST00213 1022 [1997].
P36_TL00025 2159
P36_ST00214 [57]
P36_SP00190 2197
P36_ST00215
P36_SP00191 2189
P36_ST00216 779
P36_SP00192 834
P36_ST00217 2160
P36_SP00193 910
P36_ST00218 182 Bahamian
P36_SP00194 1109
P36_ST00219 1126 246 Commissions
P36_SP00195
P36_ST00220 1387
P36_SP00196
P36_ST00221 151 Inquiries
P36_SP00197 1586
P36_ST00222 1603 referred
P36_SP00198
P36_ST00223 1758
P36_SP00199 1790
P36_ST00224 1804 198 throughout
P36_SP00200 2002
P36_ST00225 2014 63 this
P36_TL00026 2214
P36_ST00226 paper.
P36_ST00227 2312 [58]
P36_SP00201 2350
P36_ST00228 G.
P36_SP00202 733 2342
P36_ST00229 Coles,
P36_SP00203 863 2348
P36_ST00230 882 204 Crackdown
P36_SP00204 1086
P36_ST00231 1100 2319 on
P36_SP00205
P36_ST00232 115 0.89
P36_SP00206 1275
P36_ST00233 1304 145 SHORE
P36_SP00207 1449
P36_ST00234 1463 TO
P36_SP00208
P36_ST00235 1534 SHORE,
P36_SP00209
P36_ST00236 1702
P36_SP00210
P36_ST00237 official
P36_SP00211 1887
P36_ST00238 1904 193 publication
P36_SP00212 2097
P36_ST00239 2114
P36_TL00027 2361
P36_ST00240
P36_SP00213 682 2391
P36_ST00241 698 155
P36_SP00214 853
P36_ST00242 871 Institute,
P36_SP00215 1020 2397
P36_ST00243 1036 73 July
P36_SP00216 2399
P36_ST00244 1125 1997,
P36_SP00217 1221
P36_ST00245 1240 91
P36_SP00218 1331
P36_ST00246 1346 53 21.
P36_TL00028 2467
P36_ST00247 [59]
P36_SP00219 2505
P36_ST00248
P36_TL00029 2573
P36_ST00249 [60]
P36_SP00220 2611
P36_ST00250 693 An
P36_SP00221 2603
P36_ST00251 759 160 interview
P36_SP00222 24
P36_ST00252 943 with
P36_SP00223 1014
P36_ST00253 1031 90 Colin
P36_SP00224
P36_ST00254 Archer,
P36_SP00225 1265 2609
P36_ST00255 1283 Deputy
P36_SP00226
P36_ST00256 1427 Manager,
P36_SP00227 1596
P36_ST00257 1615
P36_SP00228 1707
P36_ST00258 1721 212 Supervision
P36_TL00030 2621
P36_ST00259 223 Department,
P36_SP00229 838 2659
P36_ST00260
P36_SP00230 2651
P36_ST00261 938
P36_SP00231 1068
P36_ST00262 1085
P36_SP00232
P36_ST00263
P36_SP00233
P36_ST00264 1236
P36_SP00234
P36_ST00265 1321
P36_SP00235 1493
P36_ST00266 2628
P36_SP00236
P36_ST00267 1568
P36_SP00237 1608
P36_ST00268 1624 December,
P36_SP00238 1822 2657
P36_ST00269 1841 1996.
P36_TL00031 2727
P36_ST00270 [61]
P36_SP00239 2765
P36_ST00271
P36_SP00240 2757
P36_ST00272
P36_SP00241
P36_ST00273
P36_SP00242
P36_ST00274 1032 108 Debra
P36_SP00243 1140
P36_ST00275 192 McDougal,
P36_SP00244 1349
P36_ST00276 119 Senior
P36_SP00245 1485
P36_ST00277 1498 Council
P36_SP00246 1633
P36_ST00278 1648 Offlce 0.79 006600
P36_SP00247 1754
P36_ST00279 1769
P36_SP00248 1869
P36_ST00280 1883 Attorney
P36_TL00032 2775 531
P36_ST00281 143 General
P36_SP00249 757 2805
P36_ST00282 776
P36_SP00250 816
P36_ST00283
P36_SP00251 1030 2811
P36_ST00284 1049
P36_TL00033 2882 1268
P36_ST00285 [62]
P36_SP00252 2920
P36_ST00286
P36_SP00253 763 2912
P36_ST00287
P36_SP00254 901
P36_ST00288 916
P36_SP00255 1118
P36_ST00289 184 (Proceeds
P36_SP00256 1320
P36_ST00290 1336
P36_SP00257 1371
P36_ST00291
P36_SP00258
P36_ST00292 1503
P36_SP00259
P36_ST00293 68 Act,
P36_SP00260 2918
P36_ST00294 1616 1996
P36_SP00261
P36_ST00295 1719 (Page
P36_SP00262 1825
P36_ST00296 1842 1).


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P25_ST00108 1102
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P25_ST00111 1299 any
P25_SP00104 1363
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P25_ST00117 1908
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P25_ST00191 1994 place
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P25_ST00193 134 combat
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P25_ST00261 1900
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P25_SP00564 856 2953
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P25_SP00566 1073
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P9_TL00007 596 1520
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P9_SP00071 670 626
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P9_SP00075 1132
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P9_TL00025 1634
P9_ST00279 network]
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P26_ST00517 1617
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P26_ST00518 57 still
P26_SP00476
P26_ST00519
P26_SP00477 2481
P26_ST00520 1841 designated
P26_SP00478
P26_ST00521 2057
P26_SP00479 2098
P26_ST00522 34 "a
P26_TL00044 2490
P26_ST00523 major
P26_SP00480 2528
P26_ST00524 transit
P26_SP00481 2520
P26_ST00525 2491 country
P26_SP00482
P26_ST00526 affecting
P26_SP00483
P26_ST00527 1169
P26_SP00484
P26_ST00528
P26_SP00485
P26_ST00529 1373 140 States,"
P26_SP00486 2526
P26_ST00530 according
P26_SP00487
P26_ST00531 1718
P26_SP00488
P26_ST00532 1764
P26_SP00489 1820
P26_ST00533 1996
P26_SP00490 1925
P26_ST00534 223 International
P26_TL00045 2538
P26_ST00535 Narcotics
P26_SP00491 783 2568
P26_ST00536 Control
P26_SP00492 929
P26_ST00537 Strategy
P26_SP00493 2576
P26_ST00538 Report
P26_SP00494 1234
P26_ST00539 (INCSR).[104]
P26_SP00495
P26_ST00540 1521
P26_SP00496
P26_ST00541 2539 apparent
P26_SP00497 1774
P26_ST00542 1789 149 paradox
P26_SP00498 1938
P26_ST00543 1951
P26_SP00499
P26_ST00544 2015
P26_SP00500
P26_ST00545 2545
P26_TL00046 2586 1560
P26_ST00546 editorial
P26_SP00501 2616
P26_ST00547
P26_SP00502 2624
P26_ST00548
P26_SP00503
P26_ST00549
P26_SP00504
P26_ST00550
P26_SP00505 1047
P26_ST00551 2593
P26_SP00506 1077
P26_ST00552 daily
P26_SP00507
P26_ST00553 newspaper
P26_SP00508
P26_ST00554 calling
P26_SP00509 1518
P26_ST00555 1533
P26_SP00510
P26_ST00556
P26_SP00511 1614
P26_ST00557 1629 simple
P26_SP00512
P26_ST00558 explanation.
P26_SP00513 1980
P26_ST00559 1985
P26_SP00514 2054
P26_ST00560 2069
P26_TL00047 2635
P26_ST00561 wrote:
P26_SP00515 2664 -108
P26_ST00562 2740 On
P26_SP00516 665 2770
P26_ST00563
P26_SP00517 735
P26_ST00564 750 2747 one
P26_SP00518
P26_ST00565 hand.
P26_SP00519 930 2776
P26_ST00566 948
P26_SP00520 2778
P26_ST00567
P26_SP00521
P26_ST00568 1213
P26_SP00522
P26_ST00569 Frank
P26_SP00523 1472
P26_ST00570 Watson
P26_SP00524 1623
P26_ST00571
P26_SP00525 1665
P26_ST00572 singling
P26_SP00526 1817
P26_ST00573 1834 praises
P26_SP00527 1963
P26_ST00574 1978
P26_SP00528 2027
P26_ST00575 2038
P26_TL00048 2788
P26_ST00576
P26_SP00529 787 2818
P26_ST00577 116 having
P26_SP00530 919 2826
P26_ST00578 937
P26_SP00531
P26_ST00579 successful
P26_SP00532 1231
P26_ST00580 1247
P26_SP00533 1273
P26_ST00581 1288 turning
P26_SP00534
P26_ST00582 back
P26_SP00535
P26_ST00583
P26_SP00536
P26_ST00584
P26_SP00537 1676
P26_ST00585 1690 trafflckers
P26_SP00538
P26_ST00586 1885
P26_SP00539 1949
P26_ST00587 1967 puffing 0.66 0087700
P26_SP00540
P26_ST00588 2104
P26_TL00049 2836
P26_ST00589 effect
P26_SP00541 714 2866
P26_ST00590 727 demand
P26_SP00542
P26_ST00591
P26_SP00543 1055
P26_ST00592 256 programs.And
P26_SP00544 2874
P26_ST00593 2843
P26_SP00545
P26_ST00594
P26_SP00546 1457
P26_ST00595 94 other
P26_SP00547
P26_ST00596 97
P26_SP00548 1677 2872
P26_ST00597
P26_SP00549
P26_ST00598 1779
P26_SP00550
P26_ST00599
P26_SP00551 1992
P26_ST00600 2007 sfill 0.70 07700
P26_TL00050 2884 1454
P26_ST00601
P26_SP00552 2922
P26_ST00602 regarded
P26_SP00553
P26_ST00603
P26_SP00554
P26_ST00604
P26_SP00555 2914
P26_ST00605
P26_SP00556
P26_ST00606 2891
P26_SP00557 1168
P26_ST00607 1183
P26_SP00558 1202
P26_ST00608
P26_SP00559
P26_ST00609
P26_SP00560 1423
P26_ST00610 2885
P26_SP00561 1572
P26_ST00611 affecfing
P26_SP00562
P26_ST00612 1753 their
P26_SP00563
P26_ST00613 fight
P26_SP00564
P26_ST00614 1937 against
P26_TL00051 2932 1559
P26_ST00615 111 drugs.
P26_SP00565 724 2970
P26_ST00616 194 Something
P26_SP00566
P26_ST00617 941
P26_SP00567 966 2962
P26_ST00618 crossed-eyed
P26_SP00568
P26_ST00619
P26_SP00569 1271
P26_ST00620 1286
P26_SP00570 1348
P26_ST00621 1365 240 picture.There
P26_SP00571
P26_ST00622 1622 needs
P26_SP00572
P26_ST00623 1744 2933
P26_SP00573
P26_ST00624
P26_SP00574
P26_ST00625 2939
P26_SP00575 1892
P26_ST00626 1908 explanation,
P26_SP00576 2127
P26_ST00627


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P18_ST00002 705 315 130 31 money. 000000
P18_TB00002 410 2556
P18_TL00002 630 416 1529 43
P18_ST00003 269 42 CHAPTER 0.97 0000002
P18_SP00002 899 458
P18_ST00004 917 418 28 41 5
P18_SP00003 945 459 20
P18_ST00005 965 440 7 -
P18_SP00004 980 447
P18_ST00006 1000 202 MONEY
P18_SP00005 1202
P18_ST00007 1222 367 LAUNDERING 0000002000
P18_SP00006 1589
P18_ST00008 1609 417 119 AND 000
P18_SP00007 1728
P18_ST00009 1748 373 CORRUPTION 0.96 0022000000
P18_SP00008 2121 23
P18_ST00010 2144
P18_TL00003 960 481 866
P18_ST00011 127 TWO
P18_SP00009 1087 524
P18_ST00012 1107 164 SIDES
P18_SP00010 1271
P18_ST00013 1291 74 OF 00
P18_SP00011 1365
P18_ST00014 1385 482 108 THE
P18_SP00012 1493 523
P18_ST00015 1513 157 SAME 0000
P18_SP00013 1670 21
P18_ST00016 1691 135 COIN
P18_TL00004 614 602 678
P18_ST00017 233 Corruption 0000000000
P18_SP00014 847 645 17
P18_ST00018 864 622 12
P18_SP00015 876 627 16
P18_ST00019 892 122 35 Some
P18_SP00016 1014 637
P18_ST00020 1031 603 261 Background
P18_TL00005 714 1445
P18_ST00021 69 30 The
P18_SP00017 682 744
P18_ST00022 699 180 36 Bahamas, 00000000
P18_SP00018 879 750
P18_ST00023 895 70 with
P18_SP00019
P18_ST00024 983 its
P18_SP00020 1019
P18_ST00025 1036 120 history 0000000
P18_SP00021 1156 752 13
P18_ST00026 1169 of
P18_SP00022 1204
P18_ST00027 1216 129 alleged
P18_SP00023 1345
P18_ST00028 1362 73 high
P18_SP00024 1435
P18_ST00029 1452 81 level
P18_SP00025 1533
P18_ST00030 1548 181 corrupfion 0.85 0000007700
P18_SP00026 1729
P18_ST00031 1746 64 and
P18_SP00027 1810
P18_ST00032 1825 questionable 000000000000
P18_TL00006 615 762 1472
P18_ST00033 769 143 persons
P18_SP00028 758 800
P18_ST00034 775 26 in
P18_SP00029 801 792
P18_ST00035 819 187 leadership
P18_SP00030 1006
P18_ST00036 1022 170 positions,
P18_SP00031 1192
P18_ST00037 1210 763 87 29 must
P18_SP00032 1297
P18_ST00038 1310 75 deal
P18_SP00033 14
P18_ST00039 1399 71
P18_SP00034 1470
P18_ST00040 1484 56 the
P18_SP00035 1540
P18_ST00041 1557 92 issue
P18_SP00036 1649
P18_ST00042 1664
P18_SP00037 1699
P18_ST00043 1711 114 offlcial 0.84 00660000
P18_SP00038
P18_ST00044 1840 corruption
P18_SP00039 2020
P18_ST00045 2038 if
P18_SP00040 2058
P18_ST00046 2070 it
P18_TL00007 810
P18_ST00047 817 80 ever
P18_SP00041 694 840
P18_ST00048 708 hopes
P18_SP00042 816 848
P18_ST00049 829 811 33 to
P18_SP00043 862
P18_ST00050 877
P18_SP00044 952
P18_ST00051 968 183 effectively 00000000000
P18_SP00045 1151 11
P18_ST00052 1162
P18_SP00046 1233
P18_ST00053 1251 money
P18_SP00047 1373
P18_ST00054 1388 199 laundering,
P18_SP00048 1587
P18_ST00055 1605 283 notwithstanding 000000000000000
P18_SP00049 1888
P18_ST00056 1903
P18_TL00008 857
P18_ST00057 190 legislafion. 0.87 000000077000
P18_SP00050 805
P18_ST00058 833
P18_SP00051 902 887
P18_ST00059 229 enforcement
P18_SP00052 1146
P18_ST00060 1161 34
P18_SP00053 1195 10
P18_ST00061 1205 55
P18_SP00054 1260
P18_ST00062 1274 60 Act
P18_SP00055 1334
P18_ST00063 1346 will
P18_SP00056 1402
P18_ST00064 1418 be
P18_SP00057 1459
P18_ST00065 1476 based,
P18_SP00058 1595 893
P18_ST00066 1613 27
P18_SP00059 1640
P18_ST00067 1654
P18_SP00060 1710
P18_ST00068 1724 flnal 0.75 66000
P18_SP00061 1797
P18_ST00069 1813 analysis, 000000000
P18_SP00062 1970
P18_ST00070 1987 on
P18_SP00063 2028
P18_ST00071 2043
P18_TL00009 905
P18_ST00072 133 polifical 0.83 000077000
P18_SP00064 748 943
P18_ST00073
P18_SP00065 818 935
P18_ST00074
P18_SP00066 868
P18_ST00075 878
P18_SP00067 934
P18_ST00076 950 162 country's 000000020
P18_SP00068 1112
P18_ST00077 1129 141 leaders.
P18_SP00069 1270
P18_ST00078 1301 22 If
P18_SP00070 1323 9
P18_ST00079 1332 79 they
P18_SP00071 1411
P18_ST00080 1422 209 themselves
P18_SP00072 1631
P18_ST00081 1648 121 benefit
P18_SP00073 1769
P18_ST00082 1782 from
P18_SP00074 1863
P18_ST00083 1879 corrupfion, 0.86 00000077000
P18_SP00075 2069
P18_ST00084 2087
P18_SP00076 2104
P18_ST00085 2117
P18_TL00010 953 1437
P18_ST00086 97 make
P18_SP00077 712
P18_ST00087 726
P18_SP00078 782
P18_ST00088 797
P18_SP00079 1026
P18_ST00089 1040
P18_SP00080 1075
P18_ST00090 1084
P18_SP00081 1140
P18_ST00091 1157
P18_SP00082 1279 991
P18_ST00092 1293 188 laundering
P18_SP00083 1481
P18_ST00093 1499 179 legislation
P18_SP00084 1678
P18_ST00094 1695
P18_SP00085 1775
P18_ST00095 1786 so
P18_SP00086 1827
P18_ST00096 1842 210 difflcult.The 0.90 0006600000000
P18_TL00011 1001 1506
P18_ST00097 218 involvement
P18_SP00087
P18_ST00098
P18_SP00088 882
P18_ST00099 103 major
P18_SP00089 998 1039
P18_ST00100 1011 international 0000000000000
P18_SP00090
P18_ST00101 1247 figures
P18_SP00091 1369
P18_ST00102 1386
P18_SP00092 1412
P18_ST00103 1428 131 various
P18_SP00093 1559
P18_ST00104 1575 1008
P18_SP00094 1697
P18_ST00105 1712
P18_SP00095 1900
P18_ST00106 1915 165 schemes
P18_SP00096 2080
P18_ST00107 2096 25 is
P18_TL00012 1049 1467
P18_ST00108 147 evolving
P18_SP00097 761
P18_ST00109 779 62 into
P18_SP00098 841 1079
P18_ST00110 1056 an
P18_SP00099 898
P18_ST00111 915 85 even
P18_SP00100
P18_ST00112 1016 1050 132 37 greater
P18_SP00101 1148
P18_ST00113 146 problem
P18_SP00102 1307
P18_ST00114 1321 than
P18_SP00103 1398
P18_ST00115 1413
P18_SP00104 1469
P18_ST00116 1483 150 flnancial 660000000
P18_SP00105 1633
P18_ST00117 98 crime
P18_SP00106 1747
P18_ST00118 1764 90 itself.
P18_SP00107 1854
P18_ST00119 1882
P18_SP00108 1951
P18_ST00120 1968 113 bigger
P18_TL00013 1097 1372
P18_ST00121 1104 concern
P18_SP00109 757 1127
P18_ST00122 774 96 being
P18_SP00110 870 1135
P18_ST00123 888 197 recognized
P18_SP00111 1085
P18_ST00124 1103 254 internationally
P18_SP00112 1357
P18_ST00125 1371
P18_SP00113 1396
P18_ST00126 1410
P18_SP00114 1466
P18_ST00127 connection
P18_SP00115
P18_ST00128 1696 151 between
P18_SP00116 1847
P18_ST00129 1865
P18_TL00014 1145 1482
P18_ST00130
P18_SP00117 803 1183
P18_ST00131 820
P18_SP00118 884 1175
P18_ST00132 901
P18_SP00119 1015
P18_ST00133 1030 191 corruption.
P18_SP00120 1221
P18_ST00134 95 Once
P18_SP00121
P18_ST00135 198 considered
P18_SP00122 1560
P18_ST00136 1577 1152 19 a
P18_SP00123 1596
P18_ST00137 1611
P18_SP00124 1688
P18_ST00138 1700 word
P18_SP00125 1787
P18_ST00139 1804
P18_SP00126 1889
P18_ST00140
P18_SP00127 1936
P18_ST00141 discuss,
P18_TL00015 1193 1489
P18_ST00142
P18_SP00128 794 1231
P18_ST00143 812 1200 72 now
P18_SP00129 1223
P18_ST00144 897 seems
P18_SP00130 1018
P18_ST00145 1194
P18_SP00131 1064
P18_ST00146 1080
P18_SP00132 1121
P18_ST00147 1137
P18_SP00133 1336
P18_ST00148 1352 complementary
P18_SP00134 1635
P18_ST00149 1647
P18_SP00135 1680
P18_ST00150
P18_SP00136 1818
P18_ST00151 1833 laundering.
P18_SP00137 2032
P18_ST00152 2039 [72]
P18_TL00016 1299 1503
P18_ST00153 From
P18_SP00138 707 1329
P18_ST00154 721
P18_SP00139 776
P18_ST00155 793 late
P18_SP00140 855
P18_ST00156 872 117 1970's 0.95 000020
P18_SP00141 989
P18_ST00157 1005
P18_SP00142 1069
P18_ST00158 1086 early
P18_SP00143 1173 1337
P18_ST00159 1189 1980's, 0000200
P18_SP00144 1316 1335
P18_ST00160 prosecution
P18_SP00145 1543
P18_ST00161
P18_SP00146
P18_ST00162 1606 drug-money
P18_SP00147 1828
P18_ST00163 189
P18_SP00148 2031
P18_ST00164 2045 1306 was
P18_TL00017 612 1347 1408
P18_ST00165 tied
P18_SP00149 676 1377
P18_ST00166 691 1348 32
P18_SP00150 723
P18_ST00167 739 106 aiding
P18_SP00151 845
P18_ST00168 861 65
P18_SP00152 926
P18_ST00169 942 144 abetting
P18_SP00153
P18_ST00170 1100
P18_SP00154
P18_ST00171 1172
P18_SP00155
P18_ST00172 1286
P18_SP00156 1320
P18_ST00173 drug
P18_SP00157
P18_ST00174 1425 trafflcking.ln 0.91 00006600000000
P18_SP00158
P18_ST00175 later
P18_SP00159 1743
P18_ST00176 1755 1354 years,
P18_SP00160
P18_ST00177
P18_SP00161 1949
P18_ST00178 1964
P18_TL00018 1395 1397
P18_ST00179 152 passage
P18_SP00162 767 1433
P18_ST00180 783
P18_SP00163
P18_ST00181 827
P18_SP00164 883
P18_ST00182 Money
P18_SP00165 1021
P18_ST00183 Laundering
P18_SP00166 1238
P18_ST00184 1255 Control
P18_SP00167
P18_ST00185 59
P18_SP00168 1458
P18_ST00186 1473
P18_SP00169
P18_ST00187 1514
P18_SP00170 1570
P18_ST00188 91 USA,
P18_SP00171 1431
P18_ST00189 certain 0003000
P18_SP00172 1815
P18_ST00190 1831 "Specifled 0000006600
P18_TL00019 1443 1376
P18_ST00191 154 Unlawful
P18_SP00173
P18_ST00192 94 Acts"
P18_SP00174
P18_ST00193 891 1450 were
P18_SP00175 978
P18_ST00194 995 listed
P18_SP00176
P18_ST00195 40 as
P18_SP00177 1143
P18_ST00196 1160 166 predicate
P18_SP00178 1326
P18_ST00197 1341 offenses.
P18_SP00179 1505
P18_ST00198 1536 Banking
P18_SP00180
P18_ST00199 1698 institutions
P18_SP00181
P18_ST00200 88
P18_TL00020 1491 1526
P18_ST00201 introduced
P18_SP00182 1521
P18_ST00202 1492
P18_SP00183 850
P18_ST00203
P18_SP00184 920
P18_ST00204 933 82 term
P18_SP00185
P18_ST00205 1032 105 'willful 30000000
P18_SP00186
P18_ST00206 1154 blindness' 0000000002
P18_SP00187
P18_ST00207 1349
P18_SP00188 1414
P18_ST00208 both
P18_SP00189
P18_ST00209 1524 107 banks
P18_SP00190
P18_ST00210 1646
P18_SP00191
P18_ST00211 other
P18_SP00192 1822
P18_ST00212 1835 204 businesses
P18_SP00193
P18_ST00213 2052 1498 89
P18_TL00021 1539 1500
P18_ST00214 194 scrutinized
P18_SP00194 807 1569
P18_ST00215 825 1546 more
P18_SP00195 916
P18_ST00216 931 125 closely
P18_SP00196
P18_ST00217 1070 171 regarding
P18_SP00197 1241
P18_ST00218 100 those
P18_SP00198 1355
P18_ST00219
P18_SP00199
P18_ST00220 1429 behalf
P18_SP00200 1542
P18_ST00221 1554
P18_SP00201
P18_ST00222 1598 109 whom
P18_SP00202 1707
P18_ST00223 1721 78
P18_SP00203 1799
P18_ST00224 1811
P18_SP00204 1899
P18_ST00225 1912 201 transacting
P18_TL00022 1496
P18_ST00226 169 business.
P18_SP00205 784 1617 -168
P18_ST00227 616 1693 Indeed,
P18_SP00206 747
P18_ST00228 765 1694 most
P18_SP00207 852 1723
P18_ST00229 139 banking
P18_SP00208 1007 1731
P18_ST00230 1023 244 organizations
P18_SP00209 1267
P18_ST00231 1284 have
P18_SP00210
P18_ST00232 become
P18_SP00211
P18_ST00233 1545 178 extremely 0.94 023000000
P18_SP00212
P18_ST00234 1736 diligent
P18_SP00213 1866
P18_ST00235 1881
P18_SP00214 1908
P18_ST00236 1924 combating
P18_TL00023 1741 1537
P18_ST00237 any
P18_SP00215 679 1779
P18_ST00238 693 hint
P18_SP00216 1771
P18_ST00239 771
P18_SP00217 806
P18_ST00240
P18_SP00218 940
P18_ST00241 955
P18_SP00219 1144
P18_ST00242 under
P18_SP00220 1266
P18_ST00243 1276 their
P18_SP00221 1358
P18_ST00244 'know 0.93 30000
P18_SP00222 1475
P18_ST00245 1488 your
P18_SP00223
P18_ST00246 1581 177 customer' 000000002
P18_SP00224 1758
P18_ST00247 1773 184 directives.
P18_SP00225 1957
P18_ST00248 It
P18_SP00226 2006
P18_ST00249 2021
P18_SP00227 2046
P18_ST00250 2062 clear
P18_TL00024 1789 1517
P18_ST00251 that
P18_SP00228 681 1819
P18_ST00252 696 presently
P18_SP00229
P18_ST00253 873
P18_SP00230 929
P18_ST00254 946 players
P18_SP00231
P18_ST00255 1091
P18_SP00232 1126
P18_ST00256 1138
P18_SP00233
P18_ST00257 1254 221 internafional 0.88 0000000770000
P18_SP00234
P18_ST00258 1796
P18_SP00235 1614
P18_ST00259 1629
P18_SP00236 1817
P18_ST00260 1834 are
P18_SP00237
P18_ST00261 1906 1790 not
P18_SP00238 1961
P18_ST00262 1976 153 primarily
P18_TL00025 1837 1463
P18_ST00263
P18_SP00239 692 1875
P18_ST00264 259 trafflckers.[73] 0.92 0000660000000000
P18_SP00240 966
P18_ST00265 145
P18_SP00241
P18_ST00266 1168 192
P18_SP00242 1360 1867
P18_ST00267 1375 1844
P18_SP00243
P18_ST00268 1448 no
P18_SP00244
P18_ST00269 115 longer
P18_SP00245 1621
P18_ST00270
P18_SP00246 1687
P18_ST00271 1703 main
P18_SP00247 1788
P18_ST00272 1805 1838 220 perpetrators
P18_SP00248 2025
P18_ST00273 2040
P18_TL00026 1884
P18_ST00274 1891
P18_SP00249 737 1922
P18_ST00275 751
P18_SP00250
P18_ST00276 174 schemes.
P18_SP00251 1914
P18_ST00277 102 While
P18_SP00252 1258
P18_ST00278 1272
P18_SP00253 1328
P18_ST00279 1343 142 arenaof
P18_SP00254 1485
P18_ST00280 1497
P18_SP00255 1701
P18_ST00281 1717 involved
P18_SP00256
P18_ST00282
P18_SP00257 1907
P18_ST00283 1925 101 illegal
P18_TL00027 1932 1419
P18_ST00284 transactions
P18_SP00258 834 1962
P18_ST00285 851 has
P18_SP00259 913
P18_ST00286 928 expanded,
P18_SP00260 1117
P18_ST00287 1136 nothing
P18_SP00261
P18_ST00288
P18_SP00262
P18_ST00289 1939 grown
P18_SP00263
P18_ST00290 1487
P18_SP00264
P18_ST00291 1594 rapidly
P18_SP00265 1713
P18_ST00292 1725
P18_SP00266 1794
P18_ST00293 1809
P18_TL00028 1980
P18_ST00294
P18_SP00267 2018
P18_ST00295 activities.
P18_SP00268 976 2010
P18_ST00296 1004
P18_SP00269 1073
P18_ST00297 1088 signiflcant 0.89 00000660000
P18_SP00270
P18_ST00298 1285
P18_SP00271 1379
P18_ST00299 1391 side
P18_SP00272 1464
P18_ST00300 1480
P18_SP00273 1515
P18_ST00301
P18_SP00274 1580
P18_ST00302
P18_SP00275
P18_ST00303
P18_SP00276
P18_ST00304 2037 coin
P18_SP00277 2108
P18_ST00305 2126
P18_TL00029
P18_ST00306
P18_SP00278 2066
P18_ST00307
P18_SP00279 875
P18_ST00308 890
P18_SP00280
P18_ST00309 962 role
P18_SP00281
P18_ST00310 1043 played
P18_SP00282
P18_ST00311 1177 by
P18_SP00283 1218
P18_ST00312 1232 2035
P18_SP00284
P18_ST00313 1268 host
P18_SP00285
P18_ST00314
P18_SP00286 1392
P18_ST00315 1404 individuals
P18_SP00287 1593
P18_ST00316 1610
P18_SP00288 1637
P18_ST00317 1653
P18_SP00289
P18_ST00318 93 array
P18_SP00290
P18_ST00319
P18_SP00291 1853
P18_ST00320 1864 2029 corrupt
P18_SP00292 1991
P18_ST00321 2005 acfivifies. 0.72 00770077000
P18_TL00030 2134 1453
P18_ST00322 Corrupfion
P18_SP00293 2172
P18_ST00323 821
P18_SP00294 846 2164
P18_ST00324
P18_SP00295 993
P18_ST00325 2141 new,
P18_SP00296 1092 2170
P18_ST00326 1110 54 but
P18_SP00297 1164
P18_ST00327 1179
P18_SP00298
P18_ST00328 1220
P18_SP00299
P18_ST00329 61
P18_SP00300
P18_ST00330 1990's,
P18_SP00301
P18_ST00331
P18_SP00302 1585
P18_ST00332 1603 216 privatizafion 0000000007700
P18_SP00303
P18_ST00333 1836 186 expanding
P18_SP00304 2022
P18_ST00334
P18_TL00031 2182
P18_ST00335 newly
P18_SP00305 718 2220
P18_ST00336 731 246 democratized
P18_SP00306 977 2212
P18_ST00337 992 2183 239 governments
P18_SP00307
P18_ST00338 1246 all
P18_SP00308 1283
P18_ST00339 2189 over
P18_SP00309 1378
P18_ST00340 1389
P18_SP00310
P18_ST00341 world,
P18_SP00311 1566 2218
P18_ST00342
P18_SP00312
P18_ST00343 age-old
P18_SP00313
P18_ST00344 practice
P18_SP00314 1946
P18_ST00345
P18_SP00315 1997
P18_ST00346 2009 payoffs
P18_TL00032 2230
P18_ST00347
P18_SP00316 668 2260
P18_ST00348 2231 57 get
P18_SP00317 2268
P18_ST00349 2237 86
P18_SP00318 838
P18_ST00350
P18_SP00319
P18_ST00351 959 widespread
P18_SP00320
P18_ST00352 1186 media
P18_SP00321 1295
P18_ST00353 1311 attention.
P18_SP00322 6
P18_ST00354 Open
P18_SP00323 1578
P18_ST00355 markets
P18_SP00324 1740
P18_ST00356
P18_SP00325
P18_ST00357 161 exposing
P18_SP00326 1988
P18_ST00358
P18_SP00327 2024
P18_ST00359 variety
P18_TL00033 2278 1516
P18_ST00360
P18_SP00328 649 2308
P18_ST00361 661 2279 126
P18_SP00329 787 2316
P18_ST00362 802 172 practices,
P18_SP00330 974
P18_ST00363 158 including
P18_SP00331 1150
P18_ST00364 212 bribe-taking
P18_SP00332 1380
P18_ST00365
P18_SP00333 1438
P18_ST00366 public
P18_SP00334
P18_ST00367 1572 offlcials. 0066000000
P18_SP00335
P18_ST00368 44 Of
P18_SP00336 1767
P18_ST00369 2285 84
P18_SP00337
P18_ST00370
P18_SP00338 1971
P18_ST00371
P18_TL00034 2326 1519
P18_ST00372 2327
P18_SP00339 2356
P18_ST00373 140
P18_SP00340 2364
P18_ST00374
P18_SP00341 1061
P18_ST00375 1078
P18_SP00342
P18_ST00376 68
P18_SP00343 1185
P18_ST00377 1201 private
P18_SP00344
P18_ST00378
P18_SP00345 1477
P18_ST00379 1494
P18_SP00346
P18_ST00380
P18_SP00347 1632
P18_ST00381 used
P18_SP00348 1733
P18_ST00382 1751
P18_SP00349 1792
P18_ST00383 99
P18_SP00350
P18_ST00384 1917 who
P18_SP00351 1992
P18_ST00385
P18_TL00035 2374 1400
P18_ST00386
P18_SP00352 2404
P18_ST00387 709 2375
P18_SP00353 836 2412
P18_ST00388 acfivities. 00770000000
P18_SP00354
P18_ST00389 1047
P18_SP00355 1178 2410
P18_ST00390 1196
P18_SP00356 1303
P18_ST00391 208
P18_SP00357
P18_ST00392 2381
P18_SP00358
P18_ST00393
P18_SP00359 1708
P18_ST00394 1726 identifled
P18_SP00360 1887
P18_ST00395
P18_SP00361 1943
P18_ST00396
P18_TL00036 2422
P18_ST00397 2423 173 surrogate
P18_SP00362 786 2460
P18_ST00398 investors
P18_SP00363 964 2452
P18_ST00399 979
P18_SP00364
P18_ST00400 1025 2429 some
P18_SP00365 1124
P18_ST00401 1139
P18_SP00366 1174
P18_ST00402 1184
P18_SP00367 1239
P18_ST00403 1256 proceeds
P18_SP00368
P18_ST00404
P18_SP00369
P18_ST00405 crime.
P18_SP00370 1592
P18_ST00406 1622
P18_SP00371
P18_ST00407 1829 185 payments,
P18_SP00372 2014
P18_ST00408 58 like
P18_TL00037 2470 1531
P18_ST00409
P18_SP00373 2508
P18_ST00410 2477 money,
P18_SP00374 835
P18_ST00411 853 need
P18_SP00375 939 2500
P18_ST00412 954 2471
P18_SP00376 987
P18_ST00413
P18_SP00377 1045
P18_ST00414 1060 covered
P18_SP00378 1203
P18_ST00415 up
P18_SP00379 1263
P18_ST00416 1278
P18_SP00380 1342
P18_ST00417
P18_SP00381
P18_ST00418
P18_SP00382 1685
P18_ST00419 techniques
P18_SP00383
P18_ST00420
P18_SP00384
P18_ST00421 1986 often 02200
P18_SP00385 2074
P18_ST00422 2088
P18_TL00038 2518 844
P18_ST00423 solution
P18_SP00386 2548
P18_ST00424 768 49 for
P18_SP00387
P18_ST00425
P18_SP00388 927
P18_ST00426
P18_SP00389 1090
P18_ST00427 1108
P18_SP00390 1134
P18_ST00428 2519
P18_SP00391
P18_ST00429 1292
P18_TL00039 2625 566
P18_ST00430 298 Transparency
P18_SP00392 912 2667
P18_ST00431
P18_SP00393 963 2658
P18_ST00432 982 Business
P18_TL00040 2735
P18_ST00433
P18_SP00394 2765
P18_ST00434 195 revelafions
P18_SP00395 894
P18_ST00435 910
P18_SP00396
P18_ST00436 957
P18_SP00397
P18_ST00437
P18_SP00398 1374 2773
P18_ST00438 2742
P18_SP00399 1447
P18_ST00439 1462 described
P18_SP00400 1639
P18_ST00440 1655
P18_SP00401
P18_ST00441 240 multitudinous
P18_SP00402 1952
P18_ST00442 1982
P18_TL00041 2783 1552
P18_ST00443 2790 118 scope.
P18_SP00403 2821
P18_ST00444 736 There
P18_SP00404 2813
P18_ST00445 858
P18_SP00405
P18_ST00446 presentty 000000770
P18_SP00406 1065
P18_ST00447
P18_SP00407 1098
P18_ST00448 1113 demand
P18_SP00408 1259
P18_ST00449 1275
P18_SP00409 1324
P18_ST00450 2784 241 transparency
P18_SP00410
P18_ST00451
P18_SP00411 1616
P18_ST00452 1634 159 business
P18_SP00412 1793
P18_ST00453 1806 transacfions,
P18_SP00413 2819
P18_ST00454 2056
P18_SP00414
P18_ST00455 2109
P18_TL00042 2831
P18_ST00456 standard
P18_SP00415 770 2861
P18_ST00457 785 2838 way
P18_SP00416 859 2869
P18_ST00458 871
P18_SP00417
P18_ST00459 160
P18_SP00418 1115
P18_ST00460 1130 should
P18_SP00419 1248
P18_ST00461
P18_SP00420
P18_ST00462 conducted.
P18_SP00421 1520 8
P18_ST00463 1528 In
P18_SP00422 1556
P18_ST00464
P18_SP00423 1627
P18_ST00465 1642 call
P18_SP00424
P18_ST00466 1715
P18_SP00425
P18_ST00467 1774 2832 249 transparency,
P18_TL00043 2879
P18_ST00468 however,
P18_SP00426 777 2915
P18_ST00469
P18_SP00427 2909
P18_ST00470
P18_SP00428
P18_ST00471 2886 moves
P18_SP00429
P18_ST00472
P18_SP00430 2917
P18_ST00473 many
P18_SP00431 1235
P18_ST00474 countries
P18_SP00432
P18_ST00475 1426 2880
P18_SP00433
P18_ST00476 pass
P18_SP00434
P18_ST00477 laws
P18_SP00435
P18_ST00478 prohibiting
P18_SP00436 1856
P18_ST00479 1873 corruption,
P18_SP00437 2063
P18_ST00480 2079 there
P18_TL00044 2927
P18_ST00481 2934
P18_SP00438 670 2957
P18_ST00482 685 63 few
P18_SP00439
P18_ST00483 examples
P18_SP00440 936 2965
P18_ST00484
P18_SP00441
P18_ST00485 999 213 punishment
P18_SP00442 1212
P18_ST00486 1225
P18_SP00443
P18_ST00487
P18_SP00444 1340
P18_ST00488 1353 well-heeled
P18_SP00445 1561
P18_ST00489 1579 purveyors
P18_SP00446 1756
P18_ST00490 1772
P18_SP00447 1807
P18_ST00491
P18_SP00448
P18_ST00492
P18_SP00449 2036
P18_ST00493 2051 51 did
P18_SP00450 2102
P18_ST00494 2120 2928


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P13_SP00027 1057 443
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P13_SP00028 1259
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P13_SP00029 1530
P13_ST00032 1543 will
P13_SP00030 1598
P13_ST00033 1612 88 work
P13_SP00031 1700
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P13_SP00033 1835
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P13_SP00034 1939
P13_ST00037 1953 32
P13_SP00035 1985
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P13_ST00047 1540 270 sancfions."[50] 0.90 000077000000000
P13_SP00044 1810 40
P13_ST00048 1850 172 President
P13_SP00045 2022
P13_ST00049 2037 124 Clinton
P13_TL00005 500 1529
P13_ST00050 72 also
P13_SP00046 686 530
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P13_SP00047 845
P13_ST00052 859
P13_SP00048 915
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P13_SP00060 1108
P13_ST00066 1119
P13_SP00061 1175
P13_ST00067 1190 68 Cali
P13_SP00062 1258
P13_ST00068 1274 98 cartel 0.95 000300
P13_SP00063 1372
P13_ST00069 1387 65
P13_SP00064 1452
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P13_SP00065 1580
P13_ST00071 its
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P13_ST00072 1649 126 assets,
P13_SP00067 1775 584
P13_ST00073 1790 139 thereby
P13_SP00068 1929
P13_ST00074 1942 132 "cuffing 0.70 00087700
P13_SP00069 2074
P13_ST00075 2091 47 off
P13_TL00007 596 1544
P13_ST00076
P13_SP00070 652 626
P13_ST00077 667 economic
P13_SP00071 844
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P13_SP00072 992
P13_ST00079 1007
P13_SP00073
P13_ST00080 1087 153 stopping
P13_SP00074 634
P13_ST00081 1257 603 59 our
P13_SP00075 1316
P13_ST00082 own
P13_SP00076 1401
P13_ST00083 1418 120 people
P13_SP00077
P13_ST00084 1553
P13_SP00078 1634
P13_ST00085 dealing
P13_SP00079 1778
P13_ST00086 1796 226 unknowingly
P13_SP00080
P13_ST00087 2034
P13_SP00081 2105
P13_ST00088 2122
P13_TL00008 644
P13_ST00089 companies.
P13_TL00009 750 1512
P13_ST00090 69 The
P13_SP00082 682 780
P13_ST00091 696 194 Americans
P13_SP00083 890
P13_ST00092 906 757 are
P13_SP00084 962
P13_ST00093 977 85 even
P13_SP00085 1062
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P13_SP00086 1269 788
P13_ST00095 1285
P13_SP00087 1320
P13_ST00096
P13_SP00088 1385
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P13_SP00089
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P13_SP00090 1680
P13_ST00099 1695 106 report
P13_SP00091 1801
P13_ST00100 1816 mentioned
P13_SP00092 2004
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P13_TL00010 798 1481
P13_ST00102 185 suspicion"
P13_SP00093
P13_ST00103 814 805 on
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P13_SP00095 997
P13_ST00105 1014 52 Hill
P13_SP00096
P13_ST00106 1082 42
P13_SP00097 1124
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P13_SP00098 1225
P13_ST00108 1237
P13_SP00099
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P13_SP00100 1483
P13_ST00110 1497 799
P13_SP00101
P13_ST00111 1546
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P13_SP00104 1709
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P13_ST00117
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P13_SP00110 991
P13_ST00121 1005
P13_SP00111
P13_ST00122 requisite
P13_SP00112 1231
P13_ST00123 1245 127 degree
P13_SP00113
P13_ST00124 1388 34
P13_SP00114 1422
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P13_SP00116 1797
P13_ST00127 1811
P13_SP00117 1846
P13_ST00128 1859 banking
P13_SP00118 1998
P13_ST00129 2015
P13_TL00012 894 1557
P13_ST00130
P13_SP00119 762 924
P13_ST00131 779 192 institufions 0.87 000000077000
P13_SP00120 971
P13_ST00132 987 27
P13_SP00121
P13_ST00133 1028 territories
P13_SP00122 1200
P13_ST00134 1216 901 over
P13_SP00123 1295
P13_ST00135 103 which
P13_SP00124 1409
P13_ST00136 1424
P13_SP00125 1480
P13_ST00137
P13_SP00126 1606
P13_ST00138 1623 could
P13_SP00127 1717
P13_ST00139 1735
P13_SP00128 1776
P13_ST00140 expected
P13_SP00129 1955
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P13_SP00130 2003
P13_ST00142 2019 exercise
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P13_ST00143 949
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P13_ST00145 790
P13_SP00133 825
P13_ST00146 837 influence.
P13_SP00134 1009 7
P13_ST00147 1016 [51]
P13_SP00135
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P13_ST00174
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P13_SP00161
P13_ST00176 1019 86 York
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P13_SP00188
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P13_ST00209
P13_SP00192
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P13_ST00223
P13_SP00205
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P13_SP00206
P13_ST00225
P13_SP00207
P13_ST00226
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P13_ST00227 1687 159 Kingdom
P13_SP00209
P13_ST00228 1863
P13_SP00210 1888
P13_ST00229 1904 really
P13_SP00211
P13_ST00230 2014
P13_SP00212 2033
P13_ST00231 2050 1289 part
P13_SP00213 2119
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P13_ST00233
P13_SP00214 668 1366
P13_ST00234 684 183 problem.lt
P13_SP00215 867
P13_ST00235 881
P13_SP00216
P13_ST00236 920 62
P13_SP00217 982
P13_ST00237 perception,
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P13_ST00239 1354 others,
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P13_ST00240 1491
P13_SP00221
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P13_SP00222
P13_ST00242 1654
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P13_SP00224
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P13_SP00225
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P13_SP00229 1195
P13_ST00250 1210
P13_SP00230
P13_ST00251 1375 1391 areas
P13_SP00231 1475
P13_ST00252 as
P13_SP00232 1531
P13_ST00253 1545 181 facilitating
P13_SP00233
P13_ST00254
P13_SP00234
P13_ST00255 1813 interests
P13_SP00235
P13_ST00256 1981
P13_TL00022 1432 1541
P13_ST00257
P13_SP00236 1462
P13_ST00258 178
P13_SP00237 1030 1470
P13_ST00259 crime,
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P13_ST00260 1172
P13_SP00239 1236
P13_ST00261 1251 99 these
P13_SP00240 1350
P13_ST00262 1439
P13_SP00241 1466
P13_ST00263
P13_SP00242 1535
P13_ST00264 1552 now
P13_SP00243 1625
P13_ST00265 1640
P13_SP00244 1681
P13_ST00266 targeted
P13_SP00245 1845
P13_ST00267 1861
P13_SP00246 1925
P13_ST00268 1943 become
P13_SP00247 2087
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P13_TL00023 1479
P13_ST00270 subject
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P13_ST00271 758
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P13_ST00274
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P13_ST00275
P13_SP00253
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P13_SP00254 1371
P13_ST00277
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P13_SP00256 1643
P13_ST00279 1660
P13_SP00257
P13_ST00280
P13_SP00258 1760
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P13_SP00259 1937
P13_ST00282 1954
P13_TL00024 1527
P13_ST00283 176 electronic
P13_SP00260
P13_ST00284 802 77 fund
P13_SP00261 879
P13_ST00285 transfer
P13_SP00262 1037
P13_ST00286
P13_SP00263 1113
P13_ST00287 1129 102 dollar
P13_SP00264
P13_ST00288 141 clearing
P13_SP00265 1565
P13_ST00289 services
P13_SP00266
P13_ST00290 1563 1528
P13_SP00267 1595
P13_ST00291
P13_SP00268
P13_ST00292 institutions
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P13_ST00293
P13_SP00270 2011
P13_ST00294 2026
P13_TL00025 1450
P13_ST00295 suspected
P13_SP00271 1613
P13_ST00296 228 jurisdicfions. 0.89 00000000770000
P13_SP00272 1039
P13_ST00297 [52]
P13_SP00273 1110
P13_ST00298 21 If
P13_SP00274 1605
P13_ST00299 84 such
P13_SP00275
P13_ST00300 1271 sancfions 0.83 000077000
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P13_ST00301 were
P13_SP00277
P13_ST00302 1561 ever
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P13_ST00303 1655 imposed
P13_SP00279 1806
P13_ST00304 1823
P13_SP00280 1864
P13_ST00305 1882 Bahamian
P13_TL00026
P13_ST00306 201 institufions, 0.88 0000000770000
P13_SP00281 816 1659
P13_ST00307 835 it
P13_SP00282
P13_ST00308 1630 may
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P13_ST00309 957
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P13_SP00285
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P13_ST00313
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P13_ST00318 1746
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P13_ST00322 80%
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P13_SP00297
P13_ST00324
P13_SP00298
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P13_SP00299
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P13_SP00301 1207
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P13_SP00302
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P13_SP00303 1407
P13_ST00330 States.
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P13_ST00332 1781 4
P13_SP00305 1035
P13_ST00333 1054 1803 -
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P13_ST00337 TO
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P13_ST00339 202 MONEY
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P13_ST00340 1321 367 LAUNDERING 0.94 0000002003
P13_TL00030 1965 898
P13_ST00341
P13_SP00312
P13_ST00342 709 210 Bahamas, 0.99 00000001
P13_SP00313 919
P13_ST00343 938 1974
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P13_ST00344 169 Leading
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P13_ST00345 1164 Offshore
P13_SP00316 1352
P13_ST00346 1368 Center
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P13_ST00347
P13_SP00317 2106
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P13_SP00333
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P13_SP00345
P13_ST00378 1367 Francis,
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P13_ST00385
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P13_SP00399
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P13_SP00400
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P13_ST00445
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P13_ST00461
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P13_SP00427
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P13_ST00470 Money
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P13_ST00471 752 Laundering
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P13_ST00472 (Proceeds
P13_SP00432
P13_ST00473
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P13_ST00474 Crime)
P13_SP00434
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P13_ST00476 1440 1996
P13_SP00436
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P13_SP00437
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P13_ST00480 have
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P13_SP00440
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P13_SP00441
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P13_SP00447
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P13_SP00448
P13_ST00490 1686 blueprint
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P13_SP00450
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P13_ST00499
P13_SP00457
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P13_SP00458
P13_ST00501 2095 [54]
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P13_ST00504 1073
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P13_ST00505 Handling
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P13_ST00506 Other
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P13_ST00512
P13_SP00468
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P13_ST00514
P13_SP00470
P13_ST00515
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P13_SP00472
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P13_SP00473
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P13_ST00519
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P28_SP00136 946
P28_ST00148 216 surrounding
P28_SP00137 1176 874
P28_ST00149
P28_SP00138 1246
P28_ST00150 1263 legislafion, 0.87 000000077000
P28_SP00139 1454
P28_ST00151
P28_SP00140 1525
P28_ST00152 1540 837 127 current
P28_SP00141
P28_ST00153 1682 134
P28_SP00142 1816
P28_ST00154 1832
P28_SP00143 1960
P28_ST00155 1975
P28_SP00144 2039
P28_ST00156
P28_TL00013 884 1520
P28_ST00157 221 international
P28_SP00145 914
P28_ST00158 852 efforts
P28_SP00146 965
P28_ST00159 981 95 being
P28_SP00147 1076
P28_ST00160 1094 made
P28_SP00148 1194
P28_ST00161 1207
P28_SP00149 1240
P28_ST00162 1256 210 'encourage' 0.94 30000000002
P28_SP00150 1466
P28_ST00163 1481 176 countries,
P28_SP00151 1657
P28_ST00164 1674
P28_SP00152 1854
P28_ST00165 those
P28_SP00153
P28_ST00166 1980 70
P28_SP00154
P28_ST00167 2065 well
P28_TL00014 932 1296
P28_ST00168 188 developed
P28_SP00155 801 970
P28_ST00169 817 financial
P28_SP00156 966 962
P28_ST00170 982 933 132 centers
P28_SP00157
P28_ST00171
P28_SP00158 1161
P28_ST00172 1175 193 strengthen
P28_SP00159
P28_ST00173 their
P28_SP00160 1464
P28_ST00174 1478 939
P28_SP00161 1600
P28_ST00175 1615
P28_SP00162 1803
P28_ST00176 1821 laws.
P28_TL00015 1496
P28_ST00177 39 At
P28_SP00163 651 1068
P28_ST00178 666 1039 144 present.
P28_SP00164 810
P28_ST00179 825
P28_SP00165
P28_ST00180 911 172
P28_SP00166 1083
P28_ST00181 1099 lacks
P28_SP00167 1189
P28_ST00182
P28_SP00168 1258
P28_ST00183 1274 expertise
P28_SP00169 1438
P28_ST00184
P28_SP00170 1518
P28_ST00185 1045 178 resources
P28_SP00171
P28_ST00186 1728
P28_SP00172 1761
P28_ST00187 1777 156 consider
P28_SP00173 1933
P28_ST00188 1945 seriously
P28_TL00016 1086 1361
P28_ST00189 143 carrying
P28_SP00174 757 1124
P28_ST00190 773 1087 out
P28_SP00175 828 1116
P28_ST00191 843 complex
P28_SP00176 997
P28_ST00192 1093
P28_SP00177 1132
P28_ST00193
P28_SP00178 1335
P28_ST00194 1353 248 investigations 00000000000000
P28_SP00179 1601
P28_ST00195 1614 that
P28_SP00180 1683
P28_ST00196 1695 will
P28_SP00181 1750
P28_ST00197 1767 place
P28_SP00182 1861
P28_ST00198 1875
P28_TL00017 1134
P28_ST00199 207 responsible
P28_SP00183 822 1172
P28_ST00200 49 for
P28_SP00184 886 1164
P28_ST00201 899
P28_SP00185 1021
P28_ST00202
P28_SP00186 1224
P28_ST00203
P28_SP00187 1268
P28_ST00204
P28_SP00188 1304
P28_ST00205
P28_SP00189 1502
P28_ST00206 1135 court
P28_SP00190 1609
P28_ST00207 1623
P28_SP00191 1658
P28_ST00208 1671 66 law.
P28_SP00192 1737
P28_ST00209 106
P28_SP00193
P28_ST00210 1900 65 one
P28_SP00194 1965
P28_ST00211 175 considers
P28_TL00018 1182 1440
P28_ST00212
P28_SP00195 1212
P28_ST00213 694
P28_SP00196 763
P28_ST00214 780
P28_SP00197 951
P28_ST00215 967 has
P28_SP00198
P28_ST00216 an
P28_SP00199
P28_ST00217 1103 120 annual
P28_SP00200 1223
P28_ST00218 budget
P28_SP00201 1364 1220
P28_ST00219 1378
P28_SP00202 1413 8
P28_ST00220 1421 just
P28_SP00203
P28_ST00221 104 under
P28_SP00204 1606
P28_ST00222 1619
P28_SP00205
P28_ST00223 1701 billion
P28_SP00206 1801
P28_ST00224 1817 dollars
P28_SP00207 1937
P28_ST00225 1952
P28_SP00208 2016
P28_ST00226 2033
P28_TL00019 1230 1512
P28_ST00227 103 police
P28_SP00209 718
P28_ST00228 733 force
P28_SP00210 823 1260
P28_ST00229
P28_SP00211 907
P28_ST00230
P28_SP00212 986
P28_ST00231 998 1231 two
P28_SP00213
P28_ST00232 167 thousand
P28_SP00214
P28_ST00233 1237 87 men,
P28_SP00215 1347 1266
P28_ST00234 compared
P28_SP00216
P28_ST00235
P28_SP00217 1591
P28_ST00236 1607 organizations
P28_SP00218
P28_ST00237 1863
P28_SP00219 1932
P28_ST00238 1946 are
P28_SP00220 2002
P28_ST00239 2017 110 willing
P28_TL00020 1277 1444
P28_ST00240 1278
P28_SP00221 1307
P28_ST00241 659 109 spend
P28_SP00222 768 1315
P28_ST00242 785 1284
P28_SP00223 804
P28_ST00243 821
P28_SP00224 921
P28_ST00244
P28_SP00225 1057
P28_ST00245 1072
P28_SP00226 1113
P28_ST00246 1130
P28_SP00227 1195
P28_ST00247 1210 79 drug
P28_SP00228
P28_ST00248 211 transacfion,
P28_SP00229 1515
P28_ST00249 1531 77 then
P28_SP00230 1608
P28_ST00250 1624
P28_SP00231 1679
P28_ST00251 158 enormity
P28_SP00232 1853
P28_ST00252
P28_SP00233
P28_ST00253 task
P28_TL00021 1325 1439
P28_ST00254 becomes
P28_SP00234 1355
P28_ST00255 clearer.
P28_SP00235 928
P28_ST00256 957 Given
P28_SP00236 1060
P28_ST00257
P28_SP00237
P28_ST00258 1148 1332 187 resources,
P28_SP00238
P28_ST00259
P28_SP00239 1517 1363
P28_ST00260 1533
P28_SP00240 1597
P28_ST00261 183 motivation
P28_SP00241 1798
P28_ST00262 1815
P28_SP00242 1915
P28_ST00263
P28_TL00022 1373
P28_ST00264 launderer.
P28_SP00243 1409
P28_ST00265
P28_SP00244 881 1403
P28_ST00266 898
P28_SP00245 1069
P28_ST00267 1085 1380 75
P28_SP00246 1160 1411
P28_ST00268 102 never
P28_SP00247
P28_ST00269 1291
P28_SP00248 1376
P28_ST00270 1391 sufflcient 0006600000
P28_SP00249 1554
P28_ST00271 177
P28_SP00250 1746
P28_ST00272
P28_SP00251 1792
P28_ST00273 1809 117 launch
P28_SP00252 1926
P28_ST00274
P28_SP00253
P28_ST00275 151 effective
P28_TL00023 574
P28_ST00276 fight
P28_SP00254 690 1459
P28_ST00277 704 against
P28_SP00255
P28_ST00278 851 1428
P28_SP00256
P28_ST00279 987 laundering.
P28_TL00024 1527 1334
P28_ST00280 1528 Degree
P28_SP00257 766 1570
P28_ST00281 783
P28_SP00258 1561
P28_ST00282 839 236 Successful
P28_SP00259 1562 20
P28_ST00283 1095 140 Money 00001
P28_SP00260 1235
P28_ST00284 1251 244 Laundering
P28_SP00261 1495
P28_ST00285 1514
P28_SP00262 1549
P28_ST00286 Several
P28_SP00263 1723
P28_ST00287 1743 206 European
P28_TL00025 1580
P28_ST00288 Countries
P28_TL00026 1691 1473
P28_ST00289
P28_SP00264 1721
P28_ST00290 736 it
P28_SP00265 753
P28_ST00291 767 119 comes
P28_SP00266
P28_ST00292 1692
P28_SP00267
P28_ST00293 231 prosecutions
P28_SP00268 1179 1729
P28_ST00294
P28_SP00269
P28_ST00295
P28_SP00270
P28_ST00296 launderers,
P28_SP00271
P28_ST00297 1596 few
P28_SP00272 1660
P28_ST00298 countries
P28_SP00273 1839
P28_ST00299 keep
P28_SP00274
P28_ST00300 129 reliable
P28_TL00027 1739
P28_ST00301 statistics,
P28_SP00275 779 1775
P28_ST00302 often 02200
P28_SP00276 1769
P28_ST00303 902 152 because
P28_SP00277 1054
P28_ST00304 1071
P28_SP00278 1259
P28_ST00305
P28_SP00279 1346
P28_ST00306
P28_SP00280 1435
P28_ST00307 1450 recently
P28_SP00281 1593
P28_ST00308 146 deemed
P28_SP00282 1752
P28_ST00309
P28_SP00283 1788
P28_ST00310 1740 159 separate
P28_SP00284 1961
P28_ST00311 1977 108 crime.
P28_TL00028 1787
P28_ST00312 Some
P28_SP00285 719
P28_ST00313 735 experts 0000030
P28_SP00286 867 1825
P28_ST00314 883
P28_SP00287 909
P28_ST00315 927 1794
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P28_ST00316 1064
P28_SP00289 1252
P28_ST00317 suggest
P28_SP00290 1412
P28_ST00318 1424
P28_SP00291 1493
P28_ST00319 1507
P28_SP00292 1572
P28_ST00320 1588
P28_SP00293 1688
P28_ST00321 1705 reasons
P28_SP00294
P28_ST00322 73 why
P28_SP00295 1935
P28_ST00323 launderers
P28_TL00029
P28_ST00324 1842
P28_SP00296 670
P28_ST00325 687 1836
P28_SP00297
P28_ST00326 756
P28_SP00298 1873
P28_ST00327 870 199 prosecuted
P28_SP00299
P28_ST00328
P28_SP00300
P28_ST00329 1192 frequently
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P28_ST00330
P28_SP00302
P28_ST00331
P28_SP00303 1582
P28_ST00332 1599 most
P28_SP00304
P28_ST00333 271 anfi-laundering 0.90 007700000000000
P28_SP00305 1971
P28_ST00334 1988 regimes
P28_TL00030 1426
P28_ST00335 1890
P28_SP00306 1913
P28_ST00336 685 57 sfill 0.70 07700
P28_SP00307
P28_ST00337 758
P28_SP00308 784
P28_ST00338 799
P28_SP00309
P28_ST00339 895 infancy,
P28_SP00310 1032 1921
P28_ST00340 1050
P28_SP00311 1105
P28_ST00341
P28_SP00312 1173
P28_ST00342 situation
P28_SP00313
P28_ST00343 1356
P28_SP00314 1381
P28_ST00344 1395 said
P28_SP00315 1468
P28_ST00345 1482 1884
P28_SP00316
P28_ST00346 1532
P28_SP00317
P28_ST00347 1590 185 improving.
P28_SP00318
P28_ST00348 1780
P28_SP00319
P28_ST00349 tradifional 0.86 00000770000
P28_TL00031 1931 1516
P28_ST00350
P28_SP00320
P28_ST00351
P28_SP00321
P28_ST00352
P28_SP00322 860
P28_ST00353 198 Caribbean,
P28_SP00323 1073 1967
P28_ST00354
P28_SP00324
P28_ST00355 1151 example.
P28_SP00325 1314 1969
P28_ST00356 1330
P28_SP00326 1399
P28_ST00357
P28_SP00327 1587
P28_ST00358 1602
P28_SP00328 1666
P28_ST00359
P28_SP00329
P28_ST00360 Cayman
P28_SP00330 1903
P28_ST00361 Islands,
P28_SP00331 2057
P28_ST00362 1938
P28_TL00032 1979 1457
P28_ST00363 1986 now
P28_SP00332 688 2009
P28_ST00364 703 moving
P28_SP00333
P28_ST00365
P28_SP00334
P28_ST00366 97 make
P28_SP00335
P28_ST00367 1009
P28_SP00336 1026
P28_ST00368 1040 112 easier
P28_SP00337 1152
P28_ST00369
P28_SP00338 1213
P28_ST00370 1226 bankers
P28_SP00339
P28_ST00371 1383
P28_SP00340
P28_ST00372 1432 report
P28_SP00341 1537
P28_ST00373 142 suspect
P28_SP00342
P28_ST00374 1704 223 transactions
P28_SP00343 1927
P28_ST00375 without
P28_TL00033 2027
P28_ST00376 breaking
P28_SP00344
P28_ST00377 786 bank
P28_SP00345 873
P28_ST00378 2034 secrecy
P28_SP00346
P28_ST00379 1043 89 laws,
P28_SP00347 2063
P28_ST00380 1149
P28_SP00348
P28_ST00381 50
P28_SP00349
P28_ST00382 1288
P28_SP00350 1370
P28_ST00383 flnancial 660000000
P28_SP00351
P28_ST00384 institutions
P28_SP00352
P28_ST00385 1753 2028
P28_SP00353 1786
P28_ST00386 cooperate
P28_SP00354 1982
P28_ST00387 1996
P28_TL00034
P28_ST00388
P28_SP00355 2104
P28_ST00389 agencies
P28_SP00356 1015 2112
P28_ST00390 1031 2081
P28_SP00357
P28_ST00391 1137 easily.
P28_TL00035 2181
P28_ST00392 27 A
P28_SP00358 639 2211
P28_ST00393 654 2182 0.95 000003
P28_SP00359 759 2219
P28_ST00394 774 published
P28_SP00360
P28_ST00395 964
P28_SP00361
P28_ST00396 1995
P28_SP00362 1096
P28_ST00397
P28_SP00363 1153
P28_ST00398 1165 AUSTRAC,
P28_SP00364 1372 2217
P28_ST00399 1387 Australia's 0.98 00000000020
P28_SP00365 1577
P28_ST00400 150
P28_SP00366
P28_ST00401 1758 203 intelligence
P28_SP00367
P28_ST00402 1978 unit,
P28_TL00036 2227 1471
P28_ST00403 2229 184 concluded
P28_SP00368 798 2259
P28_ST00404 813
P28_SP00369 882
P28_ST00405 897 between
P28_SP00370 1048
P28_ST00406 1063 A$1
P28_SP00371 1129 2263
P28_ST00407
P28_SP00372
P28_ST00408 1269
P28_SP00373 1333
P28_ST00409 1348
P28_SP00374 1375
P28_ST00410 1389 $4.5
P28_SP00375
P28_ST00411 101
P28_SP00376 1583
P28_ST00412 268 (US$740m-3.3
P28_SP00377 1868 2267
P28_ST00413 billion)
P28_SP00378 1998
P28_ST00414 2013 2236
P28_TL00037 2275 1552
P28_ST00415 2277 washed
P28_SP00379 2307
P28_ST00416 138 through
P28_SP00380 905 2315
P28_ST00417 Australia
P28_SP00381 1079
P28_ST00418 each
P28_SP00382 1181
P28_ST00419 1197 year.[109]
P28_SP00383
P28_ST00420 1405
P28_SP00384 1474
P28_ST00421 best
P28_SP00385 1566
P28_ST00422 estimate
P28_SP00386 1734
P28_ST00423 1747 2284
P28_SP00387 1819
P28_ST00424 A$3.5
P28_SP00388 1939 2311
P28_ST00425 1956 billion.
P28_SP00389
P28_ST00426 2095
P28_TL00038 2324 1542
P28_ST00427 2325
P28_SP00390 720 2362
P28_ST00428 98 noted
P28_SP00391 833 2354
P28_ST00429 848
P28_SP00392 917
P28_ST00430 if
P28_SP00393 952
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P28_ST00432 figures
P28_SP00395
P28_ST00433 1214 2331
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P28_ST00434 accurate,
P28_SP00397 1451 2360
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P28_ST00436 1559 Australian
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P28_SP00400
P28_ST00438 1876 were
P28_SP00401 1963
P28_ST00439 recouping
P28_TL00039 2372
P28_ST00440 barely
P28_SP00402 725 2410
P28_ST00441 1
P28_SP00403 2402
P28_ST00442 762 %
P28_SP00404 794
P28_ST00443
P28_SP00405
P28_ST00444 857 all
P28_SP00406
P28_ST00445 908
P28_SP00407
P28_ST00446 978 dirty
P28_SP00408 1056
P28_ST00447 1070 2379
P28_SP00409 1193
P28_ST00448 1204
P28_SP00410 1273
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P28_SP00411
P28_ST00450 1377 guessed
P28_SP00412 1530
P28_ST00451 1545
P28_SP00413 1617
P28_ST00452 1631 125 flowing 0.99
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P28_SP00416 1905
P28_ST00455 2373 country
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P28_SP00418 2092 2393
P28_ST00457 2106
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P28_ST00458 209 surprisingly
P28_SP00419 2458
P28_ST00459 low
P28_SP00420 2450
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P28_SP00421
P28_ST00461 1025
P28_SP00422 1120
P28_ST00462
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P28_ST00463 1215 160
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P28_ST00464 1392
P28_SP00425 1417
P28_ST00465 1431 115 widely
P28_SP00426
P28_ST00466 1560 261 acknowledged
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P28_ST00467 2421
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P28_ST00468
P28_SP00429
P28_ST00469 2427
P28_SP00430 2051
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P28_TL00041 2468 1155
P28_ST00471 2469
P28_SP00431 702 2498
P28_ST00472 716 278 comprehensive
P28_SP00432 2506
P28_ST00473
P28_SP00433 1280
P28_ST00474 1298
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P28_ST00475 1458
P28_SP00435 1484
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P28_ST00477 1568 world.
P28_SP00437 1676 7
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P28_ST00479 1719 51 10]
P28_TL00042 2574 1522
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P28_SP00439 2604
P28_ST00481 675 complete
P28_SP00440 2612
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P28_SP00441 915
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P28_SP00445 1295
P28_ST00487 1309 2575
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P28_SP00447 1503
P28_ST00489 2581
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P28_ST00490 statistics
P28_SP00449
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P28_ST00492 comments
P28_TL00043 2622 1379
P28_ST00493 2629
P28_SP00451 655 2652
P28_ST00494
P28_SP00452 726
P28_ST00495 numbers
P28_SP00453 900
P28_ST00496
P28_SP00454 950
P28_ST00497 963 148 reported
P28_SP00455 1111 2660
P28_ST00498
P28_SP00456
P28_ST00499 1265
P28_SP00457 1453
P28_ST00500 incidents
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P28_ST00502
P28_SP00460 1744
P28_ST00503 U.K.
P28_SP00461
P28_ST00504 1852
P28_SP00462 1916
P28_ST00505 1930 2623
P28_TL00044 2670 1418
P28_ST00506 174
P28_SP00463 2708
P28_ST00507 139 nations.
P28_SP00464 2700
P28_ST00508 974 These
P28_SP00465
P28_ST00509 1102
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P28_ST00510 2677
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P28_SP00468
P28_ST00512 2671
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P28_ST00513 1576
P28_SP00470
P28_ST00514 1707
P28_SP00471 1763
P28_ST00515 argument
P28_SP00472
P28_ST00516 1964
P28_TL00045 2718
P28_ST00517 despite
P28_SP00473 744 2756
P28_ST00518 116 having
P28_SP00474 877
P28_ST00519 892
P28_SP00475 2748
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P28_ST00521 laws
P28_SP00477
P28_ST00522 1275
P28_SP00478 1340
P28_ST00523 1357 2725 means
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P28_ST00524 2719
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P28_SP00481 1675
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P28_ST00527 1804
P28_SP00483 1892 2754
P28_ST00528 1909
P28_SP00484
P28_ST00529
P28_TL00046 2766
P28_ST00530
P28_SP00485 2804
P28_ST00531
P28_SP00486 2796
P28_ST00532 2767 sector,
P28_SP00487 1101 2802
P28_ST00533 1119 educated
P28_SP00488
P28_ST00534 1302 police,
P28_SP00489
P28_ST00535 1433
P28_SP00490 1497
P28_ST00536 2773
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P28_ST00537
P28_SP00492 1776
P28_ST00538 branch
P28_SP00493 1914
P28_ST00539
P28_SP00494 2031
P28_ST00540 2047
P28_TL00047 2814 1146
P28_ST00541
P28_SP00495 632 2844
P28_ST00542 647
P28_SP00496 672
P28_ST00543 still
P28_SP00497
P28_ST00544 2821 very
P28_SP00498 2852
P28_ST00545 difflcult 000660000
P28_SP00499 977
P28_ST00546 989 2815
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P28_ST00547 successfully
P28_SP00501
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fileName Z:\Main\OCR\ABBYY and KIRTAS_PROCESSING\Kirtas\AA00000027_00001\JOHN_BAINS_DISSERTATION_MONEY_LAUNDERING_A_PRACTICAL_ANALYSIS_Page_03.tif
OCRProcessing ID OCRPROCESSING_1
preProcessingStep
processingSoftware
softwareCreator Kirtas Technologies, Inc.
softwareName BookScan Editor
softwareVersion 3.6
ocrProcessingStep
Kirtas Technologies, Inc.
OCR Manager
3.0.0.0
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P3_SP00008 1280
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P3_SP00010 1551
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P3_ST00013 1920 The
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P3_ST00017 970 169 tarnished 000000000
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P3_ST00018 1157 190 reputafion. 0.86 00000077000
P3_SP00017 1347 4
P3_ST00019 1351 134 Articles 00000000
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P3_ST00020 1500 171 appeared
P3_SP00019 1671
P3_ST00021 1689 26 in
P3_SP00020 1715 21
P3_ST00022 1736 65
P3_SP00021 1801
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P3_SP00022 1927 12
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P3_ST00029 1072 113 calling
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P3_SP00028 1270
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P3_SP00029 1458
P3_ST00032 1473 40 "A
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P3_ST00034 1658 49 for
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P3_ST00035 1719 89 Sale.
P3_SP00033 1808 6
P3_ST00036 1814 57 "[8]
P3_SP00034 1871
P3_ST00037 1886
P3_SP00035 1955
P3_ST00038 1972 142 Pindling
P3_TL00004 614 452 1515
P3_ST00039 226 Government 0000000000
P3_SP00036 840 482
P3_ST00040 856 63 had
P3_SP00037 919
P3_ST00041 937 68 little
P3_SP00038 1005
P3_ST00042 1021 117 choice
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P3_ST00044 1221 453 32 29 to
P3_SP00041 1253
P3_ST00045 1269 appoint
P3_SP00042 1403 490
P3_ST00046 1417 459
P3_SP00043 1436
P3_ST00047 1452 94 "Blue
P3_SP00044 1546
P3_ST00048 1562 143 Ribbon"
P3_SP00045
P3_ST00049 1720 224 Commission
P3_SP00046 1944
P3_ST00050 1960
P3_SP00047 1996
P3_ST00051 2009 Inquiry
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P3_ST00052 501 33
P3_SP00048 645 530
P3_ST00053 661 194 investigate
P3_SP00049 855 538
P3_ST00054 868
P3_SP00050 925
P3_ST00055 942 507 62 use
P3_SP00051 1004
P3_ST00056 1019
P3_SP00052 1054
P3_ST00057 1065
P3_SP00053 1134
P3_ST00058 1150
P3_SP00054 1321
P3_ST00059 1337 as
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P3_ST00060 1392
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P3_ST00061 1425 261 transshipment 0000000000000
P3_SP00057 1686
P3_ST00062 1702 85 point
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P3_SP00059 1849
P3_ST00064 1861 101 drugs
P3_SP00060 1962
P3_ST00065 1977 153 desfined 0.81 00077000
P3_TL00006 613 548 1527
P3_ST00066
P3_SP00061 662 578
P3_ST00067 672
P3_SP00062 728
P3_ST00068 745 United
P3_SP00063 859
P3_ST00069 875 124 States.
P3_SP00064 999
P3_ST00070 1029 Unfil 0.70 00770
P3_SP00065 1108
P3_ST00071 1122 55
P3_SP00066 1177
P3_ST00072 1194 549 135 37 present
P3_SP00067 1329 586
P3_ST00073 1342 74 day.
P3_SP00068 1416
P3_ST00074 1432
P3_SP00069 1501
P3_ST00075
P3_SP00070
P3_ST00076 1706 25 is
P3_SP00071 1731
P3_ST00077 1745 176 struggling
P3_SP00072 1921
P3_ST00078 1936
P3_SP00073 1968
P3_ST00079 1983 86 shed
P3_SP00074 2069
P3_ST00080 2084
P3_TL00007 596
P3_ST00081 179 reputafion 0.85 0000007700
P3_SP00075 794 634
P3_ST00082 811 603 39
P3_SP00076 850 626
P3_ST00083 866
P3_SP00077 885
P3_ST00084 900
P3_SP00078 979
P3_ST00085 994 112 transit
P3_SP00079 1106
P3_ST00086 87
P3_SP00080 1209
P3_ST00087 1223
P3_SP00081 1287
P3_ST00088 1303
P3_SP00082 1322
P3_ST00089 1338 597 115 center
P3_SP00083 1453
P3_ST00090 1464
P3_SP00084
P3_ST00091 121
P3_SP00085 1648
P3_ST00092 1663 189 laundering
P3_SP00086 1852
P3_ST00093 1868
P3_SP00087 1932
P3_ST00094 1950
P3_SP00088 1975
P3_ST00095 1990 sfill 07700
P3_TL00008 1330
P3_ST00096 210 categorized
P3_SP00089 824 682
P3_ST00097 841 651
P3_SP00090 880 674
P3_ST00098 896
P3_SP00091 915
P3_ST00099 932 84 Drug
P3_SP00092 1016
P3_ST00100 127 Transit
P3_SP00093 1158
P3_ST00101 1173 151 Location
P3_SP00094 1324
P3_ST00102 41 by
P3_SP00095 1383
P3_ST00103 1394
P3_SP00096 1450
P3_ST00104 1467 82 USA
P3_SP00097 1549
P3_ST00105 1563 State
P3_SP00098 1657
P3_ST00106 1673 271 Department.[9] 00000000000000
P3_TL00009 750 1488
P3_ST00107
P3_SP00099 780
P3_ST00108 698 131 change
P3_SP00100 829 788
P3_ST00109 845
P3_SP00101
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P3_ST00116 1552
P3_SP00108 1601
P3_ST00117 1613
P3_SP00109 1682
P3_ST00118 1698 274 Bahamas.After 0000000002200
P3_SP00110
P3_ST00119 1985 116 having
P3_TL00010 798 1493
P3_ST00120 been
P3_SP00111 701 828
P3_ST00121 719 led
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P3_SP00117 1289
P3_ST00127 1300 50
P3_SP00118 1350
P3_ST00128 1361 43
P3_SP00119 1404
P3_ST00129 1419 years,
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P3_ST00130 799 most
P3_SP00121 1633
P3_ST00131 203 Bahamians
P3_SP00122 1851
P3_ST00132 1865 88 were
P3_SP00123 1953
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P3_TL00011 846 1557
P3_ST00134 102 about
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P3_ST00135 what
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P3_ST00136 847
P3_SP00126
P3_ST00137 expect
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P3_ST00138 81 from
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P3_ST00139 1103
P3_SP00129
P3_ST00140 1176 170 Ingraham
P3_SP00130 1346
P3_ST00141 1362 265 administration, 000000000000000
P3_SP00131 1627 882
P3_ST00142 1644 180 especially
P3_SP00132 1824
P3_ST00143 1838 853
P3_SP00133 1878
P3_ST00144 1894 it
P3_SP00134 1911
P3_ST00145 1926 related
P3_SP00135 2048
P3_ST00146 2063
P3_SP00136 2095
P3_ST00147 2112 59 law
P3_TL00012 1556
P3_ST00148
P3_SP00137 678 924
P3_ST00149 695 96 order
P3_SP00138 791
P3_ST00150 803
P3_SP00139
P3_ST00151
P3_SP00140
P3_ST00152 955 191 restorafion 00000007700
P3_SP00141 1146
P3_ST00153 1162
P3_SP00142 1197
P3_ST00154 1207
P3_SP00143 1262
P3_ST00155 1279
P3_SP00144
P3_ST00156 1475
P3_SP00145 1510
P3_ST00157 1520
P3_SP00146 1589
P3_ST00158 1606
P3_SP00147 1777
P3_ST00159 1791 895
P3_SP00148 1823
P3_ST00160 1836
P3_SP00149 1923
P3_ST00161
P3_SP00150 1956
P3_ST00162 901 72
P3_SP00151 2040
P3_ST00163 2057 before
P3_TL00013 1482
P3_ST00164
P3_SP00152 668 972
P3_ST00165 949 145 scourge
P3_SP00153 980
P3_ST00166 843
P3_SP00154 878
P3_ST00167 888
P3_SP00155 989
P3_ST00168 1003 took
P3_SP00156 1082
P3_ST00169 1097 its
P3_SP00157 1133
P3_ST00170 1147 toll
P3_SP00158
P3_ST00171 1213 on
P3_SP00159 1254
P3_ST00172
P3_SP00160 1325
P3_ST00173 1339 95 small
P3_SP00161 1434
P3_ST00174 1451 197 population.
P3_SP00162 8
P3_ST00175 1656 Indeed,
P3_SP00163 978
P3_ST00176 1805 174 beginning
P3_SP00164 1979
P3_ST00177 1997
P3_SP00165 2023
P3_ST00178 2038
P3_TL00014 990 1545
P3_ST00179 early
P3_SP00166 702 1028
P3_ST00180 90's, 0.95 00200
P3_SP00167 1026
P3_ST00181 814 991 quotes
P3_SP00168
P3_ST00182 that
P3_SP00169 1018 1020
P3_ST00183 1033 997 are
P3_SP00170
P3_ST00184 90 more
P3_SP00171 1196
P3_ST00185 1210 168 favorable
P3_SP00172 1378
P3_ST00186 1395 began
P3_SP00173 1504
P3_ST00187 1519
P3_SP00174
P3_ST00188 1567 129 appear
P3_SP00175 1696
P3_ST00189 1709 27
P3_SP00176
P3_ST00190 1750
P3_SP00177 1806
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P3_SP00178 2044
P3_ST00192 2061 98 press
P3_TL00015 1038 1509
P3_ST00193 198 concerning
P3_SP00179 812 1076
P3_ST00194
P3_SP00180 897 1068
P3_ST00195 913 181 Bahamas' 00000002
P3_SP00181 1094
P3_ST00196 93 effort
P3_SP00182 1202
P3_ST00197 1214 1039
P3_SP00183 1247
P3_ST00198 combat
P3_SP00184 1396
P3_ST00199 1045
P3_SP00185 1533
P3_ST00200 1547
P3_SP00186 1747
P3_ST00201 1763 46 To
P3_SP00187 1809
P3_ST00202 quote
P3_SP00188 1924
P3_ST00203 1940
P3_SP00189 1959
P3_ST00204 1974 149 financial
P3_TL00016 1086 1439
P3_ST00205 1087 150 reporter,
P3_SP00190 765
P3_ST00206 783 "The
P3_SP00191 865 1116
P3_ST00207 Bahamas,
P3_SP00192 1063
P3_ST00208 1080 1093
P3_SP00193 1099
P3_ST00209 228 long-reputed 000000000000
P3_SP00194 1344
P3_ST00210
P3_SP00195
P3_ST00211 1441 still
P3_SP00196 1497
P3_ST00212 1514 104 acfive 0.75 007700
P3_SP00197 1618
P3_ST00213
P3_SP00198 1712
P3_ST00214 1730
P3_SP00199
P3_ST00215 1867 187
P3_TL00017 1486
P3_ST00216 118 nation,
P3_SP00200 733 1170
P3_ST00217 has
P3_SP00201 813 1164
P3_ST00218 taken
P3_SP00202 926
P3_ST00219 1135 334 counter-measures 0000000000000000
P3_SP00203 1276
P3_ST00220
P3_SP00204
P3_ST00221
P3_SP00205 1471
P3_ST00222 1483
P3_SP00206 1538
P3_ST00223 1555 legitimizing
P3_SP00207 1755 1172
P3_ST00224 1772
P3_SP00208 1807
P3_ST00225 1819 75 illicit
P3_SP00209
P3_ST00226 1907 funds.
P3_SP00210 2016
P3_ST00227 2032
P3_TL00018 1182 1413
P3_ST00228 182 Bahamian
P3_SP00211 797 1212
P3_ST00229 1183
P3_SP00212 1030 1220
P3_ST00230 1044
P3_SP00213
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P3_SP00214 1266
P3_ST00232 1284 industry
P3_SP00215 1427
P3_ST00233 144 adopted
P3_SP00216 1585
P3_ST00234 1603 operating
P3_SP00217 1771
P3_ST00235 1788
P3_SP00218
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P3_TL00019 1230
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P3_SP00220 930 1260
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P3_SP00221 1046
P3_ST00240 1062 1237
P3_SP00222
P3_ST00241 1198 188
P3_SP00223 1386
P3_ST00242
P3_SP00224 1494
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P3_TL00020 1336 1415
P3_ST00244 According
P3_SP00225
P3_ST00245 809
P3_SP00226 1366
P3_ST00246 Dr.
P3_SP00227 907
P3_ST00247 97 Peter
P3_SP00228 1022
P3_ST00248 1036 167 Maynard,
P3_SP00229 1203
P3_ST00249 1219 former
P3_SP00230 1340
P3_ST00250 1353
P3_SP00231 1535
P3_ST00251 234 Ambassador
P3_SP00232 1783
P3_ST00252 1794
P3_SP00233 1826
P3_ST00253 1840
P3_SP00234 1896
P3_ST00254 1913
P3_TL00021 1384
P3_ST00255 146 Nations,
P3_SP00235 761 1420
P3_ST00256 778 1391
P3_SP00236 1414
P3_ST00257 number
P3_SP00237 953
P3_ST00258 966
P3_SP00238 1001
P3_ST00259 1012 1385 119 events
P3_SP00239 1131
P3_ST00260 156 occurred
P3_SP00240
P3_ST00261
P3_SP00241
P3_ST00262
P3_SP00242
P3_ST00263 past
P3_SP00243 1422
P3_ST00264 1521 three
P3_SP00244 1614
P3_ST00265 1629 decades,
P3_SP00245 1793
P3_ST00266
P3_SP00246 1912
P3_ST00267 1929 185 negatively
P3_TL00022
P3_ST00268 affected
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P3_ST00269 772
P3_SP00248
P3_ST00270 844 108
P3_SP00249 952
P3_ST00271 968
P3_SP00250
P3_ST00272 1014
P3_SP00251 1083
P3_ST00273 298 Bahamas.These
P3_SP00252 1397
P3_ST00274 231 included:[11]
P3_TL00023 707 1541 1440
P3_ST00275 0.00
P3_SP00253 722
P3_ST00276 92 Early
P3_SP00254 857 1579
P3_ST00277 872
P3_SP00255 883
P3_ST00278 105 970's, 000200
P3_SP00256 1577
P3_ST00279
P3_SP00257 1070
P3_ST00280 1548 166 presence
P3_SP00258
P3_ST00281
P3_SP00259 1304
P3_ST00282 1316 Robert
P3_SP00260 1437
P3_ST00283 Vesco
P3_SP00261
P3_ST00284 1580 235 (international
P3_SP00262 1815
P3_ST00285 1829
P3_SP00263
P3_ST00286 1994 swindler
P3_TL00024
P3_ST00287 wanted
P3_SP00264 911 1619
P3_ST00288 928
P3_SP00265 969
P3_ST00289 981
P3_SP00266 1037
P3_ST00290 1053
P3_SP00267 1167
P3_ST00291 1184 States
P3_SP00268 1299
P3_ST00292 1314 201 authorities)
P3_SP00269
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P3_ST00294 1691
P3_SP00271 1717
P3_ST00295 1732
P3_SP00272 1802
P3_ST00296 1818 Bahamas;
P3_TL00025 1639 1449
P3_ST00297 1650
P3_SP00273 1665 44
P3_ST00298 766 1982,
P3_SP00274 863 1675
P3_ST00299
P3_SP00275 933 1669
P3_ST00300 crash
P3_SP00276
P3_ST00301
P3_SP00277
P3_ST00302 1107
P3_SP00278
P3_ST00303 Vatican's 000000020
P3_SP00279 1343
P3_ST00304 1360 Banco
P3_SP00280 1472
P3_ST00305 220 Ambrosiano
P3_SP00281
P3_ST00306
P3_SP00282
P3_ST00307
P3_SP00283 1845
P3_ST00308 1862 branches
P3_SP00284 2028
P3_ST00309 2045
P3_SP00285 2071
P3_ST00310 2087
P3_TL00026 1687 664
P3_ST00311
P3_SP00286 954
P3_ST00312
P3_SP00287
P3_ST00313 1049 1688 111 strong
P3_SP00288 1160 1725
P3_ST00314 1178
P3_SP00289
P3_ST00315 1375 fies; 77000
P3_TL00027 1738 1326
P3_ST00316 1749
P3_SP00290 1764
P3_ST00317 1983,
P3_SP00291 1774
P3_ST00318 881 NBC's 00020
P3_SP00292 993 1768
P3_ST00319 1010 1739 report
P3_SP00293 1115 1776
P3_ST00320 1129 42
P3_SP00294 1171
P3_ST00321 1188 Norman's
P3_SP00295
P3_ST00322 Cay,
P3_SP00296 1457
P3_ST00323
P3_SP00297
P3_ST00324 island
P3_SP00298 1647
P3_ST00325 stronghold
P3_SP00299 1853
P3_ST00326
P3_SP00300
P3_ST00327 1916 Carlos
P3_TL00028 1786 1290
P3_ST00328 138 Enrique
P3_SP00301
P3_ST00329 "Joe"
P3_SP00302 1816
P3_ST00330 Lehder,
P3_SP00303 1822
P3_ST00331
P3_SP00304 1312
P3_ST00332
P3_SP00305 9
P3_ST00333 1369
P3_SP00306
P3_ST00334 Medellin
P3_SP00307 1590
P3_ST00335 1607 Cartel,
P3_SP00308 1724
P3_ST00336 1741
P3_SP00309 1760
P3_ST00337 195 Colombian
P3_SP00310 1971
P3_ST00338 1989
P3_TL00029 782 1834 232
P3_ST00339 organization;
P3_TL00030 1885
P3_ST00340
P3_SP00311
P3_ST00341 1984,
P3_SP00312
P3_ST00342
P3_SP00313 1104 1915
P3_ST00343 1120
P3_SP00314 1155
P3_ST00344
P3_SP00315
P3_ST00345 1892
P3_SP00316
P3_ST00346
P3_SP00317 1446
P3_ST00347 1461 Trafficking;
P3_TL00031 1935 579
P3_ST00348 1946
P3_SP00318 1961
P3_ST00349 1987,
P3_SP00319
P3_ST00350 re-election
P3_SP00320 1069 1965
P3_ST00351
P3_SP00321 1121
P3_ST00352 1130
P3_SP00322 1186
P3_ST00353 PLP;
P3_TL00032 1986 1301
P3_ST00354
P3_SP00323 2012
P3_ST00355
P3_SP00324
P3_ST00356 808
P3_SP00325 864
P3_ST00357 late
P3_SP00326 943
P3_ST00358 960
P3_SP00327 971
P3_ST00359 982 980's,
P3_SP00328 2022
P3_ST00360 1105 U.S.
P3_SP00329 1179
P3_ST00361 106 Coast
P3_SP00330
P3_ST00362 1317 Guard
P3_SP00331
P3_ST00363 1445 patrol
P3_SP00332 1544 2024
P3_ST00364 1560
P3_SP00333 1595
P3_ST00365
P3_SP00334 1789
P3_ST00366 1804 1987 waters
P3_SP00335
P3_ST00367 1938
P3_TL00033 2034
P3_ST00368
P3_SP00336 964 2064
P3_ST00369 Defense
P3_SP00337
P3_ST00370 1148 Force
P3_SP00338 1249
P3_ST00371 1265 officers
P3_SP00339
P3_ST00372 1410 2035
P3_SP00340 1442
P3_ST00373 1459
P3_SP00341
P3_ST00374 1572 arrest;
P3_TL00034 2085
P3_ST00375 2096
P3_SP00342 2111
P3_ST00376
P3_SP00343 849 2123
P3_ST00377 867 Enforcement
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P8_ST00233 171 monetary
P8_SP00215 1461
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P8_SP00216 1652
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P8_SP00217 1796
P8_ST00236 1812 (a
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P8_ST00237 matrix
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P8_ST00238
P8_SP00220 2020
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P8_TL00020 1399 1536
P8_ST00240 hardware
P8_SP00221 783 1429
P8_ST00241 protocols
P8_SP00222 1437
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P8_SP00223
P8_ST00243 1061 1406 73
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P8_ST00244 154 software 0.94 00220000
P8_SP00225 1301
P8_ST00245 1318 203 paradigms)
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P8_ST00246
P8_SP00227 1624
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P8_SP00228 1727
P8_ST00248 1742 designed
P8_SP00229 1907
P8_ST00249 with
P8_SP00230 1993
P8_ST00250 2008 security
P8_TL00021 1447
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P8_SP00231 641 1477
P8_ST00252 mind
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P8_ST00253 from
P8_SP00233 839
P8_ST00254 853
P8_SP00234 908
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P8_SP00235 1048 1485
P8_ST00256 up,
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P8_SP00237 1188
P8_ST00258 1205 167 likelihood
P8_SP00238
P8_ST00259 1387
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P8_ST00260 1468
P8_SP00240 1546
P8_ST00261 1558
P8_SP00241 1614
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P8_SP00242 1672
P8_ST00263 1689 probed
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P8_ST00264 1827 thousands
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P8_ST00265 2033
P8_TL00022 1495 1382
P8_ST00266 98 times
P8_SP00245 1525
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P8_SP00248 897
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P8_SP00249 975
P8_ST00271 193 weakness,
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P8_ST00272 1198
P8_SP00251 1223
P8_ST00273 1239
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P8_SP00253 1378
P8_ST00275 1396
P8_SP00254 1460
P8_ST00276 155 common
P8_SP00255 1632
P8_ST00277 1647 sense
P8_SP00256 1755
P8_ST00278 dictates
P8_SP00257 1912
P8_ST00279 1925
P8_TL00023 1543 1488
P8_ST00280 185 eventually
P8_SP00258 799 1581
P8_ST00281 1550
P8_SP00259 1573
P8_ST00282 121 means
P8_SP00260 969
P8_ST00283 984
P8_SP00261 1019
P8_ST00284 1031 231 manipulafing 0.87 000000007700
P8_SP00262 1262
P8_ST00285 1276
P8_SP00263 1332
P8_ST00286 1346
P8_SP00264 1476
P8_ST00287 1490
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P8_ST00288
P8_SP00266
P8_ST00289 laundering
P8_SP00267 1877
P8_ST00290 1894 purposes
P8_SP00268 2061
P8_ST00291 2077
P8_TL00024 1591
P8_ST00292 highly
P8_SP00269 720
P8_ST00293 735 likely.
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P8_SP00271 1621
P8_ST00295 911 what
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P8_ST00296 1013 81 level
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P8_ST00297
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P8_ST00298 1186 230 manipulation
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P8_ST00299 1431
P8_SP00276 1487
P8_ST00300 1503 1598 occur
P8_SP00277 1604
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P8_SP00278 1680
P8_ST00302 1695
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P8_ST00303 1767 120
P8_SP00280 1887
P8_ST00304 1902
P8_SP00281 1919
P8_ST00305 1934 may
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P8_ST00306 2023
P8_SP00283 2059
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P8_SP00284 669 1668
P8_ST00309 684
P8_SP00285 769
P8_ST00310 785
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P8_ST00312 integrity
P8_SP00288 1676
P8_ST00313 1070
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P8_ST00314 1114
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P8_ST00315 1184
P8_SP00291 1314
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P8_SP00292 1370
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P8_ST00318 1450 now
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P8_ST00321 1790
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P8_ST00322 1831 88 open
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P8_ST00323 1933
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P8_ST00324 217 speculation.
P8_SP00299 1724 7
P8_ST00325 837 248 Nevertheless, 0000000000000
P8_SP00300 1085 1722
P8_ST00326 1103 20 if
P8_SP00301 1123 1716
P8_ST00327 1687 past
P8_SP00302 1211
P8_ST00328 1226 166 high-tech
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P8_ST00329 1408 244 compromises
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P8_SP00305
P8_ST00331 1714 other
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P8_ST00332 1820 "secure"
P8_SP00307 1971
P8_ST00333 149 financial
P8_TL00027 1734
P8_ST00334 150 systems
P8_SP00308 1772
P8_ST00335 779
P8_SP00309 835 1764
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P8_ST00337 indication,
P8_SP00311
P8_ST00338 1129 losses
P8_SP00312 1242
P8_ST00339
P8_SP00313 1287
P8_ST00340 providers
P8_SP00314 1471
P8_ST00341 1486
P8_SP00315
P8_ST00342 1568 users
P8_SP00316 1665
P8_ST00343 1681
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P8_ST00344
P8_SP00318 1788
P8_ST00345 1804 proposed
P8_SP00319
P8_ST00346 1987
P8_TL00028 1782 391
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P8_SP00320
P8_ST00348
P8_SP00321
P8_ST00349 740 192 significant.
P8_SP00322 932
P8_ST00350 [34]
P8_TL00029 685
P8_ST00351
P8_SP00323
P8_ST00352 Future
P8_SP00324 847
P8_ST00353
P8_SP00325 906
P8_ST00354 920
P8_SP00326
P8_ST00355
P8_TL00030 1559
P8_ST00356 136 Despite
P8_SP00327 751
P8_ST00357 growing
P8_SP00328 907
P8_ST00358 2006 178 pressures
P8_SP00329
P8_ST00359 1118
P8_SP00330 2029
P8_ST00360 1215 221 international
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P8_ST00361 groups
P8_SP00332 1575
P8_ST00362 1590
P8_SP00333 1655
P8_ST00363 1669
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P8_ST00364 resulting
P8_SP00335 1893
P8_ST00365 212 proliferation
P8_SP00336 2122
P8_ST00366 2139
P8_TL00031 2047 1548
P8_ST00367 2054
P8_SP00337 737 2085
P8_ST00368 189
P8_SP00338
P8_ST00369 89 laws,
P8_SP00339 1046 2083
P8_ST00370 1062 successful
P8_SP00340 1253
P8_ST00371 1270
P8_SP00341
P8_ST00372
P8_SP00342 1595
P8_ST00373 1611 controls
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P8_ST00374 1769
P8_SP00344
P8_ST00375
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P8_SP00346 2107
P8_ST00377 2123
P8_TL00032 2095 1446
P8_ST00378
P8_SP00347 2125
P8_ST00379 658 all 0.97
P8_SP00348 695
P8_ST00380 712 nations,
P8_SP00349 851 2131
P8_ST00381 869 rely
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P8_ST00382 2102
P8_SP00351 988
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P8_SP00353 1210
P8_ST00385 2096
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P8_SP00355
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P8_SP00356
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P8_ST00389
P8_SP00358 1869
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P8_SP00359
P8_ST00391 1920 national
P8_TL00033 2143
P8_ST00392 priority.
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P8_ST00393 Even
P8_SP00361 2173
P8_ST00394 854 those
P8_SP00362 954
P8_ST00395 970 countries
P8_SP00363
P8_ST00396 1152 128 leading
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P8_ST00397 1294
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P8_ST00398 2150 war
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P8_ST00400
P8_SP00368 1625
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P8_SP00369 1839
P8_ST00402 83 such
P8_SP00370 1939
P8_ST00403 1956
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P8_ST00404 2009
P8_TL00034 2191 1473
P8_ST00405 91
P8_SP00372 706 2227
P8_ST00406 724 86 U.K.,
P8_SP00373 810
P8_ST00407 827
P8_SP00374 2221
P8_ST00408 170 Australia,
P8_SP00375 1076
P8_ST00409 1093 2198
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P8_ST00410 1166 losing
P8_SP00377 2229
P8_ST00411 1284
P8_SP00378 1409
P8_ST00412 1426 against
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P8_SP00380
P8_ST00414 1709 launderers
P8_SP00381 1901
P8_ST00415 1918
P8_SP00382 1944
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P8_TL00035 2239
P8_ST00417 rapidly
P8_SP00383 734 2277
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P8_SP00384 912
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P8_SP00385 1077 2269
P8_ST00420 195 landscape.
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P8_SP00388 1463
P8_ST00423 1479
P8_SP00389 1504
P8_ST00424 1519 due
P8_SP00390 1585
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P8_ST00426 1646 2240 part
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P8_ST00427 1726
P8_SP00393 1759
P8_ST00428 1773
P8_SP00394 1828
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P8_TL00036 2287 782
P8_ST00430 htmlects
P8_SP00395 2317
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P8_ST00450 691 194 region.The
P8_SP00413 885 2479
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P8_ST00453 1214 Bank
P8_SP00416 1306
P8_ST00454 1321 118 (EUB),
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P8_ST00455
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P8_SP00419 1608
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P8_ST00458 1779
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P8_ST00459
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P8_SP00423 2089 2477
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P8_ST00462 2496 one
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P8_SP00425
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P8_SP00438
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P8_ST00481 itself
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P8_ST00487 1970
P8_TL00041 616 2585 1535
P8_ST00488 162 Internet,"
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P8_ST00489
P8_SP00449 2615
P8_ST00490 EUB
P8_SP00450 944
P8_ST00491 961 invites
P8_SP00451 1074
P8_ST00492 1089 2586 customers
P8_SP00452 1278
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P8_SP00453
P8_ST00494 1340 "discover
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P8_ST00495 1518
P8_SP00455
P8_ST00496 2592 many
P8_SP00456 1690 2623
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P8_ST00498
P8_TL00042 2633
P8_ST00499 services
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P8_SP00459
P8_ST00501 (it)
P8_SP00460 2671
P8_ST00502 919 2640 can
P8_SP00461 981
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P8_ST00504 2634
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P8_ST00505 1138 savvy
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P8_ST00506 individuals
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P8_SP00466 1527
P8_ST00508 240 corporations"
P8_SP00467 1784
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P8_SP00468 1879
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P8_SP00469 1948
P8_ST00511 privacy
P8_SP00470 2093
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P8_TL00043 2681 517
P8_ST00513 82 their
P8_SP00471 2711
P8_ST00514 personal
P8_SP00472 2719
P8_ST00515 252 computer.[36]
P8_TL00044 2787 1365
P8_ST00516 152 Through
P8_SP00473 2825
P8_ST00517 its
P8_SP00474 2817
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P8_ST00519 1002 2794
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P8_SP00478 2823
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P8_ST00524 210 September,
P8_SP00481 1729
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P8_ST00526 1862
P8_SP00483 1943
P8_ST00527 111 allows
P8_TL00045 2835 1435
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P8_SP00484 802 2865
P8_ST00529 818 2842 access
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P8_ST00530
P8_SP00486 990
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P8_ST00532 full
P8_SP00488
P8_ST00533 range
P8_SP00489 1207 2873
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P8_ST00535 1269
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P8_ST00536 private
P8_SP00492
P8_ST00537
P8_SP00493 1708
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P8_ST00540 1984
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P8_SP00496 756 2921
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P8_SP00497 960
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P8_ST00545 1231 posed
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P8_ST00548 1610 locations
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P8_ST00551 1935
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P8_ST00553 760 through
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P8_SP00508 968
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P8_ST00557
P8_SP00511
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P8_SP00513 1683
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P8_SP00514
P8_ST00561 under
P8_SP00515 1977
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P20_SP00042 1882
P20_ST00046 1896 512 33 to
P20_SP00043 1929
P20_ST00047 1945 52 be,
P20_SP00044 1997
P20_ST00048 2012
P20_TL00005 559 1523
P20_ST00049 97 make
P20_SP00045 712 589
P20_ST00050 149 inquiries
P20_SP00046 597
P20_ST00051 894
P20_SP00047 929 9
P20_ST00052 938
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P20_ST00053 1009 174 character
P20_SP00049 1183
P20_ST00054 1195
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P20_ST00055 55
P20_SP00051 1295
P20_ST00056 566 121 person
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P20_ST00058 1533 110 whom
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P20_ST00060 1714 72 was
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P20_ST00061 1800 130 dealing
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P20_ST00062 1948 119 behind
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P20_ST00063 2081 57
P20_TL00006 614 607 1556
P20_ST00064 608 172 37 corporate
P20_SP00059 786 645
P20_ST00065 800 59 veil
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P20_ST00067 954 77 thus
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P20_ST00068 1047 94 avoid
P20_SP00063 1141
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P20_SP00064 1211
P20_ST00070 1228 62 risk
P20_SP00065 1290
P20_ST00071 1304
P20_SP00066 1339
P20_ST00072 1350 145 entering
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P20_ST00073 1513 into
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P20_ST00074 1590
P20_SP00069 1609
P20_ST00075 1621 78 joint
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P20_ST00076 1712 venture
P20_SP00071 1849
P20_ST00077 1863
P20_SP00072 1933
P20_ST00078 1950
P20_SP00073 1991
P20_ST00079 2008 162 apparent
P20_TL00007 655 1526
P20_ST00080 139
P20_SP00074 753 685
P20_ST00081 769
P20_SP00075 833
P20_ST00082 848
P20_SP00076 903
P20_ST00083 919 656 213 consequent 0000000000
P20_SP00077 1132 693
P20_ST00084 1146 effect
P20_SP00078 1246
P20_ST00085 1261 662 upon
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P20_ST00086 1361
P20_SP00080 1417
P20_ST00087 1434 179 reputation
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P20_ST00089 1677
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P20_ST00092 1897
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P20_ST00093 1968 Nottage's
P20_TL00008 702 1531
P20_ST00094 153 standing
P20_SP00087 766 740
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P20_ST00098 1029 211 Minister.Mr. 000000000000
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P20_SP00092 1398
P20_ST00100 1415 73 now
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P20_SP00094 1642
P20_ST00102 1656
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P20_ST00103 1728 position
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P20_ST00105 1964 25 is
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P20_ST00106 2004 anxious
P20_TL00009 612 750 1532
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P20_ST00109 781 132 himself
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P20_ST00110 924
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P20_ST00112 1036 133 interest
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P20_ST00113 1184
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P20_ST00120 1754 189 meanfime, 0.83 000077000
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P20_ST00121 1958
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P20_ST00122 2028 66 fact
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P20_ST00128 1021 805 or
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P20_ST00129 1071 799 63 not,
P20_SP00120 1134 834
P20_ST00130 1152 87 [that]
P20_SP00121 1239 836
P20_ST00131 1256 (sic)
P20_SP00122 1329
P20_ST00132 1346
P20_SP00123 1387
P20_ST00133 1404 has
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P20_SP00128 1962
P20_ST00138 1981 [76]
P20_TL00011 905 1480
P20_ST00139 28 In
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P20_ST00140 660 another
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P20_ST00141 813 224 Commission
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P20_SP00135 1369
P20_ST00146 1385 190 operafions 0.85 0000077000
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P20_SP00137 1626
P20_ST00148 1639 220 Bahamasair
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P20_ST00149 1873 (the
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P20_ST00150 1956 national
P20_TL00012 952 1444
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P20_SP00140 676
P20_ST00152 123 carrier,
P20_SP00141 988
P20_ST00153 111 where
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P20_ST00154 politically
P20_SP00143 1125
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P20_SP00145 1500
P20_ST00157 1515 88 were
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P20_ST00170 1855 Ministers
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P20_ST00171 2030
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P20_ST00181 165 airplanes
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P20_ST00184 1759 Canadian
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P20_ST00185 245 company.[77]
P20_SP00171 39
P20_ST00186 898 The
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P20_SP00173 1265
P20_ST00188 1282 260 recommended
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P20_ST00190 209 prosecution
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P20_ST00196 940 conduct
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P20_ST00204 1814 former
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P20_ST00205 1947 176 Chairmen
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P20_ST00213 1127 192 disposifion 0.86 00000007700
P20_SP00197 1319
P20_ST00214 1335
P20_SP00198 1371
P20_ST00215 1380
P20_SP00199 1436
P20_ST00216 1451 215 commission
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P20_ST00217 paid
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P20_ST00220 1971 De
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P20_ST00222 797 1247
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P20_ST00223 853
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P20_SP00207 996
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P20_ST00226 1059 Dash-8
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P20_ST00227 1205 125 aircraft 0.94 00000022
P20_SP00210 1330
P20_ST00228 1342 1241
P20_SP00211 1374
P20_ST00229 1391 297 Bahamasair.[78] 000000000000000
P20_TL00019 1516
P20_ST00230 180 High-level
P20_SP00212 795 1384
P20_ST00231 811 corruption
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P20_SP00214 1035 1376
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P20_ST00234 1136 Bahamas
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P20_ST00238 1636 documented.
P20_SP00220 1872
P20_ST00239 1900 161 Although
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P20_ST00240 2076
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P20_ST00243 925 recently
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P20_ST00245 1262
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P20_ST00252 1980
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P20_ST00255 926
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P20_ST00257 1043 PLP.
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P20_ST00289 1129 light
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P20_ST00293 1493 108 event.
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P20_ST00331 892 212 wrongdoing
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P20_ST00333 1165
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P20_ST00334 152 previous
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P20_ST00358 1837 nature
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P20_ST00361 109 crime,
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P20_ST00376 1919 crimes
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P20_ST00377 2053 1885 set
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P20_SP00349 669
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P20_SP00351 1970
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P20_ST00382 1113 238 investigators. 00000000000000
P20_SP00353 1351
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P20_ST00384 1484 146 charged
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P20_ST00385 1644
P20_SP00356 1715
P20_ST00386 1730
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P20_ST00388 1982
P20_TL00031 1979 1535
P20_ST00389 225 investigation
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P20_SP00360 2009
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P20_SP00372 2068
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P20_SP00383 2113
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P20_SP00389 1397
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P20_ST00424 1755 182 legislators
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P20_SP00393 794 2161
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P20_SP00394 844 2153
P20_ST00428 858 234 unknowingly,
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P20_ST00429 1108 failed
P20_SP00396 1203
P20_ST00430 1218 2124
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P20_ST00433 1541 195 complexity
P20_SP00400 1736
P20_ST00434 1750
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P20_ST00435 1797
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P20_ST00436 laundering
P20_TL00035 2171
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P20_SP00403 678 2201
P20_ST00438 696 173 high-level
P20_SP00404 2209
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P20_SP00405 1065
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P20_SP00406 1109
P20_ST00441 1124 2172 terms
P20_SP00407 1227
P20_ST00442 1242
P20_SP00408 1277
P20_ST00443 82 their
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P20_ST00444 1381 75 both
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P15_TL00020
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P15_ST00253 1578 214 Economic
P15_SP00231 1792
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P15_ST00261 1358 174 increased
P15_SP00238 1532
P15_ST00262 1547
P15_SP00239 1603
P15_ST00263 1619 vulnerability
P15_SP00240 1837 1629
P15_ST00264 1851
P15_SP00241 1886 9
P15_ST00265 1895
P15_SP00242 1951
P15_ST00266 1967 187 Caribbean
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P15_ST00268 739 1639
P15_SP00244 1668
P15_ST00269 785
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P15_ST00276 265 consequences
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P15_SP00253 1970
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P15_ST00292 201 institutions.
P15_SP00266 816 1764
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P15_ST00302 1857 drug
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P15_SP00285 1385
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P15_ST00316 1798
P15_SP00289 1948
P15_ST00317 1965 191 institutions
P15_TL00029 1830 1515
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P15_ST00326 1661 islands
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P15_ST00330 873 often 0.91 02200
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P15_SP00303 1294
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P15_ST00334
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P15_ST00350 1915
P15_TL00032 1974
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P15_SP00321 1008 2004
P15_ST00353 1981
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P15_SP00328
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P15_TL00033 2022 1481
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P15_TL00036 616 2224
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P15_SP00357 1127
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P15_ST00484 650 2672
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P15_SP00445 2701
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P15_SP00463 2028
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P15_SP00520 2032
P15_ST00570 2050


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P12_ST00455 1532
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P12_TL00041 2585
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P12_SP00447 1430 2671 6
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P12_ST00520 2113
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P19_ST00036 1413 188 laundering 0000000000
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P19_ST00039 1815 142 pounds.
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P19_ST00050 1345 229 enforcement 00000000000
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P19_ST00051 1588
P19_SP00048 1623 9
P19_ST00052 1632
P19_SP00049 1688
P19_ST00053 1701 241 37 transparency 000000000000
P19_TL00005 500 1282
P19_ST00054 238 requirements
P19_SP00050 853 538
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P19_SP00051 904 530
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P19_ST00059 1186 100 those
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P19_ST00060 1301 165 countries
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P19_ST00067 742 stories
P19_SP00062 862
P19_ST00068 877
P19_SP00063 913
P19_ST00069 925 high
P19_SP00064 997 645
P19_ST00070 1015 81 level
P19_SP00065 1096
P19_ST00071 1112 179 corruption
P19_SP00066 1291
P19_ST00072 1308 614 are
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P19_ST00073 1379 197 discovered
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P19_ST00074 1593 and
P19_SP00069 1657
P19_ST00075 1676 190 publicized,
P19_SP00070 1866
P19_ST00076 1881 51 we
P19_SP00071 1932
P19_ST00077 1947 see
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P19_ST00078 2025 99 some
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P19_ST00079 2140
P19_TL00007 655 1447
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P19_SP00074 668 685
P19_ST00081 684 155 methods
P19_SP00075 839
P19_ST00082 856 used
P19_SP00076 940
P19_ST00083 958 40 by
P19_SP00077 998 693
P19_ST00084 1013 656 220 perpetrators
P19_SP00078 1233
P19_ST00085 1246
P19_SP00079 1279
P19_ST00086 1296 167 legitimize
P19_SP00080 1463
P19_ST00087 1477
P19_SP00081 1559
P19_ST00088 1573 157 kickback
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P19_ST00089 1744
P19_SP00083 1808
P19_ST00090 1826 bribe
P19_SP00084 1913
P19_ST00091 1930 662 129 money.
P19_TL00008 702 1471
P19_ST00092 105 Some
P19_SP00085 719 732
P19_ST00093 734 212 spectacular
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P19_ST00094 959 174
P19_SP00087 1133
P19_ST00095 1150 85 have
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P19_ST00096 1250 occurred
P19_SP00089 1407
P19_ST00097 1422 198 throughout
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P19_SP00092 738
P19_ST00100 259 demonstrafing 0.88 0000000007700
P19_TL00009 750 1530
P19_ST00101 757 122 money
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P19_ST00102 751 189
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P19_ST00103 956 156 activities
P19_SP00095 780
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P19_ST00112 1885 politicians
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P19_SP00105 865 828
P19_ST00115 893 Very
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P19_ST00117 1078 62 has
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P19_ST00118 1157 86 been
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P19_ST00119 1259 89 done
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P19_ST00120 1362 799
P19_SP00111 1394
P19_ST00121 145 address
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P19_ST00122 1568 these
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P19_ST00123 1685 134 matters
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P19_ST00124 25
P19_SP00115 1861
P19_ST00125 1878 805
P19_SP00116 1943
P19_ST00126 1955 196 substantial
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P19_ST00129 781 209 42 Examples
P19_SP00119 990 995
P19_ST00130 1007
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P19_ST00131 1063 269 International 0000000000000
P19_SP00121 1332
P19_ST00132 1352 High
P19_SP00122
P19_ST00133 110 Level
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P19_ST00134 169 Political
P19_SP00124 1765
P19_ST00135 1784 952 231 43 Corruption
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P19_ST00136 48 No
P19_SP00125 663 1093
P19_ST00137 679 1070 area
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P19_ST00138 773
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P19_ST00141 1001 is
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P19_ST00142 1042 1064 135 exempt
P19_SP00131 1177 1101
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P19_ST00145 1359 76 type
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P19_ST00148 1732
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P19_ST00149 1776
P19_SP00138 1898
P19_ST00150 199 laundering.
P19_TL00013 1111
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P19_ST00152 104 below
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P19_ST00153 857 1118
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P19_ST00154 927
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P19_SP00143 1155
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P19_ST00161 1830 73
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P19_ST00162 1920
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P19_ST00163 2017 political
P19_TL00014 1159 1511 148
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P19_SP00151 876 1197 -169
P19_ST00165 707 1280 0.00
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P19_ST00166 766
P19_SP00153 794
P19_ST00167 811 137 Mexico,
P19_SP00154 1305
P19_ST00168 964 121 former
P19_SP00155 1085
P19_ST00169 1099 president
P19_SP00156 1266 1307
P19_ST00170 116 Carlos
P19_SP00157 1396
P19_ST00171 1412 Salinas' 0.97 00000002
P19_SP00158 1554
P19_ST00172 130 brother
P19_SP00159 1700
P19_ST00173 1714 Raul
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P19_ST00174
P19_SP00161 1880
P19_ST00175 1896 147 arrested
P19_SP00162 2043
P19_ST00176 2061
P19_TL00015 782 1316 1363
P19_ST00177 150 accused
P19_SP00163 932
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P19_ST00179 992 108 taking
P19_SP00165 1100 1354
P19_ST00180 1323
P19_SP00166 1240
P19_ST00181 1252
P19_SP00167 1333
P19_ST00182 75 both
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P19_ST00183 1440 drug
P19_SP00169 1519
P19_ST00184 1534 trafflckers 0.89 00006600000
P19_SP00170 1713
P19_ST00185 1728
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P19_ST00186 123 foreign
P19_SP00172 1931
P19_ST00187 companies
P19_TL00016 618
P19_ST00188 140 wanting
P19_SP00173 920 1402
P19_ST00189 934 1365
P19_SP00174 967
P19_ST00190 981 do
P19_SP00175 1025
P19_ST00191 159 business
P19_SP00176 1201
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P19_SP00177 1244
P19_ST00193 1262 136 Mexico.
P19_TL00017 1405
P19_ST00194 1426
P19_SP00178 1441
P19_ST00195 1415 194 Colombian
P19_SP00179 1445
P19_ST00196 976
P19_SP00180 1143 1453
P19_ST00197 1158 139 Ernesto
P19_SP00181 1297
P19_ST00198 1312 146 Samper
P19_SP00182 1458
P19_ST00199 1468
P19_SP00183 1540
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P19_SP00184 1705
P19_ST00201 1722
P19_SP00185 1757
P19_ST00202 173 accepting
P19_SP00186 1941
P19_ST00203 1958 $6.5M
P19_SP00187 2069 1449
P19_ST00204 2086
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P19_SP00188 860 1501
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P19_SP00189 999
P19_ST00207 1012
P19_SP00190 1493
P19_ST00208 1074 his
P19_SP00191 1122
P19_ST00209 1138 election
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P19_ST00210 1293 187 campaign.
P19_SP00193 1480
P19_ST00211 1510 His
P19_SP00194 1565
P19_ST00212 1582 143 Minister
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P19_ST00213 1738
P19_SP00196 1773
P19_ST00214 1786 Defense
P19_SP00197 1935
P19_ST00215 1464 went
P19_SP00198 2036 24
P19_ST00216 2060
P19_TL00019 783 1164
P19_ST00217 118 prison.
P19_SP00199 901
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P19_SP00200 1003 1541
P19_ST00219 1018
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P19_ST00221 1132 184 signiflcant 00000660000
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P19_ST00222 1330 162 evidence
P19_SP00204 1492
P19_ST00223 1508
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P19_ST00224 1556
P19_SP00206 1604
P19_ST00225 98 crime
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P19_ST00226 1733 centered
P19_SP00208 1889
P19_ST00227 1906 1518
P19_TL00020
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P19_SP00209 1004 1589
P19_ST00229 1021 banking
P19_SP00210 1160 1597
P19_ST00230 1175 223 transactions
P19_SP00211 1398
P19_ST00231
P19_SP00212
P19_ST00232 1513 1560
P19_SP00213 1546
P19_ST00233 1562 launder
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P19_ST00234 1711
P19_SP00215 1811
P19_ST00235 1828 166 proceeds
P19_SP00216 1994
P19_ST00236 2007 103 which
P19_TL00021 1607
P19_ST00237 1614
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P19_ST00238 882 said
P19_SP00218 954
P19_ST00239 969 1608
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P19_ST00240
P19_SP00220 1103
P19_ST00241 1119 178 originated
P19_SP00221 1645
P19_ST00242 1313
P19_SP00222 1393
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P19_SP00223 1462
P19_ST00244 1478 67 Cali
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P19_ST00245 1561 cartel.
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P19_SP00225 1683
P19_ST00247 763 Within
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P19_ST00249 962 61 last
P19_SP00228 1023
P19_ST00250 1035 three
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P19_ST00251 1664
P19_SP00230 1251 1695
P19_ST00252 1270 presidents
P19_SP00231 1457
P19_ST00253 1473
P19_SP00232 1558
P19_ST00254 1575
P19_SP00233 1661
P19_ST00255 forced
P19_SP00234 1789
P19_ST00256 1805 1658 out
P19_SP00235 1860
P19_ST00257 1875
P19_SP00236 1910
P19_ST00258 1921 offlce 0.79 006600
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P19_ST00259 2034
P19_TL00023 1389
P19_ST00260 Brazil
P19_SP00238 881 1735
P19_ST00261 897
P19_SP00239 961
P19_ST00262 977 Venezuela
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P19_ST00263 153 because
P19_SP00241 1340
P19_ST00264 1355
P19_SP00242 1390
P19_ST00265 massive
P19_SP00243 1550
P19_ST00266 1566 144 charges
P19_SP00244 1710 1743
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P19_SP00245 1760
P19_ST00268 1772 180 corrupfion 0.85 0000007700
P19_SP00246 1952
P19_ST00269 1968
P19_SP00247 2033
P19_ST00270 2050 1712
P19_TL00024 1753
P19_ST00271
P19_TL00025 1804
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P19_SP00249 1834
P19_ST00274 810 South
P19_SP00250 914
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P19_SP00251 1047 1840
P19_ST00276 two
P19_SP00252 1125
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P19_ST00278 1275
P19_SP00254 1842
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P19_ST00280 1580
P19_SP00256 1667
P19_ST00281 171 convicted
P19_SP00257 1854
P19_ST00282 1871
P19_SP00258
P19_ST00283 1918 124 bribery
P19_SP00259 2042
P19_ST00284 along
P19_TL00026 1852 475
P19_ST00285 70 with
P19_SP00260 850 1882
P19_ST00286 1853 57 top
P19_SP00261 922
P19_ST00287 938
P19_SP00262 1097
P19_ST00288 leaders.
P19_TL00027 1367
P19_ST00289 1914
P19_SP00263 1929
P19_ST00290
P19_SP00264 1933
P19_ST00291 812 94 India,
P19_SP00265 906 1939
P19_ST00292 923
P19_SP00266
P19_ST00293 1068
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P19_ST00294 1202 cabinet
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P19_ST00295 members
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P19_ST00296
P19_SP00270 1618
P19_ST00297 1635
P19_SP00271 1721
P19_ST00298 1739 indicted
P19_SP00272 1876
P19_ST00299 1893
P19_SP00273 1934
P19_ST00300
P19_TL00028 1950
P19_ST00301
P19_SP00274 1988
P19_ST00302 987
P19_SP00275 1051 1980
P19_ST00303
P19_SP00276 1248
P19_ST00304 1265 154 charges.
P19_SP00277 1419
P19_ST00305 1450
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P19_ST00306 1496 1951
P19_SP00279 1583
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P19_ST00308 1642
P19_SP00281 1741
P19_ST00309 114 cases,
P19_SP00282 1986
P19_ST00310 large
P19_SP00283 1977
P19_ST00311 1992 amounts
P19_TL00029 1998 1321
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P19_SP00284 817 2028
P19_ST00313 829 2005
P19_SP00285 950
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P19_ST00315 1065 1999 sent
P19_SP00287 1142
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P19_ST00317 various
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P19_ST00318 legitimate
P19_SP00290 1630
P19_ST00319 financial
P19_SP00291 1794
P19_ST00320 191 institutions
P19_SP00292 2002
P19_ST00321 2019
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P19_ST00322 2062 an
P19_TL00030 2046
P19_ST00323 92 effort 0.95 000003
P19_SP00294 874 2076
P19_ST00324 886 2047
P19_SP00295 919
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P19_SP00296 1028
P19_ST00326 1041
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P19_ST00327 funds
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P19_ST00328 1226 2053 as
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P19_ST00329 186 originating
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P19_ST00332 1678 sources.
P19_TL00031 2097
P19_ST00333 2108
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P19_ST00334 765 Former
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P19_ST00336 297 communicafions 00000000077000
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P19_ST00337 minister
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P19_ST00338 Sukh
P19_SP00308 1594
P19_ST00339 1612 Ram
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P19_ST00340 1709 2104
P19_SP00310 1781
P19_ST00341 1797
P19_SP00311 1823
P19_ST00342 1841 London
P19_SP00312 1974
P19_ST00343 1991 receiving
P19_TL00032 2145
P19_ST00344 medical
P19_SP00313 921 2175
P19_ST00345 935 2146 treatment
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P19_ST00346 when
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P19_ST00347 1236 police
P19_SP00316 2183
P19_ST00348 raided
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P19_ST00350 New
P19_SP00319 1628
P19_ST00351 1643 Delhi
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P19_ST00352 1749 101 home
P19_SP00321 1850
P19_ST00353
P19_SP00322 1892
P19_ST00354 1907 August
P19_SP00323
P19_ST00355 2052 1995
P19_TL00033 2191
P19_ST00356 2193
P19_SP00324 846 2223
P19_ST00357 861 found
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P19_ST00358 979 2200 91
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P19_ST00359 1083
P19_SP00327 1152
P19_ST00360 1166 $1M
P19_SP00328 1242 2227
P19_ST00361 1258 cash
P19_SP00329 1341
P19_ST00362 1357 stuffed
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P19_ST00363
P19_SP00331 1522
P19_ST00364 1537 suitcases,
P19_SP00332 1718 2229
P19_ST00365 1736 115 plastic
P19_SP00333 1851 2231
P19_ST00366 1865 bags
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P19_TL00034 2239
P19_ST00368 2241 bedding.
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P19_ST00369 942 Ram,
P19_SP00336 2277
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P19_SP00337 1124 2271
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P19_ST00373 2248 over
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P19_ST00374 1487 India's 0.96 0000020
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P19_ST00375 1617 $26
P19_SP00342 1682 2275
P19_ST00376 1699 billion
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P19_ST00377 1814 telecom
P19_TL00035 2289
P19_ST00378 215 privatization
P19_SP00344 2327
P19_ST00379 1016 2296 program
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P19_SP00346 2319
P19_ST00381 1264
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P19_ST00382 1366 suspected
P19_SP00348 1552
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P19_ST00384 1613
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P19_SP00351 1847
P19_ST00386 1862
P19_SP00352 1927
P19_ST00387 1944 kickbacks.
P19_TL00036 2339 1311
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P19_ST00391 951
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P19_SP00357 1135
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P19_SP00358 1288 2377
P19_ST00394 Bank
P19_SP00359 1397
P19_ST00395 1411 Limited
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P19_ST00396 1557
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P19_ST00398 1737 Kuniji
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P19_ST00399 Miyazaki,
P19_TL00037 2387
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P19_SP00364 968 2417
P19_ST00401 984 126 suicide
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P19_ST00402 1127
P19_SP00366 1153
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P19_SP00367 1256
P19_ST00404 1274 1997,
P19_SP00368 1370 2423
P19_ST00405 1388 after 0.91 02200
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P19_ST00406 2388
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P19_SP00371 2425
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P19_ST00409 1704 208 questioning
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P19_TL00038 2435 1304
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P19_SP00375 847 2465
P19_ST00413 863
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P19_ST00414 907 payoffs
P19_SP00377 2473
P19_ST00415 2436
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P19_ST00416 "sokaiya"
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P19_ST00417 1281 172 corporate
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P19_ST00418 extortionist 023000000000
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P19_ST00420 1831 Koike.
P19_SP00383 1940
P19_ST00421 1946 Koike
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P19_SP00385 966 2521
P19_ST00424 982
P19_SP00386 2513
P19_ST00425 1030 having
P19_SP00387 1146
P19_ST00426 1163 extorted 02300000
P19_SP00388 1309
P19_ST00427 1324
P19_SP00389 1423
P19_ST00428 1438
P19_SP00390
P19_ST00429 1535 Nomura
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P19_ST00430 Securities
P19_SP00392 1872
P19_ST00431 1887 176 Company
P19_TL00040 2531
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P19_TL00041 2637 784
P19_ST00433 2638
P19_SP00393 785 2671
P19_ST00434 803 232
P19_SP00394 2680
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P19_SP00395 1088
P19_ST00436 1105 78
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P19_TL00042 2748 1506
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P19_ST00439 675 menfioned 000770000
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P19_ST00440 192 previously.
P19_SP00399 1073 2786
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P19_TL00043 2796 1386
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P19_SP00408 665 2826
P19_ST00451 680 summarizing
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P19_ST00452 926
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P19_SP00413 1401
P19_ST00456 1414
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P19_ST00457 1488 1984
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P19_ST00458 1590 225 Commission
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P19_ST00460 Inquiry
P19_TL00044 2844 1482
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P19_SP00418 792 2882
P19_ST00462 806 2845
P19_SP00419 2874
P19_ST00463 855 invesfigate 00000770000
P19_SP00420 1049
P19_ST00464 195 allegations
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P19_ST00466
P19_SP00423 1400
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P19_SP00424
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P19_SP00425
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P19_ST00470 1844 Bahamas,
P19_SP00427 2880
P19_ST00471 2040
P19_TL00045 2892
P19_ST00472 283 Commissioners
P19_SP00428 2922
P19_ST00473 made
P19_SP00429
P19_ST00474 1029 119 certain 0003000
P19_SP00430 1148
P19_ST00475 1165 observafions 0.87 000000077000
P19_SP00431
P19_ST00476 concerning
P19_SP00432 1611 2930
P19_ST00477 1629 Kendal
P19_SP00433
P19_ST00478 1770 151 Nottage,
P19_SP00434
P19_ST00479 lawyer
P19_SP00435 2057
P19_ST00480
P19_SP00436 2135
P19_ST00481 2151 2899


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P16_ST00018 1672 26 in
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P16_ST00030 1565 161 exploited
P16_SP00028 1726
P16_ST00031 1741
P16_SP00029 1774
P16_ST00032 1787 56 the
P16_SP00030 1843
P16_ST00033 1859 187 maximum.
P16_SP00031 2046 8
P16_ST00034 2054 63 [59]
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P16_ST00035 78 The
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P16_ST00037 905 of
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P16_ST00038 959 67
P16_SP00035 1026
P16_ST00039 1043 236 Legislation 00000000000
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P16_ST00040 19 It
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P16_ST00045 1065 623 55 out
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P16_ST00046 1135 35
P16_SP00042 1170 9
P16_ST00047 1179
P16_SP00043 1235
P16_ST00048 1248 93 three
P16_SP00044 1341
P16_ST00049 1358 143 persons
P16_SP00045 1501
P16_ST00050 1517 216 36 interviewed, 000000000000
P16_SP00046 1733 658
P16_ST00051 1748 two
P16_SP00047 1811
P16_ST00052 1825 54 felt
P16_SP00048 1879
P16_ST00053
P16_SP00049 1961
P16_ST00054 1975 122 money
P16_TL00006 670 1512
P16_ST00055 188 laundering
P16_SP00050 803 708
P16_ST00056 818 677 72 was
P16_SP00051 890 700
P16_ST00057 906 671 not
P16_SP00052 961
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P16_SP00053 1183
P16_ST00059 1201
P16_SP00054 1227
P16_ST00060 1242
P16_SP00055 1311
P16_ST00061 1328 181 Bahamas.
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P16_ST00062 1537 105 When
P16_SP00057 1642
P16_ST00063 1659 106 asked
P16_SP00058 1765
P16_ST00064
P16_SP00059 1835
P16_ST00065 1850 164 question:
P16_SP00060 2014
P16_ST00066 2032 95 "How
P16_TL00007 612 718 1383
P16_ST00067 209
P16_SP00061 821 756
P16_ST00068 837 44 do
P16_SP00062 881 748
P16_ST00069 896 725 you
P16_SP00063 958
P16_ST00070 87 thing
P16_SP00064 1060
P16_ST00071 1078
P16_SP00065 1200
P16_ST00072 1214
P16_SP00066 1402
P16_ST00073 1420
P16_SP00067 1445
P16_ST00074 1462
P16_SP00068 1488
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P16_SP00069 1573
P16_ST00076 1589 198 Bahamas,"
P16_SP00070 754
P16_ST00077 1803 53 Mr.
P16_SP00071 1856
P16_ST00078 1872 123 Archer
P16_TL00008 1499
P16_ST00079 190 responded
P16_SP00072 805 804
P16_ST00080 820
P16_SP00073 889 796
P16_ST00081 903 773 85 even
P16_SP00074 988
P16_ST00082 1003 125 though
P16_SP00075 1128
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P16_SP00076 1186
P16_ST00084 does
P16_SP00077 1288
P16_ST00085 1305 767
P16_SP00078 1359
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P16_SP00079 1468
P16_ST00087 1482 127 exactly
P16_SP00080 1609
P16_ST00088 1624 152 because
P16_SP00081 1776
P16_ST00089 1792
P16_SP00082 1827
P16_ST00090 1836
P16_SP00083
P16_ST00091 1907 207 clandestine
P16_TL00009 814 1514
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P16_SP00084 727 844
P16_ST00093 744
P16_SP00085
P16_ST00094 788
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P16_SP00088 1052
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P16_ST00098 1251 68
P16_SP00090 1319
P16_ST00099 1335 121
P16_SP00091 1456
P16_ST00100 1471
P16_SP00092
P16_ST00101 1677
P16_SP00093 1702
P16_ST00102 1719
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P16_ST00103 a
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P16_SP00096 1926
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P16_SP00097 2084
P16_ST00106 2101
P16_TL00010 861 1492
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P16_SP00098 673 891
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P16_SP00099 827 899
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P16_SP00100 971
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P16_SP00101
P16_ST00111 1069
P16_SP00102 1094
P16_ST00112 1110
P16_SP00103 1164
P16_ST00113 220 widespread.
P16_SP00104 1397
P16_ST00114 1405 [60]
P16_SP00105 39
P16_ST00115 1507 Janis
P16_SP00106 1601
P16_ST00116 1618 182 McDougal
P16_SP00107 1800
P16_ST00117 1817
P16_SP00108
P16_ST00118 1860 answer
P16_SP00109 1993 10
P16_ST00119 2003
P16_SP00110 2036
P16_ST00120 2050
P16_TL00011 909 1522
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P16_ST00122 question
P16_SP00112 879
P16_ST00123 895 109 stated
P16_SP00113 1004
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P16_SP00114 1250
P16_ST00125 1262
P16_SP00115 1331
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P16_SP00116
P16_ST00127 189
P16_SP00117 1671
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P16_SP00118 1713
P16_ST00129 1730 910
P16_SP00119 1784
P16_ST00130 1796
P16_SP00120 2006
P16_ST00131 2024
P16_SP00121
P16_ST00132 2066
P16_TL00012 957 252
P16_ST00133
P16_SP00122 7
P16_ST00134 [61]
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P16_ST00135 76 This
P16_SP00123 1093
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P16_SP00124 755
P16_ST00137 769 1064
P16_SP00125 802
P16_ST00138
P16_SP00126
P16_ST00139 153
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P16_SP00128 1091
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P16_SP00129 1174
P16_ST00142 this
P16_SP00130 1249
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P16_SP00131 1444
P16_ST00144
P16_SP00132 1487
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P16_SP00134 1805
P16_ST00147
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P16_ST00150 2137 at
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P16_ST00151
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P16_SP00141
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P16_SP00145 1398
P16_ST00159 1411
P16_SP00146 1436
P16_ST00160 1449 1112
P16_SP00147
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P16_ST00162
P16_SP00149 1785
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P16_ST00164 2004
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P16_SP00152
P16_ST00167
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P16_SP00171
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P16_SP00176
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P16_ST00195 1657
P16_SP00179 1682
P16_ST00196 more
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P16_SP00181
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P16_SP00183
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P16_ST00214
P16_SP00196
P16_ST00215
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P16_SP00198
P16_ST00217 1079
P16_SP00199 1143
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P16_SP00200 1264
P16_ST00219 1278 America,
P16_SP00201 1439
P16_ST00220
P16_SP00202 1524
P16_ST00221 1540
P16_SP00203 1712
P16_ST00222 1728
P16_SP00204 1753
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P16_ST00225
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P16_SP00209 883 1429
P16_ST00229 898 it
P16_SP00210 915
P16_ST00230 930 has
P16_SP00211
P16_ST00231 1008 had
P16_SP00212 1072
P16_ST00232 1088 on
P16_SP00213
P16_ST00233 1144
P16_SP00214
P16_ST00234 1216 197 economies
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P16_ST00235
P16_SP00216 1464
P16_ST00236 1473 those
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P16_ST00237 1588 175 countries,
P16_SP00218 1763 1435
P16_ST00238 1779 so
P16_SP00219 1820
P16_ST00239
P16_SP00220 1904
P16_ST00240 1920 171
P16_TL00021 1447 1516
P16_ST00241 128 passed
P16_SP00221 743
P16_ST00242 758
P16_SP00222 813 1477
P16_ST00243 830
P16_SP00223
P16_ST00244 1027 1454
P16_SP00224 1117
P16_ST00245 1133
P16_SP00225
P16_ST00246 1188
P16_SP00226
P16_ST00247 1224 249 precautionary
P16_SP00227
P16_ST00248 measure.
P16_SP00228 1655
P16_ST00249 1662 [63]
P16_SP00229
P16_ST00250 1764
P16_SP00230 1887
P16_ST00251 1901
P16_SP00231
P16_ST00252 2062
P16_TL00022 1495
P16_ST00253
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P16_ST00255 845
P16_SP00234 880
P16_ST00256
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P16_SP00236
P16_ST00258
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P16_ST00259 its
P16_SP00238
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P16_SP00239 1348
P16_ST00261 1364 27
P16_SP00240 1391
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P16_SP00241
P16_ST00263
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P16_ST00264 1559
P16_SP00243 1596
P16_ST00265 1610 206 deterrence.
P16_SP00244 1816
P16_ST00266 1824 [64]
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P16_ST00267 Some
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P16_ST00268 752 232 34 Comments
P16_SP00246 984 1634
P16_ST00269 1002 51
P16_SP00247 1053
P16_ST00270
P16_SP00248
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P16_TL00024 1562
P16_ST00273 A
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P16_ST00276 965
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P16_ST00277
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P16_SP00255 1192
P16_ST00279 1209 States
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P16_SP00257
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P16_SP00258
P16_ST00282 1564 70
P16_SP00259
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P16_SP00261 1992
P16_ST00285
P16_SP00262 2035
P16_ST00286
P16_TL00025 1760 1430
P16_ST00287 laundering.
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P16_SP00271
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P16_TL00026 1808
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P16_SP00273 1838
P16_ST00299 760 1815 an
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P16_ST00301 emphasis
P16_SP00276 1846
P16_ST00302 by
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P16_ST00303 1253
P16_SP00278 1308
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P16_SP00279 1542
P16_ST00305
P16_SP00280 1591
P16_ST00306
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P16_SP00283
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P16_ST00311 751 200 laundering,
P16_SP00285 951
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P16_SP00286 1886
P16_ST00313
P16_SP00287
P16_ST00314 1228 223 international
P16_SP00288 1451
P16_ST00315 1467 report.And
P16_SP00289
P16_ST00316
P16_SP00290
P16_ST00317 1749
P16_SP00291 1822
P16_ST00318 1837
P16_SP00292 2016
P16_ST00319 should
P16_TL00028 1494
P16_ST00320 signiflcantly 0.90 0000066000000
P16_SP00293 1942
P16_ST00321 839 193 strengthen
P16_SP00294 1032
P16_ST00322 1911
P16_SP00295 1172
P16_ST00323
P16_SP00296 1375
P16_ST00324 142 controls
P16_SP00297
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P16_ST00326
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P16_ST00327 1707 1905
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P16_ST00329 1999
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P16_ST00330 2051
P16_TL00029 1952 998
P16_ST00331
P16_SP00303 729 1982
P16_ST00332 746
P16_SP00304
P16_ST00333 876 215 Department
P16_SP00305 1990
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P16_SP00306 1140
P16_ST00335 1151 State
P16_SP00307 1244
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P16_SP00308 1287
P16_ST00337 March,
P16_SP00309 1425
P16_ST00338 1996.
P16_SP00310 1541
P16_ST00339 [65]
P16_TL00030 2058 1502
P16_ST00340 169 However,
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P16_ST00341 800
P16_SP00312 869 2088
P16_ST00342 885
P16_SP00313 1057
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P16_ST00347
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P16_TL00031 2106
P16_ST00352
P16_SP00322 2136
P16_ST00353 684 2107 report, 0.96 0000030
P16_SP00323 798 2144
P16_ST00354 especially
P16_SP00324 996
P16_ST00355 1007
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P16_SP00326 1318
P16_ST00357 1332
P16_SP00327
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P16_SP00328
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P35_ST00006 1602 32 3) 0.96
P35_SP00006 1634 18
P35_ST00007 1652 175 MayJune 0.92 00060000
P35_SP00007 1827
P35_ST00008 1845 96 1997. 00000
P35_TL00002 615 415 153
P35_ST00009 64 [31] 0.98 0000
P35_SP00008 679 453
P35_ST00010 697 71 Ibid.
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P35_ST00011 [32]
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P35_ST00012 693 47 As
P35_SP00010 740 551
P35_ST00013 755 83 cited
P35_SP00011 838
P35_ST00014 855 528 40 23 on
P35_SP00012 895
P35_ST00015 910 56 the
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P35_ST00018 1371
P35_SP00016 1427
P35_ST00019 1443 156 Fifteenth 0.95 002200000
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P35_ST00020 1618 223 International 0000000000000
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P35_ST00021 1858 214 Symposium 000000000
P35_SP00019 2072
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P35_SP00021 916
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P35_SP00022 1115
P35_ST00026 1131 49 for
P35_SP00023 1180
P35_ST00027 1195
P35_SP00024 1235
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P35_SP00025 1460 607
P35_ST00029 1479 86 1997
P35_SP00026 1565
P35_ST00030 1581 570 29 at
P35_SP00027 1613 13
P35_ST00031 1626 55
P35_SP00028 1681
P35_ST00032 1696 106 Jesus
P35_SP00029 1802
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P35_ST00034 Cambridge.
P35_SP00030 824 655 -209
P35_ST00035 723 [33]
P35_SP00031 761
P35_ST00036 48 W.
P35_SP00032 741 753
P35_ST00037 759 R.
P35_SP00033 794
P35_ST00038 811 170 Spernow,
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P35_SP00035 1110 11
P35_ST00040 1121 121 crooks 0.75 305500
P35_SP00036 1242
P35_ST00041 1255 730 43 0.48 54
P35_SP00037 1298
P35_ST00042 1312 0.69 035
P35_SP00038 1367
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P35_SP00039 1456
P35_ST00044 1473 81 Why 0.86 030
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P35_ST00046 1771 77 Law
P35_SP00042 1848
P35_ST00047 1860 236 Enforcement 0.70 04050352540
P35_SP00043 2096
P35_ST00048 2111 Will 0.90 0200
P35_TL00006 771 1557
P35_ST00049 Be 0.46
P35_SP00044 662 801
P35_ST00050 678 127 Unable 440005
P35_SP00045 805
P35_ST00051 819 to 0.71 05
P35_SP00046 851
P35_ST00052 868 94 Cope 0.50 5535
P35_SP00047 962
P35_ST00053 978 70 with 0.85 0203
P35_SP00048 1048
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P35_SP00049 1202
P35_ST00055 1215
P35_SP00050 1247
P35_ST00056 1261
P35_SP00051 1317
P35_ST00057 1331 182 Electronic 0.73 0053005423
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P35_ST00058 199 Commerce 0.60 55225035
P35_SP00053 1726
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P35_SP00054 1967
P35_ST00060 1984 778 104 31 paper
P35_SP00055
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P35_TL00007 808 1403
P35_ST00062 179 presented
P35_SP00056 857
P35_ST00063 820
P35_SP00057 842 849
P35_ST00064
P35_SP00058 911
P35_ST00065 926 7"^ 0.41 0710
P35_SP00059 969
P35_ST00066 986
P35_SP00060 1209
P35_ST00067 1224 142 Oceana 000000
P35_SP00061 1366
P35_ST00068 211 Conference
P35_SP00062 1593
P35_ST00069 1609 826 42
P35_SP00063 1651
P35_ST00070 1668 122 Money
P35_SP00064 1790
P35_ST00071 1805 213 Laundering,
P35_TL00008 856 380
P35_ST00072 867 171 February,
P35_SP00065 786 905
P35_ST00073 802 193 21^1997). 0.89 0010000000
P35_TL00009 973
P35_ST00074 [34]
P35_SP00066 1011
P35_ST00075
P35_TL00010 1079 1234
P35_ST00076 [35]
P35_SP00067 1117
P35_ST00077 695 C.
P35_SP00068 731 1109
P35_ST00078 746 A.
P35_SP00069 782
P35_ST00079 143 Intriago,
P35_SP00070 944
P35_ST00080 124 0.56 55450
P35_SP00071 1086
P35_ST00081 1098 207 Laundering 0.72 0004450246
P35_SP00072 1305
P35_ST00082 1320 151 Controls 55400500
P35_SP00073 1471
P35_ST00083 1483 in 0.65 24
P35_SP00074
P35_ST00084 1530 155 Offshore 70003505
P35_SP00075 1685
P35_ST00085 1700 149 Banking 5040246
P35_TL00011 1127
P35_ST00086
P35_SP00076 1157
P35_ST00087
P35_SP00077
P35_ST00088
P35_SP00078 1165
P35_ST00089
P35_SP00079 1163
P35_ST00090
P35_SP00080
P35_ST00091
P35_SP00081
P35_ST00092
P35_SP00082
P35_ST00093
P35_TL00012
P35_ST00094 [36]
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P35_ST00095
P35_TL00013 1340
P35_ST00096 [37]
P35_SP00084 1378
P35_ST00097
P35_TL00014 1446
P35_ST00098 [38]
P35_SP00085 1484
P35_ST00099
P35_TL00015 1552 1546
P35_ST00100 [39]
P35_SP00086 1590
P35_ST00101 131 Quoted
P35_SP00087 1584
P35_ST00102 80 from
P35_SP00088 922 1582
P35_ST00103 938 1559 an
P35_SP00089 979
P35_ST00104 997 161 interview
P35_SP00090 1158
P35_ST00105 1170
P35_SP00091 1241
P35_ST00106 1257 90 Colin
P35_SP00092 1347
P35_ST00107 1362 130 Archer,
P35_SP00093 1492 1588
P35_ST00108 1510 129 Deputy
P35_SP00094 1639
P35_ST00109 1654 169 Manager,
P35_SP00095 1823 20
P35_ST00110 1843 91 Bank
P35_SP00096 1934
P35_ST00111 1948 Supervision
P35_TL00016 1600 1322
P35_ST00112 Department,
P35_SP00097 1638
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P35_ST00114 Central
P35_SP00099 1068
P35_ST00115 1085 92
P35_SP00100 1177
P35_ST00116 1191 of
P35_SP00101 1226 10
P35_ST00117 1236
P35_SP00102
P35_ST00118 1321 172 Bahamas
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P35_ST00119 1607
P35_SP00104 1549
P35_ST00120
P35_SP00105 1608
P35_ST00121 1624 198 December,
P35_SP00106 1822 1636
P35_ST00122 1996.
P35_TL00017 1706 1221
P35_ST00123 [40]
P35_SP00107 1744
P35_ST00124
P35_SP00108 1736
P35_ST00125
P35_SP00109
P35_ST00126 Intiago,
P35_SP00110
P35_ST00127 948 125
P35_SP00111 1073
P35_ST00128 1084
P35_SP00112 1291
P35_ST00129 1306
P35_SP00113 1457
P35_ST00130 1470
P35_SP00114 1500
P35_ST00131 1516
P35_SP00115 1672
P35_ST00132 1686 150
P35_TL00018 1754 1337
P35_ST00133 37 Centers,OFFSHORE 3683387500000000
P35_SP00116 1791
P35_ST00134
P35_SP00117 1194 1784
P35_ST00135 CANADA
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P35_ST00136 1395 79 (Vol.
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P35_ST00137 1490
P35_SP00120 1520
P35_ST00138 1538
P35_SP00121 1596
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P35_SP00122 1646
P35_ST00140 1664
P35_SP00123 1839
P35_ST00141 1857
P35_TL00019
P35_ST00142 [41]
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P35_ST00143 696 [As
P35_SP00125 751
P35_ST00144 767 82
P35_SP00126 1890
P35_ST00145 by
P35_SP00127 908
P35_ST00146 K.
P35_SP00128 955
P35_ST00147 137 Munroe
P35_SP00129
P35_ST00148 1129 66
P35_SP00130
P35_ST00149 1210 258 Extraterritorial 0600005002050200
P35_SP00131 1468
P35_ST00150 1480 117 Reach 05033
P35_SP00132 1597
P35_ST00151 1612 101 ofthe 50035
P35_SP00133 1713
P35_ST00152 1730 118 United 442054
P35_SP00134
P35_ST00153 1861 114 States 500050
P35_SP00135 1975
P35_ST00154 1987 Anti 0.68 5402
P35_TL00020 1908
P35_ST00155 0.64 45240
P35_SP00136 739 1946
P35_ST00156 750 0.76 0022040526
P35_SP00137 957
P35_ST00157 970 95 Laws 0001
P35_SP00138 1065 1938
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P35_ST00161 126 (Sweet
P35_SP00142 1885
P35_ST00162 1899 25 &
P35_SP00143 1924
P35_ST00163 1939 Maxwell,
P35_TL00021 1957
P35_ST00164 160 1996)]"ln
P35_SP00144 776 1995
P35_ST00165 791
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P35_SP00147
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P35_SP00152 1958
P35_ST00173 1972 102 which
P35_SP00153 2074
P35_ST00174 2089 took
P35_TL00022 2004 1437
P35_ST00175 place
P35_SP00154 709 2042
P35_ST00176 726 [in
P35_SP00155 763
P35_ST00177 780 194 Columbia],
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P35_ST00178 990 signs
P35_SP00157
P35_ST00179 1100
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P35_SP00161 1507
P35_ST00183 became
P35_SP00162
P35_ST00184 1684 184 ominously
P35_SP00163 1868
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P35_SP00164 810 2090
P35_ST00187 825
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P35_SP00210
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P35_ST00240
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P35_ST00242
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P35_SP00218 813 2428
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P35_SP00219
P35_ST00248 1008 Welling,
P35_SP00220 1152
P35_ST00249 1171 Smurfs,
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P35_ST00250
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P35_ST00251 1461
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P35_ST00257 716
P35_SP00228
P35_ST00258 799
P35_SP00229
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P35_SP00230
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P35_SP00232
P35_ST00262 1453 115 (1989)
P35_SP00233
P35_ST00263 2453 28 p.
P35_SP00234
P35_ST00264 1633 50 14.
P35_SP00235 1683
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P35_SP00237 1929
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P35_SP00238 2063
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P35_ST00269 132 Review
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P35_ST00270 287
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P35_ST00271 [43]
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P35_ST00272 33
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P35_ST00273 744
P35_SP00242 792
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P35_ST00275
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P35_SP00246
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P35_SP00249
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P35_ST00283
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P35_ST00287 1417 CONTROL,
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P35_ST00288 1645 B.
P35_SP00256 1677
P35_ST00289 98 Rider
P35_SP00257 1793
P35_ST00290 1806
P35_SP00258 1831
P35_ST00291 1846 M.
P35_SP00259 1886
P35_ST00292 1901 Ashe)
P35_SP00260 2007
P35_ST00293 2025 2674 4 .
P35_SP00261 2029
P35_ST00294 2046 113 Sweet
P35_TL00034 2696
P35_ST00295
P35_SP00262 639 2726
P35_ST00296 654 Maxwell
P35_SP00263
P35_ST00297 817
P35_TL00035 2802
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P35_ST00299
P35_SP00265
P35_ST00300
P35_SP00266 2832
P35_ST00301
P35_SP00267
P35_ST00302
P35_SP00268
P35_ST00303 Munroe]18
P35_SP00269 1168
P35_ST00304 USC
P35_SP00270 1267
P35_ST00305 1283 §
P35_SP00271
P35_ST00306 1956(f).
P35_TL00036 2909
P35_ST00307 [45]
P35_SP00272 2947
P35_ST00308 On
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P35_ST00309
P35_SP00274
P35_ST00310 March,
P35_SP00275 941 2945
P35_ST00311 1989,
P35_SP00276 1057
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P35_SP00277 1093
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P35_SP00280
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P35_SP00281
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P35_TL00037 2957 1464
P35_ST00320 Banco
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P35_ST00321 742 44 de
P35_SP00285
P35_ST00322 Occident,
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P35_ST00323 989 61 SA,
P35_SP00287 1050
P35_ST00324 1067
P35_SP00288 1132
P35_ST00325 1150 its
P35_SP00289 1186
P35_ST00326 1200 wholly
P35_SP00290 2995
P35_ST00327 1329 owned
P35_SP00291
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P35_ST00329 subsidiary
P35_SP00293
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P10_TL00004 612 452 1456
P10_ST00036 115 turned
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PAGE 1

Writing Intellection Articles Speeches Press About SPGI Money Laundering: A Practical Analysis With Particular Reference To Bahamian And Caribbean Offshore Institutions John S. Bain PDF version CHAPTER 1 AN INTRODUCTION FOREWORD Money laundering, the cleansing or disguising of money earned from an illegal business to appear to be a product of a lawful business, is not a new activity. Indeed, it exists as long as criminals have need to disguise the illicit origin of their funds; most economically motiva ted criminals have always wanted to appear legitimate.What is new, at least in The Bahamas, the U.K. and the USA, is the criminalization of money laundering. The process of money laundering itself is now a crime separate from the crime that produced the mo ney. [1] Prompted initially by concern at the scale of drug trafficking and the laundering of its proceeds, the last few years have seen an enormous increase in the international efforts to combat the problem.The Bahamas, having a well developed offshore financial sector and heavily dependent on the offshore business, was not to be left out of these new international developments. In 1996, the government of The Bahama s passed the Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1996 which went into effect on December 16, 1996. As we can all appreciate, money laundering is not just a problem in the Caribbean, but all countries are potential targets for the money launderer. The challenge facing The Bahamas is to bring itself into the fight, along with the more developed financial centers, against money laundering. The crime of money laundering has been compared to a balloon.When it is squeezed in one section, it bulges in another [2] The fight against the money launderer is a long term task which will require continuing attention if progress is to be sustained. The greater knowledge we have gained about money laundering over the past few years has confirmed that it is a dynamic activity, conducted with increasing sophistication and deceptive reasoning.This knowledge has also confirmed that money laundering is not concerned with drug traffick ing alone, but with any crime that generates significant proceeds, particularly when organized crime is involved.Money launderers have shown that they are responsive to counter measures and are always searching for new laundering routes. This is why money laundering is not confined to the banking sector but can embrace the whole range of the financial sector and indeed spread into non financial businesses of all sorts. Indeed, we should remind ourselves that money laundering not only poses a threat to fin ancial institutions, it is also part of a process that endangers the economy, society and eventually the state itself. Upcoming article SPGI in the news Tosti on terrorism debate.

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It is unrealistic to expect that money laundering can be eradicated. What can and is being done, with the help of the Financial Action Ta sk Force (FATF) and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and others, is to make money laundering more difficult and to increase the chance of money laundering being detected and caught if it is carried out.Putting in place an effective legal f ramework is an essential precondition for this. [3] The Offshore Havens of the Caribbean The Caribbean is literally a sea of developing countries offering special tax incentives, free trade zones, tax holidays and, in many cases, complete freedom from the imposition of income, estate, gift and most other taxes.The countries of the region are the setting for a broad spectrum of international financial institutions an d transactions which make use of sophisticated global technology. [4] The "no tax" havens in the region are The Bahamas, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands; they impose no income, estate or gift taxes on either residents or non residents.The "low tax" havens include most of the other countries in the region (such as Barbados), which offer tax incentives for offshore banks, international bus exempt insurance companies.The absence of such taxes is usually part of a formal policy to attract offshore banks and other corporate business to the countries concerned specifically, and to the regio n generally.For example, in the Cayman Islands, offshore companies are entitled to a tax free guarantee up to 30 years from the date of formation, although they are normally granted a 20 year guarantee. [5] Some features of the financial culture of the Caribbean include strict confidentiality, non disclosure requirements, minimal annual reporting requirements, a dual currency control system that distinguishes between residents and non residents and between local and foreign currency, extremely low and competitive fees for company and investment transactions, tax treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties and exchange of information agreements. While some tax havens ma intain an extensive network of tax and other treaties, most Caribbean tax havens have not entered into such treaties at all. [6] The Bahamas and Its People We Mix Business with Pleasure Many terms and expressions have been used to describe The Bahamas.Some call it a wondrous, sun drenched string of tropical islands set like pearls in sparkling blue waters.Some call it an international playground and some call it a l and of unmatched beauty. Even George Washington was once moved to refer to the islands as the "isles of perpetual June." The Bahamas has also been called "The Switzerland of the West." [7] With modern, internationally known hotel and banking institutions, The Bahamas leading tax haven and financial center.The natural beauty of the i slands attracts millions of visitors for sun swept sandy beaches. At the same time, freedom from taxation, together with political stability, favorable trust and banking laws, proximity to the United States and excellent communications facilities combine t o make The Bahamas a major offshore banking center. Restoring a Tarnished Reputation

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Bahamas gained a tarnished reputation.Articles appeared in The Miami Herald and Sunda y Times calling The Bahamas "A Nation for Sale." [8] The Pindling Government had little choice but to appoint a "Blue Ribbon" Commission of Inquiry to investigate th e use of The Bahamas as a transshipment point for drugs destined for the United States. Until the present day, The Bahamas is struggling to shed the reputation as a drug transit point and a center for money laundering and is still categorized as a Drug Tr ansit Location by the USA State Department. [9] The change of government in 1992 was significant for The Bahamas.After having been led by the same political leader f or 25 years, most Bahamians were anxious about what to expect from the Ingraham administration, especially as it related to law and order and the restoration of the reputation of The Bahamas to what it was before the scourge of drugs took its toll on the s mall population.Indeed, beginning in the reporter, "The Bahamas, a long reputed and still active drug money laundering nation, has taken counter measures to combat the legitimizing of illicit funds. The Bahamian government and banking industry adopted operating and reporting regulations which make money laundering more difficult." [10] According to Dr. Peter Maynard, former Bahamian Ambassador to the United Nations, a number of events occurred in the past three decades, which negatively affected the image of The Bahamas.These included: [11] wanted by the United States authorities) residing in The Bahamas; Bahamas and strong Bahamian ties; Enrique "Joe" Lehder, leader of the Medellin Cartel, a Colomb ian Drug organization; 1984, Commission of Inquiry on Drug Trafficking; 1987, re election of the PLP; Bahamian Defense Force officers to make arrest; Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agen ts, already based in Nassau, the capital of The Bahamas, could directly contact their opposite numbers in the Police Force without the red tape of referrals to the U.S. Embassy and Bahamian Attorney General; The Drug Enforcement Unit was set up within the Royal Bahamas Police Force; A joint task force from both countries now meet semi annually for frank discussions of money laundering and other law enforcement issues; Radar observation balloons manned by U.S. technicians floated over three Bahamian islan ds to detect drug ships and aircraft; allegedly a close confidant of Sir Lynden Pindling; The 1992 election of the FNM government in a flagging and weak economy; and The 1994 Commission of Inquiry on the affairs of three government corporations.

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One of the methods used in an attempt to restore the damaged reputation was the enactment of the M oney Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1996. This Act was recently enacted and was designed to combat the laundering of proceeds derived from illegal activity including drug trafficking. Although there were already a number of laws on the books detailing the willingness of The Bahamas to cooperate with other jurisdictions in halting the spread of money laundering, money laundering was never specifically identified as a crime. The government moved to close that loophole by the passage of this bill. Additio nally, in recent years, banks in The Bahamas have implemented stringent policies to ensure that their facilities are not used to launder proceeds of crime. Their efforts are considered to have been successful, for in some instances when offshore centers of money laundering are mentioned, The Bahamas is not included. The Money Laundering Act is intended to whole question of money laundering" (the Honorable Brent Symonette, forme r Attorney General). [12] Nevertheless, the question of enforceability still needs to be addressed. CHAPTER 2 MONEY LAUNDERING -TOWARDS A DEFINITION Different Definitions of Money Laundering Money laundering has been given many definitions. One definition is that money laundering is the act of converting money gained from illegal activity, such as drug smuggling, into money that appears legitimate and in which t he source cannot be traced to the illegal activity. [13] Another author defines it as follows: "The phrase of illegally obtained money so that it appears to have originated from a legitimate source."[14]The official definition by The Central Bank of The Bahamas is, "Money laundering is the process by which criminals attempt to conceal the true origin and owners hip of the processes of their criminal activities.If undertaken successfully, it also allows them to maintain control over those proceeds and, ultimately, to provide a legitimate cover for their source of income." [15] An acceptable definition of money laundering, and one which will be used in this paper, is that money laundering is a process by which the proceeds of crime are hidden from investigators, moved around financial and economic systems in order to make tracing them more difficult and then spent as if they are legitimate funds.It is very important at this stage to note that money laundering not only refers to the proceeds of drug trafficking, but to any cri me that results in the proceeds being laundered or cleansed, although early money laundering control efforts focused on drug proceeds. Money laundering is, in essence, the process of concealing the nature, source or location of criminal proceeds.In a recen t article, [16] the author attempts to quantify economy of this industry. The auth orstates that it is estimated that global money laundering involves as much as three hundred billion United States dollars annually and that the influence wielded by criminal groups controlling such incredible wealth has led world leaders to deem money la undering a geopolitical problem, which, if unchecked, threatens the political fabric of fragile democracies and democratic institutions everywhere. [17] In anothe r article, money laundering was referred to as the third largest industry globally:

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Money laundering is said to be the third largest industry by value worldwide. Research in the United States has shown that 90% of currency bills in circulation are contami nated with narcotics. In the United Kingdom, similar research showed 40% to be contaminated.Other research in the United Kingdom has shown that 80% of property related crime is committed to fund a drug habit.A single user -shooting one shot of heroin a day -needs to spend £28,500 each year just to feed his personal consumption.In order to fund that amount, he will turn to robbery, dealing in drugs, prostitution and theft.In the United Kingdom, stolen household and office goods realize approximately one third of their new value. [18] Profile of the Money Launderer Past and Present It is not uncommon to find indictments by politicians, law enforcement officers and the media, of those who are thought to be involved in money laundering. The term money launderer is pejorative and the practice of money laundering conjures up a shady world of men in pinstriped suits claiming to be "bankers" and acting for ill define d customers and vague offshore enterprises. [19] The fact that many of the cases that have become known involve exactly such scenarios has tended to reinforce suc h perceptions. [20] It is perhaps a useful device for those engaged in fighting serious crime to persuade, at least the professional financial managers, trust off icers, attorneys and bankers (those who fit the profile of the modern money launderer), that those who are prepared to assist criminals and terrorists to retain their ill gotten gains and further their illicit enterprises are no better than the crooks they serve. When the money is the product of drug trafficking or even a bank robbery, then the shame that can attach to those who assist in the laundering process is justly deserved. It is very important to remember, however, that those most actively involve d in providing such services may never transgress the law; in many cases, the laundering may well involve funds that are not referable to a crime or other form of misconduct.This is a point that is hardly mentioned in the popular press when criticizing th e apparent failure of regulatory authorities to take effective steps to interdict what are assumed to be money laundering operations. [21] Laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking is one thing, but merely assisting a leader of a developing country to retain his wealth on a confidential basis outside his country may be a very different issue. [22] To say that even the knowing facilitation of such an individual's acquisition of wealth, by covert movements of substantial amounts of wealth, where no specific crime is involved, is an unsound banking practice is a statement that few central bankers, especially in offshore centers such as The Bahamas, would be prepared to support.Responsible banking is a vague concept, even in a wholly domestic environment. In an international context, it is nebulous and is an entirely different i ssue than that of soundness. [23] The Stages of Money Laundering There is no one method of laundering money.Methods can range from the purchase and resale of luxury items to passing money through a complex international web of [24] In the case of drug trafficking and some other se rious crimes, such as robbery, the proceeds usually take the form of cash, which needs to enter the financial system by some means. Indeed, street level purchases of drugs are almost always made with cash, although some form of barter is not uncommon in t he purchase of drugs, and according to the value of the items being traded, has substituted in some ways for cash transactions. According to the customary concept of money laundering, the three stages of money

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laundering are known as placement, integratio n and layering, during which there may be numerous transactions made by launderers that could indicate criminal activity. The traditional, and somewhat simplistic, definitions are given below: 1. Placement -the physical disposal of cash proceeds derived from illegal activity. 2. Layering -separating illicit proceeds from their source by creating complex layers of financial transactions designed to disguise the audit trail and provide anonymity. 3. Integrati on -the provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived wealth. If the layering process has succeeded, integration schemes place the laundered proceeds back into the economy in such a way that they reenter the financial system appearing to be nor mal business funds. While the definitions and the stages of money laundering as described above were simple, the definitions will form a basis for further discussion into the enforceability of the legislation in The Bahamas.The definitions and the associa ted diagrams will form the foundation of the arguments to be presented in this paper. The efforts to combat money laundering as it pertains to offshore institutions largely susc eptible to recognition and have therefore largely concentrated on the deposit taking procedures of financial institutions, or the placement stage. There are, however, many sophisticated crimes where cash is not involved. According to The Guidance Notes is sued by The Central Bank, the most common form of money laundering that financial institutions will encounter on a day to day basis in respect of their mainstream banking business takes the form of accumulated cash transactions which will be deposited in t he banking system or exchanged for value items. [25] Electronic fund transfer systems increase the vulnerability by enabling the cash deposits to be switched rapid ly between accounts in different names and different jurisdictions. Banks and Trust companies, as providers of a wide range of services, are vulnerable to being used in the layering and integration stages where mortgage and other loan accounts may be used as part of this process to create complex layers of transactions. [26] Layering An Opportunity for Financial Institutions The transactions, which are used to obs cure the source of the relevant funds, will be structured in such a manner as to render it almost impossible for evidence to be obtained which would allow a court to establish the derivation of the money. This process is referred to as layering, but this implies that with diligence the truth may be uncovered through a progressive investigation.While there have been cases where dedicated, extremely lucky, and well resourced investigators have been able to peel off a series of layers to reveal what in fact took place, in the case of the more sophisticated structures, the concept of layering is too simplistic.Certain operations are structured in a manner, which resembles a mosaic or kaleidoscope rather than a layer cake. [27] Transactions will not be progressive but parallel, establishing mutual obligations which can be married or crossed, often on a contingent basis, and which would not be substantiated to the satisf action of a court applying conventional legal rules. It is, however, true that insofar as the notion of layering is often used to conjure up a picture of a stone gradually dropping to the bottom of a pond, the longer money remains in the system the more d ifficult it is to follow and identify it. [28] Furthermore, such an analogy makes the important point that the money in flight

PAGE 7

will be most noticeable when it "sp lashes" first into the pool. It is at this point of entry into the conventional banking system that regulations designed to create an "audit trail" are likely to be most effective. [29] Indeed, the metaphor of dropping a stone into a pool is appropriate: when the dirty money is first deposited, it creates a noticeable ripple, but if unnoticed then it may well remain undiscovered.This stage necessarily involves the participation of banks or other deposit taking bodies. It is therefore very important for banks to be vigilant in detecting unusual transactions at the point at which the launderer is most vulnerable to exposure. CHAPTER 3 THE ELECTRONIC DIMENSION The Computer Criminal and Economic Crimes It has always been the goal of criminals, especially those involved in the so called distance as possible between themselves and the governmental authorities. During this century, however, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of cases that have a foreign dimension, apparently by design.This is no more so apparent than in the case of economic crimes, especially the crime of money laundering.Criminals seeking to undermine and destabilize our financial and commercial institutions have every incentive to ensure that another jurisdiction is involved in the conception, realization or drawing down of their crime. Indeed, if th e law has not been able to keep up with the international nature of crime, in either its reach or its resources, the prospects of criminals, and in particular organized crime, moving into cyberspace is fundamentally more threatening. It is this htmlect of the crime of money laundering that will be, in the opinion of this author, the greatest challenge to the Bahamian authorities in enforcing the recent money laundering legislation. The Global Nature of Business Many htmlects of business, whether financial or otherwise, are today global in character. This is true not only as a result of the conscious policies of deregulation and attempts to facilitate the mobility of capital and to foster global operations, but also, and more profoundly, recent developments in technology have in effect created implemented, such as cyber banking and smart cards (that is, cards with high security chips that enable the holder to pay bills, gain access to premises, and stores data on health, and so forth) require more than ever vigorously enforced traditional anti laundering control efforts to guard against abuse by money launderers. [30] Traditional anti laundering controls, which hinge on cash transaction reporting and [31] Sophisticated criminals, especially money launderers, have followed suit and in some instances, because of their vast financial and other resources, outstripped their law abiding competitors and the less equipped governmental authorities. Added to this is the threat of destabilization of systems and the integrity of data for subversive or belligerent purposes.It may be safe to say that the prospect of crime and w arfare in the realm of cyberspace is today a reality.As with many other areas of sophisticated criminal and subversive activity, the risks may not always be apparent, although one can be assured that they are real and in their implications, for all those w ho are concerned with the safety and integrity of our financial and trade systems, are of fundamental importance. Indeed, the developed countries and economies of

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the West are at risk, but more so, the small developing offshore centers like The Bahamas fa ce an enemy of profound proportions, probably greater than any threat since the era of colonization. The modern economic criminal will prey upon the weak as well as the strong, and cyberspace recognizes no barriers. [32] The Effects on Offshore Banking These innovations promise to have a profound impact on offshore banking. Without increased commitment, offshore centers will suffer even harsher criticism than they have in the past. In the world of offshore banking, the speed and increased anonymity of cyber banking multiply the lure for money laundering. This author believes that it is only a matter of time before electronic commerce is accepted by the average co nsumer as a viable substitution for cash, checks and credit cards. This acceptance factor and the transfer of funds that it represents both nationally and globally, will motivate the cyber crook to devise schemes or series of schemes that will allow him/h er to contaminate the electronic commerce system. It has been promulgated by the National White Collar Crime Center, based in the USA, that every cyber crook is motivated by a simplistic goal that has mission statement qualities: "beat the system" and "ge t rich in the process." [33] As a result, electronic commerce, especially the transfer of cash, is at risk. While the various components of this new age monetary exchange system (a matrix of old hardware protocols and new software paradigms) have been designed with security in mind from the ground up, the likelihood that they will be probed thousands of times a day, for any weakness, is a given, and common sense d ictates that eventually a means of manipulating the system for money laundering purposes is highly likely. At what level this manipulation will occur and the impact it may or may not have on the integrity of the system as we now understand it is open to s peculation.Nevertheless, if past high tech compromises of other "secure" financial systems are any indication, losses to providers and users of this proposed system will be significant. [34] The Future of Offshore Banking Despite growing pressures from international groups and the resulting proliferation of money laundering laws, successful money laundering controls in offshore centers as in all nations, rely on pol itical will to make money laundering controls a national priority.Even those countries leading the war on money laundering, such as the rapidly changing financial landscape. [35] This is due in part to the changing htmlects of cyberspace and cyber banking. This threat is apparently being assisted by some actions of offshore institutions in this region.The European Union Bank (EUB), based in Antigua in the Caribbean, is one such offshore cyber bank that brings the challenges of money laundering controls in cyberspace to the fore. Calling itself "the first offshore bank of the Internet," t he EUB invites customers to "discover the many tax advantaged financial services that (it) can offer to savvy individuals and corporations" from the privacy of their personal computer. [36] Through its site on the Internet, launched in September, 1995, EUB allows customers access to a full range of offshore private banking services from any country, destroying the problems posed by theremote locations of mos t offshore centers through the borderless reach of cyberspace.

PAGE 9

strict bank secrecy laws, which reportedly make its offshore accounts "a perfect private banker, or coded accounts, which are numbered accounts that operate by pass code rather than signat ure. The methods used by the bank to verify identity are unclear. Once phone or fax contact is made with the customer and a minimum deposit of US$2,500 is made, the account is opened. Both the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo ration have issued warnings to their involving EUB.Still EUB continues to operate. [37] future of banking is unrealistic." [38] Indeed, it may also be the future of mon ey laundering law enforcement to bring heightened international pressure to those banking centers that offer a safe haven to "questionable" customers in the anonymity of cyberspace. When questioned on the risk of the electronic system to the money launderi ng efforts of The Bahamas during a recent interview, Mr. Colin Archer, a Central Bank of The Bahamas official, indicated: [39] Obviously, we have been trying to attract quality, clean, good business but invariably, given the volume of business which is channeled throughout The Bahamas which comes to our shores and goes to other shores, there is a possibility, as a major money center maintaining a very sophisti cated financial telecommunications network, there is a possibility of [the telecommunications network] being exploited. Those persons who engage in [money laundering] activities are very sophisticated people themselves; they are not people who have [a] li mited education or limited resources.They have substantial technical resources available to them and therefore they would make the most of those resources.The Bahamas, as a major money center and major international offshore center, is at risk to money lau ndering because we are connected to the rest of the world in terms of our banking system or bank network in terms of funds being channeled through The Bahamas, millions upon millions of dollars every day from one jurisdiction to the next, so we are at risk but that's all the more reason if we want to continue our level of prosperity, then we have to maintain a center which has the necessary controls in place to protect it. Despite these sentiments, whether the legislation, as it is currently drafted, is wid e enough to encompass cyber crimes can only be speculated about at this point. This statements, it is apparent that the officials at the Central Bank of The Bahamas are a t least aware of the wide resources and expertise available to the money launderer.He is of the opinion that the controls implemented so far can adequately control the severity of money laundering in The Bahamas. CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Private Banking in the Caribbean Confidentiality for Sale In October 1986, the United States became the first country in the world to

PAGE 10

financial centers followed suit, enacting anti laundering laws and enlisting the aid of financial institutions in detecting and preventing money laundering activities. Forced by these efforts to find new avenues for laundering illicit proceeds, money launderers turned to the privacy, con fidentiality, minimal regulation and security of offshore banking. [40] For many of the small nations of the Caribbean, international banking is an important segme nt of their economic well being.It provides jobs, international exposure and much needed revenue for their treasuries. It is a clean, desirable industry. In order to attract money offshore, banks in the small countries must offer a more favorable banking environment. This translates to minimum taxes and maximum confidentiality, which in turn lead to a higher risk of infiltration by criminally derived money seeking to be laundered. The service offered always includes confidentiality.This is especially tru e for the wealthy from other Third World countries seeking a safe haven for their capital.Some of these countries, most notably Colombia, continue to be plagued by political instability and violence including kidnappings for ransom in their home countries. [41] As a consequence, international bankers in The Caribbean commonly assists their clientele in achieving their confidentiality goals through such legal vehicl es as corporations and trust.These vehicles are used for legitimate reasons, notably tax and estate planning. Indeed, avoidance of tax liability and estate complications in a foreign country are certainly understandable and lawful goals, which are prefera bly obtained from tax preferential jurisdictions. This type of environment offers opportunities for certain forms of money laundering. This generally excludes the cruder and more blatant form of money laundering mainly the structuring of cash deposits t o avoid the currency reporting laws, [42] simply because international banking is not a cash oriented business. By its very nature, in ternational banking lends itself to large, non cash deposits and to more sophisticated forms of financial transactions using electronic methods to transfer large sums of money to both offshore and onshore destinations. Steps Taken by the United Kingdom to Curb Money Laundering In Britain, the laundering of the proceeds of drug related crimes was made an offense by the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 also made it an offense to launder the funds of terrorist organizations. However, now that the European Community's Directive on Money Laundering has been adopted and brought into law by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, laundering of the proceeds of all serious offenses is now a specific crimin al offense under English law. of great importance, not only in relation to the U.K. economy, but also in relation to global fina ncial markets.They have also seen the need to protect the financial and operational integrity of those markets. The provisions relating to the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking have been consolidated and re enacted in the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. The 1994 Act provides that it is an offense for anyone to assist drug traffickers to launder money by assisting them to retain or control the benefits of

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their criminal activity, even if this merely amounts to providing advice. The U.K. is also an attractive target for money launderers. The attraction for the breadth, depth and openness to be useful at all stages of the money laundering process, whether it is placem ent, layering or integration.This attraction has been investment services and insurance and the lowering of controls and barriers to free movement of goods, services, people an d capital around Europe. Steps Taken by the United States to Curb Money Laundering The first time in the world that any nation enacted a specific law against money laundering was in the fall of 1986 when President Ronald Reagan signed the Money Laundering Control Act. [43] This Act has subsequently been expanded in each election year (including elections for Congress 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994), which suggests at th e very least some political consideration for the implementation and strengthening of money laundering laws. The law was broader than the common usage of the phrase money laundering.It is not limited to cash, but includes all monetary instruments and all financial transactions.Indeed, in the United States, dirty money never loses it taint and is never cleansed. In essence, the law criminalizes banking services to crooks.Each movement of dirty money is a separate crime. Declaration of War The United States had effectively declared war on drug trafficking and the consequential money laundering htmlect which is an almost inevitable by product.Equipped with recent legislation and new and powerful law enforcement weapons, the modus operandi of the USA will undoubtedly have serious ramifications for many countries of the world, Caribbean neighbours to the south being no exception. The power of the United States to indict a foreign financial institution and to seize its assets world wide for conducting banking business outside of the United States is a power to destroy a financial institution.This can have a devastating impact to the financial institution itself, but also on the financial sector of the home country if the home country is small and dependent, a description which fits the Caribbean countries all too well. Casualties of War As with any war, the major combatants are driven by personal interests. Consequently, a certain amount of injury to non combatants or smaller allies is expect ed and even inevitable as the adversaries fight among themselves.Indeed, as each side pushes for victory, the weapons targeted against the enemy at times cause significant damage to friends and non combatants. As a consequence to all of this action, a gre at risk exists that the fragile economies of the Caribbean nations may be harmed irreparably because of the unintended harm caused by the United States when it utilises the extraterritorial jurisdiction of its criminal justice system against foreign financ ial institutions of small nations. The United States money laundering law specifically provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction when (a) the conduct is by a U.S. citizen anywhere in the world or, if by a non US. citizen, the conduct occurs, at least in p art, in the United States and (b) the transaction, or a series of related transactions, exceeds $10,000. [44] This means that the United States asserts its own ju risdiction and will bring money laundering

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criminal cases to the United States when at least part of the transaction occurred in the United States. [45] Are United States Laws Applicable Outside the USA_ It is true that the Americans have had far more experience in attempting to deal with problems such as racketeering and money laundering than any one else. It is also true that in some respect this experience has n ot always been impressive in terms of the results that it has achieved.It is not surprising, however, that other countries have turned to the United States for advice. While this is understandable, some countries have followed United States precedents in a rather unthinking fashion, forgetting the deficiencies of the American legislation [46] and in particular, the very special situations that it was designed to con front.The United States law has been more or less expertly crafted to address specific crime problems which exist or did exist in the United States; the laws therefore reflect the social, political and constitutional circumstances of that country. [47] Such laws and their derivative enforcement policies are not always obviously applicable to different societies. Laws that contemplate the structure and operations o f the Cosa Nostra may have little practical relevance to the Triads or Yakuza organizations in the Far East. [48] Nonetheless, many countries have simply ignored th is and enacted laws modeled on only a partial perception of the reality in the United States.The inappropriateness of essentially Western laws which presuppose Western structures and financial systems is clearly shown in regard to underground banking syste ms which were developed mainly in nationals. The United States Additionally, the United States has used the "speak softly and carry a big stick" policy promulgated by a former United States president where it literally threatened neighboring countries to conform to its policies or face isolation or political and economic suicide.The Bahamas is no stranger to this type of threat from its nort herly neighbor or the apparent disrespect for the sovereignty of The Bahamas. Indeed, during the Commission of Inquiry in 1984, testimony was given by the then Attorney General of this belief. The Commissioners concluded: The government of The Ba hamas has obviously resented the fact that the United States, through its agencies, had been involved in undercover activity in The Bahamas without the knowledge of the Bahamian government.The Attorney General expressed the view that the undercover tactics employed in Operation Grouper without the consent of The Bahamas government constituted a calculated evil use of The Bahamas for a two and a half year period by the Drug Enforcement Administration.In the opinion of the Attorney General, this conduct was b ut another example of the lack of respect for the sovereignty of The Bahamas on the part of the law enforcement agents of the United States. [49] The policy of the present day United States government has changed little towards its Caribbean and Latin American neighbors.During a recent address to the United Nations, President Bill Clinton promised to clean up tax havens that do not conform est for stronger anti money laundering laws.Addressing the United Nations, President Clinton stated: "First, the steps we will take.Yesterday, I directed our government to identify and put on notice nations that tolerate money laundering. Criminal enterpr ises are moving vast sums of ill gotten gains through the international financial system with absolute impunity.We must not allow them to

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wash the blood of profits from the sale of drugs, from terror or organized crimes.Nations should bring their banks and financial systems in conformity with the international anti money laundering standards.We will work to help them to do so.And if they refuse, we will consider appropriate sanctions." [50] President Clinton also directed the United States intelligence agencies to identify companies believed to be laundering money for the Cali cartel and freeze its assets, thereby "cutting off its economic lifelines and stopping our own people from dealing unknowingly with its companies. The Americans are even suspicious of the British.A recent report mentioned "deep suspicion" on Capital Hill on what they perceive to be a lack of British willingness and ability to provide the requis ite degree of regulatory oversight of banking and financial institutions in territories over which the British could be expected to exercise a degree of influence. [51 ] influence, there is not a great deal of regard for the actions of the British in Washington and New York law enforcement circles; they look upon the effectiveness of the British with skepticis m. The fallout from the BCCI affair fueled this suspicion and led to a mind set in certain quarters of the United States that far from providing a lead in the development of international anti money laundering legislation, the United Kingdom is really a pa rt of the problem.It is this perception, among others, that has led to the positive identification of various offshore financial areas as facilitating the interests of international organized crime, and these areas will now be targeted and become the subje ct of sanctions, among which will be the prohibition of the provision of electronic fund transfer and dollar clearing services to financial institutions in the suspected jurisdictions. [52] If such sanctions were ever imposed on Bahamian institutions, it may be the beginning of the end for an industry that derives at least 80% of its banking revenue from the United States. CHAPTER 4 THE BAHAMIAN EFFORTS TO CURB MO NEY LAUNDERING The Bahamas, a Leading Offshore Center leading offshore centers. [53] Mr. Julian Francis, the Governor of the Central Bank of The Bahamas, is quoted as saying: activeness is its occurred by chance. It has involved a series of calculated policy initiatives reflecting coloration on the part of the government of The Bahamas, the pri vate sector and the Central Bank of The Bahamas. One of the most significant steps in this concerted approach has been the recent enactment of tough money laundering legislation.The Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act, 1996 and accompanying regulatio n have come to be regarded as pioneering legislation and a blueprint for other countries contemplating the implementation of anti money laundering measures. [54] The legislation included in the Bahamian Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act

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1996, together with subsidiary legislation, has imposed a considerable burden on all ney.Added to this is the development of the law of restitution which is increasingly imposing potentially crushing civil liability on those who receive the proceeds of crime or who knowingly assist in the laundering of such hat it is this area of law that is likely to place the most significant burden on those responsible for creating and operating compliance systems in the financial sector.This is all more significant given the now clear strategy of many law enforcement agen cies to place financial intermediaries in the front line in the fight against enterprise and organized crime. Those who are probity of such services where the possibilit y exists for the facilitators to experience the personal pain of civil and possible criminal liability themselves. They are in effect the gatekeepers of the financial system and have all the traditional responsibilities of such office. [55] The Global Nature of the International Criminal Most cases of money laundering, however, will involve two or more jurisdictions. It has been claimed that international cooperat ion between law enforcement agencies is limited to conferences, visits and intelligence sharing. There is no global law designed to combat money laundering. Interpol and Europol have no authority to arrest or prosecute. [56] As a result, criminals who operate internationally are able to operate if not with impunity, certainly with far less likelihood of capture than if they were to find that there was a unified sys tem of laws.For this reason, several jurisdictions, led by the United States, are beginning to reach out beyond their own geographical borders. This is one of the approaches being advocated that can begin to put a significant dent in the world of the mone y launderer. International cooperation and the strengthening of the international bodies such as Interpol are other suggested ways of fighting the international criminal. As previously mentioned, discussion of the processes involved in money laundering ha s been limited and derivative outside the United States. The Bahamas government, like other countries, has often failed to appreciate the complexity of money laundering in terms of its both character and objectives.The government has taken for granted a s omewhat traditional crime model, which rarely conforms to reality.This model bases its premise on property and possession -a foundation that has been made obsolete by the electronic dimension, especially as it relates to economic crimes. Indeed, given t he nature, expertise, and resources of those involved in the industry of money laundering, there is every incentive for their services to be adapted to take full account of any new threat -including legislation. The Caribbean -Sunny Money Jurisdictions The Caribbean is seen as an important element in the international financial system, with major offshore centers such as Curacao, Aruba, the Cayman Islands, and The Bahamas, directly involved in servicing wholly legitimate businesses on a considerable sca le.Inevitably, some of these centers and others in the region will be used to launder funds from illegal activities, with or without the knowledge of local professionals or regulatory bodies. One feature which makes the region particularly attractive is th e widespread use of the United States dollar.Tourism and trade both generate and require United States currency; the dollar is in widespread circulation and is readily accepted throughout the region. Inflow of illicit cash in United States dollars can the refore be readily

PAGE 15

absorbed into the local economy, being commingled with American currency from legitimate activities.Another attractive feature is that some jurisdictions lack all forms of direct taxation. In The Bahamas, for instance, there are no incom e taxes, corporation taxes, inheritance taxes, value added taxes or capital gains taxes.The government derives its income from license fees and import duty on consumer items. While this is good for the financial institution, it is also good for the money launderer because the lack of a structured taxation system denies the government the ability of using the tax laws and facilities as a method of investigating possible money laundering. Offshore banking facilities are attractive to money launderers and des pite the efforts over the last few years to tighten procedures in many offshore jurisdictions in the Caribbean, some regulatory gaps remain.Some jurisdictions allow offshore bank licenses despite the lack of a home country supervisor.Standards of regulatio n vary sharply across the region and many countries confuse anti money laundering regulatory procedures with an anti investment stance which might inhibit development capital in flows.A similar confusion exists with regard to exchange control regulations w hich are being rapidly removed throughout the region. A country which removes exchange control regulations could still require banks and business houses to report transactions which are "unusual" or "suspicious".There is no real conflict.Governments can r etain an interest in knowing the source or origins of the funds without having any concern about the currency or the denomination of the bills. The Power of the Money Launderers and Its Economic Effects The recent trends identified above have increased the vulnerability of the Caribbean region to the dangers of money laundering.Consider the consequences of greater use of local businesses and small local and regional banks and other financial institutions. These enterprises effectively share in the profits of the drug trafficker, for they receive a "fee" for a cheap facility. The businesses and financial institutions concerned are usually significant local concerns in small islands or territories.Their principals are often well connected in the local politi cal scene. In some instances, the financial institutions have a significant element of public ownership with government ministers on the board. [57] The criminal proceeds laundered through such businesses are therefore far more corrosive of local political structures than they ever were when transiting the international banking community in the form of cash in suitcases. Inevitably money laundering on any scale wi ll undermine the financial structure and the judicial process, buy political protection and will neutralize any local or international law enforcement effort. Small islands and territories in the Caribbean slip easily under the control of criminal element s, usually fronted by rich and apparently successful local businessmen who exercise a degree of political influence through their contribution to the political parties. Increasingly in the region, political influence is determined by the funds available a s old political dogma tends to become irrelevant as the costs of political campaigns rise. distort market forces to the detriment of legitimate banks and businesses and a llow the criminal to enjoy the proceeds of their unethical actions. [58] The distortion of the natural market occurs by institutions benefiting from criminal fund s attracted at below market rates (as the criminal is only concerned about entering the legitimate banking system, not with value for money).Once money laundering becomes prolific, however, market distortions may become such that normal business planning i s

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impossible and institutions rapidly begin to become unstable.Because criminal organizations typically seek to quickly expand operations in any area, weaknesses in [59] The Purpose of the Legislation It is very interesting that out of the three persons interviewed, two felt that money laundering was not widespread in The Bahamas. When as ked the question: "How widespread do you thing money laundering is in The Bahamas," Mr. Archer responded that even though he does not know exactly because of the clandestine nature of the activity, he reasoned that money laundering is not a major problem i n our banking system and is not widespread. [60] Janis McDougal in answer to the same question stated categorically that money laundering is not widespread in The Bahamas. [61] This led to the question of why this legislation is being introduced in The Bahamas at tate the combating of the laundering of proceeds derived from illegal activity including drug trafficking and for that purpose to impose upon certain financial institutions regulatory requirements. [62] McDougal believes that the Act itself is more preventative. She stated that as a result of the damaging effects of money laundering throughout the world, including the USA and South America, The Bahamas is aware of the serious negative effect it has had on the economies of those countries, so The Bahamas passed the legislation more as a precautionary measure. [63] Archer believes that the strength of the legislation is its value in terns of its deterrence. [64] Some Comments on the Bahamian Legislation A report published laundering.The passage of new money laundering legislation in The Bahamas reflects an increased emphasis by the government of The Bahamas to combat money laundering, concluded an internatio nal report.And this new legislation should significantly strengthen money laundering controls said the report released by the United States Department of State in March, 1996. [65] However, The Bahamas will need to enforce its new legislation vigorously advised the report, especially the requirements for recording and reporting transactions. Further, The Bahamas will need to undergo evaluation of its money launderi ng controls by the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force so that it is ensured that appropriate implementing regulations are enacted; this action has been postponed until after implementation of the new money laundering law, the report added. [66] The report evaluates the counter narcotics situation in major drug source and transit countries around the world.It concluded that The Bahamas will remain a major transit country for United States bound Colombian cocaine and Jamaican marijuana, despite significant reduction over the past ten years of the volume of drugs moving through the country.However, if The Bahamas continues to cooperate fully with the United States go vernment to fight international narcotic cartels, the report stated, then it will be able to more efficiently carry out its counter narcotics efforts. [67] The rep ort concludes that "The Bahamas remains a dynamic financial services center and tax haven with bank secrecy laws, conditions conducive to money laundering. During 1995, the government of The Bahamas extended its efforts to fulfill the objectives of the 19 88 United Nations Convention by adopting stronger

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Bahamian government has delayed enacting this legislation until implementing regulations are ready and financial institutions can be educated on the provisions of the new law. We expect the government of The Bahamasto enforce this legislation vigorously," continued the international report on narcotic control strategies, "but it has only a limited capacity to conduct complex c ounter narcotics investigations." [68] Professor Barry Rider Comments Professor Barry Rider, Director of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London, and the author of several books on the subject of money anywhere far enough. Y our cutoff with offenses other than drugs is an offense that Most other jurisdictions that have money laundering legislation, it is usually defined as any crime ated Rider. [69] He told the members of The Bahamas Institute of Bankers that money laundering is a multifaceted problem. Terrorist organizations, governments an d criminal organizations have just as much need to launder money. "So laundering is not concerned simply just with drug money and that is a very big mistake that a number of governments make." [70] Analysis and Opinion It is important that the United States report noted that The Bahamas only has a limited capacity to conduct complex counter narcotics investigations. It is the lack of sophistication, certainly compared to the well financed money launderer, which is a major cause of concern. There will always be someone somewhere who will be prepared to prostitute his or her integrity and profession by receiving or facilitating the transmission of funds from illi cit sources.Indeed, it is more or less a safe bet that there will always be governments or at least agencies of government that are equally prepared to compromise. The ultimate solution in terms of such countries and administrations must be political, but while we await the arrival of utopia, the appropriate strategy for The Bahamas would appear to be to make it so uncomfortable, tiresome and expensive for the crooks to wash their ill gotten gains through our banks or financial institutions, they will find another more 'attractive' venue.As a consequence of this strategy, even quite proper and acceptable business will be disadvantaged and required to submit itself to additional regulatory burdens, risks and expenses.There is the risk that there will be at l east a perception that the system has become uncompetitive and unattractive to business that has the ability to relocate or at least move its money through some other channel. Our goal, at this point should be to make it as difficult and uncomfortable as p ossible for the money launderer.We must accept that we cannot hope to completely eradicate money laundering. Indeed, none other than the Governor of the Central Bank of The Bahamas stated: "Of course it will be foolhardy to believe that this legislation g money laundering activities." [71] As will be noted in successive chapters, this does not ap pear to be the view of some of the leaders of The Bahamas who have been known to make statements that imply that the passing of the money laundering legislation is enough to discourage completely the money launderers from ever attempting to use the banks a nd financial institutions in The Bahamas to launder

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dirty money. CHAPTER 5 MONEY LAUNDERING AND CORRUPTION TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN Corruption Some Background The Bahamas, with its history of alleged high level corruption and questionable persons in leadership positions, must deal with the issue of official corruption if it ever hopes to deal effectively with money laundering, notwithstanding the legislation. The enforcement of the Act will be based, in the final analysis, on the political will of If they themselves benefit from corruption, it will make the enforcement of the money laundering legislation ever so difficult.The involvement of major international figures in various money laundering schemes is evolving into an e ven greater problem than the financial crime itself. The bigger concern being recognized internationally is the connection between money laundering and official corruption. Once considered a dirty word even to discuss, corruption now seems to be consider ed complementary to money laundering. [72] money laundering was tied to aiding and abetting the crime of drug trafficking.In later years, with the passage of the Money Laundering Control Act in the USA, certain "Specified Unlawful Acts" were listed as predicate offenses. Banking institutions were other businesses were scrutinized more closely regarding those on behalf of whom they were transacting business. Indeed, most banking organizations have become extremely diligent in combating rectives. It is clear that presently the players of major international money laundering are not primarily drug traffickers. [73] Banking institutions are no lon ger the main perpetrators of money laundering schemes. While the arenaof businesses involved in illegal transactions has expanded, nothing has grown more rapidly that international corruption activities. The significant other side of the drug money laund ering coin is corruption and the role played by a host of individuals in an array of corrupt activities. newly democratized governments all over the world, the age old pract ice of payoffs will get even more widespread media attention.Open markets are exposing a variety of corrupt practices, including bribe taking by public officials.Of even more concern to banking organizations is that private banking is being used by those w ho benefit from corrupt activities. Indeed, banks themselves are being identified as the surrogate investors of some of the proceeds of crime. Corruption payments, like dirty money, need to be covered up and money laundering techniques are often the solu tion for those involved in corrupt activities. Transparency in Business The revelations of international corruption are described as multitudinous in scope.There is presently a demand for transparency in business transactions, as the standard way that bus iness should be conducted.In the call for transparency, however, and the moves by many countries to pass laws prohibiting corruption, there are few examples of punishment for the well heeled purveyors of payoffs who did not

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perform above board. Indeed, Pr ofessor B. K. Rider gave several examples of British financial criminals who while admitting their crimes, were given no more than what appeared to be a slap on the wrist for laundering millions of pounds. [74] In recent years, there was very little if any enforcement of the transparency requirements or similar laws in those countries that passed such laws. As the stories of high level corruption are discovered and publicized, we see some of the methods used by perpetrators to legitimize their kickback and bribe money. Some spectacular examples have occurred throughout the world, demonstrating money laundering activities on behalf of some of the most prominent poli ticians and businessmen. Very little has been done to address these matters in any substantial way. Recent Examples of International High Level Political Corruption No area of the world is exempt from this type of involvement in money laundering. Listed below are some recent examples of money laundering and high level political corruption: [75] and accused of taking money from both drug traffickers and foreign companies wanting to do business in Mexico. Colombian president Ernesto Samper was accused of accepting $6.5M in drug money for his election campaign. His Minister of Defense went to prison. Part of the significant evidence of his crime centered on international banking transactions used to laund er these proceeds which were said to have originated from the Cali cartel. Within the last three years, presidents have been forced out of office in Brazil and Venezuela because of massive charges of corruption and money laundering. In South Korea, two f ormer presidents have been convicted of bribery along with top business leaders. In India, several former cabinet members have been indicted on money laundering and corruption charges. In most of these cases, large amounts of money were sent through vari ous legitimate financial institutions in an effort to show the funds as originating from legal sources. Former Indian communications minister Sukh Ram was in London receiving medical treatment when police raided his New Delhi home in August 1995 and found more that $1M cash stuffed in suitcases, plastic bags and privatization program had been suspected of taking bribes and kickbacks. The head of Dai Ichi Kangyo Bank Limited in Japan, Kuniji Mi yazaki, committed suicide in June 1997, after two days of questioning about his role in payoffs to "sokaiya" corporate extortionist Ryuichi Koike.Koike is suspected of having extorted funds from Nomura Securities Company Limited. Political Corruption in T he Bahamas As mentioned previously, The Bahamas has had its share of high level corruption. On summarizing the evidence given before the 1984 Commission of Inquiry appointed to investigate allegations of drug trafficking through The Bahamas, the Commissi oners made certain observations concerning Kendal Nottage, lawyer and a

PAGE 20

senior Cabinet Minister in the Pindling Government: felon) criminal record and his association with an organized crime family. Nevertheless, a prudent man, such as we would assume Mr. Nottage to be, would make inquiries of the character of the person with whom he was dealing behind the corporate veil and thus avoid the risk of entering into a joint ven ture with an apparent standing as a Cabinet Minister.Mr. Nottage now realizes the position and is anxious to divest himself of his interest in the Islander Hotel.But in the meantime, the fact is, whether he realized it or not, [that] (sic) he has been fronting for Caruana. [76] In another Commission of Inquiry into the operations of Bahamasair (the national flag carrier, where politically appointed chairmen were always high level senior Cabinet Ministers), the Commissioners concluded that two Cabinet Ministers were in receipt of large kickbacks on the purchase of airplanes from a Cana dian company. [77] The Commissioners recommended that prosecution should be instituted into the conduct of Darrell Rolle and Philip Bethel (both former Chairmen o f the airline) in respect of the disposition of the commission paid by Boeing De Havilland on the sale of Dash 8 aircraft to Bahamasair. [78] High level corruption in The Bahamas has been clearly documented. Although the government has recently changed, the present Prime Minister is himself a former Cabinet Minister of the PLP. time or another, broke ranks with the party. Note also that corruption, by its very nature, is mostly brought to light years after the event.The normal course of events, at least as it pertains to The Bahamas (and indeed other third world countries as well), is that when a government is c hanged, a Commission of Inquiry is called to investigate the wrongdoing of the previous government. This is to say that such high level corruption could be occurring as this paper is being written, but because of the nature of the crime, it most likely wil l remain uncovered for years.Like money laundering, sometimes other financial crimes set out to deliberately confuse investigators.Those charged with the detection and investigation of such matters need to be alerted to the implications of a process that h as been carefully designed and structured with the objective of minimizing exposure and thus, the risk of interference. Sadly, Bahamian legislators have, knowingly or unknowingly, failed to appreciate the complexity of money laundering and high level corr uption in terms of their both character and objectives. Legislators have taken for granted a somewhat stylized model that rarely conforms to reality. Indeed, given the nature and expertise (not to mention resources) of those involved in this industry, th ere is every incentive for their services to be adapted to take full account of any new threat, including legislation. Their culture is one of evasion and adaptation. Analysis and Opinion Leading political figures have long been the ones to drag their feet in implementing meaningful laws against money laundering.In my opinion, corruption has slowed down the legislative train and clouded the true intentions of government officials at the highest level in many countries, including The Bahamas.While corruption in international business is commonplace if not widely accepted, the same should not hold true for legitimate democratic governments, which were elected, hopefully, for moral as well as economic reasons. Given the glare of publicity indicating that top

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p olitical leaders are themselves mired in corruption, these events will certainly not endorse the principle that laws should be obeyed by all. There is a need for more laws with teeth.The only effective judge that can objectively assess the correlation of corruption and money laundering is a discerning voting public, who should have zero tolerance when it comes to corruption of public officials. CHAPTER 6 SOME DIFFICULTIES ENFORCING THE LAW Introduction This chapter will discuss some of the reasons why The Bahamas may have some difficulty enforcing its recently enacted money laundering legislation. The difficulties of explaining a highly complex technical matter to the jury and the difficulties of the prosecution and the judges in understanding and applyin g customary law to cyber crimes are noted. The traditionally high levels of alleged corruption in the Bahamian society, and especially in the financial institutions, are also noted. The dependence of the police on the financial institutions to provide fi rst hand information and the correspondent dependence of the financial institutions on their customers (some of whom will be money launderers) are discussed in this chapter. Education may be the key to informing the population on the societal dangers of m oney laundering. This chapter also lists a chart on successful money laundering prosecutions from several European countries and addresses some fundamental questions, including the main thesis question: Is the money laundering legislation in The Bahamas e nforceable_ Did The Bahamas come under political pressure to pass some money laundering legislation_ Organized Crime in The Bahamas Organized crime constitutes any enterprise, or group of persons, engaged in continuing illegal activity, which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits irrespective of national boundaries. [79] Whether or not the Bahamian police authorities recognize that organized crimina l elements may be operating in The Bahamas is still unknown.As an entity, there is no specific branch on the police force that deals with organized crime per se, regardless of how it is defined. Indeed, it ritish police (with whom the Bahamian police identify and mimic as far as possible) finally developed and organized a specific unit to deal with crime of what is referred to as "the North American pattern." [80] It was said that senior police officers resolutely refused to accept that there was an organized crime problem in the U.K. until relatively recently. [81] Although the two societies are different, the situation in the U.K. is important for several reasons, not least that the Bahamian authorities receive most of their training in the United Kingdom, as have most Commo nwealth countries police force personnel.Some other reasons include the lack of (until recently in Britain) a centralized intelligence and investigatory capability to assess and interdict organized crime, very similar legal traditions and laws, and the imp ortance of economic related activity. [82] Indeed, when questioned on the extent of money laundering in The Bahamas, Detective Inspector Neely of the DEU was quic hard to believe that in a country with a financial center as big as ours that no money is being laundered." [83] This contradicts the claims of the Central Bank official and the representative from the Office of the Attorney General who claim that money laundering is not "a problem in The Bahamas." To date, however, the DEU, preliminarily set up to deal with drug trafficking, is the un it of the Royal Bahamas Police force that has been given the task of investigating reports of money

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laundering. There is still no specific unit to deal with financial crimes such as money laundering. The Investigators The Royal Bahamas Police Force consis ts of approximately 1,500 individuals, and the Royal Bahamas Defense Force is manned by 800 persons, who are all concerned with crimes of violence, illegal alien smuggling, drug trafficking and a crime rate that appeared higher in 1997 than ever before in the history of The Bahamas. The Defense Force is constitutionally limited to the protection of the found on the open seas, the Defense Force would not be involved in the c orrelating economic crimes such as money laundering The Bahamas is a small developing nation, with a national budget of only $968M. [84] Of that amount, $61M [85] is allocated for law enforcement, which includes salaries, provision of vehicles, housing, maintenance of patrol boats, maintenance of the air fleet, maintenance of buildings, provision of sub stations on the widely dispersed family of islands, armory andtravel expenses.I estimate that at least 5 percent ofthe police force are used to carry out non traditional duties, for example, guarding politicians, chauffeurin g the Chief Justice and posing in the front of historical buildings for the benefit of tourists.Another 10 percent are used to perform clerical duties, including general office duties like payroll, kitchen personnel, persons manning the police criminal rec ords office, traffic police, the Royal Bahamas Police Band, and other civic and ceremonial duties.With vacations, training, and sick days in this equation, and the fact that The Bahamas is an archipelago spread over more than 100,000 square miles with over 700 islands and cays, we effectively have approximately 1,000 police officers on duty at any particular time.Out of that amount, [86] Money laundering crimes can be very sophisticated, are tedious by nature and may take a long time to solve.The modern criminal interested in economic crimes may be using technology to transfer funds to an offshore e nvironment.The police authorities must be up to date and proficient with the use of the electronic commerce system, if they are to stand any chance against the experienced cyber crooks. Added to this is the fight for budgetary allocation.When there is a p roblem with violent crime in a society where politicians are after the popular vote, the community would opt for additional police cars, bulletproof vests and advanced radios, as opposed to computer training, or the training of cyber cops.Indeed, given the state of violent crime in The Bahamas, it is likely that the police department will be unable to justify funding high tech crime units and more tangible things that the voter can "see and touch"(for example, police cars and bullet proof vests) will probab share of the budget. The technology used in the force will most likely not be the latest technology available. When it comes to computer technology, law enforcement management historically has demonstrated an aversion to being a market l eader. [87] To quote a recent paper: If computer technology is purchased, it must first be proven in the private sector as a workable solution.Hence, exposure to advancements in this type of technology is delayed by a mindset only comfortable with proven (that is obsolete) products.Needless to say, it is difficult to keep up with a criminal fleeing the scene of

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a crime driving the latest model Porsche, when the pursuit vehicle is the equivalent of a reliable family car.If this is difficult to believe, stop by the local police station some day and ask the desk sergeant who handles complaints about crime on the Internet. After explaining what that means, be prepared for the following response: Additionally, such crimes seldom remain in a single jurisdiction, and this issue is one of the primary reasons why The Bahamas would have problems investigating this type of crime. The Police Force is funded by taxpayers from The Bahamas, and the politicians of today are inclined to ensure that the funds are spent on activities that benefit (or appear to benefit) those who pay the taxes. Unfortunately, money laundering crimes and investigations do not usually satisfy this philosophy and may very easily cross geographic al borders. It would not be unusual to find that an investigation has spilled over into another jurisdiction because of the discovery of additional facts or victims or that the trail of the money launderer leads to some other country. No longer is it suff icient to understand the laws of a country; one must be also be able to articulate the legal concepts of a dozen or more countries where money launderers may gather because of a lack of extradition treaties or absence of money laundering legislation. The P rosecutors The Office of the Attorney General has finally standardized its computer equipment, and after two years, has networked its computer systems.The prosecutors, usually British trained lawyers, who still today do not have a data processing course in their curriculum, have traditionally been known to be further behind the technological curve than any law enforcement department when it comes to in depth, hands on experience with computer technology. [89] Yet these prosecutors are expected to explain to a lay jury (who on average may not be computer literate) the intricacies of a complex money laundering operation that is spanning several borders and involves, s ay, millions of dollars. Make no mistake, trials that involve sophisticated money laundering transactions can be highly technical. Terms and phrases that might even confuse most persons with some computer knowledge must be clarified in detail so that no jury member walks away confused as to what happened.This is critical because confused jurors tend to vote not guilty. So we are faced with prosecutors trying to explain to a jury, concepts that even they do not fully understand. [90] Further complicating the prosecution are factors related to the lack of legal precedent. Judges prefer following legal precedent and very little case law exists on money laundering cr imes, especially cyber crimes involving the electronic commerce system. As a result, prosecutors and judges have few guidelines to fall back on when attempting to apply200 year old laws to legal situations never envisioned by the framers of the constituti on.Being human, most judges are reluctant to formulate new case law that may be reversed by a higher court because the money launderer is most likely better able to hire the best legal brains, so most prosecutors and judges tend to err on the side of cauti on in these cases and give the money launderer a break in legal decisions that may otherwise result in prison sentences. As indicated earlier, even when convicted, the electronic money launderer will probably be sentenced to community service or a very sh ort time in prison.Indeed, it may not go as far as the judge because smart lawyers may be able to persuade the jury that money laundering is a victimless crime because no overt violent act occurred.

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Corruption The issue of high level corruption in The Baha mas has already been noted above. This is another reason why The Bahamas will find it difficult to enforce money laundering legislation, because corruption itself may have become contagious, spreading like a cancer to other sectors of society because of t he example set by those in authority. Indeed, the history of The Bahamas, from piracy in the 19 th Century, to rum running during Prohibition in the USA, to drug smuggling in the According to Detective Inspector Ne ely, when asked how widespread money laundering is in The Bahamas: "Over the years the police have instigated investigations based upon our knowledge of Bahamian citizens or others who are alleged to be involved in drug trafficking. And because of their w ay of life, the way they live, their assets, it is reasonable for us to conclude that they have benefited, or that they have laundered their ill gotten proceeds. And that is the thrust of it for the time being, but we have not received any reports that A or B has laundered money in The Bahamas.So when it comes down to how widespread is money laundering in The Bahamas, we simply do not know. But we do know that there are lots of people in this country who have benefited from drug trafficking.But how much mo ney is being laundered or how many complaints of money laundering are going on in this country, we wouldn't know because those reports are not coming in as yet." [91] been contaminated with the desire for quick and easy money.Most Bahamian financial institutions are staffed with honest persons, although some employees are not so hon est.A dishonest person who works for a financial institution that is able to help launder funds is easily corrupted.A U.S. Senate Committee on Government Affairs in 1985 noted: "Money laundering is now an extremely lucrative criminal enterprise in its own right. of an emerging criminal class professional money launderers who aid and abet other criminals through financial activities.These individuals hardly fit the stereotype of an underworld criminal. legitimate professions.They need not become involved with the underlying criminal laundering, for them, is an easy route t o almost limitless wealth." [92] Under the new money laundering legislation, the police are dependent on the financial institutions to be the first line of defense and to report the suspicious transactions to them. Indeed, the following excerpt from my interview with Detective Inspector Neely reveals just how dependent the police are on the financial institutions to be the first line of defense in enforcing the new legislation: [93] Bain: So you are saying that as a front line defense, you are depending on the banking institutions to inform you_ Inspector: Certainly! I thin k that when you talk about raw money laundering, that is, a person who wants to just launder big money through our country, if it is ill gotten money, we will have to depend a lot upon the banks and the other institutions affected by this legislation -b ecause they are required to disclose. Without them disclosing, we the police would not know.What the police do know is that Aor B is a drug trafficker, A or B has lots of money, and maybe we can conclude that by the way they live, by the things that they have, and based on that, we could then begin our investigation to target A or B.But what about C and D who never come to the attention of the police_ C and D may be moving big sums of money from one bank to another bank through our jurisdiction to some ot her jurisdiction and it can be

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illegal money.C and D may never step foot in our country,but may send representatives to meet with some persons on their behalf just to pass money through our jurisdiction.But if the banking institutions become suspicious of these transactions and they disclose them, it is going to give us a chance and we may get to know something about C and D.These may very well be persons whom we were looking for over a period of time, but we were unable to get that information.Unless we ha ve sufficient information and we can go by ourselves before a court and satisfy Bain: Inspector, when you speak y ou constantly refer to the local money launderer. What about the sophisticated foreign money launderer coming into The Bahamas or using electronic mailing systems transferring funds wherever, using our institutions to transfer money and launder money with out coming here, using SWIFT or other forms of electronic transfer payment systems to do it_What do you have in place to combat that type of launderer_ Inspector: Well, I have indicated that htmlect of it would not be known to the police officers. That w ill never come to our attention, unless the institutions through whom those funds are passing become suspicious of these transactions and make a disclosure. Without that, we would never know of these persons. The police obviously are placing a lot of responsibility on the financial institutions to disclose what they (the bankers) see as "suspicious activities." But if the financial institutions themselves have been corrupted, or because of their desire to receive above average earnings on their activi ties, this dependence may not prove fruitful or may not work the way it was designed to work.Financial institutions themselves must put systems in place to ensure that corrupt staff members arenot secretly using the institutions to assist the money launder er.One of the first steps is training of staff in the financial institutions, because it appears that the front line staff are not adequately trained. For instance, it was noted at a recent money laundering conference that most businesses train their seni or officers and board members, but the people who are in a much better position to spot money laundering problems are the people on the front level such as tellers and those in sales.The training that trickles down to them is not always of the highest cali ber. Yet it is the people on the shop floor who will keep the directors out of prison. [94] Places like The Bahamas also face another problem, which has been note d above but not dealt with specifically. Offshore financial centers such as The Bahamas face the problem that money laundering legislation may tend to drive away good business along with the bad. Any organization that complies with the strict letter of th e regulations may find it very hard to retain and attract clients. If an organization is known to be making reports to the authorities, [95] then that organization may find that people may not want to use its services.The persons attracted to offshore centers are those that are very private in their dealings and they may perceive that the institutions in question may be too free with their personal information. The t rick is for legislators to find the right balance between not attracting the illegal money launderer, while making the legitimate customer feel at ease with his desired level of confidentiality.The legislation must not be so restrictive that it paralyses a blossoming offshore banking industry. The Bahamas Arrogant Authorities_ Another thing that stands in the way of enforcing the money laundering legislation is

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the arrogance of the Bahamian authorities, especially those in the government, who seem to displ ay very little understanding of the complexities of a money laundering operation.This was demonstrated recently when the United States Ambassador to The Bahamas, Sidney Williams, told a meeting of the Joint Task Force (a USA/Bahamas counter narcotics group ) that the United States government is "disturbed" that criminal organizations from Russia are attempting to use certain Caribbean jurisdictions for money laundering. [96] He also said that the USA is looking forward to an impartial evaluation of the Bahamian money laundering controls by the Caribbean Financial Actions Task Force later this year. [97] This led to a very defensive response from the government, when the Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Prime Minister quickly issued a statement that "The Bahamas government is not aware of any attempt by criminal organizati ons from Russia or Eastern Europe to infiltrate The Bahamas." [98] claims in a very non diplomatic and insulting way as "nonsense." [99] He went on to refer to the Money Laundering Act, which he claims has been effective in cutting money laundering activities [100] (this has never been quantified by the government). In the opinion of this author, The Bahamas should welcome the al representative in The Bahamas, he is unlikely to have made such a statement without the calculated intent of conveying a very specific message to the Bahamian government. Indeed, with the kind of sophisticated intelligence and security equipment that h as been and is being developed -much by the United States -it would come as no great surprise to find that the Americans may be tracking and monitoring the course of illegal activity to and from The Bahamas and the Caribbean. The editor of The Tribune wrote in response to The Bahamas comments. [101] She stated that we are just minnows daring to swim from our out island fish pond into a global ocean and shortly we will find our new environment filled with "unsavory predators capable of swallowing minnows in a single gulp. [102] We should be fully aware of the dangers, instead of presenting an "it possibly happen here" attitude. We should understand that it could happen here notwithstanding the new money laundering legislation. Is Legislat ion Enough_ The reaction of the Bahamian authorities implies that the mere passage of the legislation would be a panacea for the money laundering problems experienced thus far. If this is so, this would be considered a simplistic interpretation of the eff ects of the legislation that was passed but that The Bahamas may not have the capacity to enforce. capacity to conduct complex counter narcotics investigations," [103] yet this government appears to feel as if the legislation and a 2,000 strong police force is the solution to a complex, global, and high tech problem. Indeed, on political platform s, the FNM government boasts about the reduction in drug trafficking through these islands.Nevertheless, for some reason, The Bahamas is still being designated as "a major transit country affecting the United States," according to the 1996 International Na rcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). [104] This apparent paradox led to an editorial by the editor of a daily newspaper calling for a simple explanation.The ed itor wrote: On the one hand, Deputy Prime Minister Frank Watson is singling praises for The Bahamas having been successful in turning back the drug traffickers and putting into effect demand reduction programs.And on the other hand, The Bahamas is still be ing regarded by the USA as a drug transit country affecting their fight against drugs.Something is crossed eyed in this picture.There needs to be an explanation, in

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simple language, which all can understand. This should be an easy matter that could be res olved without fancy footwork and with no glib remarks. This is a matter that could lend itself to the utmost of niceties in international diplomacy, a matter that could be kept simple with the necessary question being a simple "Why." Instead of suggestin g that the U.S. authorities explain the continued designation of The Bahamas, The Bahamas should ask the "why" question outright and demand a "straight" answer. The Bahamian people expect as much (on all fronts) from the government they have chosen to rep resent them. In the first place, Bahamians need to be told the truth about illegal drugs in their country rather that conflicting reports that change with every announcement. [105] Without an open mind to the problems and complexities of money laundering, the government may be, by its own actions, or lack of action, making it more difficult to conquer the money laundering problem. Other Considerations The civil law and in particular tax law can be used with great effect to inhibit the operation of criminal enterprises. The courts have the power to assess and confiscate the 'earnings' of 'career criminals' under the Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act 1996. Tax and fiscal regulations have long been utilized against organized crime in the United States and to a lesser extent in other countries. Countries like The Bahamas that lack any form of direct taxes will be hard pressed to deal effectively with the mone y launderer without a structured system of taxation. One of the possible side effects of enhancing the enforcement potential of the authorities in seizing the fruits of criminal activity is that criminal organizations are encouraged to employ even more sop histicated processes in laundering their ill gotten gains. Hence, a potential reduction has been made in the flow of information which may be refined into intelligence and then used to undermine or inhibit the primary activity of the relevant criminal grou p. This has proved to be a particular problem in regard to terrorist organizations and the Colombian cocaine cartels. [106] This is not to say that the intellig ence value of such information is always greater or significantly more useful than an asset identification and removal program. It does, however, underline the importance of an integrated and coordinated approach to these problems and the fact that enforc ement of the law and the reduction of money laundering through The Bahamas involves more than the enactment of legislation. The Politics of Money Laundering Legislation It was noted above how the Money laundering Control Act in the USA has been expanded in each election year (including elections for Congress) -1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994 -which suggests at the very least some political consideration for the implementation and strengthening of money laundering laws. It was also noted that The Bahamas Act w as passed on March 19, 1996, a few days before a well publicized tour of Latin America to attract offshore business to this country by the Prime Minister of The Bahamas, the Right Honorable Hubert Ingraham, indicating that the issue of money laundering is politically sensitive at this time in the history of this region. It should be obvious that the somewhat simplistic notions of money laundering that have been reported recently presuppose a clear understanding of money laundering. The recent political utt erances in the Bahamian press after the passing of the money laundering legislation, give credence to the claim by its critics that the

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passing of the bill is nothing more than cosmetic window dressing to appease the uneasy political climate in Washington. According to Detective Inspector Neely, there Bahamian government to seek some money laundering legislation." [107] When Janis McDougal was asked the same question, she responded with a cool, "No, I do not think so," [108] and was unrespons ive to further probing by this author. This can be understood to some degree, given the political nature of her job at the Office of the Attorney General and the sensitivity of the successive Bahamian governments to criticism, especially from civil servan ts.This question was not asked to Colin Archer during his interview, but the true extent to whether political pressure was put on the government of The Bahamas cannot be known with certainty.We can only examine the circumstances surrounding the legislation the current political climate and the developed financial centers to strengthen their money laundering laws. At present, The Bahamas lacks the expertise and resources t o consider seriously carrying out complex money laundering investigations that will place those responsible for money laundering in a Bahamian court of law. When one considers that The Bahamas has an annual budget of just under one billion dollars and a police force with just two thousand men, compared to organizations that are willing to spend a billion dollars on one drug transaction, then the enormity of the task becomes clearer. Given the resources, expertise and motivation of the money launderer, Th e Bahamas may never have sufficient resources to launch an effective fight against money laundering. Degree of Successful Money Laundering in Several European Countries When it comes to prosecutions of money launderers, few countries keep reliable statisti cs, often because laundering was only recently deemed a separate crime. Some experts in money laundering suggest that one of the reasons why launderers are not being prosecuted more frequently is because most anti laundering regimes are still in their inf ancy, but the situation is said to be improving.The traditional centers in the Caribbean, for example, The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands, are now moving to make it easier for bankers to report suspect transactions without breaking bank secrecy laws, and f or their financial institutions to cooperate with international agencies more easily. concluded that between A$1 billion and A $4.5 billion (US$740m 3.3 billion) was washed thr ough Australia each year. [109] The best estimate was A$3.5 billion. The report noted that if these figures are accurate, then Australian police were recouping b arely 1% of all the dirty money that they guessed was flowing into the country a surprisingly low figure given that Australia is widely acknowledged to have one of the most comprehensive anti laundering regimes in the world. [110] To complete this chapter, I would like to produce some statistics without comments on the numbers of reported money laundering incidents in the U.K. and two European nations. These sta tistics are produced to further the argument that despite having well developed laws and means to enforce those laws, a well developed financial sector, educated police, and an intelligence branch of the police, it is still very difficult to successfully e nforce money laundering.

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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY, DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS Summary The goal of this paper was to review the issue of money laundering and how it relates to financial institutions in the Caribbean region generally, and more specifically in The Bahamas. The complementary issues of corruption and electronic cyber crimes have also been discussed, all in order to address the thesis question: Is the money laundering legislation in The Bahamas enforceable_ While there is a over abundance of informatio n available on money laundering, this paper aimed to provide information from a different angle, showing a creative use of the material currently available and relating it generally to the Caribbean and specifically,to The Bahamas. It is hoped that this pa per communicates a useful contribution to the knowledge of money laundering, and provokes some thoughts on issues to be addressed by further research. Some of the sub questions that were addressed in this paper focused on the following: The definitions of money laundering. The relationship between money laundering and drug trafficking. The modus operandi of the known money launderer and the stages of a typical money laundering operation. The influences of computer technology in the process of and the bat tle against money laundering. The effects of the electronic commerce system on traditional offshore banking. The steps taken by the international community to discourage money laundering. The role political consideration played in the decision to implement or strengthen money laundering legislation. The effect of the policies of the USA on the developing countries of th e Caribbean. The steps taken by The Bahamas to discourage money laundering. The relationship between money laundering and corruption. The effectiveness of the steps taken by the international community and The Bahamas effective to reduce money launderin g. A discussion of the major issues that affect money laundering in this region led to an overview of the complexities of the modern money launderer, the vast resources used to cover illegal activities, and some of the methods developed both international ly and regionally to deal with this problem. Included in these issues were the issue of corruption, internationally and in The Bahamas; the power and influence of the United States with its extraterritorial reach in order to fight money laundering; and th e relative size and lack of resources and expertise in The Bahamas. Given the vast amount of information available on this topic and the abundant theories as to the best method of curbing money laundering and the correlated activity of drug trafficking, se veral broad areas were used for comment to provide the

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focus of this paper. These areas were: 1. money laundering as a global crime used by the sophisticated criminal with apparently unlimited resources; 2. the issues that led to the passing of the legislation on money laundering in The Bahamas; 3. the legislation itself and the resources committed to enforcing it; 4. the insights obtained from the information reported by the individuals and institutions set up t o monitor and enforce the law in respect to money laundering; and 5. the actions taken due to those insights. This led to the specific thesis question: Is the money laundering legislation in The Bahamas enforceable_In an effort to address this problem, I re viewed the relevant literature both internationally and locally, conducted interviews and as a result, transcribed notes and recorded interview data.Additionally, with the assistance of those trained in the law, I also summarized and assessed practically t he recent money laundering legislation with a view of commenting on its application and forming an opinion on its enforceability. The major findings are summarized below: 1. The Bahamas remains a destination of choice for offshore business which has attracte d the money launderer to these islands; 2. Drug trafficking and money laundering are still appears to be prevalent throughout the Caribbean region, and specifically, The Bahamas. The Bahamas is still classified by the USA State department as a drug transit location, and by extension, a center for money laundering. 3. High level political corruption has been an integral part of the Bahamian society for a significant length of time.There continue to be charges and indictments both inside and outside The Bahamas of leading politicians and high ranking civil servants. 4. The ramifications of the electronic commerce system may have not been adequately addressed by the Bahamian authorities. The Bahamian police authorities are still overly concerned with crimes of viol ence and may not have adequately addressed economic crimes. 5. The Bahamas may not have sufficient resources, financial and otherwise, to adequately enforce the new legislation and regulations that pertain to money laundering in The Bahamas. 6. Because case la w and legal precedents are still evolving, the prosecutors and the judges themselves may not be able to present adequately cases of highly technical money laundering to a jury of laymen. Discussion and Conclusion Generally speaking, in order to succeed in reducing the instances of money laundering in The Bahamas and the Caribbean, the following general statements, which should be acceptable to both the offshore and onshore institutions and governments, must hold true.There must be good cooperation between onshore and offshore jurisdictions for all non tax related inquiries of a serious nature.There must be good cooperation between most tax havens and onshore authorities in relation to anti money laundering activities. There must be fair cooperation between onshore and offshore authorities if the transactions being investigated are the proceeds of acts, which would be a crime in both jurisdictions. Many of the larger offshore jurisdictions are signing specific bilateral treaties with

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major onshore jurisdicti ons to facilitate the provision of assistance, in relation to trans border crimes in specific circumstances. It is simply in their own commercial interest to do so. No serious offshore jurisdiction will continue to develop and flourish if it can only do so by condoning criminal behavior.International cooperation and the strengthening of the international bodies such as Interpol and Caribpol are some of the suggested ways of fighting the international criminal generally and the international money laundere r specifically. The processes involved in laundering money, or other forms of wealth, are not necessarily abusive or evil in themselves. Simply keeping wealth secret may not be objectionable in either a legal or moral sense. In certain circumstances, it might well be prudent and beneficial.It is also the case that law enforcement, even in the widest sense of the word, will never have sufficient resources to police all transactions designed to obscure the source of funds obtained from serious criminal act ivity. It must be remembered that while the proceeds of illicit trafficking in drugs are vast, other forms of criminal activity such as terrorism, extortion, theft, art and cultural property related crimes, securities frauds, and counterfeiting also produ ce sums well beyond comparison with many national economies. Additionally, laws and enforcement policies which have been fashioned to address money laundering through conventional banking systems are of little practical relevance in the case of cyber crim es. Thus, whatever devices the law has for detecting and controlling money laundering must be deployed strategically to best effect. Those crimes that are highly dependent upon the reinvestment of washed funds, which are clearly referable to economic mot ives, are most susceptible to control through interrupting the financial pipeline. It must also be recognized that it is interruption of the flow of funds that is likely to achieve the most effective results. The delaying of funds in transmission so as to cause liquidity problems for those engaged in operating a criminal enterprise is likely to be more effective in harming the criminal activity in question than in initiating difficult and expensive judicial proceedings which may or may not result in a forf eiture order. Even in situations where it is most unlikely that judicial proceedings will be feasible whether for evidential, jurisdictional, resource or even political reasons, it must never be forgotten that the intelligence value of information relating to the funding of enterprise and serious crime may be of critical value, both strategically and tactically. As has already been pointed out, one of the possible side effects of enhancing the enforcement potential of the authorities in seizing the fruits of criminal activity is that criminal organizations are encouraged to employ even more sophisticated processes in laundering their ill gotten gains. The most that can be hoped for is that a combination of devices will serve to render the objectionable stag es of the laundering process relatively uneconomic.There will always be someone somewhere who will be prepared to prostitute his or her integrity and profession by receiving or facilitating the transmission of funds from illicit sources.Indeed, it is more or less a safe bet that there will always be governments or at least agencies of government that are equally prepared to compromise. The ultimate solution in terms of The Bahamas must be political, and the appropriate strategy would appear to be to make i t so uncomfortable, tiresome and expensive for the crooks to wash their ill gotten gains through Bahamian banks or financial institutions, they will find another more 'attractive' venue. As a consequence of this strategy, even legitimate and acceptable bu siness will be disadvantaged and required to submit itself to additional regulations, risks and expenses.There is the risk that there will be at least a perception that the banking and financial systems in

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The Bahamas have become uncompetitive and unattrac tive to business that has the ability to relocate or at least move its money through some other channel. It may be impossible to stop effectively the laundering of money in any country of the world, and according to a United States report mentioned above, The Bahamas has only a limited capacity to conduct complex counter narcotics and, by extension, complex counter money laundering investigations. While The Bahamas should not expect to halt money laundering and its penetration into the legitimate economy o f the country, it intends to make such a proposition as difficult as possible, given its limited resources, both in terms of expertise and finances. The issue of whether The Bahamas will be able to enforce the legislation will unveil itself in time, beca use the anti laundering efforts are still in its infancy.At the time of writing this paper, two cases of money laundering came before the court and were both dismissed because of lack of evidence, which is not surprising given the lack of confidence and tr aining of the judiciary in dealing with matters of a highlytechnical nature. There is, at present, no clear and unequivocal answer to the thesis question: Is the money laundering legislation in The Bahamas enforceable_ If by luck, perseverance or some mir acle, the money launderers are caught, the lawbreakers will be dealt with under the law to the best of the ability of the law enforcement agencies in The Bahamas. The bottom line is that it is now an offense to launder money through banks and other financ ial institutions in The Bahamas. The financial community in The Bahamas and Caribbean must learn to say "no" money laundering, in the same way that people say "no" to drugs. It is hoped that this paper provokes the interest of students studying corporate finance or banking to continue the research in this area, especially in regard to the development and training of cyber cops and the real effect the recent money laundering legislation has had to decrease the incidence of money laundering through this regi on.Another recommended research topic is to review the ways to strengthen the CFATF and other similar bodies in the war against the modern money launderer. John S. Bain bio John S. Bain is Senior Vice President of Americas International Bank Corportion. This paper is an extracted from his Dissertation of the same name submitted to the University of Wales and the Manchester Business School as a part fulfillment for a Master of Business Administration degree in 1998. Some of the issues dealt with may have changed or been amended since that time. Some of the names of senior civil service personnel are fictitious. Mr. Bain is a British and American trained Chartered Accountant and holds professional qualifications in Information Systems. Footnotes [1] K. W. Munroe, The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Anti Money laundering Laws (MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, B. Rider & M. Ashe)Sweet & Maxwell 1996 [2] This was revealed in a speech given by Dr. Peter Maynard, attorney at law and the former Bahamas representative to the United Nations, during a money laundering conf erence by The Bahamas Institute of Bankers on March 20, 1997, in The Bahamas.

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[3] R. Parlour (Butterworth) International Guide to Money Laundering Law and Practice (1995) p. vi. [4] Dr. Peter D. Maynard, The Law Against Corruption and Money Laundering in the Caribbean with Special Reference to The Bahamas (A paper s ubmitted to the 7 th International Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, February, 21 st 1997 held in Miami, Florida), [5] Ibid. [6] Ibid. [7] Bahamas Business Guide A Guide to Doing Business in The Bahamas and the s Economic and Financial Policies (Commonwealth Publications Ltd. 1979 Page 2 ) [8] See P. Eddy; H. Sabogal; S. Walden, The Cocaine Wars, Bantam Books (1988 ) p. 94 [9] The Nassau Guardian, 2 July 1997 p. 2 [10] Steven W. Quickel, The Bahamas: On Course to the Top, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR Sept. 1991,at S2 [as quoted in Money Laundering Asset Forfeiture & International Financial Crimes F. N. Baldwin Jr. & R. J. Munroe Center for International Financial Crime Studies, Coll ege of Law, University of Florida. Bahamas ~ 3(Oceana Publications, 1996) ] [11] Dr. Peter D. Maynard, The Law Against Corruption and Money Laundering in the Ca ribbean with Special Reference to The Bahamas (A paper submitted to the 7 th International Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, February, 21 st 1997). [12] The Nassau Guardian 16 th December, 1995 [13] Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts Overseas (Letter Report 05/24/96, GOA/GDD 96 105). Comments from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in a letter addressed to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives on 24 May, 1996.This definition was downloaded from the money laundering web site on the Interne t (). [14] B. Rider & M. Ashe, Money Laundering Control (1996) Sweet & Maxwell. [15] The Central Bank of The Bahamas, Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for Banks in The Bahamas (Revised) (1996) (Page 1, para. 3). This was issued by The Central Bank of The Bahamas in response to the request for additional clarificatio n of the duties expected by financial institutions. This document was issued on 10 December, 1996, six days before the Act came into force. [16] C. A. Intriago Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking Centers .OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA(Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997. [17] Ibid. [18] See Nigel Morris Catterill The Global Threat to the Banking Community

PAGE 34

(money laundering web site on the Internet) [1995]. [19] As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Mo ney Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.] See generally J. Carr, How to Recognize a Money Launderer (1989) I.F.L.R.I.O.; R. Naylor, Bankers, Bagmen, and Bandits (1989) Black Rose; R. Franklin, Profits of Deceit (1990)) Heinemanni; and D. Francis, Entre preneurs (1988) Macmillan. [20] As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. Rowan Bosworth Davi es, Money Laundering, The Use of the Financial Service Market to Disguise the Proceeds of Funny Money (1992) Richards Butler; R. Laccy, Little Man Meyer Lansky and the Gangster Life (1991) Century; and D. Henry, Funny Money Stoc ks FORBES 23 September, 1985 page 38. [21] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. [22 ] [As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.] L. Welt, Blocked Funds (1990), Euromoney, is a first rate acc ount of how to 'unblock' funds. There are other publications specifically marketed as providing expert advice on how to launder and hide money. [23] It has been claimed that certain banking and other interests went to considerable efforts to close down criticism of the BCCI's activities during 1988 and 1989. Indeed it has been alleged that a smear campaign against journalists and authors was sponsored on this ba sis; G, Modolo, La Republica 28 July 1991. [24] The Central Bank of The Bahamas, Money Laundering: Guidance Notes for Banks in The Bahamas (Revised) (1996). [25] Ibid. [26] Ibid. [27] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. [28] Ibid. [29] [As cited by B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. ] Many jurisdictions impose reporting obligations in regard to transfers of cash or valuable securities above a certain value. See generally US Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act (31 USC 5212 et seq.) and section 60501 of the US Internal Revenue Code ; The [Australian] Case Transa ctions Reports Act of 1988. At the international level, attention is being given to record keeping and monitoring of cash transactions by non financial institutions pursuant to Recommendation 11 of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (G 7 Summit Group). [30] C. A. Intriago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking

PAGE 35

Centers .OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA(Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997. [31] Ibid. [32] As cited on the brochure introducing the Fifteenth International Symposium on Economic Crime scheduled for 14 September, 1997 at the Jesus College, Cambridge. [33] W. R. Spernow, Cyber crooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will Be Unable to Cope with Threats to the Electronic Commerce System .This paper was presented at the 7 th International Oceana Conference on Money Laundering, February, 21 st 1997). [34] Ibid. [35] C. A. Intriago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking Centers .OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA(Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997. [36] Ibid. [37] Ibid. [38] Ibid. [39] Quoted from an interview with Colin Archer, Deputy Manager, Bank Supervision Department, The Central Bank of The Bahamas on 17 December, 1996. [40] C. A. Intiago, Money Laundering Controls in Offshore Banking Centers, OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA (Vol. 2, No. 3) May/June 1997. [41] [As cited by K. Munroe The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Anti Money Laundering Laws MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)]"In the mist of unprecedented improvement of economic conditions which took place [in Columbia], signs of deep social malaise became ominously apparent; kidnapping for ransom increased drastically, private para military gro ups appeared, the private security industry boomed, judges were frequently assassinated, bankruptcies of large manufacturing and financial firms became common, and the general level of violence in the society increased." [42] [As cited by K. Munroe The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Anti Money Laundering Laws MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)] See generally Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions (1989) p. 14. University of Florida Law Review 287 [43] K. W. Munroe, The Extraterritorial Reach of the United States Anti Money Laundering Laws (MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, B. Rider & M. Ashe) Sweet & Maxwell 1996. [44] [As cited by K. Munroe]18 USC § 19 56(f). [45] On 29 March, 1989, a criminal indictment against a private Colombian bank, Banco de Occident, SA, and its wholly owned Panamanian subsidiary Banco de

PAGE 36

Occi dente (Panama), SA, was unsealed in Atlanta.The indictment accused both banks of two conspiracy counts which alleged the laundering of the proceeds of drug transactions.The indictment also included a criminal forfeiture charge. [46] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime Money Laundering Control (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996, Page 11. [47] Ibid. [48] Japan Dope Dealers Delight Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 March, 1990 pg. 12 See in particular B. Rider, Organized Crime memorandum submit ted to Home Affairs Select Committee(1994) HMSO. [As Quoted by B. A. K. Rider Ibid.] [49] Report of the Commission of Inquiry Bahamas Government Publications Nassa u Bahamas (1984) Pg. 353. [50] See Clinton to Clean up TaxHavens The Money Laundering Bulletin No. 22 (January, 1996) [51] See Rowan Bosworth Davies US Demands for Offshore Cooperation TheMoney Laundering Bulletin No. 22 (January, 1996). [52] Ibid. [53] J. W. Francis, Governor of The Central Bank of The Bahamas Adoption of Money Laundering Legislation in The Bahamas. OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA (Vol. 2 No. 6) May/June 1997. [54] Ibid. (Pg. 22) [55] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996, Page 11. [56] See Nigel Morris Cotterill, The Global Threatto the Banking Community (money lau ndering web site ) [1997]. [57] See the two Bahamian Commissions of Inquiries referred to throughout this paper. [58] G. Coles, Crackdown on Crime SHORE TO SHORE, the official publication of The Offshore Institute, July 1997, Page 21. [ 59] Ibid. [60] An interview with Colin Archer, Deputy Manager, Bank Supervision Department, The Central Bank of The Bahamas on 17 December, 1996. [61] An interview with Debra McDougal, Senior Council Office of the Attorney General 18 December, 1996. [62] The Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime ) Act, 1996 (Page 1).

PAGE 37

[63] An interview with Debra McDougal, Senior Council Office of the Attorney General 18 December, 1996. [64] An interview with Colin Archer, Deputy Manager, Bank Supervision Department, The Central Bank of The Bahamas on 17 December, 1996. [65] The Nassau Guardian March 18, 1996 Pg. 14A.. [66] Ibid. [67] Ibid. [68] Ibid. [69] The Nassau Guardian, March 28, 1996 pg. 4A. [70] Ibid. [71] J. W. Francis, Governor of the Central Bank of The Bahamas, Adoption of Money Laundering Legislation in The Bahamas. OFFSHORE FINANCE CANADA (Vol. 2 No. 6) May/J une 1997 (Pg. 22). [72] T. V. Cash, Money Laundering and Corruption in 1997 Two Intertwined Principles (1997) A paper presented at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and International Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997. [73] Ibid. [74] Professor B. A. K. Rider produced newspaper articles and other excerpts to claim that several high profile cases involving prominent citizens ended sometimes comments were included in a paper presented by Dr. Rider at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and International Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997. [75] T. V. Cash, Money Laundering and Corruption in 1997 Two Intertwined Principles (1997) A paper presented at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and Interna tional Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997. [76] Report of the Commission of Inquiry Vol. 1: Appointed to Inquire Into The Illegal Use of The Bahamas for the Transshipment of Dangerous Drugs Destined for the USA, (December, 1984). [77] Report of Commission of Inquiry Vol. 1 (Bahamasair): Appointed to Inquire into the Practices, Procedures, Policies, Systems and Mechanisms, Financial and Otherwise of Bahamasair Holdings Limited, The Hotel Corporation of The Bahamas and The Bahamas Telecommunications Corporation (August, 1995). This Commission resulted in the two pe rsons named above being denied running tickets in the 1997 general elections and contributed to the defeat of the PLP.

PAGE 38

[78] Ibid. [79] G. Coles, Crackdown on Crime." SHORE TO SHORE, the official publication of The Offshore Institute, July 1997, Page 21. This is the NCIS definition of organized crime as submitted to the U.K. [80] B. A. K. Rider, The Enterprise of Crime, MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL Edited by B. Rider & Michael Ashe (Sweet & Maxwe ll) 1996. [81] Ibid. [82] Ibid. [83] An interview with InspectorChristopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely heads the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Royal Bahamas Police Force. He was interviewed on 18 December, 1996. [84] The Nassau Guardian, 20 June, 1997 [85] The 1997/98 Budget .The Nassau Guardian, 20 June, 1997.This is the amount budgeted for 1997/98 and the amounts for previous years was even less ($57M for 1996/97). [86] This author was unable to get any specific answ ers on the percentage of police officers who are computer literate, excepta comment by Detective Inspector Neely to say that it was "an insignificant amount." [87] W R. Spernow Cyber crooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will Be Unable to Cope with Threats to the Electronic Commerce System .A paper presented at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and International Financial Crimes held in Miami in F ebruary, 1997. [88] Ibid. [89] In an attempt to alleviate this problem, new computers were recently granted to the Office of the Attorney General by the U.S. Embassy.These new computers have been given to prosecutors and to lay magistrates. hardly used, because no one ever showed them what to do with this new technology or how it could assist them in their work. [90] W. R. Spernow Cyber crooks on the Net: Why Traditional Law Enforcement Will Be Unable to Cop e with Threats to the Electronic Commerce System .A paper presented at the Oceana Conference on Money Laundering and International Financial Crimes held in Miami in February, 1997. [91] An interview Inspector Christopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely heads the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Royal Bahamas Police Force. He was interviewed on 18 December, 1996. [92] N. Clarke The Impact of Recent Money Laundering Legislation. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, Edited by B. Rider & Michael Ashe (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996.

PAGE 39

[93] An interview Inspector Christopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely heads the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Royal Bahamas Police Force. He was interviewed on 18 December, 1996. [94] Comments by Ahmed ElAmin quoting Moris Cotterill from his book How Not to be a Money Launderer ,MONEY LAUNDERING: THE SOLUTION LIES IN EDUCATION. (From the money laundering web site on the Internet) (Http:/bermuda su.org/issues/oct11 96/moneylaunder.html). [95] It is no doubt that eventually the word will get out as to which institutions make reports and those who do not.This is where the high level corruption is most prevalent in governmental departments. See the two recent Commissions of Inquiries for further evidence of this. [96] See The Nassau Guardian 28 June, 1997 page 1. This meeting was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was co chaired by the U.S. Ambassad or and the Bahamian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Janet G. Bostwick [97] Ibid. [ 98] See The Tribune 30 June, 1997 and an article in The Tribune entitled "My Turn" by Nicki Kelly8 July, 1997. [99] See The Punch 24 July, 1997. [100] See The Tribune 30 June, 1997 page 1. [101] See The Tribune 9 July, 1997. [102] Ibid. [103] See The Tribune 30 June, 1997 page 1. [104] See The Nassau Guardian 28 June, 1997 page 1 [105] See The Nassau Guardian 2 July 19 97 Editorial. [106] B. A. K. Rider, Taking the Profit out of Crime, MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (Sweet & Maxwell) 1996. [107] An interview with InspectorChristopher Neely Detective Inspector Neely heads the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Royal Bahamas Police Force.He was interviewed on 18 December, 1996. [108] An interview with Janis McDougal, Senior Council Office of the Attorney General 18 th December, 1996. [109] See Money Laundering That Infernal Washing Machine The Economist, July 26 th 1997, p.20 [110] Ibid.


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P33_SP00323 2888
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P33_SP00327 2993
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P29_ST00380 laundering;
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P29_SP00353
P29_ST00396 2778
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P29_SP00370
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P29_ST00415
P29_SP00372
P29_ST00416
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P29_ST00417
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P29_ST00432 1969
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P1_ST00076 965 161 criminals
P1_SP00061 1126
P1_ST00077 1143 84 have
P1_SP00062 1227
P1_ST00078 need
P1_SP00063 1331
P1_ST00079 1345 1341
P1_SP00064
P1_ST00080 1392 150 disguise
P1_SP00065 1542
P1_ST00081 1556
P1_SP00066 1612
P1_ST00082 1629 74 illicit
P1_SP00067 1703
P1_ST00083 1718 96 origin
P1_SP00068 1814
P1_ST00084 1831
P1_SP00069 1866 9
P1_ST00085 82 their
P1_SP00070 1957
P1_ST00086 1969 109 funds;
P1_TL00017 1387 1285
P1_ST00087 1388 most
P1_SP00071 702 1417
P1_ST00088 716 430 economically-motivated 0000000000000000000000
P1_SP00072 1146 1425
P1_ST00089 1163 160
P1_SP00073 1323
P1_ST00090 1339 85
P1_SP00074 1424
P1_ST00091 1440 123 always
P1_SP00075 1563
P1_ST00092 1578 wanted
P1_SP00076 1709
P1_ST00093 1723
P1_SP00077 1756
P1_ST00094 1771 1394 129
P1_TL00018 1427
P1_ST00095 284 legitimate.What 000000000000000
P1_SP00078 899
P1_ST00096 914
P1_SP00079 939 1465
P1_ST00097 955 1442 new,
P1_SP00080 1036
P1_ST00098 1436 at
P1_SP00081 1086
P1_ST00099 1101 least
P1_SP00082 1185
P1_ST00100 1200 in
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P1_ST00101 1242 69 The
P1_SP00084 1311
P1_ST00102 Bahamas,
P1_SP00085 1509
P1_ST00103 1524 55
P1_SP00086 1579
P1_ST00104 1596 U.K.
P1_SP00087 1670
P1_ST00105 1688 64 and
P1_SP00088 1752
P1_ST00106
P1_SP00089 1822
P1_ST00107 1839 91 USA,
P1_SP00090 1930
P1_ST00108 1948
P1_SP00091 1973
P1_ST00109 1987
P1_TL00019 614 1483 1550
P1_ST00110 258 criminalization
P1_SP00092 872 1513
P1_ST00111 889
P1_SP00093 924
P1_ST00112 936 1490
P1_SP00094 1058 1521
P1_ST00113 1073 laundering.
P1_SP00095 1272
P1_ST00114 1288
P1_SP00096 1357
P1_ST00115 1374 141 process
P1_SP00097 1515
P1_ST00116 1530
P1_SP00098 1565
P1_ST00117 1577
P1_SP00099 1699
P1_ST00118 1714 188 laundering
P1_SP00100 1902
P1_ST00119 1920 itself
P1_SP00101 2004
P1_ST00120 2017
P1_SP00102 2042
P1_ST00121 2058 now
P1_SP00103 2131
P1_ST00122 2145
P1_TL00020 1531
P1_ST00123 98 crime
P1_SP00104 712 1561
P1_ST00124 727 1532 158 separate
P1_SP00105 885 1569
P1_ST00125
P1_SP00106 980
P1_ST00126 994
P1_SP00107 1050
P1_ST00127 1065 99
P1_SP00108 1164
P1_ST00128 1177 that
P1_SP00109
P1_ST00129 1261 produced
P1_SP00110 1428
P1_ST00130
P1_SP00111 1498
P1_ST00131 178 money.[1]
P1_SP00112 1693
P1_ST00132 1710 175 Prompted
P1_SP00113 1885
P1_ST00133 1903 121 initially
P1_SP00114 2024
P1_ST00134 by
P1_TL00021 1497
P1_ST00135 1586 143 concern
P1_SP00115 757 1609
P1_ST00136 1580
P1_SP00116 806
P1_ST00137 817
P1_SP00117 873
P1_ST00138 888 94 scale
P1_SP00118 982
P1_ST00139 998
P1_SP00119 1033
P1_ST00140 1043 drug
P1_SP00120 1123 1617
P1_ST00141 1137 176 trafficking
P1_SP00121
P1_ST00142 1329
P1_SP00122 1393
P1_ST00143 1408
P1_SP00123 1464
P1_ST00144 1480 189
P1_SP00124 1669
P1_ST00145 1685
P1_SP00125 1720
P1_ST00146 1733 its
P1_SP00126 1769
P1_ST00147 1786 proceeds,
P1_SP00127 1962
P1_ST00148 1977
P1_SP00128 2033
P1_ST00149 2050 61 last
P1_TL00022 1627 1546
P1_ST00150 63 few
P1_SP00129 676 1657
P1_ST00151 690 1634 years
P1_SP00130 1665
P1_ST00152
P1_SP00131 890
P1_ST00153 seen
P1_SP00132 990
P1_ST00154 1007
P1_SP00133 1048
P1_ST00155 182 enormous
P1_SP00134 1247
P1_ST00156 1264 151 increase
P1_SP00135
P1_ST00157 1432
P1_SP00136 1458
P1_ST00158 1472
P1_SP00137 1528
P1_ST00159 222 international 0000000000000
P1_SP00138 1768
P1_ST00160 1784 112 efforts
P1_SP00139
P1_ST00161 1909 1628
P1_SP00140 1942
P1_ST00162 combat
P1_SP00141 2092
P1_ST00163 2104
P1_TL00023 1675 1418
P1_ST00164 229 problem.The
P1_SP00142 844 1713
P1_ST00165 861
P1_SP00143 1711
P1_ST00166 1060 having
P1_SP00144 1176
P1_ST00167 1192 1682
P1_SP00145 1211 1705
P1_ST00168 1226 274 well-developed 00000000000000
P1_SP00146 1500
P1_ST00169 1517 146 offshore
P1_SP00147 1663
P1_ST00170 1678 149 financial
P1_SP00148 1827
P1_ST00171 1842 1676 114 sector
P1_SP00149 1956
P1_ST00172 1968 65
P1_TL00024
P1_ST00173 heavily
P1_SP00150 741 1761
P1_ST00174 754 195 dependent
P1_SP00151 949
P1_ST00175 963 1730 on
P1_SP00152 1004 1753
P1_ST00176 1019
P1_SP00153 1075
P1_ST00177 1091
P1_SP00154 1237
P1_ST00178 1254 169
P1_SP00155 1423 1759
P1_ST00179 1438 was
P1_SP00156 1510
P1_ST00180 1527 1724
P1_SP00157 1581
P1_ST00181 1593
P1_SP00158 1626
P1_ST00182 1643
P1_SP00159 1684
P1_ST00183 1700 52 left
P1_SP00160
P1_ST00184 1766 out
P1_SP00161
P1_ST00185 1836
P1_SP00162 1871
P1_ST00186 these
P1_SP00163 1980
P1_ST00187 1997
P1_TL00025
P1_ST00188 221
P1_SP00164 1801
P1_ST00189 851 developments.
P1_SP00165 1118 1809
P1_ST00190 In
P1_SP00166
P1_ST00191 1183 1996,
P1_SP00167 1279 1807
P1_ST00192 1295
P1_SP00168 1350
P1_ST00193 1365 1772 218 government
P1_SP00169 1583
P1_ST00194 1597
P1_SP00170 1632
P1_ST00195
P1_SP00171 1712
P1_ST00196 1728 Bahamas
P1_SP00172 1901
P1_ST00197 1917 passed
P1_SP00173 2045
P1_ST00198 2060
P1_TL00026 1819 1366
P1_ST00199
P1_SP00174
P1_ST00200 202 Laundering
P1_SP00175 954
P1_ST00201 971 185 (Proceeds
P1_SP00176 1156
P1_ST00202 1172
P1_SP00177 1207 1849
P1_ST00203 1218 Crime)
P1_SP00178
P1_ST00204 1353 Act
P1_SP00179 1412
P1_ST00205 1996
P1_SP00180
P1_ST00206 104 which
P1_SP00181
P1_ST00207 1647 1820 went
P1_SP00182 1734
P1_ST00208 1749 62 into
P1_SP00183 1811
P1_ST00209 effect
P1_SP00184 1926
P1_ST00210 1940 1826
P1_TL00027 1867 370
P1_ST00211 December
P1_SP00185 805 1897
P1_ST00212 50 16,
P1_SP00186 870
P1_ST00213 1996.
P1_TL00028 612
P1_ST00214 47 As
P1_SP00187 659 2003
P1_ST00215 673 we
P1_SP00188 723
P1_ST00216 739 can
P1_SP00189 801
P1_ST00217 all
P1_SP00190 855
P1_ST00218 871 appreciate,
P1_SP00191 1071 2011
P1_ST00219 1089
P1_SP00192
P1_ST00220
P1_SP00193 1414
P1_ST00221
P1_SP00194 1457
P1_ST00222 1974
P1_SP00195
P1_ST00223 1538 just
P1_SP00196 1604
P1_ST00224 1618
P1_SP00197 1637
P1_ST00225 145 problem
P1_SP00198 1799
P1_ST00226 1816
P1_SP00199
P1_ST00227
P1_SP00200 1912
P1_ST00228 1928 Caribbean,
P1_TL00029 2021
P1_ST00229 but
P1_SP00201 669 2051
P1_ST00230 683
P1_SP00202 721
P1_ST00231 countries
P1_SP00203 901
P1_ST00232 917 2028 are
P1_SP00204 973
P1_ST00233 152 potential
P1_SP00205 1142 2059
P1_ST00234 2022 targets
P1_SP00206 1281
P1_ST00235 1296 49 for
P1_SP00207
P1_ST00236 1355
P1_SP00208 1411
P1_ST00237
P1_SP00209 1549
P1_ST00238 1564 launderer.
P1_SP00210 1745
P1_ST00239
P1_SP00211 1830
P1_ST00240 1846 challenge
P1_SP00212
P1_ST00241 2035 facing
P1_TL00030 2069
P1_ST00242
P1_SP00213 682 2099
P1_ST00243 699
P1_SP00214
P1_ST00244 886
P1_SP00215 911
P1_ST00245 2070
P1_SP00216 957
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P1_SP00217 2107
P1_ST00247 1078
P1_SP00218
P1_ST00248 1175
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P1_ST00249
P1_SP00220 1307
P1_ST00250 1321 fight,
P1_SP00221 1407
P1_ST00251 along
P1_SP00222 1520
P1_ST00252 1536 70 with
P1_SP00223 1606
P1_ST00253 1621
P1_SP00224 1677
P1_ST00254 2076 more
P1_SP00225
P1_ST00255 1798 developed
P1_SP00226 1986
P1_ST00256 2002
P1_TL00031 2117
P1_ST00257 2118 142 centers,
P1_SP00227 756 2153
P1_ST00258 against
P1_SP00228 905 2155
P1_ST00259 920 2124
P1_SP00229
P1_ST00260 1057
P1_SP00230
P1_ST00261
P1_SP00231 2147
P1_ST00262
P1_SP00232 1455
P1_ST00263 1470
P1_SP00233 1505
P1_ST00264
P1_SP00234 1639
P1_ST00265
P1_SP00235
P1_ST00266 1860 has
P1_SP00236 1922
P1_ST00267 1938 been
P1_TL00032 2164 1496
P1_ST00268 180 compared
P1_SP00237 794 2202
P1_ST00269 808 2165
P1_SP00238 841 2194
P1_ST00270 857 2171
P1_SP00239 876
P1_ST00271 892 249 balloon.When
P1_SP00240 1141
P1_ST00272 1159
P1_SP00241
P1_ST00273 1191
P1_SP00242
P1_ST00274 1231 squeezed
P1_SP00243
P1_ST00275
P1_SP00244 1451
P1_ST00276 1468 one
P1_SP00245 1533
P1_ST00277 1547 139 section,
P1_SP00246 1686 2200
P1_ST00278
P1_SP00247 1722
P1_ST00279 1737 117 bulges
P1_SP00248 1854
P1_ST00280
P1_SP00249
P1_ST00281 1914 another.
P1_SP00250 2063 6
P1_ST00282 [2]
P1_TL00033 2212 1379
P1_ST00283
P1_SP00251
P1_ST00284 697 fight
P1_SP00252 2250
P1_ST00285
P1_SP00253 919
P1_ST00286 931
P1_SP00254 987
P1_ST00287 1003 2219
P1_SP00255 1125
P1_ST00288 1140 174 launderer
P1_SP00256 1314
P1_ST00289
P1_SP00257
P1_ST00290 1368
P1_SP00258
P1_ST00291 1404 172 long-term
P1_SP00259 1576
P1_ST00292 1590 task
P1_SP00260 1666
P1_ST00293
P1_SP00261 1781
P1_ST00294 will
P1_SP00262 1851
P1_ST00295 1868 require
P1_TL00034 2260 908
P1_ST00296 184 continuing
P1_SP00263 798 2298
P1_ST00297 815 155 attention
P1_SP00264 970 2290
P1_ST00298 988 if
P1_SP00265
P1_ST00299 1020 2267 157 progress
P1_SP00266
P1_ST00300 1194
P1_SP00267 1219
P1_ST00301 1232 2261
P1_SP00268 1265
P1_ST00302
P1_SP00269
P1_ST00303 1337 sustained.
P1_TB00012 638 138
P1_TL00035 2210
P1_ST00304 Upcoming
P1_TL00036 2209 108
P1_ST00305 article
P1_TB00013 2192 230
P1_TL00037 2208
P1_ST00306
P1_SP00270 2294
P1_ST00307 2310
P1_SP00271 2337
P1_ST00308 2351
P1_TL00038 1005
P1_ST00309 news
P1_TL00039 1041
P1_ST00310 Tosti
P1_SP00272 2281 1067
P1_ST00311 2296 34
P1_TL00040 2207 67
P1_ST00312 terrorism
P1_SP00273 2345 1107 -136
P1_ST00313 1122 debate.
P1_TB00014 596 2360 1584 576
P1_TL00041 2367
P1_ST00314
P1_SP00274 2397
P1_ST00315 2368 greater
P1_SP00275 2405
P1_ST00316 842 knowledge
P1_SP00276
P1_ST00317 2374
P1_SP00277
P1_ST00318
P1_SP00278 1202
P1_ST00319 1217 gained
P1_SP00279 1338
P1_ST00320 102 about
P1_SP00280
P1_ST00321
P1_SP00281
P1_ST00322 1608
P1_SP00282 1797
P1_ST00323 1813 over
P1_SP00283 1893
P1_ST00324 1904
P1_SP00284 1960
P1_ST00325 past
P1_SP00285
P1_ST00326 2065
P1_TL00042 2414
P1_ST00327 2421
P1_SP00286 711 2452
P1_ST00328 728
P1_SP00287 791 2444
P1_ST00329 confirmed
P1_SP00288 984
P1_ST00330 999
P1_SP00289
P1_ST00331 1082
P1_SP00290 1099
P1_ST00332 1115
P1_SP00291
P1_ST00333
P1_SP00292
P1_ST00334 1189 dynamic
P1_SP00293 1343
P1_ST00335 activity,
P1_SP00294
P1_ST00336 1507 conducted
P1_SP00295 1694
P1_ST00337
P1_SP00296 1779
P1_ST00338 increasing
P1_TL00043 2462
P1_ST00339 248 sophistication
P1_SP00297 2500
P1_ST00340 877
P1_SP00298 942 2492
P1_ST00341 958 deceptive
P1_SP00299 1133
P1_ST00342 1150 reasoning.
P1_SP00300 5
P1_ST00343 1342 This
P1_SP00301
P1_ST00344 1434 194
P1_SP00302
P1_ST00345 1645
P1_SP00303 1707
P1_ST00346 also
P1_SP00304
P1_ST00347
P1_SP00305 1988
P1_ST00348
P1_TL00044 2510 1487
P1_ST00349 2517
P1_SP00306 2548
P1_ST00350 751
P1_SP00307 940
P1_ST00351
P1_SP00308 2540
P1_ST00352 2511
P1_SP00309
P1_ST00353 concerned
P1_SP00310 1257
P1_ST00354 1271
P1_SP00311
P1_ST00355 1358
P1_SP00312 1437
P1_ST00356 1452
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P1_ST00357 alone,
P1_SP00314 2546
P1_ST00358
P1_SP00315 1825
P1_ST00359 1838
P1_SP00316 1908
P1_ST00360 1924 any
P1_SP00317 1989
P1_ST00361
P1_TL00045 2558
P1_ST00362
P1_SP00318 681 2588
P1_ST00363 694 2559 generates
P1_SP00319 2596
P1_ST00364 significant
P1_SP00320 1074
P1_ST00365
P1_SP00321
P1_ST00366 1284 particularly 000300000000
P1_SP00322
P1_ST00367 1494 when
P1_SP00323
P1_ST00368 1607 177 organized
P1_SP00324
P1_ST00369
P1_SP00325 1899
P1_ST00370 1915
P1_TL00046 2606
P1_ST00371 involved.
P1_SP00326 2636
P1_ST00372 779
P1_SP00327 2644
P1_ST00373 916 192 launderers
P1_SP00328 1108
P1_ST00374
P1_SP00329
P1_ST00375 1224 shown
P1_SP00330
P1_ST00376
P1_SP00331
P1_ST00377 they
P1_SP00332
P1_ST00378 2613
P1_SP00333
P1_ST00379 1600 197 responsive
P1_SP00334
P1_ST00380 2607
P1_SP00335 1843
P1_ST00381 1859 counter-
P1_TL00047 2654 1522
P1_ST00382 2661 measures
P1_SP00336 793 2684
P1_ST00383 809
P1_SP00337
P1_ST00384
P1_SP00338 945
P1_ST00385 961
P1_SP00339 1084 2692
P1_ST00386 searching
P1_SP00340 1275
P1_ST00387 1291
P1_SP00341
P1_ST00388
P1_SP00342
P1_ST00389 1441
P1_SP00343
P1_ST00390 2655 120 routes.
P1_SP00344
P1_ST00391
P1_SP00345 1872
P1_ST00392 1889
P1_SP00346
P1_ST00393 why
P1_SP00347 2001
P1_ST00394 2016
P1_TL00048 2702 1548
P1_ST00395
P1_SP00348 803 2740
P1_ST00396
P1_SP00349 846 2732
P1_ST00397 2703
P1_SP00350
P1_ST00398 confined
P1_SP00351 1083
P1_ST00399 1098
P1_SP00352 1131
P1_ST00400 1144
P1_SP00353
P1_ST00401 140 banking
P1_SP00354
P1_ST00402 1372 113
P1_SP00355 1485
P1_ST00403 1499
P1_SP00356 1553
P1_ST00404 1567 2709
P1_SP00357 1630
P1_ST00405 1646 embrace
P1_SP00358 1805
P1_ST00406 1818
P1_SP00359 1874
P1_ST00407 1888 106 whole
P1_SP00360 1994
P1_ST00408 range
P1_SP00361 2112
P1_ST00409 2128
P1_TL00049 2750 1459
P1_ST00410
P1_SP00362 668 2780
P1_ST00411
P1_SP00363 832
P1_ST00412 2751
P1_SP00364 960
P1_ST00413 972
P1_SP00365 1037
P1_ST00414 1055 indeed
P1_SP00366 1173
P1_ST00415 spread
P1_SP00367 1312 2788
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P1_SP00368
P1_ST00417 1409 non-financial
P1_SP00369
P1_ST00418 203 businesses
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P1_ST00419 1876
P1_SP00371 1911
P1_ST00420
P1_SP00372 1959
P1_ST00421 sorts.
P1_TL00050 616 2798
P1_ST00422
P1_SP00373 747 2834
P1_ST00423 762 2805 51
P1_SP00374 813 2828
P1_ST00424 should
P1_SP00375 946
P1_ST00425 remind
P1_SP00376
P1_ST00426 1103 ourselves
P1_SP00377 1277
P1_ST00427 1290
P1_SP00378 1359
P1_ST00428
P1_SP00379 2836
P1_ST00429 1511
P1_SP00380
P1_ST00430 1717 2799
P1_SP00381
P1_ST00431 1785 only
P1_SP00382
P1_ST00432 poses
P1_SP00383
P1_ST00433 1995
P1_SP00384 2014
P1_ST00434 threat
P1_TL00051 2846
P1_ST00435 2847
P1_SP00385 645 2876
P1_ST00436
P1_SP00386
P1_ST00437 826 201 institutions,
P1_SP00387 1027 2882
P1_ST00438 1045
P1_SP00388 1062
P1_ST00439
P1_SP00389
P1_ST00440 1119
P1_SP00390
P1_ST00441 part 0.92 0003
P1_SP00391 2884
P1_ST00442 1289
P1_SP00392 1325
P1_ST00443 1336 2853
P1_SP00393
P1_ST00444 1371
P1_SP00394 1512
P1_ST00445 1526
P1_SP00395 1595
P1_ST00446 endangers
P1_SP00396
P1_ST00447
P1_SP00397
P1_ST00448 economy,
P1_TL00052 2894 685
P1_ST00449 society
P1_SP00398 2932
P1_ST00450 755
P1_SP00399 819 2924
P1_ST00451 eventually
P1_SP00400 1021
P1_ST00452
P1_SP00401
P1_ST00453 1104 2895 state
P1_SP00402
P1_ST00454 itself.


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P30_TB00002 409 2545
P30_TL00002 709 415 1429
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P30_ST00010 765 422 122 money
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P30_ST00011 901 189 laundering 0000000000
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P30_ST00013 1162 19 a
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P30_ST00014 1196 108 global
P30_SP00013 1304
P30_ST00015 1319 98 crime
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P30_ST00019 1658 239 sophisficated 0.88 0000007700000
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P30_ST00020 1914 139 criminal 00000000
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P30_ST00022 191 apparently
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P30_ST00023 988 161 unlimited 000000000
P30_SP00021 1149 493
P30_ST00024 1166 470 188 resources;
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P30_ST00033 1382 99 ofthe
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P30_ST00034 1498 179 legislation 00000000000
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P30_ST00047 1279 614 177 resources
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P30_ST00058 1323 199 information
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P30_ST00062 1832 individuals
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P30_TL00008 783 702 1265
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P30_SP00062 1376
P30_ST00070 1393 135 enforce
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P30_ST00072 1614 58 law
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P30_ST00074 1731 134 37 respect
P30_SP00067 1865
P30_ST00075 1877
P30_SP00068 1909
P30_ST00076 1926
P30_TL00009 750 280
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P30_ST00086 1332 146 insights.
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P30_SP00088 1974
P30_ST00099 1992
P30_SP00089 2018
P30_ST00100 2033
P30_TL00012 615 952 1511
P30_ST00101 172 Bahamas
P30_SP00090 787 982
P30_ST00102 270 enforceable_ln 00000000000000
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P30_SP00092 1130
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P30_ST00112 1982 relevant
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P30_ST00114 789 74 both
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P30_ST00115 881 253 internationally 000000000000000
P30_SP00103 1134 1038
P30_ST00116 1148 65
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P30_SP00105 1351
P30_ST00118 1368 conducted
P30_SP00106 1555
P30_ST00119 1573 180 interviews
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P30_ST00120 1768
P30_SP00108 1833
P30_ST00121 1849 1007
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P30_ST00122 1905
P30_SP00110 1924
P30_ST00123 1941 106 result,
P30_TL00014 612 1048 1493
P30_ST00124 202 transcribed
P30_SP00111 814 1078
P30_ST00125 1049 notes
P30_SP00112 929
P30_ST00126 945
P30_SP00113 1009
P30_ST00127 1027 158 recorded
P30_SP00114 1185
P30_ST00128 1203 160 interview
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P30_ST00129 1377 312 data.Addifionally, 0.92 000000000770000000
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P30_ST00130 1704 71
P30_SP00117 1775
P30_ST00131 1790
P30_SP00118 1846
P30_ST00132 1861 193 assistance
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P30_SP00120 712 1126
P30_ST00135 124 trained
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P30_ST00141 1176 222 summarized
P30_SP00127 1398
P30_ST00142 1415
P30_SP00128 1479
P30_ST00143 1496 171 assessed
P30_SP00129 1667
P30_ST00144 1684 182 practically
P30_SP00130 1866
P30_ST00145 1878 57
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P30_ST00146 1952 1097 recent
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P30_ST00147 1151
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P30_ST00149 957
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P30_ST00150 1152
P30_SP00135 1222 1174
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P30_ST00154 221 commenfing 0.85 0000007700
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P30_ST00157 1764 application
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P30_TL00017 1192 1526
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P30_SP00143 748
P30_ST00160 1199
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P30_ST00161 822 129 opinion
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P30_SP00147 1063
P30_ST00164 1079 251 enforceability.
P30_SP00148 1330
P30_ST00165 1359
P30_SP00149 1428
P30_ST00166 1444 103 major
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P30_ST00167 1559 140 flndings 66000000
P30_SP00151 1699
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P30_SP00152 1770
P30_ST00169 1785
P30_SP00153 2007
P30_ST00170 2025 114 below:
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P30_SP00154 1328
P30_ST00172 1324
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P30_ST00173 763
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P30_ST00175 1036 143 remains
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P30_SP00159 1214
P30_ST00177 197 destination
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P30_ST00181 1680 offshore
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P30_ST00182 1843 business
P30_SP00165 2003
P30_ST00183 2016 which
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P30_ST00185 860 157 attracted
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P30_ST00187 1104 1353
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P30_ST00188 1241 174 launderer
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P30_ST00189 1347
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P30_ST00190 1471 these
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P30_ST00193 Drug
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P30_ST00194 864 175 trafflcking 0.89 00006600000
P30_SP00175 1039
P30_ST00195 1055
P30_SP00176 1120
P30_ST00196 1401
P30_SP00177 1259
P30_ST00197 1274
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P30_ST00200 1622 147 appears
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P30_SP00183 1873
P30_ST00203 1890 168 prevalent
P30_TL00021 780 1293
P30_ST00204 throughout
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P30_SP00185 1046
P30_ST00206 1062 186 Caribbean
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P30_SP00187 1387
P30_ST00208 1404
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P30_ST00209 1484 208 speciflcally. 0.90 0000066000000
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P30_ST00210 1708
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P30_SP00191 1975
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P30_SP00196
P30_ST00218 1318
P30_SP00197 1374
P30_ST00219 1391 USA
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P30_ST00220 1487 State
P30_SP00199 1580
P30_ST00221 1594 210 department
P30_SP00200 1804
P30_ST00222 1818 1497
P30_SP00201 1858
P30_ST00223 1874
P30_SP00202 1893
P30_ST00224 1907 80 drug
P30_SP00203 1987
P30_ST00225 2001 transit
P30_TL00023 1538
P30_ST00226 locafion, 0.83 000077000
P30_SP00204 930
P30_ST00227 948
P30_SP00205 1012 1568
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P30_ST00229 1084 185 extension, 0.95 0230000000
P30_SP00207 1269
P30_ST00230 1286 1545
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P30_ST00231 1539 center
P30_SP00209 1435
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P30_ST00233 1509
P30_SP00211 1631
P30_ST00234 1646 laundering.
P30_TL00024 1586 1369
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P30_SP00212 1616
P30_ST00236 79 High
P30_SP00213 844 1624
P30_ST00237 862 level
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P30_ST00238 political
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P30_ST00239 1108 corrupfion
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P30_ST00241 1385 86 been
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P30_ST00242 1593
P30_SP00219 1529
P30_ST00243 131 integral
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P30_ST00244 1695 1587 part
P30_SP00221 1763
P30_ST00245 1778
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P30_ST00246 Bahamian
P30_TL00025 1634
P30_ST00247 127 society
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P30_ST00248 921
P30_SP00224 1664
P30_ST00249 1641
P30_SP00225 1001
P30_ST00250 1016 184 signiflcant 00000660000
P30_SP00226 1200
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P30_ST00254 1475 105 There
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P30_ST00257 1812
P30_SP00233 1853
P30_ST00258 1869 charges
P30_SP00234 2013
P30_ST00259 2029
P30_TL00026 1682
P30_ST00260 205 indictments
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P30_ST00261 1005
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P30_ST00262 104 inside
P30_SP00237 1201
P30_ST00263 1216
P30_SP00238 1281
P30_ST00264 130 outside
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P30_ST00269 1908 politicians
P30_SP00244 2086
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P30_ST00271 72 high
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P30_ST00272 873 ranking
P30_SP00246 1003
P30_ST00273 civil
P30_SP00247 1085
P30_ST00274 1099 1730 165 servants.
P30_TL00028 1390
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P30_SP00248 1807
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P30_SP00250 1077
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P30_ST00279 1208 176 electronic
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P30_ST00286 201 adequately
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P30_ST00287 996 190 addressed
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P30_ST00294 2038 police
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P30_ST00296 985 1880
P30_SP00267 1041
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P30_SP00268 1113
P30_ST00298 1128 109 overly
P30_SP00269 1911
P30_ST00299 concerned
P30_SP00270 1441
P30_ST00300
P30_SP00271
P30_ST00301 120 crimes
P30_SP00272 1662
P30_ST00302
P30_SP00273
P30_ST00303 1723 150 violence
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P30_ST00304
P30_SP00275 1953
P30_ST00305 1971
P30_SP00276 2047
P30_ST00306 2061
P30_TL00031 1921 841
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P30_SP00277 868 1951
P30_ST00308 883
P30_SP00278 1959
P30_ST00309 1098
P30_SP00279 1288
P30_ST00310 economic
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P30_ST00311 1495 crimes.
P30_TL00032 1969 1448
P30_ST00312
P30_SP00281 1999
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P30_ST00315 1976
P30_SP00284 1111
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P30_SP00285 1180
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P30_ST00318 1295 163 sufflcient 0006600000
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P30_ST00319 1473 resources,
P30_SP00288 1661 2005
P30_ST00320 flnancial 660000000
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P30_ST00321 1842
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P30_ST00322 1923 otherwise,
P30_SP00291 2107
P30_ST00323 2122
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P30_SP00292 2055
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P30_ST00326 1145
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P30_ST00329 1501
P30_SP00297 1565
P30_ST00330 1583 regulations
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P30_SP00299 1864
P30_ST00332 1879 pertain
P30_SP00300 2000
P30_ST00333 2015
P30_TL00034 2065 651
P30_ST00334 2072
P30_SP00301 904 2103
P30_ST00335 919
P30_SP00302 1107
P30_ST00336 1125
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P30_ST00337 1167
P30_SP00304 1236
P30_ST00338 1252
P30_TL00035 2113 1406
P30_ST00339 6.
P30_SP00305 2143
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P30_ST00341 937 2120 case
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P30_ST00344 1194 legal
P30_SP00310 1276 2151
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P30_SP00313 1637
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P30_SP00315 1883
P30_ST00350 1899 2114 213 prosecutors
P30_TL00036 2161 1381
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P30_SP00317 916
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P30_SP00318 1050 2199
P30_ST00354 1064 209 themselves
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P30_ST00355 2168
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P30_ST00356 2162
P30_SP00321
P30_ST00357 1449
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P30_ST00358 1506 able
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P30_SP00324 1627
P30_ST00360 1643 present
P30_SP00325 1779
P30_ST00361 1793
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P30_ST00362 2008 cases
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P30_ST00363 2128
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P30_SP00328 888 2247
P30_ST00365 900 162 technical
P30_SP00329 2239
P30_ST00366 2216
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P30_ST00368 1418 2210
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P30_ST00369 1466
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P30_ST00375 966 244 Conclusion
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P30_SP00338 790 2464
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P30_ST00378 994
P30_SP00340 2456
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P30_SP00342 1177
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P30_ST00383 1405 154 reducing
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P30_SP00346 1629
P30_ST00385 170 instances
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P30_SP00348 1867
P30_ST00387 2433
P30_TL00040 2474
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P30_SP00349 803 2512
P30_ST00389 821
P30_SP00350 847 2504
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P30_SP00351 931
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P30_ST00392 1135
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P30_ST00394 1285 Caribbean,
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P30_SP00357 1727
P30_ST00397 1742 general
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P30_ST00398 2475 211 statements,
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P30_ST00400 731 118 should
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P30_ST00402 924 acceptable
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P30_SP00363 1168
P30_ST00404
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P30_ST00411 2571 248 governments,
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P30_ST00412 878 88 must
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P30_ST00413 hold
P30_SP00372 1053
P30_ST00414 1068 true.There
P30_SP00373
P30_ST00415 1275
P30_SP00374 1362
P30_ST00416
P30_SP00375
P30_ST00417 1433 good
P30_SP00376
P30_ST00418 1537 cooperafion
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P30_SP00379 2083
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P30_ST00422
P30_SP00380 760 2648
P30_ST00423 772 217 jurisdictions 0000000000000
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P30_ST00424 1004
P30_SP00382
P30_ST00425 1065 all
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P30_ST00426 2619 non-tax
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P30_ST00433 1930
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P30_ST00435
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P30_ST00444
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P30_ST00448 203 anti-money
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P30_ST00449
P30_SP00405
P30_ST00450 activities.
P30_SP00406 2743
P30_ST00451
P30_SP00407 1325
P30_ST00452 2714
P30_SP00408
P30_ST00453
P30_SP00409
P30_ST00454 1499 fair
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P30_ST00455 1570
P30_SP00411
P30_ST00456 1800
P30_SP00412
P30_ST00457
P30_TL00046 2761
P30_ST00458
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P30_ST00459 695
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P30_ST00460 857 authorities
P30_SP00415
P30_ST00461 20 if
P30_SP00416
P30_ST00462 1091
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P30_ST00463 1160 223 transactions
P30_SP00418
P30_ST00464 1399 96 being
P30_SP00419 2799
P30_ST00465 1513 216 investigated
P30_SP00420
P30_ST00466 1746 2768
P30_SP00421 1801
P30_ST00467
P30_SP00422 1871
P30_ST00468 proceeds
P30_SP00423
P30_ST00469 2069
P30_TL00047 2809
P30_ST00470 2810 acts,
P30_SP00424 696 2845
P30_ST00471 102
P30_SP00425 2839
P30_ST00472 829 would
P30_SP00426
P30_ST00473
P30_SP00427
P30_ST00474 2816
P30_SP00428 1028
P30_ST00475 1044
P30_SP00429
P30_ST00476 1159
P30_SP00430
P30_ST00477
P30_SP00431 1277
P30_ST00478 jurisdicfions. 00000000770000
P30_TL00048 2915
P30_ST00479 Many
P30_SP00432 714 2953
P30_ST00480 727
P30_SP00433 827 2945
P30_ST00481 larger
P30_SP00434
P30_ST00482
P30_SP00435
P30_ST00483 1119
P30_SP00436 1336
P30_ST00484 2922
P30_SP00437 1408
P30_ST00485 1422 signing
P30_SP00438
P30_ST00486
P30_SP00439
P30_ST00487 1718 141 bilateral
P30_SP00440 1859
P30_ST00488 1872 treaties
P30_SP00441
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P5_ST00031 962 narcotics.
P5_SP00029
P5_ST00032 1165 28 In
P5_SP00030 1193
P5_ST00033 1207
P5_SP00031 1263
P5_ST00034 1280
P5_SP00032 1394
P5_ST00035 1412 169 Kingdom,
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P5_ST00036 1597 121 similar
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P5_ST00041 661
P5_SP00038 702
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P5_SP00039 974
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P5_ST00045 1270
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P5_ST00049 1692
P5_SP00046 1754
P5_ST00050 1768
P5_SP00047 1884
P5_ST00051 1899
P5_SP00048 1968
P5_ST00052 1981 80%
P5_SP00049 2060
P5_ST00053 2076 36
P5_TL00005 500 1558
P5_ST00054 501 150 37 property
P5_SP00050 765 538
P5_ST00055 779 related
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P5_ST00056 917 98 crime
P5_SP00052 1015
P5_ST00057 25
P5_SP00053 1057
P5_ST00058 1072 187 committed 000000000
P5_SP00054 1259
P5_ST00059 1274 32
P5_SP00055 1306
P5_ST00060 1321 76 fund
P5_SP00056 1397
P5_ST00061 1414 507 19 a
P5_SP00057 1433
P5_ST00062 1448 drug
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P5_ST00064 1684 106 single
P5_SP00060 1790
P5_ST00065 1807 user
P5_SP00061 1886 12
P5_ST00066 1898 517 4 ~ 0.25 7
P5_SP00062 1923 521
P5_ST00067 1938 153 shooting
P5_SP00063 2091
P5_ST00068 65 one
P5_TL00006 613 548 1506
P5_ST00069 shot
P5_SP00064 690 578
P5_ST00070 704
P5_SP00065 739
P5_ST00071 751 110 heroin
P5_SP00066 861
P5_ST00072 878 555
P5_SP00067 897
P5_ST00073 912 66 day
P5_SP00068 978 586
P5_ST00074 990 565
P5_SP00069 569
P5_ST00075 109 needs
P5_SP00070 1141
P5_ST00076 1154 549
P5_SP00071 1187
P5_ST00077 1201 spend
P5_SP00072 1310
P5_ST00078 1326 147 £28,500
P5_SP00073 1473 584
P5_ST00079 1489 85 each
P5_SP00074 1574
P5_ST00080 1591 80 year
P5_SP00075 9
P5_ST00081 1680 just
P5_SP00076 1746
P5_ST00082 1758
P5_SP00077 1791
P5_ST00083 1805 feed
P5_SP00078 1882
P5_ST00084 1900 48 his
P5_SP00079 1948
P5_ST00085 1965 154 personal
P5_TL00007 596
P5_ST00086 277 consumpfion.ln 0.89 00000007700000
P5_SP00080 891 634
P5_ST00087 908 order
P5_SP00081 1004 626 10
P5_ST00088 1014 597
P5_SP00082 1047
P5_ST00089 1062
P5_SP00083 1139
P5_ST00090
P5_SP00084 1223
P5_ST00091 1237 145 amount,
P5_SP00085 1382 632
P5_ST00092 1399 42 he
P5_SP00086 1441
P5_ST00093 1455 will
P5_SP00087 1510
P5_ST00094 1524 68 turn
P5_SP00088 1592
P5_ST00095 1607
P5_SP00089 1640
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P5_TL00008 644 1451
P5_ST00100 197 prostitution
P5_SP00093 812 682
P5_ST00101 829 64 and
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P5_SP00095 8
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P5_SP00096
P5_ST00104
P5_SP00097 1103
P5_ST00105 1120
P5_SP00098 1234
P5_ST00106
P5_SP00099 1421
P5_ST00107 1438 stolen
P5_SP00100 1544
P5_ST00108 1561 household
P5_SP00101 1748
P5_ST00109 1764
P5_SP00102 1829
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P5_SP00109 1408
P5_ST00118 value.
P5_SP00110
P5_ST00119 1546 [18]
P5_TL00010 799
P5_ST00120 Profile
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P5_SP00112
P5_ST00122 823
P5_SP00113
P5_ST00123 909 140
P5_SP00114 841
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P5_SP00115 1288
P5_ST00125 1302 818 -
P5_SP00116 1314
P5_ST00126 1332 92 Past
P5_SP00117 1424
P5_ST00127 1440
P5_SP00118 1517
P5_ST00128 1535 164 Present
P5_TL00011 616 1498
P5_ST00129 It
P5_SP00119 635 939
P5_ST00130 650
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P5_ST00131 691 910 not
P5_SP00121 746
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P5_SP00126 947
P5_ST00137 1381 politicians,
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P5_ST00161 1172
P5_SP00149 1235
P5_ST00162 1250
P5_SP00150
P5_ST00163 1323 pracfice 0.81 00007700
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P5_SP00164
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P5_SP00165
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P5_SP00174
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P5_SP00175
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P5_SP00176
P5_ST00191 1553 [1
P5_SP00177 1577
P5_ST00192 9]
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P5_ST00193 1656
P5_SP00179
P5_ST00194 1739 fact
P5_SP00180
P5_ST00195 1817
P5_SP00181
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P5_ST00198
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P5_ST00200
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P5_SP00186
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P5_SP00187
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P5_SP00189
P5_ST00205 1350 127 exactly
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P5_SP00191
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P5_ST00212
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P5_SP00197
P5_ST00214
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P5_ST00216 perhaps
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P5_SP00203
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P5_SP00221
P5_ST00240 1196 (those
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P5_ST00242 fit
P5_SP00224 1439
P5_ST00243 1452
P5_SP00225 1507
P5_ST00244 profile
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P5_ST00245
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P5_SP00228
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P5_ST00249 194 launderer),
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P5_ST00251
P5_SP00232
P5_ST00252
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P5_SP00234
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P5_ST00255 1357
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P5_ST00256 assist
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P5_SP00239 1763
P5_ST00259 1778 terrorists
P5_SP00240
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P5_SP00241 1984
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P5_ST00262
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P5_SP00247
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P5_ST00270 1599
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P5_SP00252 1834
P5_ST00273 1845 than
P5_SP00253
P5_ST00274
P5_SP00254 1994
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P5_ST00276 they
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P5_SP00258
P5_ST00280
P5_SP00259
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P5_SP00260
P5_ST00282
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P5_ST00285
P5_SP00264
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P5_ST00287 1760 or
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P5_ST00289
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P5_ST00293 868
P5_SP00271 924
P5_ST00294 123 shame
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P5_ST00296 1158 1491 can
P5_SP00274 1220
P5_ST00297 107 attach
P5_SP00275 1344
P5_ST00298 1359 1485
P5_SP00276 1392
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P5_SP00277 1505
P5_ST00300 1519
P5_SP00278 1593
P5_ST00301 1609
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P5_ST00305 1539 process
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P5_SP00291 1720
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P5_ST00316 1915
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P5_ST00322 1076 163 providing
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P5_ST00324 1354 services
P5_SP00300 1503
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P5_SP00304 1985
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P5_SP00307 842 1664
P5_ST00333 857
P5_SP00308 913 1658
P5_ST00334 929
P5_SP00309 1118
P5_ST00335 1136
P5_SP00310 1212
P5_ST00336 well
P5_SP00311 1292
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P5_ST00338 funds
P5_SP00313 1547
P5_ST00339 1560
P5_SP00314 1629
P5_ST00340 1644
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P5_ST00341 1716 54
P5_SP00316 1770
P5_ST00342 1786 159 referable
P5_SP00317 1945
P5_ST00343 1958
P5_SP00318 1991
P5_ST00344 2007
P5_SP00319 2026
P5_ST00345 2041
P5_TL00027 1676 1504
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P5_SP00320 1706
P5_ST00347 663 93 other
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P5_ST00348 768 form
P5_SP00322 848
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P5_ST00350 911 296 misconduct.This 000000000000000
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P5_ST00351 1224
P5_SP00325 1249
P5_ST00352 1264
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P5_ST00353 point
P5_SP00327 1386 1714
P5_ST00354 1398
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P5_ST00356 hardly
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P5_ST00358 1855
P5_SP00332 1881
P5_ST00359 1896
P5_SP00333 1952
P5_ST00360 137 popular
P5_TL00028 1724 1511
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P5_SP00334 712
P5_ST00362 726 when
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P5_ST00363 838 criticizing
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P5_ST00365 apparent
P5_SP00338 1253
P5_ST00366 1266 failure
P5_SP00339 1376
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P5_SP00340 1427
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P5_SP00341 1621
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P5_SP00342 1823
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P5_SP00343 1869
P5_ST00371 1883 take
P5_SP00344 1960
P5_ST00372 1976 effective
P5_TL00029 1772
P5_ST00373 1773 steps
P5_SP00345 710 1810
P5_ST00374 723
P5_SP00346 1802
P5_ST00375 interdict
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P5_ST00376 927 what
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P5_ST00377 1028 1779
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P5_ST00378 1100 assumed
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P5_ST00380 1328
P5_SP00352 1369
P5_ST00381 1385
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P5_ST00382
P5_SP00354 1710
P5_ST00383 1727 272 operafions.[21] 0.90 000007700000000
P5_TL00030 1437
P5_ST00384 Laundering
P5_SP00355 817 1916
P5_ST00385
P5_SP00356 887 1908
P5_ST00386 904 proceeds
P5_SP00357 1070
P5_ST00387 1087
P5_SP00358 1122
P5_ST00388 1132
P5_SP00359 1211
P5_ST00389 1226
P5_SP00360 1401
P5_ST00390 1419
P5_SP00361 1444
P5_ST00391 1459 1885
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P5_ST00392 1538 thing,
P5_SP00363 1637
P5_ST00393 1655 but
P5_SP00364 1709
P5_ST00394 merely
P5_SP00365
P5_ST00395 1860 assisting
P5_SP00366 2016
P5_ST00396
P5_TL00031 1926
P5_ST00397 leader
P5_SP00367 729
P5_ST00398 741
P5_SP00368
P5_ST00399 1933
P5_SP00369 806
P5_ST00400 821 developing
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P5_ST00401 1927 134 country
P5_SP00371 1169
P5_ST00402 1181
P5_SP00372 1214
P5_ST00403 1231
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P5_ST00404 1346
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P5_SP00375 1525
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P5_SP00377 1619
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P5_SP00379 1950
P5_ST00410 outside
P5_SP00380 2096
P5_ST00411 2112
P5_TL00032 1974
P5_ST00412 1975
P5_SP00381 2012
P5_ST00413 763
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P5_ST00414 853
P5_SP00383 894 2004
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P5_SP00385 1021
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P5_SP00386 1183
P5_ST00418 1198 issue.
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P5_ST00419 1308 [22]
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P5_ST00420 46 To
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P5_ST00423 1606
P5_SP00392 1690
P5_ST00424 1705
P5_SP00393 1761
P5_ST00425 knowing
P5_SP00394 1924
P5_ST00426 1940 181 facilitation
P5_SP00395 2121
P5_ST00427 2138
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P5_SP00396 697 2052
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P5_ST00430 198 individual's
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P5_SP00399 1177
P5_ST00432 1194
P5_SP00400 1229
P5_ST00433 1238 128 wealth,
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P5_ST00434 1384
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P5_ST00435 2023 112 covert
P5_SP00403
P5_ST00436 210 movements
P5_SP00404 1775
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P5_SP00405 1826
P5_ST00438 1836 195 substantial
P5_TL00034 2070
P5_ST00439 2071 amounts
P5_SP00406 2100
P5_ST00440 786
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P5_ST00441 830
P5_SP00408 2106
P5_ST00442 973 where
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P5_SP00414 1622
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P5_SP00415 1665
P5_ST00449 1681
P5_SP00416 1722
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P5_ST00451 1911 banking
P5_TL00035 2118
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P5_SP00418 2156
P5_ST00453
P5_SP00419 2148
P5_ST00454 813 2125
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P5_ST00455 2119 statement
P5_SP00421
P5_ST00456 1040
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P5_ST00457 1123 few
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P5_ST00458 1200 120 central
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P5_ST00459 bankers,
P5_SP00425 2154
P5_ST00460 180 especially
P5_SP00426
P5_ST00461 1703
P5_SP00427 1729
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P5_ST00463 133 centers
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P5_SP00432 935 2201
P5_ST00468 950 would
P5_SP00433 1055
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P5_TL00037 2213
P5_ST00477 2214 152 concept,
P5_SP00441 766 2251
P5_ST00478 783 2220
P5_SP00442 2243
P5_ST00479 886
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P5_ST00480 928
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P5_ST00481 wholly
P5_SP00445 1077
P5_ST00482 1090 domestic
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P5_ST00483 1269 235 environment.
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P5_ST00484 1536
P5_SP00448 1563
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P5_SP00451 2249
P5_ST00488 2034 it
P5_SP00452 2051
P5_ST00489 2067
P5_TL00038 2261
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P5_SP00453 2291
P5_ST00491 794
P5_SP00454 858
P5_ST00492 876
P5_SP00455
P5_ST00493 2268
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P5_ST00494 975 entirely
P5_SP00457 1107 2299
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P5_ST00496 1284 issue
P5_SP00459 1377
P5_ST00497
P5_SP00460 1468
P5_ST00498 1483
P5_SP00461
P5_ST00499 1566
P5_SP00462 1601
P5_ST00500 209 soundness.
P5_SP00463 1820
P5_ST00501 1827 [23]
P5_TL00039 2367 43
P5_ST00502 2368
P5_SP00464 2401
P5_ST00503 Stages
P5_SP00465 2410
P5_ST00504
P5_SP00466
P5_ST00505
P5_SP00467
P5_ST00506 244
P5_TL00040 2479
P5_ST00507 There
P5_SP00468 2509
P5_ST00508 736
P5_SP00469
P5_ST00509 777 2486
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P5_ST00510 833
P5_SP00471 899
P5_ST00511 915 method
P5_SP00472 1048
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P5_SP00473
P5_ST00513 1113
P5_SP00474 1301 2517
P5_ST00514 money.Methods
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P5_ST00515 1626
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P5_ST00517 1821 from
P5_SP00478 1902
P5_ST00518
P5_SP00479 1971
P5_ST00519 1988 purchase
P5_TL00041 2527 1540
P5_ST00520
P5_SP00480 678 2557
P5_ST00521 696 108 resale
P5_SP00481 804
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P5_ST00523 luxury
P5_SP00483 2565
P5_ST00524 items
P5_SP00484 1085
P5_ST00525 1099 2528
P5_SP00485
P5_ST00526 1148 passing
P5_SP00486 1285
P5_ST00527 1303 2534
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P5_SP00490 1780
P5_ST00531 221 internafional 0.88 0000000770000
P5_SP00491 2015
P5_ST00532 web
P5_SP00492 2104
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P5_TL00042 2574 1534
P5_ST00534 173 legifimate 0.85 0000770000
P5_SP00493 788 2612
P5_ST00535 203 businesses
P5_SP00494 2604
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P5_SP00495 1088
P5_ST00537 1106 'shell' 3000002
P5_SP00496
P5_ST00538 207 companies.
P5_SP00497 20
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P5_ST00542 1654 2581 case
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P5_SP00502 1789
P5_ST00544 1799
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P5_ST00546 2085
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P5_ST00547 2629 some
P5_SP00505 2652
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P5_ST00550 129 crimes,
P5_SP00508 2658
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P5_SP00509 1208
P5_ST00552 1225
P5_SP00510 1265
P5_ST00553 1281
P5_SP00511 2660
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P5_ST00556 1698 usually
P5_SP00514 1824
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P5_SP00515 1913
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P5_SP00516 1982
P5_ST00559 1997
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P5_ST00560 2093
P5_TL00044 2670
P5_ST00561 94 cash,
P5_SP00518 2706
P5_ST00562 103 which
P5_SP00519 826 2700
P5_ST00563 844
P5_SP00520 952
P5_ST00564 2671
P5_SP00521 998
P5_ST00565 enter
P5_SP00522
P5_ST00566 1119
P5_SP00523
P5_ST00567 1189
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P5_ST00568 system
P5_SP00525 2708
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P5_ST00570 1552 2677
P5_SP00527 1652
P5_ST00571 1668 means.
P5_SP00528 1798
P5_ST00572 1830 Indeed,
P5_SP00529 1961
P5_ST00573 1977 street
P5_TL00045 2718
P5_ST00574 level
P5_SP00530 695 2748
P5_ST00575 purchases
P5_SP00531 2756
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P5_SP00532
P5_ST00577 101 drugs
P5_SP00533 1061
P5_ST00578 2725
P5_SP00534 1133
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P5_ST00580 always
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P5_ST00581 1422 made
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P5_ST00583 1623
P5_SP00539 1717 2754
P5_ST00584 1734 155 although
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P5_SP00542 2098
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P5_SP00543 2796
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P5_ST00590 2767
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P5_ST00591 846 2773
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P5_ST00592 1064
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P5_ST00593 1105
P5_SP00548
P5_ST00594 1178
P5_SP00549 2804
P5_ST00595 1360
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P5_SP00555 1906
P5_ST00601 1921
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P5_TL00047 2814
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P5_SP00558 2844
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P5_SP00559 2852
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P5_SP00560 963 2850
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P5_ST00609 1272
P5_SP00563 1298
P5_ST00610 2821
P5_SP00564 1413
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P5_SP00566 1582
P5_ST00613 1595 cash
P5_SP00567 1678
P5_ST00614 232 transactions.
P5_TL00048 2920 1555
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P5_SP00568 2958
P5_ST00616 2921
P5_SP00569 2950
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P5_ST00618 926 191 customary
P5_SP00571
P5_ST00619 1130 143 concept
P5_SP00572 1273
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P5_ST00621 2927
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P5_ST00622 1471 200 laundering,
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P5_ST00623 1686
P5_SP00576 1742
P5_ST00624 1755 three
P5_SP00577 1848
P5_ST00625 1863 stages
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P5_ST00626 1998
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P5_ST00627 2045


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P2_SP00012 1942
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P2_SP00013 2018
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P2_SP00014 2099
P2_ST00015 2117
P2_TL00002 615 357 1393
P2_ST00016 being
P2_SP00015 711 395
P2_ST00017 726 100 36 done,
P2_SP00016 826 393
P2_ST00018 841 71 with
P2_SP00017 912 387
P2_ST00019 926 56 the
P2_SP00018 982
P2_ST00020 999 75 help
P2_SP00019 1074
P2_ST00021 1088 35 of
P2_SP00020 1123 10
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P2_SP00021 1188
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P2_SP00024 1599
P2_ST00026 1613 102 Force
P2_SP00025 1715
P2_ST00027 1731 127 (FATF)
P2_SP00026 1858
P2_ST00028 1874
P2_SP00027 1938
P2_ST00029 1953
P2_TL00003 614 405 1446
P2_ST00030 187 Caribbean
P2_SP00028 801 435
P2_ST00031 819
P2_SP00029 980
P2_ST00032 994
P2_SP00030 1106
P2_ST00033 1122 90
P2_SP00031 1212
P2_ST00034 1227
P2_SP00032 1327
P2_ST00035 1344 156 (CFATF) 0000000
P2_SP00033 1500 443
P2_ST00036 1517
P2_SP00034 1581
P2_ST00037 1597 others,
P2_SP00035 1719 441
P2_ST00038 1737
P2_SP00036 1762
P2_ST00039 1776 406 32
P2_SP00037 1808
P2_ST00040 1825 98 make
P2_SP00038 1923
P2_ST00041 1939 412
P2_TL00004 452 1450
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P2_SP00039 803 490
P2_ST00043 821 459 more
P2_SP00040 911 482
P2_ST00044 925 128 difficult
P2_SP00041 1053
P2_ST00045 1067 65
P2_SP00042 1132
P2_ST00046 1147 453
P2_SP00043 1179
P2_ST00047 1196 152 increase 00000000
P2_SP00044 1348
P2_ST00048 1362
P2_SP00045 1417
P2_ST00049 1433 130 chance
P2_SP00046 1563
P2_ST00050 1579
P2_SP00047 13
P2_ST00051 1627
P2_SP00048 1749
P2_ST00052 1763
P2_SP00049 1951
P2_ST00053 1969
P2_TL00005 613 500 1559
P2_ST00054 155 detected
P2_SP00050 768 530
P2_ST00055 785
P2_SP00051 850
P2_ST00056 866 caught
P2_SP00052 988 538
P2_ST00057 1004 20 if
P2_SP00053 1024
P2_ST00058 1036 it
P2_SP00054
P2_ST00059 1069
P2_SP00055 1094
P2_ST00060 1109 carried
P2_SP00056 1231
P2_ST00061 1248 501 out.
P2_SP00057 1312 6
P2_ST00062 1318 123 Putting
P2_SP00058 1441
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P2_ST00066 1671 151 effective
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P2_ST00067 1839 82 legal
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P2_ST00068 1936 196 framework
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P2_SP00065 655 578
P2_ST00071 672 160 essential
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P2_ST00072 848 221 precondition 000000000000
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P2_ST00081 1226 219 34 0.94 005000000
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P2_ST00090 1456 165 countries
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P2_ST00105 150 freedom
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P2_ST00107 707
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P2_ST00118 1868
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P2_ST00128 1228 910 169 spectrum
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P2_ST00130 1460 international 0000000000000
P2_SP00120 1681
P2_ST00131 1696 149 financial
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P2_ST00132 1862 192 institutions
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P2_ST00133 2069 66
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P2_ST00134 222 transactions
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P2_ST00140 108 global
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P2_ST00141 258 technology.[4] 00000000000000
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P2_ST00143 141 "no-tax"
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P2_ST00168 1945 taxes
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P2_ST00180 1915
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P2_ST00181 1986 94
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P2_ST00183 795
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P2_ST00193 1894
P2_SP00178 1943
P2_ST00194 1956 offshore
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P2_ST00200 1525 foreign
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P2_ST00202 1773 226 corporations
P2_SP00186 1999
P2_ST00203 2014
P2_TL00018 1303
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P2_ST00205 175 insurance
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P2_ST00207 1251 153 absence
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P2_ST00208 1420
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P2_ST00215 1988 1310
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P2_ST00239 1918
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P2_ST00251 1899
P2_SP00231 1941
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P2_SP00236 1002 1531
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P2_ST00261 1353 normally
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P2_ST00263 1674
P2_SP00242 1693
P2_ST00264 1708 142 20-year
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P2_ST00265 1861 1496 195 guarantee.
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P2_ST00267 105 Some
P2_SP00245 719 1631
P2_ST00268 734 features
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P2_SP00262 1916
P2_ST00286 1930 dual
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P2_ST00295 247 non-residents
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P2_ST00298 784 local
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P2_SP00276 1266
P2_ST00302 1283 178 extremely 023000000
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P2_ST00305 206 competitive
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P2_SP00282 1990
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P2_SP00285 1139 1829
P2_ST00312 1154 1794
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P2_ST00316 1618 193 assistance
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P2_ST00317 1824 treaties
P2_SP00291 1959
P2_ST00318 1974
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P2_ST00319 176 exchange
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P2_SP00295 1296 27
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P2_SP00299 1751
P2_ST00327 1768 maintain
P2_SP00300 1920
P2_ST00328
P2_SP00301 1978
P2_ST00329 1994 extensive
P2_TL00029 1888 1522
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P2_SP00302 757
P2_ST00331 772
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P2_SP00304 872
P2_ST00333 885
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P2_ST00334 966
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P2_ST00336 1233
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P2_ST00346 1937 at
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P2_SP00342 633 2232
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P2_SP00397 1257
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P2_ST00436 1375
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P2_ST00437 1457 banking
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P2_ST00438 201 institutions.
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P2_ST00440 171
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P2_ST00443 917 2554
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P2_ST00453 1864 areas
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P2_ST00454 1979
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